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Theory Talk #75: Tarak Barkawi on IR after the West, and why the best work in IR is often found at its marginsIn this Talk, Tarak Barkawi discusses the importance of the archive and real-world experiences, at a time of growing institutional constraints. He reflects on the growing rationalization and "schoolification" of the academy, a disciplinary and epistemological politics institutionalized within a university audit culture, and the future of IR in a post-COVID world. He also discusses IR's contorted relationship to the archive, and explore future sites of critical innovation and inquiry, including the value of knowledge production outside of the academy. PDF version of this TalkSo what is, or should be, according to you, the biggest challenge, or principal debate in critical social sciences and history?Right now, despite thinking about it, I don't have an answer to that question. Had you asked me five years ago, I would have said, without hesitation, Eurocentrism. There's a line in Chakrabarty's Provincializing Europe where he remarks that Europe has already been provincialized by history, but we still needed to provincialize it intellectually in the social sciences. Both sides of this equation have intensified in recent years. Amid a pandemic, in the wreckage of neoliberalism, in the wake of financial crisis, the defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan, the events of the Trump Presidency, and the return of the far right, the West feels fundamentally reduced in stature. The academy, meanwhile, has moved on from the postcolonial to the decolonial with its focus on alternative epistemologies, about which I am more ambivalent intellectually and politically. Western states and societies are powerful and rich, their freedoms attractive, and most of them will rebound. But what does it mean for the social sciences and other Western intellectual traditions which trace their heritage to the European Enlightenments that the West may no longer be 'the West', no longer the metropole of a global order more or less controlled by its leading states? What kind of implications does the disassembling of the West in world history have for social and political inquiry? I don't have an answer to that. Speaking more specifically about IR, we are dealing now with conservative appropriations of Eurocentrism, with the rise of other civilizational IRs (Chinese, European, Indian). These kinds of moves, like the decolonial one, foreground ultimately incommensurable systems of knowing and valuing, at best, and at worst are Eurocentrism with the signs reversed, usually to China. I do not think what we should be doing right now in the academy is having Chinese social sciences, Islamic social sciences, Indian social sciences, and so on. But that's definitely one way in which the collapse of the West is playing out intellectually. How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about International Relations?By the time you get to my age you have a lot of debt, mostly to students, to old teachers and supervisors, and to colleagues and friends. University scholars tend not to have very exciting lives, so I don't have much to offer in the way of events. But I can give you an experience that I do keep revisiting when I reflect on the directions I've taken and the things I've been interested in. When I was in high school, I took a university course taught by Daniel Ellsberg, of the Pentagon Papers. As many will know, before he became involved in the Vietnam War, and later in opposing it, he worked on game theory and nuclear strategy. I grew up in Southern California, in Orange County, and there was a program that let you take courses at the University of California, Irvine. I took one on the history of the Roman Empire and then a pair of courses on nuclear weapons that culminated with one taught by Ellsberg himself. I actually had no idea who he was but the topic interested me. Nuclear war was in the air in the early 1980s. Activist graduate students taught the preparatory course. They were good teachers and I learned all about the history and politics of nuclear weapons. But I also came to realize that these teachers were trying to shape (what I would now call) my political subjectivity. Sometimes they were ham handed, like the old ball bearings in the tin can trick: turn the lights out in the room, and put one ball bearing in the can for each nuclear warhead in the world, in 1945 this many; in 1955 this many; and so on. In retrospect, that's where I got hooked on the idea of graduate school. I was aware that Ellsberg was regarded as an important personage. He taught in a large lecture hall. At every session, a kind of loyal corps of new and old activists turned out, many in some version of '60s attire. The father of a high school friend was desperate to get Ellsberg's autograph, and sent his son along with me to the lecture one night to get it. It was political instruction of the first order to figure out that this suburban dad had been a physics PhD at Berkley in the late '60s and early '70s, demonstrating against the Vietnam War. But now he worked for a major aerospace defense contractor. He had a hot tub in his backyard. Meanwhile, Ellsberg cancelled class one week because he'd been arrested demonstrating at a major arms fair in Los Angeles. "We stopped the arms race for a few hours," he told the class after. I schooled myself on who Ellsberg was and Vietnam, the Cold War, and much else came into view. Meanwhile, he gave a master class in nuclear weapons and foreign policy, cheekily naming his course after Kissinger's book, I later came to appreciate. I learned about RAND, the utility of madness for making nuclear threats, and how close we'd come to nuclear war since 1945. My high school had actually been built to double as a fallout shelter, at a time when civil defense was taken seriously as an aspect of a credible threat of second strike. It was low slung, stoutly built, with high iron fences that could be closed to create a cantonment. We were not far from Seal Beach Naval Weapons Station and a range of other likely targets. All of this sank in as I progressed in these courses. Then one day at a strip mall bookstore, I discovered Noam Chomsky's US foreign policy books and never looked back. At Cambridge, I caught the tail end of the old Centre of International Studies, originally started by an intelligence historian and explicitly multi-disciplinary. It had, in my time, historians, lawyers, area studies, development studies, political theory and history of thought, and IR scholars and political scientists. Boundaries certainly existed out there in the disciplines. But there weren't substantial institutional obstacles to thinking across them, while interdisciplinary environments gave you lots of local resources (i.e. colleagues and students) for thinking and reading creatively. What would a student need to become a kind of specialist in your kind of area or field or to understand the world in a global way? Lots of history, especially other peoples' histories; to experience what it's like to see the world from a different place than where you grew up, so that the foreign is not an abstraction to you. I think another route that can create very interesting scholars is to have a practitioner career first, in development, the military, a diplomatic corps, NGOs, whatever. Even only five years doing something like that not only teaches people how the world works, it is intellectually fecund, creative. People just out of operational posts are often full of ideas, and can access interesting resources for research, like professional networks. How, in your view, should IR responding to the shifting geopolitical landscape?  The fate I think we want to avoid is carrying on with what Stanley Hoffmann called the "American social science": the IR invented out of imperial crisis and world war by Anglo-American officials, foundations and thinkers. Very broadly speaking, and with variations, this was a new world combination of realism and positivism. This discipline was intended as the intellectual counterpart to the American-centered world order, designed, among other things, to disappear the question of race in the century of the global color line. The way it conceived the national/international world obscured how US world power worked in practice. That power operated in and through formally sovereign, independent states—an empire by invitation, in the somewhat rosy view of Geir Lundestad—trialed in Latin America and well suited to a decolonizing world. It was an anti-colonial imperium. Political science divided up this world between IR and comparative politics. This kind of IR is cortically connected to the American-centered world fading away before our eyes. It is a kind of zombie discipline where we teach students about world politics as if we were still sitting with the great power peacemakers of 1919 and 1944-45. It is still studying how to make states cooperate under a hegemon or how to make credible deterrence threats in various circumstances. Interestingly, I think one of the ways the collapse of US power is shaping the discipline was identified by Walt and Mearsheimer in their 2013 article on the decline of theory in IR. In the US especially but not only, IR is increasingly indistinguishable from political science as a universal positivist enterprise mostly interested in applying highly evolved, quantitative or experimental approaches to more or less minor questions. Go too far down this road and IR disappears as a distinct disciplinary space, it becomes just a subject matter, a site of empiricist inquiry. Instead, the best work in IR mostly occurs on the edges of the discipline. IR often serves as cover for diverse and interdisciplinary work on transboundary relations. Those relations fall outside the core objects of analysis of the main social science and humanities disciplines but are IR's distinctive focus. The mainstream, inter-paradigm discipline, for me, has never been a convincing social science of the international and is not something I teach or think much about these days. But the classical inheritances of the discipline help IR retain significant historical, philosophical and normative dimensions. Add in a pluralist disposition towards methodology, and IR can be a unique intellectual space capable of producing scholars and scholarship that operate across disciplines. The new materialism, or political ecology, is one area in which this is really happening right now. IR is also a receptive home for debating the questions thrown up by the decolonial turn. These are two big themes in contemporary intellectual life, in and beyond the academy. IR potentially offers distinct perspectives on them which can push debates forward in unexpected ways, in part because we retain a focus on the political and the state, which too easily drop out of sight in global turns in other disciplines. In exchange, topics like the new materialism and the decolonial offer IR the chance to connect with world politics in these new times, after the American century. In my view, and it is not one that I think is widely shared, IR should become the "studies" discipline that centers on the transboundary. How do we re-imagine IR as the interdisciplinary site for the study of transboundary relations as a distinct social and political space? That's a question of general interest in a global world, but one which few traditions of thought are as well-equipped to reflect on and push forward as we are.That's an interesting and forceful critique which also brings us back to a common thread throughout your work: questions of power and knowledge and specifically the relation between power and knowledge in IR and social science. I'm interested in exploring this point further, because so much of your critique has been centered on how profoundly Eurocentric IR is and as a product of Western power. Well, IR's development as a discipline has been closely tied to Western state power. It would seem that it has to change, given the shifts underway in the world. It's like Wile E. Coyote in the Road Runner cartoons - he's run off the cliff. His legs are still moving, but he hasn't dropped, yet. That said, there's no singularly determinate relation between power and the historical development of intellectual traditions. Who knows what kind of new ideas and re-imagining of IR's concepts we might see? As I say, I think one reflection of these changes is that we're already seeing North American IR start to fade into universal quantitative social science. As Hoffmann observed, part of IR's appeal was that the Americans were running the world, that's why you started a social science concerned with things like bipolarity and deterrence, and with analyzing the foreign policy of a great power and its interests and conflicts around the world. Nowadays the Americans are at a late Roman stage of imperial decline. Thinking from the command posts of US foreign policy doesn't look so attractive or convincing when Emperor Nero is running the show, or something altogether darker is waiting in the wings. IR is supposed to be in command of world politics, analyzing them from on high. But what I've seen over the course of my education and career is the way world politics commands IR. The end of the Cold War torpedoed many careers and projects; the 1990s created corps of scholars concerned with development, civil war and humanitarian intervention; in the 2000s, we produced terrorism experts (and critical terrorism studies) and counterinsurgency specialists and critics, along with many scholars concerned in one way or another with Islam. What I have always found fascinating, and deeply indicative, about IR is the relative absence until relatively recently of serious inquiry into power/knowledge relations or the sociology of knowledge. In 1998 when Ole Waever goes to look at some of these questions, he notes how little there was to work from then, before Oren, Vitalis, Guilhot and others published. It's an astounding observation. In area studies, in anthropology, in the history of science, in development studies, in all of these areas of inquiry so closely entangled with imperial and state power, there are long-running, well developed traditions of inquiry into power/knowledge relations. It's a well-recognized area of inquiry, not some fringe activity, and it's heavily empirical, primary sourced based, as well as interesting conceptually. In recent decades you've seen really significant work come out about the role of the Second World War in the development of game theory, and its continuing entwinement with the nuclear contest of the Cold War. I'm thinking here of S.M. Amadae, Paul Erickson, and Philip Mirowski among others. The knowledge forms the American social science used to study world politics were part and parcel of world politics, they were internal to histories of geopolitics rather than in command of them. Of course, for a social science that models itself on natural science, with methodologies that produce so-called objective knowledge, the idea that scientific knowledge itself is historical and power-ridden, well, you can't really make sense of that. You'd be put in the incoherent position of studying it objectively, as it were, with the same tools. IR arises from the terminal crisis of the British Empire; its political presuppositions and much else were fundamentally shaped by the worldwide anti-communist project of the US Cold War state; and it removed race as a term of inquiry into world politics during the century of the global color line. All this, and but for Hoffmann's essay, IR has no tradition of power/knowledge inquiry into its own house until recently? It's not credible intellectually. Anthropologists should be brought in to teach us how to do this kind of thing. You've been at the forefront of the notion of historical IR, and in investigating the relationship between history and theory – why is history important for IR?Well, I think I'd start with the question of what do we mean when we say history? For mainstream social science, it means facts in the past against which to test theories and explanations. For critical IR scholars, it usually means historicism, as that term is understood in social theory: social phenomena are historical, shaped by time and place. Class, state, race, nation, empire, war, these are all different in different contexts. While I think this is a very significant insight and one that I agree with, on its own it tends to imply that historical knowledge is available, that it can be found by reading historians. In fact, for both empiricism and historicism there is a presumption that you can pretty reliably find out what happened in the past. For me, this ignores a second kind of historicism, the historicism of history writing itself, the historiographical. The questions historians ask, how they inquire into them, the particular archives they use, the ways in which they construct meaning and significance in their narratives, the questions they don't ask, that about which they are silent, all of these, shape history writing, the history that we know about. The upshot is that the past is not stable; it keeps changing as these two meanings of historicism intertwine. We understand the Haitian revolution now, or the indigenous peoples of the Americas, entirely differently than we did just a few decades ago.That raises another twist to this problem. Many IR scholars access history through reading historians or through synthetic accounts; they encounter history by and large through secondary sources. One consequence is that they are often a generation or more behind university historians. Think of how Gaddis, for instance, remains a go to authority on the history of the Cold War in IR. In other disciplines, from the 1980s on, there was a historical turn that took scholars into the archives. Anthropologists and literary scholars used historians' tools to answers their own questions. The result was not just a bunch of history books, but entirely new readings of core questions. The classic example is the historical Shakespeare that Stephen Greenblatt found in the archives, rather than the one whose texts had been read by generations of students in English departments. My point here is that working in archives was conceptually, theoretically significant for these disciplines and the subjects they studied. For example, historical anthropology has given us new perspectives on imperialism. While there is some archival work in IR of course, especially in disciplinary history, it is not central to disciplinary debates and the purpose is usually theory testing in which the past appears as merely a bag of facts. In sum, when I say history and theory, I don't just mean thinking historically. I mean actually doing history, being an historian—which means archives—and in so doing becoming a better theorist. Could you expand on these points by telling us about your recent work on military history? I think that military history is particularly interesting because it is a site where war is reproduced and shaped. Military history participates in that which it purports only to study. Popular military histories shape the identities of publics. Staff college versions are about learning lessons and fighting war better the next time. People who grow up wanting to be soldiers often read about them in history books. So our historical knowledge of war, and war as a social and historical process, are wrapped up together. I hope some sense of the promise of power/knowledge studies for larger questions comes through here. I'm saying that part of what war is as a social phenomenon is history writing about it. It's in this kind of context that the fact that a great deal of military history is actually written by veterans, often of the very campaigns of which they write, becomes interesting. Battle produces its own historians. This is a tradition that goes back to European antiquity, soldiers and commanders returning to write histories, the histories, of the wars they fought in. So this question of veterans' history writing is in constitutive relations with warfare, and with the West and its nations and armies. My shorthand for the particular area of this I want to look into is what I call "White men's military histories". That is, Western military history in the modern era is racialized, not just about enemies but about the White identities constructed in and through it. And I want to look at the way this is done in campaigns against racialized others, particularly situations where defeats and reverses were inflicted on the Westerners. How were such events and experiences made sense of historically? How were they mediated in and through military history? I think defeats are particularly productive, incitements to discourse and sense making. To think about these questions, I want to look at the place of veterans in the production of military histories, as authors, sources, communities of interpretation. My sandbox is the tumultuous first year of the Korean War, where US forces suffered publically-evident reverses and risked being pushed into the sea. In a variety of ways, veterans shape military history, through their questions, their grievances, their struggles over reputation, their memories. This happens at many different sites and scales, including official and popular histories, and the networks of veterans behind them as well as other, independently published works. Over the course of veterans' lives, their war throws up questions and issues that become the subject of sometimes dueling and contradictory accounts. Through their history writing, they connect their war experience to Western traditions of battle historiography. They make their war speak to other wars. This is what military history is, and how it can come to produce and reproduce practices of war-making, at least in Anglo-American context. Of course, much of this history writing, like narrations of experience generally, reflects dominant ideologies, in this case discourses of the US Cold War in Asia. But counter-historians are also to be found among soldiers. The shocks and tragic absurdities of any given war produce research questions of their own. At risk of mixing metaphors, the veterans know where the skeletons are buried. They bear resentments and grievances about how their war was conducted that become research topics, and they often have the networks and wherewithal to produce informed and systematic accounts. So as well as reproducing hegemonic discourses, soldier historians are also interesting as a new critical resource for understanding war.This shouldn't be that surprising. In other areas of inquiry, amateur and practitioner scholars have often been a source of critical innovation. LGBTQ history starts outside the academy, among activists who turned their apartments into archives. Much of what we now call postcolonial scholarship also began outside the academy, among colonized intellectuals involved in anti-imperial struggles. Let me close this off by going back to the archive. There are really rich sources for this kind of project. Military historians of all kinds leave behind papers full of their research materials and correspondence. The commanders and others they wrote about often waged extended epistolary campaigns concerned with correcting and shaping the historical record. But more than this, by situating archival sources alongside what later became researched and published histories, what drops out and what goes in to military history comes into view. What is silenced, and what is given voice? We can then see how the violent and forlorn episodes of war are turned into narrated events with military meaning. What is the process by which war experience becomes military history?Given the interdisciplinary nature of your work, what field you place yourself in? And are there any problems have you encountered when writing and thinking across scholarly boundaries?In my head I live in a kind of idealized interdisciplinary war studies, and my field is the intersection of war and empire. Sort of Michael Howard meets Critical Theory and Frantz Fanon. This has given me a particular voice in critical IR broadly conceived, and a distinctive place from which to engage the discipline. The mostly UK departments I've been in have been broadly hospitable places in practice for interdisciplinary scholarship and teaching, so long as you published rather than perished. Of course, interdisciplinary is a complicated word. It is one thing to be multi-disciplinary, to publish in the core journals of more than one discipline and to be recognized and read by scholars in more than one discipline. But work that falls between disciplinary centers, which takes up questions and offers answers recognized centrally by no discipline, that's something harder to deal with. I thought after Soldiers of Empire won prizes in two disciplines that I'd have an easier time getting funding for the project I described earlier in the interview. But I've gotten nowhere, despite years of applications to a variety of US, UK, and European funders. Of course, this may be because it is a bad project! My point, though, is that disciplines necessarily, and even rightly, privilege work that speaks to central questions; that's the work that naturally takes on significance in disciplinary contexts, as in many grant or scholarship panels. I think another point here is the nature of the times. Understandably, no one is particularly interested right now in White men's military histories. What I think has really empowered disciplines during my time in the UK academy has been the intersection with audit culture and university management. Repeated waves of rationalization have washed over the UK academy, which have emphasized discipline as a unit of measurement and management even as departments themselves were often "schoolified" into more or less odd combinations of disciplines. Schoolification helped to break down old solidarities and identities, while audit culture needed something on which to base its measures. The great victory of neoliberalism over the academy is evident in the way it is just accepted now that performance has to be assessed by various public criteria. This is where top disciplinary journals enter the picture, as unquestionable (and quantifiable) indicators of excellence. Interdisciplinary journals don't have the same recognition, constituency, or obvious significance. To put it in IR terms, Environment and Planning D or Comparative Studies in Society and History, to take two top journals that interdisciplinary IR types publish in, will never have the same weight as, say, ISQ or APSR. That that seems natural is an indicator of change—when I started, RIS—traditionally welcoming of interdisciplinary scholarship—was seen as just as good a place to publish as any US journal. Now RIS is perceived as merely a "national" journal while ISQ and APSR are "international" or world-class. This kind of thing has consequences for careers and the make-up of departments. What I'm drawing attention to is not so much an intellectual or academic debate; scholars always disagree on what good scholarship is, which is how it is supposed to be. It is rather the combination of discipline with the suffocating culture of petty management that pervades so much of British life. Get your disciplinary and epistemological politics institutionalized in an audit culture environment, and you can really expand. For example, the professionalization of methods training in the UK has worked as a kind of Trojan Horse for quantitative and positivist approaches within disciplines. In IR, in the potted geographic lingo we use, that has meant more US style work. Disappearing is the idea of IR as an "inter-discipline," where departments have multi-disciplinary identities like I described above. The US idea that IR is part of political science is much more the common sense now than it was in the UK. Another dimension of the eclipse of interdisciplinary IR has been the rise of quantitative European political science, boosted by large, multiyear grants from the ERC and national research councils. It's pretty crazy, strategically speaking, for the UK to establish a civilizational scale where you're always behind the US or its European counterparts. You'll never do North American IR as well as the North Americans do, especially given the disparity in resources. You'll always be trending second or third tier. The British do like to beat themselves up. Meanwhile, making US political science journals the practical standard for "international excellence" threatens to make the environment toxic for the very scholarship that has made British IR distinctive and attractive globally. The upshot of that will be another wave of émigré scholars, which the British academy's crises and reform initiatives produce from time to time. Think of the generation of UK IR scholars who decamped to Australia, an academy poised to prosper in the post-covid world (if the government there can get its vaccination program on track) and a major site right now of really innovative IR scholarship. To return to what you mentioned earlier regarding the hesitancy to go to the archives, this is also mirrored in a hesitancy to do serious ethnography, I think as well. Or there's this "doing ethnography" that involves a three-day field trip. This kind of sweet-shop 'pick and mix' has come to characterize some methodologies, because of these constraints that you highlight…A lot of what I'm talking about has happened within universities, it's not externally imposed or a direct consequence of the various government-run assessment exercises. Academics, eagerly assisted by university managers, have done a lot of this to themselves and their students. The implications can be far reaching for the kind of scholarship that departments foster, from PhDs on up. More and more of the UK PhD is taken up with research methods courses, largely oriented around positivism even if they have critical components. Already this gives a directionality to ideas. The advantage of the traditional UK PhD—working on your own with a supervisor to produce a piece of research—has been intellectual freedom, even when the supervisor wasn't doing their job properly. It's not great, but the possibility for creative, innovative, even field changing scholarship was retained. PhD students weren't disciplined, so to speak. What happens now is that PhD students are subject to a very strict four year deadline, often only partially funded, their universities caring mainly about timely completion not placement and preparation for a scholarly career, a classic case of the measurement displacing the substantive value. The formal coursework they get is methods driven. You can supervise interdisciplinary PhD research in this kind of environment, but it's not easy and poses real risks and creates myriad obstacles for the student. A strange consequence of this, as many of my master's students will tell you, is that I often advise them to consider US PhDs, just in other disciplines. That way, they get the benefit of rigorous PhD level coursework beyond methods. They can do so in disciplines like history or anthropology that are currently receptive both to the critical and the transnational/transboundary. That is not a great outcome for UK IR, even if it may be for critically-minded students. Outside of a very few institutions and scattered individuals, US political science, of course, has largely cleansed itself of the critical and alternative approaches that had started to flower in the glasnost era of the 1990s. That is not something we should be seeking to emulate in the UK.So yes, there's much to say here, about how the four year PhD has materially shaped scholarship in the UK. There is generally very little funding for field work. Universities worried about liability have put all kinds of obstacles in the way of students trying to get to field work sites. Requirements like insisting that students be in residence for their fourth year in order to write up and submit on time further limit the possibilities for field work. The upshot is to make the PhD dissertation more a library exercise or to favor the kind of quantitative, data science work that fits more easily into these time constraints and structures. Again, quite obviously, power sculpts knowledge. It becomes simply impossible, within the PhD, to do the kinds of things associated with serious qualitative scholarship, like learn languages, spend long time periods in field sites and to visit them more than once, to develop real networks there. Over time this shapes the academy, often in unintended ways. I think this is one of the reasons that IR in the UK has been so theoretic in character—what else can people do but read books, think and write in this kind of environment? As I say, the other kind of thing they can do is quantitative work, which takes us right back to the fate Walt and Mearsheimer sensed befalling IR as political science. Watch for IR and Data Science joint degrees as the next step in this evolution. Political Science in the US starts teaching methods at the freshman level. They get them young. We have discussed the rather grim state of affairs for the future of critical social science scholarship, at least in the UK and US. To conclude – what prospects for hope in the future are there?Well, if I had a public relations consultant pack, this is the point at which it would advise talking about children and the power of science to save us. I think the environment for universities, political, financial, and otherwise may get considerably more difficult. Little is untouchable in Western public life right now, it is only a question of when and in what ways they will come for us. The nationalist and far-right turns in Western politics feed off transgressing boundaries. There's no reason to suspect universities will be immune from this, and they haven't been. In the UK, as a consequence of Brexit, we are having to nationalise, and de-European-ise our scholarships and admissions processes. We are administratively enacting the surrender of cosmopolitan achievements in world politics and in academic life. This is not a plot but in no small measure the outcome of democratic will, registered in the large majority Boris Johnson's Conservatives won at the last general election. It will have far reaching consequences for UK university life. This is all pretty scary if you think, as I do, that we are nearer the beginning then the end of the rise of the right. Covid will supercharge some of these processes of de-globalization. I can already see an unholy alliance forming of university managers and introvert academics who will want to keep in place various dimensions of the online academic life that has taken shape since spring 2020. Often this will be justified by reference to environmental concerns and by the increased, if degraded, access that online events make possible. We are going to have a serious fight on our hands to retain our travel budgets at anywhere near pre-pandemic levels. I'm hoping that this generation of students, subjected to online education, will become warriors for in-person teaching. All of this said, it's hard to imagine a more interesting time to be teaching, thinking and writing about world politics. Politics quite evidently retains its capacity to turn the world upside down. Had you told US citizens where they would be on January 6th, 2021 in 2016, they would have called you alarmist if not outlandish. I think we're in for more moments like that. Tarak Barkawi is a professor of International Relations at LSE. He uses interdisciplinary approaches to imperial and military archives to re-imagine relations between war, armed forces and society in modern times. He has written on the pivotal place of armed force in globalization, imperialism, and modernization, and on the neglected significance of war in social and political theory and in histories of empire. His most recent book, Soldiers of Empire, examined the multicultural armies of British Asia in the Second World War, reconceiving Indian and British soldiers in cosmopolitan rather than national terms. Currently, he is working on the Korean War and the American experience of military defeat at the hands of those regarded as racially inferior. This new project explores soldiers' history writing as a site for war's constitutive presence in society and politics.PDF version of this Talk

