A Far from Simple Introduction to Communication
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 47, Issue 6, p. 481-491
ISSN: 1552-7441
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In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 47, Issue 6, p. 481-491
ISSN: 1552-7441
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 47, Issue 2, p. 95-110
ISSN: 1552-7441
The basic approach to understanding shared agency (or joint action) has been to identify individual intentional states that are somehow "shared" by participants and that contribute to guiding and informing the actions of individual participants. But, as Michael Bratman suggests, there is a problem of stability and depth that any theory of shared agency needs to solve. Given that participants in a joint action might form shared intentions for different reasons, what binds them to one another such that they have some reason for continuing to participate in the joint action in the face of conflicting reasons? This is particularly pressing in cases of joint actions that unfold over long periods of time. There are a variety of ways that the problem of stability and depth of shared intention might be addressed. We review some of those ways in section 1. We do not intend to challenge these approaches. Instead, in this article, we want to suggest that narrative is an additional, perhaps in some cases a predominant, way in which stability and depth are achieved. According to some theories, narrative plays a crucial role in the development of the self. Our suggestion is that the narratives we tell about our joint projects contribute to the development of a stable and deep "we."
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 47, Issue 2, p. 132-144
ISSN: 1552-7441
This article evaluates the idea of the modularity of mind and domain specificity. This concept has penetrated the behavioral disciplines, and in the case of some of these—for example, the cognitive study of religion—has even formed their foundation. Although the theoretical debate relating to the idea of modularity is ongoing, this debate has not been reflected in the use of modularity in behavioral research. The idea of domain specificity or modularity of mind is not without its controversies, and there is no consensus regarding its acceptance. Many neuroscientists, as well as several evolutionary psychologists and philosophers, have raised a number of objections that cannot remain overlooked. I will show the areas in which the idea is problematic, what attempts have been made to preserve it, and how social scientific research can move beyond post-Fodorian modularity without losing any valuable insights.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 47, Issue 2, p. 111-131
ISSN: 1552-7441
I explore conceptual tensions that emerge between Wilfrid Sellars' and Grace de Laguna's adoption of behaviorism. Despite agreeing on various points (e.g., the social nature of language and behavior, a methodological commitment to behaviorism), I argue that Sellars' and de Laguna's positions represent a split between normativist and descriptivist approaches to explanation that are generally incompatible, and I explore how both positions claim conceptual priority.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 47, Issue 2, p. 145-161
ISSN: 1552-7441
The predictive inadequacy of the social sciences is well documented, and philosophers have sought to diagnose it. This paper examines Brian Epstein's recent diagnosis. He argues that the social sciences treat the social world as entirely composed of individual people. Instead, social scientists should recognize that material, non-individualistic entities determine the social world, as well. First, I argue that Epstein's argument both begs the question against his opponents and is not sufficiently charitable. Second, I present doubts that his proposal will improve predictive success for the social sciences, which I support with Edith Penrose's resource-based theory of the firm.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 47, Issue 4-5, p. 370-374
ISSN: 1552-7441
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 47, Issue 1, p. 67-85
ISSN: 1552-7441
Many philosophers regard collective behavior and attitudes as the ground of the whole of social reality. According to this popular view, society is composed basically of collective intentions and cooperative behaviors; this is so both for informal contexts involving small groups and for complex institutional structures. In this article, I challenge this view, and propose an alternative approach, which I term institutional externalism. I argue that institutions are characterized by the tendency to defer to elements that are external to the content of collective intentions—such as laws, declarations, and contracts. According to institutional externalism, those elements are the grounds of institutional statutes, rights, and duties.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 46, Issue 6, p. 604-623
ISSN: 1552-7441
Although sociologists conceive obligation as an objective force (the social) that compels individuals to act and think according to pre-defined norms of conduct and ways of reasoning, philosophers view it as an imperative that is met through the agent's deliberation. The aim of this article is to undermine the standard dichotomy between the deterministically sociological and the moral–philosophical views of obligation by way of contending that Wittgenstein's view on blind obedience (as analyzed by Meredith Williams) bears a conception of the social. I will then argue that Wittgenstein's notion of forms of life and the sociological notion of situation refer to the same encompassing phenomenon: obligation. I will finally claim that this phenomenon should be re-specified in terms of impersonality to devise a shared dynamic conception of obligation admitting that a plurality of contextual normative orders monitor collective and individual action in ordinary life.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 47, Issue 1, p. 86-92
ISSN: 1552-7441
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 46, Issue 6, p. 548-564
ISSN: 1552-7441
This article argues, in opposition to a common interpretation of Wittgenstein deriving from Winch, that there is nothing especially problematic about the social sciences. Familiar Wittgensteinian theses about language, notably on the open-endedness of linguistic rules and on the importance of family resemblance concepts, have great relevance not only to the social sciences but also to much of the natural sciences. The differences between scientific and ordinary language are much less sharp than Winch, and probably Wittgenstein, supposed.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 46, Issue 6, p. 584-603
ISSN: 1552-7441
Although social scientists have been devoted to discovering specific realities of social life, many theorists devoted to critical judgment have turned to philosophy in search of universal grounds of truth and reality. They have, however, worried about the problem of relativism. Although Wittgenstein has often been characterized as a relativist, Cora Diamond, inspired by G. E. M Anscombe, argues that his work, despite internal tensions, provides rational grounds for external criticism of social practices. Her argument and her critique of the work of Peter Winch and Ilham Dilman are, however, neither adequately supported by Wittgenstein's texts nor sufficiently developed on their own terms.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 47, Issue 2, p. 162-174
ISSN: 1552-7441
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 46, Issue 6, p. 565-583
ISSN: 1552-7441
Some aspects of Wittgenstein's thought are considered in the light of a remark he makes about the "apocalyptic" view of the world. The influence of Tolstoy on Wittgenstein is discussed and elaborated with reference to the idea of a "form of life" as a locus of order, and also to that of "exceptionality" in an unfolding course of events—the latter setting up a connection with the "apocalyptic" theme. This imaginative backdrop remains discernible in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, which draws upon it to perhaps unexpected effect in achieving a dialectical balance between the motifs of order and breakdown.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 46, Issue 5, p. 498-524
ISSN: 1552-7441
The article shows how in Outline of a Theory of Practice Pierre Bourdieu relies on a kind of philosophical myth in his attempt to dispel structuralist accounts of action. Section 2 is a summary of Bourdieu's use of the concept of habitus against intellectualism and structuralism. Schatzki's criticism of Bourdieu from a purportedly Wittgensteinian perspective is also examined. Section 3 relates Bourdieu's use of habitus to a debate between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell about the role of concepts in action. Section 4 shows how McDowell's rejection of foundationalist elements in Dreyfus's account of action also raises problems for Bourdieu's account of action. Diamond's recent criticism of Winch is shown to have an interesting connection to this debate.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Volume 47, Issue 1, p. 44-66
ISSN: 1552-7441
This article introduces comparative process tracing (CPT) as a two-step methodological approach that combines theory, chronology, and comparison. For each studied case, the processes leading "from A to B" are reconstructed and analyzed in terms of ideal-type social mechanisms and then compared by making use of the identified mechanisms and ideal-type periodization. Central elements of CPT are path dependence, critical junctures and focal points, social mechanisms, context, periodization, and counterfactual analysis. The CPT approach is described, discussed, and compared with more formal and deterministic forms of process tracing, which are found to be less fruitful for systematic comparison.