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A 2018 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in partnership with computer security company McAfee, estimated that cybercrime costs the world almost $600 billion or .8% of the global Gross Domestic Product (CSIS, 2018, p. 4). In response to this booming element of transnational crime, states, private sector entities, non-governmental organizations, and individual citizens have sought to implement systems for the investigation, prosecution, and restitution of these crimes. One such solution is the development and enactment of international law. On December 27, 2019, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Russia-led resolution A/74/401, entitled "Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (United Nations, 2019, Countering the use)." Vehemently opposed by Western states such as the United States, the resolution approved the establishment of a committee of experts to evaluate the potential for an international cybercrime treaty (United Nations). While international cooperation of this kind is commendable, Western states and human rights groups have professed concerns that the vague language of the resolution has the potential to erode the human rights protections afforded to citizens under international law (Hakmeh & Peters, 2020). The purpose of this paper is to identify the human rights concerns of Russia's proposed United Nations resolution and analyze the obligations the international community has to uphold relevant human rights protections while balancing international cooperation necessitated by international law and legal norms. The first section of this paper provides historical background on the relationship between cyber issues like cybercrime and international law. ; Winner of the 2020 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Graduate category. ; Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 1 International Law & the Cyber Domain: Assessing the Human Rights Concerns of Cyber Legislation GD520 International Law and the International System Dr. John Becker Norwich University College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Kathryn R. Lamphere 23 May 2020 Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 2 Introduction A 2018 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in partnership with computer security company McAfee, estimated that cybercrime costs the world almost $600 billion or .8% of the global Gross Domestic Product (CSIS, 2018, p. 4). In response to this booming element of transnational crime, states, private sector entities, non-governmental organizations, and individual citizens have sought to implement systems for the investigation, prosecution, and restitution of these crimes. One such solution is the development and enactment of international law. On December 27, 2019, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Russia-led resolution A/74/401, entitled "Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (United Nations, 2019, Countering the use)." Vehemently opposed by Western states such as the United States, the resolution approved the establishment of a committee of experts to evaluate the potential for an international cybercrime treaty (United Nations). While international cooperation of this kind is commendable, Western states and human rights groups have professed concerns that the vague language of the resolution has the potential to erode the human rights protections afforded to citizens under international law (Hakmeh & Peters, 2020). The purpose of this paper is to identify the human rights concerns of Russia's proposed United Nations resolution and analyze the obligations the international community has to uphold relevant human rights protections while balancing international cooperation necessitated by international law and legal norms. The first section of this paper provides historical background on the relationship between cyber issues like cybercrime and international law. International Cyber Law Background The cyber domain is often presented as another realm, a world that exists outside of the mostly tidy borders the international community has used to separate themselves. Aligning with Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 3 this view is the notion that cyberspace cannot be regulated because it expands beyond the traditional idea of territorial sovereignty (Kanuck, 2010, p. 1573). These ideas raise two concerns over the identification and prosecution of cybercrime. The first concern is the conflict between "cybercrime, which is global in scale, and police activities that are confined to national borders (Cangemi, 2004, p. 166)." The conflict arises in the very structure of the Internet, which "can be characterized as a multitude of individual, but interconnected, electronic communications networks (Zekos, 2008, p. 30)." This interconnectedness has created a grey area within the legal system, where no one entity has regulatory control over what happens in that area. The second concern is far more technical and highlights the transient nature of information and data (Cangemi, 2004, p. 166). The source of information can be easily masked to hide its actual location, and data "may be amended, moved, or altered in a few seconds (p. 166)." The speed in which data travels presents a significant hurdle to the legal and law enforcement mechanisms typically used to investigate crimes. As Cangemi notes, this creates "an appreciable risk that the evidence of cyber-offences will disappear" long before implementing the required resources (p. 166). Nevertheless, despite these concerns, "nation-states do strive to exercise their sovereignty over cyberspace (Kanuck, 2010, p. 1573)." The physical elements of cybercrime, such as the location of the people perpetrating the crimes or the location of the hardware used to execute the crimes, are used as a connecting link to allow governments "to address cyber conflicts involving both state and nonstate actors as matters to be resolved by sovereign powers under their respective legal systems (p. 1573)." When evidence moves beyond territorial borders, states seek to invoke bilateral or international action to further pursue the crime. This model follows the same formula that society developed over time, whether it be in stopping crimes such as international drug trafficking or heinous acts of terrorism. The international community is well-Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 4 versed in this cycle, and the "nature of the international legal system affords this sovereign-centric approach primacy under the United Nations (U.N.) Charter regime (p. 1573)." If the international community is content in continuing to use this cycle, then "international legislation and action are essential to combat the phenomenon" of cybercrime (Pocar, 2004, 27). The essential requirement of international involvement and negotiation has rung true in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, as the international community takes steps to evolve international law to include cyber issues, specifically cybercrime. The 1980s introduced international consultation on cybercrime by multiple organizations. In 1983, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) commissioned a two-year study focusing "on the possibility of harmonizing and internationalizing national cybercrime laws (Brenner, 2012, p. 133)." OECD later published a report in 1986 summarizing the results of the study and recommending countries criminalize certain cybercrimes. In 1985, the Council of Europe convened its own study, which involved a four-year focus on "the legal issues raised by cybercrime (p. 133)." In 1997, the Council of Europe convened another study tasked with "the drafting of a cybercrime treaty that would harmonize national laws dealing with cybercrime offenses and investigations (p. 133). In 2001, the study's efforts came to fruition in the creation of the Convention of Cybercrime. Also referred to as the Budapest Convention, the international treaty entered into law in July 2004 with the principle objective of "pursuing a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against cybercrime, especially by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering international co-operation (Council of Europe, 2001, Preamble)." As of 2018, 29 states have ratified the treaty, but the rapid development of technology has resulted in the convention becoming outdated, leaving governments and organizations calling for a new treaty (Murphy, 2018, p. 549) (Shackelford, 2014, p. 312). Russia's 2019 United Nations resolution is the latest attempt to modernize international cyber Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 5 law and has received much adulation despite its vague, concerning language and human rights implications. The next section of this paper addresses human rights and provides an overview of states' obligations to this arena as members of the international community. Human Rights & the International Community Modern international human rights law begins with the first article of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), which dictates that one of the purposes of the UN is to "achieve international cooperation…in promoting and encouraging "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 785)." While the Charter provided minimal specificity as to what "respect for human rights" entailed, this provision and others within the Charter catalyzed a new international perspective on human rights. In joining the United Nations, members inherently accepted "the proposition that the Charter had internationalized the concept of human rights (p. 787)." Furthermore, the Charter insinuated that "states were deemed to have assumed some international obligations relating to human rights (p. 787)." Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter cemented the beginnings of these obligations, requiring member states to "take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of purposes" such as promoting "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all (United Nations, 1945, Article 55, 56)." The specificity of human rights became more overt when the United Nations devoted the UN Commission on Human Rights to the task of drafting non-legally-binding human rights instrument. In December 1948, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Murphy, 2018, p. 402). Composed of thirty articles, the declaration instituted vital human rights and eventually "served as a template for numerous subsequent treaties on human rights (p. 404)." As a result, the Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 6 Universal Declaration on Human Rights "has come to be accepted as a normative instrument in its own right (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 787)." Both documents uphold two pedestals of traditional international law as it pertains to human rights. The first pedestal retains responsibility for "the treatment by one state of another's nationals, an area known as state responsibility for injury to aliens (p. 389)." Although addressed at the state level, this notion asserts that individuals are afforded certain protections when in another state. The second pedestal, advanced by scholars such as Hugo Grotius, focuses on "the protection of persons against the acts of their own governments (p. 389)." It is this pedestal that introduces what is now known as humanitarian intervention, or the "idea of state intervening to protect the other state's nationals (p. 389)." Together, both the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration are "considered to spell out the general human rights obligations of all UN member states," of which there are now 193 (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 787) (Murphy, 2018, p. 59). Each international legal instrument has lent itself to the creation of international institutions dedicated to monitoring "compliance by the states parties with the obligations imposed by these instruments (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 788)." Such institutions include entities like the UN Human Rights Council and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (p. 788). Together, the instruments and institutions "laid the normative foundation of the contemporary international human rights revolution" and "influenced, in part at least, the contents of the legal norms under which international criminal tribunals operate today (p. 791)." The criticality of these elements to the international system, particularly as it pertains to international law, is justification for using each as measuring tools with which to judge the new UN cyber-focused resolution objectively. The third section of this paper will assess the purpose of the resolution and explain the supporting argument for its contents. Supporting Arguments & Analysis of A/74/401 Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 7 In order to truly understand the intent of international laws, it is crucial to develop an understanding of the stances actors take concerning the specific issues at hand. This understanding is of particular importance when discussing Resolution A/74/401 and the underlying views of cyberspace. Two opposing perspectives lie at the heart of debates surrounding the cyber domain and Internet governance and center around the notion of sovereignty. The first perspective is that "many governments are attempting to exert sovereignty in cyberspace in the same way as they do in physical domains (Nocetti, 2015, p. 111)." For these governments, the dominance of private sector institutions within cyberspace and "the unfettered internet access of their fellow citizens" are causes of concerns (p. 111). This sentiment is particularly true within the Russian government. Under its traditional views of governance, Russia "conceives of cyberspace as a territory with virtual borders corresponding to physical state borders, and wishes to see the remit of international laws extended to the internet space (p. 112)." Furthermore, Russia's domestic fears of an open Internet fuel its international concerns. Russia sees the Internet as "politically disruptive because it enables citizens to circumvent government-controlled 'traditional media (p. 113).'" It aligns this perspective "with the inherently authoritarian nature of the Russian regime (p. 114)." Russia's negative perception of the Internet as it is today ultimately lends itself to Russia's ideal mechanism of perpetuating its belief that "global internet governance is envisioned as an issue of high politics in which states - and the interstate balance of power-play – play an essential role (p. 116, 117)." Under this mechanism, it is little wonder that Russia has led international legal initiatives to refine control over the Internet since the Council of Europe's enactment of its Convention on Cybercrime. In a Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release following the General Assembly's adoption of Resolution A/74/401, Russia proclaimed that the "resolution shows that the world community urgently needs to develop a universal, comprehensive, and open-ended convention Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 8 on countering cybercrime (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019)." The adopted resolution's language appears to align with this projected intent from Russia. The resolution stresses "the need to enhance coordination and cooperation among States in combating the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes" and notes "the importance of the international and regional instruments in the fight against cybercrime (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use)." In order to fulfill these objectives, the resolution establishes an "intergovernmental committee of experts, representative of all regions" that will "elaborate a comprehensive international convention on countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (United Nations, 2019)." Remarks of supporting nations support this appearance of cohesion. The representative from Nicaragua indicated the resolution would address cybercrime "in a more representative, democratic and transparent manner, taking into account the individual circumstances of developing and developed countries (Third Committee, 2019, Meetings Coverage)." China echoed this support, stating the resolution "is conducive to filling legal gaps in international cooperation (Third Committee)." At the same time, Belarus declared that "international cooperation is vital in investigating and combating cybercrime (Third Committee)." At face value, the resolution is a gesture of goodwill, a written contract to pursue options to disrupt cybercrime that will benefit all states. However, Russia's press release takes these notions a step further, realigning its message to its traditional view of international politics. It notes, "the resolution proposed by Russia essentially enhances states' digital sovereignty over their information space and ushers in a new page in the history of global efforts to counter cybercrime (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019)." Furthermore, the press release dictates that the "convention must be based on the principles of respecting state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs (2019)." There are two Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 9 essential points within this statement that require further analysis. The first is the reassertion of the authoritarian construct with which Russia chooses to view cyberspace. In a press release initially dedicated to lauding the necessity of international cooperation, Russia simultaneously defaults to its traditional views of the international community and advocates for a "digital Westphalia (Nocetti, 2015, p. 117)." In recognizing sovereignty, Russia insinuates that the international community will successfully legislate mechanisms that will reduce cybercrime. A quick review of the supporting states in favor of the resolution upholds Russia's authoritarian views (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). In addition to China, Nicaragua, and Belarus, countries like Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are only some of the 88 Member States of the General Assembly who voted to adopt the resolution. Unsurprisingly, these states also abide by similar authoritarian perspectives on international law and sovereignty. China, for example, maintains a "comprehensive, multidimensional system that governs Internet infrastructure, commercial and social use as well as legal domains (Liang & Lu, 2010, p. 105)." This system supports "Internet censorship" and "China's single-party political system and its heavy intervention in Internet development (p. 105)." Given the nature and history of these states' political systems and methods of governance, the sudden focus on international cooperation generates questions of the underlying goals that may hide behind the official demands of the resolution. The second point requiring acknowledgment is the additional re-emphasis of sovereignty while also emphasizing non-interventionist beliefs in discussing non-interference in internal affairs. The resolution itself makes no mention of sovereignty or internal affairs beyond assisting countries with improving "national legislation and frameworks and build the capacity of national authorities" to deal with cybercrime (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). Despite the lack of language on this topic, the leading state on this initiative, Russia, felt the need Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 10 to emphasize its sovereignty in a press release about the resolution (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). Once again, Russia gives the impression that there may be a hidden desire layered within the words of the resolution. Additionally, the concept of non-interference within the international system is not without exceptions. The most critical exception being suspicion of human rights violations. As previously stated, humanitarian intervention and protecting citizens from their own government is a staple of international human rights law (Murphy, 2018, p. 389). Therefore, while non-interference in domestic matters is undoubtedly an essential tenet of international law, the resolution cannot call for international cooperation to combat cybercrime and simultaneously ignore the international cooperation required to maintain peace and security (United Nations, 1945, Charter of the United Nations). The next section of this paper will address these obligations to cooperation as it pertains to human rights while also highlighting the opposing arguments against Resolution A/74/401. Opposing Arguments for A/74/401 & Analysis of Human Rights Concerns The first perspective at the heart of the cyber domain debates, as described previously, is modeled after authoritarian beliefs and government control. The second perspective, modeled after a more Western approach to governance, is the belief of a free and open Internet that should remain decentralized and that "the best regulatory system is one that develops organically (Shackelford, 2013, p. 53)." A free Internet is more firmly the belief of the United States. This idea introduces the initial context necessary to understand the United States' opposition to the Russian-led cybercrime resolution. Even before the rapid development of the Internet, American foreign policy internalized the notion of "free flow of information internationally as an important element of national security (McCarthy, 2011, p. 92)." Former Secretary of State George Schultz argued that the free flow of information "undermined the Soviet Union and authoritarianism (p. 92, 93)." At its earliest beginnings, the Internet was a product of American ingenuity and, as a Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 11 result, built with a bias for "American libertarianism (p. 93)." In the present, the West has developed this concept in the "context of freedom expression, protection of intellectual property rights, and national security (Powers & Jablonski, 2015, p. 3)." As former Secretary of State Clinton asserted, the United States and other Western nations support the "freedom to connect" in opposition to efforts by states such as China, Iran, and Russia to create state-level information infrastructures designed for censorship (p. 3). The historical rivalry and disagreement between the two states on information, particularly as it pertains to cyberspace, only further roots the United States' opposition to the new United Nations cybercrime resolution. In its statement to the United Nations during the 49th & 50th meetings of the Third Committee, the United States expressed disappointment "with the decisions of the sponsors of this resolution to bring it to the Third Committee (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2019)." Contrary to the resolution's focus on cooperation, the United States' proclaimed the resolution would "drive a wedge between Member States and undermine international cooperation to combat cybercrime at a time when enhanced coordination is essential (United States Mission to the United Nations)." Furthermore, the United States asserted Russia's actions in introducing the resolution essentially bypass the "expert-driven, consensus-based process and therefore is not in line with their precedent (United States Mission to the United Nations)." Other Western states appear to agree with the United States assertions, as states such as the United Kingdom, Australia, France, Republic of Korea, and Germany composed part of the 58 Member States who opposed the adoption of the resolution (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). In a manner similar to the states in favor of the adoption, some opposed states made remarks in agreement with those of the United States during the Third Committee. Finland, on behalf of the European Union, remarked that "there is no consensus on the need for a new international instrument to fight cybercrime" and that the draft "represents a duplication of resources (Third Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 12 Committee, 2019, Meetings Coverage). Canada and Australia presented similar sentiments, remarking that "the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime is an important baseline for international cooperation" and that the new resolution "seeks to undercut consensus and will diminish existing global efforts that are already delivering results (Third Committee, 2019)." There is one remaining argument against the new cybercrime resolution: the potential that the document's vague language will create an environment where human rights will be more easily violated if left unchecked (Hakmeh & Peters, 2020). In a letter to the United Nations General Assembly, 37 organizations and six individuals expressed their concern for human rights protections as they pertain to the cybercrime resolution (Association for Progressive Communications (APC), 2019, Open Letter, p. 4). The first concern is a lack of clarity surrounding the scope of the "use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (APC, p. 1)." If left undefined, the language in the resolution arguably "opens the door to criminalising ordinary online behaviour that is protected under international human rights law (APC, p. 1)." If steps to do so were taken as a result of the new resolution, they would be in direct violation of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights; who stated in 2011 that "human rights are equally valid online as offline (Shackelford, 2019, p. 168)." The second concern offered by non-government entities is the increasing trend in "criminalising ordinary online activities of individuals and organisations through the application of cybercrime laws (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 1, 2)." The letter even goes so far as to quote the UN Special Rapporteur over these concerns, that the "surge in legislation and policies aimed at combating cybercrime has also opened the door to punishing and surveilling activists and protestors in many countries around the world (APC, p. 2)." If used in such a manner, these initiatives, in addition to the UN cybercrime resolution, are in direct violation of the Charter of United Nations and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Within the Charter of the United Nations, efforts to Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 13 restrict or punish opposition elements such as activists or protestors violates Articles 55 and 56, which requires states to cooperate with the UN in achieving the organizations' purposes such as promoting human rights (United Nations, 1945, Article 55, 56). The Universal Declaration on Human Rights provides more specific language with which to attribute potential violations. The open letter notes that legislation of this kind is used to "criminalise legitimate forms of online expression, association and assembly through vague and ill-defined terms that allow for arbitrary or discretionary application (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 2)." Immediately, legislation that allows for criminalization of these elements is in direct violation of Articles 18, 19, and 20, which declare "all persons have a right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and assembly (Murphy, 2018, p. 402)." Furthermore, violations such as these also violate article two, which guarantees people "the right to life, liberty, and security" and dictates that "these rights are to be held without discrimination of any kind (Murphy, p. 402, 403)." Upholding these rights within cyberspace continues to fall in line with the Western perspective on the Internet. As McCarthy quotes, "the Internet is arguably the greatest facilitator for freedom of expression and innovation in the world today (McCarthy, 2011, p. 94)." The status of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as "legitimate norms within the international system" permits this interpretation and application of international law to future resolutions (p. 94). If states are signatories to the declaration, any future adoption of any resolution must adhere to the principles and freedoms guaranteed by it. Resolution A/74/401 does refer to human rights protections, "reaffirming the importance of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the use of information and communication technologies (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use)." However, the resolution's open language is in direct contradiction to this promise, if not clarified. As the open letter indicates, "simply reaffirming the importance of respect for human rights" is "insufficient to safeguard human rights while Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 14 countering cybercrime (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 2)." The final section of this paper recommends additional actions that may further unify opposing entities on this resolution while simultaneously addressing all human rights concerns. Recommendations The Russian-led supporters of the resolution and the United States-led opposition are unified in one common element, at least in writing. The element is that consensus and international cooperation are vital in addressing cybercrime (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019) (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2019). This notion is in concert with the Council of Europe, who remains the only entity to successfully orchestrate an international cybercrime treaty (Council of Europe, 2004, Convention on Cybercrime). In 2001, the Council of Europe postulated that "solutions to the problems posed must be addressed by international law, necessitating the adoption of adequate international legal instruments" that can "ensure the necessary efficiency" required to combat cybercrime (Pocar, 2004, p. 28). If the international community determines that another cybercrime treaty is required within the intergovernmental committee of experts authorized by Resolution A/74/401, then the new treaty should consider the aims of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). In doing so, the United Nations should strive to create a "basic framework for the establishment by contracting states of domestic substantive and procedural laws" in a manner that allows states to "cooperate expeditiously with one another (Pocar, 2004, p. 30)." If successful, the United Nations will be able to "establish procedures for relevant international relations" and provide "forms of cooperation between national judicial authorities as many interact with each other both swiftly and efficiently (p. 31)." Furthermore, the necessity of these requirements is supported by the very nature of the "the world-wide dimension of the Internet," Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 15 which "implies that its illegal use and related offenses must prompt responses and concerted efforts from all relevant domestic and international authorities (p. 34)." The non-governmental organizations' open letter to the United Nations supports the need for cooperation but takes it one step further than the states themselves. In its current structure, the Internet is a public-private endeavor, with private entities dominating cyberspace (Nocetti, 2015, p. 111). The present language of the United Nations cybercrime resolution allows for an intergovernmental committee of experts. However, it does not expand on the actual composition of the committee (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). Noting that Russia and other authoritarian regimes prefer non-government entities to use the government as a proxy for communication, it can be inferred that a Russia-led resolution intends the committee to be comprised of only government entities (p. 117). The open letter rightly points out that collaboration on cyber issues must expand beyond state cooperation. Addressing cybercrime is "necessarily a multi-stakeholder endeavour" that "requires government officials and experts, members of the technical community, civil society, the private sector, and scientific and research institutions (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 4)." An assessment of this viewpoint reveals that a committee dedicated to combatting cybercrime cannot rely on government expertise alone. In order to accurately reflect the composition and requirements of a private-public Internet, all discussions surrounding this resolution should involve both private and public entities. Therefore, the committee should be reformed to more accurately reflect the Internet's users. In doing so, the United Nations breaches the divide between authoritarian and more democratic governments, further increasing cooperation on this resolution. However, increased cooperation through a broader, inclusive committee and implementation of lessons learned from the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime will not ensure that the future convention successfully resolves the resolution's weaknesses. In Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 16 modern-day, the international system emphasizes international human rights more than ever before, as "this branch of international law has experienced phenomenal growth over the past one hundred years (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 807)." This growth has contributed to the "growing political impact of human rights on the conduct of international relations and the behavior of governments (p. 807)." If real success is desired within international governance, then the committee established under the "Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes" resolution must account for human rights protections when determining the requirements of the "comprehensive international convention (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use)." As the representative from Costa Rica during the 49th and 50th meetings of the Third Committee, "the international community must protect and observe fundamental freedoms, including the right to privacy (Third Committee, 2019, Meeting Coverage)." Until there is consensus on "sensitive topics such as…State responsibility to prioritize and protect human rights," the future proposed convention will fall short of its goal of achieving complete international ratification (Third Committee). Conclusion As cyberspace expands in conjunction with the rapid advancement of technology, the fear of the unknown drives further division between already opposing states in the international system. Resolution A/74/401 is the latest testament to the evolution of politicization within Internet governance. In addressing a topic that impacts every Internet-accessible region of the world, the resolution simultaneously magnifies the opposing perspectives of states as it pertains to sovereignty within the cyber domain. Furthermore, it reignites the protracted debate over whether or not human rights obligations addressed in such documents as the Charter of the United Nations or Universal Declaration on Human Rights are legally binding. Preventing further polarization requires both an acknowledgment of a fracturing international system of Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 17 governance and a proposed solution to address the issue. While state-centric governance provides legitimacy and the potential for a higher allocation of resources dedicated to protecting the Internet, increased sovereignty also "risks sacrificing innovation, complicates the regulatory environment of cyberspace, and may threaten a positive vision of cyber peace (Shackelford, 2013, p. 50)." These risks are why an alternative method to an intergovernmental committee must develop in response to the resolution. This method should integrate a multi-stakeholder construct to more fully recognize the competing impacts of cybercrime and fairly address the allegations of human rights infringement. One such method is polycentric governance, a system composed of "diverse organizations and governments working at multiple levels" in order to "increase levels of voluntary cooperation or increase compliance with rules established by governmental authorities (p. 330)." Individually, each organization or type of government faces its own unique hurdles. Together, they "contribute to a governance regime that is multi-level, multi-purpose, multi-type, and multi-sectoral in scope that could complement the top-down governance model increasingly favored" by states such as Russia or China (p. 331). Implementing polycentric governance to more equitably debate the appropriate response to international cybercrime will create an international community willing to consider the developing convention. In doing so, the environment will be better suited to determining whether or not the international system can leverage international law to investigate and prosecute cybercrime. Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 18 References Association for Progressive Communications (APC). (2019). Open Letter to UN General Assembly: Proposed international convention on cybercrime poses a threat to human rights online. Retrieved from https://www.apc.org/sites/default/files/Open_letter_re_UNGA_cybercrime_resolution_0.pdf Brenner, S. (2012). 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Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/903245891 Shackelford, S. J. (2013). Managing Cyber Attacks in International Law, Business, and Relations: In Search of Cyber Peace: Vol. Revised Edition. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/882104883 Shackelford, S. (2019). Should Cybersecurity Be a Human Right? Exploring the "Shared Responsibility" of Cyber Peace. Stanford Journal of International Law, 55(2), 155–184. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/8185136062 United Nations General Assembly. (1945). Charter of the United Nations. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html United Nations General Assembly. (2019). Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes. Retrieved from https://www.undocs.org/A/74/401 United Nations Third Committee. (2019, November). Meetings Coverage Seventy-Fourth Session, 49th & 50th Meetings. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gashc4284.doc.htm United States Mission to the United Nations. (2019, November). Statement on Agenda Item 107 'Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes.' Retrieved from https://usun.usmission.gov/statement-on-agenda-item-107-countering-the-use-of-information-and-communications-technologies-for-criminal-purposes/ Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 20 Zekos, G. (2008). Electronic State Sovereignty. The Icfai University Journal of Cyber Law, 7(4), 30-60.

