The studies carried out on government behaviour in the context of the political and economic situation tend to show that the approach to elections and low popularity are pushing the government to favour short-term policies to regain support. Traditional explanation is based on the idea that governors try to manipulate voters' preferences designed as myopes and liabilities. The purpose of this article is to provide an alternative explanation based on an active view of the electorate. The general assumption is that, all other things being equal, citizens use variations in the prime minister's popularity and the? approach to elections to try to influence the government's policy in their favour. This translates into a fall in legislative output in these circumstances. Empirical study focuses on legislative production in France (1976-2003) and Italy (1954-1993). ; International audience ; The studies carried out on government behaviour in the context of the political and economic situation tend to show that the approach to elections and low popularity are pushing the government to favour short-term policies to regain support. Traditional explanation is based on the idea that governors try to manipulate voters' preferences designed as myopes and liabilities. The purpose of this article is to provide an alternative explanation based on an active view of the electorate. The general assumption is that, all other things being equal, citizens use variations in the prime minister's popularity and the? approach to elections to try to influence the government's policy in their favour. This translates into a fall in legislative output in these circumstances. Empirical study focuses on legislative production in France (1976-2003) and Italy (1954-1993). ; Les études menées sur le comportement gouvernemental devant la conjoncture politico-économique tendent à montrer que l?approche des élections et une faible popularité poussent le gouvernement à privilégier des politiques à court terme pour retrouver du soutien. L?explication ...
The aim is to analyse how the referendum is becoming a constraint on European local and sub-national governments. The referendum is a semi-direct democracy tool defined in modern times to compensate for the shortcomings of the representative government. We will analyse how the referendum introduces a disruption of representative time and how it forces governors to communicate and act responsibly. The referendum institution is intrinsically changing the contours of the representative government by initiating a process of continuous democracy that has nothing to do with a permanent democracy, but implies the attenuation of the time cycle marked by the preeminence of elections. ; International audience The article deals with the way referendums are becoming a constraint for local and subnational governments in Europe. The referendum is a tool of semi-direct democracy defined in our political modernity in order to complete the deficient representative government. We will analyse how the referendum introduces a new political time and how it compels governments to communicate and act in a responsive way. The institution of referendum modifies the outlines of representative government by initiating a process of continuous democracy which is not permanent democracy, but the interruption of a regular time marked by the elections. ; The aim is to analyse how the referendum is becoming a constraint on European local and sub-national governments. The referendum is a semi-direct democracy tool defined in modern times to compensate for the shortcomings of the representative government. We will analyse how the referendum introduces a disruption of representative time and how it forces governors to communicate and act responsibly. The referendum institution is intrinsically changing the contours of the representative government by initiating a process of continuous democracy that has nothing to do with a permanent democracy, but implies the attenuation of the time cycle marked by the preeminence of elections. ; Il s'agit ...
Summary. This article seeks to reflect on the existence and existence of informal mechanisms for the co-opting and construction of political accessions in Uruguay's 2005 municipal elections. To this end, the concept of 'political mediation' is proposed as a substitute for what the literature on the subject has classified as 'political clientelism' throughout the years. "Mediation" suggests a form of articulation between various political and social, Community and supporters, involving interpersonal contact between these actors and at the same time an actual or potential flow of resources. The analysis deals with this type of 'hybrids' practices and are legitimate and effective both for exiting elections at the end of obtaining votes and for constructing relatively stable political and social identities in Latin American contexts. ; International audience Abstract. This article reflects upon the existence of informal mechanisms of co-optation and construction of political adhesions during the local municipal elections of 2005 in Uruguay. For this purpose the authors propose the substitution of the phrase "political mediation" for "clientelism," a traditional concept used by specialized studies. "Mediation" refers to coordination between various political and social actors that implies interpersonal contact amongst them and, at the same time, the circulation of resources (real or potential). The authors try to analyze how these "hybrid" practices of "mediation" are effective and legitimate, not only for electoral success, but also for the construction of relatively stable political and social identities in the Latin-American context. ; Summary. This article seeks to reflect on the existence and existence of informal mechanisms for the co-opting and construction of political accessions in Uruguay's 2005 municipal elections. To this end, the concept of 'political mediation' is proposed as a substitute for what the literature on the subject has classified as 'political clientelism' throughout the years. "Mediation" ...
Globalisation has often been seen not only as a unificating process, but also as a unifying process. In the face of 'cultural exceptions', many societies believe that they need to be defended against uncontrolled imports which could 'distort' their identity. The fear of 'American cultural imperialism' with huge means, and rooting the most diverse audiences (presumably thanks to the huge diversity of this society of immigrants spread over a continental state), is particularly strong. While the position adopted (liberal, protectionist or ecectic) is taken for granted, the fundamental trend towards 'de-nationalisation' of cultures and the central role of the United States in the process are generally taken for granted. It was therefore not wrong to consider testing the reality of this process, for three eastern Asian metropoles (Seoul, Singapore and Taipeh) which share both rapid economic and social development in the 1990s and a proven politico-military alignment on the West, and more specifically in Washington, under the aegis of strong anti-communist regimes, at least until the end of the 1980s. The period chosen corresponds to a period which historians loyal to Fernand Braudel would describe as 'average', i.e. around fifty years, from 1953 to 1956 (depending on the countries concerned) until 2003/2004. These time limits cover all what is known in Japan as close to 'high growth', which has been slowing down permanently since the 1997 regional crisis, while excluding atypical years after 1945, marked in all three cases by extremely violent political turmoil. In the mid-1950s we were still in full reconstruction, with a standard of living (and equipment in the case of devastated Korea) much lower than the pre-war standard, especially as population growth was extremely rapid. Singapore remained a British colony until 1963, and Taiwan like South Korea are ways of American protectorates, with military presence, hundreds of advisers of all kinds and massive economic aid. ; International audience ; Globalisation has ...
, the level of integration of knowledge of the biotechnical sciences (agronomy and zootechnics) does not allow them to define alone the new production methods required by the redefinition of the functions of agriculture. Based on the management of fodder resources, we show the value of production management concepts (flow management, planning and steering) in organising and guiding the production of knowledge and tools to accompany this change of function. We therefore propose a generic model for the management of forage areas which takes account of the characteristics of the areas and the environmental objectives. This model is illustrated by two examples of herbage systems in processing. We conclude by showing how these analyses can be used to guide agronomists, both for the knowledge to be produced on the functioning of vegetation and for the development of models for the management of fodder resources. ; International audience ; the level of integration of knowledge of the biotechnical sciences (agronomy and zootechnics) does not allow them to define alone the new production methods required by the redefinition of the functions of agriculture. Based on the management of fodder resources, we show the value of production management concepts (flow management, planning and steering) in organising and guiding the production of knowledge and tools to accompany this change of function. We therefore propose a generic model for the management of forage areas which takes account of the characteristics of the areas and the environmental objectives. This model is illustrated by two examples of herbage systems in processing. We conclude by showing how these analyses can be used to guide agronomists, both for the knowledge to be produced on the functioning of vegetation and for the development of models for the management of fodder resources. ; Le niveau d'intégration des connaissances des sciences biotechniques (agronomie et zootechnie) ne leur permet pas de définir seules les nouvelles façons de produire imposées par la ...