By and large, we take our universities for granted. Indeed, the oldest have outlived political regimes of all kinds. This stimulating historical and comparative study exemplifies the importance of in-depth experience and engagement with the cultural and structural environments in which some of the world's greatest universities have over centuries incrementally developed and been embedded. This is crucial if we hope to understand the sources of their authority and myriad contributions to scientific knowledge and human flourishing. A neo-institutionalist scholar and multicultural citizen who fruitfully contributes to dialogues exploring core institutions in education and society on both sides of the Atlantic, Heinz-Dieter Meyer is uniquely placed to grapple with the complex processes of institutional learning and design that have made the German and American universities among the globally most productive. He also shows how they have influenced each other via the complex, yet crucial flows of inspired scholars and students carrying key idea(l)s with them for interpretation and application back home. The contributions of key actors, but also the outcomes of choices at critical junctures, such as the failure to establish a national state-funded university in the United States, take center stage in this engaging account of how the leaders of American universities adapted the German model, joining diverse concepts to design what has become the greatest uni-versity system in the world, yet one that remains nearly impossible to emulate due to the unique constellation of actors and institutional environment in which it developed. In eighteen chapters in four parts, The Design of the University: German, American, and "World Class" takes us from Göttingen and Berlin to Boston and to the world level as the scientific enterprise—and competition between scientists and the most crucial organizational form in which they conduct their experiments and make their arguments, the research university—becomes ever more global. Contributing to and inviting debate, Meyer's main argument is that the American university has suc-ceeded based upon an institutional design—or, perhaps, a non-design—that on multiple levels facil-itates self-government and the identification of a niche within an extraordinarily large and differen-tiated higher education system. This is not a full-fledged historiographic treatment of a subject fa-vored by academics (permanently searching for reputational gains) and policymakers (as they in-creasingly launch research funding programs and evaluation systems to foster competition). Rather than a full-fledged sociology of science, this book creatively sketches the trajectories of German and American university development, emphasizing affinities as well as crucial differences, to ulti-mately argue that in fact "Humboldt's most important ideas flourished in the American atmosphere of unrestricted institutional experimentation and vigorous self-government" (xiii). Interrogating what he calls the "design thinking" of eminent thinkers Adam Smith and Wilhelm von Humboldt, among others, Meyer traces the challenging, complex, and contingent learning processes in the adaptation of the German research university model to the American context, eventually becoming the most differentiated and "world-class" higher education system in the world. Asking about the reasons for the American university's success, especially in comparison to the recent insti-tutional crisis of the German research university, albeit still extraordinarily productive, Meyer argues that this American meritocratic success story has institutional design (of self-government) at its heart. Enjoying the patronage of not one, but three major institutions—state, church, and market—the American university attained true autonomy and global preeminence through unparalleled wealth of patronage and an intricate system of checks and balances. In this line of argument, chart-ing the ascendancy from humble origins of what can hardly be called a system due its extraordinary diversity, Meyer concurs with David Labaree (2017), who's A Perfect Mess [1] is a highly-suitable com-panion piece grounded in the history of American higher education. Contemporary architects of higher education policy globally, driven by the fantasy of "world class" labels, Meyer warns, have completely underestimated the "institutional, social, and political prerequisites that excellence in research and teaching require" (p. 4). Meyer begins his treatise, appropriately, in Göttingen, the site of Georgia Augusta University, where many leaders of American higher education, first and foremost Boston Brahmin George Ticknor, learned by doing, ensconced in a cosmopolitan center of learning and intellectual enlightenment. The blueprint included professionalized scholarship, the unification of research and teaching in seminars and lectures, freedom to choose among academic offerings, a vast library of scientific knowledge, and academic standing based on perpetual production of cutting-edge research judged by peers (p. 19). Instead of Adam Smith's preferred instruments of competition, choice, and tuition-dependence, Wilhelm von Humboldt's "design revolution" proposed "three unities" whose powerful integration could surpass the utilitarian logic prevalent then and now: "teaching and research; scien-tific discovery and moral formation (Bildung); scholarly autonomy and scholarly community" (p. 40). The book's second part, on institutional learning, charts the institutional migration of the blueprint; the contested design options of Gymnasium, college, and graduate school (the latter ultimately the key to global preeminence); the lasting influence of Protestantism (here Meyer follows the arguments of Max Weber, Robert K. Merton, and Joseph Ben-David) and extraordinary educational philanthropy; the battle between those who would centralize, by establishing a national university, and those committed to local control; and finally the contrasting answers to the eternal question of vocational-ism—e.g., how should business be treated, as a sibling to medicine and law or as their distant cousin? The more education-enamored, democratically-inclined patrician elites of the American East Coast were, Meyer argues, radically different institution-builders than German scholars, French state nobility, or even Chinese mandarins: "No other class combined their respect for, and grand vision of, the civilizing role of learning with their economic resources and the realism needed to put their plans into practice" (p. 113). Building on philosophical and historical elaboration, the book's third part on achieving self-government discusses the six American moves leading to institutional innovation. At organizational level, the German chair and institute give way to departments and discipline, the university presi-dent is no longer figurehead but chief executive, and independent boards of trustees, not govern-ment officials, have ultimate authority. The implications for individuals and organizations of these "design shifts" cannot be overstated. Anyone seeking to understand American higher education, with its phenomenal vertical and horizontal differentiation and on-going academic drift ("a snake-like procession" as David Riesman, to whom the book is dedicated, calls it), and its self-organized autonomy—supported by many philanthropists without the limiting control of a few state bureau-crats—will find this analysis illuminating. Embedded in civil society, "vigorous self-government is the historic design contribution of the American university" (p. 209)—and an achievement that must be guarded in an era in which university autonomy is at risk. In concluding, Meyer's American opti-mistic and laudatory tone shifts back to Germanic critique and foreboding, identifying challenges and the contemporary struggles that threaten the unintentional masterpiece of institutional learning and diversity. Such justified hopes and fears must now give way to empirical studies of the extraor-dinary outputs in terms of scientific production and societal capabilities and well-being brought about by the continuous process of university Bildung—in Germany, the United States, and around the world. [1] David Labaree (2017), A Perfect Mess: The Unlikely Ascendancy of American Higher Education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Author's introductionThe process of globalization can be defined in neutral terms as the increasing cross‐border flows of goods (e.g., coca‐cola, cocaine), services (e.g., McDonalds, prostitution), money (e.g. family cash, corporate banking), people (e.g., migration, vacation), information (e.g., internet, movies), and culture (e.g., fashion, religion), resulting in greater economic and political interdependence. Defined in this way, globalization appears rather benign – even positive. But in truth, the 'interdependence' that is being created is not one of equality or hope for most people in the world. Multinational corporations are certainly benefiting from globalization, but ordinary workers are not. In this article, I explore the way in which globalization is altering social identities in ways that are both exploitive and liberating.Author recommendsJoseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 2002).This is an important and influential critique of globalization written by a Nobel Prize winning economist. During his career as an academic, Stiglitz was a strong advocate of economic globalization, but after serving as a White House advisor and Chief economist at the World Bank, his opinion changed. He wrote this book in an attempt to publicize the devastating effect of globalization on developing countries. Written for a general audience, Stiglitz explains how globalization managed from the top down must be radically revised before the poor will benefit from global economic policies.Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild, Eds, Global Women: Nannies. Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 2002).This research anthology offers extensive documentation of the real world impact of economic globalization on women and their families. Fifteen chapters cover a range of penetrating investigations of women from across the globe who migrate, suffer and sometimes surrender in their quest for economic security. A common theme is the immense sacrifice made by mothers and children who are struggling to carve out a life amidst the powerful forces of a new global economy. The studies provide heart‐wrenching evidence that economic policies managed from the top, serve to exploit the poor, alter women's lives, and change the meaning of family.Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture: Global Mélange (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004).The potential impact of globalization on world cultures is explored in this brief but highly instructive book. Jan Nervenn Pieterse offers an accurate summary of competing theories of cultural globalization and artfully guides the reader through important intellectual debates. Does globalization lead to greater cultural integration? Are unique cultural identities and practices dissolving under the pressure of globalization? Is the world becoming uniform, standardized, and homogenized? There are no certain answers to these questions, but the author argues forcefully that globalization is leading to hybrid cultures with greater diversification and cultural mixing – a global mélange.Jeremy Brecher, Tim Costello and Brendan Smith, Globalization from Below: The Power of Solidarity (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000).The worldwide movement of resistance to top‐down globalization is reviewed, defended and advocated in this powerful little book. This inspirational volume is much more than an academic analysis of the anti‐globalization movement; it is an answer to all those who ask, 'What can be done?' The historical power of social movements is a guiding theme from start to finish. Chapters examine a global program for change, practical policy initiatives, and opportunities for participating in grassroots democracy. This is an outline for hope and a pragmatic strategy for how globalization can be altered from the bottom‐up.Hubert J. M. Hermans and Giancarlo Dimaggio, 'Self, Identity, and Globalization in Times of Uncertainty: A Dialogical Analysis', Review of General Psychology, 11(2007), 31–61.This is an excellent review article that examines the psychological consequences of globalization. According to the authors, the social, cultural and economic changes associated with globalization have disrupted traditional life patterns and have called in to question normative expectations. As a consequence, many individuals are left with a powerful sense of psychological uncertainty that motivates individuals and groups to find local niches to construct a stable identity. The organizing argument is that the processes of globalization and localization (globalization's counterforce) require a conceptualization of self and identity in which global and local voices are involved in continuous interchanges and negotiations.Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke, 'A Sociological Approach to Self and Identity'. In: Mark Leary and June Tangney (Eds), Handbook of Self and Identity (Guilford Press), 128–152.In this review article, the authors present a nice summary of a particular sociological view of self and identity. George Herbert Mead influences their approach, which falls within the theoretical tradition known as 'structural symbolic interactionism'. A key insight is that our conceptions of self are organized by larger social structures, while at the same time, social structures emerge from individual actions. The review includes an examination of different types of identities, the influence of social roles, and the impact of emotions.Online materialsGeorge Herbert Mead http://www.iep.utm.edu/m/mead.htm Mead is one of the most influential theorists of the self. His life and work are reviewed in detail at this site.Global Capitalism: The World Trade Organization http://www.wto.org/ The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the most powerful economic institutions in modern history. It is the organization through which top‐down, capitalists, and powerful nation states implement global economic policy. At this site, the WTO defends its goals and explains its operations and strategies.Fundamentalist Responses to Globalization http://www.jihadunspun.com/index.php This controversial web site represents the political and cultural interests of some Islamic fundamentalists. A significant portion of the site is devoted to news stories from the Middle East where Islamist groups are engaged in political and military battles with competing political parties and nation states. This particular web site illustrates both a fundamentalist response to globalization and the global communication tools employed by some fundamentalist groups.Democratic Responses to Globalization http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/index.php?cd_language=2&id_menu= The World Social Forum is an excellent example of how democratic resistance to top‐down globalization is global in scope. At this site, one can see evidence of bottom‐up, grassroots organizing. Learn how social movements, NGOs, and other civil society organizations come together to debate ideas and formulate proposals for ending top‐down globalization. http://www.globalexchange.org/index.html Global Exchange is another organization committed to resisting the destructive effects of globalization. This site provides a bottom‐up perspective on international trade and a wide range of resources for democratic activists. Video links also offer illustrations of some recent protest actions. http://www.topics‐mag.com/globalization/page‐resist.htm This simple but instructive site gives a basic introduction to globalization and provides several examples of local people from across the globe who are working to resist the homogenizing and harmful effects of capitalist globalization. Examples include campaigns to protect regional cuisines in Korea, France, and Brazil by protesting fast food chains and advocating for a 'slow food' movement.Sample syllabus Globalization from Above and Below Week 1: The Sociology of Globalization Anthony Giddens, Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003). Weeks 2–6: Globalization from Above Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 2002).Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise and Fall of Disaster Capitalism (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2007).Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild, Eds., Global Women: Nannies. Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 2002).Video: China Blue (Teddy Bear Films, 2006).This breathtaking documentary of life in a Chinese sweatshop is an excellent illustration of how globalization from above connects and exploits workers from across the globe (88 minutes). Weeks 7–10: Globalization and Culture John Tomlinson, Globalization and Culture (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999).Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture: Global Mélange (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004).George Ritzer, The Globalization of Nothing (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2004).Video: Wal‐Mart: The High Cost of Low Price (Brave New Films, 2005).This is a penetrating documentary that exposes the dark side of Wal‐Mart's ruthless global expansion (95 minutes). Weeks 12–15: Globalization from Below Jereny Brecher, Tim Costello and Brendan Smith, Globalization from Below: The Power of Solidarity, (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000).Leslie Sklair, 'Social Movements and Global Capitalism', Sociology, 29 (1995), 495–512.Walden Bello, Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy (London, UK: Zed Books, 2005)Video: This is What Democracy Looks Like (Big Noise Films, 2005).Here, we find remarkable documentary examination of the 'Battle in Seattle' when 50,000 activists from across the globe effectively shut down the ministerial meetings of the World Trade Organization in 1999 (72 minutes).Notes
* Correspondence address: Peter L. Callero, Western Oregon University, 345 North Monmouth Avenue, Monmouth, OR 97361, USA. Email: callerp@wou.edu