The twice-extended "humanitarian pause" in the Gaza Strip has ended, and the bombs are dropping again.

The Israeli assault on the territory has been a tragedy on multiple grounds, with the tragedy only likely to deepen as the attack resumes.
The most obvious tragedy is the extreme suffering of the people who live in the Strip, with resumption of the assault adding to a death toll that the destruction itself makes hard to estimate but already is well into five figures. Additional suffering includes many maimed or injured persons, deprivation of food, water, and fuel, the displacement of well over a million residents from the northern part of the Strip, and little left for the displaced persons ever to return to other than rubble. Even for anyone who cares only about the lives and welfare of Israelis and cares nothing about Palestinians, implications of a continued war in Gaza are bad. The violent operation is the latest lethal chapter of an Israeli policy — of clinging to land captured in a previous war and never resolving Israel's conflict with the Palestinians — which, as long as that policy continues, means that Israelis will always live by the sword and will never know true peace. The myth underlying the declared Israeli objective of "destroying Hamas" is that there is some clearly delineated hostile capability that can be destroyed and elimination of which will end violence emanating from Gaza. The myth disregards how even if whatever capability in Gaza Hamas used in its attack on October 7 were to disappear, Hamas has long used other lethal capabilities, such as individual suicide bombers, to strike Israel. It disregards how the added suffering that Israel has been inflicting on Gaza increases the pool of recruits who are enraged at Israel and willing to replace whatever capability the Israeli Defense Forces manage to destroy.Most fundamentally, it disregards how Hamas is but one manifestation of anger and resentment that will take other forms as long as occupation and denial of self-determination — and now, more devastation at the hands of the IDF — continue.
To the extent that Americans care about suffering of either Israelis or Palestinians, all this bad news associated with continued warfare in Gaza is a setback for U.S. interests. The perpetuation, with no end in sight, of the blood-stained Israeli-Palestinian conflict harms U.S. interests in multiple other ways, ranging from the conflict being a major distraction of policymaking time and attention away from other pressing matters, to the recurrent danger of the United States being dragged more directly into the conflict.

Despite talk about how the current war can and should be a turning point leading toward a resolution of the conflict, continuation of the assault makes such resolution less, not more, likely. It further enflames the already high mutual hatred. It provides further recruits for extremists seeking to subvert any progress toward peace. It physically destroys homes and livelihoods of Palestinians who would be expected to live contently next to Israelis. It moves the Israeli government ever farther down the road of brute force, rather than a road toward peaceful resolution, in dealing with its Palestinian problem.

The damage to U.S. strategic interests from the continued assault in Gaza centers on how the United States is widely seen, with good reason, as sharing responsibility for one of the biggest manmade humanitarian catastrophes since World War II. Like so much else regarding the current conflict, the relevant history did not start on October 7. The longstanding U.S. provision of diplomatic cover for Israeli policies of blockade and occupation, including through vetoes at the United Nations Security Council, is part of that history. So is the provision of voluminous no-strings-attached aid to Israel, which adjusted for inflation has totaled well over $300 billion.

Now amid the current war, the Biden administration is requesting an additional $14.3 billion to be given to Israel on top of the usual annual largesse. With a continued war, relatively little of that aid would go to what can legitimately be called defense. Most of it would go toward wreaking more destruction on the Gaza Strip.

The administration's increasing talk about the need for Israel to exercise restraint — after the administration's initial post-October 7 theme of going all-in with Israel — cannot be expected to carry much weight in the eyes of foreigners and foreign governments. Apart from the recent pause in the fighting, whatever pro-restraint urging the administration has voiced to Israel has had little effect. Observers can correctly interpret the relationship as one in which potential leverage never gets translated into usable leverage as long as the United States stays committed to being Israel's bankroller and diplomatic patron.

U.S. credibility suffers from all this, especially regarding matters of war and peace. U.S. invocations of a "rules-based international order" are disdained and dismissed when the world sees the U.S. facilitating blatant and lethal Israeli disregard for the laws of war and other international law.

The credibility deficit has been especially acute regarding the other ongoing war in which President Biden has taken a strong interest — the one in Ukraine. The president himself has linked the two wars, if only as a device to get aid for both Israel and Ukraine through a divided Congress. Foreign observers can see that in one of theses conflicts the United States is supporting resistance to an armed occupation (by Russia of Ukrainian territory) while in the other it is supporting the occupier.

Biden's own linkage of the wars also encourages comparisons of the scale of death and destruction, such as how the number of women and children killed in seven weeks of Israeli attacks on the Gaza Strip is more than twice the number killed in nearly two years of Russian attacks in Ukraine.

Perpetuation of the assault on Gaza makes foreign observers more conscious than ever of how much the dominant U.S. role in decades of a Middle East "peace process," — in which the United States often functioned as Israel's lawyer — has been a failure, a point that Russian president Vladimir Putin is exploiting. That means less foreign willingness to look to the United States for leadership in handling not just this international conflict but also other ones. It means an opening for rival powers to play a greater role as peacemakers. China had already begun doing that in the Middle East and is now using the Gaza war to expand its regional role further.

This development contributes to a decline in U.S. influence in the region, and probably elsewhere, relative to that of China.

The damage to U.S. interests is a matter not only of credibility but also of the resentment and hatred that the U.S. backing of the Israeli assault — with the United States in a minority internationally by not supporting a permanent cease-fire — has engendered. That resentment is most apparent in the Middle East but not limited to that region, with many perceiving a double standard in how the United States reacts to civilian suffering from the use of force.

Even if regimes try to filter out emotion from their own decision-making and have little sympathy for the Palestinians, they — including authoritarian regimes — must take account of strong sentiment among their populations. The effects on regime policies of importance to the United States are impossible to predict in detail but can be substantial, ranging from denial of access rights for U.S. military forces to lessened support for the United States in international organizations.

Enraged populations can inflict damage on U.S. interests regardless of the policies of their government. Boycotts in the Middle East of the products and services of U.S. companies are already under way.

More worrisome is that the anger over the assault on Gaza will stimulate anti-U.S. terrorism. One of the most consistent themes in the propaganda and confessions of terrorists who have attacked U.S. interests in the past is that they were striking back against U.S. support for Israel's subjugation of Palestinians. As recent calls to arms by al-Qaida and Islamic State suggest, the stepped-up anger resulting from the assault on Gaza may stimulate new terrorism against not only Israel but also its U.S. patron.

The ingredients are present for a repeat of the perverse relationship between terrorism and the ill-fated U.S. war in Iraq. Although that war was misleadingly sold as part of a "war on terror," one of its effects was to increase terrorism, especially by giving birth to the group that became Islamic State. Today, the habit of labeling Hamas as nothing more than a "terrorist group" — when in fact it is a nationalist movement focused on political power in Palestine, whose only U.S. victims have been collateral casualties in attacks on Israel — obscures the potential for current U.S. policy toward the Gaza war to lead to new anti-U.S. terrorism.

These major costs to U.S. interests can be diminished if the United States calls strongly and clearly for a permanent cease-fire in Gaza and uses its leverage to move Israel in that direction. In so far failing to do so, the Biden administration has been in a minority not only internationally — with the United States becoming more isolated as a result — but also within American opinion.

The current crisis has underscored some of the major longstanding differences between U.S. and Israeli interests. But regarding the Israeli interest that ought to matter most — the long-term security of Israeli citizens — the administration can honestly tell Israelis that a quick end to the slaughter in Gaza and a turn to political means for addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are far more likely to assure that security than a continuation of living by the sword.

