Suchergebnisse

La montée électorale dès le début des années 1980 du Front national, créé en 1972, a fait de la France une exception en Europe. On sait que ce n'est plus le cas et que, dans nombre de pays européens, non seulement les partis d'extrême droite obtiennent désormais des scores comparables à ceux du FN, et parfois supérieurs, mais aussi que le système électoral leur permet de faire partie de coalitions gouvernementales, pour constituer des majorités de droite. Le vote en faveur des partis d'extrême droite dans nombre de pays européens a pour cause principale le rejet de l'immigration musulmane, vue désormais comme faisant peser une menace sur l'identité nationale et les valeurs de la Nation. Dans le contexte actuel de la mondialisation économique, rendue responsable des délocalisations des entreprises industrielles et donc du chômage, l'étranger sert de bouc émissaire. Ces ressorts communs à la montée de l'extrême droite en Europe n'effacent pas les particularités des situations nationales. C'est pourquoi nous avons choisi de présenter diverses situations européennes pour mieux les comprendre, sans oublier de nous intéresser à la Russie.

While the return to growth in the US is largely credited to the rapid spreading of information technology, a key policy concern everywhere, and notably in Europe, is whether and when the US economic boom will extend abroad, and what role new technologies are about to play. In this paper, I collect and supplement data on the extent and the contribution to growth of 'new economy' activities in Europe, and in a sample of OECD countries at large, in the 1990s. Available evidence indicates that capital accumulation in information technologies did make a contribution to growth in the EU too, though not equally everywhere. The contribution of new technologies was substantial in the UK and the Netherlands, and rapidly increasing over time in Finland, Ireland and Denmark. These were also the fast EU growing countries in the 1990s. New technologies contributed less in France, Germany, Belgium and Sweden, and marginally in Italy and Spain. Most of these countries were also 'slow growers'. I conclude that the growth gaps between the EU and the US, as well as within the EU, can (also) be associated to the diverse pace of adoption of new technologies across countries.

The political systems of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia are again based on traditional democratic institutions: representative bodies and political parties. One obvious conclusion is that the democratic evolution of party systems in Central Europe opened to the people a new range of political choices. Yet while the structure of choices offered by the party systems has been radically transformed, it is not clear whether the structure of the political preferences of the society has been affected. Another question is the influence of the population's political choices upon the composition and attitudes of political elites. These questions are analyzed using data from Poland and other Central European countries. Results of elections in Poland in 1984-93 are presented and related to differences between Polish provinces. The characteristics of voters and political leaders in 100 local communities in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia are analyzed. The conclusion of the article is that party formation at the local level has not yet become crystallized in Central Europe. Voter preferences, however, seem to be stabilizing, a necessary component of democratic party systems.

Face aux évolutions pertinentes en cours tant aux Etats-Unis qu'en URSS, le maintien du couplage euro-américain suppose l'existence d'intérêts et d'attitudes partagés des deux côtés de l'Atlantique, et un certain consensus entre les Etats européens sur la nature des défis ou menaces auxquels ils sont confrontés. Au regard de ces critères, doivent être abordées les réactions possibles tant par rapport à une réduction de la présence militaire américaine en Europe, que vis-à-vis des évolutions intervenant dans la balance des forces ou aux changements réels ou potentiels en URSS. Aussi les Européens doivent se préparer à un certain retrait partiel des forces américaines. Les alliés doivent éviter que l'« option zéro » ait un effet de « domino » sur l'ensemble des moyens nucléaires stationnés en Europe et que les inconnues de l'équation soviétique les divisent. Mais des forces puissantes joueront contre la permanence d'un consensus stratégique entre Européens et Américains : la parité nucléaire depuis longtemps, et de façon constante ; la perception américaine d'un « parasitisme » européen, accompagnée d'une délégitimation de la dissuasion nucléaire... Cependant, les effets de ces données peuvent probablement être maîtrisés si les Européens coordonnent leurs politiques de sécurité.

