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A decade ago, trade and investment liberalization dominated the global economic policy agenda. The World Trade Organization (WTO) had recently been created, the United States, Mexico and Canada were implementing North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and much of Southeast Asia and South America were near the peak of an economic boom that was driven in part by greater openness to inflows of foreign capital. In bilateral and multilateral discussions of economic integration, global migration was often missing from the docket entirely. The growth in labor flows from low-income to high-income countries has not been greeted with universal enthusiasm, either by policy makers or academics. In theory, international migration increases economic efficiency by shifting labor from low-productivity to high-productivity environments. As workers move from Central America to the United States, North Africa to Europe, or Southeast Asia to Australia, the global labor supply shifts from labor abundant to labor-scarce economies, compressing international differences in factor prices and raising global gross domestic product (GDP). Migrants enjoy large income gains family members at home share in these gains through remittances, and non-migrating workers in the sending country enjoy higher wages thanks to a drop in local labor supply (Aydemir and Borjas, 2007).

In this dissertation I explore the co-emergence of multinational corporations and the consolidation of the discourse on human rights at the level of the United Nations throughout the second half of the twentieth century and analyse the resulting conceptual gap that created tensions in the international legal order. Despite attempts by developing countries to alleviate this imbalance through the New International Economic Order (NIEO), a multitude of soft law initiatives and the reluctance to address human rights issues in MNCs at the level of the United Nations failed to make MNCs incorporate human rights standards in their operations. The merging of the two concepts became increasingly more challenging throughout the 70s and 80s when the world was faced with the oil crisis and the rise of neoliberalism. This shift in the global legal architecture forced the Third World to take a new approach to tackle the conceptual gap, this resulted in the emergence of the Third generation of human rights and ultimately, the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). CSR is a concept of international private business self-regulation that aims at merging human, socio-economic, and political rights into the world of the corporation. As a response to the concerns for human rights violations by corporate actors, CSR slowly came to the forefront of the global business scene to enable the continuation of the operation of multinational enterprises. CSR presented a platform for global soft law initiatives to minimise the conceptual gap they had created over throughout the preceding decades. This allowed people such as John Ruggie to develop the Guiding Principles, the most successful initiative to date. This dissertation will provide its readers with a fruitful understanding of the crucial role that international law played in this development and further, what implications this had on the political and economic level. - Introduction In the words of Sundhya Pahuja and Anna Saunders, the second half of the twentieth century staged a 'series of encounters between rival practices of world making, each of which travelled with rival accounts of international law'.[1] Anti-colonial disputes, the Cold War, the rise of developmental issues and the increasing popularity of neoliberalism are only some of the events that generated these competing views of the international legal order. These events brought different coalitions across the Global North and Global South, and different 'alliances of interest between 'public' and 'private' actors'.[2] At the heart of the system that emerged lie two fundamental elements: the modern multinational corporation and human rights. How to conceptualize multinational corporations (MNCs) and how to define their relation to the law and the State was part of these rival stories. In this paper I explore the co-emergence of multinational corporations and the consolidation of the discourse on human rights at the level of the United Nations throughout the second half of the twentieth century and analyze the resulting conceptual gap that created tensions in the international legal order. In particular, I examine how this encounter, which became evident as calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) were being advanced within the UN, came to produce the idea of 'Corporate Social Responsibility' (CSR). I show that CSR emerged from the failure of the NIEO, particularly in relation to the roles and responsibilities of private actors in the global economy and how this can be traced to the limits of initiatives addressing the tensions between human rights claims and the interests of multinational corporations. In so doing I provide an understanding of the crucial role that international law played in this development and the implications this had at the political and economic level. The first section of this essay examines the lack of direct use of human rights language in the UN literature focusing on MNCs and their role in world development from the 1960s to the 1970s. This includes an analysis of the report entitled 'Multinational Corporations in World Development'.[3] I demonstrate the emphasis and enthusiasm for multinational corporations displayed at the level of the United Nations and how the concepts of the corporation and human rights were kept separate due to their respective supporters during the Cold War. I then focus on the attempts by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the 'Group of 77' (G77) to bridge this conceptual gap through the imposition of policies and initiatives, though without major success. The second section analyzes the influence of the oil crisis and the rise of neoliberalism on the shift of the global legal architecture, ultimately promoting the birth of the new developmental state. Here concern is with the new legal structures' attempt to merge the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights through a third generation of human rights, [4] and I engage in theoretical approaches by legal scholars such as Samuel Moyn and Antonia Darder. In the third section investigates the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and analyzes its application and limitations. CSR is a concept of international private business self-regulation that aims at merging human, socio-economic, and political rights into the world of the corporation. As a response to the concerns for human rights violations by corporate actors, CSR slowly came to the forefront of the global business scene to enable the continuation of the operation of multinational enterprises. I demonstrate how CSR aspired to close a gap between human rights and corporate action in a way that would harmonize them through a multitude of soft law initiatives. This leads to the question of whether direct regulations can apply to MNCs under international law and a discussion of the UN Global Compact, at the time the world's largest and most far-reaching CSR initiative.[5] Finally, this paper closes with the most recent developments in the global legal order designed to tackle the conceptual gap between MNCs and human rights, namely through the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises[6] and the development of the Guiding Principles. Dawn of co-existence The United Nations lies at the heart of the international regime with its normative, institutional and procedural human rights activities.[7] By adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the UN created a milestone document in the history of human rights. The Declaration has had an enormous influence on the world both in terms of 'spreading the philosophy of human rights, and in terms of inspiring legal texts and decisions'.[8] New states have used the Declaration as a basis for their constitutions, while domestic and international courts have invoked the Declaration in their judgments.[9] As human rights law developed, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, followed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, were both drafted under the auspices of the United Nations, adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1976. Together, these three instruments make up the 'International Bill of Human Rights'.[10] Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the world became a stage for global changes that altered the legal order. The end of colonialism dawned in the Global South, and during the height of the Cold War the West faced the Soviet Bloc and its mission of 'exporting revolution'.[11] Leaders of nationalist resistance movements received military as well as financial aid from the Soviet Bloc which intensified anti-colonial mobilization for self-determination.[12] Simultaneously, globalization was increasing rapidly, with multinational corporations emerging onto the global scene with heightened awareness of their existence as an entity with legal personality. As outlined by Sornarajah, their distinct bases of power allowed them to assert their interests through the law. With economic resources often exceeding those of their host state, MNCs had the ability to sculpt and manipulate legal outcomes through arbitration processes concerning foreign investment protection. This was done by exerting lobbying pressure on a host state which might be reluctant or even unable to object to the activities of MNCs.[13] The 'Multinational Corporations in World Development', report drafted by the UN Secretariat's Department on Economic and Social Affairs in 1973, considers 'the role of multinational corporations and their impact on the process of development, especially that of developing countries [.] [and] international relations'.[14] From the outset, the Report identifies the emerging phenomenon of the MNC in international economic affairs, how its size and spread has increased, and identifies the wide array of its activities and its use of natural resources which 'rival traditional economic exchanges between nations'.[15] It is surprising therefore, that a Report from the Department on Economic and Social Affairs, does not contain the term 'human rights' throughout the entire document. In the Report's introduction the UN makes a clear distinction between the differing views of impacts MNCs have on host countries. While 'depicted in some quarters as key instruments to maximizing world welfare, [they] are seen in others as dangerous agents of imperialism'.[16] The fact the United Nations recognized the potential neo-colonial nature of multinational corporations further highlights the need for guidance on human rights violations by MNCs. Yet the Report's reluctance to engage in the area of human rights provides a first glimpse into the divergence of the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights. An explanation for this can be identified by analyzing the Conventions, on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, with the UN's reluctance to avoid tensions between the supporters of both Conventions, respectively the United States and the Soviet Union. The US pushed for the development of civil and political rights, reflecting the protection of the freedom and liberties of individuals. Stemming from a Western philosophy, John Locke identified that in a 'state of nature' humans had 'natural rights' including the right to life, liberty and property. Similarly, French legal philosophers such as Rosseau, Montesquieu and Voltaire argued that such rights emerge from the inherent nature and virtue of man.[17] As Joseph and Castan argue, 'natural rights theories were highly influential [.] particularly in the revolutionary fervor of the United States'.[18] The advancement of civil and political rights reflects the capitalist ideology of the United States, conforming to the libertarian nature of Western capitalist societies.[19] In contrast, the Soviet Union pushed for the advancement of economic, social and cultural rights. These included the right to work, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to physical health. Contrary to the civil and political rights, these rights were based on the idea of equality, one deeply rooted in the political ideology of socialism. As the US would not commit to a proposition that there is a right to social goods, the US has never ratified this Convention.[20] The Soviet Bloc promoted the right of self-determination by providing military and financial aid to indigenous political activists in their fight for independence; an idea enshrined in Article 1 of the Covenant which states that: 'All peoples have the right to self-determination'.[21] For the Soviets 'national self-determination was an adjunct to revolutionary communism'.[22] They envisioned self-determination as the tool for the transition from dismantling a colonial empire to establishing a socialist state.[23] However, while the United Nations was reluctant to adhere to human rights in the framework of multinational corporations, other international institutions were motivated to develop this area. The OECD attempted to impose human rights on MNCs by adopting the Guidelines for MNCs (hereinafter 'OECD Guidelines') in 1976.[24] These were 'voluntary recommendations for business practices relating to human rights, disclosure of information, anti-corruption, labour relations, taxation, the environment and consumer protection'.[25] The Guidelines were intended to strengthen the international investment climate by improving the relationship and confidence between MNCs and host countries. National Contact Points (NCPs) were created that bore the responsibilities of enforcing and promoting the Guidelines, and any natural person could make a claim related to the violation of the Guidelines.[26] This aspect of the Guidelines provided an enforcing mechanism accessible to the public. But although the Guidelines were formally adopted by member states as a corporate responsibility instrument, they were subject to widespread criticism in the international legal order. As explained by Cernic, the Guidelines are ambiguous while the NCPs are limited in their influence on host states. Even though they outlined the need to respect human rights, the obligations were not framed in mandatory terms.[27]. Since the Guidelines lacked legal basis, the OECD was unable to assert sanctions on non-compliant corporations, and critics labeled them weak and ineffective. However, it was the intention of the OECD to guide rather than to legislate, because they saw voluntary versus legally binding standards as less of a dichotomy and more a continuum.[28] Although voluntary, corporations would be under scrutiny and potentially harm their reputation if they violated the Guidelines.[29] Yet, the Guidelines were hardly successful in the international legal order. A year later, in 1977, the ILO attempted to bridge this gap by adopting the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning MNCs and Social Policy. These also attempted to 'encourage the positive contribution the MNEs can make to economic and social progress'.[30]. Article 8 emphasizes the respect for the Universal Declaration and the International Covenants. However, its voluntary and non-binding nature, as well as its weak monitoring process made this instrument as frail as the OECD Guidelines.[31] The lack of responsibility and perseverance stemming from international organizations and their disappointing attempt at bridging the gap between multinational corporations and human rights forced national and regional change. On the one hand, developing nations began taking matters into their own hands. To portray unity and solidarity throughout the 'Third World' the G77 coalition, formed in 1964 by developing member countries with the primary intention of promoting its members' economic and humanitarian interests through cooperation at the level of the United Nations, took a strong initiative. In the late 1970s the Group expressed its concern at the 'imbalance of negotiating power between TNCs [transnational corporations] and their host countries and inability on the part of the latter to control the activities of the TNCs within their territories'.[32] Simultaneously, home countries wanted to ensure their investments abroad would be protected, 'specifically from expropriation without a commitment to compensation based on international law'.[33] In accordance with the principles and concerns of the freshly adopted NIEO, developing countries raised the issue of the dominance of MNCs over natural resources and strongly urged the UN for a reaffirmation of their sovereignty over their resources. The NIEO was an attempt by Third World developing states, in the wake of decolonization, to deploy international law to achieve economic justice and improvements in the areas of development and socio-economic rights.[34] Pushed by the G77, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) member states devised a set of NIEO proposals in 1974 including (1) that developing states are entitled to control and regulate all activities of MNCs within their territory; and (2) that international trade must be based on equitable, stable and remunerative prices for raw materials.[35] Despite its impressive aims and careful compilation, the NIEO was unsuccessful. It failed 'to displace the power and advantage held by influential states', it failed to alter international law which favoured the economic interests of capital-exporting states and, most importantly, it demonstrated the Third World's acceptance of the economic ideology of the capitalist mindset, inflating the value of foreign capital including the exploitation of local labour in developing countries.[36] Consequently, the UN set up the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations which drafted a code of conduct for TNCs, one of the first formalized instruments drafted by the UN that set an obligation upon MNCs to respect human rights in host countries.[37] However while developing countries insisted on the idea of adopting an international instrument that was binding on MNCs, developed countries were not prepared to go beyond the voluntary sets of guidelines already in place.[38] On the other hand, due to the ineffectiveness of the international institutions, some MNCs that sought to abide by human rights law attempted to create some provisions themselves. An example is the Sullivan principles designed by Leon Sullivan, former member of the General Motors' Board of Directors. These principles included the elimination of discrimination based on race, and the concept of equality in the workplace. The objective was that by engaging in human rights concepts like dignity and respect, MNCs could be a lever for the elimination of apartheid in South Africa. However, like the previously established soft law on obligations on multinational corporations, these principles were voluntary and unlike the OECD Guidelines which had the NCPs, there was no enforcement mechanism. The great majority of MNCs that adopted his principles did so with the sole motive of being able to continue to prosper in South Africa.[39] In summary, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, there were attempts at a variety of levels to bring together the concepts of human rights and multinational corporations. Though it was largely absent on the level of the United Nations until the late 1970s there were many first steps by international institutions to bridge this gap. The NIEO was the first set of concrete economic principles that were prescribed in international law 'articulating a form of justice based not on domination of one people over another'.[40] It was an 'effort to assert the sovereign autonomy of the non-western world',[41] exemplifying the importance of linking human rights and development, and the fundamental values of duties of international cooperation. However, there was still much to be done as the new decade of the 1980s saw a drastic restructuring of the global trade and investment system - ultimately ending in massive international debt and a dramatic increase in foreign direct investment. A Change in the Global Legal Architecture An accumulation of capital obtained by the main oil producing states in the Middle East led to the establishment of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Cartel in 1972. With the intention of creating a monopoly and obtaining major profits, OPEC raised the price of oil by approximately 400%, with its members keeping revenue in US or European banks, from which developing countries regularly borrowed in the form of aid and loans.[42] However, banks were now lending at higher interest rates to these countries as they were deemed less creditworthy. As a result of sovereign debt and the surplus problem in the international banking system, developing states were forced to rely on foreign direct investment (FDI), as opposed to private borrowing. The very principle that developing states wanted to control with the establishment of the NIEO was now negated by Western states selling MNCs to the developing world as necessary for their survival.[43] Simultaneously to the effects of the oil crisis, the political ideology of neoliberalism emerged on the global scene. Conservative governments gained power in western countries, communism collapsed in Eastern Europe with a move towards market economics, and Latin America implemented stabilization policies to boost their economies.[44] This process saw neoliberalism became an enemy for structural equality, political inclusion, economic access and human rights.[45] Prior to the implementation of neoliberal policies, the relationship between multinational corporations and their host state was formed through the conflict between the host country's national developmental interests as opposed to the corporation's global investment interests. The state being the more powerful actor, attempted 'to channel its private investments to serve its own developmental objectives'.[46] However, as Michael Peters argues, neoliberalism provides 'a universalist foundation for an extreme form of economic rationalism'[47], which according to Paul Haslam, was a re-forming of the modern state rather than the perceived notion of the state 'unambiguously withering away'.[48] As a result, power shifted from host countries towards multinational corporations as the era was characterized by liberalization of foreign investment rules.[49] As the United Nations World Investment Report of 2000 showed, out of the 1035 changes made in national legislation regarding Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from 1991 to 1999, only 5.9% were directed at restricting FDI.[50] Now more than ever before, the existence and nature of human rights were jeopardized in the sphere of multinational corporations led by neoliberal politics. Yet when analyzing human rights and neoliberalism, the two concepts have a plethora of similarities that run counter to this assertion. Samuel Moyn states that human rights and neoliberalism share (1) a predecessor and (2) a target, namely the welfarist West and the post-colonial nation state seeking economic autarky respectively.[51] Both concepts emerged and were formalized in the West. As a target, developing countries need both economic (neoliberalism) and social (human rights) elements to establish economic control. Furthermore, the two concepts share key foundational building blocks. Firstly, the principle of prioritizing the individual 'whose freedoms matter more than the collectivist endeavours' and secondly, their shared antipathy toward the state due to their rejection of its moral credentials.[52] As described by Darder, neoliberalism is characterized by a rampant greed that subsumes any notions of equality and public responsibility.[53] At the heart of this lies the ultimate subversion of human rights. When faced with the powers of global capitalism, human rights struggle to maintain themselves in the Third World. A prime example countering this thesis is the idea that human rights are a handmaiden to neoliberal policies. The argument follows that human rights are so tightly related to the role of a freely functioning market that there could be no socio-economic rights without extreme capitalism.[54] Unfortunately under this notion, human rights fall victim to being seen as dependent upon the capitalist order, creating the illusion that multinational corporations enhanced and promoted human rights in the developing World. What Wolfgang Streeck termed as 'non-market notions of social justice' became impossible to secure. Any attempt to place social commitments over economic ones were expelled, leaving market pressures to form human obligations and be governed by the dictatorship of neoliberalism.[55] The World Bank and the IMF, backed by the United States and other western states, became key in the project for liberalization, privatization, and market-friendly policies, known as the Washington Consensus. MNCs were given the protection they needed to flourish, be it proprietary or intellectual property rights. The interests of human rights on the other hand were not regarded. Though excelling and growing more than ever before, human rights had done so 'on a discrete track spearheaded internationally through the UN'.[56] Directed by developing states, human rights were intentionally dealt with by the United Nations while international economic law was being dealt with by the international institutions where they hold the balance of power.[57] Simultaneously, the developing world saw the third generation of human rights emerge as a result of anti-colonialist movements in the post-Second World War era. Newly born independent nations voiced their concerns over repeating their colonial past and demanded a new set of rights. These included the right to self-determination, the right to a healthy environment and the right to participation in cultural heritage. These are reflected in Declarations and Conventions such as the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960, the Proclamation of Teheran of 1968 and the Stockholm Declaration of 1972.[58] What makes this generation of human rights exceptional however is that while they reflect neither the traditional individualistic approach of the first generation, nor the socialist tradition of the second generation, they simultaneously demand certain recognitions from the state while being able to be invoked against the state. Most importantly though, as articulated by Vasak, the third generation of human rights 'can be realized only through the concerted efforts of all the actors in the social scene: the individual, the State, public and private bodies and the international community'.[59] In other words, these rights belong to the community as a collective, rather than to an individual.[60] Drafted in 1986 by the UNGA, the Declaration on the Right to Development [61] (DRD) calls for effective international cooperation towards development objectives through the enhancement of human rights and the distribution of benefits.[62] The DRD gained inspiration from the NIEO as it relied on providing equal national opportunity through measures of fair distribution of natural resources and income. Alongside neoliberal policies, the two contradicting concepts were forced to work in tandem. Foreign investment in the developing world could proceed under the neoliberal ideology as long as it did not infringe the DRD. Interestingly, the right to development was coined by the former UN Independent Expert on the Right to Development, Arjun Sengupta, as 'growth with equity'. Growth should not only focus on the economic aspect, but also emphasize human rights and the principles of justice. This focus on equity, would require a 'a change in the structure of production and distribution in the economy to ensure growth was equitable', including the required international cooperation and not having to rely on the market.