The purpose of this thesis is to determine the specificities of the two Martinican writers who conceived Creoleness, Patrick Chamoiseau and Raphaël Confiant, when dealing with two topics directly related to their manifesto, i. e. In Praise of Creoleness. More particularly, I study their vision of the West Indian history, which is different from the colonial version, and the relations of the Martinican with the multifaceted Other, in order to find out where these themes converge and diverge. These topics determine the two parts of my thesis. In a comparatist prospect, the first part of the thesis, whose objective is mainly descriptive, sets out the reasons why West Indians formed a hybrid society, and tries to identify the issues related to this society. It is worth pointing out that the Plantation – which was developed by the colonizer and deeply influenced the economic, political, social and cultural Caribbean practices – played a prominent role as it generates an ethnic diversity by hiring manpower coming from different cultures. But at the same time, the Plantation builds a well-structured social ladder, creates a supreme power held by Creole whites and by France, and determines the population concentration in first a rural and later an urban space. The system gives rise to a new culture, born three hundred years ago, which is diverse, fractured by political, linguistic and sociocultural barriers. First, we define the key concepts related to history problematisation. As in West Indies History was imposed by the ruling power, the creolists therefore assign themselves the mission of rewriting their histories. The historical subdivision mainly adopted the one suggested by Edouard Glissant and puts to the fore the perspective of the dominated : the pre-Colombian period, the slave trade and the hold, the Plantation, slavery abolition, the rise of mulatto bourgeoisie and of a trading class, the status of the West Indian as a victim of world wars and departmentalization. The second part, whose background is made up by the urban space, deals with the irony which targets the different groups in the Martinican society in their conflictual relationship with the Other. The choice of the tone, a component of which is mockery, depends on the fact that the creolists estimate that West Indians assume their reality in a certain jubilation, like a resistance to the oppression they suffered for centuries. More specifically, I tackle, in the first place, the issue of cultures in contact and then I analyze the Martinican society, mainly in a dichotomic way: on the one hand, the groups possessing political and/or economic power, and on the other hand the groups of the underprivileged deprived from these powers. In the first part, I therefore study the irony addressed to Aime Cesaire, mulattos, whites whether they are Creole or from France, and in the second part, the irony concerning the West Indians, the Coolies, the Chinese and finally the Syro-Lebanese. Since the two authors are loyal to the identity premises developed in In praise of Creoleness, this implies that there are more convergences than divergences for the history issues. However, as far as cultural mosaic is concerned, Confiant presents a more coherent relationship between the theoretical concepts of Creoleness and the representation he makes of it in his novels, insofar as he deals more lavishly with the different groups which constitute the West Indian society. Conversely, Chamoiseau limits himself to depicting its dichotomic structure. Moreover, the novelistic fictions of both writers disclose a divided society; consequently, I observed that the syncretism and the unity of the cultural components that they value in their manifesto remain to be built. In a society that suffers from consequences of colonialism, their narratives underline the conflicts between communities. Implicitly, the two writers invite West Indians, and more globally human beings, to open themselves to otherness and be improved by the Other, without losing their identity. If the creolists generally converge in their choice of irony targets, nevertheless they have their own characteristics. Each of them is original when using the processes related to usual practices. Chamoiseau resorts to more intertexts, launching so an intellectual challenge to his reader. We also observe that creolists tend to make use of event accumulation in order to mock; this accumulation is so excessive that it becomes grotesque. In Confiant's novels, this tone is different due to the lubricity of sex-related situations. Chamoiseau's work is characterized by the use of marvellous realism, the tale that reminds of the past and the invention of a fictitious world. As for Confiant, he differentiates himself by doing a pastiche of Cesaire and by setting up the microcosm of West Indian society. ; Le but de cette thèse est de déterminer les spécificités de deux écrivains martiniquais concepteurs de la créolité : Patrick Chamoiseau et Raphaël Confiant, concernant la manière d'aborder deux thématiques qui s'inscrivent dans leur manifeste, à savoir Éloge de la créolité (1989). Nous étudions plus particulièrement leur vision de l'histoire antillaise, qui diffère de la version coloniale, et les relations du Martiniquais avec l'Autre multiple afin de relever en quoi ces thématiques convergent et divergent. Ces deux thématiques déterminent les deux volets de notre thèse. Dans une perspective comparatiste, le premier volet de la thèse, à caractère majoritairement descriptif, énonce les raisons pour lesquelles les Antillais se sont constitués en tant que société hybride, afin de relever les problématiques liées à cette dernière. Il convient de signaler que la Plantation – développée par le colonisateur et ayant profondément influencé les pratiques économiques, politiques, sociales et culturelles de la Caraïbe – joue un rôle prépondérant car, en faisant appel à une main-d'œuvre issue de peuples de cultures différentes, elle engendre une diversité ethnique. Mais, en même temps, la Plantation construit une échelle sociale bien structurée, instaure un pouvoir suprême détenu par les Blancs créoles et par la France et détermine la concentration de population dans un espace rural, puis urbain. Ce système forge une nouvelle culture, jeune de trois cents ans, composite, fissurée par des barrières politiques, linguistiques et socioculturelles. En premier lieu, nous définissons les concepts-clés concernant la problématisation de l'histoire. Comme aux Antilles l'Histoire fut imposée par le pouvoir dominant ; les créolistes se donnent donc pour mission de réécrire leurs histoires. La subdivision historique adopte essentiellement celle proposée par Édouard Glissant et met en avant la perspective du dominé : la période précolombienne, la traite et la cale, la Plantation, l'abolition de l'esclavage, l'apparition de la bourgeoisie mulâtre et d'une classe commerçante, la situation de l'Antillais en tant que victime des guerres mondiales et la départementalisation. Le second volet, dont l'espace urbain constitue la toile de fond, traite de l'ironie qui prend pour cible les divers groupes de la société martiniquaise dans leur relation conflictuelle à l'autre. Le choix du ton, dont l'une des composantes est la raillerie, tient au fait que les créolistes estiment que l'Antillais assume sa réalité dans une certaine jubilation, comme une résistance à l'oppression subie pendant des siècles. Plus spécifiquement, nous abordons, en premier lieu, la problématique des cultures en contact pour analyser ensuite la société martiniquaise, essentiellement sous une forme dichotomique : d'une part, les groupes disposant de pouvoir politique et/ou économique et d'autre part, les groupes des démunis dépourvus de ces pouvoirs. Ainsi, dans la première partie, nous étudions l'ironie adressée à Aimé Césaire, aux mulâtres, aux Blancs qu'ils soient créoles ou de l'Hexagone et dans la deuxième, celle concernant les Afro-Antillais, les coolies, les Chinois et finalement les Syro-Libanais. Fidèles aux postulats identitaires développés dans Éloge de la créolité par les deux auteurs, les convergences sont largement majoritaires pour les thématiques de l'histoire. Cependant, pour ce qui concerne la mosaïque culturelle, il existe, chez Confiant, une relation plus cohérente entre les concepts théoriques de la créolité et la représentation qu'il en livre dans ses romans, en ce sens qu'il traite plus largement des divers groupes constitutifs de la société antillaise. En revanche, Chamoiseau se borne à en brosser la structure dichotomique. D'autre part, les fictions romanesques de l'un et de l'autre dévoilent une société fracturée ; nous observons dès lors que le syncrétisme et l'unité des composantes culturelles qu'ils mettent en avant dans leur manifeste restent à construire. Au sein d'une société qui souffre des conséquences du colonialisme, leurs récits soulignent les conflits entre communautés. Implicitement, les deux auteurs invitent l'Antillais, mais plus largement l'être humain, à s'ouvrir à l'altérité et ainsi à s'enrichir par l'autre, sans perdre son identité. Les créolistes convergent en général dans leur choix des cibles de l'ironie avec toutefois plusieurs caractéristiques propres à chacun. Quant au traitement du ton, chacun imprime son originalité dans les procédés par rapport aux pratiques habituelles. Chamoiseau utilise beaucoup plus d'intertextes, lançant un défi intellectuel à son lecteur. Nous relevons aussi une tendance chez les créolistes à recourir à l'accumulation d'événements dans le but de railler, laquelle frôle le grotesque dans l'excès ; chez Confiant, ce ton se différencie par la lubricité des propos sexuels. Sont spécifiques à Chamoiseau l'emploi du réalisme merveilleux, du conte comme déclencheur du passé et l'invention d'un monde fictif. Confiant, pour sa part, marque son originalité dans le pastiche de Césaire ainsi que dans la mise en scène du microcosme de la société antillaise. ; (ROM 3) -- UCL, 2009