The aim of the study was to approach an assessment of the technological level of the economies in Eastern Europe, particularly in the newly-democratising countries—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland—by means of studying their innovative activity and productivity levels in comparison with the West.

The book proposes a profound rethink of the complex relationship between Europe—defined here as the European Union and its members—and the states of the Mediterranean Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Europe's 'southern neighbours'. These relations are examined through a borderlands prism that conceives of this interaction as one between an empire of sorts that seeks to export its order beyond the border, and the empire's southern borderlands. Focusing on trade relations on the one hand, and the cooperation on migration, borders, and security on the other, the book revisits the historical origins and modalities of Europe's selective rule transfer to MENA states, the interests underwriting these policies, and the complex dynamics marking the interaction between the two sides over a twenty-year period (1995–2015). It shows that within a system of structurally asymmetric economic relations from which Europe and MENA elites benefit the most, single MENA governments have been co-opted into the management of border and migration control where they act as Europe's gatekeepers. Combined with specific policy choices of MENA governments, Europe's selective expansion of its rules, practices, and disaggregated borders have contributed to rising socio-economic inequalities and the strengthening of authoritarian rule in the 'southern neighbourhood', with Europe tacitly tolerating serious violations of the rights of refugees and migrants at its fringes. Challenging the self-proclaimed benevolent nature of European policies and the notion of 'Fortress Europe' alike, the findings of this study contribute to broader debates on power, dependence, and interdependence in the discipline of international relations.

This article is part of a broader project on the social history or histories of anarchism. The standard accounts of anarchism (Nettlau, Joll, Woodcock, Marshall etc.) have been combinations of the histories of ideas and political/social movements. A larger project I am engaged in uses another methodology and is reliant upon the vast outpouring of published and unpublished academic writing on social history that has been produced since the 1960s. I will cover only several interconnected themes here: anarchism, internationalism and nationalism in Europe. This article will give a synoptic overview of the internationalism of the European anarchist and syndicalist movements during the "classical" period of anarchism (1860–1939). It focuses on the First and Second Internationals and the birth of the Third. It examines the ideology and culture of Internationalism, which was the nursery of the modern anarchist movement. The linkage between federalist and regionalist republicanism is stressed and the legacy of the Paris Commune of 1871 is highlighted. The desire to secure a global level playing field in labour markets promoted labour internationalism during the First International and a revival of this strategy by anarchists and syndicalists during the era of the Second International. The mismatch of industrial development and union density between industrialised Britain or Germany and artisanal and industrialising France and southern Europe limited internationalism in the 1860s and the 1900s. Equally the patriotic legacy of the Commune of Paris undermined the internationalism of anarchists and syndicalists when war broke out in 1914. In 1917–1918 anarchist and syndicalist internationalism seemed to be revived as Europe entered a period of revolutionary discontent. But very quickly the Bolsheviks and the Soviet Union channelled this wave into the Third International and ultimately the interests of the newly born Soviet State. Anarchist and syndicalist internationalism had little effect on the fortunes of the anarchists in the Spanish Civil War in a world of nation‐states and state‐centric political parties and movements.

Focuses on questions such as "what does the situation of women at universities look like in Europe?" and "What does inequality mean today?" Continues by asking how has the situation changed recently and which national measures have been initiated in recent years and questioning their success. Answers some of these questions in a comparative way and provides a number of examples from Germany.

This paper draws attention to the notable parallels between the problems faced by John Major and his government over Europe and a comparative situation from the 13th century. It shows that nationalism has been a leading force in politics for far longer than chronocentric analysis has allowed and that rulers – whether kings or prime ministers – ignore it at their own cost.1

Cover -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1 States and Nations -- 2 The British Isles -- 3 France -- 4 Spain and Portugal -- 5 Italy -- 6 Germany -- 7 The Low Countries -- 8 Scandinavia -- 9 Switzerland -- 10 'Mitteleuropa' -- 11 The Balkans -- 12 Poland -- 13 The Baltic Nations -- 14 Russia-in-Europe, Belarus and Ukraine -- 15 Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliographical Note -- Index.