[63] Though the United Nations are promoting and enhancing the development of human rights, they are disregarding the fact that their work should be focused more on the human rights aspects entailed in the market, rather than solving human rights issues outside of the market framework. The development of human rights and the regulatory frameworks supporting multinational corporations attended very different interests. The new global legal architecture born of the oil crisis and rise of neoliberalism reorganized the relations between the Global South and Global North. At this point human rights and the regulation of corporations, with their distinctive genealogies, were forced to come together, but the failure of this exercise could not be challenged until the late 1980s when the third generation of human rights provided another opportunity for the merging of the two concepts. The outcomes of these new sets of discussions produced a more clearly defined relationship between human rights and multinational corporations which, although more sophisticated, was still unable to produce a satisfactory result. Nevertheless, the right to development began to take root in the corporate world. For the sake of their reputations, corporations were forced to appreciate the power held by vulnerable individuals that could act together as a strong collective.[64] As Claire Dickerson argues, multinationals became more aware of their relationship with human rights not only in regards to the individual, but rather to the society as a collective.[65] These were the first formalized steps to the recognition of what came to be known as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The Heterodox Approach What became apparent in the sphere of business and human rights were two situations, (1) that states were either unable or unwilling to implement human rights; and (2) that multinational corporations acting in such states were unprepared to deal with the risks of harming human rights through their activities. This was seen especially in the private extracting sector, such as oil, gas and coal, using aggressive means to exploit remote areas and leaving large physical and social 'footprints'. Local communities began resisting the activities by the multinationals and the language of human rights became increasingly popular in challenging corporate norms.[66] Some of the world's largest MNCs had become culprits of violating human rights standards, including Nike, Shell or Yahoo. Nike was guilty of using child labour, while Shell misused public funds to practice corruption and theft at all levels.[67] The effects were reflected in local communities that resorted to violence and criminal behaviour, significantly affecting the living conditions of these areas. In the early 1990s, some corporations began adopting measures to comply with responsible business conduct. CSR was a voluntary form of business self-regulation that attended the current societal goals. It involved the creation of monitoring schemes that regulated the workplace standards and policies of the global supply chains. However, what caused CSR to emerge, was not only pressure exerted by nations that felt their human rights had been impinged, but also a wider global political ethos. With its emphasis on privatization and deregulation, neoliberalism promoted CSR initiatives in order for corporations to gain self-control and rely less on direct government initiatives. Due to its voluntary nature, CSR was not conceived as a regulatory instrument but as a learning forum to promote strategies that enhanced socially responsible policies. This included the enhancement of human rights, environmental protection and anti-corruption efforts. [68] CSR had now progressed to the forefront of the global business scene by morphing out of corporate philanthropy.[69] Corporations began adopting voluntary schemes that not only adhered to social policy, but at times even went beyond the standard set by local requirements, which occasionally created conflict between the two.[70] Unilateral corporations produced company codes, with companies such as Gap and Nike adopting theirs in 1992. This involved internal audit teams and ethics officers to be established, verifying that contractors were complying with their company's codes of conduct. Gradually, social audit teams emerged onto the global scene. As one of the most prominent, the Fair Labour Association (FLA) monitored the working conditions for some of the top athletic brands such as Nike, Puma and Patagonia. In the food industry, the label of Fair Trade emerged, ensuring for local farmers the social, economic and environmental standards they deserved. Corporations adopted CSR measures mainly to improve their reputation. However, perhaps a greater incentive for corporations to adopt CSR measures lies in the financial risks posed by community pushback as a result of human rights violations. These pushbacks cause delays in design, operation, construction, siting, granting of permits etc. Further, they can create problems and relations with local labour markets, higher costs for financing, insurance and reduced output.[71] In a study of a large multinational company that wished to remain anonymous, Goldman Sachs found that it had accrued $6.5 billion in such costs over a two year period.[72] A great percentage of these costs could be related back to the staff time in managing conflicts that arise in communities as a result of human rights violations. In some instances between 50% and 80% of an assets manager's time can be devoted to these issues. Thus, it is clear that in this lose-lose situation, where MNCs violate human rights and thus incur losses, it makes sound corporate sense to adopt some sort of CSR measures.[73] Despite the improvements and the clear step forward the business world took in addressing human rights, CSR involved limitations and fragmentations that challenged its success. It was built on the assumption that it is an effective mechanism for a corporation to positively reconnecting with the community it is based in. Thus, in practice, CSR operates under the presumption that society has granted authority to corporations with naturally applying legal responsibilities.[74] In 2000 John Ruggie conducted research in the Fortune Global 500 and a wider range of corporations to assess the extent and success of voluntary initiatives promoting human rights. Staff monitoring schemes had evolved, demands by socially responsible investors had grown, and large public sector funds all aided in this development. However, the research also found 'company-based initiatives fell short as a stand-alone approach'.[75] Most companies still did not have the capabilities of managing human rights risks and instead were acting on a reactive based notion. Moreover, it was within the company's discretion to decide which human rights the company would address and furthermore how to define its measures. Thus, their voluntary nature could often be used as a camouflage to delay real reform.[76] A logical response to such a broad limitation would be to impose direct obligations under international law upon MNCs. Though only states and international organizations have legal standing in international law, the general view on this contention is that it would be possible to impose obligations upon MNCs due to their major economic and political influence as explained earlier, and their capabilities of influencing the enjoyment of human rights.[77] However, as explained by Zerk, the challenge lies in 'developing jurisprudence which refines and makes precise the vague aspirational statements [.] in the CSR debate'.[78] However, as the law stands, the most promising and efficient method for applying obligations on multinational corporations remains to be the national courts. Yet the fact that claims must be raised as a tort-based litigation proving a violation of domestic tort principles rather than claiming a violation under international human rights casts doubt over this method. An interesting exception to this is the US Alien Tort Statute of 1789. The tort states that district courts 'have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violations of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States'.[79] The original intention of the statute was to establish a civil remedy for violation of international law norms such as piracy, mistreatment of ambassadors and the violation of safe conducts.[80] This piece of legislation lay dormant until the 1980s when human rights lawyers discovered its potential for foreign plaintiffs to raise a claim for certain human rights abuses against an individual of any nationality, or a corporation as long as they had a presence in the United States. The question whether the Act could be enforced against a corporation was considered in 2012 in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Kiobel.[81] The court held that there was a presumption against extraterritoriality applying to claims under the Statute. There is therefore no application of the statute abroad unless it is explicitly stated in the international law which is the subject of the claim.[82] As stated by John Ruggie in his advice to the Human Rights Council in 2007 'no single silver bullet can resolve the business and human rights challenge. A broad array of measures is required, by all relevant actors.'[83] Ultimately, as a measure to seek guidance on the matter, this led to the UN Global Compact in 2000, the largest global CSR initiative.[84] The UN Global Compact was a strategic policy initiative posed by the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that aimed at improving corporate conditions in areas such as human rights, environmental protection and labour rights.[85] It was a prospective and hopeful initiative that was designed as a learning forum to develop, implement and disclose sustainability principles among corporate actors.[86] At its time, the Global Compact was the most far-reaching, non-governmental set of policies aimed at catalyzing the voluntary nature in the corporate citizenship movement.[87] Legal scholars such as Meyer and Stefanova felt the Global Compact could shape the relationship between MNCs and human rights through 'rewarding responsible TNCs [MNCs], while shaming at least some of the irresponsible TNCs [MNCs] into better promoting human rights'.[88] Their only concern about the extent of the success of the Global Compact lay, in the Global Compact's voluntary nature. Comparing it to the OECD Guidelines implemented 25 years earlier, an initiative like the Global Compact will only be successful if there is commitment to the initiative at all levels of the international system. Thus, the main task is to put a human face on globalization through the values and principles shared by the people, the corporation and the state.[89] However, Aravalo and Fallon dispute this. Published in 2008, their Report uses the Compact Quarterly and UNGC Annual Review to critique the Global Compact's activities and practices throughout its eight years of existence. Published by local networks and the UN respectively, they evaluate new businesses adhering to the Global Compact, as well as Global Compact practices and responses. Aravalo and Fallon found that after evaluating the various progress reports, the Global Compact falls short of being a successful initiative. According to the UNGC Annual Review, there are a multitude of gaps existing in the Global Compact framework. Research instruments for instance, under the principles of human rights and labour protection, have been deemed as inadequate as participants have failed to voice their concern over the protection of such rights within their corporation. The Global Compact has solely used online surveys to administer data, which smaller businesses are often unwilling or unable to provide. The methodology applied by the Global Compact was ambiguous and did not show the extent of the success of CSR initiatives.[90] Alavaro and Fallon argue that it would be highly beneficial for the Global Compact to re-think its methodology process of evaluating its success by introducing a chronological component into its future research models. [91] It would allow for a clearer comparison not only for participants of the Global Compact, but also for the comparison with non-Compact companies in the area of corporate responsibility.[92] As a result of this poor research methodology, the Global Compact has difficulty assessing its direct influence on the broad and voluntary concept of CSR. There are key principles of CSR that fail to receive the attention they deserve in the scope of the Global Compact. However, this is not to say that the Global Compact has been an outright failure. The Annual Review, though lacking quantifiable data, has provided a wide array of case studies providing evidence for the practical influence of the Global Compact on participants. These include programs in education and working relationships the Global Compact has encouraged and facilitated. It can be said therefore, that the Global Compact is making a difference, even if only in these cases. Until shortly after the turn of the millennium, neither company codes nor multilateral initiatives such as Global Compact, successfully achieved the necessary, concrete obligations in regard to human rights and environmental protection demands. This was set to change with the arrival of the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (Norms). Drafted in 2003, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights attempted to merge the concepts of MNCs and human rights and transform these newly developed principles into hard law. The intention was to impose human rights obligations upon companies through the domestic legal systems of their host countries. The Norms clearly express that 'states retain primary, overarching responsibility for human rights protection' and that corporations are identified as 'Duty-bearers' based on that expectation of following human rights principles.[93] The expectations expressed by the Norms are supported by enforcement mechanisms for their implementation which address the requirements that MNCs must adopt in terms of their internal practice. Furthermore, there are a multitude of rights that go beyond what is traditionally accepted as international human rights law. Examples include rights associated with consumer protection, the environment or corruption which are covered by different areas of the law.[94] However, the Norms failed to achieve promising results. Described as a 'train wreck' by John Ruggie, the Norms fell under heavy criticisms for a plethora of reasons. Firstly, the Norms fall under heavy scrutiny for attempting to impose obligations upon corporations, while simultaneously imposing parallel obligations on the state. The intention was to address the fact that MNCs operate in a legal vacuum due to their status of acting as a multinational. To alleviate this issue, it was thought that binding MNCs to hard international law would be the best option. On the one hand, minimalists argue that binding multinational corporations to international law is not an appropriate method as this would go beyond the concept of soft law initiatives such as Global Compact. This argument is developed by stating that binding corporations to international law would 'privatise human rights'. The Norms would be placing obligations on an entity that was never democratically elected, nor eligible to make reasonable decisions in regard to human rights at the level of international law.[95] On the other hand, maximalists lobby for a judicial body solely focused on the practice of multinational corporations and argue that corporations should be bound by international law.[96] Secondly, there was severe backlash against the Norms from states, corporations and businesses who argued that there was a lack of consultation from the Sub-Commission when drafting the Norms. However, this argument has since been disputed by institutions such as the Corporate Europe Conservatory or the scholars Weissbrodt and Kruger.[97] In regard to the discontent presented by states, many argued that there was a lack of involvement on their behalf in the Norms' development. As stated by Kinely, Nolan and Zerial, it is of vital importance that in issues revolving around CSR and their wide variety of stakeholders, everyone's voice must be heard when protecting human rights.[98] Thirdly, issues were raised regarding the language used by the Norms. Terms like 'sphere of influence'[99] and 'complicity' were deemed as vague and unclear.[100] It is agreed upon, even by supporters of the Norms, that such terms must be defined more definitively and where possible, draw definitions from more grounded areas of the law like criminal law, tort or contract law. This attitude towards the Norms from corporations shows the extent of their distrust and the scare factor used to attempt to dismantle the Norms.[101] However, even though the Norms failed as a concept, as Kinley, Nolan and Zerial maintain, 'the Norms have been a beneficial and fruitful initiative, reinvigorating debate on business and human rights'.[102] Previous to the imposition of the Norms, CSR had found itself in a position that was stagnant, focusing solely on codes of conduct that should be implemented by corporations using a bottom-up approach. The Norms altered the position of CSR to now provide a top-down approach and provided human rights activists with hope that human rights protection in regard to multinational corporations was now in the hands of the United Nations. However, the reactions to the Norms from the CSR community varied. CSR had been a newly emerging concept which was still unclear when fitted into the international legal order. It was still in its early years of development with highly broad-reaching initiatives in the fields of both soft and hard law. The playing field for CSR was simply too big for such an underdeveloped concept to handle. Further, it was attempted to implement CSR through domestic laws and quasi-legal initiatives raised to the level of international law. It is therefore often perceived that the implementation of the Norms were an attempt to remedy CSR by uniting these various aspects into one document at the level of the United Nations. The Norms conjoined national and international levels of CSR while maintaining that states continued to hold the primary responsibility of ensuring that businesses protect human rights. The world was a 'deeply divided arena of discourse and contestation lacking shared knowledge, clear standards and boundaries; fragmentary and often weak governance systems concerning business and human rights in states and companies alike'.[103] A range of governments still expressed their demand for further attention to be given to the relationship between human rights and the practices of multinational corporations. Thus, the United Nations appointed a team led by John Ruggie to establish the Guiding Principles. Rather than establishing a new international framework as was previously attempted with the Norms, Ruggie was 'urged [.] to focus on identifying and promoting good practices and providing companies with tools to enable them to deal voluntarily with the complex cluster of business and human rights challenges'.[104] Ruggie moved away from the traditional 'mandatory approach' which involved the compliance of national laws in correspondence to a corporation's voluntary measures and practices, to a heterodox approach. This heterodox approach was devised to create an environment of mixed reinforcing policy measures that provided cumulative change and large-scale success. The Guiding Principles lay on three foundations: (1) the state duty to protect against human rights abuses; (2) the responsibility by corporations to respect human rights and the implied obligation of acting in due diligence; and (3) the need for greater access to remedies for victims. However, there are two things that the Guiding Principles fail to accomplish. Firstly, to create binding international law and instead rely on normative contributions which further elaborate the implications of existing standards. Secondly, the Guiding Principles 'fail to ensure the right to an effective remedy and the need for States' measures to prevent abuses committed by their companies overseas'.[105] Amnesty International goes further by reiterating that aside from lacking accountability measures, the Guiding Principles should mandate a due diligence approach rather than only recommending it, as this would solve internal as well as extraterritorial accountability issues. Alongside Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch criticized the Guiding Principles for not adopting a global standard in corporate responsibility, and instead resort to a 'sliding scale' based on a corporation's size and geographic location.[106] However, when compared to other governance regimes in the past and present, the Guiding Principles seem to be a robust framework. Although various human rights organizations and NGOs identify neglect of human rights in the framework of MNCs, the Guiding Principles reiterate business as an instrument to contribute to societal welfare.[107] Thus, it acts as a basis for the empowerment of society and a benchmark to judge practices and conduct of corporations and governments.[108] Conclusion The discourse of the co-emergence of multinational corporations and human rights took the world by storm. The ongoing globalization of multinational corporations and the evolution of the concept of human rights were born attending different aims in the global legal order. Their greatest challenge however was not necessarily their harmonization and co-existence, but more importantly co-existing under the intentional gap created through the world's largest and most influential actor, the United Nations. This was clearly visible in the 1960s and 1970s. Throughout the various Reports and Declarations that were passed through the international institution, the two concepts were kept separate. While the United Nations was enthusiastic for the growth of both MNCs and human rights, it intentionally avoided discussing the harmonization of both concepts. Due to the underlying pressures imposed on the United Nations by the tensions from the Cold War, the UN was left in a legal vacuum unable to merge the two distinctive genealogies. The global international legal order was unaware of the extent of the importance of such a gap being eradicated before adopting a resolution as complex as the NIEO. Thus, from this point onwards, the NIEO was therefore already bound to be unsuccessful. Not only had international law not developed enough to impose such obligations upon MNCs, the corporations themselves were not aware of the ramifications and necessity for abiding human rights obligations as I showed in the third section of this dissertation. Enthusiasm for further initiatives such as the push by the G77 or the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations was only short lived. The events of the 1980s greatly disrupted the already turbulent environment of the global international legal order creating a greater gap between the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights. The 1980s became a stage which saw a great change in the global legal structure. The NIEO was an already broken concept from the outset as the conceptual gap had already created a disparity in the relationship between MNCs and human rights. This meant that although they were not aware of it at the time, the Global South could not rely on the imposition of the NIEO. Fostering the Western neoliberal policies, the conceptual gap between MNCs and human rights was now well established. For human rights to become a globally instructed concept, MNCs are a useful tool to spread, promote and enhance human rights across the globe. This of course is under the condition that the MNC does not violate human rights. From the other perspective MNCs rely on human rights in terms of their societal and financial risks. It becomes clear that when this is not realized by the proponents of both concepts, it can lead to major discrepancies and disparities as was proven in the Global South during this period. If there had not been this conceptual gap, and instead there had been a clear and devised relationship between MNCs and human rights, the effects of the oil crisis and neoliberalism would not have left the detrimental mark in developing countries that they did, potentially allowing the NIEO to prevail. However, the ongoing persistence of developing countries and their call for the third generation of human rights to gain prominence forced MNCs to catch up with their relationship to human rights. What emerged, were essentially the first initiatives and practices of CSR. CSR was heavily affected by the fact that it relied on the voluntary nature of businesses to adhere to as well as practice CSR. Even though corporations had an incentive to adopt CSR measures, weak monitoring systems allowed violations to still occur on a grand scale. The issue was that the multinational corporation as a concept was still unclear and lacked definition and that tying MNCs down with hard international law was not possible due to the diversity of MNCs. CSR allowed for too large a divergence from the issue at hand and required to approach human rights at a different angle. This was the key reason for the partial success of the Guiding Principles. Ruggie's unconventional, heterodox approach provided clarity and distinct concepts that individuals, business and states could adhere to. Although the conceptual gap has still not vanished, the UN has after an array of various attempts, managed to narrow the gap that it had created almost sixty years ago by continuously forcing society to rethink and redefine the relationship. What exactly lies in the future is uncertain and impossible to foresee. It can be said with great certainty however, that if initiatives such as Global Compact or the Guiding Principles are enhanced and given more attention, the world will be faced with a much clearer and concise relationship between multinational corporations and human rights. Focusing on monitoring mechanisms, methodological research and greater transparency and accountability among all actors involved will undoubtedly seal the conceptual gap that has caused the international legal order to experience such unsettling times. [1] Pahuja, Sundhya. Saunders, Anna. Rival Worlds and the place of the Corporation in International Law in Dann and Von Bernstorff (eds). Decolonisation and the Battle for International Law (OUP, 2018) p.1 [2] Ibid. [3] UN, Multinational Corporations in World Development ST-ECA/190 [4] Linarelli, John. Salomon, Margot. Sornarajah M. The Misery of International Law. (OUP, 2018) p.245 [5] Ruggie, John. Just Business. (W.W. Norton & Company, 2013) p.70 [6] United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 [7] Alston, Philip. Mégret, Frédéric. (eds) The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Second Edition, OUP, 2020) p.1 [8] Clapham, Andrew. Human Rights: A Very Short Introduction (OUP, 2007) p.42 [9] (n.8) p.108. [10] ibid . p.109 [11] Allina, Eric. Imperialism and the Colonial Experience in Paul A. Haslam, Jessica Schafer and Pierre Beaudet, Introduction to International Development (3rd Edition, OUP, 2017), pp. 24-42. p.39 [12] Ibid. p. 40 [13] Sornarajah M. International Law on Foreign Investment (CUP, 2010) p.5 [14] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Multinational Corporations in World Development, 1973 ST-ECA/190 p.VI [15] ibid. p.1 [16] ibid. [17] Joseph, Sarah. Castan, Melissa. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials. (3rd Edition, OUP, 2013) p.4 [18] ibid. p.5 [19] ibid. [20] Alston, Philip. U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social And Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy. The American Journal of International Law Vol.84, No.2 (CUP,1990) pp.365-393, p.4 [21] UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, Article 1 [22] Simpson, Gerry. The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age (Ashgate Publishing, 2000) p.266 [23] Ibid. [24] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 1976 [25] Carasco, Emily. Singh, Jang. Towards Holding Transnational Corporations Responsible for Human Rights. European Business Review Vol.22, No.4, (Emerald Publishing Group, 2010). p.4 [26] Cernic, Jernei. Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Hanse Law Review, Vol.4, No.1, (2008). p.16 [27] Ibid. p. 12 [28] Sanchez, Juan Carlos Ochoa. "The Roles and Powers of the OECD National Contact Points Regarding Complaints on an Alleged Breach of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by a Transnational Corporation." Nordic Journal of International Law (2015) Vol.84, No.1, pp: 89-126 p. 18 [29] Bolt, Cassidy. "Leveraging Reputation in Implicit Regulation of MNEs: An Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises' Capacity to Influence Corporate Behavior." Corporations and International Law, 20 Jan. 2018, Available at: sites.duke.edu/corporations/2018/01/20/leveraging-reputation-in-implicit-regulation-of-mnes-an-analysis-of-the-oec