The purpose of this thesis is to determine the specificities of the two Martinican writers who conceived Creoleness, Patrick Chamoiseau and Raphaël Confiant, when dealing with two topics directly related to their manifesto, i. e. In Praise of Creoleness. More particularly, I study their vision of the West Indian history, which is different from the colonial version, and the relations of the Martinican with the multifaceted Other, in order to find out where these themes converge and diverge. These topics determine the two parts of my thesis. In a comparatist prospect, the first part of the thesis, whose objective is mainly descriptive, sets out the reasons why West Indians formed a hybrid society, and tries to identify the issues related to this society. It is worth pointing out that the Plantation – which was developed by the colonizer and deeply influenced the economic, political, social and cultural Caribbean practices – played a prominent role as it generates an ethnic diversity by hiring manpower coming from different cultures. But at the same time, the Plantation builds a well-structured social ladder, creates a supreme power held by Creole whites and by France, and determines the population concentration in first a rural and later an urban space. The system gives rise to a new culture, born three hundred years ago, which is diverse, fractured by political, linguistic and sociocultural barriers. First, we define the key concepts related to history problematisation. As in West Indies History was imposed by the ruling power, the creolists therefore assign themselves the mission of rewriting their histories. The historical subdivision mainly adopted the one suggested by Edouard Glissant and puts to the fore the perspective of the dominated : the pre-Colombian period, the slave trade and the hold, the Plantation, slavery abolition, the rise of mulatto bourgeoisie and of a trading class, the status of the West Indian as a victim of world wars and departmentalization. The second part, whose background is made up by the urban space, deals with the irony which targets the different groups in the Martinican society in their conflictual relationship with the Other. The choice of the tone, a component of which is mockery, depends on the fact that the creolists estimate that West Indians assume their reality in a certain jubilation, like a resistance to the oppression they suffered for centuries. More specifically, I tackle, in the first place, the issue of cultures in contact and then I analyze the Martinican society, mainly in a dichotomic way: on the one hand, the groups possessing political and/or economic power, and on the other hand the groups of the underprivileged deprived from these powers. In the first part, I therefore study the irony addressed to Aime Cesaire, mulattos, whites whether they are Creole or from France, and in the second part, the irony concerning the West Indians, the Coolies, the Chinese and finally the Syro-Lebanese. Since the two authors are loyal to the identity premises developed in In praise of Creoleness, this implies that there are more convergences than divergences for the history issues. However, as far as cultural mosaic is concerned, Confiant presents a more coherent relationship between the theoretical concepts of Creoleness and the representation he makes of it in his novels, insofar as he deals more lavishly with the different groups which constitute the West Indian society. Conversely, Chamoiseau limits himself to depicting its dichotomic structure. Moreover, the novelistic fictions of both writers disclose a divided society; consequently, I observed that the syncretism and the unity of the cultural components that they value in their manifesto remain to be built. In a society that suffers from consequences of colonialism, their narratives underline the conflicts between communities. Implicitly, the two writers invite West Indians, and more globally human beings, to open themselves to otherness and be improved by the Other, without losing their identity. If the creolists generally converge in their choice of irony targets, nevertheless they have their own characteristics. Each of them is original when using the processes related to usual practices. Chamoiseau resorts to more intertexts, launching so an intellectual challenge to his reader. We also observe that creolists tend to make use of event accumulation in order to mock; this accumulation is so excessive that it becomes grotesque. In Confiant's novels, this tone is different due to the lubricity of sex-related situations. Chamoiseau's work is characterized by the use of marvellous realism, the tale that reminds of the past and the invention of a fictitious world. As for Confiant, he differentiates himself by doing a pastiche of Cesaire and by setting up the microcosm of West Indian society. ; Le but de cette thèse est de déterminer les spécificités de deux écrivains martiniquais concepteurs de la créolité : Patrick Chamoiseau et Raphaël Confiant, concernant la manière d'aborder deux thématiques qui s'inscrivent dans leur manifeste, à savoir Éloge de la créolité (1989). Nous étudions plus particulièrement leur vision de l'histoire antillaise, qui diffère de la version coloniale, et les relations du Martiniquais avec l'Autre multiple afin de relever en quoi ces thématiques convergent et divergent. Ces deux thématiques déterminent les deux volets de notre thèse. Dans une perspective comparatiste, le premier volet de la thèse, à caractère majoritairement descriptif, énonce les raisons pour lesquelles les Antillais se sont constitués en tant que société hybride, afin de relever les problématiques liées à cette dernière. Il convient de signaler que la Plantation – développée par le colonisateur et ayant profondément influencé les pratiques économiques, politiques, sociales et culturelles de la Caraïbe – joue un rôle prépondérant car, en faisant appel à une main-d'œuvre issue de peuples de cultures différentes, elle engendre une diversité ethnique. Mais, en même temps, la Plantation construit une échelle sociale bien structurée, instaure un pouvoir suprême détenu par les Blancs créoles et par la France et détermine la concentration de population dans un espace rural, puis urbain. Ce système forge une nouvelle culture, jeune de trois cents ans, composite, fissurée par des barrières politiques, linguistiques et socioculturelles. En premier lieu, nous définissons les concepts-clés concernant la problématisation de l'histoire. Comme aux Antilles l'Histoire fut imposée par le pouvoir dominant ; les créolistes se donnent donc pour mission de réécrire leurs histoires. La subdivision historique adopte essentiellement celle proposée par Édouard Glissant et met en avant la perspective du dominé : la période précolombienne, la traite et la cale, la Plantation, l'abolition de l'esclavage, l'apparition de la bourgeoisie mulâtre et d'une classe commerçante, la situation de l'Antillais en tant que victime des guerres mondiales et la départementalisation. Le second volet, dont l'espace urbain constitue la toile de fond, traite de l'ironie qui prend pour cible les divers groupes de la société martiniquaise dans leur relation conflictuelle à l'autre. Le choix du ton, dont l'une des composantes est la raillerie, tient au fait que les créolistes estiment que l'Antillais assume sa réalité dans une certaine jubilation, comme une résistance à l'oppression subie pendant des siècles. Plus spécifiquement, nous abordons, en premier lieu, la problématique des cultures en contact pour analyser ensuite la société martiniquaise, essentiellement sous une forme dichotomique : d'une part, les groupes disposant de pouvoir politique et/ou économique et d'autre part, les groupes des démunis dépourvus de ces pouvoirs. Ainsi, dans la première partie, nous étudions l'ironie adressée à Aimé Césaire, aux mulâtres, aux Blancs qu'ils soient créoles ou de l'Hexagone et dans la deuxième, celle concernant les Afro-Antillais, les coolies, les Chinois et finalement les Syro-Libanais. Fidèles aux postulats identitaires développés dans Éloge de la créolité par les deux auteurs, les convergences sont largement majoritaires pour les thématiques de l'histoire. Cependant, pour ce qui concerne la mosaïque culturelle, il existe, chez Confiant, une relation plus cohérente entre les concepts théoriques de la créolité et la représentation qu'il en livre dans ses romans, en ce sens qu'il traite plus largement des divers groupes constitutifs de la société antillaise. En revanche, Chamoiseau se borne à en brosser la structure dichotomique. D'autre part, les fictions romanesques de l'un et de l'autre dévoilent une société fracturée ; nous observons dès lors que le syncrétisme et l'unité des composantes culturelles qu'ils mettent en avant dans leur manifeste restent à construire. Au sein d'une société qui souffre des conséquences du colonialisme, leurs récits soulignent les conflits entre communautés. Implicitement, les deux auteurs invitent l'Antillais, mais plus largement l'être humain, à s'ouvrir à l'altérité et ainsi à s'enrichir par l'autre, sans perdre son identité. Les créolistes convergent en général dans leur choix des cibles de l'ironie avec toutefois plusieurs caractéristiques propres à chacun. Quant au traitement du ton, chacun imprime son originalité dans les procédés par rapport aux pratiques habituelles. Chamoiseau utilise beaucoup plus d'intertextes, lançant un défi intellectuel à son lecteur. Nous relevons aussi une tendance chez les créolistes à recourir à l'accumulation d'événements dans le but de railler, laquelle frôle le grotesque dans l'excès ; chez Confiant, ce ton se différencie par la lubricité des propos sexuels. Sont spécifiques à Chamoiseau l'emploi du réalisme merveilleux, du conte comme déclencheur du passé et l'invention d'un monde fictif. Confiant, pour sa part, marque son originalité dans le pastiche de Césaire ainsi que dans la mise en scène du microcosme de la société antillaise. ; (ROM 3) -- UCL, 2009

Keith Hart on the
Informal Economy, the Great Transformation, and the Humanity of Corporations














International Relations
has long focused on the formal relations between states; in the same way,
economists have long focused exclusively on formal economic activities. If by
now that sounds outdated, it is only because of the work of Keith Hart. Famous
for coining the distinction between the formal and the informal economy in the
1970s, Hart is a critical scholar who engages head-on with some of the world's
central political-economic challenges. In this Talk, he, amongst others, discusses the value of the distinction 40
years after; how we need to rethink The
Great Transformation nearly a century later; and how we need to undo the
legal equivalence of corporations to humans, instituted nearly 150 years back.














Print version of this Talk (pdf)




What is, according to you, the
central challenge or principal debate in International Relations? And what is
your position regarding this challenge/in this debate?







I think it is the lack of fit between politics, which
is principally national, and the world economy, which is global. In particular,
the system of money has escaped from its national controls, but politics, public
rhetoric aside, has not evolved to the point where adequate responses to our
common economic problems can be posed. At this point, the greatest challenge is
to extend our grasp of the problems we face beyond the existing national
discussions and debates. Most of the problems we see today in the world—and the
economic crisis is only one example—are not confined to a single country.







For me, the question is how we can extend our research
from the local to the global. Let the conservatives restrict themselves to
their national borders. This is not to say I believe that political solutions
to the economic problems the world faces are readily available.  Indeed, it is possible that we are entering
another period of war and revolution, similar to 1776-1815 or 1914-1945. Only
after prolonged conflict and much loss might the world reach something like the
settlement that followed 1945. This was not only a settlement of wartime
politics, but also a framework for the economic politics of the peace,
responding to problems that arose most acutely between the wars.  It sounds tragic, but my point in raising the
possibility now is to remind people that there may be even more catastrophic
consequences at stake that they realize already. We need to confront these and
mobilize against them. When I go back in history, I am pessimistic about
resolving the world's economic problems soon, since the people who got us into
this situation are still in power and are still pursuing broadly the same
policies without any sign of them being changed. I believe that they will bring
us all into a much more drastic situation than we are currently facing. Yet in
some way we will be accountable if we ignore the obvious signs all around us.











How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about IR?







My original work in West Africa arose out of a view that
the post-colonial regimes offered political recipes that could have more
general relevance for the world. I actually believed that the new states were
in a position to provide solutions, if you like, to the corrupt and decadent
political structures that we had in the West. That's why, when we were demonstrating
outside the American embassies in the '60s, we chanted the names of the great
Third World emancipation leaders—Frantz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah, Fidel Castro, and so
on.







So for me, the question has always been whether
Africans, in seeking emancipation from a long history of slavery, colonialism, apartheid
and postcolonial failure, might be able to change the world. I still think it
could be and I'm quite a bit more optimistic about the outcome now than I have
been for most of the last fifty years. We live in a racialized world order
where Africa acts as the most striking symbol of inequality. The drive for a
more equal world society will necessarily entail a shift in the relationship
between Africa and the rest of the world. I have been pursuing this question
for the last thirty years or more. What interests me at the moment is the
politics of African development in the coming decades.







Africa began the twentieth century as the least populated
and urbanized continent. It's gone through a demographic and urban explosion
since then, doubling its share
of world population in a century. In 2050, the UN predicts that 24% of the world
population will be in Africa, and in 2100, 35% (read the report here, pdf)! This is because Africa is growing
at 2.5% a year while the rest of the world is ageing fast. Additionally, 7 out
of the 10 fastest growing economies in the world are now African—Asian
manufacturers already know that Africa holds the key to the future of the world
economy.







But, besides Africa as a place, if you will, a number
of anti-colonial intellectuals have played a big role in influencing me. The
most important event in the twentieth century was the anti-colonial revolution.
Peoples forced into world society by Western Imperialism fought to establish
their own independent relationship to it. The leading figures of that struggle
are, to my mind, still the most generative thinkers when we come to consider
our own plight and direction. My mentor was the Trinidadian writer C.L.R. James, with whom I spent a
number of years toward the end of his life. I am by temperament a classicist; I
like to read the individuals who made a big difference to the way we think now.
The anti-colonial intellectuals were the most important thinkers of the 20th
century, by which I mean Gandhi, Fanon and James.







But I've also pursued a very classical, Western
trajectory in seeking to form my own thinking. When I was an undergraduate, I
liked Durkheim and as a graduate student Weber. When I was a young lecturer, I
became a Marxist; later, when I went to the Carribbean, I discovered Hegel,
Kant and Rousseau; and by the time I wrote my book on money, The Memory Bank,
the person I cited more than anyone else was John Locke. By then I realized I
had been moving backwards through the greats of Western philosophy and social
theory, starting with the Durkheim school of sociology. Now I see them as a set
of possible references that I can draw on eclectically. Marx is still probably
the most important influence, although Keynes, Simmel and Polanyi have also shaped my
recent work. I suppose my absolute favorite of all those people is Jean-Jacques
Rousseau for his Discourse on Inequality and his inventive
approach to writing about how to get from actual to possible worlds.











What would a student need (dispositions, skills) to become a specialist
in IR or understand the world in a global way?







In your 20s and 30s, your greatest commitment should
be to experience the world in the broadest way possible, which means learning
languages, traveling, and being open to new experiences. I think the kind of
vision that I had developed over the years was not one that I had originally
and the greatest influence on it was the time I spent in Ghana doing my
doctoral fieldwork; indeed, I have not had an experience that so genuinely
transformed me since!







Even so, I found it very difficult to write a book
based on that fieldwork. I moved from my ethnographic investigations into a
literature review of the political economy of West African agriculture, and it
turns out that I am actually not an ethnographer, and am more interested in
surveying literature concerning the questions that interest me. I am still an
acute observer of everyday life; but I don't base my 'research' on it. Young people
should both extend their comparative reach in a practical way and dig very
deeply into circumstances that they encounter, wherever that may be. Above all,
they should retain a sense of the uniqueness of their own life trajectory as
the only basis for doing something new. This matters more than any professional
training.











Now we see spectacular
growth rates in African countries, as you mentioned, one of which is the DRC.
How can we make sense of these formal growth rates: are they representative of
the whole economies of these countries, or do they only refer to certain
economic tendencies?







The whole question of measuring economic growth is a
technical one, and it's flawed, and I only use it in the vaguest sense as a
general indicator. For example, I think it's more important that Kenya, for
example, is the world leader in mobile phone banking, and also a leader in
recycling old computers for sale cheaply to poor people.







The political dispensation in Africa—the combination
of fragmented states and powerful foreign interests and the predatory actions
of the leaders of these states on their people -- especially the restrictions
they impose on the movements of people and goods and money and so on – is still
a tremendous problem. I think that the political fragmentation of Africa is the
main obstacle to achieving economic growth.







But at the same time, as someone who has lived in
Africa for many years, it's very clear that in some countries, certainly not
all, the economies are very significantly on the move. It's not--in principle—that
this will lead to durable economic growth, but it is the case that the cities
are expanding fast, Africans are increasing their disposable income and it's the
only part of the world where the people are growing so significantly. Africa is
about to enter what's called the demographic dividend that comes when the
active labor force exceeds the number of dependents. India has just gone
through a similar phase.







The Chinese and others are heavily committed to taking
part in this, obviously hoping to direct Africa's economic growth in their own
interest. This is partly because the global economy is over the period of
growth generated by the Chinese manufacturing exports and the entailed infrastructure
and construction boom, which was itself an effect of the greatest shift from the countryside to the city in history. Now, the Chinese
realize, the next such boom will be—can only take place—in Africa.







I'm actually not really interested in technical
questions of how to measure economic growth. In my own writing about African
development, I prefer anecdotes. Like for example, Nollywood—the Nigerian film industry—which has just past
Bollywood as the second largest in the world! You mention the Congo which I
believe holds the key to Africa's future. The region was full of economic
dynamism before King Leopold took it over and its people have shown great
resilience since Mobutu was overthrown and Rwandan and Ugandan generals took
over the minerals-rich Eastern Congo. Understanding this history is much more
important than measuring GDP, but statistics of this kind have their uses if
approached with care.











Is it possible to
understand the contemporary economic predicament that we are seeing, which in
the Western world is referred to as the "crisis", without attributing it to
vague agencies or mechanisms such as neoliberalism?







I have written at great length about the world
economic crisis paying special attention to the problems of the Eurozone. My belief
is that it is not simply a financial crisis or a debt crisis. We are actually
witnessing the collapse of the dominant economic form of the last century and a
half, which I call national capitalism—the attempt to control markets, money
and accumulation through central bureaucracies in the interests of a presumed
cultural community of national citizens.







The term neoliberalism is not particularly useful, but
I try to lay out the history of modern money and why and how national
currencies are in fact being replaced. That, to my mind, is a more precise way
of describing the crisis than calling it neoliberal. On the other hand, neoliberalism does refer to
the systematic privatization of public interests which has become normal over
the last three or four hundred years. The bourgeois revolution claimed to have
separated public and private interests, but I don't think it ever did so. For
example, the Bank of England, the Banque de France, and the Federal Reserve are
all private institutions that function behind a smokescreen of being public
agencies.







It's always been the case that private interests
corrupted public institutions and worked to deprive citizens of the ability to
act purposefully under an ideological veil of liberty. But in the past, they
tried to hide it. The public wasn't supposed to know what actually went on
behind the scenes and indeed modern social science was invented to ensure that
they never knew. What makes neoliberalism new is that they now boast about it
and even claim that it's in everyone's interest to diminish public goods and
use whatever is left for private ends—that's what neoliberalism is.







It's a naked grab for public resources and it's also a
shift in the fundamental dynamic of capitalism from production for profit
through sales tow varieties of rent-seeking. In fact, Western capitalism is now
a system for extracting rents, rather than producing profits. Rents are income
secured by political privilege such as the dividends of patents granted to Big
Pharma or the right to control distribution of recycled movies. This has got
nothing to do with competitive or free markets and much opposition to where we
are now is confused as a result. Sometimes I think western capitalism has
reverted to the Old Regime that it once replaced—from King George and the East
India Company to George W and Halliburton. If so, we need another liberal
revolution, but it won't take place in the North Atlantic societies.











In your recent work,
you refer to The Great Transformation, which invokes Karl Polanyi's famous
analysis of the
growth of 19th century capitalism and industrialization. How can Polanyi
help us to make sense of contemporary global economy, and where does this
inspiring work need to be complemented? In other words, what is today's Great Transformation
in light of Polanyi?







First of all, the
Great Transformation is a brilliant book. I have never known anyone who
didn't love it from the first reading. The great message of Polanyi's work is
the spirit in which he wrote that book, regardless of the components of his
theory. He had a passionate desire to explain the mess that world society had
reached by the middle of the 20th century, and he provided an
explanation. It's always been a source of inspiration for me.







A central idea of Polanyi's is that the economy was
always embedded in society and Victorian capitalism disembedded it. One problem
is that it is not clear whether the economy ever was actually disembedded (for
example capitalism is embedded in state institutions and the private social
networks mentioned just now) or whether the separation occurs at the level of
ideology, as in free market economics. Polanyi was not against markets as such,
but rather against market fundamentalism of the kind that swept Victorian
England and has us in its grip today. The political question is whether politics
can serve to protect society from the excesses produced by this disembedding;
or whether it lends itself to further separation of the economy from society.







And I would say that Polanyi's biggest failure was to
claim that what happened in the 19th century was the rise of "market
society". This concept misses entirely the bureaucratic revolution that was
introduced from the 1860s onwards based on a new alliance between capitalists
and landlords which led to a new synthesis of states and corporations aiming to
develop mass production and consumption. Polanyi could not anticipate what
actually happened after he wrote his book in 1944. An American empire of free
trade was built on a tremendous bureaucratic revolution. This drew on
techniques and theories of control developed while fighting a war on all
fronts. The same war was the source of the technologies that culminated late in
the digital revolution. Karl Polanyi's interpretation of capitalism as a market
economy doesn't help us much to understand that. In fact, he seems to have
thought that bureaucracy and planning were an antidote to capitalist market
economy.