Puerto Rico and Newfoundland are located at two extremes of the Atlantic Ocean, the former in the Caribbean Sea and the latter in the North Sea of the American continent. Both formations—former colonies from Spain and Great Britain—have been linked through the production and consumption of salted fish (that is, cod and other members of the Gadidae family) from the 16th to the 20th century. Spain transferred to the Caribbean colonies its "addiction" to cod, a cheap source of protein for peasants and laborers in the Peninsula, and a foodstuff that became the source of protein for slaves, peasants, and rural workers in the Caribbean.The British also used that alimentary strategy in their Caribbean colonies, which became importers of salted fish from New England, Labrador, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland, a territory that dominated the production and processing (culling and salting) of cod. The plantation system required a cheap protein source for the slave labor force that the American codfish market provided. By the end of the 19th century, the supply of New England cod waned (due to a number of reasons), and that opened up an opportunity for Newfoundland to become the most important supplier of fish, a commodity mediated at first through the British authorities, and later by the merchants of the Dominion. The expansion of the productive frontier—from the 19th to the 20th century—required the investment of capital in larger boats and an increase in effort through the use of nets and long liners in waters distant from the inshore areas.This paper presents an anthropological and historical analysis of the relationship between Puerto Rico and the producers of salted fish in the North Sea, namely, New England and Newfoundland, through the use of a number of historical and ethnographical studies and, most importantly, through the analysis of primary sources from the General Archive of Puerto Rico, the National Records and Archives Administration in the United States, and the Provincial Archive of Labrador and Newfoundland. This research started, originally, with an interest in understanding the relationship between both markets in their complex export-import relationship, and with a special focus on the 20th century due to the availability of the primary sources. However, this effort led me to the search for other historical and ethnographic sources that documented the social, economic, and political processes that shaped the production of salted fish and the circulation of that commodity in the Atlantic Ocean, with emphasis on the Caribbean.In that context, the work of Jason Moore proved to be pertinent as a theoretical model to analyze the role of producers and consumers of cheap foodstuffs on a global scale. The World-Ecology model, and the concepts of production frontiers, commodity frontiers, and ecological surplus are extremely useful in understanding how Newfoundland expanded the productive frontier, both horizontally and vertically, by moving the effort from the inshore areas to the offshore banks, which required fishing in deeper waters. In order to provide a cheap commodity to the laborers of the plantation system of the Caribbean, the Newfoundland merchants exploited the unpaid labor of the women and children of the outports (coastal communities) in the processing phase (culling and salting), while forcing the men to look for cash in other subsidiary activities. Low wages and poor working conditions in the curing of fish discouraged laborers to do high-quality work, and therefore, the curing was not always of the required standard for the markets. However, the low-quality fish, the Labrador cure, found its way to the Puerto Rican market. The United States, in the defense of its vested interests in sugarcane cultivation and sugar production, imposed low prices for the importation of salted fish from Newfoundland, and therefore regulated the price per pound at the local markets.The work of Jason Moore matches the theoretical model developed by Daniel Pauly, a scientist devoted to the study of the global fisheries, and particularly those of the North Sea. For Pauly, the fate of the world fisheries has been in the hands of a threefold expansion (dubbed as the "toxic triad") led by the development in fisheries technologies over the past four hundred years, and accelerated in the 19th and 20th centuries. Those are the geographical expansion, the bathymetric expansion and the taxonomic expansion. That is, global fisheries expanded their productive activities to new geographical frontiers hitherto explored or utilized, including depths. It also expanded the number of species caught, a process that impacted the food chain. Industrialization, and the use of trawler nets in the 20th century, depleted the North Sea fish stocks and destroyed benthic habitats, which contributed to the collapse of 1992. An "undercurrent" flowing in this paper consists of the argument that there is a strong correspondence between the theoretical thinking of Jason Moore and that of the most progressive fishery scientists, exemplified by Pauly.Over the last thirty years, I have been involved in research and applied work related to fisheries management and the conservation of habitats and fish populations and stocks. In understanding the relationship between Puerto Rico and Newfoundland, I became interested in the history of fisheries management and conservation, and the economic and political forces that contributed to the collapse of the stocks and populations of cod (Gadus morhua) and other Gadidae that forced the 1992 closure and the demise of one of the most important fisheries in our hemisphere. Data and interpretations from a number of studies suggest that, for a long period of time, the 1992 closure reflected the cumulative effect of centuries of the intensification of production, due to the demand for cod from different parts of the world. This paper suggests that Puerto Rico played a critical role in that process, due to the importance of imports from Newfoundland. Throughout the 20th century, Puerto Rico was one of the most important buyers of salted fish, importing as much as all the Caribbean islands at different points in time. That is a line of research that I will continue to pursue, and this paper is a first step in that direction.Newfoundland tried to maintain the salt fish market of the Caribbean until the 1960s, when Puerto Rico was in the midst of an industrialization and modernization process that reshaped the taste and consumption patterns of the population. By then, cod ceased to be a gastronomic addiction, despite the efforts of two merchant classes, one in St. John's and the other in San Juan.The article is divided into eight sections that broadly cover the following topics: the history of salted fish consumption and production in the North Sea, Spain, and New England; the British and Newfoundland market in Puerto Rico; cod consumption in Puerto Rico during the 19th century; the relations of production (ecological surplus) that made possible cheap cod; 20th century transformations in Puerto Rico, and a final reflection on the role of Puerto Rico and Newfoundland in the World-Ecology. ; Este artículo explora, por medio del examen y análisis de estudios antropológicos, históricos y de las fuentes documentales de varios archivos, la relación entre Puerto Rico y Terranova, como consumidores y productores de pescado salado, respectivamente. El bacalao fue un alimento barato usado para sostener a la fuerza de trabajo esclavizada y libre en la larga duración caribeña y trasatlántica. El desarrollo del capitalismo, según Jason Moore, ha dependido de la expansión de las fronteras productivas (zonas de explotación de mano de obra y recursos) y de la extracción y consumo de insumos baratos. Para ello, ha dependido de la extracción de un excedente ecológico basado, en este caso, en la apropiación del trabajo no remunerado de mujeres y niños. El bacalao se produjo en unas condiciones de explotación y trabajo no remunerado de hombres, mujeres y niños en Terranova, para alimentar a familias pobres en Puerto Rico. El objetivo principal de este trabajo consiste aplicar esos planteamientos teóricos de Moore, en el análisis de esas dos formaciones sociales, que han sido colonias de poderes imperiales; ambas vinculadas en una Ecología-Mundo basada en la producción y el consumo del bacalao; un proceso mediado por las clases mercantiles de ambos territorios. Las islas caribeñas estuvieron vinculadas a ese comercio trasatlántico (que incluía esclavos, melaza, rones y maderas) a través de intercambios con Terranova y Nueva Inglaterra, desde el siglo XVI. Los siglos XIX y XX, con el auge de la producción azucarera en Puerto Rico, fueron determinantes en establecer ese patrón de consumo y Terranova fue uno de los principales productores y suplidores de ese producto a Puerto Rico y el Caribe, manteniendo una estrategia de expansión de la frontera productiva, saliendo de la pesca costera para pescar en los grandes bancos, mediante un proceso sistemático de acumulación e inversión de capital, articulado por innovaciones en las artes de pesca y las embarcaciones. Este artículo sugiere que la suma de las importaciones por los países del Caribe contribuyó al eventual colapso de los abastos pesqueros de Terranova. Este trabajo es un primer paso en el análisis de la profunda relación entre el capital y la naturaleza y un paso en la exploración de como esas relaciones trasatlánticas fueron configurando el trabajo y la naturaleza en dos extremos del océano. Cuando se escriba la historia de las poblaciones de peces y los abastos pesqueros de Terranova, habrá que contar con la participación de Puerto Rico, y su rol en el proceso de intensificación de la producción, es decir, de la expansión de la frontera vertical y de la horizontal de la producción.

The article pursues two objectives: a) to comparatively trace the debates on the relationship between armed conflicts or direct violence and situations of stress / water shortage or distributive confrontations (resources or shared basins, for example) surrounding water, and in doing so add to the systematization of recent approaches; and b) based on the results of the aforementioned, propose new tools for the analysis and intervention in these conflicts, taking advantage, by way of example and not of detailed analysis, of ten current and heterogeneous cases of distributive conflicts over water. This issue became popular in the nineties of the twentieth century with striking statements that proclaimed: "the next wars would not be for oil or mineral resources but for access to drinking water." In this sense, the current paper focuses on examining the debate between 1985 and 1995, where the dominant issue was on whether water scarcity or water competition could be a direct causal factor of violent conflicts, or if it was simply a multiplier or accelerating factor linked to other causes. These contributions, while previously dominated by the omnipresence of approaches and texts based on security studies and the then so called "ecological security", are now based on contributions from studies of the analysis, resolution and transformation of conflicts. Meanwhile, new epistemological reflections respectful of cultural and gender bias are also present, along with non-western-centric approaches. Thirty years after the end of the Cold War, factual changes, new narratives, and novel guidelines for analysis have urged scholars to revisit the debate on the present and future relationships between armed conflict -or direct violence- and the scarcity or competition for water resources. I have just mentioned factual changes, among which I will highlight the following: significant ongoing changes in geopolitics and geo-economics; changes in the location and nature of direct violence, given that 80% of homicide deaths in the world are not related to direct violence of a clearly political nature (that is, armed conflict and terrorism), something that is linked with the strong growth of private security actors (legal and illegal) and a partial loss of the state's monopoly on the massive instruments of violence; ongoing mutations in the nature and spread of power; a progressive de-westernization of the international system and of the ways of analyzing it (international theory); the emergence of climate change and the climate emergency agenda and, in addition, the pandemics linked to recurrent zoonosis processes; and, to close this list, and returning to the topic being studies in this issue of the journal, the central position that water occupies in the 2030 agenda and in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Hence, we need new tools that allow us to analyze and better understand these conflicts related to water, in general, and also their occurrences in the major geopolitical areas of the world in the coming decades (Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean). Regarding the new narratives and analysis guidelines, the paper focuses on the new approaches in the area of analysis, resolution and transformation of conflicts that have emerged from the consensus on liberal peace, along with contributions from political ecology specialized in distributive environmental conflicts and environmental justice. Taking into account these new epistemological reflections, including those related to identity, is important as it allows one to focus on causality, and the tools that facilitate its analysis In addition to its introduction and conclusions, this article has three sections. The first establishes a factual starting point, summarizing the data related to fresh drinking water. Through a succinct description of ten conflicts, both intra and international, and from various continents and regions, this establishes a central thesis: the most significant conflict causation factor is not so much the lack of water, but the management and governance of water in general and its shortages. Secondly, it summarizes the analysis and the results of the debate on water conflicts, in particular on the causation links between water use and scarcity and direct violence from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s of the last century. The third section presents new perspectives, based not on security studies or ecological security, as before, but on the consolidated works of peace research, and studies on conflict analysis and transformation. Specifically, the main contributions and findings are displayed, and, also, a seminal framework to apply them to water conflicts, through three assumptions and seven theses. Finally, the conclusions insist on the need to treat these conflicts as social conflicts, showing that their specificity is linked to the management and governance of the resource rather than the scarcity itself. In the concluding remarks, the paper highlights that the most pertinent features of any analysis and intervention in environmental conflicts, especially those that are persistent and difficult to resolve (what American literature usually calls "intractable" conflicts) do not reside in the adjective "environmental", or "hydric", as the mainstream suggested in the first half of the 1990s. What is really meaningful is that they are social conflicts, basically distributive conflicts, and linked to the search for fairer solutions; that is, related to the allocation, use and / or management of environmental goods. The specificity provided by the adjective "environmental" or "hydric" exists, of course, beyond its growing importance for the contextual reasons already mentioned -such as demographic pressure, climate change or pollution and destruction of resources. However, this does not justify a differentiated treatment for these conflicts, as was the case previously. They are social conflicts, and therefore marked by cultural and contextual differences. Therefore, this means that they must be analyzed and intervened upon, in order to manage, resolve and transform them, with the same tools and techniques used for all the social distributive conflicts. We can call them "environmental", or "hydric" if that is the case, but only if this means that we do not stop dealing with them as social conflicts. And moreover, we must not forget that like most of these conflicts, it is necessary to apply "analytical filters" to them based on knowledge of the logic of collective action, public goods and collective goods Finally, the paper argues that these conflicts and the new analytical and resolutions framework force us to modify the famous formula of "thinking globally, acting locally". Today, to tackle them, you also have to think in a multidimensional way, and, in many cases, act globally. In doing so, the paper emphasizes the governance and governance challenges that need to be addressed. ; El artículo busca dos objetivos: a) exponer, en clave comparativa y treinta años más tarde del momento inicial y candente, los debates sobre la relación entre conflictos armados o violencia directa y situaciones de estrés/ carencia hídrica o enfrentamientos distributivos (recursos o cuencas compartidas, por ejemplo) por el agua. Al hacerlo, se añadirán a la sistematización los nuevos y más recientes enfoques; y b) a partir de los resultados del punto anterior, proponer nuevas herramientas para el análisis y la intervención en dichos conflictos, aprovechando, a modo de ejemplo y no de análisis detallado, diez casos heterogéneos activos en el presente de conflictos distributivos con el agua como incompatibilidad crucial. Los temas mencionados se popularizaron en los años noventa del siglo XX con afirmaciones impactantes que sostenían que "las próximas guerras no serían por petróleo o recursos minerales sino por el acceso al agua potable". En ese sentido, la comparación se centra en examinar el debate entre 1985 y 1995, donde el tema dominante fue si la escasez/concurrencia por el agua podía o no ser factor causal directo de conflictos violentos o si era simplemente un factor multiplicador o acelerador vinculado a otras causas, con las aportaciones y enfoques actuales. Estas aportaciones, frente a la omnipresencia en los años noventa de enfoques y textos basados en estudios de seguridad y la entonces llamada "seguridad ecológica", se centran actualmente en las herramientas que proporcionan los estudios sobre análisis, resolución y transformación de conflictos y en nuevas reflexiones epistemológicas respetuosas del sesgo cultural y de género y no occidentalocéntricas. El texto, además de introducción y conclusiones, tiene tres apartados. El primero establece un punto de partida fáctico, resumiendo los datos relativos al agua dulce y potable, para establecer, mediante una sucinta descripción de diez conflictos, internos e internacionales, de varios continentes, una tesis central: la conflictividad más caliente, incluyendo conductas violentas, no es tanto por la carencia de agua en sí, sino por la gestión y gobernanza del agua, en general y en casos de escases de la misma. En segundo lugar, se resume las claves analíticas y los resultados del debate sobre los conflictos hídricos, en particular sobre los vínculos entre uso y escasez de agua y violencia directa desde finales de los años ochenta a mediados de los años noventa del siglo pasado. La tercera sección presenta nuevas miradas, basadas no en los estudios de seguridad o la seguridad ecológica, como antes, sino en los trabajos, consolidados, de la investigación para la paz y los estudios sobre análisis y transformación de conflictos. Concretamente, se exponen las aportaciones, y se propone como aplicarlas a los conflictos hídricos, mediante tres asunciones y siete tesis. Finalmente, las conclusiones insisten en la necesidad de tratar estos conflictos como conflictos sociales, mostrando que su especificidad está vinculada a la gestión y gobernanza del recurso más que a la escasez en sí y, al hacerlo, ponen el acento, en las dificultades de gobernabilidad y gobernanza que hay que abordar.