Arms transfers have significant political value, suggesting many security agreements or alliances between seller and buyer. Government control is therefore necessarily exercised, since in such operations dependency relationships are often long-term, based on trust. For France, a model is being developed to analyse the influence of arms exports on economic employment, investment or growth. Without knowing exactly which arms sales have not, 'in fine', been paid, the model shows that the need for the growth of the French economy to maintain a strong arms export position has not been demonstrated, quite the contrary. This choice can be triggered by the armaments industries, but it can only really be validated on political and strategic grounds. ; International audience Arms transfers have an important political value, suggesting numerous security agreements or alliances between the seller and the buyer. Government control is therefore necessarily exercised, since in this type of transaction, dependency relationships are often long-term, based on trust. For France, a model is constructed to analyse the influence of arms exports on employment, investment or economic growth. Without knowing exactly which arms sales were "in the end" not paid for, the model shows that the need for the growth of the French economy to maintain a strong position in arms exports has not been demonstrated, quite the contrary. This choice may be prompted by the arms industries, but it can only be truly validated in political and strategic terms. ; Arms transfers have significant political value, suggesting many security agreements or alliances between seller and buyer. Government control is therefore necessarily exercised, since in such operations dependency relationships are often long-term, based on trust. For France, a model is being developed to analyse the influence of arms exports on economic employment, investment or growth. Without knowing exactly which arms sales have not, 'in fine', been paid, the model shows that the need for the ...
Argentina receives immigrants from neighboring countries with serious deficiencies as regards their rights. The Argentinean government had to implement different policies to protect them, incorporating international treaties on human rights in their internal legal system and making public policies. Simultaneously, obstacles can be observed, when having access to these rights on an equal condition with Argentinean citizens. It is pertinent to analyze this situation using a methodological tool like an ethnographic study. The analysis will be divided into two parts, on the one hand, the migrant's tools to have access to these basic human rights will be described, and on the other hand, it will be analyzed through court decisions, interviews and NGOs documents, if those rights are indeed satisfied. As a result, it is evident that while immigrants in Argentina have free access to benefits which in their countries are difficult to achieve, there are, still quantitative and qualitative inefficiencies, especially in health and education. ; Diariamente llegan a Argentina inmigrantes provenientes de países vecinos, con deficiencias para acceder a sus derechos en su país de origen. El Estado argentino debió realizar diversas medidas para protegerlos, sancionando normativa acorde a la incorporación de los Tratados y Pactos internacionales y realizando políticas y acciones públicas en clave de derechos humanos. Simultáneamente se pueden observar obstáculos a la hora de acceder efectivamente a esos derechos en pie de igualdad con los ciudadanos. Resulta pertinente analizar cómo estas personas ven satisfechos sus derechos al llegar al país utilizando, como estrategia metodológica, un estudio etnográfico. El análisis se dividirá en dos partes; se describirá cuáles son las herramientas con las que cuentan los migrantes a la hora de intentar acceder a esos derechos humanos básicos y se conocerá, mediante el análisis de fallos judiciales, entrevistas y documentos de ONGs abocadas a la temática, si efectivamente se cumple con la ...
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After months of political wrangling the Ukraine military aid package cleared both chambers of Congress and was signed by the president on Wednesday. This is an important milestone signaling bipartisan support for the Ukrainian cause. Yet, although immediate shipments were promised, a substantial portion of the package—$48 billion out of nearly $61 billion—will pay for replenishing U.S. weapons stockpiles and producing new equipment for Ukraine. Russia, meanwhile, shows no signs of curbing its confrontation with the West. Regardless of how long Ukraine can withstand the onslaught of the Russian war machine, or whether the United States and Europe can continue providing support to Ukraine, the current season of confrontation between Russia and the West promises to be a long one. Not Provoking the Aggressor?Russia will remain a threat to the United States and its allies for a long time to come, analysts Miranda Priebe and Samuel Charap write in a RAND research report (for a quick read, see the research brief with a summary). They paint two scenarios. In the one more favorable to the United States, the war ends quickly, the ceasefire is sustainable, and the Russian war machine is severely weakened. In the less favorable (and potentially more likely) scenario the war of attrition lasts a long time, the ceasefire is unsustainable, and Russia is not weakened enough to cease preparations for the next imperialist wars. In both more and less favorable scenarios, the RAND report says, the United States could adopt softer or tougher policies toward Russia. By choosing relative softness, the United States would signal it was willing to negotiate with Russia. It would not send additional military forces to Eastern Europe, and it would show restraint in providing political and military support to countries threatened by Russia. If it chose relative toughness, the United States would continue efforts to gain Ukraine accession to NATO and would seek to punish, contain, and weaken Russia for its aggression.This leads to a matrix of four scenarios. If Russia is significantly weakened by the war, the U.S. hard approach leads to Cold War 2.0. The soft approach leads to "cold peace." If Russia quickly rebuilds its military machine after the war, the U.S. soft approach leads to localized instability and the hard approach to widespread, pervasive instability.If Russia's aggressiveness continues unabated and the United States pursues a tough policy, international tensions will rise rapidly, Russian-Chinese cooperation will deepen, NATO-Russia relations will deteriorate further, and global economic fragmentation will increase. With a softer policy, the United States weakens its support for European NATO countries. U.S. relations with Russia improve slightly. China's ties with Russia do not strengthen, and global trade does not fragment into competing blocs. The United States is less involved in the conflict with Russia and can shift its focus to the rivalry with China. This scenario is very similar to Trump's possible policy in 2025. Priebe and Charap conclude that the best scenario for the United States is one in which Russia is weakened as much as possible by the war and the United States pursues a soft policy afterward. The worst scenario is one in which Russia's war machine remains strong and the United States pursues a tough policy.This conclusion and reasoning may seem logical: both strategically and economically, peace is better than war, and global war is worse than local war. The problem, however, is that the likelihood and intensity of the war Russia is waging are determined less by the hawkish or dovish policies of the United States than by the capabilities and desires of the Kremlin. Russia is not losing the current war of attrition, and the longer the war goes on, the less likely are the scenarios favorable to the United States. The Russian war machine is clearly accelerating. For Russia to be significantly weakened at the end of the war with Ukraine, aid to Ukraine now would have to be much more timely and massive. The current difficulties the United States and Europe are experiencing in providing timely, adequate military assistance to Ukraine reduce the likelihood of a cold peace and new Cold War scenarios. Having ended the war with Ukraine, Russia may be almost ready for new wars.Priebe and Charap seem to underestimate Russia's willingness and ability to continue waging war in Eastern Europe and overestimate the beneficial effects of U.S. peacemaking. They also assume that a soft U.S. policy will help avoid a Russian conflict with NATO members. However, the likelihood of such a conflict depends much more on events and attitudes in Moscow than on events and attitudes in Washington. If the Kremlin's appetite for risk continues to grow, a soft U.S. policy will only encourage an attack. The real consequence of the softer U.S. policy could be what we have seen online in recent months: Ukraine's weapons deficit, the accelerated pace of Russia's offensive, and direct signals that the offensive will not be limited to Kharkiv or even the whole of Ukraine. What provokes Russia most is not the West's strength and toughness but its weakness, its fragmented and delayed efforts, its indecision and half-heartedness, and the many holes in European and transatlantic unity.Stopping RussiaThe authors of the CEPA report, edited by Sam Greene and SaraJane Rzegocki, have a much more realistic view of Russian politics. They take seriously the claims of Putin and his associates that from 2022 on, Russia has been at war not with Ukraine but with the West. Even the end of the Russia-Ukraine war will not stop Russia's war with the West. Russia's challenge to the West is not limited to Ukraine and will not disappear in the coming years. This is exactly what Putin and his associates are warning the West about. The chances are very high that Russia will continue its war with the West after Putin leaves office.Russia's goals now, according to the CEPA report, are as follows:To maintain the power of Putin's elite through the military mobilization of society;To change the world order by depriving the United States of its primacy and changing the international norms and rules that have brought prosperity