Borders and mobility in arts, history, and well-being -- Comparison of curcumin content and antioxidant activity of turmeric samples collected from Indonesia and Thailand: Considerations for the future sharing of the natural resource A. Dechakhamphu, J. Junlatat, M. Agil, B. Prajogo and N. Pursariwati -- Efficiency of household accounting: A case study of a model village in Thailand N. Thongprasert and S. Mala -- Forecasts for trans-border mobility: A case study of agricultural products imported from Laos to Thailand via the Chong-Mek border N. Nanthasamroeng -- Social class representation: FoodTruck Culinary Surabaya community R. Rahartika -- The Bawean ethnic language: Attitude and diglossic community culture S.W.B. Utami -- Multi-ethnic and religious conflicts in media reported by international online media: http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/statue-of-chinese-god-guan-yu-stokestension-in-indonesia P. Wibawanto -- Demystifying Nusantara A. Bahroni -- Commercial activities and development of the towns in the west side of Banda Sea Indonesia, early twentieth century L.O. Rabani -- Borders and mobility in literature and culture -- Remixed Javaneseness: Lyrics of levelling adiluhung non-adiluhung E.D. Riyanto -- The expression of cultural values in Sundanese manuscripts of the Mandala period H.M. Lyra, D. Indira and T. Muhtadin -- Criticisms of the depiction of freedom of characters in Dewi Lestaris novel entitled Supernova: Kesatria, Putri dan Bintang Jatuh M.N.A.T. Gemilang -- Translation ideology recommendation for translating cultural issues in children comics from English into Indonesian: Crossing the borders between language and culture of SLT and TLT Nurlaila, M. Nababan, Djatmika and R. Santosa -- The directors responses and the shaping of Indonesias identity in the European film festival funding R. Ihwanny and M. Budiman -- Children in Indonesian cinema during colonialism: The border of cross-identity S. Wibawa -- Mimicking East Asian popular culture products: Temporality of urban global culture in Indonesia S.M.G. Tambunan -- Representation of nostalgia for home in diasporic poetry: An analysis of selected poems of mahtem shiferraw S. Elias -- Returned participants Perception of the Sarjana Mengajar di Daerah Terluar, Terdepan dan Tertinggal (SM-3T) program Y.S. Amalia, C.S. Budiono and R. Andini -- Capital reconversion practices by Srintil in the novel Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk T.W. Iswara -- Borders and mobility in language and multilingualism -- Morphological system of Javanese verbs in the border area of East Java (Tapal Kuda) A.S. Rohmah, Mahdar and W.A. Sari -- Javanese Unggah-Ungguh level used in some rubrics of the Jaya Baya and Panjebar Semangat magazines B.D.Y. Puteri -- The role of language in border relations (Desa Tajungan Kec Kamal, Kab Bangkalan, Madura) D.R. Sugiharti, Miladiyah and Y.S. Amalia -- Indirect criticism in the ethnic Madurese community: Its various semantic formulas, lingual markers, and context of use E. Jauhari and D. Purnanto -- Multilingualism and mobility: Defining borders within Surabaya city through the linguistic cityscape E. Rusnaningtias -- Border or beyond: Dangdut jazzs reception and liminality analysis in the ITS Jazz community F.Z. Putri and B.A. Sansoko -- Culture shifting from wearing sarong to wearing trousers amongst the people of Bangkalan Madura I. Husna -- Linguistic landscapes: A study of human mobility and identity change K. Artawa and N.W. Sartini -- Language transfer in Javanese video clips on YouTube: A sociolinguistic analysis of Cak Ikins Culoboyo videos S.D.S. Tungga and T. Suhardijanto -- Linguistic landscape as a social identity construction of the public space: The case of Batu District Y. Indarti -- Borders and mobility in education and policies -- Policy implementation for fulfilling 30% quota of womens representation in the 2014 legislative member election: A study on the PDI-P and the PPP in Palangka Raya R.S. Tulis -- Empowering SMEs and cooperatives: Export capacity building in the era of AEC trade liberalisation Koesrianti, D. Puspitawati and N.A. Kurniasari -- Development of an exercise program to enhance the ability of students in Thai massage classroom: Considerations for promoting traditional medicine education at national and international levels K. Peng-ngummuang, K. Noiming, P. Promsit, S. Srisanga and J. Junlatat -- Gaming is learning: No more border between children with and without autism spectrum disorder L.H. Suryawardhani and Y.S. Amalia -- Homeschooling as an alternative education system in Surabaya Wulansary -- Borders and mobility in gender, identity, and behaviorism -- Environmentalism and consumerism: The contradiction of globalization in behavior consumption of the urban middle class in Surabaya, Indonesia D.A. Arimbi, N. Wulan and F. Colombijn -- The enforcement of state territoriality and shifting on borderlanders mobility: The case of IndonesiaMalaysia border in Sebatik Island L. Puryanti -- Civil society and the model of Dayak identity struggle in Central Kalimantan: A framework of neo-GramscianTocquevillian analysis A. Haridison and J.R.A. Sandi -- Girl marriage and marginalisation of women in the cities of East Java E. Susanti -- Ajhemo practice among Madurese women and its correlation with independently healthy life behaviour S. Ratnawati -- Muslimah identity on the Wardah Muslim-segmented cosmetic products N.C. Fajri -- Borders and mobility in maritime, spatial movement and locality -- Movements around island and waterfront reclamation projects T. Kerr -- Maintaining expressions of prohibition (pamali) as signaling the existence of tengger communitys culture D. Handayani and M. Lutfi -- Multiculturalism and local wisdom in the Gilimanuk-Bali community I.B.P. Manuaba -- Cultural capital of traders on Pahing Sunggingan market in Boyolali J.S. Gumilang, M. Wijaya, B. Haryono and M. Si -- The Legend of Nusantara: Disguising the boundary between locality and globality in Indoeskrim Nusantaras commercial advertisement Milawaty -- Urban environmental quality and human well-being assessment: Towards walkable neighborhood (A case study of Dr. Soetomo Hospital, Surabaya) E.T. Sunarti, A.B. Tribhuwaneswari, O.E. Rachmalisa and R.P. Kurniasanti -- Trialectic city space based on an immigrant view through urbanisation: A study on settlement migrants in Surabaya city I.Y.A. Rohmah -- The influence of social mobility on cultural values: A case study on Chinese-Indonesians in Surabaya, Indonesia preliminary research R.A. Saputra -- Local government capacity in managing fishery conflict in the IndonesiaMalaysia maritime border zone M.A.P. Sari, M.R.K. Muluk and Sujarwoto -- Coffee stall: Politics identity of Cangkrukan L. Santoso and M.G.R. Pandin -- Borders and mobility in media, technology and global research -- Awareness and preparation for cross-border future careers under the one belt, one road initiative proposed by the Peoples Republic of China (PRC): A case study of students majoring in Chinese at UBRU, Thailand and HUFL, Vietnam S. Songsukrojiroad and L.L. Chuyen -- Articulating Indonesian migrant domestic workers activism in Hong Kong and the use of communication technology I. Wahyudi -- Interagency collaborative team in broadcasting management at the border area of Sintang Regency, Indonesia L.H. Kurnia, I.W. Midhio and T.B. Prasetyo -- Border broadcasts and national identity representation in Entikong, West Kalimantan L. Tjahjandari, T.I. Setyani and L.H. Kurnia -- The slut-shaming phenomenon in social media: A case study on female English literature students of Binus University P. Ayuningtyas and A.A.T. Kariko -- Mobile life, communication technology, and disreputable literacy S. Herminingrum.

