This article analyzes the role of Eulalia Bernard Little (1935-2021) as a pioneer in representing Afro-Costa Rican women in public and international decision-making and management arenas. Through the use of visual and documentary archives and by employing an interdisciplinary methodology that combines discourse analysis and ethnography, her pioneering status in the black political field, both inside and outside Costa Rica, is examined. First, her consolidation as a Diaspora activist during the 1970's is explored, from the relationship between her own experiences in Afro-Caribbean circulation and her participation in scenarios of political and cultural analysis and discussion. Subsequently, it considers her incursion in the national party structures and the scope of social transformation of her discourse. Finally, her influence in the participation of other Afro-Costa Rican women in the political and political-cultural sphere is identified. The understanding of this other dimension of Ms. Bernard Little rounds out the works on her literary production, while at the same time broadens the studies and historiography of the Afro-Costa Rican community. ; El artículo analiza la figura de Eulalia Bernard Little (1935-2021) como precursora de la representación de las mujeres afrocostarricenses en los espacios de decisión y gestión pública e internacional. A partir de archivos visuales y escritos y mediante el empleo de una metodología interdisciplinaria, que combina el análisis del discurso y la etnografía, se examina su condición de pionera en el campo político negro, dentro y fuera de Costa Rica. En primer lugar, se explora su consolidación como activista de la diáspora durante la década de los 70, desde la relación entre sus mismas experiencias de circulación afro-circuncaribeñas y su participación en escenarios de reflexión y discusión política y cultural. Seguidamente, se considera su incursión en los cuadros partidistas nacionales y el alcance de transformación social de su discurso. Finalmente, se identifica su influencia en la participación de otras mujeres afrocostarricenses situadas en la esfera política y político-cultural. La lectura de esta otra faceta de Bernard Little complementa los trabajos sobre su producción literaria, a la vez que amplía los estudios e historiografía de la comunidad afrocostarricense. ; Este artigo analisa o papel de Eulalia Bernard Little (1935-2021) como uma pioneira na representação das mulheres afro-costa-riquenhas nas instâncias públicas e internacionais de tomada de decisão e gestão. Através do uso de arquivos visuais e documentais e empregando uma metodologia interdisciplinar que combina análise do discurso e etnografia, seu status de pioneira no campo político negro, tanto dentro como fora da Costa Rica, é examinada. Primeiro, sua consolidação como ativista da diáspora durante os anos 70 é explorada, a partir da relação entre suas próprias experiências na circulação afro-caribenha e sua participação em cenários de análise e discussão política e cultural. Em seguida, considera sua incursão nas estruturas partidárias nacionais e o alcance da transformação social de seu discurso. Finalmente, é identificada sua influência na participação de outras mulheres afro-costa-riquenhas na esfera política e político-cultural. A compreensão desta outra dimensão de Bernard Little completa as obras sobre sua produção literária, ao mesmo tempo em que amplia os estudos e a historiografia da comunidade afro-costa-riquenha.
The Panama Canal is the most important maritime company in the Panamanian isthmus, this magnificent work of engineering was completed in 1912 and its formal inauguration was made in 1914. With an extension of approximately 80 kilometers, this road connects the Atlantic and Pacific oceans in one of the narrowest points of the American continent. The purpose of this research is to describe how its operation has evolved over time. A search for documentary information is carried out, in digital media such as Google Scholar, without time restrictions. The findings support that the Canal throughout its history has played different roles, including military strategic point, dynamize of international trade and maritime shortcut to save distance, time / costs in world maritime transport. It is currently an important link in the logistics system of distribution and container transshipment. The connectivity offered by the route through the Canal gives the shipping company the opportunity to achieve a better use of its fleet and provide a greater range of services to its customers through its connectivity between ports. ; El Canal de Panamá es la empresa marítima más importante del istmo panameño, esta magna obra de ingeniería se terminó de edificar en 1912, y su inauguración formal se hizo en 1914. Con una extensión de aproximadamente 80 kilómetros, esta vía comunica los océanos Atlántico y Pacífico en uno de los puntos más angostos del continente americano. Esta investigación tiene como propósito describir cómo ha evolucionado su funcionamiento a través del tiempo. Se realiza una búsqueda de información documental, en medios digitales como Google Académico, sin restricciones de tiempo. Los hallazgos sustentan que el Canal a lo largo de su historia ha desempeñado diferentes roles, entre estos: punto estratégico militar, dinamizador del comercio internacional y atajo marítimo para ahorrar distancia, tiempo/ costos en el transporte marítimo mundial. Actualmente, es un eslabón dentro del sistema logístico de distribución y trasbordo de contenedores. La conectividad que ofrece la ruta a través del Canal le brinda al naviero la oportunidad de alcanzar una mejor utilización de su flota y le proporciona una mayor oferta de servicios a sus clientes a través de su conectividad entre puertos. ; O canal de Panama e a empresa marítima mais importante do istmo panamenho, esta magna obra de engenheira se termino de edificar em 1912, e sua inauguração formal se fez em 1914. Com uma extensão de aproximadamente 80 quilômetros, esta via comunica os oceanos Atlântico e Pacifico em um dos pontos mais estreitos do continente americano. Esta investigação tem como proposito descrever como tem evolucionado seu funcionamento através do tempo. Se realiza uma busque-a da informação documental, nos médios digitais és como Google acadêmico, sem restrições de tempo. as descobertas sustentam que o canal ao largo da história tem desempenhado diferentes roles, entre estes: ponto estratégico militar, dinamizador do comercio internacional e atalho marítimo para minimizar distancia, tempo/custos no transporte marítimo mundial. Atualmente, es um elo dentro do sistema logístico de distribuição y transbordo de contêineres. A conectividade que oferece a rota através do canal, brinda ao navegante a oportunidade de alcançar uma melhor utilização da sua frota e proporciona-o uma maior oferta de serviços através das suas conectividades entre portos.
The Haiti Productive Land Use Systems (PLUS) Research Project continued and expanded the work of the Haiti Agroforestry project. It was intended to encourage Haitian farmers to plant trees as part of an overall plan by USAID to curb the devastating erosion which was washing the top soil into the sea. This project also investigated the effects on other crops as a result of tree planting. ; 1. This inventory of crop varieties is a compilation of information on crop genetic resources available to the PLUS Project. The varieties listed are varieties existing in Haiti or in other countries (in particular, the Dominican Republic) with similar agroclimatic conditions and which could be of potential value in Haiti. Staple food, vegetable and fruit crops are included. 2. Approximately eighty-five varieties are described with information on agroclimatic adaptation, yields, disease and insect reactions, management considerations and seed sources. Information was obtained, by interview and reference to published reports, from various agencies in Haiti including the Department of Agriculture and associated organizations, NGOs, PVOs, developmental agencies, agriculture projects and private enterprises. A visit was made to the Dominican Republic to obtain information and to bring back seed of promising varieties. Information was also sought from other national programs as well as regional and international research programs which conduct crop research under agroclimatic conditions similar to those in Haiti. 3. Recommendations are made of varieties for major agroclimatic zones as defined by rainfall and elevation. 4. Recommendations are made with regard to variety preservation and seed multiplication. An artisanal seed production and distribution system is recommended involving farmers' organizations, government agencies, NGOs, private enterprises and universities. ; 1. Envantè sa-a sou varyete ki plante se yon travay rasanble enfòmasyon pou konnen ki resous jenetik Pwojè PLUS kapab jwenn. Varyete ki sou lis yo se varyete ki egziste an Ayiti oubyen nan lòt peyi (espesialman Sen Domeng) ki genyen menm kondysyon klima ak sòl ak Ayiti ki ta ka gen valè an Ayiti. Tout kalite kilti te konsidere nan rapò-a: kilti vivryè (mayi, diri, pitimi, pwa) legim ak fwi. 2. Apeprè katrevensenk (85) varyete dekri nan rapò-a. Enfòmasyon bay sou ki kote (kondisyon agroklimatik) chak varyete adapte, randman li bay, ki maladi ak ensèk ki atake-l, kòman pou ta sèvi ak varyete-a ak kote pou jwenn semans yo. Enfòmasyon sa yo te rasanble nan pale ak moun ki konnen ak nan rapò ki te pibliye pa pliziè òganizasyon an Ayiti, nou vle pale de Ministè agrikilti ak lòt òganizasyon ki gen rapò ak li, òganizasyon ki pa gouvènman-an, òganizasyon prive, ajans developman, pwojè agrikòl ak biznis prive. Yon vizit te fèt nan Republik Dominikèn pou chèche enfòmasyon ak pou vini an Ayiti ak semens varyete ki enteresan. Kontak te pran tou ak lòt pwogram nasyonal, rejional ak entènasyonal ki fè rechèch nan menm kondisyon agroklimatik ak Ayiti. 3. Rekòmandasyon fèt sou varyete ki ta dwe plante nan chak zòn agroklimatik enpòtan yo (diferans fèt ant zòn yo dapre kantite lapli ki tonbe ak nan ki wotè yo ye). 4. Konsiltan-an fè rekòmandasyon sou fason pou konsève varyete yo ak kòman pou miltiplye semans yo. Li pwopoze yon sistèm atizanal pou pwodwi ak distribye semans. Sistèm sa-a genyen ladan-l òganizasyon perizan, ajans gouvènman-an, òganizasyon ki pa gouvènman-an, antrepriz prive ak inivèsite.
The growth of mechanisms for the protection of the cohabitation of same-sex partners in national legislations has been accompanied by a change in the doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights, which has recognized that stable cohabitation is included in the concept of family life, and that marriage between persons of the same sex participates in the right stated in Article 12 of the Convention. In the model of marriage found in the civil codes and international texts in the mid-20th century, people's individual interest in forming a family community merged with the public interest in safeguarding the generational shift and in providing a framework for the socialisation and education of children. After the European Union Charter of Human Rights and the sentence of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Schalk and Kopf v. Austria we find the absolute pre-eminence of the individual interest of the spouses or the members of a stable union. These cohabitation models protect their dignity and individual freedom and also defend the free development of their personality. The presence of public interest in the regulation and protection of both cohabitation formulae is completely obscured. For this reason, it is striking that protection and access to these institutions are excluded for other cohabitation models in which the same individual interests are present, together with the same values and principles. This support for committed heterosexual and homosexual relationships, found in other sentences of the European Court of Human Rights which are used to justify exclusion brings up the idea of the legitimate interest of the State and makes one wonder what this interest is and why it is demanded for some types of cohabitation and not for others. This issue must be properly resolved so as not to infringe the principle of non-discrimination. ; El incremento de los mecanismos de protección de la convivencia entre personas del mismo sexo por parte de las legislaciones nacionales se ha visto acompañado de un cambio en la doctrina del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, que ha reconocido que dicha convivencia estable está incluida en el concepto de vida familiar y que el matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo tiene encaje dentro del derecho recogido en el artículo 12 del Convenio. En el modelo de matrimonio presente en los códigos civiles y en los textos internacionales de mediados del siglo pasado confluía el interés individual de las personas en constituir una comunidad de vida familiar, con el interés público en velar por el relevo generacional y por disponer de un marco de socialización y educación de los hijos. Tras la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea y tras la Sentencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos en el asunto Schalk and Kopf v. Austria se constata el predominio absoluto del interés individual de los cónyuges o de los integrantes de la unión estable, sirviendo dichos modelos de convivencia para la tutela de su dignidad y de su libertad individual, así como para el libre desarrollo de su personalidad. La presencia de un interés público en la regulación y protección de ambas fórmulas de convivencia queda totalmente oscurecida. Por esta razón, resulta llamativo que se excluya de dicha protección y del acceso a dichas instituciones a otros modelos de convivencia en los que están presentes los mismos intereses individuales, así como los mismos valores y principios. La apuesta por las relaciones comprometidas heterosexuales y homosexuales, presente en otras sentencias del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y sobre la cual se justifica la citada exclusión, hace aflorar de nuevo en sede familiar la idea de interés legítimo del Estado y permite plantearse cuál es ese interés y por qué viene a ser exigido a unos tipos de convivencia y no a otros. Cuestión ésta que ha de ser correctamente resuelta, para evitar vulnerar el principio de no discriminación.