to much of the world since 1945; and To gain military, political, and economic dominance in the post-Soviet space. To counter these attempts, the United States should not only contain Russia but also deny it the ability to wage war in Europe and in the post-Soviet space, now and in the future.This will require attention and vigilance. Deterrence is the only alternative to escalation, says the CEPA report, whose authors echo George Kennan's famous cable. A new deterrence strategy should include a strengthened NATO commitment to defend the Eastern bloc countries, countering Russia's attempts to destabilize Western societies and influence their politics, and a principled refusal to accept that the post-Soviet countries are an area of interest to Moscow. Similar recommendations to the U.S. authorities can be found in the CFR report, written by Liand Fix and Maria Snegovaya, and the CNAS report, prepared by Andrea Kendall-Taylor.The strategy of deterrence involves supplying Ukraine with weapons not "as long as it takes" but "as quickly as possible." This requires a significant strengthening of transatlantic and European solidarity to overcome the strategic weakness of the West. It requires a significant increase in U.S. and European engagement in Moldova, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, including, curiously, assistance to China in building alternative trade routes between Southeast Asia and Europe. In the absence of a firm and coherent deterrence strategy, Russia will continue to pose threatening challenges to NATO and Europe. The goal of deterrence should not be the defeat or collapse of Russia. During the Cold War, the goal of the United States and Western Europe was not the defeat or collapse of the USSR. It was to preserve world order, protect the United States and its allies, and prevent further destabilization of the international order. Doing so this time will be difficult and will require determination, consistency, internal unity, and a great deal of patience.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
After months of political wrangling the Ukraine military aid package cleared both chambers of Congress and was signed by the president on Wednesday. This is an important milestone signaling bipartisan support for the Ukrainian cause. Yet, although immediate shipments were promised, a substantial portion of the package—$48 billion out of nearly $61 billion—will pay for replenishing U.S. weapons stockpiles and producing new equipment for Ukraine. Russia, meanwhile, shows no signs of curbing its confrontation with the West. Regardless of how long Ukraine can withstand the onslaught of the Russian war machine, or whether the United States and Europe can continue providing support to Ukraine, the current season of confrontation between Russia and the West promises to be a long one. Not Provoking the Aggressor?Russia will remain a threat to the United States and its allies for a long time to come, analysts Miranda Priebe and Samuel Charap write in a RAND research report (for a quick read, see the research brief with a summary). They paint two scenarios. In the one more favorable to the United States, the war ends quickly, the ceasefire is sustainable, and the Russian war machine is severely weakened. In the less favorable (and potentially more likely) scenario the war of attrition lasts a long time, the ceasefire is unsustainable, and Russia is not weakened enough to cease preparations for the next imperialist wars. In both more and less favorable scenarios, the RAND report says, the United States could adopt softer or tougher policies toward Russia. By choosing relative softness, the United States would signal it was willing to negotiate with Russia. It would not send additional military forces to Eastern Europe, and it would show restraint in providing political and military support to countries threatened by Russia. If it chose relative toughness, the United States would continue efforts to gain Ukraine accession to NATO and would seek to punish, contain, and weaken Russia for its aggression.This leads to a matrix of four scenarios. If Russia is significantly weakened by the war, the U.S. hard approach leads to Cold War 2.0. The soft approach leads to "cold peace." If Russia quickly rebuilds its military machine after the war, the U.S. soft approach leads to localized instability and the hard approach to widespread, pervasive instability.If Russia's aggressiveness continues unabated and the United States pursues a tough policy, international tensions will rise rapidly, Russian-Chinese cooperation will deepen, NATO-Russia relations will deteriorate further, and global economic fragmentation will increase. With a softer policy, the United States weakens its support for European NATO countries. U.S. relations with Russia improve slightly. China's ties with Russia do not strengthen, and global trade does not fragment into competing blocs. The United States is less involved in the conflict with Russia and can shift its focus to the rivalry with China. This scenario is very similar to Trump's possible policy in 2025. Priebe and Charap conclude that the best scenario for the United States is one in which Russia is weakened as much as possible by the war and the United States pursues a soft policy afterward. The worst scenario is one in which Russia's war machine remains strong and the United States pursues a tough policy.This conclusion and reasoning may seem logical: both strategically and economically, peace is better than war, and global war is worse than local war. The problem, however, is that the likelihood and intensity of the war Russia is waging are determined less by the hawkish or dovish policies of the United States than by the capabilities and desires of the Kremlin. Russia is not losing the current war of attrition, and the longer the war goes on, the less likely are the scenarios favorable to the United States. The Russian war machine is clearly accelerating. For Russia to be significantly weakened at the end of the war with Ukraine, aid to Ukraine now would have to be much more timely and massive. The current difficulties the United States and Europe are experiencing in providing timely, adequate military assistance to Ukraine reduce the likelihood of a cold peace and new Cold War scenarios. Having ended the war with Ukraine, Russia may be almost ready for new wars.Priebe and Charap seem to underestimate Russia's willingness and ability to continue waging war in Eastern Europe and overestimate the beneficial effects of U.S. peacemaking. They also assume that a soft U.S. policy will help avoid a Russian conflict with NATO members. However, the likelihood of such a conflict depends much more on events and attitudes in Moscow than on events and attitudes in Washington. If the Kremlin's appetite for risk continues to grow, a soft U.S. policy will only encourage an attack. The real consequence of the softer U.S. policy could be what we have seen online in recent months: Ukraine's weapons deficit, the accelerated pace of Russia's offensive, and direct signals that the offensive will not be limited to Kharkiv or even the whole of Ukraine. What provokes Russia most is not the West's strength and toughness but its weakness, its fragmented and delayed efforts, its indecision and half-heartedness, and the many holes in European and transatlantic unity.Stopping RussiaThe authors of the CEPA report, edited by Sam Greene and SaraJane Rzegocki, have a much more realistic view of Russian politics. They take seriously the claims of Putin and his associates that from 2022 on, Russia has been at war not with Ukraine but with the West. Even the end of the Russia-Ukraine war will not stop Russia's war with the West. Russia's challenge to the West is not limited to Ukraine and will not disappear in the coming years. This is exactly what Putin and his associates are warning the West about. The chances are very high that Russia will continue its war with the West after Putin leaves office.Russia's goals now, according to the CEPA report, are as follows:To maintain the power of Putin's elite through the military mobilization of society;To change the world order by depriving the United States of its primacy and changing the international norms and rules that have brought prosperity to much of the world since 1945; and To gain military, political, and economic dominance in the post-Soviet space. To counter these attempts, the United States should not only contain Russia but also deny it the ability to wage war in Europe and in the post-Soviet space, now and in the future.This will require attention and vigilance. Deterrence is the only alternative to escalation, says the CEPA report, whose authors echo George Kennan's famous cable. A new deterrence strategy should include a strengthened NATO commitment to defend the Eastern bloc countries, countering Russia's attempts to destabilize Western societies and influence their politics, and a principled refusal to accept that the post-Soviet countries are an area of interest to Moscow. Similar recommendations to the U.S. authorities can be found in the CFR report, written by Liand Fix and Maria Snegovaya, and the CNAS report, prepared by Andrea Kendall-Taylor.The strategy of deterrence involves supplying Ukraine with weapons not "as long as it takes" but "as quickly as possible." This requires a significant strengthening of transatlantic and European solidarity to overcome the strategic weakness of the West. It requires a significant increase in U.S. and European engagement in Moldova, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, including, curiously, assistance to China in building alternative trade routes between Southeast Asia and Europe. In the absence of a firm and coherent deterrence strategy, Russia will continue to pose threatening challenges to NATO and Europe. The goal of deterrence should not be the defeat or collapse of Russia. During the Cold War, the goal of the United States and Western Europe was not the defeat or collapse of the USSR. It was to preserve world order, protect the United States and its allies, and prevent further destabilization of the international order. Doing so this time will be difficult and will require determination, consistency, internal unity, and a great deal of patience.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.
