Suchergebnisse

Although member states are obliged to transpose directives into domestic law in a conformable manner and receive considerable time for their transposition activities, we identify three levels of transposition outcomes for EU directives: conformable, partially conformable and non-conformable. Compared with existing transposition models, which do not distinguish between different transposition outcomes, we examine the factors influencing each transposition process by means of a competing risk analysis. We find that preference-related factors, in particular the disagreement of a member state and the Commission regarding a directive's outcome, play a much more strategic role than has to date acknowledged in the transposition literature. Whereas disagreement of a member state delays conformable transposition, it speeds up non-conformable transposition. Disagreement of the Commission only prolongs the transposition process. We therefore conclude that a stronger focus on an effective sanctioning mechanism is warranted for safeguarding compliance with directives.

This article introduces a novel approach for generating agenda-related estimates of the policy positions of political parties from party manifestos and expert surveys. We show that current party estimates provide for little variation across policy areas and over time. In response, we propose to relate the issue-specific ideological preference profiles of political parties to the legislative context. For the dimensional representation of policy positions of political parties our procedure weights the issue-specific preference profiles by their prominence on the agenda of each policy area. We apply this procedure to EU legislation and locate national political parties on a national/supranational and left/right dimension, which can be used for the analysis of Council decision-making.

The theory of issue evolution predicts that the dimensional space of party competition is simple. We contrast this prediction with the expectation that a complicated multi-party system, such as the one in France, produces a more complicated dimensional structure. To test this claim, we examine the longitudinal structure of the policy preferences that underlie public opinion in France. Using surveys of preferences as a basic data source, we are able to extract two latent dimensions that almost fully explain the reported preferences. Both dimensions are defined by the left–right structure of the French party system. Whereas one is the traditional socioeconomic domain, the other comprises a wide array of new cultural issues. The orthogonal solution, however, does not produce the expected socioeconomic and cultural dimensions. Thus we impose our prior belief in the socioeconomic and cultural content and rotate the two dimensions independently to maximize fit with the two prior dimensions. We show that the same two-dimensional structure is also present in cross-sectional data, and can be used to position parties in the two-dimensional space. Moreover, we find that the two dimensions are closely connected, despite their completely different content. The explanation, which arises from the theory of issue evolution, is that the meaning of left–right is dynamic as well as elastic and incorporates new issues as they arise.