Suchergebnisse

La cultura è un processo che propone un sapere utile al mantenimento e allo sviluppo di gruppi sociali ed antropologici diversi. In questo saggio analizzo il romanzo italiano tra il primo Ottocento e la metà del Novecento, segnalando le differenze tra quello nato in una cultura agraria e quello nato in una cultura marinara. In quest'ultimo ambito, attraverso i testi di Foscolo, Tommaseo, D'Annunzio, Svevo, Pirandello, Vittorini e Calvino, evidenzio i sistemi simbolici a partire dai quali gli autori pescano le loro trame narrative. Prendendo in considerazione le tre tappe fondamentali dell'avventura umana, nascita, riproduzione, morte, si può constatare come gli scrittori di mare, pur in modi storicamente diversi, utilizzino figure identiche, così come molto simili sono le strategie economiche, le ideologie politiche, le delimitazioni del sapere e della morale attivate e perseguite da chi nel suo specifico microcosmo si è formato.

The aim of this paper is to study the role positive organizational behaviors play in Lessons Learned systems in military organizations. The paper is based on the outcomes of the analysis of military documentation, the observation method and the opinions of the Lesson Learned personnel of the organizations under the study. The case study provides the examples identified in: NATO, the U.S. Army and the Polish Armed Forces. In a natural way, the attention is focused on the organizations recognized as the key Lessons Learned players in their respective armies/alliance: the NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC), the U.S. Centre for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and the Polish Armed Forces Doctrine and Training Centre (PAF DTC). The scope of the analysis includes leadership and the stakeholders' involvement in capturing observations, sharing information and learning from others

The aim of this paper is to study the role positive organizational behaviors play in Lessons Learned systems in military organizations. The paper is based on the outcomes of the analysis of military documentation, the observation method and the opinions of the Lesson Learned personnel of the organizations under the study. The case study provides the examples identified in: NATO, the U.S. Army and the Polish Armed Forces. In a natural way, the attention is focused on the organizations recognized as the key Lessons Learned players in their respective armies/alliance: the NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC), the U.S. Centre for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and the Polish Armed Forces Doctrine and Training Centre (PAF DTC). The scope of the analysis includes leadership and the stakeholders' involvement in capturing observations, sharing information and learning from others

The NATO-led intervention in Libya, Operation Unified Protector, is noteworthy for two central reasons. First, it is the first instance in over a decade of what Andrew Cottey calls "classical humanitarian intervention"—that is, humanitarian intervention that lacks the consent of the government of the target state, has a significant military and forcible element, and is undertaken by Western states. Not since the NATO intervention in 1999 to protect the Kosovar Albanians from ethnic cleansing has there been such an intervention. To be sure, since 2000 there have been some robust peace operations that fall in the gray area between classical humanitarian intervention and first-generation peacekeeping (such as MONUC, the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo). But, even if these operations were to some extent forcible, they had the consent of the government of the target state.

"Euro-Atlantic" as a political power brand name was employed possibly for the first time in a 1985 speech by Bettino Craxi, then president of the European Council, when he spoke about "Italy's Euro-Atlantic role." Its political usage was codified in the label Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), a group formed in 1997 and which now numbers fifty "partner" governments. EAPC is the successor to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. (The NACC was created as an adjunct to NATO six years earlier in the first flush of post–Cold War Europe.) Among EAPC partners are not only eleven far-flung (and non-Atlantic-riparian) governments of the former Soviet Union—from Armenia to Uzbekistan—but also the six republics of the former Yugoslavia. Russia itself is listed among the partners, although its leaders remain highly suspicious of the NATO parent.

The article deals with main areas of Spanish national defence policy within the Mediterranean area. This vital element of the Spanish defence policy is strongly connected with close cooperation within NATO and the EU. It discusses three main fora the Mediterranean policy has been being realized, namely the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Barcelona Process and the 5 + 5 Initiative, their basic principles, assumptions and role in the overall Spanish policy towards the Mediterranean region. It concludes with a few remarks stating that Spain wants to be present on as many for a as possible which deal with cooperation with the non-European countries of the Mediterranean region, being aware, on the other hand that only a synergy of efforts in the field especially between NATO and the EU would be a best solution also to omit duplication.

