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The second volume of the Handbook of Defense Economics addresses defense needs, practices, threats, and policies in the modern era of globalization. This new era concerns the enhanced cross-border flows of all kinds (e.g., capital and labor flows, revolutionary rhetoric, guerrillas, and terrorists) including the spillovers of benefits and costs associated with public goods and transnational externalities (i.e., uncompensated interdependencies affecting two or more nations). These ever-increasing flows mean that military armaments and armies are less able to keep out security threats. Thus, novel defense and security barriers are needed to protect borders that are porous to terrorists, pollutants, political upheavals, and conflicts. Even increased trade and financial flows imply novel security challenges and defenses. Globalization also underscores the importance of a new set of institutions (e.g., the European Union and global governance networks) and agents (e.g., nongovernmental organizations and partnerships). This volume addresses the security challenges in this age of globalization, where conflicts involve novel tactics, new technologies, asymmetric warfare, different venues, and frightening weapons

"Biography of William J. Spillman, scientist and educator for the United States Department of Agriculture. Explores Spillman's role in the development of the agricultural economics, the agricultural New Deal, genetics research, agricultural education and the Cooperative Extension Service, the post-World War I overproduction crisis, and the Law of Diminishing Returns"--Provided by publisher

Organizational theorists have long acknowledged the importance of the formal and informal incentives facing a firm's employees, stressing that the political economy of a firm plays a major role in shaping organizational life and firm behavior. Yet the detailed study of incentive systems has traditionally been left in the hands of (organizational) economists, with most organizational theorists focusing their attention on critical problems in culture, network structure, framing, and so on—in essence, the social context in which economics and incentive systems are embedded. We argue that this separation of domains is problematic. The economics literature, for example, is unable to explain why organizations should find it difficult to change incentive structures in the face of environmental change, while the organizational literature focuses heavily on the role of inertia as sources of organizational rigidity. Drawing on recent research on incentives in organizational economics and on cognition in organizational theory, we build a framework for the analysis of incentives that highlights the ways in which incentives and cognition—while being analytically distinct concepts—are phenomenologically deeply intertwined. We suggest that incentives and cognition coevolve so that organizational competencies or routines are as much about building knowledge of "what should be rewarded" as they are about "what should be done." We argue that this recognition has important implications for our understanding of organizational inertia in the face of environmental change, and that it opens up important new areas for further research.