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This article explores the processes that lead to different types of civil war outbreak in postconflict societies, combining quantitative analysis with case studies of Myanmar and Sierra Leone to disaggregate situations in which former rebels resume fighting from those when new rebels emerge in the postconflict environment. The analysis, based in principal–agent theory, illuminates how relations between the government and ex‐rebel elites, group cohesion among rebels, and the relationship between the government and the ex‐combatants all can lead to resumed civil war. Its findings suggest that victories and settled conflicts are the most important outcome for preventing conflict recurrence by former rebels, but do not prevent the rise of new insurgencies. Moreover, the absence of government repression emerges as the factor most likely to reduce the risk of new rebellion.

This article explores the processes that lead to different types of civil war outbreak in postconflict societies, combining quantitative analysis with case studies of Myanmar and Sierra Leone to disaggregate situations in which former rebels resume fighting from those when new rebels emerge in the postconflict environment. The analysis, based in principal–agent theory, illuminates how relations between the government and ex‐rebel elites, group cohesion among rebels, and the relationship between the government and the ex‐combatants all can lead to resumed civil war. Its findings suggest that victories and settled conflicts are the most important outcome for preventing conflict recurrence by former rebels, but do not prevent the rise of new insurgencies. Moreover, the absence of government repression emerges as the factor most likely to reduce the risk of new rebellion.

AbstractThe role of semi-public intermediary institutions is underestimated in political research. This paper elaborates the dynamics of the interaction pattern of mission-agencies, promoting and conducting research in the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany. The principal-agent-model serves as the organizing theoretical concept. By stressing the role of the third party, usually neglected in the model, it is shown that intermediary agencies in policy-making are drawn into cooperative and almost symbiotic relationships with the recipients of programs. The use of intermediary agencies becomes a double-edged sword for policy-makers. While close relationships with the scientific community improve the acceptance of political research programs, the formulation of research policies becomes subject to compromise and coalition building within funding agencies.

THE ROLE OF SEMI-PUBLIC INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTIONS IS UNDERESTIMATED IN POLITICAL RESEARCH. THIS PAPER ELABORATES THE DYNAMICS OF THE INTERACTION PATTERN OF MISSION-AGENCIES, PROMOTING AND CONDUCTING RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND GERMANY. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL SERVES AS THE ORGANIZING THEORETICAL CONCEPT. BY STRESSING THE ROLE OF THE THIRD PARTY, USUALLY NEGLECTED IN THE MODEL, IT IS SHOWN THAT INTERMEDIARY AGENCIES ON POLICY MAKING ARE DRAWN INTO COOPERATIVE AND ALMOST SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE RECIPIENTS OF PROGRAMS. THE USE OF INTERMEDIARY AGENCIES BECOMES A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD FOR POLICY MAKERS. WHILE CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY IMPROVE THE ACCEPTANCE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH PROGRAMS, THE FORMULATION OF RESEARCH POLICIES BECOMES SUBJECT TO COMPROMISE AND COALITION BUILDING WITHIN FUNDING AGENCIES.

Auf den Märkten für medizinische Leistungen und in der Beziehung zwischen Arzt und Patient existieren Informationsasymmetrien in einer Vielzahl, wie sie in kaum einem anderen Bereich einer Ökonomie anzutreffen sind. In der Arbeit wird die beidseitige Informationsasymmetrie zwischen Arzt und Patient untersucht. Zum einen geschieht dies hinsichtlich des Einflusses von Änderungen der Vertragsparameter auf die medizinische Leistung und das Verhalten des Patienten. Zum anderen betrifft dies die Wahl der Versicherungs- und Vergütungsparameter. Ergänzend wird die Arzt-Patient-Beziehung mittels einer empirischen Analyse untersucht. In deren Mittelpunkt stehen die Determinanten der Gesundheitszufriedenheit des Patienten und dabei insbesondere die Inanspruchnahme medizinischer Leistungen.

This paper is entitled « Contracts For Regulating Environmental Damage From Farming: A Principal- Agent Approach » and explores the use of agency theory in the procurement of environmental public goods. The voluntary participation basis of many European agri-environmental schemes, combined with heterogeneity in the farm population and policy makers' lack of information about individual farms, poses a contract design problem. In particular, undifferentiated payment contracts and contracts that are amenable to « cheating » by farmers can lead to inefficiencies. Agency theory can assist in the design of contracts to overcome this situation. This paper presents a simple theoretical two-producer model, together with a simulated numerical example, to demonstrate the potential advantages of using agency theory in this manner. The results indicate how over-payment to farmers can be reduced. The increasing policy and funding importance of agri-environmental objectives suggest that further research in this field is merited. ; L'article étudie l'emploi de la théorie de l'agence dans les procédures administratives touchant à la fourniture de biens publics, ici l'environnement. La conception des contrats entre l'administration et les agriculteurs se heurte à trois facteurs: le principe de participation volontaire des agriculteurs qui caractérise un certain nombre de programmes agri-environnementaux européens, l'hétérogénéité de la population agricole, et le manque d'information disponible sur les exploitations individuelles. Deux types de contrats en particulier posent problème : ceux qui ne distinguent pas les différences entre agriculteurs et ceux qui permettent aux agriculteurs de " tricher ". La théorie de l'agence aide à formuler des contrats qui contournent ces difficultés. Les auteurs présentent ici un modèle théorique simple représentant deux types d'agriculteurs et une simulation à partir d'un exemple numérique. L'intérêt potentiel d'une telle application de la théorie de l'agence est mis en évidence. En particulier, les résultats indiquent la possibilité de diminuer l'attribution de subventions excessives aux agriculteurs. L'importance grandissante accordée aux objectifs agri-environnementaux dans l'élaboration des politiques montre la nécessité de poursuivre des recherches dans ce sens.