If you ask me what is today's great transformation, I
would prefer to treat the last 200 years as a single event, that is, a period
in which the world population increased from one billion to seven billion, when
the proportion of people living in cities grew from under 3% to around half,
and where energy production increased on average 3% a year. The Great Transformation
is this leap of mankind from reliance on the land into living in cities. It has
been organized by a variety of institutions, including cities, capitalist
markets, nation-states, empires, regional federations, machine industry, telecommunications
networks, financial structures, and so on. I'm prepared to say that in the
twentieth century national capitalism was the dominant economic form, but by no
means all you need to know about if you want to make a better world.







I prefer to look at the economy as being organized by
a plural set of institutions, including various political forms. The Great Transformation
in Polanyi's sense was not really the same Great Transformation that Marx and
Engels observed in Victorian England—the idea that a new economic system was
growing up there that would transform the world. And it did! Polanyi and Marx
had different views (as well as some common ideas), but both missed what
actually happened, which is the kind of capitalism whose collapse is constitutes
the Great Transformation for us today. The last thirty years of financial
imperialism are similar to the three decades before the First World War. After
that phase collapsed, thirty years of world war and economic depression were
the result. I believe the same will happen to us! Maybe we can do something
about it, but only if our awareness is historically informed in a
contemporarily relevant way.











The distinction between
states and markets really underpins much of what we understand about the workings
of world economy and politics. Even when we just say "oh, that's not economic"
or "that's not rational", we invoke a separation. How can we deal with this
separation?







This state-market division comes back to the bourgeois
revolution, which was an attempt to win freedom from political interference for
private economic actors. I've been arguing that states and markets were always
in bed together right from the beginning thousands of years ago, and they still
are! The revolution of the mid 19th century involved a shift from
capitalists representing workers against the landed aristocracy to a new
alliance between them and the traditional enforcers to control the industrial
and criminal classes flocking into the cities. A series of linked revolutions
in all the main industrial countries during the 1860s and early 70s—from the
American civil war to the French Third Republic via the Meiji Restoration and
German unification—brought this alliance to power.







Modernity was thus a compromise between traditional
enforcers and industrial capitalists and this dualism is reflected in the
principal social form, the nation-state. This uneasy partnership has marked the
relationship between governments and corporations ever since. I think that we
are now witnessing a bid of the corporations for independence, for home rule,
if you like. Perhaps, having won control of the political process, they feel
than can go ahead to the next stage without relying on governments.  The whole discourse of 'corporate social responsibility'
implies that they could take on legal and administrative functions that had
been previously 'insourced' to states. It is part of a trend whereby the
corporations seek to make a world society in which they are the only citizens
and they no longer depend on national governments except for local police
functions. I think that it is a big deal—and this is happening under our noses!







Both politicians and economic theorists (OliverWilliamson got a Nobel prize for
developing Coase's theory of the form along these lines)
are proposing that we need to think again about what functions should be
internal to the firm and what should be outside. Perhaps it was a mistake to
outsource political control to states and war could be carried out by private
security firms. The ground for all of this was laid in the late 19th
century when the distinction in law between real and artificial persons was
collapsed for business enterprises so that the US Supreme Court can protect
corporate political spending in the name of preserving their human rights!
Corporations have greater wealth, power and longevity than individual citizens.
Until we can restore their legal separateness from the rest of humanity and
find the political means of restricting their inexorable rise, resistance will
be futile. There is a lot of intellectual and political work still to be done
and, as I have said, a lot of pain to come before more people confront the
reality of their situation.











What role do
technological innovations play in your understanding and promoting of shifts in
the way that we organize societies? Is it a passive thing or a driver of
change?







I wrote a book, the
Memory Bank: Money in an Unequal World
(read it here, with the introduction
here), which centered on a
very basic question: what would future generations consider is interesting
about us? In the late '90s, the dot com boom was the main game in town. It
seemed obvious that the rise of the internet was the most important thing and
that our responses to it would have significant consequences for future
generations.







When I started writing it, I was interested in the
democratic potential of the new media; but most of my friends saw them as a new
source of inequality – digital exclusion, dominance of the big players and so
on. I was accused of being optimistic, but I had absorbed from CLR James a
response to such claims. It is not a question of being optimistic or
pessimistic, but of identifying what the sides are in the struggle to define
society's trajectory. In this case the sides are bureaucracy and the people. Of
course the former wish to confine our lives within narrow limits that they
control in a process that culminates as totalitarianism. But the rest of us
want to increase the scope for self-expression in our daily lives; we want
democracy and the force of the peoples of world is growing, not least in Africa
which for so long has been excluded from the benefits of modern civilization.
Of course there are those who wish to control the potential of the internet
from the top; but everywhere people are making space for themselves in this
revolution. When I see how Africans have moved in the mobile phone phase of
this revolution, I am convinced that there is much to play for in this
struggle. What matters is to do your best for your side, not to predict which
side will win. Speaking personally, Web 2.0 has been an
unmitigated boon for me in networking and dissemination, although I am aware
that some think that corporate capital is killing off the internet. A lot depends
on your perspective. I grew up learning Latin and Greek grammar. The
developments of the last 2-3 decades seem like a miracle to me. I guess that
gives me some buoyancy if not optimism as such.







It's obvious enough to me that any democratic response
to the dilemmas we face must harness the potential of the new universal media.
That's the biggest challenge. But equally, it's not clear which side is going
to win. I'm not saying that our side, the democratic side, is going to beat the
bureaucratic side. I just know which side I'm on! And I'm going to do my best
for our side. Our side is the side that would harness the democratic potential
of the new media. In the decade or more since I wrote my book on money and the
internet, I have become more focused on the threat posed by the corporations
and more accepting of the role of governments. But that could change too. And I
am mindful of the role the positive role that some capitalists played in the
classical liberal revolutions of the United States, France and Italy.











Final Question. I would
like to ask you about the distinction between formal and informal economy which
you are famous for having coined. How did you arrive at the distinction? Does the
term, the dichotomy, still with have the same analytical value for you today?








Around 1970, there was a universal consensus that only states could organize economies for development. You were either a Marxist or a Keynesian, but there were no liberal economists with any influence at that time. In my first publication on the topic (Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana, read it here, pdf)—which got picked up by academics and the International Labor Organization—I was reacting against that; the idea promoted by a highly formal economics and bureaucratic practice that the state as an idea as the only actor. In fact, people in Third World cities engaged in all kinds of economic activities, which just weren't recognized as such. So my impulse was really empiricist—to use my ethnographic observations to show that people were doing a lot more than they were supposed to be doing, as recorded in official statistics or discussed by politicians and economists.






Essentially, I made a distinction between those things
which were defined by formal regulation and those that lay outside it. I posed
the question how does it affect our understanding in the development process to
know more what people are doing outside the formal framework of the economy.
And remember, this came up in West Africa, which did not have as strong a colonial
tradition as in many other parts of Africa. African cities there were built and
provisioned by Africans. There were not enough white people there to build
these cities or to provide food and transport, housing, clothing and the rest
of it.







In my book on African agriculture, I went further and
argued that the cities were not the kind of engines of change that many people
imagined that they were, but were in fact an extension of rural civilizations
that had effectively not been displaced by colonialism, at least in that
region. Now if you ask me how useful I think it is today, what happened since
then of course is neoliberal globalization, for want of a better term, which of
course hinges on deregulation. So, as a result of neoliberal deregulation, vast
areas of the economy are no longer shaped by law, and these include many of the
activities of finance, including offshore banking, hedge funds, shadow banking,
tax havens, and so on. It also includes the criminal activities of the
corporations themselves. I've written a paper on my blog called "How the
informal economy took over the world" which argues that we are witnessing the
collapse of the post-war Keynesian consensus that sought to manage the economy in
the public interest through law and in other ways that have been dismantled; so,
it's a free-for-all. In some sense, the whole world is now an informal economy,
which means, of course, that the term is not as valuable analytically as it
once was. If it's everything, then we need some new words.







The mistake I made with other people who followed me was
to identify the informal economy with poor slum dwellers. I argued that even
for them, they were not only in the informal economy, which was not a separate
place, but that all of them combined the formal and informal in some way. But
what I didn't pay much attention to was the fact that the so-called formal
economy was also the commanding heights of the informal economy—that the
politicians and the civil servants were in fact the largest informal operators.
I realize that any economy must be informal to some degree, but it is also
impossible for an economy to be entirely informal. There always have to be
rules, even if they take a form that we don't acknowledge as being
bureaucratically normal like, for example, kinship or religion or criminal
gangs. So that's another reason why it seems to me that the distinction has
lost its power.







At the time, it was a valuable service to point to the
fact that many people were doing things that were escaping notice. But once
what they were doing had been noticed, then the usefulness of the distinction
really came into question. I suppose in retrospect that the idea of an informal
economy was a gesture towards realism, to respect what people really do in the
spirit of ethnography. I have taken that idea to another level recently in mywork on the human economy at the University of Pretoria in South Africa. Here, in addition to
privileging the actors' point of view and their everyday lives, we wish to
address the human predicament at more inclusive levels than the local or even
the national. Accordingly, our interdisciplinary research program (involving a
dozen postdocs from around the world, including Africa, and 8 African doctoral
students) seeks ways of extending our conceptual and empirical reach to take in
world society and humanity as a whole. This is easier said than done, of
course.







Keith
Hart is Extraordinary Visiting Professor in the Centre for the Advancement of
Scholarship and Co-Director of the Human Economy Program at the University of
Pretoria, South Africa. He is also centennial professor of Economic Anthropology at the LSE.











Related links










Faculty Profile at U-London


Personal webpage


Read Hart's Notes towards an Anthropology of the Internet (2004, Horizontes Antropológicos) here (pdf)


Read Hart's Marcel Mauss: In Pursuit of a Whole (2007, Comparative Studies in Society and History) here (pdf)


Read Hart's Between Democracy and the People: A Political History of Informality (2008 DIIS working paper) here (pdf)


Read Hart's Why the Eurocrisis Matters to Us All (Scapegoat Journal) here (pdf)









Print version of this Talk (pdf)

The variety of presently occurring economic and political processes and phenomena contribute to continuous changes in world economy, affecting its subjective structure and the changes in the relations and co-dependencies between its subjects. Globalisation is undoubtedly one of such processes, as it affects the positions of countries and international organisations within global economy. It is a multidimensional process, connected to the intensifi cation of relations both on the economic grounds, resulting from accelerated fl ow of goods and services, technologies, capital, workforce, and on the political grounds. The dynamic development of globalisation has been happening under the infl uence of ICT technologies, facilitating the reduction of the costs of production factors movement and increasing their mobility. The distribution of benefi ts resultant from this process is disproportional, as it strengthens the position of some countries and regions, at the same time weakening the importance of economic and political centres functioning to date as its leaders. A growing importance of new centres can be observed on the global scene – Asian countries, including China, are coming into strength and affecting the positions of the economic powers to date, such as the European Union and the USA. A complicated pattern of economic and political relations is being formed, and it is necessary to ensure that proper balance is kept. A new global order is being introduced, resultant from these particular relations, the existing connections and interferences occurring among its actors. Apart from that, the process of globalisation facilitates the intensifi cation of the economic integration processes. The international groups aiming at strengthening their positions in the global economy, as well as their spheres of infl uence, are implementing new inter-state agreements of economic and political character, thus affecting the global structure of power and co-dependencies, together with the changes occurring within these structures. The European Union must continually take up actions to provide stability and European security in the increasingly more complicated global order. Ensuring stability in the neighbouring regions through the European Neighbourhood Policy is of particular importance. This multithreaded issue was undertaken in the research carried out by Centre of Excellence at Warsaw School of Economics – CEWSE on European Union's Security and Stability in a new Economic, Social & Geopolitical Settlement and its partners, scientists representing a wide range of scientifi c centres, including international ones. The research focuses on challenges regarding: uniting or divisive history, transformations of contemporary European countries, European culture, national cultures, innovativeness and creativity of economy, science, migration crisis, refugee crisis, the relations between the EU and the Russian Federation, the crisis in Ukraine, energy security, public security, sustainable growth, social solidarity, demographic changes, Brexit, institutional crisis in the EU, the future of the EU, and more. As a signifi cant actor in global economic and political relations, the EU holds an important economic position, intensifying the pre-existing relations with third countries, organisations and groupings. It is very active in external contacts, negotiating and forming transatlantic agreements, with Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada as an example. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), whose intended aim was to create a free trade zone between the biggest players – the EU and the USA – previously under negotiations, has been suspended for the time being. Nevertheless, talks are being held as regards deepening the relations between the EU and MERCOSUR, and creating a free trade zone. The new transatlantic agreements, signed or undergoing negotiations, surpass the traditionally accentuated trade relations, covering also the issues of investment, intellectual property rights, legal regulations and standards, as well as regulating other spheres of socio-economic life, which in turn causes the process of negotiating and fi nalising such agreements is prolonged and complicated. The EU also intensifi es its relations with the dynamically developing African continent, hoping to mark its presence there next to other, for example Chinese, investors. Another dimension of external economic and political relations are the developing alliances with Asian countries, which constitute another strategic aim of the EU. The EU undergoes transformations from its very beginning, due to both the processes of expanding and deepening. The latest expansion of the EU took place on 1st July 2013, when Croatia became a new Member State. At the same time, the process of deepening mutual relations was advancing. Thus, the structure of the EU is very dynamic. Currently, the EU is facing numerous challenges of economic, political and social character. However the common values which accompanied the establishment of this organisation and which constitute the foundation of its unity should be supported through realizing agreed-upon operations. Some countries constitute the Eurozone, while other remain outside this hub of enhanced economic co-operation. This creates the so-called "multi-speed" Europe, with diversifi ed economic dimensions, and – as highlighted in the White Paper on the future of Europe1 – the scenarios for further EU development are also diverse. The EU also shapes its external relations in the international arena, economic and political relations with non-member countries on the European continent. Actions are being taken to provide protection and security in the area, which experiences numerous confl icts and crises. After the accession of 10 new countries to the European Union, it was necessary to develop relevant forms of co-operation and relations with the organisation's neighbouring countries. One of the dimensions of implemented policy is the European Neighbourhood Policy, as the neighbouring countries, as well as those maintaining deepened relations with the EU, have been offered the opportunity to develop co-operation and mutual connections within the areas of politics, security, economy and culture. In its original formula, it put forward a list of priorities to be met by the countries covered by the Policy and which have to be included in the Action Plans for numerous key areas, including political dialogue and reforms, trade, justice system, energy, transport, information society. The neighbouring countries deepen their relations with the EU while respecting mutual values. The fi nancial support for this policy is provided by the European Neighbourhood Instrument, the introduction of which is supposed to create the framework conditions for deepening further regional co-operation, at the same time enhancing stability and security in the region2. The present publication, as a product of the research carried out, approaches the subject of the EU's role in providing security and stability in the global order, with particular focus on the Neighbourhood Policy. The hereby publication consists of four thematically integral and interconnected parts.Part 1, entitled "The Concept of European Integration and the Role of the EU in the Global Order", consists of papers concentrating on the presentation of the effects of the European integration to date and the challenges which the EU is currently facing, the issues related to the system for protection of human rights. The diversifi cation of the integration process is highlighted.The importance of the EU as a global partner is also emphasized, indicating the activities dedicated to the least-developed countries. Part 2, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Need for Evolution or Revolution?" concentrates around the issues regarding diverse dimensions of integration. It discusses the questions related to the mechanisms of monitoring and solving disputes within the framework of association agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Attention has been paid to threats and opportunities for Europe due to new eastern neighbourhood. Institutional aspects of the transformation of the eastern countries have also been indicated, as well as its fi nancial aspects. This brings about new quality and opportunities in the context of EU cohesion policy, where new subjects have a chance to be sanctioned and obtain certain liberties. The third part, "EU Trade & Investment Policy: Engine for Growth and Job Creation?; The Economic Effects of New FTAs Generation – How to Assess Their Effects?", concerns the non-trade effects of DC-FTAs. The connections between the EU and China within the framework of multilateral WTO system have been indicated. Trade relations with MERCOSUR, integration processes in Africa have been discussed, with emphasis on the EAC – EU Economic Partnership Agreement. The trade and investment policies in the countries of the Visegrad Group have also been discussed. Nowadays, trade relations are growing in importance as compared to the past. Due to lasting, long-term co-operation, a tendency to tighten relations can be observed. The last, fourth part "The EU External Policy at a Crossroads Facing New Challenges and Threats from the East and Mediterranean Region" concentrates on the issues regarding external relations between the EU and the countries of the Mediterranean and Eastern regions. Issues related to the foreign policy of Turkey in the context of its relations with the EU are also raised in this part. The structure adopted in this publication introduces the reader to a review of the newest issues regarding mostly the external challenges facing the EU and the actions taken in order to overcome them and provide stability. Papers included in the publication refl ect their authors' own opinions and it is the authors who take full responsibility for their texts. We would like to express our gratitude to all the people and institutions who, through their expertise and fi nancial support, have contributed to the commencement of the present publication. Hereby, we would like to express our most sincere gratitude to the Jean Monnet Chair of European Union, SGH Warsaw School of Economics, University of Warsaw (Centre for Europe), University of Gdańsk (Research Centre on European Integration),University of Economics in Katowice, New Vision University, Tbilisi, Faculty of Administration and National Security of the Jacob of Paradies University in Gorzów Wielkopolski, College of Economics and Social Sciences, Warsaw University of Technology, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the worldwide networks of the European Community Studies Association (ECSA-World), including Polish European Community Studies Association (PECSA), ECSA Moldova, ECSA Ukraine, ECSA Georgia. The present publication presents the outcomes of research and is supposed to enable the reader to identify the role of the EU in providing stability and security and shaping effective co-operation not only with the neighbouring countries, on the political and economic platform. It is also supposed to inspire further scientific research. ; Centre of Excellence at Warsaw School of Economics (CEWSE); European Commission within the Erasmus+Programme – Jean Monnet Activities.