There is growing recognition of the new strategic significance of the Arctic. Tensions have been rising between Russia and the four other Arctic Ocean littoral states as climate change alters the region's geostrategic dynamics. There are unresolved disputes among the four NATO members, the fault lines between the NATO states on the one hand and Russia on the other appear to be deepening, and the sense of common space is under pressure. Military conflict, while not likely, cannot entirely be ruled out. There is a risk that the overall strategic objective of maintaining stability could be forgotten. Growing military activity, closer security coordination among the Western states, and inflammatory rhetoric could set off a vicious circle, jeopardising the wide-ranging collaboration put in place since the end of the Cold War. (Survival / SWP)

In April 2008, the NATO Summit at Bucharest explicitly acknowledged the US plans for developing a European component of its strategic antimissile defense as substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles. The argument against the US plans that it would take several years for the Middle East to develop far-reaching nuclear warheads misjudges the strategic intent of antimissile defense for the following reasons: 1) a construction period of several years; 2) an antimissile defense system combats proliferation; & 3) the region wants to maintain its political & military capacity to act. As defensive system, the anti missile defense falls within NATO. Created outside of treaties it would weaken bilateral security relations, within it would confirm its function as central security guarantor for the allies. E. Sanchez

"For over half a century, the policies of NATO & the European integration process have been complementary -- if not by design then at least in practice. Today, however, we need a true strategic partnership between our organizations -- & we need our new members to build it with us. What we need, in particular, is to give real substance to our relationship. & the way to do it is by broadening our common agenda to deal with the full spectrum of challenges before us -- including the fight against terrorism, & preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In addition to the broadening of NATO-EU cooperation to new functional areas, I believe we should also extend it to new geographical areas. And in this regard too, our new members can have a real impact...". Adapted from the source document.

In this reprint from Parameters Winter edition, the author discusses the role of NATO with respect to the politics & influence of the EU, the continued preeminence of the U.S. as Europe's leading military force, & the ongoing terrorist threat. A historical narrative of NATO's role in postwar Europe is described in terms of the development of European defense capability (beginning in the the 1950's), Prime Minister Blair's shift to support a European Defense force, & the creation of the EU's European Security & Defense Policy (ESDP). These changes in Europe necessitate an update of the EU/US relationship. Key issues that need to be addressed in the new relationship include: maintaining NATO's primacy; EU/NATO diplomacy; operational command; arms trade as a national security issue; changes in the relationship with Russia; & the credibility gap present in development of ESDP. J. Harwell

As a democracy of continental Europe Poland is highly interested in guaranteeing the functioning of a democratic, independent, and sovereign state within a secure framework. For that reason, the realization of the European security project is in the basic interest of the Polish state. After having nearly totally attained the strategic goals of Polish foreign policy, i.e. integration into Western structures, especially the membership in NATO (1999) and the upcoming accession to the European Union (2004), Poland must now actively attend to the future security situation on the European Continent. The NATO member country of Poland should react with flexibility and responsibility to this for Warsaw new constellation in Europe and in the world in order to be able to effectively define and implement its own role on the European continent under new international conditions. (Europäische Sicherheit / SWP)

Die russischen Streitkräfte befinden sich in einem kritischen Zustand. Das betrifft ihre innere Verfassung, Moral, Ausbildung, Ausrüstung und Kampfbereitschaft. Die Armee ist von Korruption und Kriminalität durchsetzt. Gewalt ist an der Tagesordnung. Die Streitkräfte sind immer noch auf einen großen konventionellen Krieg mit der NATO ausgerichtet. Ihr Charakter als eine mehr als eine Million Mann umfassende Massenarmee hat sich nicht geändert. Die Einsatzpläne des Kalten Krieges liegen immer noch griffbereit in den Schubladen des Generalstabs. Gebraucht werden heute schnell einsatzfähige, mobile und flexible Kräfte. Über derartige Kräfte verfügt Rußland jedoch nicht. Schließlich beleuchtet der nicht enden wollende Konflikt in Tschetschenien einerseits den desolaten Zustand der Streitkräfte und Sondertruppen, andererseits verschärft er die kritische Situation. Präsident Putin hat die Notwendigkeit grundlegender Reformen im Militärwesen erkannt. Er will Streitkräfte, die "kompakt, modern und gut bezahlt sind". Er hat sich für drastische Personalkürzungen stark gemacht und will eine Berufsarmee einführen. Putin hat sogar einer "Demilitarisierung des öffentlichen Lebens" das Wort geredet. Anders als in internationalen militärischen und sicherheitspolitischen Fragen wie Raketenabwehr, NATO-Ost-Erweiterung und amerikanische Militärpräsenz in Zentralasien sowie im Kaukasus hat er sich bei den internen russischen Militärfragen jedoch nicht durchsetzen können. Er hat praktisch die Kontrolle über die in Tschetschenien eingesetzten bewaffneten Kräfte verloren. Eine Militärreform bleibt infolgedessen eine ungelöstes Problem sowohl der russischen Politik als auch des Verhältnisses zwischen Rußland und dem Westen. (SWP-Studie / SWP)