Suchergebnisse

Depuis la fin des années 1980, une image négative, implicite et explicite, est liée à la religion musulmane. Cette image dépeint les personnes de confession musulmane comme soumises et capables de rallier des groupes de lutte armée se réclamant de l'islam. La présente étude sur le vécu de femmes de confession musulmane par rapport au groupe de lutte armée Daesh tente de saisir les répercussions des idées et des actes de ce groupe sur leurs vies. La thèse se situe dans un courant de l'anthropologie du politique et du religieux en abordant une démarche expérientielle et une position réflexive. À partir de la mobilisation de concepts tels que la radicalisation, le jihadisme, la laïcité, le point Godwin islamique et le féminisme musulman et décolonial, l'objectif de la thèse est de comprendre les perceptions quant aux exactions de Daesh et au groupe Daesh, de femmes musulmanes de trois pays différents (Liban, Belgique, Canada), vivant dans des contextes sociopolitiques et économiques très divers. La méthodologie repose sur des récits de vie, un terrain multisitué, et des entretiens menés auprès de 92 femmes, soient 37 à Bruxelles, 36 à Beyrouth et 19 à Montréal. Les résultats de mes analyses montrent la présence de catalyseurs anthropiques, qui ont pour effet d'intensifier la réactivité (passive, active ou neutre) des femmes rencontrées . Ces réactions s'expriment par des actions ou sentiments concrets, conscients ou inconscients. Il peut y avoir plusieurs catalyseurs anthropiques selon les pays, les régions, et l'environnement des femmes rencontrées. ; Since the late 1980s, a negative image, both implicit and explicit, has been linked to Islam. This image portrays people of the Muslim faith as submissive and capable of joining armed groups claiming to be Islamic. This study of Muslim women's experiences with the armed group Daesh (the Islamic State) attempts to capture the impact of the group's ideas and actions on their lives. The thesis is situated in a current of anthropology of politics and religion by approaching an experiential approach and a reflexive position. From the mobilization of concepts such as radicalization, jihadism, secularism, Point Godwin islamique, and decolonial and Muslim feminism, the objective of the thesis is to understand the perceptions of Muslim women from three different countries (Lebanon, Belgium, Canada), living in very diverse socio-political and economic contexts. The methodology is based on life stories, a multi-site fieldwork, and interviews with 92 women: 37 in Brussels, 36 in Beirut, and 19 in Montreal. The results of my analyses show the presence of anthropogenic catalysts, which have the effect of intensifying reactivity (passive, active or neutral). These reactions are expressed through concrete, conscious or unconscious actions and feelings. There may be several anthropic catalysts depending on the country, region, and environment of the women we met.

COVID-19 (coronavirus) has had an enormous impact on nearly every country in the world. However, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon were already facing difficult to extreme circumstances even before the pandemic erupted, making them particularly vulnerable. This report looks at the impact of the pandemic, associated lockdowns and economic shocks and other misfortunes which have compounded the crisis, such as sharply lower oil revenues in Iraq and the Port of Beirut explosion in Lebanon, as well as political instability in both. The report estimates that 4.4 million people in the host communities and 1.1 million refugees or IDPs were driven into poverty in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, and while this considers all of Lebanon, it only includes three governorates in Jordan and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, due to data limitations. A response commensurate with the magnitude of the shock is needed to prevent further misery. The poverty impact of COVID-19 and the ensuing confinement policies and economic contractions have been felt throughout the world, not least by marginalized communities. However, COVID-19 has compounded existing vulnerabilities or crises in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Lebanon. Syrian refugees – most of whom have been displaced for up to nine years – are particularly exposed given their perilous pre-crisis situation. Host communities in these three countries, who have supported and accommodated such large numbers of refugees, have also been heavily affected; all three countries were in strained positions prior to COVID-19, ranging from economic stagnation and high public debt in Jordan, to a collapse in public revenues due to international oil price shocks in KRI, to complete political and economic crisis in Lebanon. By March 2020, all three countries had witnessed their first cases of COVID-19 and introduced stringent containment policies ranging from partial closures of schools and shops to full curfew. While these measures were initially largely successful in containing the spread of the pandemic, they also led to a decline in economic activity across most sectors, particularly in the informal market. In Jordan and Iraq, the losses are estimated at around 8.2 and 10.5 percent of 2019's GDP respectively. In Lebanon where the COVID-19 crisis is compounded by economic and political crises the losses are much higher, around 25 percent of GDP. Lebanon has experienced inflation of over 100 percent, largely due to its import dependence and currency depreciation. Unsurprisingly, given the magnitude of these shocks, recent rapid needs assessments and UNHCR administrative data show that refugees, who are highly concentrated in low-skilled jobs in the informal sector, have had to reduce food intake, incur additional debt and in some instances suffered eviction.

