In response to Hansson Wahlberg, this paper argues, first, that he misunderstands the redescription principle developed in my book The Causal Power of Social Structures, and second, that his criticisms rest on an ontological individualism that is taken for granted but in fact lacks an adequate ontological justification of its own.
An assessment of Joel Isaac's recent, well-researched attempt to provide a context for the emergence of Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. That context consisted in the open space for cross-disciplinary projects between the natural and social sciences that existed at Harvard during the presidency of James Bryant Conant, from the early 1930s to the early 1950s. Isaac's work at the Harvard archives adds interesting detail to a story whose general contours are already known. In particular, he reinforces the view that the guiding intellectual presence of what Isaac dubs Harvard's "interstitial academy" was the biochemist Lawrence Henderson, someone who was enamored of Vilfredo Pareto's version of scientism and was materially supported by the Rockefeller Foundation's interest in increasing worker productivity. Isaac fails to consider the normative implications of Henderson's vision, which influenced Talcott Parsons even more deeply than Kuhn. Isaac's book is read in light of this concern, which reveals a profound sense of what is required of the sort of future elite policy maker that Harvard hoped to train: namely, a systems-based orientation that is at the same time tolerant of considerable intrasystemic incommensurability. The epistemological and ethical aspects of this prescription are analyzed.
In this paper, I provide a qualified defense of the claim that cognitive biases are not necessarily signs of irrationality, but rather the result of using normative standards that are too narrow. I show that under certain circumstances, behavior that violates traditional norms of rationality can be adaptive. Yet, I express some reservations about the claim that we should replace our traditional normative standards. Furthermore, I throw doubt on the claim that the replacement of normative standards would license optimistic verdicts about human rationality.
Mario Bunge offers here a political philosophy and a view of current politics as judged by his vision of an integrated democracy that is thoroughly green, quasi-communalist, participatory, and quasi-socialist; all enterprises there belong to their workers. He tempers his egalitarianism with some meritocracy. His vision is impracticable but deserves examination.
Drawing general inferences on the basis of single-case and small- n studies is often seen as problematic. This article suggests a logic of generalization based on thinly rationalistic social mechanisms. Ideal-type mechanisms can be derived from empirical observations in one case and, based on the assumption of thin rationality, used as a generalizing bridge to other contexts with similar actor constellations. Thus, the "portability" builds on expectations about similar mechanisms operating in similar contexts. We present the general logic behind such "rationalistic generalization" and relate it to other ideas about generalization from single-case studies.
Paul Roth claims that "interpretivists" in the philosophy of social sciences like Charles Taylor assume a positivist caricature of natural science to motivate their arguments against naturalism in the social sciences. Roth argues that not only is adopting the view of meaning relied upon by those he sometimes refers to as the "friends of understanding" unmotivated once the critique of positivism has been taken on board, he argues further that Quine has shown why this "meaning realism" is unavailable in principle. Roth bolsters his use of Quine against interpretivists by referring to Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein on rule-following. But McDowell has shown how Kripke overlooks an alternative reading of those remarks, which provides "interpretivists" with arguments against mainstream naturalism and which makes no use of anything resembling "meaning realism." This opening for interpretivists is actually already present in Roth's discussion of the distinction between "thin" and "thick" description. This suggests how mainstream naturalism itself might be rethought to accommodate interpretivism.
In a recent article in this journal, Del Mar offered two main criticisms of Marmor's account of social conventions. The first took issue with Marmor's claim that the constitutive rules of games and kindred social practices determine in an objective way their central aims and values; the second charged Marmor with scanting the historical context in which conventions do their important normative work in shaping the goals of games. I argue that Del Mar's criticism of Marmor's account of the normative centrality and force of constitutive rules in games and the like fails, but that his criticism faulting Marmor for giving short shrift to the normative work conventions do in these social practices is on the mark. So while I reject Del Mar's claim that a closer look at the social and historical contexts in which the conventions of games and the like carry out their normative tasks undermines Marmor's account of constitutive rules, I think his argument that conventions play a far more important, even if supplementary, role in shaping our understanding of and participation in these social practices than Marmor allows is persuasive.
In this review essay, I examine the central tenets of sociologist Dave Elder-Vass's recent contribution to social ontology, as put forth in his book The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, Structure and Agency. Elder-Vass takes issue with ontological individualists and maintains that social structures exist and have causal powers in their own right. I argue that he fails to establish his main theses: he shows neither that social structures have causal powers "in their own right" (in any sense of this expression) nor that they exist.
The common assumption is that if a group comprising moral agents can act intentionally, as a group, then the group itself can also be properly regarded as a moral agent with respect to that action. I argue, however, that this common assumption is the result of a problematic line of reasoning I refer to as "the collective fallacy." Recognizing the collective fallacy as a fallacy allows us to see that if there are, in fact, irreducibly joint actors, then some of them will lack the full-fledged moral agency of their members. The descriptivist question of whether a group can perform irreducibly joint intentional action need not rise and fall with the normative question of whether a group can be a moral agent.
This paper discusses the so-called non-interference assumption (NIA) grounding causal inference in trials in both medicine and the social sciences. It states that for each participant in the experiment, the value of the potential outcome depends only upon whether she or he gets the treatment. Drawing on methodological discussion in clinical trials and laboratory experiments in economics, I defend the necessity of partial forms of blinding as a warrant of the NIA, to control the participants' expectations and their strategic interactions with the experimenter.