International audience ; This paper is entitled « Contracts For Regulating Environmental Damage From Farming: A Principal- Agent Approach » and explores the use of agency theory in the procurement of environmental public goods. The voluntary participation basis of many European agri-environmental schemes, combined with heterogeneity in the farm population and policy makers' lack of information about individual farms, poses a contract design problem. In particular, undifferentiated payment contracts and contracts that are amenable to « cheating » by farmers can lead to inefficiencies. Agency theory can assist in the design of contracts to overcome this situation. This paper presents a simple theoretical two-producer model, together with a simulated numerical example, to demonstrate the potential advantages of using agency theory in this manner. The results indicate how over-payment to farmers can be reduced. The increasing policy and funding importance of agri-environmental objectives suggest that further research in this field is merited.

This paper presents an analytical framework for comparing patterns of devolution to subnational governments and autonomous social insurance institutions in social security systems. The framework has two components. One is an analysis of financial structures along the dimensions of financial autonomy (indicated by the extent to which the administering institution raises its own revenue or depends on central grants) and financial responsibility (indicated by whether marginal costs are borne by the administering institution). The other component of the framework concerns the assignment of policy-making power; in particular, we contrast the effects of competitive and cooperative modes of devolution. The discussion uses examples from Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the USA. While we looked for 'principal-agent' relationships between central governments and administering institutions, we found that more complex multi-level governance structures prevailed in most cases.

This article studies the nature of the trade-off between incentives and enforcement mechanisms that an Armed Illegal Organization (AIO)'s leadership, which is the principal, offers to its operatives, who act as agents. This principal-agent model focuses on both the expected benefits and costs for those who decide to stay or defect from the armed organization, in an uncertain context in which desertion is encouraged by an external agent who is providing incentives aimed at fostering operatives' individual desertion. Given a parameterization of the model, we find the optimal transfer system using the constrained minimization routine fmincon in MATLAB's optimizations toolbox. Once we obtain a numerical version of the contract, we use the computational tool to simulate the behavior of agents who are facing the probability of being punished and how this could encourage agents to not make any effort.

The relationship between government and parents is modelled as a principal-agent problem, with the former in the role of principal and the latter in the role of agents. We make three major points. The first is that, if the well-being of the child depends not only on luck, but also on parental actions that the government cannot readily observe, the latter can influence parental behaviour indirectly, by conditioning transfers on performance. The second point is that, if there are market inputs into the making of a happy or successful child, which the government can observe, but cannot ascribe to any particular parent or child because they are bought anonymously, an income transfer policy can be usefully complemented by an indirect tax policy that systematically distorts prices in favour of these inputs. The third is that, if parents care about their children, insurance and incentive considerations must be tempered by the need to compensate parents who have the misfortune of getting a child with low ability or, more generally, less well equipped to make the most of life. Ways of making these findings operative are discussed in some detail.

This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on fiscal consolidation and the questionable effectiveness of the Stability and Growth Pact by addressing the problem of economic governance in the EMU with a game-theoretic principal-agent approach. Following the theory of delegation, we develop a principal-multi agent model where the EMU authorities act as a collective principal that designs contracts for each of two agents that reflect Europe's "South" and "North". We investigate what happens when agents face hidden-information moral hazard problem and when they are able to coordinate their actions. Bearing in mind the applicability of incentive mechanisms, we discuss the optimal contracts for the principal and each of the agents. We prove that the most efficient solution consists of tailor-made contracts, according to which highly indebted countries must be offered strong incentive mechanisms in the form of substantial penalties but also rewards (e.g., preferential loans). We also stress the importance of taking into account positive spillover effects, which could be facilitated by economic integration and fiscal policy coordination between the EMU Members.

Money laundering has an element of a bate for one individual
and a tool of exploitation for another individual and carries an
externality (positive or negative) for the society. Its multifarious
nature is analysed in perspective of Principal-Agent-Client Model of
Provan and Milward (2001). Model of Network Evaluation by Provan and
Milward (2001) is originally used for health and social sector; however
this model is extended and applied for governance of money laundering.
In this model we evaluate the affectivity of the network of money
transaction with the objective function to minimise transaction of money
through money laundering by making laws and procedure and get these
implemented through agents. As there is involvement of multiple
stakeholders, therefore, evaluation of network effectiveness is made at
three levels i.e. at community level to analyse: community, the network
itself and the network's organisational participants. These levels are
of interest to three major constituents of money transaction network
such as principal, agent, and clients.

This article examines the distribution and correlates of mass attitudes toward the privatization of US military operations. Relying on insights from principal–agent theory, we form predictions about what beliefs are associated with a willingness to grant authority over military operations to private military companies (PMCs). The model predicts that citizens' beliefs about actor motives, accountability, and costs are associated with attitudes toward PMCs. Using a nationally representative survey, we find that beliefs about the profit-oriented motives of private firms and perceptions of their lack of accountability reduce support for the use of PMCs, particularly in combat operations. By contrast, belief in private firms' superior fiscal efficiency increases support for utilizing PMCs in both combat and noncombat operations. The results illustrate the usefulness of principle-agent theory for understanding mass attitudes and help to improve the field's understanding of the contours of public attitudes toward US defense policy.