The study takes an anthropological perspective on a globalized political environment – more particularly on the fields of global environmental governance and development cooperation and their interplay with national and local arenas and actors. I offer an anthropological account of the rise of the global environmental governance agenda, of the international arenas where it has been generating debates and joint decisions, and of their consequences for national politics and local resource management regimes in the Global South. Furthermore, this study contributes observations and findings on how ideas, discourses, and processes at different scales affect the emergence and change of local institutions. The connecting thread underlying my account is based on the way in which natural resource management concepts and models emerge on the international scene of water experts, policy-makers, and practitioners, and how the models travel between international, national, regional, and local scales, being translated and transformed during their travelling. Having applied the concept of travelling models previously elaborated by a group of anthropologists and other social scientists to my particular case, to the field work I did, and to the documents I collected, I draw some conclusions from my own experiment, following ethnographically a travelling model of community-based water management across scales and between locations. The main contribution of the study at hand is to devise and refine ways of grasping the dynamics behind discourses and blueprint-like models at different scales, conceptually and methodologically. My account serves to demonstrate the potential of the travelling models approach in ethnography and anthropological analysis, especially by focusing on the travelling of a particular model for local behaviour in situations of connectivity between actors from different spheres and scales, and in interactions of representatives of the state with civil society organizations and of both of these with local individuals and groups. This study meets the challenge of not only concentrating on the local consequences of global tendencies as others have done before, but also of applying the toolbox of anthropological methods to scenarios where 'the global' becomes tangible, and to the spaces of connectivity, movement, and friction in between the different scales. In so doing, the aim has been to also test the theoretical paradigm of 'travelling models' based on researchers from STS and ANT, and applied to other ethnographic contexts more recently by a group of mainly Germany-based anthropologists, and to identify some of the advantages and limitations it has to offer. I demonstrate by an exemplary case how such a standardized model for the management of rural water supply, prescribed by the state and introduced at the water points by a group of external actors, emerges from and is influenced by discourses and actors at the national and global level. For Namibia, a new set of standardized management institutions was introduced in a blueprint-like manner to groups of water users through a national reform programme and through various development interventions starting in the 1990s. My analysis focuses on institutions that regulate the management and supply of water in Namibia's rural areas, and more particularly in Kunene Region – and in similar ways in many other countries in the Global South. The historical perspective provided on prominent ideas and concepts in the water-management sector in the colonial past informs the account of present-day water management institutions and practice, because these historical concepts have shaped the emergence and travelling of the community based water management model in question. Key findings The establishment of the Namibian community-based water management (CBWM) model is shaped by global discourses which 1) conceive of water as a scarce resource per se; 2) have led to approaches of water governance following the idea of a 'hydraulic mission', augmenting water supply as part of a state-run 'environmental engineering' approach; 3) having realized that the hydraulic mission had failed to lead to increased sustainable water supply, have advocated ideas of participation, decentralization, and demand-orientation as guarantors of sustainability and equality, as well as of cost efficiency in the realm of water management. These ideas are actively propagated by NGOs and state actors in Namibia and elsewhere within the framework of community meetings, institutional blueprints, and training guidelines. The decentralization program's success is measured by the same actors implementing and monitoring the CBWM model, and they evaluate their achievements according to the extent to which the water-point user associations implement their own developed rules and water point constitutions. Pending further analysis I would state from the information gathered among established WPAs that the CBWM-related component did not quite lead to the outcomes that the Ministry would have called for. The major criteria, defined by the WPA model constitution, which the national water administration usually takes into account when assessing the functionality of a WPA, include regular WPC and WPA meetings, regular collection of user fees; financial and management-related reporting, and the adherence to management plans and budgets adopted upon establishment of the WPA. Many of these criteria were not met in most of the places I visited. At the same time, however, only a few of the WPAs visited reported any shortcomings in terms of accessibility of sufficient quantities of water. In a nutshell, water in these places seems to be managed in a generally reliable and satisfactory way for local users, even though WPAs do not comply with the official management rules introduced by the state. That is not to say that other important criteria, such as satisfactory water quality, or 'fairness' (in terms of the water fees postulated by the state's facilitators and by the user groups) are being met. The situation reveals the picture of a complex and costly administration and implementation process around a model for which it has not been established whether its guidelines suit the living conditions of the rural water users. While one of the underlying motivations of reforming the rural water supply sector starting in the 1990s was to mitigate the detrimental effects that a century of colonization and Apartheid rule had had on the society and the environment, questions such as for instance: 'Is there any distributional justice in regard to the access to water?', or 'Is water affordable for all?', are not currently priority matters of discussion in Namibia's water sector or politics. To some extent, this might have to do with the fact that the actors involved have significant vested interest in the decentralization program continuing as it is, such as retaining employment in the public administration, decentralized presence in the local communities, political influence, and voters' consent; yet it would be worthwhile to (re-)evaluate these and other aspects of the CBWM measures. In the meantime, the debate around the human right to water and sanitation is ongoing. Even five years after this right was officially declared by the UN in July 2010, its supporters still claim that generally not enough is being done, or not enough of the right things are being done, in order to enforce it worldwide. Another continuing debate is the longstanding confrontation and sometimes probably fruitful engagement of supporters of the idea that water as a public, common good should be managed publicly in order to ensure equitable access and sustainability, and proponents of the idea of water as an economic good and commodity, which ought to be managed based on commercial principles. The fifteen years of global action for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) between 2001 and 2015 included the target of halving the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation which shaped many of the discourses this study sheds light on. The 193 UN member states who adopted the new set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) following up on the MDGs in September 2015 have decided to include an independent water-related goal which aims to ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all by 2030. I hope that some of the content discussed here may be of interest not only to scientists, but also to people working in and on the water-sector in other ways towards achieving this SDG.