This dissertation tries to present a critical analysis of conflicts over contested forms of urban transformation and urban policies in the metropolitan area of Rome and Berlin (comparative analysis developed in co-tutoring research thesis). In particular it focuses on the reclaiming of the "right to the city" debate that is witnessing a renewed interest, among urban social movements and academics, due to what happened in the streets, among the urban social movements, in the "rebel cities" (Harvey, 2012), in the last decade. The conflicts selected for the two compared city contexts took place over contested "indeterminate territories" and "urban voids." As yet "indeterminate," these places allow unveiling the generative conflict on different meanings of the city. In these processes the "urban void" plays a key role because, according to Borret (2009), the "empty" can be seen as a productive element in the urban public space, as it is not tied to a single interpretation or intention. The bottom-up and grassroots practices proposed, experimented, developed over these spaces are intended as strategy of resistance/opposition to not-negotiated politics in a framework of economic crisis and urban austerity increasingly producing side effects including gentrification and social exclusion and the welfare state crisis. In response to this the movements of insurgent citizenship are organized in many forms: from tenants' organizations activists, who oppose gentrification and evictions in former working class neighbourhoods of Berlin (Holm, 2010) and calling for more public policies capable to combat speculation and address disinvestment in the subsidized housing sector; to movements of housing struggle in Rome claiming the access to more affordable places in the context of the strong housing crisis; to autonomous movements subtracting spaces from the capitalist logic of the market competitiveness and the speculation (in the case of Berlin and Rome) for living and for social, political, artistic and recreational activities (Membretti, 2003; Holm, Kuhn, 2011; Pruijt, 2012); to urban social movements trying to oppose the privatization of parts of the city considered a "common good", using various state-driven mechanisms to advance their causes against civic policies, projects, and regulatory measures, that are considered detrimental to the city's public space, such as the groups of citizens reclaiming co-/self-managed public spaces and services (e.g. Gualini, Majoor, 2007, for Amsterdam; Gualini, 2008, for Berlin; Pask, 2010 in the case of Vancouver; Teatro Valle, 2012, in the case of Rome; Vitale, 2007 and Gualini 2014 several cases). In summary, the limits of urbanism based on competitive growth and profit have been emphasized by numerous critical and theoretical practices that have developed theories capable of analysing the issue to a higher level of argumentations, including systemic and ideological aspects, from the point of view of all the actors involved. These intellectual resources, can be useful «for those institutions, movements and actors aiming [.] to promote alternative forms of urbanism, radically democratic, socially just and sustainable» (Brenner, Marcuse, Mayer, 2009). The interesting element is the capacity of these communities to propose, experiment and develop, through forms of social struggles and collective/cooperative action, alternatives to what are considered as unsustainable strategies of urban transformations (mostly based on the substitution/reduction of public resources), analysing power relationships, negotiation of conflicts and participation in institutional planning practice. Doing so, some of these forms of spatial contestation, such as the "transitional reappropriated spaces" (Growth and Corijn, 2005) –on which the research focus- have shown in recent years a programmatic capacity and a proactive potential in suggesting and implementing "Public Policies from the Bottom" (Paba, 2010): e.g. "banking and financial policies" through the activation of forms of microcredit; "training and educational policies" offering a wide range of free or very affordable courses; "policies of management and recycling of waste, housing policies, policies to support youth and women entrepreneurship, policies addressing the problems of immigration, cultural and sports policies"; "architectural heritage renewal policies", and others. These two European cities have faced so a renewed interest in the phenomenon of "reclaiming" of urban physical spaces that was carried on by social movements and wilfully appropriated by citizens using "appropriation" as a legitimate tactic of protest. Moreover, these radical participated practices have been a tool that enables experimentation and implementation of grassroots alternatives embodying a series of dynamics of "insurgent (re)appropriation" of urban space and self-production and provision of collective resources. Doing so, these informal actors and grassroots groups, organized in new forms of urban social movements, experimenting more progressive understanding of the mechanisms of space and social reproduction, started reclaiming the idea of "commons" and together with it the role that a third subject, a collective subject (different from a single private investor or the State and public institutions), could play in a direct management of what are intended to be collective properties/resources. In the two cities contexts analysed citizens have implemented a set of new strategies. Among them: new forms of self-help collective housing, self-/co-managed public spaces and the definition of urban commons. The research analyse some relevant cases of insurgent reappropriation/reclaiming of urban public spaces making a comparison between two cities historically characterized by organized forms of social struggle and grassroots transitional space reappropriations. Which is the value of such alternative experiences? Can these grass-root experiments of self-management and DIY renovation contribute to the production of new operative strategies for: public housing stock; heritage management; alternative forms of welfare; the development of more sustainable urban transformation practices and public space management? Analysing the evolution of the same pattern in forms of contestation, it permits to investigate how/if these practices have stand the chance to be facilitated, hampered, or co-opted, during the time and how each of these have had/can have an impact upon contemporary policymaking in political economy and if they have been/can be able to influence a change in the welfare policies and urban agenda. ; Diese Dissertation versucht, eine kritische Analyse von Konflikten unstrittener Erscheinungsformen städtischer Transformation und Politik im metropolitanem Raum von Rom und Berlin zu präsentieren (vergleichende Analyse entwickelt im gemeinsamen Tutoring der Forschungsthese). Der Fokus dieser Dissertation liegt insbesondere auf dem Zurückerobern (Reclaiming) der "Recht auf Stadt"-Debatte, die ein erneuertes Interesse unter städtischen sozialen Bewegungen und Akademiker*innen erweckt und beobachtet, basierend auf Protesten in den Strassen und der Entwicklung der sozialen Bewegungen der letzten Dekade in den "rebellischen Städten" (Harvey, 2012). Die analysierten Konflikten in den zwei vergleichenden Städten finden auf umstrittenen "ungeklärten/unbestimmten Territorien" und verlassenen, leer stehenden Räumen und Grundstücken statt. "Unbestimmte Territorien" offenbaren den generativen Konflikt unterschiedlicher Bedeutung und Interessen der Stadt. In diesen spielen die leer stehenden Gebäude und Orte eine besondere Rolle, weil, laut Borret (2009), das Leere als ein produktives Element im städtischen öffentlichen Raum gedeutet und gesehen werden kann, nicht gebunden und vordefiniert an eine einzige Interpretation oder Absicht. Die in diesen Räumen vorgeschlagenen, entwickelten, ausprobierten Praktiken der Basisbewegungen können als Strategie von Widerstand und Opposition gegen eine (nicht ausgehandelte) Politik im Rahmen der ökonomischen Krise und städtischen Austerität mit zunehmenden Auswirkungen wie Gentrifizierung, sozialer Exklusion und Krise des Sozialstaates, gesehen werden. Als Antwort darauf haben sich die rebellischen Bürger*innen Bewegungen (insurgent citizenship) auf vielfältige Weise organisiert: von Mieter*innen/Aktivist*innen Organisationen, die der Gentrifizierung und den (Zwangs)-Räumungen in den ehemaligen Arbeiter*innenvierteln Berlins widerstehen (Holm, 2010) und zu mehr öffentlicher Politik auffordern, die fähig sei, der Spekulation sowie der Desinvestition im subventionierten Wohnungsbausektor entgegen zutreten; bis hin zu Bewegungen der Wohnungskämpfe (housing struggle) in Rom, die Zugang zu mehr bezahlbarem Wohnraum im Kontext der Wohnungsmarktkrise fordern; autonomen Bewegungen, die Orte und Räume aus der kapitalistischen Logik der Marktwettbewerbfähigkeit und der Spekulation für Wohnraum (an den Beispielen von Berlin und Rom), soziale, politische, künstlerische und Erholungsaktivitäten herausbrechen (Membretti, 2003; Holm, Kuhn, 2011; Pruijt, 2012); und städtischen sozialen Bewegungen, die versuchen, der Privatisierung von Teilen der Stadt, was als Allgemeingut verstanden wird, zu widerstehen - in Form unterschiedlicher staatlich bedingter Mechanismen, um deren Anliegen, was als schädlich gegenüber dem öffentlichen städtischen Raum betrachtet wird, gegen staatliche Politik, Projekte und Regulatorien zu untermauern, wie die Gruppen von Bürger*innen, die co-/selbst-organisierte öffentliche Räume und Service zurückerobern (z.B. Gualini, Majoor, 2007, für Amsterdam; Gualini, 2008, für Berlin; Pask, 2010 für Vancouver; Teatro Valle, 2012, für Rom; Vitale, 2007 und Gualini 2014 in einigen Fällen). Zusammenfassend sind die Grenzen des Urbanismus, basierend auf konkurrierendem Wachstum und Profit, erkennbar und hervorgehoben von zahlreichen kritischen und theoretischen Praktiken, die Theorien entwickelten, fähig das Thema auf einem höheren Level der Argumentation, inklusive systemischer und ideologischer Aspekte, zu analysieren - und zwar aus den Persektiven aller Involvierten Akteur*innen. Diese intellektuellen Mittel können nützlich für "diese Institutionen, Bewegungen und Akteur*innen sein, welche alternative Formen des Urbanismus, radikaler Demokratie, sozial und nachhältig vorantreiben möchten" (Brenner, Marcuse, Mayer, 2009). Das interesante Element ist die Fähigkeit dieser Communities und Gemeinschaften, durch Formen sozialer Kämpfe , und kollektiven/kooperativen Aktivitäten, Alternativen zu nicht nachhaltiger städtischer Transformation vorzuschlagen, zu entwickeln und auszuprobieren sowie Machtstrukturen, die Aushandlung von Konflikten und die Partizipation in institutionalisierter Städteplanung und Praxis zu analysieren. Diese zwei europäischen Städte haben das Interesse des Phänomens Reclaiming, des Zurückeroberns städtischer physischer Räume erweckt, ausgeführt von sozialen Bewegungen und bewußt übernommen von der Bürger*innenschaft als Aneignung und legitime Form und Taktik von Protest. Zudem sind diese radikale partizipativen Praktiken ein Werkzeug, dass Experimentation und Umsetzung basisorganisierter Alternativen ermöglicht und demzufolge eine Serie von rebellischen aneignenden Dynamiken des städtischen Raumes sowie Eigenproduktion und Bereitstellung kollektiver Resourcen verkörpert. Diese informellen Akteur*innen und Basisgruppen, organisiert in neuen Formen städtischer sozialer Bewegungen, experimentierend in progressivem Verstehen der Mechanismen von Raum und sozialer Reproduktion, begannen die Idee von Commons zusammen mit der Rolle eines dritten Subjekts, eines kollektiven Subjekts, zurück zuerobern. Sie können eine direkte Verwaltung und Organisierung als kollektive Resource und kollektives Eigentum ausfüllen. In den Kontexten der beiden analysierten Städten haben die Bürger*innen eine Reihe neuer Strategien realisiert. Dazu zählen: Neue Formen der kollektiven Häuser und Wohnraum-Selbsthilfe, Selbstorganisierte öffentliche Räume und die Definition von städtischen Commons. Die Forschungsanalyse analysiert einige relevante Fälle rebellischer Wiederaneignung/Zurückeroberungen öffentlicher städtischer Räume und vergleicht zwei Städte, die historisch betrachtet von organisierten Formen sozialer Kämpfe und Basis-transitionaler Raumaneignung gekennzeichnet sind. Was ist der Wert, der Nutzen solcher alternativer Erfahrungen? Können diese grass-root-Experimente der Selbst-Organisierung und DIY Renovation zu der Produktion neuer operativer Strategien für den öffentlichen Wohnraum- und Häuser Bestand; des Bauerbe-Managements; der alternativen Formen von Wohlstand; der Entwicklung mehr nachhaltiger städtischer Transformations Praktiken und öffentlicher Raum Managements beitragen?

Yeni medyanın yükselişinden global ölçekte hakimiyet kazanan sosyal ağlara kadar dijital teknolojinin birleştirici etkisi insanların iletişim kurma biçimlerini değiştirmiştir. Yeni teknolojiler ve dünyanın değişen kimyası iletişim literatürüne sanal gerçeklik, artırılmış gerçeklik, türetici (prosumer), kullanıcı (user) vb. gibi bugüne kadar hiç duyulmamış yeni terimleri kazandırırken; gerek kişiler, gerek medya, gerekse kurumsal iletişim mekanizmaları bu hızlı döngüdeki yenilikleri hem takip etme hem de kendi işleyiş yapılarına uygulamada çağa ayak uydurmak durumunda kalmıştır. Mesajın oluşturulması aşamasındaki kontrolün editoryal yapı ya da reklamveren cephesinden "bireylere" geçmesi ise, geçmişin pasif ve süreçte söz sahibi olmayan kitlelerine bireysel temelde önemli bir güç kazandırmış ve onları "Yeni dünyanın cesur kahramanlarına" dönüştürmüştür. Bu mevcut durum aslında 4-5 Mayıs tarihlerinde İstanbul Ticaret Üniversitesi Halkla İlişkiler ve Reklamcılık bölümü tarafından organize edilen 1. Uluslararası İletişim'de Yeni Yönelimler Konferansı'nın çıkış noktası olmuştur. Konferansta sunulan uluslararası hakem ve bilim kurulu üyeleri tarafından kabul edilerek seçilen bildirilerden oluşan bu bilimsel kitap, dijital çağın beraberinde getirdiği "Yeni" Gelişmeler "Yeni dijital kültür", "Dijital Çağın Yeni Pazarlama Trendleri", "Dijital Çağ ve Yeni Reklamcılık", "Kurumsal İletişim ve Halkla İlişkiler Çalışmalarında Yeni Yönelimler", "Siyasal İletişimde Dijitalleşme", "Sosyal Medya ve Yeni Haber Algısı", "Görüntünün Dijitalleşmesi" ve son "Yeni İletişimde Yeni Fırsatlar, Yeni Sınırlar" ana başlıkları çerçevesinde konunun uzmanı akademisyenler ve lisansüstü öğrencileri tarafından yapılan gerek nitel gerekse de nicel araştırmalar ve kuramsal analizlerle değerlendirilmiş; bugünün iletişim dünyasındaki yönelimleri zengin bir bilimsel temelde ortaya koyması adına alana önemli bir katkı sağlamıştır. Bu uluslararası konferansın gerçekleşmesinde emeği geçen ve desteklerini bizden esirgemeyen konferans hakem kurulu, bilim kurulu ve düzenleme kurulunda yer alan değerli hocalarıma, İstanbul Ticaret Üniversitesi Rektörümüz Prof.Dr.Nazım Ekren ve üst yönetime, üniversitemiz Genel Sekreteri Prof.Dr. Murat Kasımoğlu, Genel Sekreter Yardımcıları sayın Adnan Eceviş ve sayın Yusuf Ünal'a; İletişim Fakültesi dekanımız Prof.Dr.Mim Kemal Öke'ye, İletişim Fakültesi İdari Ofis Müdürümüz sayın Mine Tan Şehitoğlu'na; ilgili kitabımızın yayın sponsoru olarak katkılarıyla bizi mutlu eden Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık ve nezdinde sayın Nevzat Argun'a, dijital medya sponsorumuz DijitalAjanslar.com'a ; değerli çalışmaları ile aramızda olan tüm hocalarımıza ve konferans organizasyonunda yer alan sevgili bölüm öğrencilerimize; konferans organizasyonun gerek çevrimiçi, gerekse çevrımdışı tüm sürecinde hiçbir desteğini esirgemeyen ve bu sürecin somut çıktılarının sağlanmasında emeği göz ardı edilemeyen değerli bölüm hocamız Öğr.Gör.İhsan Eken'e sonsuz teşekkürler. Sonraki yıllarda yapılacak konferans serimizin ilkini oluşturan 1. Uluslararası İletişimde Yeni Yönelimler Konferansı'nın alana ilgi duyan, bu yeni dünyayı merakla takip eden ve gönül veren tüm çevrelere yepyeni bir bakış açısı sunması dileklerimle… Dijitalin yeni dünyasına hoşgeldiniz! ; TABLE OF CONTENT / İÇİNDEKİLER NEW DIGITAL CULTURE - YENİ DİJİTAL KÜLTÜR "Examination of the Level of Dependency on Social Media College Students: A Study on Students of Istanbul Kültür University" Res. Assist. Merve Çelik 1 "Socail Media, Fashion and Design" Sema Hatun Türker 11 "The Effects of New Communication Technologies to The Social Life: Internet Marriage Sites" Tarkan Kılıç and Gülhan Gündoğdu 17 "Social Media and Its Impact on Intercultural Communication" Assoc. Prof. Dr. Noureddine Mouhadjer 29 "The Relation between Social Media Usage and Life Satisfaction: A Survey on University Students" Prof. Dr. Şükrü Balcı and Lec. Mevlüt Can Koçak 34 "Interpersonal Relationships of Celebrities in Social Media: A Content Analysis of Famous Turkish TV Series Actors' and Actresses' Instagram and Twitter Messages" Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hilal Özdemir Çakır 46 "New Media Trends Fashion and Beauty Video Vlogs in YouTube" Nesibe Yaraş 54 "Fame, Power, Identity: The Fame Culture in The Context of Social Values And Plausible Identity in Turkey" Res. Assist. Sena Aydın 64 NEW MARKETING TRENDS OF DIGITAL AGE DİJİTAL ÇAĞIN YENİ PAZARLAMA TRENDLERİ "Retail Technology: A Challenge on Shopper Oriented Perception" Assoc. Prof. Dr. Figen Yıldırım and Prof. Dr. Özgür Çengel 72 "Deep Metaphors of Social Media Consumers: A Zmet Study on Social Media" Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sibel Onursoy 79 "Communications Strategy of Turkish Cittaslow Cities" Assoc. Prof. Dr. Şule Yüksel Özmen, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Haluk Birsen and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özgül Birsen 91 "Analysing the Mobile-Tech Based Transformation of Youth's Leisure Time Activities According to the MTUAS Scale" Res. Assist. Ayşegül Karagülle Çaycı, Res. Assist. Berk Çaycı and Lec. İhsan Eken 101 "Real-Time Marketing as A New Approach to Marketing Communication: A Review on The Shares of Brands in Social Media" Res. Assist. Selçuk Bazarcı and Begüm Mutlu 116 1st International Conference on New Trends in Communication 1. Uluslararası İletişimde Yeni Yönelimler Konferansı "The Impact of Wearable Technology on Fashion Industry" Assoc. Prof. Dr.Gözde Öymen 131 "Rereading Cittaslow Studies in Turkey" Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özgül Birsen, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Haluk Birsen, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Şule Yüksel Özmen and Res. Assist. Onur Oğur 139 "Internet Speed, Consumer Culture and the Necessities: Effects of Transition to 4.5 G Infrastructure in the Concept of Consumption" Assist. Prof. Dr. Can Diker 149 "A Research towards Measuring the Effect of Interactive Communication in Social Networks on Brand Loyalty"-- Assist. Prof. Dr. Murat Koçyiğit and Dr. Ersin Diker 157 "Digital Game Development in Turkey; Current Situation and Problems" Assist. Prof. Dr. Burak Yenituna 168 "A Review on the Use of Corporate Web Sites by Slow Cities: Comparison of Web Site Main Pages of Cittaslow Turkish Municipalities" Res. Assist. Tülay Yazıcı and Res. Assist. Deniz Keba Ekinci 179 "Airport Marketing: An Airport Marketing Analysis on Istanbul New Airport (IGA) Brand Identity" Lec. Selen Butgel Tunalı 194 "The Impact of Using Social Media in the Health Promotion: Turkish Health Ministry's Use of Social Media" Gülhan Gündoğdu and Tarkan Kılıç 206 DIGITAL AGE AND NEW ADVERTISING - DİJİTAL ÇAĞ VE YENİ REKLAMCILIK "Defining Search Engine Advertising Metrics According to AIDA Advertising Model" Assoc. Prof. Dr. Emel Poyraz and Naim Çetintürk 219 "An Assessment on Social Networks and Online Advertisement" Dr. Alev Aslan 230 "A Rising Trend in Digital Advertising: Micro-Video Ads" Assoc. Prof. Dr. Gülay Öztürk 236 "Culture, New Consumer Capitalism And Advertising Narrative in The Digital Age", Assist. Prof. Dr. M.Nur Erdem 247 "Structural Transformation of Advertising Narration in Turkey at Digital Era" Assist. Prof. Dr. Recep Yılmaz 260-- "The Role of Facebook Advertising on the Intention Of Consumer's Purchases: An Investigation on Purchase Behaviours of University Students" Dr. Ersin Diker and Assist. Prof. Dr. Zekiye Tamer Gencer 268 "A New Kind of "Advertainment"": Webisodes" Duygu Yıldırım 280 1st International Conference on New Trends in Communication 1. Uluslararası İletişimde Yeni Yönelimler Konferansı "The Construction of Orientalist and Otherization Discourse in Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper Advertisements" Fatma Şişli 286 "Happy in Their Own World" Zeynep Betül Kavak 295 "Goodvertising: A New Perspective in the Philosophy of Advertising" Dr. Alparslan Nas 302 NEW TRENDS IN CORPORATE COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC RELATIONS STUDIES - KURUMSAL İLETİŞİM VE HALKLA İLİŞKİLER ÇALIŞMALARINDA YENİ YÖNELİMLER "New Generation Opinion Leaders in Public Relations: A Research on Snapchat" Assoc. Prof. Dr. Banu Karsak and Assist. Prof. Dr. Gaye Aslı Sancar 315 "Logo Meaning and Logo Likability Relationship: A Research on Istanbul Grand Airport (IGA) Logo Design" Lec. Selen Butgel Tunalı 324 "Crisis Communication in Social Media: The Case Study of Turkcell" Lec. Beyza Nur Kalaycı 331 "The Role of New Media in Social Movements Within the Frame of Corporate Social Responsibility: Adım Adım Formation" Dr. Gözde Sunal and Cansu Sunal 342 "Creating the Manager of Emotional Intelligence in the Digital Age" Arzu Kara 355 DIGITALIZATION IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION SİYASAL İLETİŞİMDE DİJİTALLEŞME "The Role of Instagram in Digital Diplomacy: The Case Study of "Come See Turkey" Assist. Prof. Dr. Gaye Aslı Sancar 371 "Communication Tecnologies, Political Communication And Public Sphere" Assist. Prof. Dr. Süleyman Güven 381 "Consistency of Public Opinion Polls In Turkey" Res. Assist. Oğuz Göksu 389 SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE PERCEPTION OF NEW NEWS SOSYAL MEDYA VE YENİ HABER ALGISI "User Perception of News Credibility in Social Media" Assoc. Prof. Dr. Deniz Kılıç and Assoc. Prof. Dr. N. Bilge İspir 402 "Social Media and Journalism: An Assessment of Turkish Experience" Dr. Zafer Kıyan and Prof. Dr. Nurcan Törenli 410 "Comparison of Columnists' Twitter Agenda on Turkey June 7TH November 1ST 1st International Conference on New Trends in Communication 1. Uluslararası İletişimde Yeni Yönelimler Konferansı General Election" Assoc. Prof. Dr. Bilge İspir and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Deniz Kılıç 413 "How Do the Television News Use Social Media?" Assoc. Prof. Dr. Funda Erzurum 420 "New Media, New Television: Is this New Era an End to Collective Viewing Dream?" Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oya Şakı Aydın 430 "Whose Are Social Media Accounts: Keeping Social Media Accounts of Journalists Under Surveillance Assist. Prof. Dr. Nihal Kocabay Şener 438 "The Battle of Internet Journalism with Traditional Newspapers: Did Internet Journalism Finish Traditional Journalism? An Update on Opinion of University Students about Internet Journalism" Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mihalis Kuyucu 448 "New Arenas and Approaches in Agenda Setting" Res. Assist. Mehmet Gülnar 469 "New Media and Changing Discourse on News: Example of Hurriyet Daily and Its Online Site" Mert Civeleker 478 "Citizen Journalism Under the State of Emergency vs Anti-Terrorism Nexus in Ethiopia: Courses and Prospects" Yirgalem Abebe Haile 491 "Violence Society in the Social Media: Comments for "Reina Attack" in Instagram" Gizem Güler 501 DIGITALIZATION OF IMAGE - GÖRÜNTÜNÜN DİJİTALLEŞMESİ "New Narrative Forms in Documentary Films in Digital Media" Prof. Dr. Huriye Kuruoğlu and Elçin Akçora 510 "Reading Early Film History in the Digital Era" Assoc. Prof. Dr. Âlâ Sivas Gülçur 523 NEW OPPORTUNITIES, NEW BOUNDARIES IN NEW COMMUNICATION YENİ İLETİŞİMDE YENİ FIRSATLAR , YENİ SINIRLAR "Discussing the "Freedoms" about New Media in the TRNC within the Frameworks of "Legal" and "Ethical" Boundaries" Lec. Ayhan Dolunay and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Fevzi Kasap 533 "Social Media and New Technology Education Access for New Generations" Zeynep Mine Alptekin 546 "The Growing Inequalities Produced by Recognitional Communications in the Digital Age" Lec. Dr. Lukasz Swiatek 555 ; 1. bs.