Thermal engineering is playing an important role in development of sustainable technologies especially in the scope of renewable energy, energy storage, and energy saving. This issue is devoted to the theme of thermal engineering for sustainable technologies covering few papers presented in the 12th International Conference on Thermal Engineering: Theory and Applications (ICTEA2019). The ICTEA conference series was inspired to assist and provide opportunities for professional development among scientists and engineers working in the field of thermal engineering and its applications. The vital need for such developments persists for a long time, despite the dedicated commitment of regional governments in developing countries to raise the standard of undergraduate education and to create world-class research capabilities in the institutions of higher education. The purpose of starting an international conference like ICTEA is to meet this requirement and to provide a well-structured platform to expedite interdisciplinary research activities and productivity in the region, as well as providing a well-established point of contact and worldwide networking. Such a conference can serve as a focal point for the gathering of scientists and engineers. The theme "Thermal Engineering" has been selected as an umbrella title for the conference series because of its encompassing meaning, and the wide range of research areas covered under this theme are of equally important in the developing and developed world. A wide range of interdisciplinary topics related to the environment, energy, petroleum, and construction are the obvious examples of thermal engineering applications that are crucial for the industrial and economic development. The first conference on Thermal Engineering was held in Beirut, Lebanon, from 31st May to 4th June, 2004. Looking at the success beyond expectations, the series continued, and the next conference was held in the United Arab Emirates from 3rd January to 6th January, 2006. Since then, Ryerson University, Canada, has been organizing the conference series in Thermal Engineering and continued at Jordan, Oman, Morocco, and Doha. The 12th conference of the series was held in India at Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University, Gandhinagar, Gujarat. After a careful selection procedure, invitations were sent to the ICTEA 2019 authors to prepare extended articles based on the relevance to the journal and the reviews of the conference version of the papers. Out of seventeen submitted articles, after thorough reviewing procedures, seven were finally accepted for this special issue section of Clean Technologies and Environmental Policy (CTEP). We appreciate the willingness of the authors for helping in organizing this special issue. We are thankful to the CTEP journal publisher, Editor in Chief, and Production Editor for supporting this publication. We hope that the readers will be benefitted from the content of this special issue.

COVID-19 (coronavirus) has had an enormous impact on nearly every country in the world. However, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon were already facing difficult to extreme circumstances even before the pandemic erupted, making them particularly vulnerable. This report looks at the impact of the pandemic, associated lockdowns and economic shocks and other misfortunes which have compounded the crisis, such as sharply lower oil revenues in Iraq and the Port of Beirut explosion in Lebanon, as well as political instability in both. The report estimates that 4.4 million people in the host communities and 1.1 million refugees or IDPs were driven into poverty in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, and while this considers all of Lebanon, it only includes three governorates in Jordan and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, due to data limitations. A response commensurate with the magnitude of the shock is needed to prevent further misery. The poverty impact of COVID-19 and the ensuing confinement policies and economic contractions have been felt throughout the world, not least by marginalized communities. However, COVID-19 has compounded existing vulnerabilities or crises in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Lebanon. Syrian refugees – most of whom have been displaced for up to nine years – are particularly exposed given their perilous pre-crisis situation. Host communities in these three countries, who have supported and accommodated such large numbers of refugees, have also been heavily affected; all three countries were in strained positions prior to COVID-19, ranging from economic stagnation and high public debt in Jordan, to a collapse in public revenues due to international oil price shocks in KRI, to complete political and economic crisis in Lebanon. By March 2020, all three countries had witnessed their first cases of COVID-19 and introduced stringent containment policies ranging from partial closures of schools and shops to full curfew. While these measures were initially largely successful in containing the spread of the pandemic, they also led to a decline in economic activity across most sectors, particularly in the informal market. In Jordan and Iraq, the losses are estimated at around 8.2 and 10.5 percent of 2019's GDP respectively. In Lebanon where the COVID-19 crisis is compounded by economic and political crises the losses are much higher, around 25 percent of GDP. Lebanon has experienced inflation of over 100 percent, largely due to its import dependence and currency depreciation. Unsurprisingly, given the magnitude of these shocks, recent rapid needs assessments and UNHCR administrative data show that refugees, who are highly concentrated in low-skilled jobs in the informal sector, have had to reduce food intake, incur additional debt and in some instances suffered eviction.