This chapter uses the First International Symposium on Language for Specific Purposes (LSP) keynote address titled "Theory and Method in Translation Studies (TS) and Business Language Studies (BLS): Illustrative Considerations for LSP in American Higher Education and Beyond" as a springboard to continue the theoretical BLS cartography initiated in "Business Language Studies in the United States: On Nomenclature, Context, Theory, and Method." It does so with a triple purpose: (1) to begin to fill in what was omitted from the original BLS mapping, (2) to extend the nomenclature proposal and disciplinary coverage, as manifested within a general theoretical framework, beyond that of the initial BLS content domain, and (3) to encourage the formation of post-UAB symposium LSP Theory Development Working Groups to further develop the theoretical cartographies and narratives, which the gathering era of global LSP will require in American higher education. The overarching goal is to encourage collaboration to devise a useful, informative, and adaptable general Non-English Language for Specific Purposes (NE-LSP) theoretical model that accounts for (1) what is already being done while (2) serving as a catalyst and predictor for future NE-LSP developments. It is not at all far-fetched to say in 2012 that US foreign language programs, departments, and institutions that do not embrace non-English LSP will be on the wrong side of curricular and pedagogical history in secondary and higher education as we go deeper into the LSP era of the 21st century. This affirmation presupposes the basic and applied research-intrinsic and extrinsic-that underlies, informs, and is derived from how NE-LSP is used or intended to be used, a general theory of which will more firmly anchor LSP in higher education as a crucial field of scholarly inquiry. ; To cite the digital version, add its Reference URL (found by following the link in the header above the digital file). ; CONTINUING CARTOGRAPHY Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 2 Continuing Theoretical Cartography in the Language for Specific Purposes Era Michael S. Doyle University of North Carolina at Charlotte Abstract: This chapter uses the First International Symposium on Language for Specific Purposes (LSP) keynote address titled "Theory and Method in Translation Studies (TS) and Business Language Studies (BLS): Illustrative Considerations for LSP in American Higher Education and Beyond" as a springboard to continue the theoretical BLS cartography initiated in "Business Language Studies in the United States: On Nomenclature, Context, Theory, and Method." It does so with a triple purpose: (1) to begin to fill in what was omitted from the original BLS mapping, (2) to extend the nomenclature proposal and disciplinary coverage, as manifested within a general theoretical framework, beyond that of the initial BLS content domain, and (3) to encourage the formation of post-UAB symposium LSP Theory Development Working Groups to further develop the theoretical cartographies and narratives, which the gathering era of global LSP will require in American higher education. The overarching goal is to encourage collaboration to devise a useful, informative, and adaptable general Non-English Language for Specific Purposes (NE-LSP) theoretical model that accounts for (1) what is already being done while (2) serving as a catalyst and predictor for future NE-LSP developments. It is not at all far-fetched to say in 2012 that US foreign language programs, departments, and institutions that do not embrace non-English LSP will be on the wrong side of curricular and pedagogical history in secondary and higher education as we go deeper into the LSP era of the 21st century. This affirmation presupposes the basic and applied research—intrinsic and extrinsic—that underlies, informs, and is derived from how NE-LSP is used or intended to be used, a general theory of which will more firmly anchor LSP in higher education as a crucial field of scholarly inquiry. Keywords: Business Language Studies (BLS), BLS cartography, Language for Specific Purposes (LSP), method, nomenclature, theory (intrinsic and extrinsic), theory development working groups Introduction A prolegomenal theory of non-English Business Language Studies (NE-BLS) has been outlined in "Business Language Studies in the United States: On Nomenclature, Context, Theory, and Method," in which an initial mapping provided a general theoretical overview of the BLS interdisciplinary topography that requires further exploration and ongoing development in order "to anchor the field more adequately in American higher education" (Doyle, 2012a, p. 105). At the groundbreaking First International Symposium on Language for Specific Purposes (LSP), hosted by the University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB) on April 13–14, 2012,1 a reminder was issued that pressing aspects of this preliminary cartography include its momentary omissions and blind spots in regards to other discourse domains and related features that remain to be adequately addressed within a general theory of LSP and NE-LSP, which itself must become more fully developed. This provisionality is similar to the future-oriented reminder in Alvord CONTINUING CARTOGRAPHY Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 3 Branan's (1998) "Preface: Part I" in the paradigmatic volume sponsored by the American Association of Teachers of Spanish and Portuguese (AATSP), Spanish and Portuguese for Business and the Professions, when, scaffolding his forecast on the pioneering work of Grosse (1985) and Grosse and Voght (1990), he predicted that the development of the yet-to-be-named BLS2 "movement will spread, as it has already begun to do, to all the professions: medical and health care, social work, law, science, and technology" (p. 5). Branan's prediction has recently been corroborated in "Evolution of Languages for Specific Programs in the United States: 1990–2011" by Long and Uscinski (2012), whose most recent findings, an update of Grosse and Voght (1990), show that "the sophistication and variety of [LSP] offerings have become deeper and more focused in response to broader needs" (p. 173), and that, while "business language [BL] courses remain the most common type of LSP courses," non-English "LSP courses are now more widely distributed across different professions" and languages (175–176). They confirm that LSP is now "solidly established as another curricular option, beside literature, cultural studies, and linguistics, in institutions where students demand it" (173).3 Indeed, within NE-LSP-BL, Spanish for business and international trade, for example, "has evolved from curricular margin to mainstay" and "has moved from being an occasional, boutique or exotic course offering to a new status as an established, regular, and even core SSP [Spanish for Specific Purposes] feature in many Spanish programs today" (Doyle, forthcoming). Within this general NE-LSP context in American higher education, this follow-up article uses the UAB First International Symposium keynote address titled "Theory and Method in Translation Studies (TS) and Business Language Studies (BLS): Illustrative Considerations for LSP in American Higher Education and Beyond"4 as a springboard to continue the provisional theoretical BLS cartography initiated in Doyle's (2012a) "Business Language Studies in the United States" with a triple purpose in mind: (1) to begin to fill in what was omitted from the original BLS mapping, (2) to extend the nomenclature proposal and disciplinary coverage, as manifested within a general theoretical framework, beyond that of the initial BLS content domain, and (3) to encourage the formation of post-UAB symposium LSP Theory Development Working Groups to further develop the theoretical cartographies and narratives that the gathering era of global LSP will require in American higher education. The mapping remains provisional and awaits ongoing refinement by content- and situation-based instruction NE-LSP specialists in "more complex sites of engagement" (to adapt Bowles's phrase) of the various subject matter domains themselves (Bowles 2012, p. 48). Taking BLS theory as a starting point, this article proposes that the original cartography of this particular LSP subdiscipline, itself based on LSP-Translation (Doyle, 2012a, p. 105), be extended to include mappings of other prominent NE-LSP domains in the United States, such as LSP-Medical and Health Care, LSP-Education, LSP-Legal (Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice), LSP-Engineering, LSP-Science, LSP-Technology, and LSP-Agriculture, among others that may currently exist or be in various developmental or anticipatory stages. As the theoretical cartography broadens to cover an array of LSP domains, a distinct and desirable possibility is that eventually, taken together, the domain mappings, developed and regulated by specialists in the various subdisciplinary regions, can serve as the aggregate basis from which to extract, extrapolate, and confirm a more general map for NE-LSP itself as it undergoes its fuller maturation process within American higher CONTINUING CARTOGRAPHY Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 4 education. This maturation will surely continue,5 as all language usage can be defined as LSP one way or another, either narrowly (e.g., for specific disciplines, professions, or communicative work situations) or more broadly and less traditionally (e.g., LSP-Literature; i.e., the specific use of language for literary studies and criticism, or even the supposedly more general LSP of being able to engage in tourism or to socialize and "hang out" informally in a language, which in itself undoubtedly constitutes a specific cultural, ethnographic, pragmatic, and sociodialectal use of language). Any university program of study, for example, may be considered as a cognate specialization in the LSP of that particular content domain (e.g., to major or specialize in business, medicine, law, engineering, education, psychology, or philosophy is to engage in mastering the specific languages and discourses of those fields). It is anticipated that a belated, general (and perhaps generally accepted) theory may emerge from a distillation of the sum of its LSP domain parts. Both intellectual and pedagogical outcomes promise a more rigorous and thicker articulation of a general NE-LSP intrinsic theory that draws from and renourishes extrinsic, applied theory. In this manner, pedagogy and praxis become overtly theory based by definition and methodological DNA—that is what they are in essence6—in their responsiveness to the need for continuous development as LSP domains evolve to meet the demands of society. Bowles (2012) reminds us that a key challenge to research informing pedagogy and praxis (and, it is understood, reciprocally and symbiotically to pedagogy and praxis informing theory-based research: see Figure 1) —in sum, to intrinsic and basic research that extend themselves into extrinsic and applied LSP— resides in the fact that LSP practitioners must resolve issues of translating the increase in LSP "analytical insights and research data into instructable materials" (p. 44). Theoretical considerations are crucial to LSP because they more firmly anchor this recently emerging field of scholarly inquiry and pedagogical methodology in higher education, a locus characterized by the ongoing development, analysis, and refinement of core theory and method. Figure 1. LSP theory informs pedagogy and praxis, and LSP pedagogy and praxis inform theory, as well as each other. Continuing the Provisional Theoretical Cartography of LSP-BLS The definition offered previously for the NE-LSP subfield of BLS is that it is "a major empirical sub-discipline of LSP whose objective is to examine and predict how languages are, may, or should be used to conduct business in various communicative situations and cultural contexts" (Doyle, 2012a, p. 109). This core definition encompasses the crucial ethnographic and multimethod considerations identified by Bowles (2012) "as a way of narrowing the product/process gap" (i.e., the LSP researcher "who views discourse as a CONTINUING CARTOGRAPHY Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 5 product" vs. the practicioner/user for whom such discourse "is an ongoing process") (p. 52). The prolegomenal mapping of BLS's theoretical terrain, as BLS has been and is currently being developed in the United States, can now be continued. In Figure 2, the original Provisional Map of Business Language Studies (Doyle, 2012a, Figure 2, p. 111) is revisited, now within a general NE-LSP paradigm, with a dividing line heuristically separating intrinsic and extrinsic theory, although these nourish each other and together they feed into a general theory of BLS. This separation will allow for additional cartographic detail, which appeared originally only in the narrative for the "Descriptive Theory" and "Provisional or Partial Theory" regions of the map (Doyle, 2012a, p. 110), to be provided for each theoretical side. That is, the earlier core description, which now needs to become more granular and thicker both in terms of narrative and cartographic representation, is included in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 2. Provisional Map of Business Language Studies (LSP-BLS) within a general NE-LSP-XYZ theoretical paradigm and with heuristic dividing line between intrinsic and extrinsic theory. (XYZ = any given LSP content domain) (Doyle, 2012a, p. 111). Figure 3, which addresses the pure or intrinsic theory aspect of BLS, now incorporates graphically the core explanation of (1) the descriptive theory considerations identified in the earlier narrative as product, function, or process oriented, and (2) the provisional or partial general theory considerations identified in the same earlier narrative as medium-, area-, rank-, discourse type-, time-, and problem-restricted elements (Doyle, 2012a, p. 110). CONTINUING CARTOGRAPHY Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 6 Figure 3. Provisional Map of Business Language Studies with core explanations of descriptive theory and general theory (provisional) (Doyle, 2012a, p. 112). Figure 4, which addresses the applied or extrinsic theory aspect of BLS, now incorporates and further develops the formerly separate graphic depicting methods and methodology in business language (BL) pedagogy as well as sources of information and research for other applied theory considerations, such as course and curriculum development, assessment of learner outcomes, faculty training, and BLS policy. Applied theory represents the area of BLS where most of the theory-based research to date has taken place (Doyle, 2012a, pp. 105, 111). With this, an ongoing theoretical mapping of NE-BLS in the United States continues to fill in what was not covered or dealt with earlier in as integrative a manner. The goal of providing a useful, general BLS theoretical cartography can benefit only from the forthcoming insights of additional researchers who are interested in contributing to the overall BLS objective: "to examine and predict how languages are, may, or should be used to conduct business in various communicative situations and cultural contexts" (Doyle, 2012a, p. 109). Such a collective benefit is also potentially the case as the NE-LSP theoretical mapping project extends its disciplinary coverage in the US beyond that of the point-of-departure focus on the BLS content domain. CONTINUING CARTOGRAPHY Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 7 Figure 4. Provisional Map of Business Language Studies including BL methods and methodology as well as other applied theory considerations. Extending Nomenclature and Provisional Theoretical Cartography from BLS to Other NE-LSP Domains The nomenclature Business Language Studies (BLS) has been proposed as a "more serviceable and academically communal name—a more rigorous toponymic identity—by which to identify itself as a theory-based field of scholarship" within LSP (Doyle, 2012a, p. 105). This has been done because, for academic and political reasons in higher education, nomenclature "encapsulates and stimulates further articulation and validation of the intellectual foundations—theory, method, and methodology—upon which a discipline or subdiscipline builds itself through a pragmatic and constructivist (shared and learner-centered) epistemology" (Doyle, 2012a, p. 106). Furthermore, nomenclature "identifies a scholarly forum in which to explore further and refine underlying intellectual assumptions (metareflection) as well as principles (derived from fundamental, basic, pure, or intrinsic research) that inform and upon which pedagogy and praxis (applied or extrinsic research) may subsequently be based" (Doyle, 2012a, p. 106). BLS may prove useful as a model for more broadly theorizing NE-LSP, such that the "studies" nomenclature may be applied productively to other content domains, which addresses the critical intercultural communication needs of our representative professional schools in the United States via a movement from Business Language Studies (NE-BLS) to, for example, Medical and Health Care Language Studies (NE-MHCLS), Legal Language Studies (NE-LLS), Education Language Studies (NE-EDLS: e.g., the rising importance of using Spanish, Vietnamese, Chinese, etc., administratively and pedagogically in K–16 settings), CONTINUING CARTOGRAPHY Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 8 Engineering Language Studies (NE-EGLS), Scientific Language Studies ( NE-SCLS), Technical Language Studies ( NE-TLS), and Agriculture Language Studies ( NE-AGLS), among others. The point is that NE-LSP domains such as these constitute essential areas for effective cross-cultural communication in today's global economy, in which the vast majority of the world does not do its daily living and work in English, and in the increasingly multicultural and multilingual US itself. The word "studies," a rubric broadly adopted in US higher education for interdisciplinary areas of investigation and pedagogy, seems custom-made for LSP and its XYZ content domains. As Lafford (2012) elaborates, "studies" indicates "a field that calls on the expertise of many disciplines for its realization" (p. 6). The definition of BLS, which represents an example of any NE-LSP domain (XYZ), may be extended and adapted to serve as a suitable vehicle for other NE-LSP domains such as those listed above. Figure 5 demonstrates the slight adjustments required initially, but always in need of ongoing (and definitive) regulation and refinement by specialists within the respective content domains. As seen previously, the NE-LSP subfield of BLS is "a major empirical sub-discipline of LSP whose objective is to examine and predict how languages are, may, or should be used to conduct business in various communicative situations and cultural contexts." Definitional adaptations would replace the phrasing "to conduct business" with wording apposite to each NE-LSP-XYZ discourse domain, as in "for medical, health care, and nursing purposes," "for legal and criminal justice purposes," or "for engineering purposes." Figure 5 provides a definitional template that may be useful for the NE-LSP nomenclature and theory agenda. Figure 5. Prolegomenal, definitional template for various (XYZ) NE-LSP studies (S) domains. Within the LSP mapping of a general theory of NE-LSP-XYZ (XYZ = Medical, Legal, etc.), the Descriptive and Provisional content of the Pure Theory (Intrinsic) terrain presented for BLS in Figure 3 would need to be shifted to the different domains being considered, that is, from BLS to MHCLS, LLS, EDLS, EGLS, etc. For example, the business language (BL) in Pure Theory → Descriptive → Product Oriented in the wording "[d]escribes or compares diachronically and synchronically existing and past BL texts and scenarios" would be modified accordingly to any other XYZ content domain (e.g., MHCL, medical and health care language; LL, legal language; etc.) under consideration, as indicated in Figure 6: CONTINUING CARTOGRAPHY Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 9 Figure 6. Pure Theory → Descriptive → Product oriented adjustments for various (XYZ) NE-LSP studies (S) domains. Similar adaptations would be LSP domain-matched throughout as warranted for other descriptive paradigm components (e.g., Function Oriented, Process Oriented, as well as in the Provisional cartography sections of Medium-Restricted, Area-Restricted, etc.). A corresponding LSP-XYZ adaptation would apply as well to other components of the theoretical modeling, as in the case of the Applied Theory → Pedagogy → Methods/Methodology consideration. Figure 7 anticipates what this particular adaptation might look like initially, with the expectation that LSP domain specialists will refine and regulate the mapping. Figure 7. Applied Theory → Pedagogy → Methods/Methodology adjustments for various (XYZ) NE-LSP studies (S) domains. The overarching goal is to collaboratively devise a useful, informative, and adaptable general NE-LSP theoretical model that accounts for (1) what is already being done (e.g., initially in NE-LSP-BLS) while (2) serving as a catalyst and predictor for future NE-LSP developments. A goal is also to more solidly secure the NE-LSP field theoretically in US higher education, an anchoring project that remains a continuing priority (Doyle, 2012A; Fryer, 2012; Lafford, 2012). CONTINUING CARTOGRAPHY Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 10 The Potential of Post-UAB Symposium LSP Theory Development Working Groups and Beyond The third purpose of this article is to propose for consideration the opportune formation of post-UAB First International Symposium theory development working groups to collaborate on the further development of the theoretical cartographies and narratives that the gathering era of global LSP—a new curricular and research status quo—will require in US higher education and beyond. The synergetic work of these LSP Theory Development Working Groups (TDWG), at (although not restricted to) future UAB-initiated symposia on Language for Specific Purposes, with a near-term focus on shoring up pure and intrinsic LSP theory, will cooperate with the more developed and ongoing research in applied theory, new directions for which can also be proposed and pursued by the symbiotic TDWGs (in intrinsic and extrinsic theory). Ideally, the TDWGs would complement the parallel creation of additional symbiotic working groups, such as an LSP Content Development Working Group (CDWG) and an LSP Methodology Development Working Group (MDWG), among others that might be identified as essential to a better understanding and advancement of LSP. The UAB-initiated theory, content, and methodology working groups could also meet to pursue and share their ongoing research and development at other professional meetings, such as the annual conference of the federally-funded Centers of International Business Education and Research (CIBERs), annual gatherings of the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL), the AATs (American Associations of Teachers of French, German, and Spanish and Portuguese), the Chinese Language Teachers Association (CLTA), the Modern Language Association of America (MLA), and the American Association for Applied Linguistics (AAAL), among others, as well as extending their efforts internationally in a global LSP dialogue and collaboration that should be pursued more vigorously and purposefully than ever before. The formation of such LSP working groups in core developmental areas—theory, content, and methodology—represents a consequential opportunity for UAB to extend its LSP leadership beyond the groundbreaking First International Symposium. As Symposium Director Lourdes Sánchez-López (2012) has written in her colloquium epilogue, "Because of the discussions that took place during and after the symposium, we believe that we may have prepared a solid ground for something larger, collaborative and long-lasting with strong national and international repercussions" and "[c]ollaboration, integration and unity are key elements for the success of our growing field" (no pagination). The UAB Symposium could serve as a prelude to an International Year of LSP, to be coordinated globally among scholars and to herald a concerted and sustained International Decade of LSP. This would serve to galvanize an integrative, long-term commitment to LSP development during which "the field of LSP can truly 'come of age'" (Lafford, 2012, p. 22). In this promising context, the UAB Symposium may even help trigger the creation of an American Association of Languages for Specific Purposes (AALSP), along the lines of the European Association of Languages for Specific Purposes,7 or even a more global International Association of Languages for Specific Purposes (IALSP). In any event, as a result of ongoing interest forums, such as the UAB Symposium, future surveys of the "Evolution of Languages for Specific Programs in the United States" will have the greatest potential ever to confirm LSP as a curricular status quo and mainstay. CONTINUING CARTOGRAPHY Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 11 Conclusion In 2012, it is not at all far-fetched to say that US foreign language programs, departments, and institutions that do not embrace non-English LSP will be on the wrong side of curricular and pedagogical history in secondary and higher education as we advance further into the LSP era of the 21st century. This affirmation presupposes the basic and applied research (intrinsic and extrinsic) that underlies, informs, and is derived from how NE-LSP is used or intended to be used. Ongoing fruitful work in theory and method, which should contribute to improved curricula, pedagogy, and teaching materials, must be pursued as essential to the maturation of the field. Notes 1 The conference theme was "Scholarship of Teaching and Learning" and featured inter-national presenters in a broad array of LSP sessions (see http://www.uab.edu/languages/symposium). Conference Director, Lourdes Sánchez-López, and the Organizing Committee (Brock Cochran, Malinda Blaire O'Leary, Yahui Anita Huang, John Moore, Sheri Spaine Long, Susan Spezzini, Rebekah Ranew Trinh, and Mike Perez) are to be commended for planning and hosting the informative event. 2 Doyle addresses the issue of LSP-BLS title and taxonomy twelve years later, in 2012, in "Business Language Studies in the United States: On Nomenclature, Context, Theory, and Method." 3 See "Table I: Types of Languages in the United States Currently Offered Across Languages and Professions During the 2010–2011 Academic Year" (Long and Uscinski, 2012, p. 176). The Grosse and Voght (1990) survey showed that LSP was already well-established in the national curriculum and pedagogy at "all sizes and types of four-year institutions. . .at private and public institutions. . .fairly evenly distributed among small, medium and large institutions" (p. 38). 4 Delivered by Doyle on April 14, 2012, the keynote address focused on two theoretical considerations: (1) that those engaged with LSP-Translation, especially its pedagogy, be "good utopians" who are well grounded in the extensive bibliography on translation theory (descriptive, prescriptive and speculative) and method, and (2) that those engaged in LSP-Business Language Studies (BLS) further articulate and develop its intrinsic theoretical aspects in order to complement the extensive work already done in extrinsic and applied BLS, given that the development of methods and methodology has far outstripped theoretical considerations per se, the latter of which are now warranted to more adequately anchor the field in American higher education. These are bookend theoretical concerns in that the first, in the field of translation, deals with an abundance of theory, dating back several millennia, which should not be ignored when praxis and pedagogy occur; the second, in the field of BLS, considers the lack of articulated theory upon which praxis and pedagogy are based. 5 Regarding this maturation process, Lafford (1991) has written that "the field of (non-English) LSP in the United States needs to follow the lead of the fields of CALL [computer-assisted language learning], Translation Studies, and ESP/EAP [English for Specific Purposes/English for Academic Purposes] all over the globe in order to become recognized as a valuable subfield of applied linguistics and to take its rightful place in the CONTINUING CARTOGRAPHY Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 12 academy. At that point, the field of LSP can truly 'come of age' and Grosse and Voght's (1991) initial optimism over the position of LSP in the FL [foreign language] curriculum finally will be realized" (22). Long and Uscinski (2012) also conclude that the maturation is ongoing, as the Grosse and Voght "optimistic, almost euphoric hopes for the reenergizing and internationalization of the US education system (and LSP's role in that process) have yet to be fully realized" (188). Long and Uscinski "predict a continued steady presence ["maturation"] of LSP in university curricula for years to come" (188). 6 Doyle (2012a) reminds us that "methods and methodology, of course, presuppose a theory, regardless of whether it is fully developed and articulated" (108–109). 7 Created in 1992, it is an "association of European University professors specialised in languages for specific purposes" whose "objective is that of fostering and promoting both the research into and teaching of modern languages as regards their applications to science and technology" (http://www.aelfe.org/?l=en&s=origen). References Bowles, H. (2012). Analyzing languages for specific purposes. Modern Language Journal, 96, 43–58. Branan, A. G. (1998). Preface: Part I. In T. B. Fryer & G. Guntermann (Eds.), Spanish and Portuguese for business and the professions (pp. 3–5). Lincolnwood, IL: National Textbook Company. Doyle, M. (Forthcoming). Business Spanish in the United States: Evolution, methodology, and markets. In Cuadernos de Asociación de Licenciados y Doctores Españoles en EEUU (ALDEEU). Doyle, M. (2012a). Business language studies in the United States: On nomenclature, context, theory, and method. Modern Language Journal, 96, 105–121. Doyle, M. (2012b). Theoretical foundations for translation pedagogy: Descriptive, prescriptive, and speculative (in defense of the 'good utopian'). Association of Departments of Foreign Languages (ADFL) Bulletin, 42(1), 43–48. Doyle, M. (2012, April). Theory and method in translation studies (TS) and business language studies (BLS): Illustrative considerations for LSP in American higher education and beyond. Keynote address presented at the First International Symposium on Language for Specific Purposes, University of Alabama at Birmingham. European Association of Languages for Specific Purposes. Retrieved September 4, 2012, from http://www.aelfe.org/?l=en&s=origen. Fryer, B. (1998). Faculty training opportunities in language for international business. In B. Fryer & G. Guntermann (Eds.), Spanish and Portuguese for business and the professions (pp. 167–187). Lincolnwood, IL: National Textbook Company. Fryer, B. (2012). Languages for specific purposes business curriculum creation and implementation in the United States. Modern Language Journal, 96, 122–139. Fryer, B., & Guntermann, G. (1998). Spanish and Portuguese for business and the professions. Lincolnwood, IL: National Textbook Company. Grosse, C. (1985). A survey of foreign languages for business and the professions at US colleges and universities. Modern Language Journal, 69, 221–226. CONTINUING CARTOGRAPHY Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 13 Grosse, C. (2001a). Global managers' perceptions of cultural competence. Global Business Languages, 6, 25–39. Grosse, C. (2001b). Mexican managers' perceptions of cultural competence. Foreign Language Annals, 34, 334–340. Grosse, C., & Voght, G. (1990). Foreign language for business and the professions at US colleges and universities. Modern Language Journal, 74, 36–47. Grosse, C., & Voght, G. (1991). The evolution of languages for specific purposes in the United States. Modern Language Journal, 75, 181–195. Grosse, C., & Voght, G. (2012). The continuing evolution of languages for specific purposes. Modern Language Journal, 96, 190–202. Holmes, J. S. (2000). The name and nature of translation studies. In L. Venuti (Ed.), The translation studies reader (pp. 172–185). London: Routledge. Kelm, O. Orlando Kelm. Retrieved June 19, 2012, from http://orlandokelm.wordpress.com/ Lafford, B. (2012) Languages for specific purposes in the United States in a global context: Commentary on Grosse and Voght (1991) revisited [Special Issue]. Modern Language Journal, 96, 1–27. Long, M., & Uzcinski, I. (2012). Evolution of languages for specific purposes programs in the United States: 1990–2011. 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Pajak adalah kontribusi wajib kepada negara yang terutang oleh orang pribadi atau badan yang bersifat memaksa berdasarkan undang-undang, dengan tidak mendapatkan imbalan secara langsung dan digunakan untuk keperluan negara bagi sebesar-besarnya kemakmuran rakyat. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh ukuran perusahaan, leverage, profitabilitas dan proporsi komisaris independen terhadap tax avoidance. Variabel independen yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah ukuran perusahaan, leverage, profitabilitas dan proporsi komisaris independen. Sedangkan variabel dependen dalam penelitian ini adalah tax avoidance yang diukur menggunakan Effective Tax Rate (ETR).Populasi penelitian ini berjumlah 48 perusahaan sektor pertambangan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) tahun 2017-2019. Penentuan sampel penelitian menggunakan metode purposive sampling sehingga diperoleh sampel sebanyak 25 perusahaan atau 75 sampel penelitian. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah metode analisis deskriptif dengan analisis regresi linear berganda dan menggunakan alat bantu SPSS versi 25. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa variabel ukuran perusahaan, leverage dan proporsi komisaris independen tidak berpengaruh terhadap tax avoidance. Sedangkan profitabilitas berpengaruh negatif signifikan terhadap tax avoidance.Kata Kunci: Ukuran Perusahaan, Leverage, Profitabilitas, Proporsi Komisaris Independen, Tax Avoidance.DAFTAR PUSTAKAAgusti, W. Y. (2014). Pengaruh Profitabilitas, Leverage, dan Corporate Governance (Studi Empiris Pada Perusahaan Manufaktur yang Terdaftar di BEI tahu 2009-2012). Jurnal Akuntansi, 2(3), 1–22.Ajzen, I. (1991). The Theory of Planned Behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50(2), 179–211.Andriyanto, H. N. (2015). Pengaruh Return On Assets, Leverage, Corporate Governance, dan Sales Growth terhadap Tax Efficience Pada Perusahaan Manufaktur yang Terdaftar di BEI Tahun 2009-2012. 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Alexander Dugin on
Eurasianism, the Geopolitics of Land and Sea, and a Russian Theory of
Multipolarity