The scope of this thesis is to searching the potential ofthe maritime traffic in the Black Sea, the good application of the INCOTERMS in this region and the opportunities of maritime transport with the others seas. The research project conducted in this thesis uses qualitative methods: interviews with people that working in the maritime transport in the Black Sea that were made through e-mail to get a practical view on the topic, statistics and studies makes by me in the practice. The results indicate that there are no outstanding obstacles for the development of the commercial maritime traffic in the Black Sea and that the maritime companies of the world are very interested to start a large process to export and import in this region, ofcourse applying correct the INCOTERMS. Also, we analyze in this study the im portance of the Bosporus Strait that connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterrean Sea and offers big opportunities to the global maritime transport. The studies in this field of maritime traffic conducted us to find out what are the standards in the maritime trade in the Black Sea but also in comparison with the Mediterrean Sea, Baltic Sea and Caspian Sea. The Black Sea basin presents various challenges and offers numerous opportunities. Ps a result, its development requires special consideration by policy makers. The central question of this paper is given the difference in legal and political systems in the presence, more geo strategically considerations, building on the commercial development from existing business practices. Mercantile custom plays an important role in international commercial law, whether that is as a source of or merelyas an element of the new law merchant. Trade usages and practices tend to be linked to a specific location, trade or port in which they are used. Es pecially in the context of trade term s, differences in interpretation detract from their harmonization function. The latest edition of the ICC INCOTERMS was carried out in 2010 when the INCOTERMS. Two major innovations are the num ber of rules and their classification. Under previous INCOTERM revis ions, term s were grouped in order of increasing responsibilityon the seller, now were classified according to the mode of trans port. There are 11 rules instead of13.INCOTERMS 2010 includes two new rules, Delivered atTerminal (DAT) and Delivered at Place (DAP), and eliminates the Delivered at Frontier (DAF), Delivered Ex-Ship (DES), Delivered Ex-Quay (DEQ) and Delivered Duty Unpaid (DDU) designations. DAT replaces the current DEQ, while DAP replaces DAF, DES and DDU. The option of applying one or another INCOTERM of the delivery conditions or practices known worldwide should consider a number of criteria, such as the following: the ratio of currency and foreign currency contract for payment of transportation, insurance and other charges related to delivery; market situation and the charges of air and land transport, participation in international conventions on transport, which involves preferential rates oftransport, customs outlets in markets or supplies. In the case of a saturated market, where there is a strong competition, the exporter can earn a segment of this market, providing certain favorable conditions to the importer within the meaning of risk and minimal costs that the latter must bear. Delivery condition is one of the essential terms are agreed between international contract partners, thereby regulating the transfer actually goods and the seller to the buyer risks, including legal consequences and general economic. Since the implementation ofthe each entry in the various delivery methods, costs, which can't be neglected, their enrollment contract specifications require is especially importantto establish who and what pays any omission of this view mayor cancel benefits buying or selling expected at closing. We hope that this thesis may be able to help the future importers and exporters in the global maritime traffic. ; L'abast d'aquesta tesi es buscar el potencial del transit marítim al Mar Negre, la bona aplicació dels INCOTERMS en aquesta regió i les oportunitats del transport marítim amb el mar altres. El projecte de recerca dut a terme en aquesta tesi utilitza els mètodes qualitatius: entrevistes amb persones que treballen en el transport marítim al Mar Negre, que es van realitzar a traves de correu electrònic per obtenir una visió practica sobre el tema, les estadístiques i els estudis fa per mi en la practica. Els resultats indiquen que no hi ha obstacles pendents per al desenvolupament del tràfic comercial marítim al Mar Negre i que les companyies marítimes del món estan molt interessats a iniciar un llarg procés per exportar i importar en aquesta regió, per suposat l'aplicació de corregir els INCOTERMS. A més, s'analitzen en aquest estudi la importància de l'estret del Bòsfor que connecta el Mar Negre amb el Mar Mediterrani i ofereix grans oportunitats per al transport marítim mundial. Els estudis en aquest camp del transit marítim que ens va portar a terme per esbrinar quines son les normes en el comerç marítim al Mar Negre, sinó també en comparació amb el Mar Mediterrani, Mar Bàltic i el Mar Caspi. La conca del Mar Negre presenta diversos desafiaments i ofereix nombroses oportunitats. Com a resultat d'això, el seu desenvolupament requereix una consideració especial pels responsables politics. La pregunta central d'aquest treball es dóna la diferencia de sistemes jurídics i politics en presencia, més consideracions geo estratègica, basant-se en el desenvolupament comercial de les practiques comercials existents. Mercantil costum juga un paper important en el dret comercial internacional, ja sigui com a font d'o simplement com un element de la nova llei comercial. Usos i practiques comercials, tendeixen a estar vinculat a un lloc específic del comerç,o el port en que s'utilitzen. Especialment en el context dels termes comercials, les diferencies d¿interpretació en detriment de la seva funció d¿harmonització. L'ultima edició dels Incoterms ICC es va dur a terme el201 0, quan els INCOTERMS. Dos grans innovacions son el nombre de normes i la seva c1assificacio. En anteriors revisions INCOTERM,els termes es van agrupar per tal d'augmentar la responsabilitat sobre el venedor, ara es classifiquen segons la manera de transport. Hi ha 11 normes en lloc de 13. INCOTERMS2010 inclou dues noves regles, lliurats a la Terminal (DAl) i lliurat en el lloc (DAP), i elimina la Delivered at Frontier (DAF), Delivered Dutysobre Vaixell (DES), Delivered Ex-Quay(DEQ) i L1iuratsense pagar (DDU) designacions. DAT substitueix l'actual DEQ, mentre que DAP reemplac;a DAF,DES i DDU. L¿opció d'aplicar un 0 altre INCOTERM de les condicions de lliurament 0 les practiques conegudes a tot el mon hauria de considerar una sèrie de criteris, com ara les següents: la relació de la moneda i els contractes en moneda estrangera per al pagament de transport, assegurances i altres costos de lliurament, el mercat situació i els càrrecs de transport aeri i terrestre, la participació en les convencions internacionals sobre el transport, el que implica taxes preferencials de transport, punts de venda de duanes en els mercats o subministraments. En el cas d'un mercat saturat, on hi ha una forta competència, I'exportador pot guanyar un segment d'aquest mercat, proporcionant certes condicions favorables per a l'importador en el sentit del risc i els costos mínims que aquests han de suportar. Forma de subministrament es un dels termes essencials del contracte acordat entre els socis internacionals, de manera que la regulació de la transferència de bens i en realitat el venedor al comprador els riscos, incloses les conseqüències legals i econòmiques en general. Esperem que aquesta tesi pot ser capaç d'ajudar els futurs importadors i exportadors en el tràfic marítim mundial. ; Postprint (published version)