El incremento de los mecanismos de protección de la convivencia entre personas del mismo sexo por parte de las legislaciones nacionales se ha visto acompañado de un cambio en la doctrina del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, que ha reconocido que dicha convivencia estable está incluida en el concepto de vida familiar y que el matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo tiene encaje dentro del derecho recogido en el artículo 12 del Convenio. En el modelo de matrimonio presente en los códigos civiles y en los textos internacionales de mediados del siglo pasado confluía el interés individual de las personas en constituir una comunidad de vida familiar, con el interés público en velar por el relevo generacional y por disponer de un marco de socialización y educación de los hijos. Tras la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea y tras la Sentencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos en el asunto Schalk and Kopf v. Austria se constata el predominio absoluto del interés individual de los cónyuges o de los integrantes de la unión estable, sirviendo dichos modelos de convivencia para la tutela de su dignidad y de su libertad individual, así como para el libre desarrollo de su personalidad. La presencia de un interés público en la regulación y protección de ambas fórmulas de convivencia queda totalmente oscurecida. Por esta razón, resulta llamativo que se excluya de dicha protección y del acceso a dichas instituciones a otros modelos de convivencia en los que están presentes los mismos intereses individuales, así como los mismos valores y principios. La apuesta por las relaciones comprometidas heterosexuales y homosexuales, presente en otras sentencias del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y sobre la cual se justifica la citada exclusión, hace aflorar de nuevo en sede familiar la idea de interés legítimo del Estado y permite plantearse cuál es ese interés y por qué viene a ser exigido a unos tipos de convivencia y no a otros. Cuestión ésta que ha de ser correctamente resuelta, para evitar vulnerar el principio de no discriminación. ; The growth of mechanisms for the protection of the cohabitation of same-sex partners in national legislations has been accompanied by a change in the doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights, which has recognized that stable cohabitation is included in the concept of family life, and that marriage between persons of the same sex participates in the right stated in Article 12 of the Convention. In the model of marriage found in the civil codes and international texts in the mid-20th century, people's individual interest in forming a family community merged with the public interest in safeguarding the generational shift and in providing a framework for the socialisation and education of children. After the European Union Charter of Human Rights and the sentence of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Schalk and Kopf v. Austria we find the absolute pre-eminence of the individual interest of the spouses or the members of a stable union. These cohabitation models protect their dignity and individual freedom and also defend the free development of their personality. The presence of public interest in the regulation and protection of both cohabitation formulae is completely obscured. For this reason, it is striking that protection and access to these institutions are excluded for other cohabitation models in which the same individual interests are present, together with the same values and principles. This support for committed heterosexual and homosexual relationships, found in other sentences of the European Court of Human Rights which are used to justify exclusion brings up the idea of the legitimate interest of the State and makes one wonder what this interest is and why it is demanded for some types of cohabitation and not for others. This issue must be properly resolved so as not to infringe the principle of non-discrimination.
ÖZETCUMHURİYET DÖNEMİ MODERNLEŞME ALGISI: DEMİRYOLU ÖRNEĞİAyten, DeryaMaster, Uluslararası İlişkiler BölümüTez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Ahmet DemirelOcak 2014Modernleşmenin, 19. yüzyılda Batı dünyasında demiryolları ile eşzamanlı olarak geliştiği söylenebilir. Demiryolu gelişimi ve modernleşme sürecinin Avrupa kıtası dışında da birlikte gerçekleşmesiyle, bu teknoloji Batılı olmayan dünyada da kıtadakine benzer etkiler doğurmuştur. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu da, demiryolu yapımının modernleşme yolunda önemli olduğuna inanan ülkeler arasında yer almaktadır. Demiryollarında kodlanmış bu modernleşme arayışı Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne miras kalmıştır. Demiryolu teknolojisinin Türk devletinin modernleşme algısı üzerinde önemli etkisi olmuştur. Bu etki yeni kurulan cumhuriyetin başlattığı yeni ulaştırma politikaları ve Anadolu'da hızlandırılan demiryolu ağı inşaatlarının olduğu dönemden başlayıp, devletin ulaştırma politikasının demiryolu yerine karayolu olarak değiştiği 1940'lı yıllara kadar sürmüştür. Sosyal, siyasal ve ekonomik alanlarda önemli etkileri olan modernleşme ideali, Atatürkçülüğün/Kemalizmin devrim yasaları çerçevesinde, muasır medeniyet seviyesine ulaşma olarak tanımlanmıştır. Bu idealin bir parçası olarak cumhuriyetin ilk dönemi olan 1923 ve 1940 yılları arasında, devlet "Şimendifer Siyaseti" olarak bilinen demiryolu politikasını benimsemiştir. Bu politika ile devlet yeni demiryolları yapımına başlamanın yanı sıra, Osmanlı'dan miras kalan ve yabancı demiryolu şirketlerinin elinde bulunan mevcut demiryollarını da millileştirmiştir. Devrim kanunları ile devletin demiryolu politikası arasındaki ilişkiyi analiz eden bu tezde, demiryolu gelişiminin devletin modernleşme algısının oluşumuna olan etkisi incelemektedir. Bu çerçevede, tezin esas konusunu, devletin takip ettiği demiryolu politikasına bağlı olarak ortaya çıkan sosyal, ekonomik, kültürel ve/veya siyasal değişiklikler oluşturmamaktadır. Tezde, cumhuriyet döneminde devletin modernleşme paradigması içerisinde demiryolu politikasının önemine odaklanılmıştır. Tezin amacı, izlenen demiryolu politikasının, devletin muasır medeniyet seviyesine ulaşma söylemine olan katkısını incelemektir. Anahtar Kelimeler: Modernleşme, Demiryolu, Osmanlı Modernleşmesi, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Demiryolu Gelişimi, Türkiye'nin Modernleşme Politikaları, Cumhuriyet Döneminde Demiryolu Gelişimi ABSTRACTPERCEPTION OF MODERNIZATION DURING THE REPUBLICAN ERA: RAILWAY CASEAyten, DeryaM.A., Department of International RelationsSupervisor: Prof. Dr. Ahmet DemirelJanuary 2014Modernity might be said to have developed concurrently with the railways in the nineteenth century within the Western context. The impact of this technology to the non-Western world produced a similar realization as railway development and modernization process went hand in hand in those areas that fall outside the borders of the continent. The Ottoman Empire was among those in which the construction of railroads conformed to the pursuit of modernization. Encoded in railways, quest for modernization was bequeathed to the Turkish Republic. Railway technology had a considerable impact on the development of Turkish state's perception of modernization, from when the newly founded republic had initiated a new transportation policy and accelerated the building of railway network throughout Anatolia, to the 1940s until when the early republican period came to an end together with the change in the state's preference from railroad to highway. Within the context of the revolutionary laws under the aegis of Atatürkism/Kemalism, the idea of modernization as crystallized reaching to contemporary civilization came to the fore as one of the most important ideals which had social, political and economic dimensions. As part of this ideal, between the years 1923 and 1940, representing the early republican period, the state adopted a railway policy known as Şimendifer Siyaseti through which not only new railway lines were started to be constructed, but also already-existing ones inherited from the Ottoman Empire were nationalized as these lines had been under the ownership of the foreign railroad companies. Analyzing the relationship of this railway policy with the revolutionary laws, this thesis addresses the impact of railroad development on the formation of the state's perception of modernization. Within this framework, the aim of this thesis is not to explore the socio-economic and politico-cultural changes the state went through due to the outcomes of this railway policy, but to focus on the position of this policy in the modernization paradigm of the Turkish state and to explore the contribution of the railroad development to the state's discourse of reaching to contemporary civilization. Keywords: Modernization, Railway, Ottoman Modernization, Railway Development in the Ottoman Empire, Turkish Modernization Policies, Development of Railways during the Republican Period
Maģistra darbā "Sabiedrības līdzdalības tiesības būvniecības procesā" pētīta sabiedrības loma publiskās varas lēmumu ietekmēšanā. Tiek sniegts vispārējs ieskats ar būvniecības procesu saistītajos tiesību pārkāpumos un praktiskajās problēmās. Darba aktualitāti uzsver šībrīža situācija Latvijā, kad, plaši attīstoties būvniecībai, sabiedrības paustajam viedoklim ir nozīme, lai varētu sekmīgi virzīt būvprojektu, saskaņojot to starp zemes īpašnieku un sabiedrības interesēm un ievērojot vides un kultūras mantojuma aizsardzības intereses. Valsts pienākums ir nodrošināt sabiedrībai labvēlīgu vidi, tādēļ ir svarīga cilvēktiesību ievērošana valsts institūcijās. Darbā analizēti tiesiskie un praktiskie aspekti, kas saistīti ar pašvaldības lēmumiem, kuri pieņemami būvniecības procesa sākuma stadijā. Īpaša uzmanība pievērsta pašvaldības atzinumam par paredzētās būves publiskas apspriešanas rīkošanu un tās nepieciešamību. Šajā aspektā analizēti problēmjautājumi, kas saistīti ar nesavlaicīgu un neizsmeļošu informācijas sniegšanu iedzīvotājiem par paredzēto būvniecību, kā arī par formālu publiskās apspriešanas norisi, kuras formālie rezultāti var novest pie pretlikumīgas būvniecības. Darbā aplūkotas sabiedrības iespējas piedalīties paredzētās būvniecības ieceres izvērtēšanā un paust savu viedokli lēmumu pieņemšanas procesā. Darbā ir salīdzinātas publiskās apspriešanas teorētiskās nostādnes un praktiskā rīcība, tajā skaitā pašvaldību aktivitāte, popularizējot un veicinot sabiedrības līdzdalību. Ļoti svarīgas ir būvniecības procesā pieņemto lēmumu apstrīdēšanas un pārsūdzēšanas likumīgās iespējas, un tas, kā tās tiek piemērotas praksē. Būvniecības procesa sākumā lielākā atbildība jāuzņemas pašvaldībām, jo tieši pašvaldību rīcības brīvība, kas piemērojama saprātīguma un labas ticības principa robežās, ietekmē gan būvniecības turpmāko procesu, gan tā ietekmi uz vidi un sabiedrību. Pētot sabiedrības līdzdalības tiesības būvniecības procesā, izmantoti starptautiskie un nacionālie tiesību avoti, Administratīvo tiesu un Satversmes tiesas nolēmumi, kā arī vairāku autoru darbi. Pētījuma rezultātā darba noslēgumā sniegti priekšlikumi un ierosinājumi, kā papildināt Latvijas normatīvos aktus un uzlabot būvniecības nozares procesus, lai tiktu ievērotas sabiedrības tiesības un likumiskās intereses. ; In the Master's Paper "Rights to Public participation in building process" the role of society in influencing the decision-making is examined. General overwiev is made on practical problems and violations in rights connected with building process. The topicality of the Paper is emphasized by nowadays situation in Latvia when, during a wide developmental process of building, public opinion has a significant role in successful advancing of construction design, coordinating it to the interests of landowner and public interests, as well as considering the interests of environmental and cultural inheritage protection. It is state's responsibility to ensure beneficial conditions for the society; therefore the observance of human rights in govermental institutions and municipalities is essential. In the Paper the legal and practical aspects are being analysed, connected to the decisions of local municipalities that are to be made in the beginning of a building process. Special attention has been turned to the municipal resolution on the need and management of public participation in a building process. From that point of view, problems have been analysed, connected with late and non-exhaustive information to the society on the planned building, as well as on the formal process of public participation which may lead to illegal building. In the Paper the possibilities of public participation are studied how the society can participate in evaluating the planned building and influence the decision making. The theoretical approach of public participation is compared to practical actions, including activities of municipalities in popularization and development of public participation. Legal possibilities of judicial review are essential, as well as their practical adjustments. At the beginning of the building process the main responsibility lays upon municipalities, as the freedom of activity, being used according to the principles of judiciousness and good belief, influences both the further process of building and its impact on the environment and society. In the research of rights to public participation in building process, there have been used international and national legal sources, decisions by Administrative Courts and Constitutional court, as well as works of several authors. As the result of the study in the conclusion of the Paper suggestions and proposals are presented to improve the legislation of Latvia and processes in building to follow the public rights and legal interests.