This book examines the planning and implementation of policies to create sustainable neighborhoods, using as a case study the City of Sydney. The authors ask whether many past planning and development practices were appropriate to the ways that communities then functioned, and what lessons we have learned. The aim is to illustrate the many variations within a city and from neighborhood to neighborhood regarding renewal (rehabilitation), redevelopment (replacement) and new development. Case study examples of nine City of Sydney neighborhoods note the different histories of planning and development in each. Features of the studies include literature searches, field work (with photography), and analysis. The authors propose a set of sustainability principles which incorporate elements of the twenty seven principles of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development Part One explores sustainable urban planning, and the importance of planning tools that enable best planning outcomes for communities and investors. Common factors in the nine case study neighborhoods are renewal, redevelopment and development pressures affecting Sydney from the 1970s to 2014. Also discussed are the differing circumstances of planning faced by authorities, developers and communities in each of the study areas.Part Two of the book is focused on the case study areas in City of Sydney East area: Woolloomooloo and Kings Cross. Part Three covers case study areas in Sydney's Inner South area: Chippendale, Redfern and Waterloo District. Part Four surveys the Inner West suburb of Erskineville. Part Five looks at the City West area, including the Haymarket District and the Pyrmont and Ultimo District. Part Six concentrates on the North West area suburb of Glebe. Part Seven of the book looks at the growth area of South Sydney District, which includes the suburbs of Beaconsfield, Zetland and the new localities of Victoria Park and Green Square. The authors recount lessons learned and outline directions of planning for sustainable neighborhoods. Finally, the authors challenge readers to apply the lessons of these case studies to further advances in sustainable urban planning. Raymond Charles RauscherI have always been interested in town planning, being born in Brooklyn, New York City (1943) and graduating from the City College of New York (Bachelor of Engineering, Civil 1966). I later completed a first part of a masters degree at the Univ of Michigan (research submission on Detroit entitled A Solution to the Urban Crisis: Proposal for the Creation of Region Serving New Cities (unpublished 1969). The Masters of Town and Country Planning was completed at Sydney University (1971) with a thesis Community Response to a Redevelopment Proposal (University of Sydney Library Microfilm Dept). The thesis covered planning conflicts in Erskineville and measures to resolving these. Chapter 7 of this book refers back to the planning of Erskineville in 1971, and lessons learned. Delving into the subject of sustainable urban planning, I completed a PhD (2009) at the University of Newcastle, including the thesis Sustainable Area Planning Framework for Ecologically Sustainable Development: Case Study Wyong Shire, NSW, Australia.Wanting to research further the subject of sustainable urban planning, I published (with co-author Salim Momtaz) Sustainable Communities: A Framework for Planning - Case Study of an Australian Outer Sydney Growth Area (Springer 2014). Over the years I continued to study urban change in my birth place Brooklyn (New York). My interest was drawn to Bushwick (my old neighborhood), an area of Brooklyn that met its low point of urban slide in the 1977 arson fires. I did field work over several years, from 1979 onwards, to better understand reasons for USA style urban decline and renewal. This culminated in the book (with co-author Salim Momtaz) Brooklyn's Bushwick - Urban Renewal in New York, USA (Springer 2014). Still wanting to understand the urban changes in inner city neighbourhoods (beyond Erskineville of 1971), I continued (over a number of years) to monitor planning and development of the City of Sydney inner city areas. This monitoring focused on the question of how sustainable were the urban changes taking place in these Sydney neighbourhoods (given the rapid growth of Sydney into a global city). To prepare this book I spent five years (2009-2014) on the ground in the inner city of Sydney doing qualitative research field work, including photographing changes in City of Sydney neighbourhoods. During this research I recalled my involvement with community groups at the time of my earlier research in Erskineville noted above. At the time (1971-1973), neighbourhood associations were successful in calling on the New South Wales (NSW) Builders Labourers' Federation (BLF) to impose 'green bans' to stop NSW State or developer proposed developments which residents felt were inappropriate. This led to a number of 'green bans' imposed in inner city communities covered in this book, including Woolloomooloo (Chapter 3), Victoria St, Kings Cross (Chapter 4), Waterloo (Chapter 6), and Glebe (Chapter 10). Since 1973 I have been a member of the Australian based Social Developers Network (SDN) The Network commenced at the time of PM Gough Whitlam (1972-1975) (currently 98 years old, living in Sydney). As prime minister Whitlam (and Minister for Planning and Regional Development, Tom Uren) promoted and instituted programs in urban planning, regional development and community development. A number of those initiatives are included in the book (Woolloomooloo in Chapter 3, Kings Cross in Chapter 4, and Glebe in Chapter 9). I am currently a Conjoint Lecturer at the University of Newcastle, Australia. I am also a director of Habitat Association for Arts and Environment Inc. Under this body I continue to work on 'Visions Inner Sydney' (VIS). This is a program recording the changes in the inner city local government areas of the City of Sydney, and Municipalities of Leichhardt, Marrickville and Ashfield.Salim MomtazDr Salim Momtaz is a senior lecturer at the University of Newcastle, Australia. He teaches in the area of sustainable resource management. A geographer, environmental scientist and social planner by training, Salim's research interests include: environmental planning and governance, social adaptation to climate change, impact assessment and community participation. His recent publications include: Evaluating Environmental and Social Impact Assessment in Developing Countries, Elsevier: Oxford (2013) (co-author S.M.Z. Kabir); Sustainable Communities: A Framework for Planning, Springer: London (2014) (co-author R.C. Rauscher); and, Brooklyn's Bushwick - Urban Renewal in New York, USA, Springer (2014) (co-author R.C. Rauscher).