This article, originally delivered in the Fall of 2011 at a seminar held in Beirut at the Centre for Arab Unity Studies, examines the 2011 amendments to the Moroccan Constitution in light of the historical background. The tumultuous events of the so-called 'Arab Spring' brought new urgency to the issue of constitutional reforms that had been broached initially on the accession of Muhammad VI to the throne in 1999. Since independence, Moroccan political society has typically been vibrant, democratic and home to numerous political parties of various orientations and, since the 1970s, has witnessed calls by various sides for constitutional reforms as well as for the institution of a constitutional or parliamentary monarchy. On 9 March 2011 Muhammad VI gave a momentous address subjecting the issue of royal authority to public deliberations. This topic had previously ranked as one of the few unapproachable taboos of the political scene. A vital driving force in the process of constitutional reform has been the youthful February 20 Movement that was instrumental in the mobilization of millions of Moroccans and led to submitting the new draft Constitution to popular referendum and its ratification on 1 July 2011. Unlike other Arab countries, Morocco's functioning democracy, its well-established political parties and the fact that the issue of constitutional reforms had already been on the table meant that when Moroccans descended into the streets they had a set of clearly defined demands – demands that were also less drastic than those being made in other countries. Yet while Moroccan politics have been highly developed and articulate since the 1940s, the events of the Arab Spring provided the necessary shock and catalyst to transform relative complacency into action. The dense topography of mature political parties and organizations in Morocco factored in two ways: first, it permitted a stable environment for democratic transition, which was not new as a concept; and in a somewhat less positive regard, the compromises and concessions to numerous sides dictated by Moroccan political pluralism led – in the drafting of the amended Constitution – to a document of somewhat indistinct character. The King's authority, in particular, is not so limited as a contemporary parliamentary monarchy and he retains a distinct set of powers, particularly under the aegis of his role as 'Commander of the Faithful' (Amir al-Mu'minin). Nevertheless, there have been significant changes and this article examines the nature of these, their genesis and links to various political trends and parties. The uniqueness of the Moroccan model is demonstrated, though other Arab countries, notably Jordan, may follow a similar path.

AbstractEpisodes of urban violence, particularly those inflected by religious sectarianism, have a particular dynamic of ordering urban spaces and identity publics, not just during the episodes themselves but long after. Using sketches of urban violence in Lebanon (Beirut) and India (Delhi and Ahmedabad), this article focuses on an emerging phenomenon associated with such episodes — one that orders city spaces around rehabilitative activities in such a way that these spaces, in both material and experiential terms, bear an integral relationship with aspects of religious activity. Religiously motivated aid practices, channeled through faith‐based relief organizations, enumerate vulnerable populations and circumscribe their continued survival within bounded spatial entities, especially in those contexts where long‐term 'secular' or state‐sponsored rehabilitative effort is lacking. These processes of emplacing religiously marked populations in urban environments suggest the potential for a religiously coded bio‐politics, or a practice of governmentality that puts agents other than the state in a position of exerting power over continued social life. The three sketches variously illustrate how the intertwining of religion with survival within contemporary urban socio‐spatial formations suggest powerful intimacies between religion and individual or community life, which at the same time make place for alternative claims of governance, security and citizenship.RésuméLes épisodes de violence urbaine, notamment s'ils sont teintés de sectarisme religieux, présentent une dynamique particulière de classement des espaces urbains et des publics identitaires, à la fois pendant les événements et longtemps après. À partir de scènes de violence urbaine survenues au Liban (Beyrouth) et en Inde (Delhi et Ahmedabad), cet article s'intéresse à un phénomène qui se dessine conjointement et ordonne les espaces de la ville autour d'activités de réinsertion de sorte que ces espaces comportent, tant en termes matériels que d'expérience, une relation intrinsèque avec certains aspects d'une activité religieuse. Des aides motivées par la religion, dispensées par des organismes d'assistance aux fondements religieux, recensent les populations vulnérables et confinent leur survie future dans des entités spatiales circonscrites, notamment si les efforts de réinsertion à long terme "laïcs" ou financés par l'État sont insuffisants. Ces processus d'implantation de populations étiquetées sur le plan religieux laissent entrevoir la possibilité d'une biopolitique codifiée par la foi, ou d'une pratique de gouvernement qui permet à des agents autres que l'État d'exercer un pouvoir sur la pérennité de la vie sociale. Les trois événements illustrent diversement comment l'intrication entre religion et survie au sein de formations socio‐spatiales urbaines contemporaines sous‐entend de puissantes proximités entre religion et vie communautaire ou individuelle, lesquelles laissent simultanément le champ à des revendications alternatives en matière de gouvernance, de sécurité et de citoyenneté.