Ensuring the information security ofUkraineis the most important function of the State, the cause of all Ukrainian people. However, the problem of the development of the theoretical foundations of the information security of Ukraine remains unsolved for today, and the main obstacle concerning the matter is underdevelopment, imperfection and inconsistency of the terminology base, which results in disorientation of the practical activity, which in turn leads to arbitrary understanding and use of the terms, their situational modification, and ignoring them in cases when it is inappropriate. This situation has especially negative effects in the case of the formation or development of the theory and practice in the areas of the State information policy, which is generally determined in accordance with the norms of the national legislation. Because of this, certain laws ofUkrainewhich regulate the information sphere contradict each other, which prevents a large number of legislative provisions from being adequately considered for practice. This leads to systemic difficulties related to the inconsistency of the positions of different stakeholders on the national level, which does not allow building inUkrainea unified and clear State information policy and mechanisms for its implementation, in particular, on the information security issues.Non-compliance with the principles of systemic approach and consistency in ensuring terminological stability in the information legislation of Ukraine led, in particular, to the administrative (artificial) disengagement of the information space and cybernetic space and, as a consequence, information security and cybernetic security which is functionally (physically) impossible to implement, and for practice it is an inadmissible methodological error.This general state affects the national understanding of information policy, the formation and development of a corresponding theory, mutually agreed application of key concepts in practice, including in the military sphere. This cannot be justified, and therefore it is necessary to correct the situation in the national information law on the basis of the correct terminology.Improving the existing state of affairs first of all requires a legislative definition of the essence of the state information policy of Ukraine on the basis of a clear and correct conceptual framework and clarification of the directions of its implementation, chief among which should be ensuring the information security of the State. The above-mentioned generates today the general theoretical preconditions for the necessity of improving the current legislation of Ukraine in the interests of ensuring information security of the State. ; Обеспечение информационной безопасности Украины является важнейшей функцией государства, делом всего украинского народа. Однако сегодня еще остается нерешенной задача разработки теоретических основ обеспечения информационной безопасности Украины, где главным препятствием следует считать неразвитость, несовершенство и непоследовательность терминологической базы, следствием чего практическая деятельность дезориентируется, что приводит к произвольному пониманию и использованию терминов, их ситуативной модификации, игнорированию, в случаях, когда такое нецелесообразно. Особенно негативные последствия такое состояние имеет в случае формирования или развития теории и практики в области государственной информационной политики, которая концентрировано определяется нормами национального законодательства. Из-за этого отдельные Законы Украины, регулирующие информационную сферу, противоречат между собой, что препятствует адекватному рассмотрению на практике значительного количества законодательных положений. Это приводит к трудностям системного характера, связанным с несогласованностью на общегосударственном уровне позиций разных заинтересованных сторон, не позволяющих выстроить в Украине единую и четкую государственную информационную политику и механизмы ее реализации, в частности, по вопросам обеспечения информационной безопасности.Несоблюдение принципа системности и последовательности в обеспечении терминологической стабильности в информационном законодательстве Украины привело, в частности, к административному (искусственного) разъединению информационного пространства и кибернетического пространства и, как следствие, информационной безопасности и кибернетической безопасности, что функционально (физически) реализовать невозможно, а для практики является недопустимой методологической ошибкой.Такое общее состояние вредит общегосударственному пониманию информационной политики, становлению и развитию соответствующей теории, взаимосогласованному применению в практике ключевых понятий, в том числе в военной сфере. Это не может быть оправданным, а потому необходимо исправление ситуации в национальном информационном законодательстве на основе устоявшейся корректной терминологии.Первоочередное улучшение существующего состояния требует законодательного определения сущности государственной информационной политики Украины на основе четкого и корректного понятийного аппарата и уточнения направлений ее реализации, главным из которых должно быть обеспечение информационной безопасности государства. Это обстоятельство обуславливает сегодня общетеоретические предпосылки необходимости усовершенствования действующего законодательства Украины в интересах обеспечения информационной безопасности государства. ; Обґрунтовано загальнотеоретичні передумови необхідності удосконалення чинного законодавства України з питань інформаційної безпеки держави.
Кантовский взгляд на просвещение в статье 1784 года несет в себе ряд затруднений: в нем доминируют негативные характеристики, кроме того, безудержное пользование собственным рассудком может привести к логическому эгоизму (и иным его формам), отрицающему необходимость проверки своих суждений при помощи рассудка других. В «Критике способности суждения» и в «Антропологии…» Кант уточнил собственную позицию, дополнив негативную максиму самостоятельного мышления позитивной максимой мышления себя на месте другого, а также максимой последовательного и согласного с собой мышления. Самостоятельное мышление как поиск высшего пробного камня истины в собственном рассудке/разуме дополняется мыслью об общем человеческом разуме как пробном камне истины, который одинаково близок и доступен всем. Обдумывание способов содействия просвещению и выхода из состояния несовершеннолетия приводит Канта к противоречиям и парадоксам. Принуждение к отказу от принуждения в индивидуальном порядке с 1790 года тесно переплетается с тематикой социально-политических преобразований, способствующих прогрессу. Хотя в статье о просвещении, в «Религии в пределах одного только разума» и в «Антропологии…» Кант и дает глубокое философское и экзистенциальное толкование революции как истинного преобразования образа мышления (Denkungsart), умонастроенности (Gesinnung), внутреннего мира человека (Innern), преобразования, связанного с образованием ноуменального характера, однако в 90-е годы XVIII века под впечатлением испытанного от Французской революции «энтузиазма» доминирующим у него становится довольно плоское социально-политическое значение революции, правда, интерпретируемой им как «знак» исторического прогресса и прогресса в осуществлении естественного права. Некоторые современники Канта, оспоривая оценки революции, оказывались ближе к его идеалам середины 80-х годов XVIII века, чем он сам середины 90-х годов того же века. ; The originality of Kant's answer to the question of the Enlightenment in a 1784 article consisted not in addressing the words of Horace, which was commonplace in Germany of the time, but in linking it to the revised legal notion of immaturity, which is now interpreted from the philosophical and theological perspective and has become one of key philosophical notions. However, Kant's view is fraught with certain complications: firstly, it is dominated by negative characteristics; secondly, unlimited use of one's understanding can lead to logical egoism (and other forms thereof) consisting in denying the necessity of verifying one's judgements with the help of the understanding of others. In the Critique of Judgement and Anthropology, Kant describes his position in more detail supplementing the negative maxim of independent thinking with a positive maxim of thinking oneself in the position of others and the maxim of consistent and coherent thinking. Moreover, the requirement of independent thinking is limited by the idea of universal human reason, although Kant is not always consistent in distinguishing between reason and understanding in this context. Independent thinking as a search for the ultimate touchstone of truth within one's reason/understanding is supplemented with a thought about common human reason as a touchstone of truth that is equally available to everyone. Reflecting on the ways to facilitate enlightenment and overcoming the state of immaturity leads Kant to contradictions and paradoxes. After 1970, coercion to abandon coercion by each individual was closely linked to the topic of social and political transformational advancing progress. Although, in the article on enlightenment, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, and Anthropology, Kant provides a deep philosophical and existential interpretation of revolution as a true transformation of the way of thinking (Denkungsart), disposition (Gesinnung), the inner world of the self (Innern), and transformations relating to the formation of noumenal nature. Nevertheless, in the 90s, under the influence of "enthusiasm" aroused by the French revolution, he emphasises a restricted social and political meaning of revolution, however, interpreting it as a sign of historical progress and progress in implementing natural law. Unstinting support for the French revolution, despite acknowledging the illegitimate nature of social and political revolutions per se, made Kant revise the ideals of enlightenment, which he pursued earlier. It affected even the philosopher's attitude to his contemporaries. Observing the revolutionary "experiment" with an open heart, Kant refused to notice that the apparent "progress" is the forcible "happy-making" of people in accordance with the idea of happiness promoted by those in power at the moment, whereas the others are reduced to the position of children or the immature, or even the mentally challenged. Such protests were voiced by some of Kant's contemporaries, who were closer to his ideals of the 1780s than he himself in the mid-1890s.