1. Abbott Laboratories : Medicare fraud (2003) -- 2. Abbott Laboratories : off-label marketing of Depakote (2012) -- 3. Abercrombie & Fitch : employment-related race discrimination (2004) -- 4. Adelphia communications : securities fraud (2005) -- 5. Ahold : accounting fraud related to wholesale food vending (2005) -- 6. AIG : bid rigging, securities fraud, and tax evasion (2006) -- 7. AIG and PNC Financial Services : securities fraud (2003-2004) -- 8. Alabama Power : clean air act violations (2006) -- 9. American Electric Power : clean air act violations (2006) -- 10. AOL-Time Warner : securities fraud (2005) -- 11. Apple : collusion in the pricing of e-books (2013) -- 12. AstraZeneca : financial misconduct in the marketing of Zoladex (2003) -- 13. AstraZeneca : off-label marketing of Seroquel (2011-2013) -- 14. Bank of America, UBS, GE Capital, and Wells Fargo : fraud in the municipal bond business (2012) -- 15. Bank of America and Countrywide Financial : mortgage fraud (2011) -- 16. Bank of America and Merrill Lynch : employment discrimination against women financial advisors (2013) -- 17. Bank of America and Merrill Lynch : mortgage fraud (2012) -- 18. Bayer and GlaxoSmithKline : Medicaid fraud and overcharging for medication (2003) -- 19. Bernard L. Madoff securities : operating a Ponzi scheme -- 20. Beverly Enterprises : medicare fraud (2000) -- 21. Blodget, Henry : securities fraud while at CIBC Oppenheimer and Merrill Lynch (2003) -- 22. Boeing : employment-related gender discrimination (2005) -- 23. Boeing : violating military contract procurement rules (2004) -- 24. BP : largest oil spill in American history (2010) -- 25. Bridgestone and Ford : manufacturing and design defects causing tire blowouts and ensuing crashes (2001-2005) -- 26. Burlington Northern : genetic testing in violation fo the Americans with Disabilities Act (2001) -- 27. Chiquita : engaging in transactions with a specially designated global terrorist organization (2007) -- 28. ChoicePoint : breaches in company security systems resulting in customer identity theft (2005) -- 29. Citigroup : mortgage fraud (2011 and 2012) -- 30. Coca-Cola : racial discrimination related to employment (2001) -- 31. Computer chip manufacturers (Hynix, Infineon, and Samsung) : price-fixing (2004-2010) -- 32. Countrywide Financial and Angelo Mozilo : fraud and insider trading (2010) -- 33. Dell : accounting fraud (2010) -- 34. Dial : workplace sexual harassment (2003) -- 35. Dominion Energy : Clean Air Act violations (2003) -- 36. DuPont : toxic contamination related to chemical production (2002-2011) -- 37. Eli Lilly : off-label marketing of Zyprexa (2009) -- 38. Enron Corporation : financial fraud (2006) -- 39. Equifax : failing to correct false information on a credit report (2013) -- 40. ExxonMobil : Clean Water Act violations involving oil spills on Navajo lands (2005) -- 41. Food processors (ADM, Cargill, and Tate and Lyle) : price-fixing related to food additives (1998-2004) -- 42. Galleon Group and Raj Rajaratnam : insider trading (2011) -- 43. General Motors : product liability related to the design and placement of gas tanks (1999-2003) -- 44. GlaxoSmithKline : blocking generic entries to the market (2004) -- 45. GlaxoSmithKline : illegal marketing and promotion of pharmaceutical products (2012) -- 46. Goldman Sachs : mortgage securities fraud (2010) -- 47. Halliburton : product liability related to asbestos production and usage (2001-2005) -- 48. Hospital Corporation of America : Medicare fraud (2000 and 2002) -- 49. Hospital Corporation of America : patient neglect (2012) -- 50. HSBC : money laundering (2012) -- 51. IBM : age discrimination resulting from pension plan conversion (2004) -- 52. Invesco Funds : mutual fund trading violations (2004) -- 53. ITT : violations of the Arms Export Control Act (2007) -- 54. Johnson & Johnson : bribery of foreign health care providers and administrators (2011) -- 55. JPMorgan Chase : manipulation of energy markets (2013) -- 56. JPMorgan Chase : mortgage fraud (2013) -- 57. JPMorgan Chase : unlawful military foreclosures and evictions (2011) -- 58. JPMorgan Chase and Credit Suisse : misleading investors (2012) -- 59. Koch Industries : Clean Water Act violations related to oil spills (2000) -- 60. KPMG : tax fraud (2005) -- 61. Lippo Group : U.S. Campaign Law violations (2001) -- 62. Lucent : securities fraud (2004) -- 63. Medco : Medicare fraud (2006) -- 64. Merck : improper marketing of pharmaceuticals (2007 and 2011) -- 65. Merrill Lynch : employment discrimination against African American financial advisors (2012) -- 66. Microsoft : antitrust violation related to Internet Explorer bundling (2001) -- 67. Microsoft : antitrust violations related to software overcharges (2003-2007) -- 68. Microsoft : patent infringement (2011) -- 69. Morgan Stanley : employment-related gender discrimination/sexual harassment (2004) -- 70. Mortgage-Holding Banks, including Aurora Bank, Bank of America, Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, MetLife Bank, PNC, Sovereign, SunTrust, U.S. Bank, and Wells Fargo : illegal mortgage foreclosures (2013) -- 71. National Century Financial Enterprises : financial fraud in the health care sector (2009) -- 72. National Football League : collusion in player head trauma (2013) -- 73. Natural gas producers (Anadarko, ChevronTexaco, ConocoPhillips, Devon, Exxon, and Kerr-McGee) : fraud related to natural gas royalty underpayments (2007-2012) -- 74. New Century Financial : securities fraud related to subprime mortgages (2007) -- 75. Newmont Mining : environmental contamination (2006) -- 76. Nike : making false commercial statements (2003) -- 77. Orthopedic firms (Biomet, DePuy Orthopedics, Smith & Nephew, Stryker Corporation, and Zimmer Holdings) : illegal kickbacks to physicians (2007) -- 78. Petroleum refiners (31 Companies) : Oil Refinery Clean Air Act violations (2004-2007) -- 79. Pfizer : off-label marketing of Bextra (2009) -- 80. Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds : wholesale practices that encouraged cigarette smuggling (2004 and 2010) -- 81. Ralphs Grocery : criminal labor law violations (2006) -- 82. Royal Dutch Shell : oil reserve overstatements (2002-2009) -- 83. SAC Capital : insider trading (2013) -- 84. Schering-Plough : improper marketing of pharmaceuticals (2002 and 2006) -- 85. Serono : health care fraud and illegal marketing (2005) -- 86. Taco Bell : copyright infringement and contract violations (2009) -- 87. Tenet Health Care Corporation : Medicare fraud (2006) -- 88. Tenet Health Care Corporation and Redding Medical Center : unnecessary heart surgeries (2004 and 2005) -- 89. UBS : conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government and tax fraud (2009) -- 90. United Technologies : Arms Export Control Act violations (2012) -- 91. Visa and MasterCard : price-fixing related to swipe fees (2012) -- 92. Wall Street analysts including Credit Suisse, First Boston, Merrill Lynch, Salomon Smith Barney (a Division of Citigroup), Bear Stearns, UBS Warburg, Goldman Sachs, Piper Jaffray, JPMorgan Chase, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley : conflict of interest in investment banking activities (2003) -- 93. Walmart : wage and hour violations (2007-2010) -- 94. Wegelin & Company : conspiracy to commit tax fraud (2012) -- 95. WellPoint : underpayments to physicians (2005) -- 96. Wells Fargo : civil rights violations related to lending practices (2009) -- 97. Williams Companies, Inc. : stock fraud (2006) -- 98. Wood products manufacturers (Boise Cascade, Georgia-Pacific, Louisiana-Pacific, Weyerhaeuser, and Willamette) : Clean Air Act violations (1993-2002) -- 99. WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers : accounting fraud (2005) -- 100. Wyeth : product liability related to Fen-Phen (1997-2013).

France's President Emmanuel Macron, after suffering a humiliating defeat in the European Parliament elections on June 9, has dissolved the national parliament and called for snap elections on June 30 and July 7. This step will have potentially huge implications for France's domestic and foreign policies, particularly with respect to its support for Ukraine. In the European elections, 50% of the French voters participated and delivered a shocking rebuke to the establishment: 37% of the votes went to far-right populist parties, the National Rally and Reconquest, led by Marine Le Pen and Eric Zemmour, respectively. Another 10% landed with the far-left populist La France Insoumise.By contrast, Macron's centrist liberal list earned only 14.6% of the vote, less than half of the vote for the National Rally.There are several possible explanations for Macron's move. One is that he intends to emulate Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, who, faced with the defeat of his Socialists in last year's local elections, called snap parliamentary elections two months later and managed to hang onto power thanks to an improbable coalition ranging from the far left to right-wing regional nationalists from Catalonia. Like Sanchez, Macron may be calculating that the specter of "fascism" would mobilize liberal, centrist and leftist voters against Le Pen and deliver him victory. It remains to be seen whether he can pull it off, but Spain, with its troubled history of civil war and Francoist dictatorship, may not serve as a credible blueprint for France, and no right-wing populist party in Spain has ever approached the levels of popularity that the National Rally has in France.Alternatively, Macron may be setting the National Rally up for legislative victory and the position of prime minister which, according to his possible calculation, would expose the populists' inexperience and incompetence in governing and exhaust them before the presidential elections in 2027. Modern French history provides precedents for what is known as "cohabitation" – when the president and prime minister belong to different parties. By virtue of the French constitution, the president has ample powers to sabotage the prime minister, and Macron would certainly be highly incentivized to do so should Jordan Bardella, the 28-year-old National Rally candidate, become the one.Yet calling for elections is a huge gamble that may backfire spectacularly. The sheer scale of Le Pen party's victory in the European elections – it won in a staggering 93% of French municipalities — places it in a strong position to win a plurality of votes in the National Assembly. Above all else, the result shows the party's staying power in French politics; its perennial presidential candidate, Marine Le Pen, increased her share of votes from around 34% in 2017 to 41% in 2022. If current trends are not drastically reversed, she could have a decent shot at victory in 2027.That has major implications for France's foreign policy, especially for Ukraine. Macron is one of Kyiv's strongest European supporters, voicing, for example, a readiness to send Western military trainers to Ukraine and, in a dramatic policy shift, calling for permitting Ukraine to strike targets inside Russia with Western weapons. The impending elections, whatever their outcome, won't necessarily affect these policies because foreign policy in France is a prerogative of the president, but the sheer complexity and gravity of the war policies promoted by Macron and their implications would presumably require his full attention. Instead, Macron will likely be distracted by the elections that he has called. In the longer term, a strong right-wing populist presence in the parliament and government may hinder plans for strengthening a common EU security and defense policy, long a major priority for Macron and for the outgoing president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, who is hoping to be reappointed to her position for a second five-year term.As France is the EU's main military power, Paris' cooperation is indispensable for making the effort prosper. Doing so, however, will require not only diplomatic support, but also, crucially, financial muscle. Macron is one of the main proponents of the EU joint borrowing scheme to boost defense spending in response to the war in Ukraine. This spending by France would have to be subject to parliamentary approval.While Le Pen has softened her Russia-friendly image of the 2010s and offered clear support for Ukraine, the sheer size and scale of Ukraine's military and reconstruction needs would require a strong national consensus to continue providing Kyiv with the assistance it requires for an indefinite period of time. Since Ukraine's reconstruction needs alone run around $500 billion, the parliaments of EU member states will inevitably have a say in the disbursement of assistance. A right-wing populist-dominated French parliament and government may not be fully forthcoming. Even if Ukraine enjoys stable support for now, how long it may endure and whether it will extend to a post-war stage remains uncertain, particularly given Le Pen's past reluctance to back Kyiv. Moreover, given France's status as a nuclear power and self-sufficiency in terms of its own defense, Macron's rhetoric about the existential stakes involved in Ukraine may ring hollow to much of the French electorate, and certainly the more nationalist part of it. Another long-term implication of Le Pen's ascendancy for Ukraine is the additional uncertainty it will bring to Ukraine's aspirations for EU membership. The French constitution itself is a hurdle — any new EU enlargement must be approved by a referendum or by three fifths of both houses of parliament. While skepticism of EU enlargement in France is by no means limited to the populist right, the right has certainly been hostile to the group's expansion. Nationalism is part of the reason, but so is money: according to Bruegel, a Belgium-based think-tank, Kyiv's potential accession could cost the EU between $119 billion and $146 billion, including $92 billion from the common agriculture policy (the EU's subsidies to the farmers), of which France is a key beneficiary. And all that doesn't include Ukraine's $500bn reconstruction bill.It remains to be seen whether Macron's gamble with snap elections will pay off, but it certainly risks weakening Ukraine's cause – particularly if the populist right will manage to maintain the momentum it gained by crushing Macron's party in last week's European elections.

Frantz Fanon has been making the rounds lately. The subject of a new biography by Adam Shatz and a recent New Yorker essay, the anticolonial activist is enjoying a sort of intellectual renaissance. Perhaps that's because like so many people today, he lived in a world shaped by violence.
While the formal process of post-World War II decolonization had begun to run its course by 1961, when Fanon died at the age of 36, the Global South remained a violent space. Western powers continued to extract resources from former colonies, to manipulate local economies, and to expand local civil wars by intervening in regions from Latin America to Southeast Asia.
Fanon believed that violence not only begot violence, but that it could serve to uplift peoples long suffering under the colonial system. His 1961 seminal work, The Wretched of the Earth, spared no details on this point. "At the individual level," the revolutionary political philosopher argued, "violence is a cleansing force. It rids the colonized of their inferiority complex, of their passive and despairing attitude. It emboldens them, and restores their self-confidence."
More than sixty years later, we might ask if Fanon's claims on violence still hold merit. While Fanon's writings focused entirely on anti-colonialism in his own time, broader interpretations of all violence as cleansing have entered the intellectual bloodstream. Recent conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East demonstrate the fallacies of perpetually seeing violence as a "cleansing force." All of this is worth examining in context, today.
The Martinique philosopher, it should be noted, did not speak in terms of "ethnic cleansing." In no way was he following in the abominable footsteps of an Adolf Hitler or setting a precedent for Slobodan Milošević, the 1990s "Butcher of the Balkans." Instead, Fanon meant to convey the rehabilitative nature of violence for oppressed peoples still living under the thumb of their former imperial masters. Perhaps this was because, as a psychiatrist, he actually treated victims of colonial violence — and colonizers themselves — during the Algerian war for independence from France.
But war doesn't rehabilitate. It only despoils and destroys. War is not reparative. Instead, it requires costly reconstruction in the wake of what it leaves behind. Policymakers and hawkish intellectuals alike peddle falsehoods when they promise war's therapeutic cures.
If Fanon justified the use of violence as a form of anticolonial self-defense — Shatz argues "cleansing" is better translated as "de-intoxicating" — such views have been extrapolated to rationalize military force for any occasion. In restating Russia's goals in Ukraine, for instance, President Vladimir Putin spoke in cleansing terms. Peace would come, he argued, only after the "denazification, demilitarisation and a neutral status" imposed upon Ukraine. It has been nearly a year since the World Bank estimated the costs of Ukraine's reconstruction at US $411 billion. One wonders if such massive destruction truly will wash away Putin's fears of Western encroachment toward Russian borders.
If Fanon saw violence as redemptive, he also judged it to be reactive, at least for the colonized. Violence could be politically and strategically instrumental in altering power relationships between oppressor and oppressed. In other words, it is a way to contest the infliction of injury by the more powerful when peace failed to deliver.
Did similar thinking underscore Hamas's 7 October 2023 attack against Israel? As the BBC reported, the Islamic Resistance Movement justified its actions as a response to "Israeli crimes against the Palestinian people." But the orgy of violence that followed—French President Emmanuel Macron called the 7 October attacks the "biggest antisemitic massacre of our century"—hardly was cleansing.
Nor did Israel's military response shy away from a Fanonian belief in the virtues of violence. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sidestepped criticisms of the heavy death toll among Palestinian civilians inflicted by the Israeli response, reaching back to the allies' World War II bombing campaign as justification for the "legitimate actions" of a state at war. If Fanon maintained that the colonized individuals could regain their dignity through "counter-violence," a way to liberate themselves from subjugation, surely Netanyahu thought similarly for the Israeli state writ large.
Yet the right-wing Likud party has gone farther than simply opposing violence with violence, with some extremists calling for the annihilation of Gaza and the Palestinians who live there. Can this language of genocidal violence, if not its actual practice, truly lead to the liberation of which Fanon spoke?
Lest Americans think that Fanon's political philosophizing doesn't apply to them, they need look no further than the global war on terror. In the aftermath of 9/11, President George W. Bush landed on a two-pronged strategy for the Middle East that assumed a successful counterterrorism campaign would pave the way for a democratic transformation of the entire region. Turning Fanon on his head, the Bush administration saw violence as a way to bring order back to decolonized locales where disorder—and, to Bush and his supporters, violence—now reigned supreme.
Contemporary critics, of course, voiced their concerns. Not long after the national trauma of 9/11, journalist Chris Hedges contemplated American notions of war as a cleansing force that gave them meaning. Hedges wasn't convinced. He found the language of violence hollow, the implementation of it repugnant.
I think Hedges's doubts were (and are) justified, and not just for Americans. Do Israelis, for instance, who see themselves living in a besieged state consider their lives more meaningful for the violence they both support and endure? Do Palestinians judging themselves victims of a violent settler colonial project feel their world has been cleansed?
If Fanon remains relevant so long after his death in 1961, then perhaps policymakers and publics alike should question their enduring embrace of violence and war as cleansing forces. Historian and philosopher Hannah Arendt certainly did, arguing that the "most probable change [violence] will bring about is the change to a more violent world." Current events in both the Middle East and Eastern Europe seem to be bearing Arendt out.
To his credit, Fanon believed that violence leading to "pure, total brutality" could undermine the very political movements employing violence in the first place. But when policymakers and their people seek to use violence as a cleansing force, brutality itself seems to be the point.