Die vorliegende Arbeit zielt darauf ab, zwei Forschungslücken in der Literatur über Bürgerkriege zu schließen. Erstens, die Analyse der Strukturen nicht-staatlicher bewaffneter Gruppen. Zweitens, die Untersuchung der Politik von Milizen, als Form nicht-staatlicher Gruppen, denen in gegenwärtigen Bürgerkriegen eine zunehmende Bedeutung zukommt. Diese beiden Bereiche werden mit Hilfe einer historisch vergleichenden Analyse am Beispiel von zwei Milizen, die im sudanesischen und libanesischen Bürgerkrieg kämpften, untersucht. Die "Popular Defense Forces", 1989 von der Regierung des Sudan mobilisiert, wurden zum Sammelbecken für undisziplinierte und teilautonome militärische Einheiten, die schwerste Kriegsverbrechen begingen. Die "Lebanese Forces", eine maronitisch-nationalistische Miliz, wurde von einer Koalition konservativer christlicher Parteien gegründet. Nach dem Zusammenbruch des Staates 1975-6 wurde diese Miliz zu einer autonomen politischen Einheit mit einem territorial abgegrenzten Kanton im Osten von Beirut. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Prozesse und Strategien, die diesen Milizen die Etablierung von Herrschaft ermöglichte. Die beiden Gruppen entwickelten sich zu Organisationen, die die zu verteidigenden Gebiete beherrschten und mit staatlichen Geldgebern verbündet waren, aber auch in Konkurrenz zu ihnen standen. Diese Arbeit identifiziert drei Mechanismen, die die Entwicklungen von Milizen im Laufe ihrer Zeit bestimmen. Der Erste erklärt die Formierung von Milizen als ein Bricolage von politischen und nicht-politischen Antworten auf Unsicherheit. Der Zweite erklärt, wie sich Milizen in hybride Organisationen, von zentraler Mobilisierungseinheit und lokal eingebettete Organisationen, entwickeln. Der Dritte führt die Kontrolle des Zentrums über die lokalen Organisationen auf die Macht über Ressourcen zurück. Die Arbeit schließt mit dem Entwurf eines alternativen analytischen Modells für die Untersuchung von Bürgerkriegen. ; This thesis provides an analysis of the organizational politics of state supporting armed groups, and demonstrates how group cohesion and institutionalization impact on the patterns of violence witnessed within civil wars. Using an historical comparative method, strategies of leadership control are examined in the processes of organizational evolution of the Popular Defence Forces, an Islamist Nationalist militia, and the allied Lebanese Forces, a Christian Nationalist militia. The first group was a centrally coordinated network of irregular forces which fielded ill-disciplined and semi-autonomous military units, and was responsible for severe war crimes. Equally responsible for war crimes, such as the Sabra and Shatila massacre of Shi''a and Palestinian civilians in 1982, the second group, nonetheless, became an autonomous military formation with an established territorial canton with a high degree of control over military units. After first analysing the political and institutional context of formation of these two groups, detailed case study analysis illustrates how political-military leaderships consolidated internal authority over combat units. At first, this authority relied on a bricolage of norms, motivations and institutions, as highly diverse, loosely coordinated actors mobilised in response to insecurity. As key leadership figures emerged, these groups evolved into hybrid organisations, divided between central organisations and locally embedded units operating according to localised security arenas decoupled from central military or political strategy. Central authority was then consolidated through a process of progressive institutionalisation and expansion, as centralised control was established, often violently, over resources, recruitment and discipline. This thesis shows, how militias, formed in allegiance with the state evolved into organizations rivalling state sovereignty and exploiting the communities which they claimed to defend.