La investigación aborda desde un enfoque de derechos humanos y de género, el proceso de liderazgo seguido por las mujeres en la organización social. Analiza su precaria incorporación a la Población Económicamente Activa (PEA) y su posterior integración al movimiento sindical más representativo del país como es la Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (CGTP). El trabajo analiza 16 años de vida orgánica de la CGTP, visibilizando la flexibilización laboral de los años 90, que provoca despidos masivos de trabajadores y trabajadoras, donde las mujeres se incorporan como nuevas actoras en el campo del trabajo. Pero que no resuelve la desigualdad laboral entre las mujeres y los hombres sino que la acrecienta convirtiendo a las mujeres en mano de obra barata, confinándola a condiciones laborales precarias, en un contexto donde la demanda fundamental como es la estabilidad laboral es puesta en peligro. La investigación observa como la reforma laboral del gobierno de Alberto Fujimori marca el retroceso de un Estado que abdica de su papel regulador y fiscalizador y que más bien despoja a los trabajadores de sus derechos laborales fundamentales. Señalando como un hito trágico el asesinato de Pedro Huilca Tecse por el grupo Colina el 18 de diciembre de 1992, a nueve meses de haber sido elegido secretario general de la CGTP. Situación y hechos que considera influyen en el debilitamiento de la confederación, reflejada en la disminución de sus afiliados, que en la década previa a los años noventa era de 21.9 % y que entre 1995 y 2006 disminuye a 8 % y 5 %. La tesis toma en cuenta que en el 2003 bajo la dirección de Juan José Gorriti, siendo responsable Susan Portocarrero de la secretaría de la mujer y defensa del niño trabajador, se registran hechos importantes con relación a la participación cualitativa y cuantitativa de las mujeres. Proceso que es fortalecido por la reestructuración orgánica de la central, donde las secretarías se transforman en departamentos sindicales y en el que también se implementa la afiliación sindical directa. En este contexto, la secretaría de la mujer y defensa del niño trabajador, elabora su Manual de Organización y Funciones y la I Plataforma Laboral de Género y los presenta al XII Congreso Nacional de la CGTP en noviembre de 2006. Donde siete mujeres son incorporadas al consejo directivo nacional. Y que elige después de 78 años de vida orgánica a Carmela Sifuentes Inostroza como la primera presidenta mujer de su historia y a Gloria Pérez Saavedra como secretaria de la mujer. Durante el análisis se resalta que con una CGTP reconstituida y con un nuevo discurso centrado en la recuperación de la democracia y los derechos perdidos, el trabajo de la mujer adquiere mayor presencia a través del acciones del reestructurado departamento de la mujer, que consigue incorporar a más mujeres en sus comisiones de trabajo, elabora los sustentos teóricos y políticos de la estrategia de transversalización del enfoque de género, que logra más mujeres con un discurso argumentado, que disponen de herramientas como la escuela sindical para mujeres y también mixtas para hombres y mujeres con este enfoque, donde se visibiliza la importancia de una afiliación sindical con esta visión. Logrando que sus derechos y los de otras mujeres de los sectores más precarios del ámbito laboral, se incluyan como temas específicos en los pliegos y convenios colectivos a través de la Agenda Laboral de las Mujeres Trabajadoras, lo que dinamiza la participación de más mujeres en todas las instancias de la CGTP, particularmente en sus asambleas nacionales. La investigación valora como factores decisivos que contribuyen a la inclusión de la Agenda de Género dentro de la CGTP, las acciones realizadas por las mujeres del consejo nacional, por las del departamento de la mujer y por sus comisiones de trabajo, así como por el apoyo recibido de parte del secretariado ejecutivo. Todo lo cual permite que en noviembre de 2011 presenten al XIII Congreso Nacional Ordinario la moción de Cuota de Género sustentada por la responsable del departamento. La misma que pese a requerir la reforma de los estatutos, se aprueba en la Comisión No.4: Situación Orgánica y Fortalecimiento de la CGTP, ratificada por la plenaria y que está pendiente de ser revalidada por un congreso estatutario. La investigación concluye en que estos 16 años de la CGTP marcan la promoción, negociación y aprobación de acciones afirmativas inspiradas en el modelo sindical europeo13, adaptadas al modelo peruano y a los intereses colectivos de las mujeres trabajadoras. Y que a partir de 2011 comienza una nueva historia para el movimiento sindical de la CGTP sobre este tema. ; --- The Women's Leadership in organizations such as the Trade Union's, is analyzed from the perspective of human rights and gender in the present investigation. Since its intervention in the workplace: the precarious action and its subsequent integration into the most representative trade union movement in the country, such as the General Confederation of Workers of Peru - CGTP. We traveled through 16 years of the organic life of the CGTP, making visible the labor reform of the 90's that marks the start of labor flexibility, causing massive layoffs of workers and secondly incorporating more strongly to new actors to the world Labour: Women. This addition does not respond to public policy to equip participation and working conditions of women and men in this area and therefore bridge the gaps that support discrimination; This situation reflects the demand for cheap labor in poor working conditions, backed by labor unrest, thus losing the main feature of unionized workers or workers / as: "Job Stability." The labor reform of A. Fujimori government marks the beginning of the retreat of the state not only in its role as regulator, but also to oversight of compliance with labor standards as part of the same government specifically the December 18, 1992, nine months into the General Secretariat, Peter Huilca was killed by the Colina group, both heavy blows to the unions originate the weakening of the most visible of the Country confederation, this is reflected in the declining share of national affiliation in the decade before the nineties was approximately 21.9% and between 1995 and 2006% the percentage fluctuated between 8% and 5%. In 2003, under the direction of Juan José Gorriti, important findings were made in relation to the qualitative and quantitative participation of women, the responsibility of the Ministry of Women and Child Worker fell on Susan Portocarrero. In that same year, the organizational restructuring process starts, from Secretaries to Departments and Trade also implementing direct affiliation. The Ministry of Women and Child Workers, adopted its Manual of Organization and Functions and the First Labour Platform Gender, which was taken to the XII Congress of the CGTP in November 2006, where 7 women join the National Executive Council, and after 78 years of organic life, the first female president is elected in its history; it also chooses Gloria Perez Saavedra as the new Secretary for women, and it is from this year that the CGTP reconstituted and a new discourse centered on the struggle for restoration of democracy and rights lost, becomes more incident now called the women's Department of the CGTP, calling women on the commission structure work. Begin the theoretical and political underpinnings for developing strategy mainstreaming gender in CGTP, which translates into: women with a speech argued; tools such as union school for women and mixed for men and women develop the gender issue; visible the importance of union membership with gender; building proposals for collective bargaining rights for women in the specifications and detailed collective agreements on a work schedule of working women; promoting the participation of more women in the functional activities organized by the CGTP as National Assemblies; promoting the union agenda includes those most precarious sectors of the workplace, which are mostly made up of women. The development of planned and promoted by the women of the CN of the CGTP and the department including its working committees, had the political backing of the national leadership represented by the executive secretariat actions, so that in November 2011, arriving at XIII National Ordinary Congress proposing as its core proposal "gender quota" involving the reform of its statutes, this proposal was presented as a motion supported by the head of department and approved by the Commission number four: "Organic status and Strengthening CGTP "and later in the plenary, being willing to be ratified in the Statutory Congress. They were 16 years leading the most representative trade union confederation in the country, focusing on promotion, negotiation and approval of affirmative action that inspired the European union model applied to the Peruvian model. In these periods the collective interests of many working women is one of the main reasons for the trade union movement there were more important. From the year 2011 begins a new story written for the motion of the CGTP union on this issue. ; Tesis

'Social pedagogy' is not a familiar term in South Africa. Instead, everything to do with education outside or beyond schooling is subsumed under 'adult education'. Community education or alterna- tives are generally known as 'radical' or 'popular' education' concerned with social, economic and political transformation. Based on the pedagogy of Paulo Freire and participatory development paradigms these are rooted in the mass democratic struggles against apartheid. This paper is based on extensive research by the authors as participant observers and activists, conducted over many years into university-based adult education on the one hand, and praxis outside academic institutions, on the other. The authors have a his- tory of engagement in worker education, and key elements of education in the non-racial trade union move- ment as one of the most important organised forces of internal political resistance are suggested as informing curricula of university-based adult education.Since 1994 and the change to democracy, adult education departments in universities have increasingly been eroded or disappeared as separate departments or programmes. Like elsewhere in the north, we have witnessed the undermining and increased professionalization and institutionalization of adult education across contexts – and with it a marked reduction in radical outlook and purpose. However, the method- ological approach has remained committed to participation and dialogue, and, with the waning of commu- nity-based students who bring with them extensive experience from the field, there is a consistent emphasis on other, practice-based knowledges through guest educators, and by sending students to design and con- duct research and small interventions, at community level.Popular education outside the university takes numerous forms, and as an 18-month research project has shown, there are still many initiatives that target members of working class communities who have no other access to education. Much of this work is based on a 'pedagogy of contingency' in that it responds di rectly to local needs and concerns. However, not all of the popular education practices continue the tradi tion of radical, conscientising education. We describe three tensions or contradictions experienced by ed- ucators concerned with transformation; firstly, the tension between participation as a principle or a technique; secondly, the tension between individual or collective change; thirdly, the tension between working 'bottom- up' or 'top-down' in designing curricula and asking 'Who leads, and who follows?' in attempts to work dem- ocratically. We conclude that constraints and demands informed by neoliberal politics have made the work of activist academics and academic activists increasingly difficult. The paper concludes by suggesting that building global solidarity amongst adult educators who have carried their struggles from the past into the future, and younger educators who create new forms of radical pedagogy forward, are important ways of keeping social justice agendas and practices alive. ; La Pedagogía Social no es un término común en Sudáfrica. En su lugar, todo cuanto hace referencia a la educación que quede fuera o más allá de la escolaridad se integra en la ense- ñanza de adultos. La educación de la comunidad u otras alternativas son conocidas generalmente como educación radical o popular, y se ocupa de la transformación social, económica o política. Según la pedagogía de Paulo Freire y paradigmas de desarrollo participativo, esta pedagogía hunde sus raíces en la lucha democrática de masas contra el apartheid. Este artículo se basa en una ex- tensa investigación realizada por los autores como observadores participantes y activistas, llevada a cabo durante varios años en la educación de adultos con base universitaria por una parte, y en la praxis fuera del ámbito académico por la otra. Los autores han estado comprometidos con la educación obrera, y los elementos esenciales de la educación en el movimiento sindicalista anti- rracista, considerado como una de las fuerzas organizadas de resistencia política interna más im- portantes, son sugeridos como planes de estudio de la educación de adultos con base universitaria.Desde 1994 y el cambio hacia la democracia, los departamentos de educación para adultos en las uni- versidades se han visto cada vez más mermados o directamente han desaparecido en otros departamen- tos o programas diferentes. Como en cualquier otro lugar en el norte, nosotros hemos sido testigos de una extenuante e incrementada profesionalización e institucionalización de la educación de adultos indepen- dientemente del contexto -y, con ello, de una notable reducción en punto de vista y propósito. Sin embargo, el enfoque metodológico ha permanecido comprometido con la participación y el diálogo, y, con la dismi- nución de estudiantes localizados a nivel comunitario que aporten amplia experiencia obtenida en el te- rreno. Por ese motivo existe un continuo énfasis en otros conocimientos basados en la práctica a través de educadores invitados, y en enviar estudiantes a diseñar y realizar investigaciones y pequeñas intervencio- nes a nivel comunitario.La educación popular fuera de la universidad presenta numerosas formas, y como un proyecto de in- vestigación de 18 meses de duración ha mostrado, aún hay muchas iniciativas cuyo objetivo son miembros de comunidades de clase trabajadora que no tienen ningún otro acceso a la educación. Gran parte de este trabajo se basa en una 'pedagogía de la contingencia' que responde directamente a las necesidades y pro- blemas locales. Sin embargo, no todas las prácticas de educación popular continúan la tradición de una edu- cación radical y de concienciación. Describimos tres tensiones o contradicciones experimentadas por educadores preocupados por la transformación; en primer lugar, la tensión entre la participación como prin- cipio o como técnica; en segundo lugar, la tensión entre el cambio individual o colectivo; en tercer lugar, la tensión entre trabajar de arriba abajo o en sentido contrario a la hora de diseñar planes de estudio y pre- guntarnos '¿Quién lidera, y quién sigue?' en un intento de trabajar democráticamente. Concluimos que las limitaciones y las exigencias de los políticos neoliberales han hecho el trabajo de los académicos activistas y de los activistas académicos cada vez más difícil. El artículo concluye sugiriendo que construir la solidari- dad mundial entre educadores de adultos que han transmitido sus luchas desde el pasado hasta el futuro,y educadores más jóvenes que crean nuevas formas de pedagogía radical, es una manera importante de mantener vivas las agendas y prácticas de la justicia social. ; "Pedagogia social" não é um termo familiar na África do Sul. Em vez disso, tudo que tem a ver com educação fora ou além da escolaridade está subsumida na "educação de adultos". Educação comuni- tária ou alternativa são geralmente conhecidas como educação 'radical' ou 'popular' interessada com a trans- formação social, econômica e política. Com base na Pedagogia de Paulo Freire e paradigmas de desenvolvimento participativo, estão enraizadas nas lutas democráticas de massa contra o apartheid. Este artigo é baseado em extensa pesquisa pelos autores como observadores participantes e ativistas, realizada ao longo de muitos anos em educação de adultos de base universitária, por um lado, e na práxis fora de ins- tituições acadêmicas, por outro. Os autores têm uma história de envolvimento com a educação do traba- lhador e elementos-chave da educação no movimento sindical não-racial como uma das forças organizadas mais importantes de resistência política interna são sugeridos como informando currículos da educação de adultos universitária.Desde 1994, mudança para a democracia, os departamentos de educação de adultos nas universidades cada vez mais têm sido erodidos e desapareceram como departamentos ou programas separados. Como em outros lugares no Norte, temos assistido o aumento da profissionalização e institucionalização da Pe- dagogia Social em vários contextos - e com ela uma redução acentuada na perspectiva e propósito radical. No entanto, a abordagem metodológica permaneceu comprometida com a participação e o diálogo, e, com a diminuição de estudantes enraizados em comunidades que trazem consigo uma vasta experiência no campo, há uma consistente ênfase sobre outros conhecimentos baseados em práticas através de educa- dores de hóspedes, enviando os alunos a projetarem e realizarem investigações e pequenas intervenções a nível comunitário.A educação popular fora da universidade assume inúmeras formas e, como um projeto de investigação de 18 meses mostrou, ainda existem muitas iniciativas que têm como alvo os membros das comunidades da classe trabalhadora que não possuem outra acesso à educação. Muito desse trabalho é baseado em uma "pedagogia de contingência" a medida que responde diretamente às necessidades e interesses locais. No entanto, nem todas as práticas de educação popular continuam a tradição radical de educação conscienti- zadora Nós introduzimos três tensões que descrevem as contradições para educadores preocupados com a transformação; em primeiro lugar, as tensões entre a participação como princípio ou a uma técnica; em segundo lugar, a tensão entre a mudança individual ou coletiva; em terceiro lugar, a tensão entre o traba- lho "bottom-up" ou "top-down" na concepção de currículos e perguntando "quem lidera e quem segue" na tentativa de trabalhar democraticamente. Concluimos que as restrições e exigências informados por polí- ticas neoliberais fizeram o trabalho de ativistas acadêmicos e acadêmicos ativistas cada vez mais difícil. O artigo conclui sugerindo que a construção de uma solidariedade global entre os educadores de adultos que tem carregado suas lutas suas lutas do passado para o futuro e os jovens que criam novas formas de pe- dagogia radical para a frente, é uma forma importante de manter vivas agendas e práticas de justiça social.