 Nikki Haley's "what about slavery?" statement reminds us that the 2024 campaign is one of ethnic outbidding--specifically, white nationalist outbidding.  I have been writing about ethnic outbidding for quite some time, in my own academic work, and then applied to the US especially in the age of Trump.  To be clear, the concept is not mine.  It was most clearly articulated by Donald Horowitz--that when multiple politicians or parties compete for support from an homogenous group in a heterogeneous society, they will be tempted/pressured to outbid each other in their promises to be the best defender of that group.*  In 2016, Trump was best positioned to win this auction, this competition for ever more extreme voters, as he was willing to say anything, including banning Muslims, and, yes, his personality feeds into it as he always wants to top other folks.  After the 2020 election, Fox News felt pressure from its right, as it initially recognized Trump's defeat, but started to lose market share to OAN and other far right outlets.In the 2024 race, the competition to be the best white nationalist (I tend to prefer white supremacist but YMMV) is so evident with non-white candidates like Nikki Haley and Tim Scott appealing to the white vote.  Many have noted the irony or hypocrisy of those running to lead the Party of Lincoln getting all soft on slavery.**  Haley once was on the right side of history, lowering the confederate flag from government buildings when she was governor of South Carolina.  But that was before Trump changed the permission structure of Republican politics.  Now, to compete at the national level, one must establish one's white nationalist bona fides by being pro-confederacy.  [Save me the BS about state's rights, as SC's secession and pretty much every other one was based on the selective state's right to support the institution of slavery and oppose the rights of non-slave-holding states to regulate their own borders].  To be clear, ethnic outbidding refers to pressures and temptations--the fear of losing white voters to other candidates or the temptation to pander to extremist voters to get a leg up on more moderate candidates.  Candidates and parties still have agency. They have a choice to make, often a tough one, but they can choose to go another way at some cost.  Fox could have been willing to risk losing some market share to far right outlets.  Nikki Haley could have risked losing some share of the electorate to others, with the hope that she could corner the market of reasonable Republicans (if such a beast still exists).  The challenge is that we know that the most enthused voters show up at primaries, and those tend to be those on the extremes.  But in this time of increased threat of autocracy, there is an opportunity for a Republican to take a stand.  This is not just wishful thinking or idealism--the white nationalist vote is going to Trump.  Whatever is left will go to DeSantis and others who fit the bill--white "Christian" men.  Nikki Haley could be the candidate that grabs other voters.  Again, she has agency, she has a choice to make, and, until this week, she had somewhat of an advantage with her background--not just being a person of color (perhaps in denial about that) and a woman, but someone who had pulled down the confederate flag in a previous job.  She had the credentials to try to be the savior of the GOP.  And Haley tossed it away.  Out of weakness. Due to cowardice.  She simply is not going to win an outbidding race against Trump or against the other dudes in the race.  So, we can blame the structure of the American politics--the winner take all process where small numbers of voters in primaries set the agenda--but we cannot let these politicians off.  They have responsibility for their stances.  We got here because of GOP weakness and temptation.  In 2016, GOP candidates didn't attack Trump directly because they wanted his voters--the deplorables that Hillary Clinton so aptly called them.  In 2024, the cowardice has a physical element to it--that Trump supporters have threatened violence.  But cowardice it still is--to run for Presidency and sell out whatever values one has and ultimately endanger oneself and one's family.  Again, Haley may think of herself as white, but she isn't to to white nationalists to whom she is pandering.  Indian-Americans may not be at the top of their hate list, but I am pretty sure Great Replacement Theorists worry about South Asians replacing white folks, just as they worry about Jews, Black Americans, Muslims, etc.  Structure and agency are in play here--we need to hold accountable the politicians who pander to the worst instincts in people and we need to remember that Trump and Haley wouldn't be doing this stuff if it did not work, if there was not an audience for it.* This is not just an American thing, of course, as Horowitz was inspired by the Sinhalese case in Sri Lanka.  These days, Canada is having a bit of the outbidding dynamic as the Conservative Party of Canada feels pressured by a small far right party run by, well, an idiot.  That case illustrates it is not just pressure but temptation.  The temptation to split off voters from the heterogeneous party.** You don't have to be an historian to know that the two parties switched their positions/places on the rights of African-Americans to be free and to vote, but it doesn't hurt.  Follow Kevin Kruse on social media to get the basics as he has responded extensively to the whole "hey, the Dems were the party of racism" stuff.  It is called partisan realignment for a reason--the parties and voters realigned in response to the response to the civil rights movement.

Conventional wisdom would have it that presidential elections are not decided on foreign policy, and that Black Americans, like the majority of the American population, vote primarily on domestic issues.Both statements are partially true. However, based on a recent survey conducted by the Carnegie Endowment's American Statecraft Program, African Americans do not vote primarily on foreign policy, but they are paying attention to how candidates describe the US's role in the world. In other words, foreign policy may not be the deciding factor for how the masses of Black Americans vote in 2024, but it stands to have an impact on voter enthusiasm and turnout.The Carnegie Endowment survey, comprised of a representative sample of Black Americans, revealed that economy and jobs registered as the most important issue with 29 % of respondents selecting that option. This finding tracks with a recent polling that found that the majority of Americans view the economy as the most important issue facing the country. Considering that increased inflation and the overall cost of living has placed hardships on many American families, this shouldn't come as a surprise..Our survey contained three options related to foreign policy: National Security, Immigration (which some argue cuts across international and domestic politics), and US foreign policy/role of the U.S .in the world. None of these choices cracked double digits. National Security received 5% of the vote, followed by immigration at 3%, rounded out by the U.S.'s role in the world at 2%. Despite these findings, evidence shows that Black Americans can see the importance of global developments, even when facing domestic issues. Respondents were asked if a President's foreign policy agenda matters to them when they vote. Interestingly, four in ten (39%) respondents said that it is "very important" and a plurality (44%) reported that it is "somewhat important." Across party lines, 43% of both Black Democrats (who comprised 70% of the sample) and Black Republicans reported that a president's foreign policy agenda mattered a great deal when they vote.Education attainment proved salient here, with 59% of African Americans with a postgraduate degree reporting that a president's foreign policy platform was "very important" when voting compared to 39% of all Black respondents who felt the same way. The same held true for respondents' familiarity with foreign policy issues. Forty five percent of Black Americans with postgraduate education reported being "very familiar" with foreign policy matters compared to 25% of all Black respondents that reported similarly.It should be noted, regardless of political affiliation, two of the top three most important issues to African American voters — economy and healthcare — have an international component. For instance, jobs and economic growth are impacted by trade agreements and foreign supply lines, and the response to the COVID-19 pandemic (which disproportionally impacted communities of color) required significant international cooperation. Even for foreign policy topics that did not rank high for respondents, such as immigration and National Security, there is evidence that these issues will weigh heavily on the minds of some Black voters. Take for example, the crisis at the southern border. While few African Americans see migrants as a critical threat (only 29% of African Americans see immigrants and refugees as a critical threat compared to 44% of White Americans), some African American communities may view the accommodation of migrants into historically underserved neighborhoods as reason to be concerned with Biden's handling of illegal immigration and border security.For instance, as the city of Chicago plans to turn a community center in the predominantly Black northwest neighborhood of Galewood into a migrant housing facility, Chicago CBS reported that many Black residents feel their already scarce community resources are being allocated elsewhere. One resident stated "the thing that we're most concerned about is our children, our Black children, the football, the soccer, and all the things that they do… and now they're going to take this part beautiful part and give it to migrants."On the topic of national security and US military intervention, only two in ten (20%) Black Americans are supportive of possibly sending troops to assist Ukraine or help Taiwan defend itself from a hypothetical Chinese invasion. This, of course, is partly due to the community's perennial concern with the material and human costs associated with major war. Moreover, research conducted by the Chicago Council for International Affairs reveals that 46% of Black Americans feel the US should urge Ukraine to settle for peace as soon as possible so that the costs aren't so great for American households, compared to 38% of the American public that feel the same way. According to the numbers, Black Americans are supportive of assistance to Ukraine, but many are cautious that an incipient forever war would potentially require imbalanced human and material costs from the community, or even draw attention and resources from domestic challenges. Perhaps it will prove beneficial if messaging around support for Ukraine for "as long as it takes" is coupled with a peace plan or pathways towards de-escalation.On collective action issues such as climate change, a majority of African Americans (54 %) believe the US should take the lead in combating the issue, at an even higher rate than White Americans (42 %). With concerns regarding Black voter enthusiasm and turnout in the 2024 presidential election, it might be beneficial for candidates addressing Black voters to tie together how mutual cooperation on shared global challenges will impact the economic wellbeing of the Black community. One potential solution to solving the disconnect between Black voters and the foreign policy establishment lies in connecting with Black American civil society. The same manner in which Vice President Kamala Harris tapped into the Black sorority network (which serve as some of the Black community's oldest advocacy organizations) to galvanize the Black vote, it can prove beneficial for political parties to connect with historically Black fraternities and sororities and explicate how foreign policy translates into domestic wellbeing for the Black American community. Much more in terms of foreign policy messaging will be required, of course, but it is a first step.What is clear is that solely using messaging that addresses Black American domestic concerns without addressing America's role in the world will leave many Black voters feeling they are getting more of the same.

Back in 2019, when the current European Commission assumed its term, its president, German conservative Ursula von der Leyen, proclaimed the ambition to build a "geopolitical Commission," or to bolster the EU's ability to act collectively in shaping the international order on a par with such players as the United States and China.The crisis in Gaza, sparked by the horrific atrocities perpetrated by the terrorist organization Hamas, and concerns about the extent to which the Israeli response would conform to international law, has shattered that ambition, giving way to cacophony and an image of deep divisions within the EU.That, perhaps, was inevitable given how divisive the Israel-Palestine issue is in the EU — unlike the Russian war in Ukraine that elicited a remarkably unified response from the bloc. The divisions run through the EU's 27 member states reflecting their different historical experiences and public opinion sensitivities, with Ireland and Spain seen as traditionally most sympathetic towards the Palestinian cause, while Germany, Austria and eastern European states, like Hungary and the Czech Republic, leaning towards Israel.There are also divisions between the EU institutions themselves, such as Von der Leyen's Commission, the European Council chaired by the former Belgian prime minister Charles Michel and the European External Action Service, the EU's fledgling diplomatic service led by the veteran Spanish politician Josep Borrell. To make matters even more complicated, the Gaza crisis revealed divisions within the Commission itself. And the political color of EU member state governments matters too. For example, Sweden, ruled for a better part of the last century by social-democrats, was traditionally seen as supportive of the Palestinian cause, but flipped to a more "pro-Israeli" side under the current right-wing government (which enjoys parliamentary support from a party with neo-Nazi roots).These structural weaknesses were compounded by some ill-judged moves from influential EU quarters. Fresh from the shock of Hamas's attack, Hungarian Oliver Varhelyi the EU commissioner responsible for close regional relations — which includes Israel and Palestinian autonomy — announced a freeze in EU development funding for Palestine worth 300 million euros annually. Varhelyi, an ally of the country's prime minister Victor Orban, who in turn, enjoys close relations with his Israeli counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu, apparently acted without a consent of other EU bodies, or even the Commission itself. However, he may have been forgiven for acting on an assumption that his boss, Commission President Von der Leyen, would back such a move. In her immediate reaction to the terrorist attack on Israel, she declared her unqualified support for Israel's right to self-defense "today and in the days to come." Many in the EU interpreted the absence of any reference to international law as going beyond the indispensable expression of sympathy to Israel, essentially amounting to giving a blank check for any sort of retaliation.Von der Leyen promptly visited Israel in a show of support. A number of EU member states — Ireland, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovenia, and Denmark — resented what they saw as Von der Leyen's usurpation of the EU foreign policy prerogatives which are reserved for the Council. In a highly unusual move, the EU foreign policy chief Borrell rebuked her as not speaking on behalf of the EU. Varhelyi's attempt to freeze aid to Palestinians was shut down, with the EU instead committing to a review to ensure that the aid does not inadvertently fund terrorism.In a move resembling the activation of the "dissent channel" in the U.S. State Department, 842 EU civil servants issued an open letter in which they strongly criticized Von der Leyen's perceived pro-Israeli tilt. The officials, having condemned in the strongest terms the Hamas terrorism, stated that they "hardly recognize the values of the EU in the seeming indifference demonstrated over the past few days by our Institution (Commission) toward the ongoing massacre of civilians in the Gaza strip."They also deplored what they called "the patent show of double standards which considers the blockade of water and fuel operated by Russia on the Ukrainian people as an act of terror whilst the identical act by Israel against the Gazan people is completely ignored."Nathalie Tocci, director of the Italian Institute for Foreign Affairs and one of Europe's foremost foreign policy thinkers, took Von der Leyen to task for failing to see how the failure to mention the imperative that Israel respects international humanitarian law "seriously undermines European credibility, starting with our support for Ukraine."With this backdrop, Borrell moved towards proposing a humanitarian pause to facilitate aid to Palestinians trapped in Gaza. However, even that proposal does not enjoy the unanimous support among EU member states — while some heavyweights like France favor it, others, like Germany, reportedly do not.It certainly doesn't help that even those EU leaders who try to perform a balancing act between support for Israel's right to defend itself and Palestinian aspirations to statehood, like the French president Emmanuel Macron, carelessly throw out ideas that could only lead to a broader regional conflagration they profess to want to avoid. During the visit to Israel on October 24, Macron suggested that the international coalition against ISIS could rally against Hamas too.The inconvenient truth is that Iran and its partners — the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria — were also a de-facto part of that coalition. It is a well-known fact that in Iraq, the U.S. and pro-Iranian forces coordinated their actions against ISIS. If, however, the anti-ISIS template is applied in the war against Hamas, it would have Iran and its formidable network of regional allies and proxies on the other side of the equation. That would make Western assets in the region vulnerable to their attacks.Indeed, since the start of the Gaza war there has already been an uptick in attacks against U.S. bases in Syria and Iraq. The Russian factor should also be taken into account given the current enmity between the U.S. and EU on the one hand, and Russia on the other, and Russia's increasing reliance on Iran in Ukraine, a broader war in the Middle East could also draw in Russia against the U.S. and EU.The lack of a unified, coherent, and realistic response by the EU to the war in Gaza has clearly exposed a glaring gap between its leaders' geopolitical rhetoric and their capabilities to shape outcomes on the ground.

Bossier City's long history of trying to count coup
on Shreveport for once might serve it well, with an opportunity presenting
itself through a blunder by the latter.

For decades, Bossier City leaders have burdened themselves
with a psychological inferiority complex relating to their larger and
better-known (and, to many outsiders, with a more easily-pronounceable name) neighbor
across the Red River. Feeling overshadowed, they have pursued policies
attempting to make their city stand out from, if not look better than,
Shreveport.