Tämän tutkimuksen sysäsi liikkeelle kuilu, jonka havaitsin politiikkaideaalien ja kehitysyhteistyön käytännön välillä. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan, miten laajaan turvallisuuteen sekä kehityksen ja rauhaan liittyvät ideaalit heijastuvat käytäntöön. Tutkimuskohteena on kehitysyhteistyö konfliktista kärsineellä alueella. Tutkimus on luonteeltaan tapaustutkimus. Se tarkastelee Suomen ja Nepalin kahdenvälisen vesi- ja sanitaatiohankkeen toteutusta. Tutkimus kysyy, millä tavoin Rural Village Water Resources Management -hanke huomioi konfliktin vaikutukset toimintaympäristöönsä. Tavoitteena on tuottaa politiikkarelevanttia tietoa avunannosta konfliktialueilla. Tutkimuksen teoreettinen ja käsitteellinen perusta ammentaa keskustelusta, joka pohtii turvallisuuden ja kehityksen välistä yhteyttä. Keskiössä ovat ajatus siitä, että rauha, turvallisuus ja kehitys muodostavat tiiviin yhteenliittymän, sekä keskustelu avunannon ja konfliktien välisestä yhteydestä. Tutkimuksen teoreettinen viitekehys pohjaa näihin teemoihin. Siinä määritellään kehitysinterventioita neljän ulottuvuuden kautta. Ensimmäinen on kehitysinterventioiden määrittely suhteessa konfliktiin: toimivatko ne konfliktissa, pyrkivätkö ne vaikuttamaan konfliktiin vai kiertäväktö ne sen. Muita ulottuvuuksia ovat ajatus konfliktisensitiivisyydestä ja riskienhallinnasta sekä interventioetiikka. Tutkimus perustuu narratiiviseen tietämiseen. Se tuo hankkeessa toimivat yksilöt esiin kansainvälisen politiikan legitiimeinä tietäjinä. Samalla tutkimus tarjoaa ruohonjuuritason näkökulman siihen, millaisena kansainvälisyys näyttäytyy kehitysyhteistyön käytännöissä. Tutkimuksen aineisto koostuu hankedokumentaatiosta, arkistomateriaalista, haastatteluista ja tutkimuspäiväkirjan merkinnöistä. Tutkimuksessa on käytetty tarinoihin pohjaavaa narratiivista analyysiä. Työtä ovat ohjanneet arvostavan kyselyn (appreciative inquiry) periaatteet. Tuloksena on tapaushanketta koskeva retrospektiivinen narratiivi. Tapaustutkimuksella on kolme käytännön ulottuvuutta. Yhtäältä se liittyy suomalaisiin, kehitysyhteistyötä koskeviin politiikkalinjauksiin, toisaalta taas Nepaliin konfliktista kärsineenä alueena, etenkin yhteen kaukolännen kyläkehityskomiteaan, Bhatakatiyaan Achhamin maakunnassa. Kolmas ulottuvuus on Suomen ja Nepalin välinen kehitysyhteistyö. Narratiivisen analyysin avulla syntynyt tarina valottaa, miten monin tavoin toimintaympäristöä kohdannut konflikti on vaikuttanut tutkittuun hankkeeseen. Hanketta koskevassa dokumentaatiossa mainittiin toistuvasti, että hanke edistää rauhan rakentamista. Hankkeen vaikutusta rauhaan ei kuitenkaan monitoroitu eikä arvioitu, ja väitteet osoittautuivat pitkälti tyhjiksi. Narratiivi osoittaa, että tavat, joilla hanke vastasi ympäristön haasteisiin olivat enimmäkseen reaktiivisia, eivät ennalta suunniteltuja. Syitä tähän olivat muun muassa paikallisten analyysien puuttuminen ja ohueksi jäänyt toimintaympäristön ymmärrys, hankkeessa toimineiden henkilöiden epätasainen ja heikko konfliktisensitiivisyyden tuntemus sekä puutteelliset politiikka- ja ohjelmaohjeistukset konfliktialueilla toimimiseen. Tarina paljastaa, että hankkeessa painotettiin riskien hallintaa. Tästä huolimatta hankkeessa ei tehty systemaattisia konfliktianalyysejä eikä riskiarviointeja. Toisaalta narratiivi osoittaa kuinka hanke toimi myös proaktiivisesti suhteessa identifioituihin riskeihin. Esimerkkejä tästä ovat läpinäkyvyys, osallistavuus sekä toimintatapa, joka painotti paikallistuntemusta ja yhteyksiä hankkeen edunsaajiin. Tarina tuo myös esiin sen, että hanke kykeni vastaamaan rakenteellisen epäoikeudenmukaisuuden haasteisiin. Keinoina olivat paikallista omistajuutta ja sosiaalista inkluusiota korostava lähestymistapa. Empiirinen narratiivi käsitellään työn diskussiossa teoreettisen viitekehyksen kautta. Tutkittu hanke kuvaillaan siinä ensin konfliktia kiertäväksi ja konfliktista huolimatta toimivaksi. Konflikti koettiin hankkeessa kehityksen esteenä ja välteltävänä asiana. Toiseksi tutkimus paljastaa, että riskienhallintaan liittyvä ajattelu oli yksisuuntaista. Hankeeseen kohdistuneet riskit huomioitiin, mutta hankkeen mahdollisesti aiheuttamia riskejä ei arvioitu lainkaan. Kolmanneksi hanke määritellään semisensitiiviseksi suhteessa konfliktiin. Määrittelyssä huomioidaan intuitiiviset tavat toimia konfliktista kärsineellä alueella. Hankkeen toimijat tunnustivat konfliktin olemassaolon ja heidän toimintaansa ohjasivat kokemukset aiemmasta suomalaisesta kehitysinterventiosta Nepalissa sisällissodan aikana. Neljänneksi tutkitun hankkeen voi myös nähdä vaikuttaneen konfliktin syihin. Keskeisiä tekijöitä tässä oli kaksi: osallistava, paikallista omistajuutta korostava prosessi, jonka avulla laadittiin suunnitelma vesiresurssien hallitsemiseksi sekä toimintatapa, joka korosti sukupuolten välistä tasa-arvoa ja sosiaalista inkluusiota. Viidenneksi tutkimus osoittaa, että interventioetiikan kannalta tapaushanke toimi pitkälti vastavuoroisuuden, puolueettomuuden, johdonmukaisuuden ja universaalisuuden periaatteiden mukaisesti. Kestävyyden ja täydentävyyden periaatteiden osalta hanke toimi eri vaiheissaan vaihtelevasti. Tilivelvollisuuden ja refleksiivisyyden periaatteiden osalta hanke jäi puutteelliseksi. ; A gap between policy idea(l)s of broad security and a security-development nexus, and their seeming absence in the practice of development cooperation led to this study. This research explores the practice of development in a conflict-affected context. It is a case study of a Finnish-Nepali bilateral water and sanitation project in Far Western Nepal. It asks whether or not and how it was that the Rural Village Water Resources Management Project came to take into consideration its conflict-affected operational context. The aim is to produce policy-relevant insights on the theme of aid and conflict. The theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the study are based on a review of the shifts in security-development thinking. In focus is the notion of a peace-security-development nexus and the debate on aid and conflict. These themes provide a foundation for the four-dimensional theoretical framework, which defines interventions as working in, on or around conflict; as well as through peace and conflict sensitivity; risk management thinking; and intervention ethics. The study is based on storied knowing (narrative cognition). It provides a grassroots perspective into development practice as a representation of the international by bringing individuals involved in the project to the fore as legitimate knowers in the sphere of International Relations. The dataset of the study is composed of project documentation, archival material, interviews and research journal entries. Informed by principles of appreciative inquiry, the research has been carried out as a configurative narrative analysis. The result is a retrospective historical narrative of the studied case project. The studied case is set into context through three intersecting dimensions: Finnish policies guiding development cooperation; Nepal as a conflict-affected area, with focus on the Far West and Bhatakatiya VDC in Achham district; and Finnish-Nepali bilateral development cooperation. The narrative shows that the studied project was affected by its conflict-affected context in several ways throughout its duration, and points to repeated claims within the project documentation of the intervention's contribution to peacebuilding. Yet these claims are found to be largely void of substantial content and wanting of monitoring and evaluation to confirm them. The project's responses to contextual challenges are disclosed as having been predominantly reactive and ad hoc. Reasons for this included thin contextual knowing and absence of local analyses, uneven and weak understanding of conflict sensitivity among project actors; as well as the vague and inconclusive policy and program guidance regarding aid in conflict-affected contexts. Further, despite a strong emphasis in the intervention on risk management, the narrative presents the project as lacking in systematic and localized context and conflict analyses or risk assessments. On the other hand the story tells how transparency in all project work; emphasis on project actors' local knowledge and contacts with local staff and beneficiaries; as well as adopting a participatory approach were used proactively as ways to respond to the risks perceived. Finally, the story reveals how the project was able also to respond to structural injustices and root causes of conflict through its program design based on strong local ownership as well as through its inclusive working modalities. The findings of the empirical narrative are discussed through the theoretical framework, which presents the studied project first as having worked around, and in conflict despite the conflict: conflict was found to have been treated as a constraint to development and something to be avoided. Secondly, the study reveals the primacy of "one-way-street" risk management thinking in the project: only risks presented by the context toward the project were considered, but not vice versa. Thirdly, the project was found to have been semisensitive to conflict and to have worked intuitively in the conflict-affected context: aid actors were found to have acknowledged the conflict and to have been guided by experience of a prior Finnish development intervention in Nepal during the time of the civil war. Fourth, this research exposes the intervention design based on a rigid participatory step-by-step process of water use master planning and the approach of gender equity and social inclusion as courses through which the project may be seen as having also worked on conflict. Fifth, through a reflection of a framework of intervention ethics, this study shows how the project largely held with principles of mutuality, impartiality, consistency, and universality; how it held with the principles of sustainability and complementarity in varying degrees during different stages of the project, and how it did not quite fully live up to the principles of accountability and reflexivity.
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Robert Wade on Zombie Ideas, Being inside the World Bank, and the Death of Ethics in Economics after the Marginal Revolution
The global economy is at the core of some of the main issues in contemporary International Relations. But how do we understand the global economy and what impact does that have on how we deal with the power politics around it? A fault line seems to have emerged between those who take economic theory seriously and those who denounce it for being part of the problem. Informed by his training as an anthropologist, Robert H. Wade—professor at the LSE—takes a different tack: he bases his engagement with the way in which Adam Smith has been appropriated to advocate for a dominant view of 'free markets' on real-world economics and in-depth accounts of insiders. In this Talk, Wade—among others—discusses experimentation in international economic regimes, why the International Financial Institutions don't fight economic crises, and the powers and perils of being inside the World Bank.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current International Relations? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?
If we'd reframe your question as being more broadly about global studies, I think that one of the really fundamental questions is how and why it is that the precepts of neoliberalism have penetrated into every nook and cranny of Western societies, and have penetrated to a very large extent many non-Western countries.
This has happened especially, but not only, through the agency of the IMF and the World bank, which have imbued these neoliberal principles; through the mechanism of graduate education: children of the elites in developing countries go out to American, British, other Western universities, and they learn that this is 'true' economics, or 'true' IPE, or 'true' Political Science, and then they come back and implement these same principles and make them a reality back home. But across the globe, this even holds for the Nordic countries. In Iceland and other Nordic countries, from the 1980s, networks of people sharing a belief in neo-liberal precepts, began to form and sort of place each other in key positions within the state, and in politics, and built a momentum in this direction. These precepts have become understood as just natural, as in Margaret Thatcher's 'there is no alternative'.
I live in the UK, and the great bulk of the British public really does believe that the government is just like a household writ large, and the same rules of budgeting that apply to the household should apply to the state. That when times are tough the household has to tighten its belt, cut back on spending, and it is only fair that the government does the same, and if the government does not, if the government runs a deficit in hard times, then the government is being irresponsible. And this is a completely mistaken and pre-Keynesian idea, but it is a 'zombie idea'—that is, however much arguments and evidence may be mounted against it, it just keeps coming up and up and up, and governments come to power riding on this zombie idea and a flotilla of related ideas.
The persistence of this zombie idea is all the more amazing as we just had a global financial crisis in 2007/8, which would prompt a rethinking of these ideas. But these neoliberal precepts have been, if anything, more strongly reinforced. In previous hard times—and obviously the 1930s depression is the exemplary case—there has been a stronger move towards, what you could call, social democratic precepts. But not this time! Indeed, even after the crisis, the whole of the European Union with 500 million people is even more thoroughly structured on the basis of these ideas. I am thinking of what is popularly known as the Fiscal Compact signed by the EU Member States in 2012, which commits all governments to balance budgets all the time—that is, first, the structural deficit may not rise above 0.5 percent of GDP. Second, the public debt may not rise above 60 percent of GDP. Third, automatic financial sanctions are levied on governments that exceed these two thresholds. Fourth, the whole procedure is supervised by the European Commission, and this is presented as in the name of sound budgeting. This package is presented as justified by the proposition that government is a household writ large. The most elementary principles of Keynesian macroeconomics show why this is not simply mistaken, but a disaster, and will keep generating recessionary pressures. It is sold as a kind of excuse for avoiding to put in place the essential conditions for the monetary union, namely, a common budget and a sizable transfer mechanism to the regions just as exists in the United States. But they do not want to do that, but still they call this agreement 'cooperation', which is all about not cooperation, but about writing these dictates around this zombie idea written into the very basic architecture of the EU. Beyond EU politics, it materializes all the way down to, I don't know, the function of the privatization of the Post Office, it goes all the way down to the sort of capillaries of how universities are run, and the incentive systems that have placed upon academics, and there is very little pushback. The one reason, why I am almost completely delighted about Jeremy Corbyn's election as the leader of the Labour party, is that this is one small case of where there seems to be some concerted pushback against these zombie ideas. The point being that the established Labour party basically bought into this whole set of neo-liberal ideas. It combined maintaining the overall structure of inequality in society with more emphasis on providing some help to the poor, but they had to be hardworking poor.
Yet, one knows that there can be dramatic changes in the prevailing zeitgeist of norms. One knows that there can be big changes in the space of a few decades and the question is can one imagine a scenario in which they might be a big change in norms back to a more kind of social-democratic direction. So where will this take place? Because of technological change in the labor market, there is a real big crisis of employment with many middle-class jobs cut out and polarization in the labor market. This might then induce a political movement to have a much bigger change in income distribution than anybody with power is now talking about. Talk of re-distribution these days is really almost entirely around redistribution through the state, but the point I would make is that if there is to be any significant reduction of inequality, especially inequality at the top, there has to be more attention to changes in market-income distribution.
