Trotz aller Zweifel an der Abschreckungskraft der NATO hat sich die Allianz bewährt. Eine realistische Alternative zeigt sich nicht. Von grundlegender Bedeutung bleibt der Beitrag der USA zur Verteidigung Europas . Ein Gegengewicht zur Sowjetunion liegt jedoch nicht nur in deren Interesse, sondern auch in dem der Europäer selbst. Dies kann keine Abkehr von der bisherigen Strategie bedeuten, wohl aber ein verstärktes Engagement , nicht zuletzt auch eine Beteiligung am amerikanischen Projekt "Strategic Defense Initiative". (SWP-Btg)
Der Autor vertritt die These, daß eine politische Veränderung in den portugiesischen Ländern leichter zu erreichen ist als Rhodesien und in der Südafrikanischen Republik. Die Ursachen dafür liegen - abgesehen von geographischen und demographischen Gegebenheiten - in der anhaltenden Tätigkeit der afrikanischen Nationalbewegungen im eigenen Lande, dem Abfluß des portugiesischen Kapitals als Folge der Befreiungskämpfe und der Kontrolle, der Portugal als europäisches Land und NATO-Mitglied unterliegt. (DÜI-Ker)
Die strukturellen Grundlagen der gegenseitigen Bedrohung sind mit einem 'positiven Frieden' unvereinbar. "Positiver Frieden konstituiert sich ... aus dem Abbau von Bedrohung und der Schaffung für alle Beteiligten wertvoller Beziehungen, die keineswegs den Charakter eines Nullsummenspiels haben", d. h. Umstellung der militärischen Strukturen auf strukturelle Nichtangriffsfähigkeit vor allem bei der UdSSR und den USA, die deswegen nicht ihren Supermachtstatus verlieren würden. Das bisherige gradualistische Konzept muß durch unilaterales Handeln eines Landes, verbunden mit multilateralen Konsultationen, abgelöst werden, so daß ein Wandlungs- und Vertrauensprozeß folgt. Die Bundesrepublik als wesentliches NATO- Land könnte aufgrund ihrer Sperrminorität die Vorreiterrolle übernehmen. Leitender Gesichtspunkt für die Umstrukturierung militärischer Potentiale heißt Nichtbedrohung der anderen Seite, bedeutet deshalb aber auch Abbau von Angst einflößenden Feindbildern, d. h. einen sozialen Massenlernprozeß. (WMM)
"This book investigates several aspects of military power and security in the North Atlantic and Arctic region. NATO's northern flank is a large maritime and littoral theatre, where NATO directly borders Russia's Northern Fleet Military Administrative Territory, which is the location of some of Russia's most potent air, sea, and land power capabilities. While military tensions on the northern flank had been relatively low for years, the Ukraine war and increased great-power rivalry have altered that dynamic, with heightened geopolitical tensions. This has increased the focus on military-strategic competition in this northernmost region of the alliance. This book presents new assessments of several aspects of military power and security in the North Atlantic and Arctic region. With an analysis of the security and political climate in the High North, and of developments in Western military strategies, capabilities, doctrines, and operational concepts, the volume seeks to bring together an holistic understanding of the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the North Atlantic states and NATO in this dynamic area of responsibility for the alliance. In doing this, the book provides key insights into the role of intelligence, as well as branch-specific and joint approaches to power-projection and operations in the High North, which also includes selected country case studies. This book will be of much interest to students of NATO, military studies, security studies and International Relations"--
"When Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981, the United States and NATO were losing the Cold War. The USSR had superiority in conventional weapons and manpower in Europe, and had embarked on a massive program to gain naval preeminence. But Reagan already had a plan to end the Cold War without armed conflict. Reagan led a bipartisan Congress to restore American command of the seas by building the navy back to six hundred major ships and fifteen aircraft carriers. He adopted a bold new strategy to deploy the growing fleet to northern waters around the periphery of the Soviet Union and demonstrate that the NATO fleet could sink Soviet submarines, defeat Soviet bomber and missile forces, and strike aggressively deep into the Soviet homeland if the USSR attacked NATO in Central Europe. New technology in radars, sensors, and electronic warfare made ghosts of American submarines and surface fleets. The United States proved that it could effectively operate carriers and aircraft in the ice and storms of Arctic waters, which no other navy had attempted. The Soviets, suffocated by this naval strategy, were forced to bankrupt their economy trying to keep pace. Shortly thereafter the Berlin Wall fell, and the USSR disbanded. In Oceans Ventured, John Lehman reveals for the first time the untold story of the naval operations that played a major role in winning the Cold War"--
"The psychological operations (PSYOPS) doctrines of many NATO member states, including Romania, do not allow the use of influence activities on internal audiences. While this is an ethical provision, difficulties arise when formulating an adequate counter-propaganda strategy, as domestic groups that are susceptible to influence are targeted by an effective propaganda conducted by the adversary. The 2014 edition of the NATO doctrine on PSYOPS (psychological operations) was ambiguous with regard to this limitation, while the Romanian doctrine from 2016 kept it, in accordance with the older NATO doctrine from 2007. With this limitation PSYOPS risk being ineffective in countering propaganda, their role being restricted to analysing the effects of the propaganda on the audiences and making recommendations to counter it. Without using influence activities, the recommendations would be, based on the scenario, addressing the public or not (choosing "silence") with information activities through the responsible structures. Going further, inform and influence activities (IIA) intertwine, which leads to the need for more clarity in the doctrines that regulate their employment. The propaganda of the Russian Federation in Donbas, that victimised the separatists leading to their support for the invasion of Ukraine is a relevant example for situations when PSYOPS should be allowed to target internal audiences. The present paper does not go into detail on the case of Ukraine but problematises on the above-mentioned ethical limitation that has the advantage of giving the adversary advantages on multiple levels."