Rouham,Yamout:American University of Beirut Rita,Giacaman:Community and Public Health ; With the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, about 700 000 Palestinians were dispossessed and dispersed, mostly to neighbouring countries. Roughly 100 000 Palestinians fled to Lebanon and now 400 000 are living there, most in refugee camps. Although tolerated by the Lebanese Government and population, with their basic needs supported by the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Palestinian refugees are subjected to regulations that hinder their opportunities to seek employment and ownership of property, thereby restricting their integration into society and compromising their wellbeing. In a study of the quality of life and wellbeing of Palestinians living in the occupied Palestinian territory, a team from Birzeit University, Ramallah, West Bank, investigated classic and war-related indicators of insecurity in the Gaza Strip 6 months after the Israeli war during the winter of 2008—09, using locally developed scales for the measurement of insecurity and individual distress. We assessed the relevance and validity of the two scales as measures of wellbeing for Palestinian refugees living in camps in Lebanon. Methods Researchers from Lebanon undertook six focus group discussions to investigate notions of relevance to the quality of life and wellbeing of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and modified the questionnaire used in the Gaza Strip, without changing its psychometric properties and without modifying the questions in the scales to be studied. In this pilot study, households were selected from four Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon to represent the different areas—north, south, Beirut, and Dbayeh (only functional refugee camp hosting Christian Palestinians, whereas the refugees in the others are Sunni Muslim). Every other household was selected in Beddawi and one in every three households in Burj el-Barajneh and Ein el-Helweh, and all households were approached in Dbayeh. In the camps of Beddawi, Burj el-Barajneh, and Ein el-Helweh, the fieldworkers stopped gathering data when the sample size of 100 individuals was attained, whereas in Dbayeh this number could not be achieved. One adult respondent from every household was randomly selected according to Kish tables, with alternating of men and women—ie, the person answering the door was asked to list the male or female adult members of the household. Indicators of insecurity and individual distress were analysed after application of the cutoffs used in the Gaza Strip study. χ2 and logistic regression analyses were done to identify the association between the dependent variable—reports of high insecurity—with demographic, socioeconomic, and health factors, and with objective and subjective factors related to the political and legal conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This study was approved by the Institute of Community and Public Health Ethical Review Committee, West Bank. Data gatherers obtained verbal informed consent from the household members selected before their participation in the study. Findings 356 (94%) of 378 adults who were approached by the fieldworkers responded—101 in Beddawi, 100 in Burj el-Barajneh, 100 in Ein el-Helweh, and 55 in Dbayeh. All the indictors of insecurity and distress were the same as in the study undertaken in the Gaza Strip, with Chronbach's α showing good internal consistency for the insecurity scale (0·84) and for the individual distress scale (0·86). 134 (38%) respondents reported moderate to high amounts of individual distress and 121 (34%) reported high intensity of insecurity. A first logistic model, including demographic and socioeconomic variables, showed that insecurity was associated with living at Burj el-Barajneh refugee camp (49 [49%] of 100 vs 72 [28%] of 256 living in the other three camps surveyed), displacement of the family from another refugee camp (28 [55%] of 51 vs 92 [30%] of 303 whose families had not been displaced), and the respondents thinking that the camp was overcrowded (86 [43%] of 202 vs 35 [24%] of 148 who did not have a problem with the camp crowding). The results of a second model of all the variables that were significant in the bivariate analysis and adjusted for age, sex, and employment, showed that the odds of individuals reporting high insecurity were significantly higher in Palestinians living in the refugee camp at Burj el-Barajneh than in those living at Dbayeh (49 [49%] of 100 vs eight [15%] of 55, respectively; odds ratio 5·95, 95% CI 2·05—17·29); in individuals whose families had been displaced from another refugee camp than in those who had not been displaced (28 [55%] of 51 vs 92 [30%] of 303, respectively; 5·62, 2·67—11·85); in Palestinians who felt deprived than in those who did not (50 [43%] of 115 vs 69 [29%] of 237, respectively; 2·18, 1·22—3·89); and in individuals who felt estranged from their homeland than in those who did not (95 [41%] of 234 vs 23 [21%] of 109, respectively; 2·41, 1·28—4·53) Interpretation The security and distress measures developed in the Gaza Strip showed good internal consistency when applied to Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon. Furthermore, high intensities of insecurity and distress were noted in Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon, raising questions about the legal, political, and social conditions imposed on these individuals as determinants of their insecurity, life quality, and wellbeing. The results encourage testing and validation of the security and distress scales in Palestinian refugees in other Arab countries, and in other migrants, refugees, and people living in zones affected by war and conflict. Funding Medical Aid for Palestinians. Contributors RY is the principal investigator and drafted the Abstract. SF did the data analysis. NMEAR and RG participated in the concept and design of the study and reviewed the data analysis and the drafts. DH reviewed the consecutive drafts of the Abstract. All authors have read and approved the final Abstract for publication. Conflicts of interest We declare that we have no conflicts of interest.