The scope of this thesis is to searching the potential ofthe maritime traffic in the Black Sea, the good application of the INCOTERMS in this region and the opportunities of maritime transport with the others seas. The research project conducted in this thesis uses qualitative methods: interviews with people that working in the maritime transport in the Black Sea that were made through e-mail to get a practical view on the topic, statistics and studies makes by me in the practice. The results indicate that there are no outstanding obstacles for the development of the commercial maritime traffic in the Black Sea and that the maritime companies of the world are very interested to start a large process to export and import in this region, ofcourse applying correct the INCOTERMS. Also, we analyze in this study the im portance of the Bosporus Strait that connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterrean Sea and offers big opportunities to the global maritime transport. The studies in this field of maritime traffic conducted us to find out what are the standards in the maritime trade in the Black Sea but also in comparison with the Mediterrean Sea, Baltic Sea and Caspian Sea. The Black Sea basin presents various challenges and offers numerous opportunities. Ps a result, its development requires special consideration by policy makers. The central question of this paper is given the difference in legal and political systems in the presence, more geo strategically considerations, building on the commercial development from existing business practices. Mercantile custom plays an important role in international commercial law, whether that is as a source of or merelyas an element of the new law merchant. Trade usages and practices tend to be linked to a specific location, trade or port in which they are used. Es pecially in the context of trade term s, differences in interpretation detract from their harmonization function. The latest edition of the ICC INCOTERMS was carried out in 2010 when the INCOTERMS. Two major innovations are the num ber of rules and their classification. Under previous INCOTERM revis ions, term s were grouped in order of increasing responsibilityon the seller, now were classified according to the mode of trans port. There are 11 rules instead of13.INCOTERMS 2010 includes two new rules, Delivered atTerminal (DAT) and Delivered at Place (DAP), and eliminates the Delivered at Frontier (DAF), Delivered Ex-Ship (DES), Delivered Ex-Quay (DEQ) and Delivered Duty Unpaid (DDU) designations. DAT replaces the current DEQ, while DAP replaces DAF, DES and DDU. The option of applying one or another INCOTERM of the delivery conditions or practices known worldwide should consider a number of criteria, such as the following: the ratio of currency and foreign currency contract for payment of transportation, insurance and other charges related to delivery; market situation and the charges of air and land transport, participation in international conventions on transport, which involves preferential rates oftransport, customs outlets in markets or supplies. In the case of a saturated market, where there is a strong competition, the exporter can earn a segment of this market, providing certain favorable conditions to the importer within the meaning of risk and minimal costs that the latter must bear. Delivery condition is one of the essential terms are agreed between international contract partners, thereby regulating the transfer actually goods and the seller to the buyer risks, including legal consequences and general economic. Since the implementation ofthe each entry in the various delivery methods, costs, which can't be neglected, their enrollment contract specifications require is especially importantto establish who and what pays any omission of this view mayor cancel benefits buying or selling expected at closing. We hope that this thesis may be able to help the future importers and exporters in the global maritime traffic. ; L'abast d'aquesta tesi es buscar el potencial del transit marítim al Mar Negre, la bona aplicació dels INCOTERMS en aquesta regió i les oportunitats del transport marítim amb el mar altres. El projecte de recerca dut a terme en aquesta tesi utilitza els mètodes qualitatius: entrevistes amb persones que treballen en el transport marítim al Mar Negre, que es van realitzar a traves de correu electrònic per obtenir una visió practica sobre el tema, les estadístiques i els estudis fa per mi en la practica. Els resultats indiquen que no hi ha obstacles pendents per al desenvolupament del tràfic comercial marítim al Mar Negre i que les companyies marítimes del món estan molt interessats a iniciar un llarg procés per exportar i importar en aquesta regió, per suposat l'aplicació de corregir els INCOTERMS. A més, s'analitzen en aquest estudi la importància de l'estret del Bòsfor que connecta el Mar Negre amb el Mar Mediterrani i ofereix grans oportunitats per al transport marítim mundial. Els estudis en aquest camp del transit marítim que ens va portar a terme per esbrinar quines son les normes en el comerç marítim al Mar Negre, sinó també en comparació amb el Mar Mediterrani, Mar Bàltic i el Mar Caspi. La conca del Mar Negre presenta diversos desafiaments i ofereix nombroses oportunitats. Com a resultat d'això, el seu desenvolupament requereix una consideració especial pels responsables politics. La pregunta central d'aquest treball es dóna la diferencia de sistemes jurídics i politics en presencia, més consideracions geo estratègica, basant-se en el desenvolupament comercial de les practiques comercials existents. Mercantil costum juga un paper important en el dret comercial internacional, ja sigui com a font d'o simplement com un element de la nova llei comercial. Usos i practiques comercials, tendeixen a estar vinculat a un lloc específic del comerç,o el port en que s'utilitzen. Especialment en el context dels termes comercials, les diferencies d¿interpretació en detriment de la seva funció d¿harmonització. L'ultima edició dels Incoterms ICC es va dur a terme el201 0, quan els INCOTERMS. Dos grans innovacions son el nombre de normes i la seva c1assificacio. En anteriors revisions INCOTERM,els termes es van agrupar per tal d'augmentar la responsabilitat sobre el venedor, ara es classifiquen segons la manera de transport. Hi ha 11 normes en lloc de 13. INCOTERMS2010 inclou dues noves regles, lliurats a la Terminal (DAl) i lliurat en el lloc (DAP), i elimina la Delivered at Frontier (DAF), Delivered Dutysobre Vaixell (DES), Delivered Ex-Quay(DEQ) i L1iuratsense pagar (DDU) designacions. DAT substitueix l'actual DEQ, mentre que DAP reemplac;a DAF,DES i DDU. L¿opció d'aplicar un 0 altre INCOTERM de les condicions de lliurament 0 les practiques conegudes a tot el mon hauria de considerar una sèrie de criteris, com ara les següents: la relació de la moneda i els contractes en moneda estrangera per al pagament de transport, assegurances i altres costos de lliurament, el mercat situació i els càrrecs de transport aeri i terrestre, la participació en les convencions internacionals sobre el transport, el que implica taxes preferencials de transport, punts de venda de duanes en els mercats o subministraments. En el cas d'un mercat saturat, on hi ha una forta competència, I'exportador pot guanyar un segment d'aquest mercat, proporcionant certes condicions favorables per a l'importador en el sentit del risc i els costos mínims que aquests han de suportar. Forma de subministrament es un dels termes essencials del contracte acordat entre els socis internacionals, de manera que la regulació de la transferència de bens i en realitat el venedor al comprador els riscos, incloses les conseqüències legals i econòmiques en general. Esperem que aquesta tesi pot ser capaç d'ajudar els futurs importadors i exportadors en el tràfic marítim mundial. ; Postprint (published version)
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Readers will be aware of the philosophy journal poll I have been hosting here. The poll was comprehensive in that it covered over 140 philosophy journals, most of them suggestions by readers. These journals cover the full spectrum of the discipline. There have been more than 36,000 votes cast already and I believe we can draw some initial findings. Journals are each assigned a score: this is the percent (%) chance that voters will select this journal as their favourite if asked to choose between this journal and a second journal chosen at random.