La investigación aborda desde un enfoque de derechos humanos y de género, el proceso de liderazgo seguido por las mujeres en la organización social. Analiza su precaria incorporación a la Población Económicamente Activa (PEA) y su posterior integración al movimiento sindical más representativo del país como es la Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (CGTP). El trabajo analiza 16 años de vida orgánica de la CGTP, visibilizando la flexibilización laboral de los años 90, que provoca despidos masivos de trabajadores y trabajadoras, donde las mujeres se incorporan como nuevas actoras en el campo del trabajo. Pero que no resuelve la desigualdad laboral entre las mujeres y los hombres sino que la acrecienta convirtiendo a las mujeres en mano de obra barata, confinándola a condiciones laborales precarias, en un contexto donde la demanda fundamental como es la estabilidad laboral es puesta en peligro. La investigación observa como la reforma laboral del gobierno de Alberto Fujimori marca el retroceso de un Estado que abdica de su papel regulador y fiscalizador y que más bien despoja a los trabajadores de sus derechos laborales fundamentales. Señalando como un hito trágico el asesinato de Pedro Huilca Tecse por el grupo Colina el 18 de diciembre de 1992, a nueve meses de haber sido elegido secretario general de la CGTP. Situación y hechos que considera influyen en el debilitamiento de la confederación, reflejada en la disminución de sus afiliados, que en la década previa a los años noventa era de 21.9 % y que entre 1995 y 2006 disminuye a 8 % y 5 %. La tesis toma en cuenta que en el 2003 bajo la dirección de Juan José Gorriti, siendo responsable Susan Portocarrero de la secretaría de la mujer y defensa del niño trabajador, se registran hechos importantes con relación a la participación cualitativa y cuantitativa de las mujeres. Proceso que es fortalecido por la reestructuración orgánica de la central, donde las secretarías se transforman en departamentos sindicales y en el que también se implementa la afiliación sindical directa. En este contexto, la secretaría de la mujer y defensa del niño trabajador, elabora su Manual de Organización y Funciones y la I Plataforma Laboral de Género y los presenta al XII Congreso Nacional de la CGTP en noviembre de 2006. Donde siete mujeres son incorporadas al consejo directivo nacional. Y que elige después de 78 años de vida orgánica a Carmela Sifuentes Inostroza como la primera presidenta mujer de su historia y a Gloria Pérez Saavedra como secretaria de la mujer. Durante el análisis se resalta que con una CGTP reconstituida y con un nuevo discurso centrado en la recuperación de la democracia y los derechos perdidos, el trabajo de la mujer adquiere mayor presencia a través del acciones del reestructurado departamento de la mujer, que consigue incorporar a más mujeres en sus comisiones de trabajo, elabora los sustentos teóricos y políticos de la estrategia de transversalización del enfoque de género, que logra más mujeres con un discurso argumentado, que disponen de herramientas como la escuela sindical para mujeres y también mixtas para hombres y mujeres con este enfoque, donde se visibiliza la importancia de una afiliación sindical con esta visión. Logrando que sus derechos y los de otras mujeres de los sectores más precarios del ámbito laboral, se incluyan como temas específicos en los pliegos y convenios colectivos a través de la Agenda Laboral de las Mujeres Trabajadoras, lo que dinamiza la participación de más mujeres en todas las instancias de la CGTP, particularmente en sus asambleas nacionales. La investigación valora como factores decisivos que contribuyen a la inclusión de la Agenda de Género dentro de la CGTP, las acciones realizadas por las mujeres del consejo nacional, por las del departamento de la mujer y por sus comisiones de trabajo, así como por el apoyo recibido de parte del secretariado ejecutivo. Todo lo cual permite que en noviembre de 2011 presenten al XIII Congreso Nacional Ordinario la moción de Cuota de Género sustentada por la responsable del departamento. La misma que pese a requerir la reforma de los estatutos, se aprueba en la Comisión No.4: Situación Orgánica y Fortalecimiento de la CGTP, ratificada por la plenaria y que está pendiente de ser revalidada por un congreso estatutario. La investigación concluye en que estos 16 años de la CGTP marcan la promoción, negociación y aprobación de acciones afirmativas inspiradas en el modelo sindical europeo13, adaptadas al modelo peruano y a los intereses colectivos de las mujeres trabajadoras. Y que a partir de 2011 comienza una nueva historia para el movimiento sindical de la CGTP sobre este tema. ; --- The Women's Leadership in organizations such as the Trade Union's, is analyzed from the perspective of human rights and gender in the present investigation. Since its intervention in the workplace: the precarious action and its subsequent integration into the most representative trade union movement in the country, such as the General Confederation of Workers of Peru - CGTP. We traveled through 16 years of the organic life of the CGTP, making visible the labor reform of the 90's that marks the start of labor flexibility, causing massive layoffs of workers and secondly incorporating more strongly to new actors to the world Labour: Women. This addition does not respond to public policy to equip participation and working conditions of women and men in this area and therefore bridge the gaps that support discrimination; This situation reflects the demand for cheap labor in poor working conditions, backed by labor unrest, thus losing the main feature of unionized workers or workers / as: "Job Stability." The labor reform of A. Fujimori government marks the beginning of the retreat of the state not only in its role as regulator, but also to oversight of compliance with labor standards as part of the same government specifically the December 18, 1992, nine months into the General Secretariat, Peter Huilca was killed by the Colina group, both heavy blows to the unions originate the weakening of the most visible of the Country confederation, this is reflected in the declining share of national affiliation in the decade before the nineties was approximately 21.9% and between 1995 and 2006% the percentage fluctuated between 8% and 5%. In 2003, under the direction of Juan José Gorriti, important findings were made in relation to the qualitative and quantitative participation of women, the responsibility of the Ministry of Women and Child Worker fell on Susan Portocarrero. In that same year, the organizational restructuring process starts, from Secretaries to Departments and Trade also implementing direct affiliation. The Ministry of Women and Child Workers, adopted its Manual of Organization and Functions and the First Labour Platform Gender, which was taken to the XII Congress of the CGTP in November 2006, where 7 women join the National Executive Council, and after 78 years of organic life, the first female president is elected in its history; it also chooses Gloria Perez Saavedra as the new Secretary for women, and it is from this year that the CGTP reconstituted and a new discourse centered on the struggle for restoration of democracy and rights lost, becomes more incident now called the women's Department of the CGTP, calling women on the commission structure work. Begin the theoretical and political underpinnings for developing strategy mainstreaming gender in CGTP, which translates into: women with a speech argued; tools such as union school for women and mixed for men and women develop the gender issue; visible the importance of union membership with gender; building proposals for collective bargaining rights for women in the specifications and detailed collective agreements on a work schedule of working women; promoting the participation of more women in the functional activities organized by the CGTP as National Assemblies; promoting the union agenda includes those most precarious sectors of the workplace, which are mostly made up of women. The development of planned and promoted by the women of the CN of the CGTP and the department including its working committees, had the political backing of the national leadership represented by the executive secretariat actions, so that in November 2011, arriving at XIII National Ordinary Congress proposing as its core proposal "gender quota" involving the reform of its statutes, this proposal was presented as a motion supported by the head of department and approved by the Commission number four: "Organic status and Strengthening CGTP "and later in the plenary, being willing to be ratified in the Statutory Congress. They were 16 years leading the most representative trade union confederation in the country, focusing on promotion, negotiation and approval of affirmative action that inspired the European union model applied to the Peruvian model. In these periods the collective interests of many working women is one of the main reasons for the trade union movement there were more important. From the year 2011 begins a new story written for the motion of the CGTP union on this issue. ; Tesis

With the scientific contribution that will be made, and in a debate, the Ohrid 2015 conference will answer the questions that are of interest to the scientific and social public. One of those questions addresses the issue of defining security science as a concept, which is related to the concept of security. For this concept different language systems use different terms. Also, one of the principal problems is the naming of the science which deals with researching security. Namely, security is a phenomenon which is the subject of research of philosophy and science, but it is also the subject of interest of other forms of knowledge as well, such as religious, common-sense and artistic ones. But it also denotes a state, activity and certain social creations which, one way or the other, fill human life or are in the function of meeting human needs. It deals with searching for the answer related to the nature of the destructions, the risks and prerequisites for setting up the conditions and the environment for the creation and improvement of human life, and also with the values: a) whether these values are threatened, to what extent, what from and why; b) how to improve and promote the values and eliminate their threat, who from, with what measures and against whom? Topics  Approaches and methods in researching security  Contemporary security – problem of the state or the society  Security as a public good and its transformation in the spirit of the new generation of security risks and threats  Classification of security – types of security  The concept of security system reform  Security neutrality versus European and Atlantic integration  The concept of securitization  Place and role of intelligence and counterintelligence services  Expanded approach to security  Parliamentary control over the security system  Security law  Corporate security – new type of dealing with risks  The "public's right to know" and the security system  Prevention of violence at sports events  Energetic security in Southeast Europe  Comparative experiences and latest mechanisms for preventing corruption  Types of corruption in the security system and the judiciary  Participation of citizens in the fight against corruption  Practical policies for police reforms  Police integrity yesterday, today and tomorrow  Forms of cooperation between police forces and police organizations  Structure of international police cooperation  Contents of international police cooperation  Forms of ad hoc institutionalization of international police cooperation  Educational systems and profile of police profession in the Balkan states  Forms of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the area of dealing with crime, trafficking in humans, narcotics and psychotropic substances  Institutionalization of regional cooperation in dealing with crises and other security problems  Is the formation of joint Balkan police forces?  Is the formation of Balkan network of criminologists as well as networks of individuals coming from particular specialties possible?  Approaches in cases of domestic violence  Contemporary forms of trade, legal regulations and relations between states  Cooperation of economic subjects between legal security and security threats and risks  Regional cooperation and regional economic policies  Democracy, legal state, human rights, their enhancement and forms of protection  International standards for the protection of freedoms and rights of persons and citizens and the policies of the Balkan states  Forms of protection of freedoms and rights – experiences and perspective  Strengthening the rule of law and the responsibility of the institutions  The role of international organizations in the promotion and implementation of international norms for the protection of human rights in the Balkans  Democracy, stabilization, integration  Inter-state and inter-institutional cooperation in the protection of human freedoms and rights  Contemporary forms of crime and ways for their suppression  Contemporary forms of cyber crime (electronic: frauds, misleadings, threats, id thefts and other forms of electronic frauds and crimes)  Forms of crime related to the Internet and cyber services and manners for their detection  Criminalistic experiences, achievements, methods, means and manners for the suppression of contemporary forms of criminality  Gender perspectives in security  Relationship between criminological and victimological sciences and security as a science – independence, complementarity, distinctiveness, delimitation, subject of study and research methods.  Relationship between criminal law science and security as a science – independence, complementarity, distinctiveness, delimitation, subject of study and research methods.  Relationship between criminalistics and security as ascience - independence, complementarity, distinctiveness, delimitation, subject of study and research methods  Classical (conventional) criminality – (un) justly neglected topic  Homicides and other crimes against the person – a worrying upward trend  Capital punishment – pros and cons (reasons for reconsideration)  Frauds – unjustly neglected criminality (phenomenology, etiology, prevention, penal policy)  Victimization of vulnerable groups (women, children, older persons, persons with disabilities etc.) and their protection  Reform of the criminal material and process law  Contemporary risk management methods in socio-pathological phenomena  Modernization of criminal justice  Contemporary challenges to criminology  Prevention of juvenile delinquency  Contemporary responses to criminality suppression  Sexual abuse of children  Assistance and support to crime victims  Problems relating to the statistical recording of criminality  Gender perspective of criminality  Women and criminality  Stress and victimization in penal institutions Through an open and well-argued debate the Conference should make topical the discussion on the difference between security as an activity and the science which deals with it, i.e. the scientific deliberation and the discovering of scientific laws and rules in the social field of security. These two concepts are most commonly referred to as security and security science or sciences, respectively. Yet, no clear distinction is drawn between them. Most commonly, when talking about security science the discussion revolves around security and its structure. In that sense the concept of security is currently being used with several meanings. As far as security at national or global level is concerned, we should bear in mind the fact that its contemporary concept and basic contours date back to the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall, i.e. after the Cold War. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 mark a new era in the studies and the practice of security. As a result of globalization and the processes which led to the change in the structure of the world power, the phenomena encroaching security are perceived as challenges, risks and threats. The ranking of these concepts and phenomena depends on the level of their impact on the encroachment of security, and for this reason they represent latent, potential or factors of immediate encroachment. In scientific and expert debate security and security science are being disputed. Thus, instead of science, the notions of state (integral security), field (security sector) or a specific system are used. There are no doubts that security encompasses all of them. It is an important human activity in which numerous processes, subjects and relations are interwoven. That sphere is characterized by specific occurrences and phenomena which are challenges for numerous individuals, organs and organizations, and above all, for the state. Security is a complex phenomenon, a controversial concept which has very often been one-sidedly and narrowly defined through history. Security is a complex phenomenon, and, is essentially a disputable concept not only because of its elusive nature and contents bearing in mind the time and the place in which it has been discussed, but also because of the fact that discussion on security is inevitably related to other categories: fear (for physical survival), absence of structural violence, peace, well-being and stability. In international relations, security is defined in various ways, and very often in literature this concept is used without being more closely determined. As a political concept, security is evidently a pre-condition for the existence of life - individual and societal, and refers to the absence of threats and protection from threats. The understanding of security as an innate interest of every individual and broader human collectivities – family, society, nation, state, international system, points to the need for broadening the concept of security towards such approaches. Therefore, in theory concepts are formed such as national and international security, and, in more recent time, human, individual, societal and global security, which indicates an important expansion of new dimensions of security. The paradigms and the institutional models of security have a historical continuity. They have been changing. Security is inseparably related to the state and its organization, organs and function. Contemporary debates on security are expanded to the social and political sphere. Although the very mentioning of the concept of security, is, above all, associated with internal peace and peaceful life of the citizens, i.e. as freedom from threats, it also denotes a state of defence from an external enemy and encroachment of sovereignty. Therefore, the central interest of the concept of security is the state, which can be jeopardized by internal turmoil, economic and social disturbances, particularly in communities lacking the feeling of endangerment of identity and social cohesion. Hence, it can be concluded that "freedom means nothing without security" and that "the test of the freedom is the security of the minorities". For that purpose the Faculty of Security will organize an international conference in Ohrid in the period 2-3 June 2015 on the topic: "Researching security – approaches, concepts and policies". This will mean that the Faculty of Security Skopje will continue its orientation towards giving contribution to the development of scientific thought by organizing international conferences in the area of security, thus helping the decision-makers at regional, national and local level, to overcome practical problems they face in a faster, simpler and timely manner with the help of the findings and the research results.

