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This paper explores the evolving relationship between central banks and governments in the European monetary unification process. In particular, it focuses on the institution-building phase (setting up of the ECB) and the monetary and macro-economic policy mix within EMU. I attribute the undeniable success of the institution-building phase to an exceptional convergence of favourable facts and influences. Most importantly: the strong political commitment of the governments concerned; the trust placed in central bank experts in preparing the Maastricht Treaty; the incremental momentum resulting from the tight timetable; and, last but not least, the prevailing macro-economic conditions. As for the monetary and macro-economic policy mix, it is argued that in the run-up to achieving EMU the convergence criteria spelled out by the Maastricht Treaty proved a very effective tool in aligning national policies and in consolidating central bank independence (which became, in fact, the "sixth" convergence criterion, conditioning access to EMU). However, since the late 1990s, this delicate balance seems to have become rather less secure for mainly three reasons: the weakening restraint of politicians with regards to monetary policymaking; the worsening performance of the economy in the euro area; and the fact that economic union continues to lag monetary union, particularly with respect to micro or supply side reforms

Whereas the establishment of all previous alliances in the post-Soviet space was motivated by a desire for political union, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) has focused on the economic component.1 One of its goals has been defined as a transition to a coordinated and concerted economic policy, including fiscal and monetary policies. Some decisions in this area are already being taken. But in light of the global financial and economic crisis, central banks have had to pursue a looser monetary policy, while governments in all EAEU countries have increased their influence on central bank decisions. There are differences in this respect: in some countries (Belarus and Russia), the primary objective of the central bank has not been identified at all and there is a multiplicity of objectives (see Table 1); in others, one and the same objective—the achievement of price stability— is defined as both the objective of the monetary authority and the goal of its monetary policy. In Belarus and Russia, price stability is regarded as a means of ensuring the stability of the national currency (the ruble). In order to coordinate the key elements of monetary policy across the EAEU, the authors suggest setting a primary objective for the central bank, vesting it with exclusive authority in the area of monetary policy, and increasing its real independence. © 2017, CA and CC Press AB. All rights reserved.

The dominant narrative presents the Economic and Monetary Union as an incomplete structure which, to operate stably, needs to be supplemented by a deeper fiscal integration. We study the general features of the recent proposals for a fiscal stabilisation mechanism, intended to smooth the effects of asymmetric shocks on Member States, from a multi-disciplinary viewpoint, combining economic, legal and political analyses. While possible to construct within the current Treaties, we find the proposals economically and politically fragile, and likely to be unenforceable. Our gravest concern however relates to the envisaged broad macroeconomic conditionality, which is largely unconnected to the stability aims of the mechanism but has potential to undermine the democratic legitimacy of some of the Member States' most foundational societal choices.

We argue that the European currency union (ECU) reduced the de facto monetary policy autonomy of EU countries abstaining from introducing the euro. The large share of imports from euro zone countries renders a close alignment of monetary policy to the interest rate set by the European Central Bank (ECB) necessary if the monetary authorities of countries outside the ECU want to impede the import of inflation from the euro zone or a declining competitiveness of the domestic industry. In turn, the increasing role of the euro as an international reserve medium equal to the US dollar reduced the monetary policy autonomy of countries importing more goods and services from the euro zone than from the dollar zone. An empirical analysis of monetary policy in the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden lends support to our theoretical argument. Analysing the shortterm adjustments of central bank interest rates in these three EU countries, which did not introduce the euro, we show that these countries' monetary policies more closely follow the ECB's policy than they followed the Bundesbank's policy before 1994. In addition, we demonstrate the diminishing influence of the dollar on monetary policy in the UK, Denmark and Sweden since the countries of the Economic and Monetary Union harmonized monetary policies.

