Suchergebnisse

Internationale Sportveranstaltungen wie die Olympischen Spiele oder die Fußballweltmeisterschaft sind herausragende Wettbewerbe des Sports. Sie sind zudem gesellschaftliche Großereignisse von hoher wirtschaftlicher und politischer Bedeutung. Über den Ausrichter einer internationalen Sportveranstaltung entscheiden die verantwortlichen internationalen Sportverbände wie das Internationale Olympische Komitee oder der Weltfußballverband FIFA. Die Vergabe der Sportveranstaltung an einen Ausrichter erfolgt in einem von den internationalen Sportverbänden festgelegten Verfahren und zu den von ihnen bestimmten Bedingungen. Rechtliche Vorgaben aus staatlichen Rechtsordnungen spielen bei der Ausgestaltung der Verfahren bislang kaum eine Rolle. Der Ablauf der Verfahren und die Entscheidungen über die Vergabe an einen bestimmten Ausrichter werden regelmäßig heftig kritisiert. Es werden mangelnde Transparenz der Vergabeverfahren, unfaire Ausgestaltung der Vergabebedingungen und Entscheidungen nach sachfremden Kriterien gerügt. Die Sportverbände berufen sich auf die Autonomie des Sports. Der Autor untersucht, welche Vorgaben sich aus dem Recht der Europäischen Union für die Vergabe einer internationalen Sportveranstaltung herleiten lassen. Im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchung steht das primärrechtliche Vergaberecht mit seinen Grundsätzen der Gleichbehandlung und Transparenz. Anhand der unionsrechtlichen Maßstäbe wird die Ausgestaltung der Vergabeverfahren bedeutender internationaler Sportveranstaltungen bewertet

Following a brief historical introduction and a discussion of different types of commercial policy, this paper reviews the arguments for and against trade protection. In the bench-mark case of a competitive, small, open economy, free trade maximizes aggregate national welfare, although some individual groups will lose unless compensation is actually paid. Guidelines for policy include the uniform reduction and concertina rules for tariff cuts, and the principle of targeting: corrective measures should be applied as close to the source of the distortion as possible. Relaxing the bench-mark assumptions allows exceptions to the case for free trade: optimal tariffs to manipulate world prices; strategic tariffs or export subsidies when home firms engage in oligopolistic competition with foreign rivals; and infant industry protection to allow home firms benefit from learning by doing. Protection can also raise the growth rate, though it is less likely to raise welfare in a growing economy. Overall, with due allowance for some ambiguity, both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggest a pragmatic case for free trade. Finally, the paper notes the political pressures for and against protection, and the role of international institutions such as the GATT in underpinning moves towards freer trade.

1. Explaining compliance with international law -- 2. Rules governing territorial defense : anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, and anti-trafficking -- 3. Rules designed to regulate the market : shipping and airline regulation and CFC control -- 4. Laws on human rights promotion : anti-slavery law and protection of women -- 5. Cross-national analysis of compliance -- 6. Globalized democracies : Peru and Bolivia -- 7. Globalized autocracies : Tunisia and Pakistan -- 8. Isolationist autocracies : Belarus and Equatorial Guinea -- 9. Isolationist democracies : Botswana and Papua New Guinea -- 10. Conclusions.

International trade in commodities is the most traditional form of international trade and makes up more than 20% of world exports. Minerals account for more than 12%, and agricultural commodities and food, for about 9%. The main distinctive feature of mineral and agricultural resources is their uneven distribution. Sharp price fluctuations in the oil, sugar and cocoa markets and steadily rising prices for agricultural commodities and food in 2010 and 2011 attract the attention of politicians, economists and business people. But, in our view, surprisingly little attention is paid to the system of international regulation of primary commodity markets that emerged in the 1970s and worked quite effectively up to the end of the 20th century, but in a globalizing world it can no longer cope with its tasks. The need to reform the system of international organizations, including trade organizations, it obvious. But first it makes sense to take a closer look at the existing interstate commodity market regulation system, where Russia is a member of almost all its organizations. Adapted from the source document.

Today, many of the world's river and lake basins are threatened by environmental problems such as change in river flow, water pollution, reduced water availability, salt water intrusion, or loss of plant and animal species. International River Basin Organizations (RBOs) governing such rivers are increasingly in need to address such challenges. At the same time many of them receive technical and financial support from international donor organizations. The paper therefore addresses the question of how international financing institutions support adaptation capacities of RBOs. The aim is to identify conditions under which donor support to RBOs can support adaptation to environmental changes and improve the resilience of international water basins. It does so by focusing on two cases in Southern Africa, including the Orange-Senqu Basin and the Orange-Senqu River Commission (ORASECOM) as well as the Cubango-Okavango Basin and the Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission (OKACOM). The findings of the paper illustrate an ambivalent role of international donors with regard to river basin adaptation. While they do provide important means for adaptation in form of knowledge, financial and technical resources, they can, at the same time, threaten the long-term sustainability of adaptation activities.