Let me explain. The share of profits in national income has been going up and the share of labor income has been going down. So we should harness the shareholder structure of the market to affect a more equal income distribution by enabling a much wider section of the population to buy into the profit share. At the moment the profit share goes to senior executives and equity holders, but equity holders are highly concentrating at the top of the income and wealth distribution. If equity earners could be spread much more equally, then a much wider section of the population would get income, while they sleep so to speak. We could institute something like trusts, whose members could be the employees of a company, the customers, the neighbors of the company, and the trust would borrow on capital markets and take out insurance against the repayment of the lending of loan and then it would buy shares, it would use that borrowed money to buy shares in the company, and the company would pay out dividends on the shares and then that dividend income coming out of profits would be distributed to the members of the trust. That would be a way of getting the rising share of profits in national income distributed out to the population at large. I particularly like this metaphor of "earning income while you sleep", since at the moment it is only the rich people, who are earning income while they sleep. Somehow that facility of earning income while you sleep has to be made much more widely and available—by using the market against itself, so to speak.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about International Relations?
I suppose the starting point was really this; my father was a New Zealand diplomat, so we moved quite often. By that time I was twelve my parents were posted to Colombo, Ceylon as it was called then. After having lived just in Western countries, I suddenly encountered at this very formative age Colombo and Sri Lanka. I was just amazed by that experience; by the color, the taste, the exoticness, but I was also very struck by how the many boys at the same age as me, were walking around with no shoes. I particular remember this boy carrying a baby on his shoulder, the baby looked half-dead and covered in scabs, and I think it was then I got the idea of just how unequal the world was. Then at university I studied economics, but I also visited my parents in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and I got another sense of that great disparity in wealth and living standards. At this time I had come across Adam Smith and the wealth of nations question and that helped to encapsulate or to crystalize my interests. So I wanted to go the Institute of Development Studies in Sussex and got enrolled for a PhD in economics, but en route I spent several weeks in India and during that time I began to dwell upon just how boring and how useless everything I studied under the name of microeconomics. I kept thinking of these dreadfully dry textbooks of marginal cost curves and marginal revenue curves and utility function and difference curves etc., which I had forced myself to sit exams in. By this time I had done a little bit of fieldwork, living on Pitcairn Island in the middle of the Pacific.
When I got back to Sussex after fieldwork I announced that I wished to not do a PhD in economics, but to do one in anthropology thinking all the time, that this would actually be more use for understanding why for example India, where I had been, was so very poor. So that's what I did: a PhD in anthropology… In some ways I regard that as having been a mistake, because the sort of mainstream of anthropology is very far away from the Adam Smith questions. Having done the degree in anthropology, pretty soon I began to change direction and pay much more attention to the state, to the state bureaucracy. I went to India and I studied the Irrigation Department and other related departments. I went to South Korea and I studied state irrigation agencies and I went to Taiwan and I studied the state more broadly. So I was kind of moving up from my Italian village, moving kind of up the scale in terms of state agencies and then the state as a whole.
Then I went to work for the World Bank in the 1980s and my main reason for doing that was not to do the research the World Bank wanted me to do, but rather to study the World Bank from the inside as fieldwork. If in some ways switching to anthropology was a mistake, in other ways it was not, because I approached those kind of Wealth-of-Nations-questions in a way very different from how economists approached them. For example when I went to Taiwan and studied the trade regime, the first thing I did was to go and talk to people who operated through the trade regime, whereas I noticed that the published works by economists celebrating Taiwan's free trade regime was based on what the rules said and what certain government officials told them was the case. They had never actually talked to people who traded through the trade regime. If they would have, they would have learned about all the covert controls that went on such that there was quite a distinction between the liberal face of the trade regime and the reality of the trade regime. The reality was that the government was managing trade in line with industrial policy, but the government absolutely did not want the world to know that. So all this was kept hidden and I was really regarded as rather unwelcome visitor—and in fact to this day my book Governing the Market (1990, read the introduction here) is not well received in Taiwan. It says the government of Taiwan did a good job of managing the market, but they want the world to believe that Taiwan is a free trade country. So that is the kind of intellectual trajectory that I have been on.
So I think that the value of the anthropology PhD was that it really taught me, in practical terms, the meaning of the anthropological maxim, which is 'soaking and poking'. To put it another way—I love this—anthropologists are social scientists, who believe that the plural of anecdote is evidence. And indeed I place a lot of weight on anecdotes, on gossip, on the stories people tell, whereas economists would be much happier reducing, let us say, South Korea's trade regime to one data point in a matrix, and then compare that data point with, let us say, Malaysia's data point to see how the trade regimes are correlated with growth, or something like that, and that is really not my interest.
What would a student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?
Despite what I've just said, I do think that a graduate training in economics is very useful, provided one does not believe it. And that is really difficult, because the socialization pressures are intense: if you do not say the right things—which are neoliberal type things on the whole—then you will likely not get a high grade. But I have noticed that economists tend to know how to think, how to make arguments, they tend to understand the idea of causality, and that may seem an astonishing thing to say on my part, because it implies that students coming from other disciplines are often weak in understanding the very basic ideas of causality, but that is my experience. I had many students coming from, who knows, IR or Political Science or Sociology or Anthropology, who clearly do not have much idea of causality; they can describe things, but they find thinking in terms of cause and effect, in terms of independent and dependent variables, in terms of left and right side, they just find it difficult. So I do think that there is a lot to be said for studying economics, and mastering the maths, provided that the critical facility is not lost. That is point number one.
Point number two is that I think that there is a huge premium on doing fieldwork, and the field work maybe in developing countries, but when I say field work, I don't just mean going out to villages, going out to see poor people 'over there'. I am talking of fieldwork inside bureaucracies: to try and understand the culture, the incentive systems that people are working under—fieldwork at home so to speak, in the countries one comes from. From the students' point of view, it is clearly much easier to sit in the LSE library to do the research. So in my marking I give quite a premium to a student actually doing fieldwork, going out and interviewing, and having the experience of writing up and interpreting the interviews and somehow fitting it back into a larger argument—but really few students actually do that, and I think that that is a real, real big mistake. Mind you, the same risk holds for fieldwork in economics as it does for studying economics: I encourage students to work for (do fieldwork in, experience) the World Bank; and several have—but to the best of my knowledge almost none of them has kept their critical perspective. They really come to buy into it.
The relations between states are settled either through diplomacy or warfare. Why would we have to focus on economics to understand IR?
Because economics—such as for example balances of payment, surpluses and deficits—set the constraints and incentives on countries in terms of their relationships with each other. A great deal of diplomacy is driven by economic pressures: diplomacy to get other countries to for example open their markets, or to cut deals with countries—'if you do this, we will do that'—deals that may relate to areas that are rather different, for instance if you buy more of these of our exports, we will help you fight such and such country, because the manufactures are in my constituency.
So, in a way, the way you framed the question is part of the reason why I react against the discipline of IR: because it tends to treat diplomacy, war, and so on, as somehow rather separate from economic pressures, and I see these economic pressures as very powerful drivers of both of the other two things. As another example, one of the drivers of the Syrian conflict was that there was an acute drought (like Weizman observed in Theory Talk #69, red), which meant that many people were rendered destitute; rural areas flooded into the cities, and the Assad regime just was—understandably—unable to cope; and large numbers of young men, concentrated in cities, rootless and with no jobs, just were recruiting fodder for the Wahhabi sect. I have always thought of economics—not so much as in the making choices in conditions of scarcity, that is sort of Lionel Robin's definition—in the sense of Alfred Marshal, about how people make a living, as a very fundamental driver of a lot of what happens in International Relations.
Pikkety recently published Capital in the 21st Century, causing quite the stir. But why would inequality between people matter for IR?
Let me comment by invoking a very contemporary exhibit—the migration crisis in Europe now. Maybe a decade ago I looked at the figures and if you took the average income of the EU-15 prior to latest extensions and then expressed the average income of countries outside of the EU—including sub-Sahara Africa—as a percentage, then there was a really dramatic falling away of income levels relative to the EU, in countries all around the EU and whether you took market exchange rates or purchasing power parity. If you went round to sub-Sahara Africa and took the average, it was more like two percent in market exchange rates and seven percent in purchasing power parity; and the 'problem' is that there is certainly here a rather thin slither of sea between Africa and the promised land of Europe and to the east there are these great open planes, where armies can go up and down to the speed of light, so to speak, but people can also move pretty quickly across these planes.
So all one has to do—and this might just be only a bit of an exaggeration—if one is on the poor end of this poverty pyramid is hop across the border and you have a chance at least of getting a very appreciable increase in living conditions and income, with which you can then get savings to remit back to home. So the migrations pressures are just huge. So that is one reason for linking inequality to issues in International Relations—really fundamental issues, and very very difficult to dissolve.
You've done anthropological fieldwork inside the World Bank—an institution drawing a lot of criticism from its detractors in IR. Can you shed some kind of light about what kind of 'animal' the World Bank is?
First of all, let me say that at the micro-level—the level of the people you know and the people I know inside the World Bank—I agree that there are people doing a lot of good work. But if you look at the organization more generally—the World Bank and also the IMF—they are clearly instruments mainly of US foreign policy—and any number of US senators, members of the House, have basically said that. When they are defending the International Financial Institutions (they often criticize them), they do so by saying they are important for US foreign policy. And you have to look at the governance structures to see how it is that the US in particular—but Western states more generally—have from the beginning, through the very Articles of Agreement, created a structure which locks in their power, and has made it very difficult for other countries (including Japan) to significantly increase their shareholdings. The US has kept the presidency of the Bank and the much less recognized Number Two position of the IMF, and has used these positions to have a very strong influence.
Just to illustrate what the Bank and the Fund do: at the time of the East-Asian crisis—specifically the Korean crisis in 1997-1998—the IMF mission was in Seoul. The negotiations were in a hotel there. David Lipton from the US Treasury (and a former student of Larry Summers who was by then Deputy Secretary) was just down the corridor of where the negotiations took place, and every so often the IMF people would walk out of the negotiations and consult with David Lipton, then come back in and—as Paul Blustein reports in his book called The Chastening—often said something rather different from what they had been saying before they consulted with David Lipton.
Just to take another example, the US being able to appoint the president of the Bank—to appoint a person known personally to the Treasury Secretary or to the Secretary of the State, or both—is really of great value: when there is a 'trustful relationship'—or a relationship of dependency, the president being dependent on those who appointed him in the Administration—it is possible for those people in the Administration, or people close to them, to just ring up the president of the Bank, and talk in a very informal, confidential, trustful way about what is happening in Latin America, or what is happening in the Middle East, and what the US thinks the Bank should or should not be doing in those places. Larry Summers appointed a protégé of his to one of the regional development banks, and this person—who is very senior in the bank—told me that Larry would frequently ring him, while he is being driven home in the evening from the Treasury, just to have a chat about how things were going in her region, and to pass on suggestions about what the Bank should be doing there, and to get intelligence from her about what was happening in the region, and so on. The point is that, making these personal connections is of immense value, but at the same time, the US Congress, in particular, is very much against having a big Bank against allowing a capital increase for the World Bank—so that the bank could, as it should be doing, increase its lending for infrastructure investment ten times. It is just a complete scandal how little the Bank has been lending for the past 20 years or more for infrastructure, for roads and power stations and so on. The US does not want the Bank providing socialistic competition with the private sector: it says these things are for the private sector to do, and the Bank has to take care of poverty, because the private sector is not interested in poverty.