The subject. The article analyses the practice of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and its Judgement of 18 August 2020, rendered against those found guilty of a terrorist act and the impact on the progressive development of international criminal law.The purpose. This article seeks to define what goal the international community pursued in establishing the Special Tribunal for Lebanon from the perspective of international security law, international criminal justice, and counter-terrorism cooperation. The legal nature of the terrorist attack of 14 October 2005 is essential in this regard: is the crime is comparable in its gravity and consequences to the crimes of genocide or war crimes in the territory of the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, which predetermined the subsequent establishment of ad hoc international criminal tribunals? Further, was the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon an attempt to make the crimes of terrorism an international crime in practice? Finally, was the establishment of the Tribunal an attempt to lay the groundwork for a new type of international judicial bodies with jurisdiction over crimes of terrorism? The methodology. The authors use such general theoretical and specific scientific methods as comparative analysis, generalization, interpretation and classification as well as systemic analysis and formal logical methods.The main results. The legal qualification and analysis of the circumstances of the terrorist attack do not enable the conclusion that the bomb explosion in Beirut was comparable in danger and consequences to any international crimes or was a threat to international peace and security. In its turn, the involvement of the Security Council in the establishment of the Tribunal does not unequivocally evidence its alleged attempt to create a purely international criminal structure.The choice of applicable law granted to Lebanon and the fact that the crime committed solely affected the interests of that State would qualify the Tribunal as an internationalized judicial body, whose work would focus on defining the crime of terrorism through a broader lens of interpreting national legislation. In other words, the impetus for development has been given not to international but national criminal law.The Tribunal was created neither to progressively develop international criminal law with regard to defining terrorism as an international crime nor to advance the international criminal justice system. Rather, it was an attempt to address Lebanon's specific political and legal challenges.Conclusions. The outcome of the Tribunal's work could have a rather negative impact on the development of international criminal law, discrediting the very idea of enabling "peace through justice" and uniform, consistent application and interpretation of international criminal law. ; Анализируются причины создания Специального трибунала по Ливану, существо преступлений, подпадающих под его юрисдикцию, политические аспекты работы. Приводится подробный анализ Приговора Трибунала 2020 г. и всей его деятельности с позиций влияния на развитие международного уголовного права. Отмечается неоднозначность правовых методик и оценок, положенных в основу Приговора; делается вывод о его потенциально отрицательном эффекте для развития международного уголовного права.

International audience ; The 2015 Paris Agreement and the recent Quito New Urban Agenda both emphasised the need to empower cities in climate change policies, including energy policies that aim at energy transitions towards more energy efficiency and the use of renewable energies. Being both factors in and potential victims of climate change, cities have many reasons to act. Therefore, there is a need to examine how changes in urban governance could indeed address this necessity and the challenge cities have to face.This issue has been addressed in many studies and plans for cities in the Western and advanced industrial world. These first studies have highlighted several results. Firstly, instead of considering only climate change issues, they stressed the need to understand ecological pressures more widely, particularly the way global energy pressures, like peak oil threats or price increases have created energy stress for cities. Secondly, they also underlined how privatisation trends and the ascent of transnational energy firms reconfigured energy regulation by sidelining public energy utilities and companies. Thirdly, metropolisation, the concentration of wealth and power in the big metropolises, transforms urban governance. The role of states in energy regulation is thus undermined and metropolitan coalitions are more diverse and open to private and as well as local urban interests. Green growth becomes a new market for private firms, and metropolitan governments compete for jobs and investments in the sector. At the same time, ensuring the continuity of energy supply or of other infrastructure is another goal for metropolitan firms and authorities. This leads to newagendas, including local policies of energy transition, which combine the promotion of renewable energies and energy efficiency with the shortening of energy circuits.However, several factors that are favouring these changes in energy governance seem to be specific to world cities and might not apply in other contexts. The increasing – albeit contested – political autonomisation of such cities in their relation to national states and their specific wealth are cases in point. My goal in this chapter is to look at Arab cities, for which, at a first glance, energy transition initiatives seem difficult to identify. My chapter draws on a wide collective analysis of urban energy transition policies in ten metropolises from emerging economies, including several Arab cities such as Amman, Beirut, Tunis and Sfax (Jaglin and Verdeil, 2017; Verdeil et al., 2015; Verdeil, 2014a; 2016; forthcoming), and on secondary literature about the United Arab Emirates. It aims to propose some preliminary observations and to raise questions to fuel the upcoming debate. I will not present case studies but rather identify policy issues and policy options that vary greatly according to context and, above all, according to the national availability of fossil energy such as oil and gas and the social contracts that governthe redistribution of this wealth in exchange for loyalty.