IR has long been regarded as an
Anglo-American social science. Recently, the discipline has started to look
beyond America and England, to China (Theory Talk
#51, Theory Talk
#45), India (Theory Talk
#63, Theory Talk
#42), Africa (Theory Talk #57, Theory Talk
#10) and elsewhere for non-Western
perspectives on international affairs and IR theory. However, IR theorists have
paid little attention to Russian perspectives on the discipline and practice of
international relations. We offer an exciting peek into Russian geopolitical
theory through an interview with the controversial Russian geopolitical thinker
Alexander Dugin, founder of the International
Eurasian Movement and allegedly an important
influence on Putin's foreign policy. In this Talk, Dugin—among others—discusses his Theory of a Multipolar
World, offers a staunch critique of western and liberal IR, and lays out
Russia's unique contribution to the landscape of IR theory.




Print version of this Talk (pdf) Russian version




What, according to you, is
the central challenge or principle debate within IR and what would be your
position within this debate or towards that challenge?



The field of IR is extremely interesting and multidimensional.
In general, the discipline is much more promising than many think. I think that
there is a stereometry today in IR, in which we can distinguish a few axes
right away.



The first, most traditional axis is realism – the English school
– liberalism.



If the debates here are exhausted on an academic level, then on
the level of politicians, the media, and journalists, all the arguments and
methods appear new and unprecedented each time. Today, liberalism in IR
dominates mass consciousness, and realist arguments, already partially
forgotten on the level of mass discourse, could seem rather novel. On the other
hand, the nuanced English school, researched thoroughly in academic circles,
might look like a "revelation" to the general public. But for this to happen, a
broad illumination of the symmetry between liberals and realists is needed for
the English school to acquire significance and disclose its full potential.
This is impossible under the radical domination of liberalism in IR. For that
reason, I predict a new wave of realists and neorealists in this sphere, who,
being pretty much forgotten and almost marginalized, can full well make
themselves and their agenda known. This would, it seems to me, produce a
vitalizing effect and diversify the palette of mass and social debates, which
are today becoming monotone and auto-referential.



The second axis is bourgeois versions of IR (realism, the
English school, and liberalism all together) vs. Marxism in IR. In popular and
even academic discourse, this theme is entirely discarded, although the
popularity of Wallerstein (Theory
Talk #13) and other
versions of world-systems theory shows a degree of interest in this critical
version of classical, positivistic IR theories.



The third axis is post-positivism in all its varieties vs.
positivism in all its varieties (including Marxism). IR scholars might have
gotten the impression that postmodern attacks came to an end, having been
successfully repelled by 'critical realism', but in my opinion it is not at all
so. From moderate constructivism and normativism to extreme post-structuralism,
post-positivistic theories carry a colossal deconstructive and correspondingly
scientific potential, which has not yet even begun to be understood. It seemed
to some that postmodernism is a cheerful game. It isn't. It is a new
post-ontology, and it fundamentally affects the entire epistemological
structure of IR. In my opinion, this axis remains very important and
fundamental.



The fourth axis is the challenge of the sociology of international
relations, which we can call 'Hobson's challenge'. In my opinion, in his
critique of euro-centrism in IR, John M. Hobson laid the foundation for an
entirely new approach to the whole problematic by proposing to consider the
structural significance of the "euro-centric" factor as dominant and clarifying
its racist element. Once we make euro-centrism a variable and move away from
the universalistic racism of the West, on which all systems of IR are built,
including the majority of post-positivistic systems (after all, postmodernity
is an exclusively Western phenomenon!), we get, theoretically for now, an
entirely different discipline—and not just one, it seems. If we take into
account differences among cultures, there can be as many systems of IR as there
are cultures. I consider this axis extremely important.



The fifth axis, outlined in less detail than the previous one,
is the Theory of a Multipolar World vs. everything else. The Theory of a
Multipolar World was developed in Russia,
a country that no one ever took seriously during the entire establishment of IR
as a discipline—hence the fully explainable skepticism toward the Theory of a
Multipolar World.



The sixth axis is IR vs. geopolitics. Geopolitics is usually
regarded as secondary in the context of IR. But gradually, the epistemological
potential of geopolitics is becoming more and more obvious, despite or perhaps
partially because of the criticism against it. We have only to ask ourselves
about the structure of any geopolitical concept to discover the huge potential
contained in its methodology, which takes us to the very complex and
semantically saturated theme of the philosophy and ontology of space.



