Suchergebnisse

Abstract
This article provides an overview of cases decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning contract law. The present issue covers the period between the beginning of July 2019 and the end of December 2019.

The second part of the second ordinary session of the Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU) was held in Strasbourg from October 11 to 13, 1956, under the chairmanship of Mr. J. S. Maclay (United Kingdom). Following examination of a report presented by its General Affairs Committee, the Assembly adopted three recommendations to the WEU Council, concerning, respectively, cultural matters, WEU's activities in the Saar, and social questions. On October 12, the Assembly discussed the state of European defense, on the basis of a report presented by Mr. J. J. Fens (Netherlands, Popular Catholic). Following its debate, the Assembly adopted two further recommendations. The first called upon the Council to take an immediate decision concerning the nature of the reorganization of western defensive forces, and to give a clear lead to public opinion in the matter; it continued that it must be accepted that substantial conventional forces be retained in order to meet all eventualities, and that the west German contribution to European defense should be made effective as soon as possible. In the second recommendation, the Assembly expressed its belief that it could not hold an informed debate unless, with due regard to the requirements of security, all the documentation necessary was made available, and recommended that the Council urgently review its interpretation of the Brussels Treaty as regarded WEU's function in that field. The latter resolution, according to press reports, followed a debate marked by a sense of frustration, with nearly all the speakers complaining that the Council had not given the Assembly's defense committee sufficient information on which to base recommendations. A majority of the continental deputies were reported to favor the Council's becoming responsible to the Assembly, rather than to member governments, for its decisions, but they were reported to realize that the United Kingdom parliament would never accept the consequent limitation of sovereignty. However, in the meantime, the feeling was reported to be that governments could still do much to strengthen WEU.

The first part of the fourth session of the Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU) was held July 2–5, 1958, in Paris, under the presidency of Sir James Hutchison (United Kingdom, Conservative). In the course of its discussion of military questions, the Assembly debated three reports and took note of a communication by M. Etienne de la Vallée Poussin (Belgium, Social Christian) on the responsibility of WEU in military policy. After its consideration of the request for an opinion from the Consultative Assembly on the military implications of regional or limited disarmament or of the policy of disengagement in central Europe, the Assembly adopted a resolution rejecting the Rapacki Plan and stating that disengagement which implied a withdrawal of United States and Soviet troops would be highly dangerous to the west unless it took place under certain express conditions, one of these being that neutralization of western Germany could not form part of such a policy. The Assembly also adopted a resolution and a recommendation on WEU's contribution to the production of armaments within the Atlantic alliance; the resolution allowed for the creation of a committee of investigation of five members, to be nominated by the Presidential Committee. In connection with the state of European security the Council approved by 50 votes to 6, with 8 abstentions, a recommendation from its defense committee calling for a minimum land force in central Europe of 30 divisions, with tactical nuclear weapons. There was to be no reduction in the contribution of member states, according to the recommendation, and they were to bring their contingents up to the agreed level.

The European Commission is advocating Exit programmes for White Supremacists as part of its counter-radicalisation programme. The author critically examines the experiences of Sweden and Germany in using Exit with far-right extremists since the 1990s, and finds anti-racism itself being blamed by its practitioners who tend to see their clients as new victims. The programmes themselves have no effective evaluation mechanism of fascist disengagement and the fact that those who are 'turned' by Exit not only avoid sanctions but also can be made into public experts-cum-celebrities, is also problematic. But for governments this apolitical and malleable counter-radicalism industry, that distances itself from traditional anti-fascist values, is attractive. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright, the Institute of Race Relations.]

Today, for the first time in the history of the EU, political and legal scholarship has focused on routes that could lead to the exit of a Member State from the European Union. This book provides a detailed discussion of the legal prerequisites, process and specific issues arising from a Member State's exit from the EU. This may take the form of a voluntary withdrawal under Article 50 TEU, such as in the case of "Brexit", or from the Eurozone, as was discussed in the case of Greece. However, it could also occur in the form of a "forced" exit, including expulsion due to an infringement of fundamental rules, or secession--the most relevant example at present being Catalonia. Legal scholars, practitioners and students, as well as political scientists and anyone interested in what the future holds for European integration, will find this book particularly relevant.