The aim of this article is to discuss how a weakening transatlantic relationship influences European defence cooperation and integration. It also asks how these observed patterns of weakening EU–US relations can be explained and what the consequences might be for the EU's efforts to build a stronger and more coherent security and defence policy. Building upon a "comprehensive neo-functionalist" approach first coined by the Norwegian scholar Martin Sæter, European security and defence policy should be seen as part of an externalisation of EU integration as a response to weakening transatlantic relations. The debate on European "strategic autonomy," the Strategic Compass, and the European "defence package" should therefore be considered as part of such an externalisation process of actively influencing and reshaping the transatlantic relationship. When analysing European security and defence, the article also shows that it is misleading to regard European integration as something to be subordinated to NATO. Nevertheless, a European security deficit does exist due to differing perspectives among member states on how the EU process should relate to NATO. The article, therefore, concludes that strategic autonomy can only be developed with close EU–NATO cooperation. Furthermore, a more multipolar world order where the EU no longer can rely upon a transatlantic security community to the same extent as before challenges the EU's role as a defender of multilateralism and poses new challenges to the EU's common foreign and security policy.
In the changing conditions of the operational environment and facing the new security environment which is the most complex and the most ambiguous ever, the nature and the size of threats at the address of security changed a lot. Because of that, the modern army started looking for alternative or better options to exceed this challenge. In the current conflicts, the emergence of autonomous systems represented an opportunity but also a challenge for the armed forces, offering on the battlefield a number of advantages such as increasing the force, speed, response of reaction, precise coordination but also disadvantages such as lack of motivation and flexibility of human intelligence. Combining the best elements of the humanmachine team can increase the capacity of future armed forces. The challenge is determining the proper balance between man and machine. Currently autonomous systems are already capable of eliminating the human presence in solving many tasks performed by the military and have the ability to improve over time. The purpose of this article is to analyze both existing and potential uses of autonomous systems in military logistics, focusing on the advantages and risks for military organizations and operations. ; Andrew P. Williams, Paul D. Scharre: Autonomous Systems Issues for Defence Policymakers, NATO Communications and Information Agency ISBN 9789284501939Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038, Department of Defense, 2017.Nato LogisticsHandbook, Logistics Capabilities Section, Defence Policy and Planning Division, NATO HQ, Brussels, BELGIUM 2012.
AbstractNATO burden sharing is currently hotly contested. While it has been measured at the political, economic, and military levels and being looked at from the input and output side, the most commonly used variable to measure NATO BS is considering the percentage of GDP that a country spends on defense, which NATO agreed upon in 2014 should be 2%. The aim of this article is twofold. First, we review the most commonly used system- and state-level variables to explain burden sharing behavior and to carve out their explanatory limitations due to their strong rationality assumptions, positivist epistemologies, deductive, hypothesis testing research designs, and methodological individualism. The gap in the burden sharing literature currently is that it is unable to explain why a particular burden sharing behavior exists (i.e., free-riding) and why it occurred (or not) at a particular point in time. Our second aim is to make suggestions on how to fill these gaps by offering a selective number of post-positivist theories to study NATO burden sharing. We argue that we need to unravel the BS logics and social mechanisms that underpin BS decisions and behaviors, and hypothesize that states may, for example, not exclusively be informed in their burden sharing behavior by a logic of consequentiality but one of appropriateness. However, in order to gain access to this logic and social mechanisms, we need to employ post-positivist theories (and thus methodologies).
Abstract As early as 1994, scholars, analysts and policymakers began to wonder the extent to which the Baltic States mattered in the relationship between Russia and the West. The general consensus for the following 20 years was that the Baltic States matter considerably, especially following their inclusion in both the EU and NATO in 2004. However, in the past few years two trends have emerged which begin to call this accepted knowledge into question. First, the relationship between Russia and the West has turned more hostile following nearly 20 years of detente. The West insists (especially NATO) insists that it is within its right to protect states that were formerly part of the Soviet Union/Russia's "near abroad". Russia, on the other hand, insists that NATO incursion into the "shared neighborhood" is a violation of trust and overstepping normal geopolitical bounds. Second, the Baltic States who once presented something of a united front for the West against Russia, no longer appear to have a common approach to foreign policy. While Estonia leans toward Scandinavia, and Lithuania leans toward Poland and Ukraine, Latvia is a bit of an odd man out with nowhere to turn. Furthermore, even other states in the Shared Neighborhood no longer seem to see Latvia as a valuable ally within the West. Considering this state of affairs, this paper considers whether Latvia matters anymore in regional geopolitics, or whether they are losing relevance.
The evolution of subregional cooperation among European nations in security and defense area is the topic of the article. It describes sub-regionalism as a phenomenon and explains the reasons why small states of Europe are eager to cooperate in defense area after the end of the Cold War. Such cooperation is analyzed within the broader context of European integration - a trend which still has a great impact on sub-regional cooperation in certain parts of a common EU and NATO space. According to the article former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as some European neutral states viewed sub-regional groupings as means of security enhancement in a period of transition - a time when these countries were getting ready for fully-fledged integration into European or Euro-Atlantic organizations. Nevertheless, subregional groupings have become even more relevant while EU and NATO enlargements were slowing down. So called threat perception gap among individual members of the EU and NATO contributed to forming of small subregional groupings based on members' security common vision and their aspiration to reach common goals. These groupings estimated as marginal by pan -European organizations, are extremely important for the grouped countries themselves. For European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance it is not easy to govern these subregional trends of multinational cooperation and synchronize them with European and Euro-Atlantic integration as such.