Most people spend much of their lives working. By working, I mean "wage labor": activity undertaken in exchange for money in a society where money is necessary for survival. This has not always been the case, and it is not the case universally, in all places, or for everyone. But it is now a fact of life so foundational in most parts of the world as to seem a feature of nature rather than history. I begin with truism because I think that the fact of work, in all its bluntness, has never been accorded proper importance in literary criticism or cultural criticism in general. There is, of course, a convenient explanation for the absence: historically, art has been either the province of the leisured classes or something made and experienced outside of the bounds of the workday. Art is, therefore, an exception to the rule of work. And even Marxist critics – those whom one would expect to believe, as Marx did, that production and labor were foundational in capitalism –tend to approach the painting or the poem from the side of the market, consumption, and everyday life, for the understandable reasons outlined above. If they tell a story about capitalism's determinative effect on art, it is usually a story about the penetration of market logics into the realm of art, a story about commodification. Few ask what the work of art might share with work in general or how the constant technological and social refashioning of the workplace might affect the horizon of possibility for artworks.My dissertation, "The Work of Art in the Age of Deindustrialization," attempts to provide one answer to these questions, a historical answer, by a reading of important literary and artistic works from the 1960s and 1970s. These are decades in which twin political and economic crises – the political militancy we associate with 1968, on the one hand, and the crisis of profitability and the dollar we associate with 1973 on the other – force a profound restructuring of capitalism and class relations. In particular, the multiple transformations of the labor process – deindustrialization, the rise of the service sector, the introduction of information technologies into the burgeoning managerial and white-collar sectors – provide a useful vantage from which to investigate the rapid changes in art and writing. Whereas the much-documented aesthetics of objects, things and facticity associated with modernism took its bearings from the factory-system (or, in a variant, anti-industrial form, from the artisanal and craft forms industrialization was in the process of destroying) such a cultural mode becomes increasingly anachronistic in the postwar era. As I argue, the productivist aesthetic of modernism gives way to an aesthetic of administration and distribution that takes signs and social relations rather than physical matter as its primary "material." Instead of the factory or workshop, such a mode draws from the routinized cognitions of office work and the forced conviviality of the service sector.The relationship between the economic and the cultural is not, as it might seem, a case of simple synchronicity or one-to-one correspondence. Experimental poetry, for example, is avant-garde in the sole sense that it is speculative, a laboratorial mode which runs ahead of the work-a-day world rather than simply reflecting it. Such experimental modes elaborated critical responses and forms of technical imagination which aimed to respond to the rigid hierarchies of 1960s society and yet, via a kind of "cunning of reason," laid some of the foundations for the new work relations which became dominant in the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, part of my argument is that some of the most recognizable of avant-garde devices – erasing, replacing, counting, sorting, arranging by chance or rule – have been thoroughly integrated into the very office machinery (now generalized into the home) which writers use to produce their works.Such recuperation builds upon an uneasy affinity between left- and right-wing critiques of postwar capitalism. If leftists, countercultural figures and artists took aim at the rigid, bureaucratic and hierarchical nature of the corporate form and worklife in postwar society, targeting the managerial layer in particular, they found strange bedfellows in a class of business management theorists and economists who saw in that same layer a hindrance to profitability. In response to the artistic and countercultural critique, businesses concoct a new, flexible, "flattened" and adaptive corporate form that trims the middle-managerial layer by imposing upon workers a set of pseudo-democratic work relations under the sign of such corporate shibboleths as teamwork, flexibility, participation, creativity and self-management. Rather than the industrialization of culture that Adorno and Horkheimer famously bemoan, my dissertation describes the same operation in reverse – the "culturization" (or aestheticization) of industry, where the workday absorbs the resources, faculties and affects associated with the aesthetic. This operation is designed to produce more highly-productive, motivated workers but also to ward off and absorb the countercultural and artistic critiques that might lead to disaffection. The aesthetic, in this regard, becomes a mechanism for the establishment of a pseudo-democracy and a pseudo-autarky. If "self-management" – the ideal of labor militants, communists and anarchists since the 19th century – once meant freedom from the imperatives of the boss it now means, increasingly, in light of this reorganization, an internalization of such imperatives.My first chapter traces the thematics of "management" and "self-management" as they appear in the early poetry of John Ashbery, and in his controversial book The Tennis-Court Oath (1962) in particular. Numerous poems in this collection – developed from an earlier poem, "The Instructional Manual" – take up the position of the midlevel employee, who is both the object of commands and the producer of commands. The contradictions in this standpoint – examined in C. Wright Mills' White Collar and many subsequent studies of "the new middle class"provide insight into this transitional moment in capitalism, in which the extensive growth of deskilled white-collar work created, for large firms and the post-war bureaucracy, a crisis of management. One of the ways in which this appears in Ashbery's poetry is through a subtle and inventive play with free indirect discourse and point of view, in which individual moments and voices manifest as antagonistic fragments in an intersubjective field, requiring the "managerial" intervention of the arranging, organizing poetic voice or mind, a mind that is itself fragmented by its multiple allegiances and responsibilities. The experimental collages of The Tennis Court Oath illuminate the curious ambiguity of that special commodity, labor-power, which is at once object and subject: a thinking object, a commodity that speaks.As I discuss in my second chapter, one site where all of these meanings are contested – a site that again attracts the interest of both artists and business management theorists – is the emergent discourse of cybernetics, Through the central notion of "feedback," cybernetics presents an image of social self-regulation based upon reciprocal, horizontal relations rather than explicit hierarchies. Writers and conceptual artists borrow from this discourse to model utopian social forms, ones where form is embedded less in explicit command than in something like a changeable grammar or syntax – cybernetics calls this "information" – which can be revealed and manipulated by art. To give just two examples, both Hannah Weiner in her Code Poems and Dan Graham in his Works for Magazine Pages follow the founder of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, by treating information – and by extension, the formative powers of cultural labor – as a kind of anti-entropic, organizing force. Following Benjamin Buchloh, I describe this development as an "administrative aesthetic," since the cultural artifact comes to see its vocation as one of regulating social relations. Though I treat only a handful of figures in this chapter, the list of writers and artists influenced by this conception of information (and its close cousin, entropy) provides a remarkable cross-section of the period. A partial list of figures who help forge these new aesthetic values would include, in fiction, William Burroughs, William Gass, Kurt Vonnegut, Philip K. Dick and Thomas Pynchon; in poetry, Charles Olson, John Ashbery, A.R. Ammons, Hannah Weiner and Bernadette Mayer; and in art, Hans Haacke, Robert Smithson, Dan Graham and Martha Rosler.One of the reasons why it has been difficult to approach the cultural transformations of the 1960s and 1970s from the side of labor rather than, say, consumption– from the side of the workday rather than leisure time – is that increasingly these two spheres commingle, and the values associated with leisure time are invoked to make the workday more tolerable, at the same time as the protocols and routines associated with work colonize the space of leisure time. This crossing of spheres bears in particular upon the relations between unpaid "reproductive" or domestic labor (the housework associated with women) and waged labor. The subject of my third chapter, Bernadette Mayer's project Memory (1972) – performance, installation and epic poem – investigates the crossing and blurring of these spheres, as everyday life is increasingly subsumed by the protocols of office work, and as office work is increasingly colored in the shades and hues of the street or the home. Memory models this process of merger and blurring through its incorporation of multiple media (type, photography, audio recording), artistic genres and techniques. In this sense, Mayer's elaboration of a "total" artwork which merges different technologies into one single apparatus prefigures the coming reorganization of office work around the personal computer.

Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on vallankäytön luonteen ja sen ilmenemisen tulkinta ja ymmärtäminen ammattikorkeakoulujen vakinaistamis- ja laajentumisprosessissa vuosina 1995-2000. Tutkimus jakautuu kahteen pääosaan: teoreettiseen ja tapausesimerkkinä toteutettavaan empiiriseen osaan. Työn lähtökohtana on teoreettisen viitekehyksen kautta jäsentää, tulkita ja ymmärtää tutkimuskohteena olevaa ilmiötä eli vakinaistamis- ja laajentumisprosessiin liittynyttä vallankäyttöä. Työn metodinen painopiste lähenee teoriaperusteista analyysia ja arviointia. Tiivistäen ilmaistuna teoria saa työssä tulkintavälineen aseman. Tavoitteena on teorian ja sen pohjalta luodun viitekehyksen ja aineiston välinen dialogimainen vuoropuhelu, jota täydennetään eri tutkijoiden esittämillä näkemyksillä. Työn dokumenttiaineisto painottuu kirjoitetussa muodossa olevaan, aitoon ja alkuperäiseen sekä selkeästi rajattuun tekstikorpukseen, jolle annettiin ja jolle muodostui keskeinen asema korkeakoulupoliittisia ratkaisuja tehtäessä. Työn tulkintaprosessin myötä voidaan päätyä mm. toteamaan, että valta ei paikantunut tai sijoittunut ammattikorkeakoululaitoksen luomisen prosessin osalta ainoastaan valtakunnan tason toimijoille ja päätöksentekijöille eli suunta ei ole yksinomaan ylhäältä alhaalle. Kokonaisuuden onnistuminen ja toimivuuden turvaaminen jäivät ja jäävät pitkälti anojien eli paikallistason vastuulle. Vaihtoon liittyvää ulottuvuutta ja vuorovaikutusta tarvitaan prosessin jatkokehittämisen onnistumiseksi. Tarkasteltavassa prosessitodellisuudessa ilman paikallistason työpanosta ja muutoksen syvällisyyttä ja hallintaa - nimenomaan ammatillisen korkeakoulutuksen näkökulmasta - todellinen muutos jää puutteelliseksi. Viitekehyksen keskeisimmät ulottuvuudet nousevat selkeästi esille empiirisen aineiston tulkinnan myötä; vallankäyttö prosessitodellisuuden eri toimijatasojen menettelyjen osalta liikkui nollasummapeli - positiv-summekonflikt -ulottuvuudella, kuten myös mahdollistamisen ja antienergisoinnin ja toimintaa hankaloittavien ratkaisujen puitteissa. Vallankäyttö seurauksineen liikkui ylivallan ja yhteistoiminnallisen vallan kentissä. Valta kapasiteettina ja kykynä tulkita sekä omaa että toisten todellisuutta sekä kokonaisuuden hallintana - jopa edellä mainittujen ulottuvuuksien puutteenakin - saa keskeisen sisällön tarkasteltavan tapausesimerkin puitteissa. Vallan suhdeperusteinen ja muuttuva luonne tulee selvästi esille. Vallankäyttö näkyy selkeästi konkreettisessa toiminnassa paikallisella, alueellisella ja valtakunnallisella toimijatasolla. Kun tilannetta tarkastellaan työn viitekehyksestä käsin, paljastuu valtakäsitteen hyödyntämisen ja tulkinnan jääneen prosessin kuluessa osittain rajautuneeksi. Työn pohjalta voi tulkita vallankäytön heijastusvaikutusten ja mahdollistamisulottuvuuden pohdinnan jääneen osittain keskeneräiseksi. Tehtyjen ratkaisujen ja valittujen periaatteiden seurauksena vallankäyttöön olennaisesti liittyvä kokonaisuuden hallinta ja kyky taata muutoksen syvällisyys eivät olleet ongelmattomia. Kaiken kaikkiaan kyse on työn otsikon mukaisesti vallankäytön oppimisesta. Samalla paljastuu vallankäytön haasteellisuus korkeakoulupolitiikkaa laajemminkin hallinnon kannalta. Valtaan liittyvän todellisuuden tulkinta laajentaa prosessin ymmärtämistä. Samalla paljastuu viitekehyksen laajempi sovellettavuus ja tutkimuksen käyttökelpoisuus sekä vallan suhdeperusteinen ja muuttuva luonne. Perehtyminen työ viitekehykseen ja sen pohjalta tehtyyn empiiriseen tarkasteluun voi edistää muutosta ja sen hallittavuutta. Työ viitekehyksenä oleva mallikombinaatio, synteesi mahdollistaa suoraa vallan harjoittamista laajemman prosessinäkökulman ja auttaa ymmärtämään laaja-alaisemmin organisationaaliseen vallankäyttöön liittyvän toiminnan seurauksia. Siten käytetty malli monipuolistaa vallan tulkintaa. ; The purpose of this study is to interpret and understand the nature and presence of the use of power in polytechnics during the years 1995 - 2000 when they were both being made permanent and undergoing expansion. The study is divided into two main parts: the theoretical and the empirical case study. The use of power within the process examined is interpreted through the theoretical part. Put concisely the theory becomes an interpretative tool in this study. The study concerns itself with two principle levels, the national and the provincial / local: the relationship between and within these two is analysed and interpreted from the viewpoint of the use of power. The basic arrangement of the study is to consider the use of power through and with the help of the two earlier mentioned levels. The workings of the evaluation board of the polytechnics and its licensing section (initially a separate working group), government, parliament, the commission of education and culture, and the ministry of education form the national level of the empirical part of the study. These bodies can be broadly divided into two working groups: the political decision makers, and the specialists. The second level is made up of local and provincial questions of power, resources and dependency. North Savo Polytechnic and Pirkanmaa Polytechnic, both of which could not get permanent official status immediately on first application, have been chosen as examples of the local level. During the period studied North Savo Polytechnic applied for permanent status three times and made one application to broaden the mandate sought. Thus the process reality and entirety and its power dimensions and its changes can be seen. After these submissions the process continued in North Savo provisionally or as education based on agreement making certain units permanent. Pirkanmaa Polytechnic was assessed at the start of the process and again at the end of it when it got provisional approval for making the school permanent. Thus in the time period studied we can examine two different cases as examples within the local process. The study covers issues on both micro and macro levels. The central theme is to look at the process and its content dimension in its entirety. The views of both local and national influencers have been included to make the research more substantive. The use of power as part of process reality is modelled with the aid of two intersecting lines. At the ends of the horizontal line there are the power dimensions of authoritarian (power over) and co-operative (power with). The vertical line describes energy and anti-energy power dimensions; empowerment and action that hinders or even blocks it. Thus we have a four-field model that describes power dimensions in the building process and serves as a technical tool for the study and its theoretical framework. The starting point of the study is that "power moves" as a result of actions in the aforementioned four-field model even during the same process reality, and then the use of power takes different forms and has different consequences. The positions of the power wielders and power targets vary during social interaction and action. Power as a phenomenon manifests itself in varying non-static process relationships and a conclusion as a nil sum game or open conflict is not enough to keep the process developing positively. They are counterbalanced by reciprocal exchange relationships and the positive sum conflict dimension. The interpretation of process reality, securing a change, and management of the entirety become central. The starting point of the study is, through the above-mentioned theoretical framework, to analyse, interpret and understand the phenomenon studied, i.e. the use of power in the process of awarding permanent status and broadening a mandate already received. The methodological emphasis comes close to theory based analyses and evaluation. The aim is a dialogue between on one hand the theory and the framework it's based on and on the other hand the data. This dialogue is then completed with views from various researchers. The documentary data consists mainly of written original, genuine and clearly defined bodies of text which were submitted and which formed a central part in the making of political decisions in the polytechnic field. Through the interpretation process of the study it can be stated that as regards the creation of the polytechnics that power was not only located at the level of national decision makers i.e. the direction is not only from the top to the bottom. Successful implementation and feasibility were and still are the contributory responsibility of the local level applicants. Interaction and reciprocity exchange are needed to make further development successful. Real change in the process reality will be incomplete if local level work input, management and depth of the change - especially from the viewpoint of the polytechnics - are not taken into consideration. The most central dimensions of the framework are brought out with the interpretation of the empirical data; the use of power in the differing action levels of the process reality was moving in the nil sum game - positive sum conflict dimension, as also in the facilitating / empowering and anti-energising / solution retardation dimension. The use of power with its results was moving in the fields of authoritarian (power over) and co-operative (power with). Power as capacity and as ability to interpret one's own and others´ reality and also as management of the entirety - even lacking of all the before mentioned dimensions - receives a central role in the case study examined. The changing and relationship based nature of power is brought out. The use of power can be seen clearly in the tangible actions at the local, provincial and national levels. When the situation is looked at from the framework of the study it can be seen that the utilisation and interpretation of the concept of power has remained partly limited in the course of the process or that the decision makers have not thought about it from the viewpoint of the framework. On the basis of the study it can be interpreted that the study of the reflex effects and facilitating / empowering dimension of the use of power has remained somewhat incomplete or that at least the knock on effects have not been studied in all aspects. As a result of the decisions made and the principles chosen the management of the entirety and the ability to secure the depth of the change that essentially go together with the use of power were not problem free. All in all it is about, in accordance with the title of the study, learning to use power. At the same time the challenging nature of the use of power in administration other than in the polytechnics is revealed.