So the US wants to keep the presidency of the Bank, it wants to keep, secondly, its unique veto right on the big decisions, such as decisions on whether to increase the capital base—but provided those two things are met it does not care that much about the Bank. In the case of the Fund, the US is also very powerful, but of course the Europeans have a bit more relative power. Right now I think the world is in an even more dangerous sort if financial condition than might appear, because the IMF is acutely short of secure or guaranteed lending resources, so if there is to be another round of crisis—as I think is entirely likely within the next five years—the Fund depends upon borrowing short-term from member countries, like on six months terms, but member countries can say 'no', and that means that the Fund's ability to fight crises is quite constrained. The Fund should implement what was agreed in 2010 by all the member countries represented on the board of the IMF: to roughly double the quote of the guaranteed lending resources, that is, resources the countries actually hand over to the Fund, over which they actually give up country control. All the relevant capitals ratified it with one exception—the US—because Congress refused because the individual barons, who are not under that much party discipline, each said to the Treasury: 'look, the question of the IMF is of zero significance to my electorate, so if you want my vote on the IMF, you have to give me things that I want like projects in my constituency and so on'. The Treasury added up the demands of the people, whose vote had to be won, and it considered those demands were just way, way, way over the top. As long as a Democrat is in the presidency, while the House is controlled by Republicans the world is sort of held hostage to this. Beyond this example, this actually entails a structural problem: the US blocking or producing a gridlock in international organizations, because the Congress is hostile to international organizations, because Congress sees it to imply a loss of US sovereignty. The only way to end this gridlock is to end the US veto in the Fund and the Bank, but the problem is that the US can veto any measures.
One response of the big developing countries is to create bypass organizations—such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Banks, such as the new Development Bank, such as the Contingent Reserve arrangement the BRICs have established, and then a growing number of sort of regional development banks. And I think that that is a good thing, but it does raise questions about coordination, about who is looking after, if you will, the global interests, global issues such as climate change. In short, we need a genuine World Bank, rather than the American-Bank-in-the-World we have today.
You engage thoroughly with economics and economic theory. Now there seem to be two kinds of critical approaches to economics in IPE: one criticizes its rationality as flawed, and another buys into its rationality but attempts to point out where actual policy gets it wrong. Where do you stand in this?
If you take the example of how the EU attempted to impose fiscal rules on Greece, you see a notion of rationality which draws upon these very primitive notions that I referred to right at the beginning, where the government is just a household writ large, and the same set of rules that apply to the budgeting of the household must apply to the government as well. Here, the assumption is that any macroeconomic proposition must have microeconomic foundations, that it must be derivable from propositions about microeconomic agents acting in this sort of self-maximizing way, and if you cannot derive macroeconomic propositions from those micro foundations, then there is something unreliable, un-rigorous about your macroeconomics. So what are then the sources of these micro-economic assumptions?
This leads us to one fundamental and almost completely unaddressed weaknesses of economics can be traced back to the Marginal Revolution in the late 19th century. From that moment onwards, there has been an attempt to model economics on physics, and that was very explicit on the part of people like Pareto and Walras, and Jevons, early Marginalist thinkers. They even drew up tables with terms of physics, like velocity, on one side, and then corresponding terms in economics on the other. That had a huge benefit in terms of the 'science' of economics, because it cut economics loose from Adam Smith's and other classical economists' preoccupations with issues of morality and ethics. Adam Smith thought his most important book was not the Wealth of Nations but his Theory of Moral Sentiments, on which he was working, revising yet again, when he died. For Smith, economics and morals were never separate worlds, but intimately related. So for him, the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations were just twins. The point about the marginalist revolution, and the embrace of physics as the model, was that it cut economics free of all that sort of subjective stuff about values. So economics after the marginalist revolution set off with the assumption that not production, but the movement of individuals in markets engaged in trading with each other became the center of gravity of economics. Making the study of exchange rather than the study of production central was analogous to, say, Boyle's Law in physics. Boyle's Law in physics explained the movement of molecules in gasses, as a function of the pressure applied to the gas. So why did they make that analogy?
The point of likening of individuals in microeconomic actions with molecules in gasses was the following. Everybody knows that we do not apply any consideration of ethics or moral sentiments to the movement of the molecules in gas, so neither should we apply any notions of ethics or moral sentiments to the movements of individuals in market exchanges. And that was the way that all considerations of ethics, of morality were just removed from economics. I for instance asked the question to well-known American growth theorist, as we were walking down the street in Providence at Brown University: 'is it moral for people to freeride?' And he said, 'yes of course, provided they do not break the law'. So ethics and questions of morality have been almost completely expunged from economics in a way that would horrify classical economists including Smith; and a particular idea of rationality has been an important part of cleansing economics from those moral considerations. George DeMartino, editor of the Oxford Handbook of Professional Economics Ethics which just appeared has a wonderful phrase to capture this—'econogenic harm': the harm built into the way that economics, professional economists work.
Haven't specific fields, like development economics—a field you engage with yourself—advanced to overcome these weaknesses in economic theory?
Let me root my answer again in observations about the linkages between theory and practice, for it is in practice that economic theory really does its work and its politics becomes visible. It always amazes me we have had a development industry in place for roughly the past 70 years with vast numbers of people, organizations, money all orchestrated underneath this umbrella of development; yet if you go back and read what the early writers about development and economic growth said—I am thinking of people like Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Myrdal, Hirschman, Prebisch, but also Moses Abramovitz. If you go back and look at what they were saying, it seems to me that we have not advanced all that much. Sure, we have advanced a lot in terms of econometric techniques, but in terms of substance we have not. One conclusion I draw from that is that it is really important that international regimes—for example, World Bank and IMF loan conditions, but also WTO regimes—give room for experimentation, because it is really not the case that 'there is no alternative'. This Washington Consensus agenda has clearly not been effective in accelerating production, upgrading it, and production diversification, or export upgrading, or export diversification. So, there should be written into the regimes a lot of room for experimentation. But this isn't there because of the political origin of these regimes; because of what western countries want for the rest world, namely, to open the rest of the world to their markets.
In the 80s there were a lot of experts in industrial development in the World Bank and they did good work, promoting industrial growth and investment in productive infrastructure. But then Anne Krueger came in as chief economist, and brought in a whole lot of people with her—who, like here, were arch-neoliberals. The industrial growth people were invited to find employment elsewhere, or to rebrand themselves as experts in who knows what, environmental assessment, primary education, or good governance. There was no room for them. This also fitted well with some bad experiences the Bank had had with investing in infrastructure. It had gotten into a lot of trouble with large-scale infrastructural interventions such as roads and dams and the like from, especially, US NGOs mobilizing Congress—which then put pressure on the Treasury and so on. My lament throughout this whole conversation has been that we seem to have become just locked into this direction that was set in the 1980s, and it is very difficult to see what kind of economic catastrophe would be necessary to give a sufficient shock to reroute the global system of economic governance.
So after the 1980s, the Bank sort of backed off and began saying that development, economic development, was about poverty reduction—the slogan of the Bank became, 'our dream is a world free of poverty'. You can understand that shift partly in terms of pulling out of the concern with production to get into safe territory, but also because poverty reduction seemed to sort of take care of inequality, because you reduced inequality to poverty—to the poor 'over there', and we can feel good about helping them; but we do not want talk about inequality, which involves us, because then there is the question of justice of our income.
But then the most recent turn is that we're seeing a renewed push for infrastructure in the World Bank and western development agencies. I think that you can link this recent infrastructure push to uncertainty about the sources of economic growth. In the West there is a real question about sustaining economic growth without housing bubbles and stock market bubbles—in other words, without endogenously building financial instability. There may well be a similar sort of issue in terms of the growth of developing countries.
Last question. Adam Smith seems to be constantly present in your work as a critical interlocutor. How come?
I kind of engage in a critical debate with Adam Smith, but especially with people today, who believe his ideas. I often start to frame arguments in terms of his famous 40 word summary of the causes of the relative wealth of nations, which he actually wrote in 1755, which is to say long before the first edition of the Wealth of Nations. I will just tell you what these 40 words say, and then I will tell you the significance of them. He said:
'Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism than peace, easy taxes, and tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things.'
So I am struck by how today many economists say or imply that this is essentially right; you need some qualifications of course, but essentially that is the nub of it. You might have to translate peace, easy taxes, tolerable administration of justice into more modern terms, but that is the essence of it. For example, Gregory Mankiw—Professor of economics at Harvard, former chair of the National Council of Economic Advisers during the Bush administration, and author of a very popular textbook in economics—said in the Wall Street Journal in 2006: Adam Smith was right to say that – and then he gave the 40 word quote. The renowned economists Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson wrote Pillars of Prosperity, which also begins with Smith's 40 words, and they even see the book as a kind of elaboration, but in that same kind of spirit, of Smith's basic idea. So my point is that these ideas are still current; they are still the sort of front of a lot of neoliberal thinking. I am just astonished these ideas all these centuries later remain so powerful. I have had at the back of my mind the idea of organizing an international competition to provide a contemporary 40 word statement, which is sort of equivalent to Smith's, which would obviously have to be of a more global character, encompassing the globalized world economy.
Robert Hunter Wade worked at the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, 1972-95, World Bank, 1984-88, Princeton Woodrow Wilson School 1989/90, MIT Sloan School 1992, Brown University 1996-2000. Fellow of Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton 1992/93, Russell Sage Foundation 1997/98, Institute for Advanced Study, Berlin 2000/01. Fieldwork in Pitcairn Is., Italy, India, Korea, Taiwan. Research on World Bank 1995-continuing. Author of Irrigation and Politics in South Korea (1982), Village Republics: The Economic Conditions of Collective Action in India (1988, 1994), Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asia's Industrialization (1990, 2003). Latter won American Political Science Association's award of Best Book in Political Economy, 1992.