This is a fully revised and updated edition of S.F. Goodman's popular book The European Community . Retitled to reflect recent changes, the book includes discussion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference to review the working of the Maastricht Treaty and prepare for the next stage of monetary union. The book applies economic theory in a clear, direct manner to major areas of interest such as foreign exchange markets, agriculture, trade, money and the ERM

Dieses ZEI Discussion Paper zeigt auf, dass der Prozess der Wirtschafts‐ und Währungsintegration in Westafrika stets maßgeblich von europäischen Entwicklungen abhängig war. Es verdeutlicht, wie die Veränderung der politischen Landkarte in Europa auch die Anreize der Interessenvertreter in der Region Westafrika verändert haben. Diese Entwicklungen eröffnen neue Möglichkeiten für ein Programm der Wirtschafts‐ und Währungsintegration in der ganzen Region. In diesem ZEI Discussion Paper wird argumentiert, dass die beste Art, das oben genannte Ziel zu erreichen, die schrittweise Aufnahme neuer Mitglieder aus der Zweiten Währungsunion, die schon seit mehr als einem Jahrzehnt existiert, in die Westafrikanische Wirtschafts‐ und Währungsunion (WAEMU) sei. Außerdem plädiert dieses ZEI Discussion Paper dafür, dass die Europäische Union das obige Konzept unterstützt.

This study examines the extent to which the development and operation of social partnership at EU level can be explained in terms of the logic of self-interest, as opposed to factors such as the influence of ideas or of cultural or ideological values. The editors have assembled a team of international authors with rare expertise, who present fresh and original data based on extensive research interviews with the main players, from the highest level through to those involved in the detail of the negotiations.

Starting July the 1st 1997, Bulgaria adopted a Currency Board (CB) monetary system. This paper aims at investigating if the adoption of the CB monetary system, which involves the cost of loosing monetary autonomy, has provided a relatively better (with respect to other CEEC) monetary integration of Bulgaria with the European Monetary Union (EMU). Since Bulgarian monetary variables are endogenous under a CB, we focus on the ECB and FED interest rates as the main sources on monetary volatility. First, we find that ECB shocks are more rapidly absorbed and have less significant impact of domestic variables, with respect to other external monetary shocks (FED rate changes). Second, the responses of Bulgarian variables following changes in the ECB interest rate present lower persistence and significance, with respect to what the previous literature emphasized for other CEEC with monetary autonomy. This latter result still holds when accounting for different sources of cross-country heterogeneity outlined in the literature, thus supporting that the adoption of the CB may have worked as a rather good device in terms of integration of Bulgaria into the EMU.

Against the background of the recent housing boom and bust in countries such as Spain and Ireland, we investigate in this paper the macroeconomic consequences of cross-border banking in monetary unions such as the euro area. For this purpose, we incorporate in an otherwise standard two-region monetary union DSGE model a banking sector module along the lines of Gerali et al. (2010), accounting for borrowing constraints of entrepreneurs and an internal constraint on the bank's leverage ratio. We illustrate in particular how different lending standards within the monetary union can translate into destabilizing spill-over effects between the regions, which can in turn result in a higher macroeconomic volatility. This mechanism is modeled by letting the loanto-value (LTV) ratio that banks demand of entrepreneurs depend on either regional productivity shocks or on the productivity shock from one dominating region. Thereby, we demonstrate a channel through which the financial sector may have exacerbated the emergence of macroeconomic imbalances within the euro area. Additionally, we show the effects of a monetary policy rule augmented by the loan rate spread as in Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) in a two-country monetary union context.

On June 27, 2014, at the 23rd Ordinary Session of the Summit of the African Union held in Malobo, Equatorial Guinea, member states of the Africa Union adopted the Protocol on the Establishment of the African Monetary Fund (Fund).
Plan for the Fund is not new but dates back to the 1963 Charter of the Organization of African Unity (the predecessor to the Africa Union) as well as to the 1991 Abuja Treaty—the agreement that established the African Economic Community and put in place a framework for continental integration. The Constitutive Act of the African Union (Constitutive Act) adopted in 2000 also envisaged the establishment of the Fund. Annexed to the Protocol is the Statute of the African Monetary Fund (Statute). As envisioned in the Abuja Treaty, the Fund, together with continental institutions such as the Africa Investment Bank and the African Central Bank that are still in the pipeline, are critical to efforts to create a continental economic and monetary union in Africa.