Switzerland will host a summit this weekend aimed at shoring up global support for Ukraine's war effort — and Washington and its Western partners are looking to ensure that Kyiv enters the meeting in as strong a position as possible.Not much of the news coming out of Ukraine in recent months has been particularly positive. Russia has started taking Ukrainian territory for the first time since 2022, there has been increasing political turmoil in Kyiv, and morale among frontline soldiers continues to suffer. Last weekend, right-wing parties that are more skeptical of assisting Ukraine overperformed in European parliamentary elections, particularly in France and Germany. Aid to Ukraine is unlikely to be affected for the time being. The EU parliament has little power to dictate foreign policy, and centrist parties on the continent won more seats overall. But many experts are interpreting the results as a potential sign of growing resistance to funding Ukraine. More immediately, President Emmanuel Macron dissolved the French parliament and called for snap parliamentary elections in the aftermath of the EU vote, and if Marine Le Pen's National Rally repeats its success and wins a majority in those elections, it could have a more direct impact on aid."If the gamble is lost by Macron and Le Pen and her group win and they get the national assembly, then assistance from France could be a bit turbulent," Jim Townsend, a former Defense Department official told Politico. "On the Ukraine stage or on the defense stage, they will not be supportive of a lot of the stuff that Macron wants to do." Despite these setbacks, the U.S. is working to strengthen its partnership with Ukraine. At the G7 summit this week, Presidents Joe Biden and Volodymyr Zelensky announced a bilateral security pact. "The deal — whose final details were expected to be announced later Thursday — will outline a long-term effort to train and equip Ukraine's forces, promising to provide more modern weapons and help the Ukrainians build their own self-sustaining military industry that is capable of producing its own arms," according to the New York Times, citing unnamed U.S. officials. Though national security adviser Jake Sullivan said that the agreement means that "our support will last long into the future," the Times report notes that it is ultimately only a deal between two presidents that could be in jeopardy if Donald Trump is elected in November. "While Mr. Zelensky is expected to embrace the agreement at a news conference with President Biden on Thursday, the Ukrainians are skeptical of these accords," according to the Times. "Without congressional funding, the support is largely rhetorical."At the summit, the Group of 7 also agreed to a $50 billion loan for Kyiv that will help Ukraine buy more arms and start to rebuild its infrastructure. The loan, which will be underwritten by the U.S, is expected to eventually be repaid through seized Russian assets. In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:— A new poll showed that nearly half of Ukrainians believe that the war is at a stalemate, but a majority of respondents still believe that Kyiv will eventually be able to reclaim all of its territory.Forty-three percent of respondents said that Ukraine should negotiate with Russia to achieve peace. A large majority of Ukrainians, however, also indicated that they did not trust Russian motives, with approximately 80% saying that they believed Moscow would attack again if a peace deal were to be signed."The survey also found striking new divisions among age groups, with older Ukrainians more optimistic about Ukraine's chances of prevailing militarily and less willing to seek a compromise with Russia," according to The Washington Post. — Late last month, the Biden administration quietly gave Ukraine permission to conduct limited strikes in Russian territory using U.S. weapons. Now, members of Congress are pushing the administration to give Kyiv even broader discretion. In a letter sent to Biden, Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas) called on the president to allow Ukraine to use American long-range ATACMs to strike Russian targets supporting the ongoing offensive as well as airfields."Under your current restrictions, however, Ukrainian forces are only able to strike near Kharkiv in Russia," the letter reads. "This policy restriction defies congressional intent and must be revised immediately to best allow Ukraine to defend its territory and win this war."Politico reported on Thursday that Democrats were also pushing Biden to allow Ukraine to strike deeper in Russian territory. "It has to be a constant effort to look and really to have a good sense of where the red line is," said Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.). "We crossed a dramatic sort of threshold when we said 'OK, you can use these weapons systems even if they are directed to activities in Russia.' And so far, the Russians have kind of accepted it. It would not surprise me if, over the course of the next several weeks, range increases are allowed." — In another policy shift by the Biden administration, the State Department announced this week that it was lifting the ban on the use of American weapons by the notorious Azov Brigade in Ukraine."Naturally, this latest move by the State Department has been celebrated by Azov and met with rebuke in Moscow," Artin DerSimonian wrote in RS this week. "However, this development also signals that the situation on Ukrainian front lines has become so acute that even a ban on an armed unit with ties to human rights violations and neo-Nazism is now being revoked."U.S. State Department news: In a Thursday press briefing, State Department spokesman Matt Miller was asked about detained Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich's upcoming trial."There is absolutely zero credibility to those charges. We have been clear form the start that Evan has done nothing wrong. He should never have been arrested in the first place; journalism is not a crime," Miller said. "The charges against him are false, and the Russian Government knows that they are false. He should be released immediately. And I can tell you that on behalf of the United States Government, we will continue to try to work – or we will continue to work to bring home Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan every day."

Back in 2019, when the current European Commission assumed its term, its president, German conservative Ursula von der Leyen, proclaimed the ambition to build a "geopolitical Commission," or to bolster the EU's ability to act collectively in shaping the international order on a par with such players as the United States and China.The crisis in Gaza, sparked by the horrific atrocities perpetrated by the terrorist organization Hamas, and concerns about the extent to which the Israeli response would conform to international law, has shattered that ambition, giving way to cacophony and an image of deep divisions within the EU.That, perhaps, was inevitable given how divisive the Israel-Palestine issue is in the EU — unlike the Russian war in Ukraine that elicited a remarkably unified response from the bloc. The divisions run through the EU's 27 member states reflecting their different historical experiences and public opinion sensitivities, with Ireland and Spain seen as traditionally most sympathetic towards the Palestinian cause, while Germany, Austria and eastern European states, like Hungary and the Czech Republic, leaning towards Israel.There are also divisions between the EU institutions themselves, such as Von der Leyen's Commission, the European Council chaired by the former Belgian prime minister Charles Michel and the European External Action Service, the EU's fledgling diplomatic service led by the veteran Spanish politician Josep Borrell. To make matters even more complicated, the Gaza crisis revealed divisions within the Commission itself. And the political color of EU member state governments matters too. For example, Sweden, ruled for a better part of the last century by social-democrats, was traditionally seen as supportive of the Palestinian cause, but flipped to a more "pro-Israeli" side under the current right-wing government (which enjoys parliamentary support from a party with neo-Nazi roots).These structural weaknesses were compounded by some ill-judged moves from influential EU quarters. Fresh from the shock of Hamas's attack, Hungarian Oliver Varhelyi the EU commissioner responsible for close regional relations — which includes Israel and Palestinian autonomy — announced a freeze in EU development funding for Palestine worth 300 million euros annually. Varhelyi, an ally of the country's prime minister Victor Orban, who in turn, enjoys close relations with his Israeli counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu, apparently acted without a consent of other EU bodies, or even the Commission itself. However, he may have been forgiven for acting on an assumption that his boss, Commission President Von der Leyen, would back such a move. In her immediate reaction to the terrorist attack on Israel, she declared her unqualified support for Israel's right to self-defense "today and in the days to come." Many in the EU interpreted the absence of any reference to international law as going beyond the indispensable expression of sympathy to Israel, essentially amounting to giving a blank check for any sort of retaliation.Von der Leyen promptly visited Israel in a show of support. A number of EU member states — Ireland, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovenia, and Denmark — resented what they saw as Von der Leyen's usurpation of the EU foreign policy prerogatives which are reserved for the Council. In a highly unusual move, the EU foreign policy chief Borrell rebuked her as not speaking on behalf of the EU. Varhelyi's attempt to freeze aid to Palestinians was shut down, with the EU instead committing to a review to ensure that the aid does not inadvertently fund terrorism.In a move resembling the activation of the "dissent channel" in the U.S. State Department, 842 EU civil servants issued an open letter in which they strongly criticized Von der Leyen's perceived pro-Israeli tilt. The officials, having condemned in the strongest terms the Hamas terrorism, stated that they "hardly recognize the values of the EU in the seeming indifference demonstrated over the past few days by our Institution (Commission) toward the ongoing massacre of civilians in the Gaza strip."They also deplored what they called "the patent show of double standards which considers the blockade of water and fuel operated by Russia on the Ukrainian people as an act of terror whilst the identical act by Israel against the Gazan people is completely ignored."Nathalie Tocci, director of the Italian Institute for Foreign Affairs and one of Europe's foremost foreign policy thinkers, took Von der Leyen to task for failing to see how the failure to mention the imperative that Israel respects international humanitarian law "seriously undermines European credibility, starting with our support for Ukraine."With this backdrop, Borrell moved towards proposing a humanitarian pause to facilitate aid to Palestinians trapped in Gaza. However, even that proposal does not enjoy the unanimous support among EU member states — while some heavyweights like France favor it, others, like Germany, reportedly do not.It certainly doesn't help that even those EU leaders who try to perform a balancing act between support for Israel's right to defend itself and Palestinian aspirations to statehood, like the French president Emmanuel Macron, carelessly throw out ideas that could only lead to a broader regional conflagration they profess to want to avoid. During the visit to Israel on October 24, Macron suggested that the international coalition against ISIS could rally against Hamas too.The inconvenient truth is that Iran and its partners — the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria — were also a de-facto part of that coalition. It is a well-known fact that in Iraq, the U.S. and pro-Iranian forces coordinated their actions against ISIS. If, however, the anti-ISIS template is applied in the war against Hamas, it would have Iran and its formidable network of regional allies and proxies on the other side of the equation. That would make Western assets in the region vulnerable to their attacks.Indeed, since the start of the Gaza war there has already been an uptick in attacks against U.S. bases in Syria and Iraq. The Russian factor should also be taken into account given the current enmity between the U.S. and EU on the one hand, and Russia on the other, and Russia's increasing reliance on Iran in Ukraine, a broader war in the Middle East could also draw in Russia against the U.S. and EU.The lack of a unified, coherent, and realistic response by the EU to the war in Gaza has clearly exposed a glaring gap between its leaders' geopolitical rhetoric and their capabilities to shape outcomes on the ground.

ABSTRAK Tesis ini membahas tentang Peran Kantor Wilayah Kementerian Hukum Dan Hak Asasi Manusia Kalimantan Barat Dalam Pelaksanaan Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (Ranham) Tahun 2015 – 2019 Berdasarkan Peraturan Presiden Nomor 75 Tahun 2015 Tentang Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia. Metode yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah metode penelitian hukum normatif dan sosiologis. Kesimpulan dari tesis ini adalah: Berdasarkan uraian dalam pembahasan dan analisis hasil penelitian, maka dikemukan kesimpulan sebagai berikut : 1.Peran Kantor Wilayah Kementerian Hukum dan Hak Asasi manusia Kalimantan Barat dalam pelaksanaan Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (RANHAM) tahun 2015 – 2019 berdasarkan Peraturan Presiden No. 75 Tahun 2015 Tentang Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, Menkumham menginstruksikan kepada seluruh Kakanwil Kementerian Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia untuk melaksanakan dan menerapkan Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (RANHAM) di wilayah kerjanya masing-masing.Menkumham menilai, Kantor Wilayah (Kanwil) memiliki peran yang sangat penting di dalam mengimplementasikan RANHAM di daerah. Menkumham menambahkan, Kakanwil diharapkan dapat membantu Pemerintah Daerah, Sekretaris Daerah, dan Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Daerah (Bappeda) beserta jajaran untuk dapat menjelaskan bagaimana pentingnya melaksanakan RANHAM. "Saudara perlu mengingatkan institusi di daerah untuk bersinergi dan berkoordinasi dalam mengimplementasikan dan mensukseskan RANHAM. Sebagaimana yang tertuang dalam pasal 6 Perpres Nomor 75 Tahun 2015 ini menyebutkan bahwa dalam melaksanakan RANHAM, kementerian, lembaga, dan pemerintah daerah wajib menyusun Aksi HAM yang ditetapkan setiap 1 (satu) tahun.Dalam menyusun Aksi HAM tersebut, kementerian, lembaga, dan pemerintah daerah wajib melakukan koordinasi dengan Sekretariat Bersama RANHAM. 2. Permasalahan Yang Dihadapi Kantor Wilayah Kementerian Hukum Dan Hak Asasi Manusia Kalimantan Barat Dalam Pelaksanaan Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (RANHAM) Tahun 2015 – 2019 Berdasarkan Peraturan Presiden No. 75 Tahun 2015 Tentang Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia. Permasalahan tersebut dihadapi Kantor Wilayah Kementerian Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Kalimantan Barat utama yang dihadapi penyandang disabilitas adalah keterbatasan akses terhadap pelayanan pendidikan, pekerjaan, kesehatan, transportasi, dan partisipasi politik atau keadilan. Mereka sering menghadapi hambatan untuk berpartisipasi dalam setiap aspek kehidupan bermasyarakat. Hambatan dapat terjadi dalam berbagai bentuk, termasuk dalam kaitan dengan lingkungan fisik, teknologi informasi dan komunikasi, legislasi dan kebijakan yang belum sepenuhnya berpihak, sikap masyarakat dan diskriminasi. 3. Upaya yang dilakukan Kantor Wilayah Kementerian Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Kalimantan Barat dalam Pelaksanaan Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi manusia (RANHAM) tahun 2015 -2019 berdasarkan Peraturan Presiden No. 75 Tahun 2015 Tentang Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia. Upaya yang ditempuh oleh penyelenggara Negara untuk memenuhi kewajiban dan tanggung jawabnya. Negara terutama Pemerintah diharuskan dapat mengambil tindakan yang memadai, dengan seluruh sumber daya yang ada padanya, memenuhi dan melindungi Hak Asasi Manusia warga negaranya tanpa terkecuali. Negara harus mencegah pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia, termasuk memastikan individu dan organisasi untuk menghormati hak-hak orang lain, serta memberikan sanksi terhadap pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia.Kata Kunci : Peran, Kantor Wilayah Kementerian Hukum Dan Hak Asasi Manusia, Pelaksanaan dan RANHAM. ABSTRACT This thesis discusses the role of the Regional Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights of West Kalimantan in the Implementation of the National Action Plan on Human Rights (Ranham) of 2015 – 2019 based on Presidential Regulation No. 75 of 2015 concerning the National Action Plan for Human Rights. The method used in this research is a normative and sociological legal research method. The conclusions of this thesis are: Based on the description in the discussion and analysis of the research results, the following conclusions are drawn: 1.The role of the Regional Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights of West Kalimantan in the implementation of the National Action Plan on Human Rights (RANHAM) 2015 – 2019 Presidential Regulation No. 75 of 2015 concerning the National Action Plan for Human Rights, the Minister of Law and Human Rights instructs all Heads of Regional Offices of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights to implement and implement the National Action Plan on Human Rights (RANHAM) in their respective working areas. Menkumham assessed that Regional Offices (Kanwil) have a very important role in implementing the RANHAM in the regions.Menkumham added, Kakanwil is expected to assist the Regional Government, Regional Secretaries, and the Regional Planning and Development Agency (Bappeda) and their ranks to be able to explain how important it is to implement RANHAM. "You need to remind institutions in the regions to synergize and coordinate in implementing and succeeding RANHAM. As stated in article 6 of the Presidential Regulation Number 75 of 2015 it is stated that in implementing the RANHAM, ministries, institutions, and local governments are required to draw up human rights actions that are set every 1 (one) year. In preparing the Human Rights Action, ministries, institutions, and local governments are obliged to coordinate with the Joint Secretariat of RANHAM. 2. Problems Faced by the Regional Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights of West Kalimantan in the Implementation of the 2015 – 2019 National Action Plan for Human Rights (RANHAM) Based on Presidential Regulation No. 75 of 2015 concerning the National Action Plan for Human Rights. The problems faced by the Regional Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights in West Kalimantan are the main problems faced by persons with disabilities are limited access to education, employment, health, transportation, and political participation or justice services.They often face barriers to participating in every aspect of social life. Barriers can occur in various forms, including in relation to the physical environment, information and communication technology, legislation and policies that do not fully take sides, public attitudes and discrimination. 3. The efforts made by the Regional Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights of West Kalimantan in the Implementation of the 2015-2019 National Action Plan for Human Rights (RANHAM) based on Presidential Regulation no. 75 of 2015 concerning the National Action Plan for Human Rights. Efforts taken by state administrators to fulfill their obligations and responsibilities. The state, especially the government, is required to take adequate action, with all available resources, to fulfill and protect the human rights of its citizens without exception. The state must prevent human rights violations, including ensuring individuals and organizations respect the rights of others, as well as providing sanctions for human rights violations.Keywords: Role, Regional Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, Implementation and RANHAM.