Related links
Faculty profile at LSE Read Wade's The Piketty phenomenon and the future of inequality (2014, real-world economics review) here (pdf) Read Wade's Capitalism and Democracy at Cross-Purposes (2013, Challenge) here (pdf) Read Wade's Rethinking Industrial Policy for Low Income Countries (2007 ADB Conference paper) here (pdf) Read Wade's Bringing the State Back In (2005, IPG) here (pdf) Read Wade's Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality? (2004, World Development) here (pdf) Read Wade's Creating Capitalisms (Introduction to 2003 book 'Governing the Market') here (pdf)
This book takes both a global as well as a local perspective in assessing the impacts of climate change on the economy, agricultural sector, and households in three of the MENA countries; Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. The major channels of impact for global climate change are through changing world food (and energy) prices, especially since all the countries under analysis are or have become net importers of oil and petroleum products and many food commodities in recent years. The impacts of local climate change decrease crop yields in the longer run and through them, productivity in the agricultu
У теорији постоји сагласност да тероризам представља политички мотивисано насиље и да у том смислу представља један од облика насилне политичке борбе. Специфична разлика тероризма у односу на друге облике политичког насиља је примарна усмереност ка стварању, одржавању и експлоатацији страха ради застрашивања противника и јачања подршке међу присталицама. Суштинска одступања од теоријских и правних критеријума при одређивању тероризма постоје у пракси Савета безбедности. Општа оцена деловања Савета безбедности приликом доношења резолуција о тероризму јесте да прати владајући политички дискурс у коме су најпре државе биле одговорне за тероризам, да би потом "слабе", "неодговорне" и "репресивне" државе биле одговорне за омогућавање деловања међународних терористичких организација на својој територији. Савет безбедности усвајао је резолуције у којима је терористичке акте одређивао спрам природе акта, али и спрам извршиоца чиме су сви акти претходно одређене терористичке организације квалификовани као терористички акти. Истраживањем је утврђено и да је приликом усвајања појединих резолуција политичка сврсисходност утицала да се истоврсна понашања не квалификују увек као терористички акти. На основу изведених закључака утврђено је да сложеност борбе против тероризма представља последицу првенства политичке сврсисходности при квалификовању акта насиља као терористичког акта, а не због тешкоћа у дефинисању тероризма. Промене у концепцији тероризма у резолуцијама Савета безбедности и њихова усклађеност са владајућим јавним дискурсом одвијају се истовремено са настојањем САД и других западних држава да преобликују међународну заједницу и успоставе нови светски поредак. У таквим околностима тероризам почиње да егзистира као офанзивно политичко средство хибридног ратовања, при чему се негативна конотација тероризма експлоатише на два начина. Прво, тероризам постаје политичка оцена нечијег деловања без обзира на природу тако означене активности. Друго, тероризам се употребљава као насилно политичко средство које, у зависности од интереса онога ко цени одређено понашање, неће у свакој ситуацији бити означено као тероризам, већ понекад и као легитиман облик политичке акције. Офанзивни карактер одлуке истовремено води занемаривању научних критеријума у корист политичке сврсисходности при квалификацији неког понашања као терористичког акта. Доминација политичког критеријума при квалификовању терористичког акта утиче на инструментализацију тероризма и његово претварање у ефикасно средство хибридног ратовања. Садржај хибридног ратовања није последица неограниченог избора средстава односно оружја нити њихове софистицираности, већ способности безбедносног менаџмента да у свакој конкретној ситуацији независно од организационог нивоа примени такву комбинацију различитих, али међусобно компатибилних појединачних начина ратовања којом се остварује синергијски ефекат ради реализације претходно постављеног циља. Управо због тога тероризам као облик сложеног политичког насиља постаје предмет експлоатације у сврху хибридног ратовања. На основу резултата истраживања описана су три модела експлотације тероризма у сврху хибридног ратовања. Први модел експлоатације тероризма изведен је из политичке праксе САД да државе за које САД сматрају да користе тероризам као политичко средство ставе на Листу спонзора тероризма. Имајући у виду политички и сваки други утицај који САД имају, овакава пракса и њене последице формално или неформално су прихваћене широм света. Основне последице стављања на Листу спонзора тероризма су санкције, дискредитација у међународној јавности и легитимисање мера против таквих држава, док се у исто време таквом праксом врши притисак на државе које нису на Листи да ускладе своју политику са интересима великих сила. Други модел експлоатације тероризма у сврху хибридног ратовања манифестује се кроз организовање, финансирање, опремање, обуку и усмеравање сурогат снага против влада држава са којима није остварена компатибилност интереса, при чему су сурогат снаге представљене у јавном дискурсу као борци за слободу. Предмет експлоатације у Другом моделу јесте насиље које испуњава теоријске критеријуме да буде означено као тероризам, али је због политичке сврсисходности квалификовано као борба за слободу, отпор против угњетавања и сл. Експлоатација насиља у Другом моделу врши се у циљу промене носилаца политичке власти, стварање аутономних регија односно држава које би биле кооперативне са политиком државе која примењује Други модел или као део шире стратегије управљања безбедносним процесима. Трећи модел експлоатације тероризма у сврху хибридног ратовања подразумева организовање и управљање сурогат снагама које су квалификоване као терористичке организације или се врши инфилтрација појединаца у изворне и самосталне народне побуне ради преузимања руководећих места и управљања њиховим деловањем у складу са интересима државе која предузима Трећи модел. Предмет експлоатације у Трећем моделу јесте насиље које је квалификовано као тероризам, при чему је циљ експлоатације вишеструк: 1. Путем насиља и страха који настаје као последица вршења терористичких аката управља се безбедносном ситуацијом у држави која је мета агресије или у региону који је потребно политички и територијално контролисати, са или без физичког присуства оружаних снага државе која примењује Трећи модел; 2. Стварање страха код одређеног или унапред неодређеног броја држава од потенцијалних напада терористичких организација ради вршења латентног политичког притиска на државе да буде кооперативне, и 3. Стварање разлога за војну интервенцију ради присуства и политичке контроле одређене државе или региона. На основу претходно изнетих резултата истраживања изведен је закључак да први корак у спречавању експлоатације тероризма против наше државе представља отклањање или смањивање потенцијала за друштвене сукобе који настаје услед стварања или продубљивања друштвених противречности. Из тог разлога извршена је анализа нормативно – политичког и институционалног оквира у релевантним областима друштвеног живота. Истраживањем је утврђено да у Републици Србији постоји добар основ за ангажовање и интегрисање свих ресурса друштвене моћи на плану остваривања националне безбедности, али и да постоји потреба да се актуелни политички и безбедносни институционални оквир усклади са таквим могућностима. Као резултат истраживања предложене су три групе мера чија примена треба за резултат да има: отклањање и смањивање опасности од стварања потенцијала за друштвене сукобе; успостављање ефикасног и интегрисаног институционалног оквира за супротстављање политичком насиљу које евентуално проистекне из постојећих противречности и отклањање и смањивање штетних последица таквог политичког насиља. ; U teoriji postoji saglasnost da terorizam predstavlja politički motivisano nasilje i da u tom smislu predstavlja jedan od oblika nasilne političke borbe. Specifična razlika terorizma u odnosu na druge oblike političkog nasilja je primarna usmerenost ka stvaranju, održavanju i eksploataciji straha radi zastrašivanja protivnika i jačanja podrške među pristalicama. Suštinska odstupanja od teorijskih i pravnih kriterijuma pri određivanju terorizma postoje u praksi Saveta bezbednosti. Opšta ocena delovanja Saveta bezbednosti prilikom donošenja rezolucija o terorizmu jeste da prati vladajući politički diskurs u kome su najpre države bile odgovorne za terorizam, da bi potom "slabe", "neodgovorne" i "represivne" države bile odgovorne za omogućavanje delovanja međunarodnih terorističkih organizacija na svojoj teritoriji. Savet bezbednosti usvajao je rezolucije u kojima je terorističke akte određivao spram prirode akta, ali i spram izvršioca čime su svi akti prethodno određene terorističke organizacije kvalifikovani kao teroristički akti. Istraživanjem je utvrđeno i da je prilikom usvajanja pojedinih rezolucija politička svrsishodnost uticala da se istovrsna ponašanja ne kvalifikuju uvek kao teroristički akti. Na osnovu izvedenih zaključaka utvrđeno je da složenost borbe protiv terorizma predstavlja posledicu prvenstva političke svrsishodnosti pri kvalifikovanju akta nasilja kao terorističkog akta, a ne zbog teškoća u definisanju terorizma. Promene u koncepciji terorizma u rezolucijama Saveta bezbednosti i njihova usklađenost sa vladajućim javnim diskursom odvijaju se istovremeno sa nastojanjem SAD i drugih zapadnih država da preoblikuju međunarodnu zajednicu i uspostave novi svetski poredak. U takvim okolnostima terorizam počinje da egzistira kao ofanzivno političko sredstvo hibridnog ratovanja, pri čemu se negativna konotacija terorizma eksploatiše na dva načina. Prvo, terorizam postaje politička ocena nečijeg delovanja bez obzira na prirodu tako označene aktivnosti. Drugo, terorizam se upotrebljava kao nasilno političko sredstvo koje, u zavisnosti od interesa onoga ko ceni određeno ponašanje, neće u svakoj situaciji biti označeno kao terorizam, već ponekad i kao legitiman oblik političke akcije. Ofanzivni karakter odluke istovremeno vodi zanemarivanju naučnih kriterijuma u korist političke svrsishodnosti pri kvalifikaciji nekog ponašanja kao terorističkog akta. Dominacija političkog kriterijuma pri kvalifikovanju terorističkog akta utiče na instrumentalizaciju terorizma i njegovo pretvaranje u efikasno sredstvo hibridnog ratovanja. Sadržaj hibridnog ratovanja nije posledica neograničenog izbora sredstava odnosno oružja niti njihove sofisticiranosti, već sposobnosti bezbednosnog menadžmenta da u svakoj konkretnoj situaciji nezavisno od organizacionog nivoa primeni takvu kombinaciju različitih, ali međusobno kompatibilnih pojedinačnih načina ratovanja kojom se ostvaruje sinergijski efekat radi realizacije prethodno postavljenog cilja. Upravo zbog toga terorizam kao oblik složenog političkog nasilja postaje predmet eksploatacije u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja. Na osnovu rezultata istraživanja opisana su tri modela eksplotacije terorizma u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja. Prvi model eksploatacije terorizma izveden je iz političke prakse SAD da države za koje SAD smatraju da koriste terorizam kao političko sredstvo stave na Listu sponzora terorizma. Imajući u vidu politički i svaki drugi uticaj koji SAD imaju, ovakava praksa i njene posledice formalno ili neformalno su prihvaćene širom sveta. Osnovne posledice stavljanja na Listu sponzora terorizma su sankcije, diskreditacija u međunarodnoj javnosti i legitimisanje mera protiv takvih država, dok se u isto vreme takvom praksom vrši pritisak na države koje nisu na Listi da usklade svoju politiku sa interesima velikih sila. Drugi model eksploatacije terorizma u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja manifestuje se kroz organizovanje, finansiranje, opremanje, obuku i usmeravanje surogat snaga protiv vlada država sa kojima nije ostvarena kompatibilnost interesa, pri čemu su surogat snage predstavljene u javnom diskursu kao borci za slobodu. Predmet eksploatacije u Drugom modelu jeste nasilje koje ispunjava teorijske kriterijume da bude označeno kao terorizam, ali je zbog političke svrsishodnosti kvalifikovano kao borba za slobodu, otpor protiv ugnjetavanja i sl. Eksploatacija nasilja u Drugom modelu vrši se u cilju promene nosilaca političke vlasti, stvaranje autonomnih regija odnosno država koje bi bile kooperativne sa politikom države koja primenjuje Drugi model ili kao deo šire strategije upravljanja bezbednosnim procesima. Treći model eksploatacije terorizma u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja podrazumeva organizovanje i upravljanje surogat snagama koje su kvalifikovane kao terorističke organizacije ili se vrši infiltracija pojedinaca u izvorne i samostalne narodne pobune radi preuzimanja rukovodećih mesta i upravljanja njihovim delovanjem u skladu sa interesima države koja preduzima Treći model. Predmet eksploatacije u Trećem modelu jeste nasilje koje je kvalifikovano kao terorizam, pri čemu je cilj eksploatacije višestruk: 1. Putem nasilja i straha koji nastaje kao posledica vršenja terorističkih akata upravlja se bezbednosnom situacijom u državi koja je meta agresije ili u regionu koji je potrebno politički i teritorijalno kontrolisati, sa ili bez fizičkog prisustva oružanih snaga države koja primenjuje Treći model; 2. Stvaranje straha kod određenog ili unapred neodređenog broja država od potencijalnih napada terorističkih organizacija radi vršenja latentnog političkog pritiska na države da bude kooperativne, i 3. Stvaranje razloga za vojnu intervenciju radi prisustva i političke kontrole određene države ili regiona. Na osnovu prethodno iznetih rezultata istraživanja izveden je zaključak da prvi korak u sprečavanju eksploatacije terorizma protiv naše države predstavlja otklanjanje ili smanjivanje potencijala za društvene sukobe koji nastaje usled stvaranja ili produbljivanja društvenih protivrečnosti. Iz tog razloga izvršena je analiza normativno – političkog i institucionalnog okvira u relevantnim oblastima društvenog života. Istraživanjem je utvrđeno da u Republici Srbiji postoji dobar osnov za angažovanje i integrisanje svih resursa društvene moći na planu ostvarivanja nacionalne bezbednosti, ali i da postoji potreba da se aktuelni politički i bezbednosni institucionalni okvir uskladi sa takvim mogućnostima. Kao rezultat istraživanja predložene su tri grupe mera čija primena treba za rezultat da ima: otklanjanje i smanjivanje opasnosti od stvaranja potencijala za društvene sukobe; uspostavljanje efikasnog i integrisanog institucionalnog okvira za suprotstavljanje političkom nasilju koje eventualno proistekne iz postojećih protivrečnosti i otklanjanje i smanjivanje štetnih posledica takvog političkog nasilja. ; There is a consensus in security studies that terrorism is a politically motivated violence and, therefore, it represents one of the forms of violent political struggle. What distinguishes terrorism from other forms of political violence is its primary focus on creating, maintaining and exploiting fear in order to intimidate opponents and strengthen support among allies. Fundamental deviations from theoretical and legal criteria in determination of terrorism are identified in the pratice of the Security Council. The general assessment of the Security Council's actions related to terrorism is that the Council has been following the prevailing political discourse in which, initially, states in their entirety were responsible for terrorism, and later the blame was put on "weak", "irresponsible" and "repressive" states for enabling international terrorist organizations to operate on their territories. The Security Council passed resolutions in