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A more powerful China under the seemingly confident leadership of President Xi Jinping has committed to a more activist global policy. In particular, this commitment has influenced Beijing's policy towards UN peacekeeping operations, with a long-awaited decision to add combat forces to the engineering troops and police and medical units that have been features of its past contribution. In addition, Beijing has doubled the size of its contribution to the UN peace operations budget. This article explains why the UN is a key venue for China to demonstrate its 'responsible Great Power' status and expressed willingness to provide global public goods. The main explanatory factors relate to the UN's institutional design, which accords special status to China even as it represents a global order that promotes the sovereign equality of states. Moreover, there are complementarities between dominant Chinese beliefs and interests, and those contained within the UN system. Especially important in this latter regard are the links that China has tried to establish between peacebuilding and development assistance with the aim of strengthening the capacity of states. China projects development support as a contribution both to humanitarian need and to the harmonization of conflict-ridden societies. The Chinese leadership has also spoken of its willingness to contribute to peacemaking through stepping up its efforts at mediation. However, such a move will require much deeper commitment than China has demonstrated in the past and runs the risk of taking China into controversial areas of policy it has hitherto worked to avoid. (International Affairs (Oxford) / SWP)

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The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has mainly been used to deploy small-scale operations, which generally did not provide the member states with clear security benefits. This article combines insights from different theories of international relations to explain this disappointing track record. It argues that liberal theories adequately identify the domestic pressures the member states' governments need to accommodate in the area of crisis management. Constructivism, on its part, properly emphasises the diverging strategic cultures of the member states. Both theories however fail to explain why domestic pressures and diverging strategic cultures lead to small-scale operations. Rational-choice institutionalism does provide a convincing explanation for the latter by drawing attention to the CSDP's ineffective institutional design. Realism, in turn, is best positioned to explain why the CSDP was not designed more effectively, by emphasising the reluctance of states to transfer sovereignty to international organisations. The article concludes by discussing two measures that could alleviate the impact of the identified impediments on the CSDP's track record: devising a CSDP-strategy and adapting the consensus rule. However, since the latter is very unlikely in the near future, the CSDP is not expected to develop into a more effective framework for crisis management. Keywords: Common Security and Defence Policy, liberal theories, constructivism, rational-choice institutionalism, institutional design, realism, sovereignty. (Romanian Journal of European Affairs / SWP)