The first finding is that there appears to be a top tier of philosophy journals -- this is not controversial -- that is relatively small -- this latter part may be more controversial.
From the poll, the top tier of philosophy journals appears to consist of the following publications:
1. Journal of Philosophy 87
2. Philosophical Review 84 3. Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 83 3. Nous 83 5. Mind 82 6. Ethics 80
I say that these appear to be the top tier as each were no. 1 or 2 at some point during the voting (unlike other journals). Each would be selected at least 80% of the time if paired with a second journal chosen at random.
A further finding is that the second tier of journals -- which we might classify as chosen at least 60-79% of the time when paired with a second journal chosen at random -- is perhaps surprsingly large. This second tier might consist of the following journals:
7. Philosophical Studies 79 8. Synthese 77 8. Philosophy & Public Affairs 77 10. Analysis 76 10. Philosophical Quarterly 76 10. American Philosophical Quarterly 76 10. Philosophers' Imprint 76 10. Monist 76 10. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 76 16. Journal of the History of Philosophy 75 16. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 16. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 75 16. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 20. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 21. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 21. European Journal of Philosophy 73 23. Erkenntnis 72 24. Philosophy of Science 71 25. Philosophy 70 25. History of Philosophy Quarterly 70 25. Ratio 70 28. Journal of Moral Philosophy 69 29. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 68 30. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 67 31. Philosophical Papers 67 32. Journal of Philosophical Logic 67 33. Journal of Philosophical Research 66 33. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 66 33. Utilitas 66 33. Mind and Language 66 33. Journal of Ethics 66 38. Southern Journal of Philosophy 65 39. Review of Metaphysics 64 39. Philosophical Investigations 64 39. Kant-Studien 64 42. Metaphilosophy 62 42. Philosophy Compass 62 42. Journal of Political Philosophy 62 42. Philosophical Topics 62 42. Philosophia 62 47. Hume Studies 61 47. Linguistics and Philosophy 61 49. Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 60
The next third tier of journals are those chosen about 50% of the time (from 40-60%) where paired with a second journal chosen at random:
50. Phronesis 59 51. Journal of the History of Ideas 58
51. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 58 53. Ethical Theory & Moral Practice 57 53. Philosophical Forum 57 53. Inquiry 57 56. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 56 57. Political Theory 55 57. Social Theory & Practice 55 57. Philosophical Explorations 55 57. Journal of Social Philosophy 55 57. Economics & Philosophy 55 62. Law & Philosophy 54 62. dialectica 54 62. Public Affairs Quarterly 54 62. Acta Analytica 54 66. Social Philosophy & Policy 53 66. Theoria 53 66. Journal of Applied Philosophy 53 69. Faith and Philosophy 52 70. Political Studies 51 71. Journal of Value Inquiry 51 72. Harvard Law Review 50 73. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 49 73. Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly 49 73. Philosophical Psychology 49 76. Bioethics 48 76. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 48 78. Politics, Philosophy, Economics 47 78. Kantian Studies 47 79. History of Political Thought 44 80. Legal Theory 43 81. Hypatia 42 82. Philosophical Writings 41 82. southwest philosophy review 41 84. Apeiron 40 84. European Journal of Political Theory 40 84. American Journal of Bioethics 40
The remaining results for other journals are as follows:
87. Environmental Ethics 39 87. Logique et Analyse 39 87. Philosophy Today 39 90. Ratio Juris 38 90. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 90. Business Ethics Quarterly 38 93. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 37 93. Ethical Perspectives 37 93. Public Reason 37 96. Hegel-Studien 36 97. Philosophy & Social Criticism 35 97. Res Publica 35 97. Philosophy in Review 35 97. Philo 35
101. Neuroethics 34 101. Ethics and Justice 34 103. Philosophy and Theology 33 104. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 32 105. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 32 106. Review of Politics 31 106. Jurisprudence 31 106. Research in Phenomenology 31 109. Journal of Philosophy of Education 30 109. Review Journal of Political Philosophy 30 109. Philosophy East and West 30 112. South African Journal of Philosophy 29 112. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 29 114. Teaching Philosophy 28 114. Review Journal of Philosophy & Social Science 28 114. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 28 117. Journal of Global Ethics 27 117. APA Newsletters 27 119. Transactions of the C. S. Peirce Society 26 120. Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 25 121. Adam Smith Review 23 121. Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 23 121. Imprints: Egalitarian Theory and Practice 23 124, Theory and Research in Education 22 125. Polish Journal of Philosophy 21 125. Epoche 21 125. Fichte Studien 21 125. Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 21 125. Asian Philosophy 21 130. Think 20 131. Archives de Philosophie du Droit 18 131. Collingwood & British Idealism Studies 18 131. Owl of Minerva 18 131. New Criminal Law Review 18 135. Journal of Indian Philosophy 17 136. Continental Philosophy Review 17 136. The European Legacy 17 138. Education, Citizenship, and Social Justice 15 139. Reason Papers 14 139. Associations 14 139. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion 14 142. Studia Philosophica Estonica 13 143. Derrida Today 5
Some further reflections. While there are several exceptions, it would be interesting to analyze any correlation between the age of a journal and its position in the rankings. There are several surprises on the list, this list does not correspond to my own opinions (I would have ranked many journals differently), and I do not believe that there is much difference between journals ranked closely together.
I also purposively put some selections in to see how they might play out. For example, I added Harvard Law Review out of curiosity and I was surprised to see of all journals exclusively publishing law and legal philosophy journals it appears to come second to the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies and above other choices. (I was surprised legal philosophy journals did not score much better.) I added several journals edited by political scientists, such as Political Studies, and was surprised to see they did not score as highly as I had thought. Roughly speaking, journals with a wider remit performed much better than journals with a more specific audience. I also added at least one journal, Ethics and Justice, that I believe is no longer in print. (Can readers correct me on this? I hope I am in error.) It scored 34% and came in at 101st.
What I will do shortly is create a new poll that will only have the top 50 philosophy journals from this poll roughly speaking. Expect to see this new link widely advertised shortly.
In the meantime, what do readers think we can take away from the results thus far? Have I missed anything?