which it classified terrorist acts according to the nature of the act but also to the nature of the perpetrator, which resulted in treating all acts of a previously designated terrorist organization as terrorist acts. The research also determined that during the adoption of certain resolutions, political expediency influenced the fact that similar behaviors do not always qualify as terrorist acts. Based on the previously derived conclusions, it could be said that the complexity of fight against terrorism is a consequence of the primacy of the political criterion in designation of an act of violence as a terrorist act, and not because of the difficulties in defining the notion of terrorism. Changes in the concept of terrorism in the Security Council Resolutions and their harmonization with the prevailing public discourse coincides with the efforts of the United States and other Western countries to reshape the international community and establish a new world order. In such circumstances, terrorism becomes an offensive political tool of hybrid warfare, with the negative connotation of terrorism being exploited in two ways. First, terrorism has become a political assessment of one's actions, regardless of the nature of the such activities. Second, terrorism has become a violent political tool which, depending on the interests of those in the position to evaluate certain behaviors, will not be labeled as terrorism in each situation, but rather as a legitimate form of political action at times. Offensive character of the decision leads to the neglect of scientific criteria in favor of political expediency in the process of terrorist act designation. Dominance of the political criterion in designation of a terrorist act influences the instrumentalisation of terrorism and its transformation into an effective means of hybrid warfare. Content of hybrid warfare is not a consequence of an unlimited variety of weapons used, nor their sophistication, but the ability of security management to apply such combinations of different, yet mutually compatible types of warfare in order to achieve a previously determined aim. These are reasons why terrorism, as a form of complex political violence, is exploited in hybrid warfare. Based on the results of the research, three models of exploitation of terrorism for the purposes of hybrid warfare are described. The First Model of exploitation is derived from the political practice of the United States to put countries on the U.S list of state sponsors of terrorism. In accordance with the political and any other influence that the United States has, this practice and its consequences are formally or informally accepted around the world. The main consequences of being placed on the List are sanctions, discredit on the international level and legitimization of measures against such states, while at the same time putting pressure on countries that are not on the List to harmonize their policies with the interests of great powers. The Second Model of exploitation of terrorism for the purpose of hybrid warfare consists of organizing, financing, equipping, training and directing surrogate forces against the governments of countries with whom compatibility of interests has not been achieved, where surrogate forces are presented in the public discourse as freedom fighters. The subject of exploitation in the Second Model is violence that meets the theoretical criteria to be designated as terrorism. However, due to its political expediency it is qualified as a fight for freedom, resistance against oppression etc. The exploitation of violence used in the second model is done with the intention of shifting political power in order to create autonomous regions or states that would be cooperative with the policy of the state that applies the Second Model or as a part of a broader strategy for managing security processes. The Third Model of exploitation of terrorism for the purposes of hybrid warfare implies organization and managing of surrogate forces that are qualified as terrorist organizations or infiltrating individuals into original and independent popular uprisings in order to take leadership positions and manage their actions in accordance with the interests of the state which apply the Third Model. The subject of exploitation in the Third Model is violence that is qualified as terrorism, with multiple goals: 1. Violence and fear that arises as a result of terrorist acts allows crisis management in the country targeted by aggression or in the region in need of political and territorial control, with or without the physical presence of the armed forces of the State applying the Third Model; 2. Creating fear of potential terrorist attacks in order to exert latent political pressure on states to be cooperative, and 3. Creating reasons for a military intervention which results in physical presence and political control of a certain state or region. Based on the previously presented research results, it may be concluded that the first step to prevent terrorist exploitation against our country should be to eliminate or reduce the potential for social conflicts driven by social contradictions. For this reason, an analysis of the normative - political and institutional framework in the relevant areas of social life was conducted. The research has determined that in the Republic of Serbia there is a good basis for engaging and integrating all resources of national power in terms of achieving national security. In addition, there is a need to harmonize the current political and institutional framework for national security with such possibilities. As a result of the research, three groups of measures have been proposed: elimination or reduction of the potential for social conflicts; establishment of an effective and integrated institutional framework for countering political violence that may arise from the aforementioned contradictions, and elimination and reduction of harmful consequences of such political violence.
Traditional arts and crafts reflect the degree of development in any society, and the history of traditional arts and crafts of any people is part of the social and cultural history of the people in which the utilitarian function is combined with religious functions, customs, traditions and inherited values.The handicrafts sector is of great interest in most countries of the world,and efforts are increasing at the national, regional and international levels to emphasize the social and cultural importance of crafts, traditional arts and handicrafts as part of the national heritage, not only interest is not limited to cultural and social aspects, but also the economic aspects of the importance of taking advantage of the available possibilities, whether those possibilities related to human resources that have distinct skills in craft activities or to increase the use of raw materials available in the local environment, or other possibilities available in some of the relevant parts, which can be utilized in the development of the arts and heritage sector ,some countries focus on the development of this sector, because of the importance of its products in attracting tourists and increasing their numbers Problem statement: One of the most serious problems that face handicrafts and traditional arts today is that it is far from its origins as a result of the influence of the arts coming from outside of our cultural environment, as well, the terrible industrial and technological progress we are witnessing today. Some believe that handicrafts are threatened with extinction due to the accuracy of their manufacture and their low yield ,however, the call for their return to the origins does not necessarily follow the old traditions without innovation and creativity, but is to preserve the originality with the utilize of sufficient provided by new technologies .There is no doubt that the academic institutions have a great role in reviving and rooting the heritage and folklore in the hearts and minds of young people, they are able to play this role, through which can transfer and display many of the crafts , folklore and preserve them from extinction, and highlights the importance of the participation of academic institutions in developing scientific and practical solutions to the problems related to the development of these traditional crafts and heritage arts, to overcome the problem of continuous and steady increase in the quantities and qualities of products and craft goods from abroad, which represents the optimum utilization of human resources and environment of those crafts ,which represents an impressive point in supporting the tourism industry , This is the problem of the study Crafts and heritage arts are considered a civilizational product for thousands of years of living interaction between communities and in the context of processes of economic, social and cultural change, crafts and heritage arts are declining, and their preserving is not a luxury but a duty to preserve identity because of its cultural, economic, social and political dimensions, this requires a more modern and interconnected development, so that it can deal with the changes of the times and its mechanisms and then its tools and the problem of research is focused on recognizing the role of academic institutions in the development of. Crafts and heritage arts in society by linking the education process to the needs and variables of comprehensive development, and supporting the intellectual and creativity capabilities of traditional crafts. This is the problem of the study, which must be considered and addressed through the provision of scientific studies and the development of a proposed vision for the development of traditional crafts and heritage arts, by getting benefit of the available resources and adding required environmental products that can compete locally and globally, as well as developing innovative capabilities and training young people to work in competitive fields that provide job opportunities and releasing creative energies that small producers have. this research aims to -activating the role of academic institutions in supporting the system of crafts and heritage arts to contribute to develop , highlight the most important problems of heritage crafts and Arts and setting the criteria to be observed for their preservation and advancement ,Preparing a strategy for the revival of heritage crafts and Arts according to the needs and requirements of the era and directing the attention of officials to the importance of this strategy and Developing the innovation of students in academic institutions and guiding them on how to how to benefit from applied courses in the promotion of heritage arts and crafts , The importance of research lies in increasing awareness and promoting belonging towards the love of heritage, for the revival, heritage arts and crafts in the hearts of young ,the study shows the importance of the arts and crafts sector in the employment of labor and decrease the negative effects of unemployment, the preservation and innovative application of crafts and heritage arts Proportionately modern life and This study can be used for graduates to prepare small industrial projects. Methodology: this research use Descriptive analytical method, Results: this research reached many results , including ,Heritage arts can be revived and preserved from extinction by teaching them in arts courses of academic institutions , heritage crafts and arts contribute in achieving balanced regional development, covering urban and rural areas, Investment in heritage crafts reflects an aspect of national identity and an effective tool in preserving heritage, Benefiting from academic artistic output, effectively contributes to the development and revival of heritage arts and crafts and Arts programs in academic institutions have an active role in the development of heritage crafts and arts
Droughts and climate-change-driven warming are leading to more frequent and intense wildfires1,2,3, arguably contributing to the severe 2019–2020 Australian wildfires4. The environmental and ecological impacts of the fires include loss of habitats and the emission of substantial amounts of atmospheric aerosols5,6,7. Aerosol emissions from wildfires can lead to the atmospheric transport of macronutrients and bio-essential trace metals such as nitrogen and iron, respectively8,9,10. It has been suggested that the oceanic deposition of wildfire aerosols can relieve nutrient limitations and, consequently, enhance marine productivity11,12, but direct observations are lacking. Here we use satellite and autonomous biogeochemical Argo float data to evaluate the effect of 2019–2020 Australian wildfire aerosol deposition on phytoplankton productivity. We find anomalously widespread phytoplankton blooms from December 2019 to March 2020 in the Southern Ocean downwind of Australia. Aerosol samples originating from the Australian wildfires contained a high iron content and atmospheric trajectories show that these aerosols were likely to be transported to the bloom regions, suggesting that the blooms resulted from the fertilization of the iron-limited waters of the Southern Ocean. Climate models project more frequent and severe wildfires in many regions1,2,3. A greater appreciation of the links between wildfires, pyrogenic aerosols13, nutrient cycling and marine photosynthesis could improve our understanding of the contemporary and glacial–interglacial cycling of atmospheric CO2 and the global climate system. ; Analyses of satellite aerosol observations used in this study were produced with the Giovanni online data system, developed and maintained by the NASA GES DISC. We thank SeaWiFS and MODIS mission scientists and associated NASA personnel for the production of the data used in this research effort. The BGC-Argo data were collected and made freely available by the International Argo Program and the national programs that contribute to it (http://www.argo.ucsd.edu, http://argo.jcommops.org). The Argo Program is part of the Global Ocean Observing System (https://doi.org/10.17882/42182). W.T. is supported by the Harry H. Hess Postdoctoral Fellowship from Princeton University. N.C. is supported by the "Laboratoire d'Excellence" LabexMER (ANR‐10‐LABX‐19) and co-funded by a grant from the French government under the program "Investissements d'Avenir". S.B. acknowledges the AXA Research Fund for the support of the long-term research line on Sand and Dust Storms at the Barcelona Supercomputing Center (BSC) and CAMS Global Validation (CAMS-84). P.G.S., J.L., M.M.G.P. and A.R.B. are supported by the Australian Research Council Discovery Projects scheme (DP190103504). P.G.S. and J.W. are supported by the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Climate Extremes (CLEX: CE170100023). J.L. is supported by the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement no. 754433. A.R.B. is supported by the Australian Research Council Future Fellowship scheme (FT130100037). R.M. is supported by the CSIRO Decadal Climate Forecasting Project. We thank M. Strzelec, M. East, T. Holmes, M. Corkill, S. Meyerink and the Wellington Park Management Trust for help with installation and sampling the Tasmanian aerosol time-series station; A. Townsend for iron aerosol analyses by ICPMS at the University of Tasmania; and A. Benedetti and S. Remy for providing insights on the validation of aerosol reanalysis. ; Peer Reviewed ; "Article signat per 15 autors/es: Weiyi Tang, Joan Llort, Jakob Weis, Morgane M. G. Perron, Sara Basart, Zuchuan Li, Shubha Sathyendranath, Thomas Jackson, Estrella Sanz Rodriguez, Bernadette C. Proemse, Andrew R. Bowie, Christina Schallenberg, Peter G. Strutton, Richard Matear & Nicolas Cassar" ; Postprint (author's final draft)
