Suchergebnisse

In recent years, the International Criminal Court has emerged as a major player within the Great Lakes region of East and Central Africa. However, few scholars and commentators have sought to assess the court's activities from within this regional lens. Yet viewing the court's work from within this perspective is critical, because it highlights some of the profound deficiencies with the court's investigative strategy thus far. Time and again, the court has chosen to target criminal activity while ignoring the larger criminal enterprise, seeking to eliminate the impunity of mid-level warlords, while allowing their patrons-who are often high-level government officials-to go free. For the court to truly have a long-term impact on the criminal networks that proliferate throughout the region, it will need to retool its political strategy. Adapted from the source document.

Why do states build international courts, submit cases, and enforce court judgments? This article examines the role of a court that is neither a "decider" nor an "information provider." Litigation is costly and does not reveal private information. The court's ruling is not binding and bargaining can occur before and after the court has ruled. Nevertheless, an alternative dispute resolution mechanism emerges: court rulings can coordinate endogenous multilateral enforcement. Disinterested states will enforce to ensure that they can profitably use the court in the future. Accepting jurisdiction of the court allows a state to make efficiency-enhancing "trades," winning high-value disputes in exchange for losing low-value disputes. This is possible because litigation is a screening device: states only sue when they derive relatively high value from the disputed asset. The use of the court as a coordination device for multilateral enforcement allows for the existence of a court with endogenous enforcement and jurisdiction. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]