The book under review is critiqued with regard to its adherence, modification, and departure from John Maynard Keynes's position. This review is weighted to emphasizing the role of "expectation" in Keynes's work and its role in the book under review. The review seeks to develop an interpretation of the "psychology of society" or "structural rationality" in Keynes's work and contrasts this with the positions of the authors in the book under review. Following this Keynes's work is advocated as being highly malleable and a corpus that can illuminate further research and policy prescription.
The emergentist position that R. Keith Sawyer has formulated, nonreductive individualism, contains three propositions. First, that social characteristics must always be realized in individuals; second, that it is nevertheless possible to understand social properties as irreducible; and third, that therefore it is possible to demonstrate how social properties are able to exercise independent causal influences on individuals and their properties. It is demonstrated that Sawyer is not able to meet an objection that Kim has formulated against the analogous position in the philosophy of mind. In his defense of the claim of irreducibility Sawyer refers to Fodor's argument about multiple realizability, but this line of argument cannot preserve the claim for downward causation because Fodor's claim for irreducibility rests on assumptions that are not compatible with a systematic formulation of downward causation. The article proposes a reading of Fodor's argument that is consistent with individualism but not with nonreductive individualism.
John Searle's argument that social-scientific laws are impossible depends on a special open-ended feature of social kinds. We demonstrate that under a noncontentious understanding of bridging principles the so-called "counts-as" relation, found in the expression "X counts as Y in (context) C," provides a bridging principle for social kinds. If we are correct, not only are social-scientific laws possible, but the "counts as" relation might provide a more perspicuous formulation for candidate bridge principles.
The article analysis the views approaching quantitative and qualitative methods in social sciences as separable or irreconcilable. First, we characterize these views and show how they deal with this divide and how they view the aspects of the latter. Next, we identify the works of Herbert Blumer as the basis of that divide and subject them to an analysis. Finally, by means of categories like quantity, quality, and measure, we show that the qualitative-quantitative divide is based on a wrong approach to these categories and the quantitative and qualitative methods.
I introduce a case study from organization studies to argue that social epistemologists' recommendation to cultivate diversity and dissent in science is unlikely to be welcomed in the social sciences unless it is coupled with another epistemic ideal: the norm of epistemic responsibility. The norm of epistemic responsibility enables me to show that organization scholars' concern with the fragmentation of their discipline is generated by false assumptions: the assumption that a diversity of theoretical approaches will lead to fragmentation and the assumption that an imposed consensus on a theoretical approach is needed to maintain the unity of the discipline.
The intuitive difference between a system that choreographs the motion of its parts in the service of goals of its own formulation and a system composed of a collection of parts doing their own thing without coordination has been shaken by now familiar examples of self-organization. There is a broad and growing presumption in parts of philosophy and across the sciences that the appearance of centralized information-processing and control in the service of system-wide goals is mere appearance, i.e., an explanatory heuristic we have evolved to predict behavior, but one that will eventually get swept away in the advancing tide of self-organization. I argue that there is a distinction of central importance here, and that no adequate science of complex systems can dispense with it.
The classical view of "rational man" as the unit of analysis for economic behavior and marketplace exchange has been changed by the late twentieth century with the help of behavioral economics that considers predictable irrationality as a normal mode of behavior. Instead of revising neoclassical economics to fit contemporary economic crises, it is recommended to follow Adam Smith's original concerns for the social setting of individual behavior and to treat economic crises with pragmatic flexibility rather than with dogmatic ideology.
I here respond to several points in Faucher and Machery's vigorous and informative critique of my volitional account of racism (VAR). First, although the authors deem it a form of "implicit racial bias," a mere tendency to associate black people with "negative" concepts falls short of racial "bias" or prejudice in the relevant sense. Second, such an associative disposition need not even be morally objectionable. Third, even for more substantial forms of implicit racial bias such as race-based fear or disgust, Faucher and Machery offer no account or explanation of when we should consider these racist, in whom, in what respect(s), or why. So, findings of implicit racial bias pose no clear objection to VAR. Fourth, because VAR allows not only racial hate, but also callous indifference, disdain, and other forms of racially driven disregard, to be racist,VAR is not "psychologically monist." Fifth, as VAR allows racist attitudes to be immoral in more than one way, offending against both the moral virtues of benevolence and justice, VAR is not "morally monist" either. I also reveal problems with some of Faucher and Machery's other claims: Faucher and Machery take too narrow a conception of the types of psychology that can contribute to understanding racism; the internal complexity of hatred, which they approvingly mention, is irrelevant to VAR's truth and undermines part of their criticism of VAR; whether some forms of racial bias are "racial ills" is irrelevant to VAR, which only analyzes racism; over-attention to implicit racial bias may cloak or exacerbate some of our society's racial ills, or even constitute a new one. I conclude by noting that Faucher and Machery are not just critics of VAR but also allies of VAR in important controversies against those who insist racism lies primarily in social structures and institutions.
Here we propose a new theory for the origins and evolution of human warfare as a complex social phenomenon involving several behavioral traits, including aggression, risk taking, male bonding, ingroup altruism, outgroup xenophobia, dominance and subordination, and territoriality, all of which are encoded in the human genome. Among the family of great apes only chimpanzees and humans engage in war; consequently, warfare emerged in their immediate common ancestor that lived in patrilocal groups who fought one another for females. The reasons for warfare changed when the common ancestor females began to immigrate into the groups of their choice, and again, during the agricultural revolution.
This book is largely unpublished material from Popper's literary remains regarding his The Open Society and Its Enemies that conveys some interesting stories about its publication and initial reception, throws light on its message, and complements it somewhat. It also contains much that Popper hardly discussed elsewhere.
Milton Friedman's 1953 essay created controversy and consternation amongst economists. It provided a prescription, based on empirically generated predictive success, of how to do economics, yet many saw it as a concession of the search for truth and theoretical beauty within the discipline. This article reviews a 50th anniversary festschrift devoted to views of the essay. The purpose of the volume is to provide today's reader with the essay, responses, and a guide to interpreting it. The volume is selective and several contributors have their own agendas, but the feeling of tumult the essay still engenders is nicely conveyed.
This volume is a historical anthology of interesting views on science from antiquity to the twentieth century plus a defensive anthology of logical positivism, whose legacy deserves better: clear-eyed assessment and then putting to rest.
We offer a particularist defense of conspiratorial thinking. We explore the possibility that the presence of a certain kind of evidence—what we call "fortuitous data"—lends rational credence to conspiratorial thinking. In developing our argument, we introduce conspiracy theories and motivate our particularist approach (§1). We then introduce and define fortuitous data (§2). Lastly, we locate an instance of fortuitous data in one real world conspiracy, the Watergate scandal (§3).
This essay offers a critical introduction to the intellectual issues involved in the Kitzmiller case relating to intelligent design, and to Steve Fuller's involvement in it. It offers a brief appraisal of the intelligent design movement stemming from the work of Phillip E. Johnson, and of Steve Fuller's case for intelligent design in a rather different sense.