En nuestro país, atendiendo las exigencias internacionales de protección reforzada de las menores de edad, entendidas dentro del marco del aumento punitivo de las normas penales que atentan contra la libertad, integridad y formación sexual, se ha limitado el otorgamiento de beneficios penales en casos de delitos sexuales (de menores entre los doce y los catorce años), que inician su actividad sexual con jóvenes mayores de edad, y en donde conforman una familia, comoquiera que se presume que para estos casos el consentimiento no es válido. Esta problemática surge dentro de una sociedad que se está adecuando a las nuevas concepciones de protección especial de las menores, en donde, sin embargo, hay factores socioculturales y socioeconómicos que llevan a que las menores inicien de manera voluntaria su vida sexual antes de cumplir la edad señalada por el legislador, lo cual conlleva un cuestionamiento de si se debe aplicar una sanción penal en dichos casos. Esta problemática es abordada desde el análisis del principio de necesidad de la pena, soportado en diferentes debates dados desde la criminología crítica y la victimología para señalar el carácter relativo del derecho respecto al rango de la edad, tanto para establecer la mayoría de edad como para presumir la validez del consentimiento, trayendo a colación estudios internacionales y nacionales que han mostrado que las menores están empezando su actividad sexual cada vez más temprano. Se analiza el debate dado desde el punto de vista criminológico y victimológico para señalar que se debería acudir a investigaciones empíricas y a enfoques diferentes a los jurídicos para obtener una visión general de las problemáticas y así buscar soluciones alternativas al sistema penal que solucionen conflictos, y en donde se busque situar a la víctima en el centro de la discusión, resolviendo el conflicto desde la óptica de aquella y no de los denunciantes ni del Estado. Se trae al debate cómo los operadores jurídicos en cumplimiento de su deber de aplicar política criminal podrían dar aplicación al principio de la necesidad de la pena, de conformidad con lo normado en los artículos 3 y 4 del C.P., con el objeto de que se logre una dogmática orientada por la política criminal dirigida hacia las consecuencias, en donde se pueden satisfacer necesidades de prevención especial, pero también se analice la situación concreta a partir de la aplicación de derechos fundamentales que deben integrarse para solucionar problemas penales, con el objeto de que la imposición de la sanción pueda responder a "los principios de necesidad, proporcionalidad y razonabilidad", y así dar cabal cumplimiento con las "funciones de prevención general, retribución justa, prevención especial, reinserción social y protección al condenado", analizando la posibilidad de aplicar sanciones alternativas a la privación de la libertad, o la concesión de subrogados, con el objeto de garantizar la efectividad de los principios y fines de la pena. ; In our country, attending to the international policy of underage children, specifically in the case of girls, understood from the point of view of the increment in penal regulations that are against the freedom, integrity and sexual development, penal benefits have been limited in sexual harassment (in the case of girls between 12 and 14 years old), that have started their sexuality with teenager and overaged people (>18 years old) , in which they conform a family, any old way that is presumed for these cases there is no consent. This quandary emerge inside a society that is constantly changing and adapting to the new conceptions of special children protection , where it is well known, there are sociocultural as well as socioeconomic aspects that push underage girls into a new way of explore and develop their sexuality before turning into a legal aged person, thus questioning if it is or not necessary impose penalties in such cases. This dilemma is address from the analysis of the need of penalty, supported in different discussions given from the point of view of the critical criminology and victimology to emphasize the relative character of law respect to the range of age, to presume the validity of consent as well as establish a policy of overage, bringing then the international, as well as national, that have shown that underage girls are starting their sexual life earlier. Here this discussion is tackle from the point of criminology and victimology, to point that from the legal point of view is not possible to obtain a general vision of the problem and instead is necessary an empirical research to find an alternative and viable solution to this problem, in which the victim is the center of discussion, thus solving the conflict from the victim instead of the one from the accusers or the state. Here is argued the fact that the juridic procedure, in the case of the criminal policy, could extend the principle of the need of the penalty, following the articles 3 and 4 from the criminal code; with main objective, get a dogmatic oriented by the criminal policy aimed to the consequences, in which it can satisfy the special prevention as well as analyze the concrete situation imposing their fundamental rights as a priority, and thus solving penal problems, with the goal that the penalty imposed could answer the need of the need of the penalty, principle of proportionality and reasonableness, and thus satisfy the general functions of prevention , fairly contribution, special prevention, social reintegration and the protection to the convicted person, evaluating the possibility of applying alternative penalties to the deprivation of liberty or the concession of substitutes, having in mind the goal of guarantee the effectiveness of the principles and the end of the penalty. ; CRAI-USTA Bogotá ; orcid:0000-0002-5663-629X ; https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=FMV0mBcAAAAJ&hl=es ; http://scienti.colciencias.gov.co:8081/cvlac/visualizador/generarCurriculoCv.do?cod_rh=0001378605 ; http://unidadinvestigacion.usta.edu.co
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1979) was a French intellectual, philosopher and literateur who stood on a common platform of philosophy and psychology. His importance to us lies not only in his great impact on twentieth century thought, but also because he outlined a fairly elaborate system of descriptive psychology as a prelude to his ontological description of the world. His treatises on 'Imagination' and 'Emotions' are classics in the existential tradition. His novels and plays are based on the same themes as concern a psychiatrist in his daily clinic. His principal text of philosophy, 'Being and Nothingness', contains a whole chapter on 'Existential Psychoanalysis'. Not surprisingly, therefore, he has had a significant impact on our approach to mental patients. With the increasing emphasis on the scientific method, the philosophical moorings of medical science became more and more blurred. The result was an impersonal view of the diseased. Thus during this period it had become common practice to view human beings as objects worthy of study from the disease view point. As a result the disease and its causation became more important than the diseased person himself. It must be granted that progress in medicine often results from this passion with causation. However, a causal view of phenomena presupposes that clarity about the phenomena exists among us. Prior to the problem of establishing the etiological basis of a disease entity, there is the problem of uncovering the phenomenal character of the disease in question. This task may not be formidable in most branches of medicine, but in the case of psychiatry the disease entities are human realities themselves expressed in the life activities of fellow-men. This is where empirical psychology breaks down and why some psychiatrists tend to resort to the existential-ontological departure. The point is to liberate man from the speculative subject-object relationship and to stress his uniqueness and individuality. This movement started with Binswanger (1881-1966) who was the first psychoanalyst to use Heidegger's principles to criticize Freud (4,5). He was in the quest of a genuine psychology (7). There have been other psychiatrists of repute who emulated his example. Some prominent psychologists who have been influenced to varying degrees by existentialism are Allport, Angyal, Fromm, Goldstein, Maslow and Rogers (10). At the same time, existential philosophers have themselves been keenly interested in psychology and psychiatry. Karl Jaspers began life as a psychiatrist and his first major work was his General Psychopathology' (12). Jean-Paul Sartre has been keenly interested in psychology and has written a lot on the subject (17). Admittedly, Sartre's impact on psychiatry and psychotherapy has not been as significant as on literature and politics (7). But he has, along with Heidegger, provided a unification which has helped in the understanding of the normal human mind as well as the abnormal one. The series of steps Sartre took towards his totalization of human experience are of great interest to a psychologist because of his investigation of psychic phenomena in the process. This detailed evaluation of individual phenomena is, he says, the only way we can make psychology progress. His insistence on the unambiguous description of such phenomena is in the great Husserlian tradition (28). Here, we shall take a look at the series of steps Sartre took towards his composite view of human psychology.
