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"Although there are many texts on the law of evidence, surprisingly few are devoted specifically to the comparative and international aspects of the subject. The traditional view that the law of evidence belongs within the common law tradition has obscured the reality that a genuinely cosmopolitan law of evidence is being developed in criminal cases across the common law and civil law traditions. By considering the extent to which a coherent body of common evidentiary standards is being developed in both domestic and international jurisprudence, John Jackson and Sarah Summers chart this development with particular reference to the jurisprudence on the right to a fair trial that has emerged from the European Court of Human Rights and to the attempts in the new international criminal tribunals to fashion agreed approaches towards the regulation of evidence"--

This article presents the difference between legal norms and legal principles. The author's viewpoint is based on the differentiation between regulatory, systemic and teleological legal attitudes in the legal order of a state of law (Rechtsstaat). The conceptual framework of legal principles entails constituent laws and different areas of a legal order. Unlike legal norms (as subject-specific regulating legal attitudes) and legal standards (as the most general legal attitudes), legal principles are radiating teleological legal attitudes. Moreover, being the result of systemic and teleological concretisation of written law, legal principles as basic teleological legal attitudes are shaped as bundles of teleological legal attitudes and legal conceptions. In the order of a legal state, legal principles have a circular flow in the operation of the legal order, which is determined by the complementary roles of the institutional order of public authority, the institutional order of state authority, and the institutional order of a territorial community. It necessarily brings to light the difference between the fundamental legal principles of a legal order and the legal principles governing different areas of a legal order. This article analyzes the aspects of systemic and teleological understanding of legal principles, particularly considering the distinctive nature of legal principles as sources of law. Legal principles are also viewed as canons directly developed in jurisprudence, within the framework of the "internal legal system" based on legal forms.

The world is in crisis due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Corona Virus Disease 2019 (Covid-19) is a disease that was first discovered in the city of Wuhan, China. The transmission of Covid-19 in the People's Republic of China (PRC) occurred in 2019 and caused the death of Chinese citizens. By early 2020, the spread had spread to every country, including Indonesia. The wide spread of Covid-19 throughout Indonesia has resulted in the government declaring a health emergency and implementing a lockdown policy by limiting activities that trigger the massive spread of the Covid-19 virus. Activities that were initially carried out offline must be carried out online, and one of these activities is court proceedings. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, every activity, including the judiciary, is carried out online. This study aims to examine the problems that occur as a result of the implementation of online criminal justice in criminal procedural law. This research is descriptive research with a literature study method. The results of the study show that the implementation of online trials creates problems that are considered inconsistent with several principles and contrary to the Criminal Procedure Code, some of which are the validity of evidence in court, then there is an examination of the defendant in court until the last one is the personnel and equipment. which is not supported. Another problem is the Regulation of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia No. 4 of 2020 concerning the Administration and Trial of Criminal Cases in Courts Electronically which is contrary to the principles of Courts Open to the Public and Quick Trials.

This article critically examines the claim that EPPO is a proper federal supranational prosecutor. The article observes that the EPPO among policymakers and commentators appears to be a hallmark of the transformation of EU criminal law from an intergovernmental paradigm to a strong federal and supranational polity. The EPPO primarily stands out among other EU agencies by having been conferred with an independent competence to prosecute crimes relating to the common EU financial interest. By establishing the EPPO, the Union has practically assumed such competences that traditionally belong to the central government in a federal state. The article discusses comprehensively the scope, nature and limits to the EPPO's powers as well as its operating structure in light of Article 86 TFEU and the recently adopted EPPO Regulation. It departs from the basic assumption that the EPPO stands in the midst of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Whilst the EPPO is envisaged to be independent from the Member States, the EPPO's complicated, multifaceted and vertical structure entails that Member States maintain a certain direction of its activities. It, however, argues that a general assessment of the EPPO's operational and strategic direction (where its operational activities are managed and supervised by centralised 'European' prosecutors), and the type (direct criminal enforcement powers) and nature of its powers (criminal prosecutorial powers) makes it distinctive as the most 'integrated' and 'supranational' EU agency.

This article critically examines the extent to which the European Public Prosecutor's Office can be claimed to constitute a prime example of supranational criminal law. The article observes that among policymakers and commentators, the Office appears to be a hallmark of the transformation of EU criminal law from an intergovernmental paradigm to a strong federal and supranational polity. The article discusses the scope, nature and limits to the powers of the European Public Prosecutor's Office, as well as its operating structure in light of Article 86 TFEU and the recently adopted EPPO Regulation. It departs from the basic assumption that the EPPO stands in the midst of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Whilst the EPPO is envisaged to be independent of the Member States, the Office's complicated, multifaceted and vertical structure means that Member States are able to direct, to some extent, its activities. The article argues, however, that a general assessment of the Office's operational and strategic direction (where its operational activities are managed and supervised by centralized 'European' prosecutors), and the type (direct criminal enforcement powers) of powers it has makes it distinctive as the most 'integrated' and 'supranational' EU agency.

This article explores, whether domestic judges might be held accountable under international criminal law (ICL). To date, international criminal justice has almost entirely focused on prosecuting political or military leaders. The Justice Case tried before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal in 1946 marks the most prominent exception. Prior to it, the judiciary – otherwise considered the epitome of justice – had mutated into a murderous machinery under Nazi rule. Judicial decisions do have far-reaching implications possibly constituting or contributing to international crimes. This holds true in a wide range of cases, for instance on practices of warfare and torture, on the use of certain weapon technologies, or on policies relating to minorities or racial segregation. I argue that domestic judges are accountable when engaging in international crimes. The article delves into technical aspects of criminal law; as well as the notions of judicial independence and immunity. While guaranteeing the rule of law, these two notions challenge the core idea of ICL: its equal application vis-à-vis all perpetrators of international crimes irrespective of official capacity. In order to differentiate due judicial conduct and its abuse in violation of ICL, I suggest a threshold a judicial act needs to exceed for entailing accountability for an international crime.