Usually,
it has led to undesirable consequences. Leaders chafed when no
comprehensive hospital located in Bossier City, so they decided to build the
government-run Bossier Medical Center. That worked out until it became apparent
that Willis-Knighton Systems would come to town with an initial offer allegedly
for $42 million to buy BMC, whereupon egos kicked in and city leaders refused
it. WKS then built its own, drove BMC numbers steeply into the red, and in a
short time the city had a fire sale of the facility, which no longer operates,
for $18 million. (Two city councilors from that era, no party Jeff Darby
and Democrat Bubba
Williams, still serve on the Council.)

That was just an opportunity missed, as opposed to
the current money pit that is the Brookshire Grocery Arena. Built just after
the BMC debacle for tens of millions more dollars than at first contemplated,
it has consistently lost money year after year. But city leaders wanted a
modern indoor arena to contrast with what Shreveport had available (the Hirsch Memorial
Coliseum, which technically isn't even the city's but is part of a nonprofit
organization), so rather than wait on a nongovernment entity to build one it
took the plunge, to taxpayers' everlasting regret.

Typically, it has been the heavy hand of
government intervention, spending more to bulk up, that Bossier City has turned
to in order to draw its intended contrast which then backfired, stubbornly
resisting the idea that a government that spent less with lower taxation and
fees would create more incentive for people to live and work there. To
paraphrase Edmund Burke, to make people love their city, the city ought to
be lovely.

Now there presents a way to do that with a much more
valid dose of government intervention, courtesy of Shreveport's
impending jettison of a total smoking ban at its casinos. Earlier this week
it changed its ordinance
regarding smoking to require just a quarter of the area of a casino, boat or
land, to be nonsmoking. It's uncertain whether Republican Mayor Tom
Arceneaux will veto it or, if so, that veto would be overridden as it
passed on a 4-2 vote.

Practically speaking, that means there is no ban
at all. No technology can prevent smoke from wafting around nonsmoking areas.
In essence, this puts the facilities off-limits to anybody who suffers
physiologically from having to breathe smoke.

Shreveport thusly becomes the first jurisdiction in
the country to reverse itself on a smoking ban. The rationale for the declining
city, facing sharp population loss and revenue retrenchment as a result, to do
this was the restriction hurt the bottom line of the city's casinos and therefore
related city tax collections. Theoretically, one could make an argument that enforcement
of nonsmoking could do this, for gambling is an addictive behavior like smoking
with a relatively high association between the two, Thus, a smoking ban disproportionately
could chase away chumps.

Yet the data
don't indicate as such. Smoking bans have gone into place in all of the state's
largest cities for casinos, but changes in revenue in places that did largely
have tracked those located in jurisdictions that continue to allow smoking.
Indeed, a review
of Shreveport and Bossier City markets, with the latter continuing to allow
people to smoke up in casinos, shows no significant difference in revenue changes.

Changes trending down, of course, that have little
to do with smoking and everything
to do with increased competition from Texas but particularly tribal casinos
in Oklahoma. It seems that smoking bans are basically unrelated with revenues because
of a substitution effect. Smokers
tend to be older, less educated, and lower-income compared to nonsmokers,
so it may be that potentially fewer admittances by smokers could be partially
offset by some nonsmokers who then lose more lucre.

Regardless, a deeper civil rights issue remains. A
growing portion of the population suffers from pulmonological conditions where
even a hint of smoke can send them into distress, something they can't control –
as opposed to smoking, which is an entirely voluntary action where consequences
are exported to other people who can avoid these only by curtailing their own
autonomy. In fact, with smoking in the population at nearly half its rate of
two decades ago, the proportions of smokers and people with pulmonological
diseases are about equal.

While argumentation about exportation of smoke
onto others, such as casino employees, that can impact negatively their health
merit investigation as there appears to be some association between someone's
health and breathing in smoke, there is no doubt that a causal mechanism exists
where smoke negatively affects directly some people's pulmonological health. In
essence permitting smoking in any part of a casino denies a portion of the
population the ability to work there, eat there, gamble there, and be
entertained in whatever other way there – meaning smokers are privileged in their
conduct of a voluntary behavior over those who suffer from a disability they
must bear involuntarily.

Decades ago, when mainly in the South and
profusely in Shreveport and Bossier City citizens shamefully were discriminated
against merely for the color of their skin in the conduct of commerce, the U.S.
Congress stepped in and legislated to guarantee that people couldn't be denied commercial
access solely on the basis of that. In our constitutional system, health
matters are governed by states, and local governments if delegated that way by
the states. A statewide ban by Louisiana on smoking in casinos would be best,
but absent that local governments should take up that in order to protect equal
access for vulnerable citizens.

Bossier City instituting a smoking ban in its
casinos would produce a rare instance where the city in trying to distinguish
itself from Shreveport acted on the whole actually to increase its citizens'
autonomy and quality of life. That it hasn't done this to date is to its
discredit, but that's magnified if it fails to act when served this reminder of
the west bank's stupidity.

The urgency of the research. At present, new aviation rules concerning the provision of air navigation information have been introduced in Ukraine. The rules take into account the legislation of the European Union, Eurocontrol documents, ICAO Standards on the accuracy, processing and use of aeronautical data, which include data on terrain and obstacles in the areas of airports. Target setting. One of the factors influencing the safety of civil aviation is the consideration of obstacles on the routes in the form of elevations and high-ltitude objects. This is evidenced by accidents and catastrophes of aircraft caused by collisions with high-altitude obstacles. Therefore, it is necessary to monitor the ground space in the areas of an airport for the timely detection of obstacles to the updating of the electronic database on terrain and obstacles. Actual scientific researches and issues analysis. Recent open access publications on existing methods of collecting geospatial data to determine terrain and obstacles in areas of the airport were reviewed. Uninvestigated parts of general matters defining. The analysis of the given sources allows to draw a conclusion that concerning area 1 of the airport which is the territory of the state, the contradictory information on use of this or that method of definition of a relief of district and obstacles is resulted. The research objective. The main purpose of the article is to analyze the methods of monitoring spatial information on terrain and obstacles in area 1 of the airport using space-based radar systems that would meet the requirements of ICAO in this area for the maintenance of electronic databases of terrain and obstacles. The statement of basic materials. The quantitative requirements of ICAO for data on terrain and obstacles in area 1 of the airport are given. The errors of the results of the satellite radar topographic survey (SRTM), which allowed to obtain a digital model of the Earth's topography, were resolution in the vertical plane 1 m, and in the horizontal plane - 30 m. The method of Permanent Scatterer SAR Interferometry PSInSAR - interferometry of stable reflectors using radars with synthesized space-based aperture allows to obtain the accuracy of stable reflectors (natural and man-made objects) in the vertical plane of about 1 m and the error in determining the heights of other objects is 14 m. Currently, the PSInSAR method is used to monitor the subsidence of the earth's surface in cities, which allows to determine the deformation of the earth's surface to the nearest millimeter. The grouping of remote sensing satellites TerraSAR-X and TanDEM-X provided global coverage of the earth's surface with a digital terrain model with an accuracy of at least 2 m in height. The spatial resolution was about 1 m. In 2020, a satellite with a synthesized aperture of the Capella-2 radar survey was launched into Earth orbit. This unique micro satellite weighs 107 kg. Its camera equipment currently has an ultra-high spatial resolution of 50 x 50 cm. Conclusions. Modern methods of satellite radar can determine the planned and altitude position of objects in the area of airport 1 (territory of the state) with accuracy and resolution that meets the requirements of ICAO for the maintenance of an electronic database of terrain and obstacles. It is proposed to perform the first phase of monitoring objects in the country with the help of satellite radar, and in the second phase of monitoring to involve a ground survey - to clarify the attributive information about the objects detected in the first phase. ; Актуальність теми дослідження. На сьогодні в Україні введено нові авіаційні правила, які стосуються обслуговування аеронавігаційною інформацією. Правила враховують законодавство Європейського Союзу, документи Євроконтролю, Стандарти ІСАО стосовно точності, опрацювання та використання аеронавігаційних даних, складовими яких є дані про місцевість і перешкоди в районах аеропортів. Постановка проблеми. Одним із чинників, що впливають на безпеку польотів цивільної авіації, є врахування перешкод на трасах перельотів у вигляді підвищень рельєфу та висотних об'єктів. Про це свідчать аварії та катастрофи повітряних суден, спричинені зіткненням із висотними перешкодами. Тому необхідно проводити моніторинг наземного простору в районах аеропорту для своєчасного виявлення перешкод для актуалізації електронної бази даних щодо місцевості та перешкод. Аналіз останніх досліджень і публікацій. Були розглянуті останні публікації у відкритому доступі, які присвячені існуючим методам збирання геопросторових даних щодо визначення рельєфу місцевості та перешкод у районах аеропорту. Виділення недосліджених частин загальної проблеми. Аналіз наведених джерел дозволяє зробити висновок, що стосовно району 1 аеропорту, яким є територія держави, наведена суперечлива інформація щодо використання того чи іншого методу визначення рельєфу місцевості та перешкод. Мета статті. Головною метою статті є аналіз методів моніторингу просторової інформації щодо місцевості та перешкод у районі 1 аеропорту з використанням радіолокаційних систем космічного базування, які б задовольняли вимоги ІКАО в цьому районі щодо ведення електронної баз даних про місцевість та перешкоди. Виклад основного матеріалу. Наведено кількісні вимоги ІКАО щодо даних про місцевість та перешкоди в районі 1 аеропорту. Розглянуто похибки результатів супутникового радіолокаційного топографічного знімання (Shuttle radar topographic mission (SRTM), яке дозволили отримати цифрову модель рельєфу Землі. Похибки для території Євразії – де знаходиться Україна, складали 8,8 м у плані та 6,2 по висоті та мали роздільну здатність у вертикальній площині 1 м, а у горизонтальній площині – 30 м. Метод Permanent Scatterer SAR Interferometry PSInSAR) – інтерферометрії стійких відбивачів із використанням радіолокаторів із синтезованою апертурою космічного базування дозволяє отримати точність стійких відбивачів (природних та техногенних об'єктів) у вертикальній площині близько 1 м та похибка визначення висот інших об'єктів місцевості складає 14 м. Нині методику PSInSAR застосовують для моніторингу осідання земної поверхні в містах, що дозволяє визначати деформації земної поверхні з точністю до міліметрів. Угрупування супутників ДЗЗ: TerraSAR-X і TanDEM-X забезпечило глобальне покриття земної поверхні цифровою моделлю рельєфу з точністю за висотою не менше ніж 2 м. Просторове розрізнення становило близько 1 м. У 2020 році було виведено на навколоземну орбіту супутник із синтезованою апертурою радіолокаційного знімання Capella-2. Цей унікальний мікро супутник має масу 107 кг. Його знімальна апаратура має наразі надвисоку просторову роздільну здатність 50×50 см. Висновки відповідно до статті. Сучасні методи супутникового радіолокаційного знімання дозволяють визначити планове та висотне положення об'єктів місцевості в районі аеропорту 1 (територія держави) з точністю та роздільною здатністю, яка відповідає вимогам ІКАО щодо ведення електронної бази даних про місцевість та перешкоди. Пропонується виконувати першу фазу моніторингу об'єктів місцевості на території держави за допомогою супутникового радіолокаційного знімання, а на другій фазі моніторингу залучати наземне обстеження – для уточнення атрибутивної інформації щодо об'єктів, виявлених на першій фазі.

Koncem 17. i početkom 18. stoljeća dolazi do velikih promjena u skoro svim europskim državama. One su se odrazile na daljnji razvoj viteških vladarskih redova i uvjetovale nastanak redova za vojne zasluge. U Francuskoj, Rusiji, Prusiji i Austriji uspostavljene su apsolutističke monarhije, zasnovane na novoj koncepciji vlasti. Radi ostvarenja svojih političkih ciljeva zaštite i obrane države, odnosno osvajanja tuđeg teritorija, kao i kontinuiteta svoje vlasti, europski apsolutistički vladari organiziraju stalne oružane snage: stajaće najamničke vojske, spremne na brzu intervenciju. Zapovijedanje stajaćom plaćeničkom vojskom prelazi u ruke vladara, koji više nije zavisan o volji i ambicijama svojih vazala. Tako je postignut glavni preduvjet za ostvarenje djelotvorne političke moći. Apsolutistički vladari 17. i 18. stoljeća tražili su načine kako da privežu uza se vojsku i mirno produže svoju vlast. Dodjeljujući vojnim zapovjednicima plemićke titule, novčane nagrade i ordene, a vojnicima novčane nagrade i medalje, zadobili su vlast nad vojskom, a samim tim i nad državom. Vojsku treba stalno stimulirati, ne samo kad dobiva bitke, nego i kad ih gubi, jer se iscrpljena i malodušna vojska može okrenuti protiv svoga gospodara. Jedan od načina stimuliranja vojske jest nagrađivanje hrabrih i sposobnih vojnika jer plaću dobivaju i oni koji nemaju te vrline. Tako su nastale medalje za vojne zasluge, a nešto kasnije i redovi za vojne zasluge. Novi redovi za zasluge više nisu ekskluzivni kao stari viteški redovi koji su bili rezervirani za najviši sloj aristokracije. Liberalizacijom pristupa redu, red prestaje biti institucija i postaje znak; institucija se pomalo gubi, a njezin znak postaje glavna značajka reda. Prvi red za zasluge – Kraljevski i vojnički red sv. Louisa (l'Ordre royal et militaire de Saint-Louis) osnovao je 5. travnja 1693. francuski kralj Louis XIV. (*1638. – †1715.), u čast zaštitniku Francuske. Glavni uvjet za ulazak u red bio je da je kandidat odlično služio posljednjih deset godina u francuskoj vojsci ili mornarici. Kasnije se taj rok povećao na dvadeset godina. Tako je prvi put časnicima koji nisu bili aristokratskog podrijetla omogućeno da postanu članovima reda. Unatoč svemu, novi se red nije posve oslobodio tradicije. Broj osoba koje su smjele ući u red bio je striktno ograničen. Pristupiti redu mogli su samo časnici katoličke vjere. Red je imao tri stupnja: 1. Veliki križ, 2. Komander, 3. Vitez. Primjer francuskog Reda sv. Louisa slijedile su i druge europske monarhije. Ruski car Petar I. (*1672. - †1725.) osnovao je 30. kolovoza 1698. Red sv. apostola Andrije Prvozvanoga. Pretpostavlja se da je car Petar I. nakon povratka s diplomatske misije po Zapadnoj Europi 1698. godine htio imati viteški red po uzoru na europske redove. Sudeći prema odlikovanim osobama, orden se u početku dodjeljivao za iznimne zasluge za Rusko Carstvo, za vojne podvige ili za građanske zasluge. Godine 1720. car Petar I. odredio je da se odlikovanje dodjeljuje: "jednima kao nagrada za vjernost, hrabrost i razne zasluge učinjene Nama i domovini, a drugima da potaknu sve plemenite i herojske vrline (.)". Orden je imao samo jedan stupanj, a broj vitezova bio je ograničen na dvanaest osoba iz Rusije i dvanaest iz inozemstva, dakle, ukupno na dvadesetčetiri osobe. ; At the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, there were great changes in almost all European countries. This was reflected on the further development of chivalric dynastic orders and led to the creation of orders of military merit. Absolutist monarchies were founded in France, Russia, Prussia and Austria, based on the new concept of ruling. To realise their political goals – the protection and defence of the state, conquest of outside territories, and also the continuity of their rule - European absolutist rulers established permanent armed forces: standing professional armies ready for quick intervention. The standing army was under the command of the monarch, who no longer depended on the will and ambitions of his vassals. This was the main precondition for realising effective political power. The absolutist rulers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries sought ways to tie the army to themselves and to peacefully prolong their rule. By awarding noble titles, prizes in money and orders to the military commanders, and prize money and medals to the soldiers, they gained authority over the army, and thus also over the state. The army needed constant stimulation, not only when it won battles, but also when it lost, because an exhausted and faint-hearted army could turn against its master. One of the ways to stimulate the army was to reward the bravest and ablest soldiers, because even the soldiers who did not have these qualities were paid. This is how military medals of merit were created, and somewhat later also orders of military merit. The new orders of merit were no longer exclusive as were the old chivalric orders, which were reserved for the highest members of the aristocracy. By opening access to the order, it stopped being an institution and became a sign; the institution was slowly lost and its sign became the main characteristic of the order. The first order of merit – the Royal and Military Order of Saint Louis (l'Ordre royal et militaire de Saint-Louis), was founded on 5 April 1693 by King Louis XIV (1638-1715) of France in honour of Saint Louis, the patron saint of France. The main condition for being inducted was for the candidate to have given excellent service in the French army or navy in the last ten years. Later that term increased to twenty years. In this way officers who were non-nobles got the chance of becoming members of an order. The order had three degrees: 1. Great Cross, 2. Commander, 3. Knight. Other European monarchies followed the example of the French Order of Saint Louis. The Russian Tsar Peter I (1672-1725) founded the Order of St Andrew the Apostle the First-Called on 30 August 1698. It is thought that Tsar Peter I, after returning from a diplomatic mission in Western Europe in 1698, wanted to have a chivalric order modelled on the European orders. Judging from the persons who received the order, at first it was awarded only for exceptional merit for the Russian Empire, for military feats or for civil merit. The order had only one degree, and the number of knights was limited to twelve from Russia and twelve from abroad, a total of twenty-four persons.