Western Armenian was declared "definitely endangered" in 2010, although the language is taught in private Armenian schools across a global diaspora created by a genocide in 1915. Enrollment in Armenian schools in the Middle East has been declining for four decades, while the Armenian schools of France are growing & evolving & all are facing a rapidly changing educational climate. Conducted in Beirut, Amman, Paris & Marseille, and involving participants from Aleppo, this study analyzes data from more than 100 diasporan Armenians and a dozen schools. An interdisciplinary, post-structuralist & constructivist approach is taken to understanding the roles of school policies in attracting parents to Armenian schools, in effectively transmitting the language to students, & promoting the vitality of the language in each of the four contexts. Discourse Analysis is applied to both structural & personal representations of the language & of the schools. Ethnolinguistic Vitality & Language Socialization theories are used to understand the connections between policy, parent school choice & the wider vitality of the language. Parent school choice is looked at in terms of consumer psychology, and ultimately Bourdieu's concept of habitus is the most apt for explaining why Armenian parents choose non-Armenian schools, & why this often becomes a definitive family break from the institution. Policy above the school level is found to have less impact on vitality than school enrollment & dominant discourses on language maintenance. Recommendations are made for policies & pedagogy. ; L'arménien occidental est classé comme langue en danger depuis 2010, mais il est enseigné dans un réseau d'écoles arméniennes à travers une diaspora mondiale, crée par un génocide en 1915. Les inscriptions sont en déclin dans les écoles du Moyen-Orient depuis quatre décennies, alors qu'en France on observe un développement des écoles privées. Toutes les écoles sont confrontées à une culture éducative en évolution. Les données sont collectées à Beyrouth, Amman, Paris et Marseille, et des participants venant d'Alep. L'approche est interdisciplinaire, poststructuraliste et constructiviste, dans le but de comprendre le rôle des politiques scolaires dans l'attractivité des écoles et dans la transmission linguistique et dans la promotion de la vitalité de la langue dans chaque contexte. L'analyse de discours est employée pour analyser les représentations de la langue et des écoles aux niveaux personnel et structurel. Les théories de la vitalité ethnolinguistique et de la socialisation linguistique aident à éclairer les liens entre la politique, le choix des parents, et la vitalité de la langue. Le choix des parents est approché du point de vue de la psychologie de la consommation, et finalement c'est la notion de l'habitus (de Bourdieu) qui éclaire le mieux les dynamiques de ce choix et pourquoi il constitue souvent une rupture définitive avec l'institution. L'étude montre que les politiques au-delà de l'institutionnel ont moins d'influence sur le maintien de la langue que l'inscription à l'école et les discours dominants. Des préconisations sont formulées pour des changements de la politique scolaire et de la pédagogie.

Cet article aborde les modalités de déterritorialisation et de reterritorialisation des villes vivant un processus de métropolisation. Dans ces villes, l'évolution des différents espaces de la ville est moins en rapport avec des logiques de centralité liant la ville à son arrière-pays. Elle plus affectée par la compétition entre différentes centralités inscrites dans des réseaux locaux et internationaux d'acteurs et de lieux, menant à la déterritorialisation de la ville. Cette évolution constitue un défi politique considérable, tant pour les citadins que pour les institutions en charge de la régulation urbaine. Les principales réponses à ce défi cherchent à ramener de la cohérence par des efforts de reterritorialisation de l'urbain. Cette reterritorialisation s'appuie sur des stratégies de gouvernance territoriale qui peuvent se déployer sur trois échelles différentes : métropolitaine, régionale ou locale. En se fondant sur l'exemple de Beyrouth, cet article souligne le fait que, bien que de natures très différentes, voire opposées, ces trois formes de gouvernance peuvent opérer simultanément dans un même contexte urbain. L'article avance aussi l'idée qu'une focalisation sur le développement des controverses en lien avec l'organisation et l'usage de l'espace urbain, notamment les grands projets urbains, peut servir de grille pour saisir l'articulation, la tension et le développement mutuel de ces gouvernances. Les controverses poussent les acteurs à se positionner les uns par rapport aux autres, construire ou redéfinir des réseaux d'action, porter des projets de transformation urbaine, soit autant de modalités de reterritorialisation de la ville. ; This article deals with modalities of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation in cities undergoing metropolisation processes. In these cities, territorial evolution is becoming less related to logics of centrality linking the city and its hinterlands. It is more affected by competition logics between different centralities anchored in different local and international actors and place networks, leading to the "deterritorialisation" of the city. This evolution represents a considerable political challenge for urban citizens as well as for institutions in charge of urban regulation. The main answers to this challenge usually aim to bring back coherence through efforts of "reterritorialisation". This reterritorialisation builds on territorial governance strategies that may deploy on three different scales : metropolitan, regional or local. Through the case of Beirut, this article stresses that, though of different or even opposing nature, these three forms of territorial governance may be simultaneously operating in the same urban context. The article also asserts that focusing on the development of controversies linked to the organization and use of urban space, and mainly to large urban projects, could serve as a framework for understanding the articulation, tension and mutual development of these governances. Controversies push actors to position themselves, build or redefine networks and engage in projects that would transform urban space, resulting in various modalities of reterritorialisation of the city. ; Peer reviewed