The European Union is one of the world?s most complex political systems: this makes it a challenge to study. To the uninitiated its institutions seem remote, its remit unclear, its operations difficult to understand and its outputs sometimes perplexing. It combines some attributes of a state with those of an international organisation, yet it closely resembles neither. Its development is shaped by an increasing number of players, including 25 member governments, multiple common EU institutions, clusters of experts, private interests and citizen groups. All converge to influence what the EU is.

The Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) held the first part of its sixth ordinary session in Paris from May 31 to June 3, 1960. After Mr. Badini Confalonieri (Italian Liberal) had been reelected President of the Assembly, the first item of business was the presentation of the fifth report of the Council of WEU, covering the period from January 1 to December 31, 1959, by Mr. van Houten, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and Chairman ad interim of the Council. In connection with the transfer of social and cultural activities from WEU to the Council of Europe, he pointed out that, by means of partial agreements, the seven governments of WEU remained free to undertake new activities either among themselves or within the framework of the WEU Council, and that only the implementation of current activities was to become the responsibility of the Council of Europe. Speaking next of the Standing Armaments Committee and of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, Mr. van Houten stated that the procedure for cooperation in the field of equipment formulated by the Committee had been successful and that the Control Agency had continued to develop its activities. Concluding his report, he pointed to the importance of political consultations within WEU as a means of enabling members to discuss differences of opinion and thereby come nearer to a solution. In the general debate which followed, members stressed the importance of cooperation in armaments and civil defense.

The second part of the first session of the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) was held in Strasbourg on October 24 and 28, 1955 under the chairmanship of Mr. John Maclay, President of the Assembly (United Kingdom, National Liberal and Conservative). A draft charter and draft rules of procedure, the chief items on the agenda, were presented to the Assembly on behalf of the Committee on Organization by the rapporteur, Mr. van der Goes van Naters (Netherlands, Socialist), who stated that the method of creating new organizations in Europe had empirical merits, but that there was a danger of inefficient use of Europe's resources as a whole; he felt that the best possible use should be made of parliamentary time; that parliamentarians should not sit on committees that duplicated each other's work; and that no new assemblies should be created without a careful examination of the burdens involved. Mr. van der Goes van Naters declared that collaboration between the ministerial and parliamentary organs of WEU was the keynote of the charter; in order to avoid a clash between the ministers and the Assembly, the charter had been drafted so as to avoid making general rules to govern future and unknown situations and to allow for each case to be treated on its merits as it arose. He stated that with the exception of two provisions where the assent of the Council of Europe must first be sought, the charter contained no provisions on which the Assembly could not decide for itself.

This article provides an overview of cases decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning contract law. The present issue covers the period between the beginning of February and the end of June 2019.

Although it is widely appreciated that rights of exit from a legal order can be important and valuable, there currently exists no adequate account of the relationship between exit rights and legitimacy. This Article cures that deficiency by describing the contribution made by exit rights to the legitimacy of a legal order--a contribution that I call the "exit legitimacy" of that legal order--and offers two accounts of its normative significance. On the "thin" account, exit rights operationalize consent by making it more genuine, more ascertainable, and more closely related to relevant acts and relationships of governance; on the "thick" account, exit rights instantiate a value that I call 'political autonomy." The Article offers grounds to think that, while exit legitimacy is salient in legal orders of all kinds, it is particularly significant for international orders and institutions, which often lack the democratic, traditional, and other legitimating resources available to their national equivalents. Finally, to complete the account of exit legitimacy, the Article considers and responds to four of the strongest objections to which it appears vulnerable. It demonstrates that none of these objections convincingly undermines the case for this unique ground of legitimacy, and that each provides useful guidance for promoting exit legitimacy in legal orders of all kinds.

Abstract
The year 2017 was eventful for the EU and its member states. Given the widespread Euroscepticism and populism which appeared to be on the rise last year, election results in the Netherlands, France and Germany were greeted with relief and hope for the future. The EU was in an optimistic mood. European Commission President Jean- Claude Juncker used his State of the European Union speech in September to note that the EU had the 'wind in its sails' (Juncker, 2017). At the same time, he cautioned that the fair weather conditions would not last long - there was no room for complacency. The EU had to act to protect, empower and defend its citizens. The EU moved forward on a number of policy fronts in the wake of the Brexit vote and also concluded high-profile international trade deals in an effort to fill the vacuum left by the protectionist policies of the Trump administration.

This article provides an overview of cases decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning contract law. The present issue covers the period between mid-January 2018 and mid-July 2018.