In connection with the COVID-19 pandemic, all countries of the world are taking actions to minimize the spread of the virus. These actions interfere with civil rights and liberties. They particularly affect convicts who serve prison sentences, as such sentences deprive them many of their rights or significantly restrict them. Recognizing the situation of prisoners at this difficult time, in March 2020, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CPT) issued the Statement of principles relating to the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty in the context of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19)1, while the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment prepared Advice to States parties and national preventive mechanisms to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether our country, while taking certain actions, takes into account the recommendations contained in both aforementioned documents. ; g.szczygiel@uwb.edu.pl ; Grażyna Szczygieł is a Professor at the Department of Criminal Law and Criminology, Faculty of Law, University of Bialystok, Poland. ; University of Bialystok, Poland ; Aebi F.M., Tiago M.M. , Prisons and Prisoners in Europe in Pandemic Times: An evaluation of the medium-term impact of the COVID-19 on prison populations, http://www.antoniocasella.eu/nume/Aebi_Tiago_10nov20.pdf. ; Coronavirus: guidance to government on respecting human rights, democracy and the rule of law, Information Documents SG/Inf(2020)11, 7 April 2020, https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/coronavirus-guidance-to-governments-on-respecting-human-rights-democracy-and-the-rule-of-law. ; Covid-19 pandemic: urgent steps are needed to protect the rights of prisoner in Europe – Pandemic and Human Rights – Commissioner for Human Rights (coe.int), COVID-19 pandemic: urgent steps are needed to protect the rights of prisoners in Europe – Pandemic and Human Rights – Commissioner for Human Rights (coe.int). ; Epidemia za kratami. Więźniowie w czasach koronowirusa, https://krytykapolityczna.pl/kraj/epidemia-za-kratkami-wiezniowie-w-czasach-koronawirusa/. ; European Organization of Prison and Correctional services (EuroPris), https://www.europris.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/Overview-Commission-30-March-2020.pdf. ; European Organization of Prison and Correctional Services (EuroPris), https://www.europris.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/Overview-Commission-30-March-2020.pdf. ; Follow-up statement regarding the situation of persons deprived of their liberty in the context of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic issued on 9 July 2020, CPT/Inf (2020) 21, https://rm.coe.int/16809ef566. ; GLOBAL PRISON TRENDS 2020, https://cdn.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Global-Prison-Trends-2020-Penal-Reform-International-Second-Edition.pdf. ; Grzesiak P., Wykonywanie kary pozbawienia wolności w czasie pandemii COVID-19 – uwagi dogmatycznoprawne i socjologicznoprawne, https://palestra.pl/pl/e-palestra/49/2020/wykonywanie-kary-pozbawienia-wolnosci-w-czasie-pandemii-covid-19-uwagi-dogmatycznoprawne-i-socjologicznoprawne. ; Koronawirus a więzienia. Skargi do RPO – na brak środków ochrony, nieprzestrzeganie zaleceń sanitarnych, dostęp do badan, https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/koronawirus-a-wiezienia-skargi-rpo-od-osadzonych-i-rodzin. ; Koronawirus. Wracają widzenia osadzonych – ale tyko z jednym członkiem rodziny i bez dzieci. Interwencja Rzecznika, https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/wracaja-widzenia-osadzonych-z-rodzinami-ale-nie-z-dziecmi-interwencja-rpo. ; Koronawirus. Widzenia osadzonych z bliskimi wstrzymane. RPO: Mogą je zastąpić komunikatory typu Skype https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/art-z-rpo/17708. RPO ponownie pisze do Służby Więziennej w sprawie widzeń osadzonych z dziećmi, https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-do-sluzby-wieziennej-widzenia-osadzonych-z-dziecmi. ; Koronawrius. RPO pyta o zakażenia w więzieniach, aresztach, zakładach poprawczych, https://www. rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/koronawrius-rpo-pyta-o-zakazenia-wiezieniach-aresztach-zakladach-poprawczych. ; Krajowy Mechanizm Prewencji Tortur rozpoczął cykl wideorozmów z pozbawionymi wolności [The National Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture has started a series of video calls with detainees], https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/koronawirus-krajowy-mechanizm-prewencji-tortur-zaczal-cykl-wideorozmow-wiezniami. ; Małecki M., Ustawodawca tarczą antykryzysową wprowadza chaos w prawie karnym, https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/nowelizacja-ustawy-czekajacej-na-wyrok-tk-wywiad-z-dr-mikolajem,501074.html. ; Mid-term impact of Covid-19 on European prison populations: new study, https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/mid-term-impact-of-covid-19-on-european-prison-populations-new-study. ; Niełaczna M., Funkcjonowanie zakładów karnych w czasie epidemii koronawirusa, LEX/el. 2020,https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344287374_Nielaczna-maria-funkcjonowanie-zakladow-karnych-w. ; Niełaczna M., COVID-19 a funkcjonowanie polskiego więziennictwa, "NKPK" 2020, vol. LVII. ; Omówienie dokumentu Przestrzeganie praw człowieka w dobie pandemii COVID-19. Stanowisko Rady Europy. 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The urgency of the research. At present, new aviation rules concerning the provision of air navigation information have been introduced in Ukraine. The rules take into account the legislation of the European Union, Eurocontrol documents, ICAO Standards on the accuracy, processing and use of aeronautical data, which include data on terrain and obstacles in the areas of airports. Target setting. One of the factors influencing the safety of civil aviation is the consideration of obstacles on the routes in the form of elevations and high-ltitude objects. This is evidenced by accidents and catastrophes of aircraft caused by collisions with high-altitude obstacles. Therefore, it is necessary to monitor the ground space in the areas of an airport for the timely detection of obstacles to the updating of the electronic database on terrain and obstacles. Actual scientific researches and issues analysis. Recent open access publications on existing methods of collecting geospatial data to determine terrain and obstacles in areas of the airport were reviewed. Uninvestigated parts of general matters defining. The analysis of the given sources allows to draw a conclusion that concerning area 1 of the airport which is the territory of the state, the contradictory information on use of this or that method of definition of a relief of district and obstacles is resulted. The research objective. The main purpose of the article is to analyze the methods of monitoring spatial information on terrain and obstacles in area 1 of the airport using space-based radar systems that would meet the requirements of ICAO in this area for the maintenance of electronic databases of terrain and obstacles. The statement of basic materials. The quantitative requirements of ICAO for data on terrain and obstacles in area 1 of the airport are given. The errors of the results of the satellite radar topographic survey (SRTM), which allowed to obtain a digital model of the Earth's topography, were resolution in the vertical plane 1 m, and in the horizontal plane - 30 m. The method of Permanent Scatterer SAR Interferometry PSInSAR - interferometry of stable reflectors using radars with synthesized space-based aperture allows to obtain the accuracy of stable reflectors (natural and man-made objects) in the vertical plane of about 1 m and the error in determining the heights of other objects is 14 m. Currently, the PSInSAR method is used to monitor the subsidence of the earth's surface in cities, which allows to determine the deformation of the earth's surface to the nearest millimeter. The grouping of remote sensing satellites TerraSAR-X and TanDEM-X provided global coverage of the earth's surface with a digital terrain model with an accuracy of at least 2 m in height. The spatial resolution was about 1 m. In 2020, a satellite with a synthesized aperture of the Capella-2 radar survey was launched into Earth orbit. This unique micro satellite weighs 107 kg. Its camera equipment currently has an ultra-high spatial resolution of 50 x 50 cm. Conclusions. Modern methods of satellite radar can determine the planned and altitude position of objects in the area of airport 1 (territory of the state) with accuracy and resolution that meets the requirements of ICAO for the maintenance of an electronic database of terrain and obstacles. It is proposed to perform the first phase of monitoring objects in the country with the help of satellite radar, and in the second phase of monitoring to involve a ground survey - to clarify the attributive information about the objects detected in the first phase. ; Актуальність теми дослідження. На сьогодні в Україні введено нові авіаційні правила, які стосуються обслуговування аеронавігаційною інформацією. Правила враховують законодавство Європейського Союзу, документи Євроконтролю, Стандарти ІСАО стосовно точності, опрацювання та використання аеронавігаційних даних, складовими яких є дані про місцевість і перешкоди в районах аеропортів. Постановка проблеми. Одним із чинників, що впливають на безпеку польотів цивільної авіації, є врахування перешкод на трасах перельотів у вигляді підвищень рельєфу та висотних об'єктів. Про це свідчать аварії та катастрофи повітряних суден, спричинені зіткненням із висотними перешкодами. Тому необхідно проводити моніторинг наземного простору в районах аеропорту для своєчасного виявлення перешкод для актуалізації електронної бази даних щодо місцевості та перешкод. Аналіз останніх досліджень і публікацій. Були розглянуті останні публікації у відкритому доступі, які присвячені існуючим методам збирання геопросторових даних щодо визначення рельєфу місцевості та перешкод у районах аеропорту. Виділення недосліджених частин загальної проблеми. Аналіз наведених джерел дозволяє зробити висновок, що стосовно району 1 аеропорту, яким є територія держави, наведена суперечлива інформація щодо використання того чи іншого методу визначення рельєфу місцевості та перешкод. Мета статті. Головною метою статті є аналіз методів моніторингу просторової інформації щодо місцевості та перешкод у районі 1 аеропорту з використанням радіолокаційних систем космічного базування, які б задовольняли вимоги ІКАО в цьому районі щодо ведення електронної баз даних про місцевість та перешкоди. Виклад основного матеріалу. Наведено кількісні вимоги ІКАО щодо даних про місцевість та перешкоди в районі 1 аеропорту. Розглянуто похибки результатів супутникового радіолокаційного топографічного знімання (Shuttle radar topographic mission (SRTM), яке дозволили отримати цифрову модель рельєфу Землі. Похибки для території Євразії – де знаходиться Україна, складали 8,8 м у плані та 6,2 по висоті та мали роздільну здатність у вертикальній площині 1 м, а у горизонтальній площині – 30 м. Метод Permanent Scatterer SAR Interferometry PSInSAR) – інтерферометрії стійких відбивачів із використанням радіолокаторів із синтезованою апертурою космічного базування дозволяє отримати точність стійких відбивачів (природних та техногенних об'єктів) у вертикальній площині близько 1 м та похибка визначення висот інших об'єктів місцевості складає 14 м. Нині методику PSInSAR застосовують для моніторингу осідання земної поверхні в містах, що дозволяє визначати деформації земної поверхні з точністю до міліметрів. Угрупування супутників ДЗЗ: TerraSAR-X і TanDEM-X забезпечило глобальне покриття земної поверхні цифровою моделлю рельєфу з точністю за висотою не менше ніж 2 м. Просторове розрізнення становило близько 1 м. У 2020 році було виведено на навколоземну орбіту супутник із синтезованою апертурою радіолокаційного знімання Capella-2. Цей унікальний мікро супутник має масу 107 кг. Його знімальна апаратура має наразі надвисоку просторову роздільну здатність 50×50 см. Висновки відповідно до статті. Сучасні методи супутникового радіолокаційного знімання дозволяють визначити планове та висотне положення об'єктів місцевості в районі аеропорту 1 (територія держави) з точністю та роздільною здатністю, яка відповідає вимогам ІКАО щодо ведення електронної бази даних про місцевість та перешкоди. Пропонується виконувати першу фазу моніторингу об'єктів місцевості на території держави за допомогою супутникового радіолокаційного знімання, а на другій фазі моніторингу залучати наземне обстеження – для уточнення атрибутивної інформації щодо об'єктів, виявлених на першій фазі.