Corruption in present-day Algeria has become so rife that it has gone from what Algerians once sardonically termed the 'sport of the elite' to being the 'national sport'. Not only has it reached epidemic proportions at all levels, it has become a culture unto itself, endemic to the country. Because most documented instances of major corruption and scandals have been linked to official branches, apparatuses and persons of the state, and because most have occurred and would not have been possible without some sort of official sanction, corruption in Algeria is ipso facto political. The mechanisms and networks of corruption are many and interlocking, revolving around and feeding on bribery, clientelism, tribalism, nepotism, webs of personal interest and loyalties. The crisis is multifaceted with international dimensions as well, given the collusion of multinational corporations and the intersection of power and vast revenues deriving from oil rent that has also permitted, through an overinflated and ineffectual state bureaucracy, a fertile environment for the pernicious phenomenon. Privatization; the opening of Algerian markets to direct foreign investment and liberalization of trade in response to structural reforms demanded by international monetary institutions during the 1990s; what was effectively a vicious and disastrous civil war in the wake of the suspension of the 1992 elections; as well as globalization have all factored in reinforcing old forms of corruption and promoting new ones. Elite coteries, crony capitalism, and a new generation of ambitious intermediaries and young opportunistic entrepreneurs, such as Rafiq 'Abd al-Mu'min Khalifa (convicted head of the al-Khalifa Group), have become the new players in billion-dollar schemes of graft, theft and embezzlement of unprecedented proportions. Furthermore, court cases and judicial proceedings have often taken on the aspect of farce when arrests are made and charges brought against minor officials, leaving those higher-up and known to have been party to illicit activities and dealings above the law in the realm of the 'untouchables'. Significantly, the road to reform, which must necessarily be political in the first instance, is fraught with obstacles, not the least of which is that favouritism is institutionalized in the letter of Algerian law. With good reason, Algerians in general have become highly circumspect with candidates and an electoral process that are open to every tactic of manipulation. This article provides valuable insider information into the specifics and mechanics of Algerian corruption, which even the ruling elite has been obliged to admit constitutes the primary threat to the stability and continuity of the state. The research and distillation of conclusions in this article are drawn from the full-length Arabic-language book by Muḥammad Ḥalīm Līmām entitled Ẓāhirat al-Fasād al-Siyāsī fī al-Jazāʾir: al-Asbāb wa al-Āthār wa al-Iṣlāḥ. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies (CAUS), 2011.

The European University Institute (RSCAS) was selected by the European Commission to carry out a Study on "Labour Markets Performance and Migration Flows in Arab Mediterranean Countries: Determinants and Effects" (Nº ECFIN/D/2008/036). Scientific Director: Philippe Fargues Project Coordinator: Iván Martín Objectives The objectives of the Study are two-fold: 􀁹 to analyze the key labour market determinants of migration flows from selected Arab Mediterranean Countries (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and the Occupied Palestinian Territories), with a particular emphasis on demographic pressures, wage differentials and relative income disparities with the EU, employment policies, labour market flexibility and unemployment rates; this analysis includes the impact of migration on the labour markets of Arab Mediterranean Country (AMCs) labour markets; 􀁹 to propose a series of specific recommendations to improve the design of the EU's migration policies towards AMCs and policy options available to them for the management of mismatches between labour supply and demand. Team of Experts for the Study Philippe Fargues, Migration Programme Director, RSCAS-EUI Iván Martín, Project Coordinator, RSCAS-EUI, and ICEI, Spain Samir Aita, General Manager, A Concept Mafhoum Rafik Bouklia, Université d'Oran, Algeria. Jad Chaaban, American University of Beirut, Lebanon Brahim El-Mouaatamid, Research Assistant, CARIM Project, EUI-RSCAS Thoraya El-Rayyes, ILO Arab States Regional Office, Jordan Tamirace Fakhoury, Research Assistant, CARIM Project, EUI-RSCAS Larabi Jaidi, Université Mohammed V de Rabat, Morocco Nathalie Jouant, Research Assistant, CARIM Project, EUI-RSCAS Mustafa Khawaja, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Palestine Azzam Mahjoub, Université de Tunis, Tunisia Francesca Marchetta, University of Florence Mohammad Omari, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Palestine Ibrahim Saif, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Fatiha Talahite, CNRS, Université Paris 13 Nord, France Alessandra Venturini, Executive Director, CARIM, EUI, and Universitá de Torino Jackline Wahba, University of Southampton, UK ; The main objective of this Study is to analyze the key labour market determinants of migration flows from selected Arab Mediterranean Countries (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and the Occupied Palestinian Territories) and the impact of outward migration on the labour markets of Arab Mediterranean Countries (AMCs). This has been done mainly on the basis of the evidence and analysis produced by the two Thematic Background Papers and the 8 National Background Papers commissioned for the Study. In turn, the National Background Papers are deliberately based on national statistical data sources: this makes comparability less straightforward, but has the merit of using original data available at the local level, where they are collected and generated. ; European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs © European Union, 2010 ; Volume I: Final Report and Thematic Background Papers [in English]; Volume II: National Background Papers Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisa)[in French]; Volume III: National Background Papers Mashreq: Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria) [in English]