If we now superimpose these axes onto one another, we get an
extremely complex and highly interesting theoretical field. At the same time,
only one axis, the first one, is considered normative among the public, and
that with the almost total and uni-dimensional dominance of IR liberalism. All
the wealth, 'scientific democracy', and gnoseological pluralism of
the other axes are inaccessible to the broad public, robbing and partly
deceiving it. I call this domination of liberalism among the public the 'third
totalitarianism', but that is a separate issue.





How did you arrive at where
you currently are in your thinking about IR?    




I began with Eurasianism, from which I
came to geopolitics (the Eurasianist Petr Savitskii quoted the
British geopolitician Halford Mackinder) and remained for a long
time in that framework, developing the theme of the dualism of Land and Sea and
applying it to the actual situation That is how the Eurasian school of
geopolitics arose, which became not simply the dominant, but the only school in
contemporary Russia. As a professor at Moscow State University, for six years I
was head of the department of the Sociology of International Relations, which
forced me to become professionally familiar with the classical theories of IR,
the main authors, approaches, and schools. Because I have long been interested
in postmodernism in philosophy (I wrote the book Post-philosophy on the subject), I paid special attention to
post-positivism in IR. That is how I came to IR critical theory,
neo-Gramscianism, and the sociology of IR (John Hobson, Steve Hobden, etc.). I came
to the Theory of a Multipolar World, which I eventually developed myself,
precisely through superimposing geopolitical dualism, Carl Schmitt's theory of the Grossraum, and John Hobson's critique of
Western racism and the euro-centrism of IR.





In your opinion, what would
a student need in order to become a specialist in IR?



In
our interdisciplinary time, I think that what is most important is familiarity
with philosophy and sociology, led by a paradigmatic method: the analysis of
the types of societies, cultures, and structures of thought along the line
Pre-Modernity – Modernity – Post-Modernity. If one learns to trace semantic
shifts in these three epistemological and ontological domains, it will help one
to become familiar with any popular theories of IR today. Barry Buzan's (Theory
Talk #35)
theory of international systems is an example of such a generalizing and very
useful schematization. Today an IR specialist must certainly be familiar with
deconstruction and use it at least in its elementary form. Otherwise, there is
a great danger of overlooking what is most important.



Another very important competence is
history and political science. Political science provides generalizing,
simplifying material, and history puts schemas in their context. I would only
put competence in the domain of economics and political economy in third place,
although today no problem in IR can be considered without reference to the
economic significance of processes and interactions. Finally, I would earnestly
recommend to students of IR to become familiar, as a priority, with geopolitics
and its methods. These methods are much simpler than theories of IR, but their
significance is much deeper. At first, geopolitical simplifications produce an
instantaneous effect: complex and entangled processes of world politics are
rendered transparent and comprehensible in the blink of an eye. But to sort out
how this effect is achieved, a long and serious study of geopolitics is
required, exceeding by far the superficiality that limits critical geopolitics
(Ó Tuathail et. al.): they stand at the beginning of
the decipherment of geopolitics and its full-fledged deconstruction, but they
regard themselves as its champions. They do so prematurely.





What
does it entail to think of global power relations through a spatial lens ('Myslit prostranstvom')?  



This is the most important thing. The
entire philosophical theme of Modernity is built on the dominance of time. Kant
already puts time on the side of the subject (and space on the side of the
body, continuing the ideas of Descartes and even Plato), while Husserl and Heidegger
identify the subject with time altogether. Modernity thinks with time, with
becoming. But since the past and future are rejected as ontological entities,
thought of time is transformed into thought of the instant, of that which is
here and now. This is the basis for the ephemeral understanding of being. To
think spatially means to locate Being outside the present, to arrange it in
space, to give space an ontological status. Whatever was impressed in space is
preserved in it. Whatever will ripen in space is already contained in it. This
is the basis for the political geography of Friedrich Ratzel and subsequent geopoliticians. Wagner's Parsifal ends with the words of
Gurnemanz: 'now time has become space'. This is a proclamation of the triumph
of geopolitics. To think spatially means to think in an entirely different way
[topika]. I think that postmodernity has already partly arrived at this
perspective, but has stopped at the threshold, whereas to cross the line it is
necessary to break radically with the entire axiomatic of Modernity, to really
step over Modernity, and not to imitate this passage while remaining in
Modernity and its tempolatry. Russian people are spaces [Russkie lyudi prostranstva],
which is why we have so much of it. The secret of Russian identity is concealed
in space. To think spatially means to think 'Russian-ly', in Russian.





Geopolitics
is argued to be very popular in Russia nowadays. Is geopolitics a new thing,
from the post-Cold War period, or not? And if not, how does current
geopolitical thinking differ from earlier Soviet (or even pre-soviet)
geopolitics?



It is an entirely new form
of political thought. I introduced geopolitics to Russia at the end of the 80s,
and since then it has become extremely popular. I tried to find some traces of
geopolitics in Russian history, but besides Vandam, Semyonov-Tyan-Shansky, and a few
short articles by Savitskii, there was nothing. In the USSR, any allusion to
geopolitics was punished in the harshest way (see the 'affair of the
geopoliticians' of the economic geographer Vladimir Eduardovich Den and his group).
At the start of the 90s, my efforts and the efforts of my followers and
associates in geopolitics (=Eurasianism) filled the worldview vacuum that
formed after the end of Soviet ideology. At first, this was adopted without
reserve by the military (The Military Academy of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces of Russia), especially under Igor Rodionov. Then,
geopolitics began to penetrate into all social strata. Today, this discipline
is taught in the majority of Russian universities. So, there was no Soviet or
pre-Soviet geopolitics. There is only the contemporary Eurasian school, which
took shape at the end of the 80s. Foundations
of Geopolitics was the first programmatic text of this school, although I had
published most of texts in that book earlier, and some of them were circulated
as texts in government circles. Recently, in 2012, I released two new
textbooks: Geopolitics and The Geopolitics of Russia, which
together with The War of Continents
are the results of work in this field, along four axes. 





In
your book International Relations, not
yet published in English, you set out your Theory of a Multipolar World as a
distinct IR theory. What are the basic components of the Theory of a Multipolar
World—and how is it different from classical realism?



In order to be understood
and not get into the details, I can say that the Theory of a Multipolar World
seriously and axiomatically adopts Samuel Huntington's thesis about the
plurality of civilizations. Russia has its own author, who claimed the same
thing more than a hundred years ago: Nikolay Danilevsky, and then the Eurasianists.
However, everything starts from precisely this point: civilization is not one,
but many. Western civilization's pretension to universalism is a form of the
will to domination and an authoritarian discourse. It can be taken into account
but not believed. It is nothing other than a strategy of suppression and
hegemony. The following point follows: we must move from thinking in terms of
one civilization (the racism of euro-centric versions of IR) to a pluralism of
subjects. However, unlike realists, who take as the subject of their theory
nation-states, which are themselves products of the European, bourgeois, modern
understanding of the Political, the Theory of a Multipolar World proposes to
take civilizations as subjects. Not states, but civilizations. I call them
'large politeiai', or civilizations, corresponding to Carl Schmitt's 'large
spaces'. As soon as we take these civilizations—'large politeiai'—as subjects,
we can then apply to them the full system of premises of realism: anarchy in
the international system, sovereignty, the rationality of egoistic behavior,
etc. But within these 'politeiai', by contrast, a principle more resembling
liberalism, with its pacifism and integration, operates, only with the
difference that here we are not talking about a 'planetary' or 'global' world,
but about an intra-civilizational one; not about global integration, but about
regional integration, strictly within the context of civilizational borders.
Post-positivism, in turn, helps here for the deconstruction of the
authoritarian discourse of the West, which masks its private interests by
'universal values', and also for the reconstruction of civilizational identity,
including with the help of technological means: civilizational elites,
civilizational media, civilizational economic algorithms and corporations, etc.
That is the general picture.





Your
theory of multipolarity is directed against the intellectual, political, and
social hegemony of the West. At the same time, while drawing on the tools of
neo-Marxist analysis and critical theory, it does not oppose Western hegemony
'from the left', as those approaches do, but on the basis of traditionalism (Rene
Guenon, Julius
Evola), cultural
anthropology, and Heideggerian phenomenology, or 'from the right'. Do you think
that such an approach can appeal to Anglo-American IR practitioners, or is it
designed to appeal mainly to non-Western theorists and practitioners? In short,
what can IR theorists in the West learn from the theory of multipolarity?



According to Hobson's
entirely correct analysis, the West is based on a fundamental sort of racism.
There is no difference between Lewis Morgan's evolutionistic racism
(with his model of savagery, barbarism, civilization) and Hitler's biological
racism. Today the same racism is asserted without a link to race, but on the
basis of the technological modes and degrees of modernization and progress of
societies (as always, the criterion "like in the West" is the general measure).
Western man is a complete racist down to his bones, generalizing his
ethnocentrism to megalomaniacal proportions. Something tells me that he is
impossible to change. Even radical critiques of Western hegemony are themselves
deeply infected by the racist virus of universalism, as Edward Said showed with the
example of 'orientalism', proving that the anticolonial struggle is a form of
that very colonialism and euro-centrism. So the Theory of a Multipolar World
will hardly find adherents in the Western world, unless perhaps among those
scholars who are seriously able to carry out a deconstruction of Western
identity, and such deconstruction assumes the rejection of both Right
(nationalistic) and Left (universalistic and progressivist) clichés. The racism
of the West always acquires diverse forms. Today its main form is liberalism,
and anti-liberal theories (most on the Left) are plagued by the same
universalism, while Right anti-liberalisms have been discredited. That is why I
appeal not to the first political theory (liberalism), nor the second
(communism, socialism), nor to the third (fascism, Nazism), but to something I
call the Fourth Political Theory (or 4PT), based on a
radical deconstruction of the subject of Modernity and the application of
Martin Heidegger's existential analytic method.



Traditionalists are brought
in for the profound critique of Western Modernity, for establishing the
plurality of civilizations, and for rehabilitating non-Western (pre-modern)
cultures. In Russia and Asian countries, the Theory of a Multipolar World is
grasped easily and naturally; in the West, it encounters a fully understandable
and fully expected hostility, an unwillingness to study it carefully, and
coarse slander. But there are always exceptions.





What
is the Fourth Political Theory (4PT) and how is it related to the Theory of a
Multipolar World and to your criticism of the prevailing theoretical approaches
in the field of IR?



I spoke a little about this in the
response to the previous question. The Fourth Political Theory is important for
getting away from the strict dominance of modernity in the sphere of the
Political, for the relativization of the West and its re-regionalization. The
West measures the entire history of Modernity in terms of the struggle of three
political ideologies for supremacy (liberalism, socialism, and nationalism).
But since the West does not even for a moment call into question the fact that
it thinks for all humanity, it evaluates other cultures and civilizations in
the same way, without considering that in the best case the parallels to these
three ideologies are pure simulacra, while most often there simply are no
parallels. If liberalism won the competition of the three ideologies in the
West at the end of the 20th century, that does not yet mean that
this ideology is really universal on a world scale. It isn't at all. This
episode of the Western political history of modernity may be the fate of the
West, but not the fate of the world. So other principles of the political are
needed, beyond liberalism, which claims global domination (=the third
totalitarianism), and its failed alternatives (communism and fascism), which
are historically just as Western and modern as liberalism. This explains the
necessity of introducing a Fourth Political Theory as a political frame for the
correct basis of a Theory of a Multipolar World. The Fourth Political Theory is
the direct and necessary correlate of the Theory of a Multipolar World in the
domain of political theory.





Is
IR an American social science? Is Russian IR as an academic field a
reproduction of IR as an American academic field? If not, how is IR in Russia
specifically Russian?



IR is a Western scientific discipline,
and as such it has a prescriptive, normative vector. It not only studies the
West's dominance, it also produces, secures, defends, and propagandizes it. IR
is undoubtedly an imperious authoritarian discourse of Western civilization, in
relation to itself and all other areas of the planet. Today the US is the core
of the West, so naturally in the 20th century IR became more and
more American as the US moved toward that status (it began as an English
science). It is the same with geopolitics, which migrated from London to
Washington and New York together with the function of a global naval Empire. As
with all other sciences, IR is a form of imperious violence, embodying the will
to power in the will to knowledge (as Michel Foucault explained). IR in Russia remains purely
Western, with one detail: in the USSR, IR as such was not studied. Marxism in
IR did not correspond to Soviet reality, where after Stalin a practical form of
realism (not grounded theoretically and never acknowledged) played a big
role—only external observers, like the classical realist E.H. Carr, understood
the realist essence of Stalinism in IR. So IR was altogether blocked. The first
textbooks started to appear only in the 90s and in the fashion of the day they
were all liberal. That is how it has remained until now. The peculiarity of IR
in Russia today lies in the fact that there is no longer anything Russian
there; liberalism dominates entirely, a correct account of realism is lacking,
and post-positivism is almost entirely disregarded. The result is a truncated,
aggressively liberal and extremely antiquated version of IR as a discipline. I
try to fight that. I recently released an IR textbook with balanced (I hope)
proportions, but it is too early to judge the result.





Stephen
Walt argued in a September
article in Foreign Policy that Russia 'is nowhere near as threatening as the old Soviet
Union', in part because Russia 'no longer boasts an ideology that can rally
supporters worldwide'. Do you agree with Walt's assessment?



There is something to that. Today, Russia
thinks of itself as a nation-state. Putin is a realist; nothing more. Walt is
right about that. But the Theory of a Multipolar World and the Fourth Political
Theory, as well as Eurasianism, are outlines of a much broader and large-scale
ideology, directed against Western hegemony and challenging liberalism,
globalization, and American strategic dominance. Of course, Russia as a
nation-state is no competition for the West. But as the bridgehead of the
Theory of a Multipolar World and the Fourth Political Theory, it changes its
significance. Russian policies in the post-Soviet space and Russia's courage in
forming non-Western alliances are indicators. For now, Putin is testing this
conceptual potential very gingerly. But the toughening of relations with the
West and most likely the internal crises of globalization will at some point
force a more careful and serious turn toward the creation of global alternative
alliances. Nevertheless, we already observe such unions: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, the Eurasian Union—and they require a new
ideology. Not one like Marxism, any universalism is excluded, but also not
simple realist maneuvers of regional hegemons. Liberalism is a global
challenge. The response to it should also be global. Does Putin understand
this? Honestly, I don't know. Sometimes it seems he does, and sometimes it
seems he doesn't.





Vladimir
Putin recently characterized the contemporary world order as follows: 'We have entered a period of differing interpretations and
deliberate silences in world politics. International law has been forced to
retreat over and over by the onslaught of legal nihilism. Objectivity and
justice have been sacrificed on the altar of political expediency. Arbitrary
interpretations and biased assessments have replaced legal norms. At the same
time, total control of the global mass media has made it possible when desired
to portray white as black and black as white'. Do you agree with this
assessment? If so, what is required as a response to this international
situation?



These are true, but rather
naïve words. Putin is just indignant that the West establishes rules in its own
interests, changes them when necessary, and interprets allegedly 'universal
norms' in its own favor. But the issue is that this is the structure of the
will to power and the very organization of logo-phallo-phono-centric discourse.
Objectivity and justice are not possible so long as speech is a monologue. The
West does not know and does not recognize the other. But this means that
everything will continue until this other wins back the right to recognition.
And that is a long road. The point of the Theory of a Multipolar World is that
there are no rules established by some one player. Rules must be established by
centers of real power. The state today is too small for that; hence the
conclusion that civilizations should be these centers. Let there be an Atlantic
objectivity and Western justice. A Eurasian objectivity and Russian justice
will counter them. And the Chinese world or Pax Sinica [world/peace: same word
in Russian] will look different than the Islamic one. Black and white are not
objective evaluations. They depend on the structure of the world order: what is
black and what is white is determined by one who has enough power to determine
it.





How
does your approach help us understand Russia's actions on the world stage
better than other IR approaches do? What are IR analyses of Russia missing that
do not operate with the conceptual apparatus of multipolarity?



Interesting question. Russia's behavior
internationally is determined today by the following factors:



First,
historical inertia, accumulating the power of precedents (the Theory of a
Multipolar World thinks that the past exists as a structure; consequently, this
factor is taken into account from many sides and in detail, while the
'tempocentrism' (Steve Hobden, John Hobson) of classical IR theories drops this
from sight. We have to pay attention to this especially taking into
consideration the fact that Russia is in many ways still a traditional society
and belongs to the 'imperial system' of IR.) There are, besides, Soviet inertia
and stable motives ('Stalinism in IR');



Second,
the projective logic of opposition to the West, stemming from the most practical,
pragmatic, and realist motivations (in the spirit of Caesarism, analyzed by
neo-Gramscians) will necessarily lead Russia (even despite the will of its
leaders) to a systemic confrontation with American hegemony and globalization,
and then the Theory of a Multipolar World will really be needed (classical IR
models, paying no attention to the Theory of a Multipolar World, drop from
sight the possible future; i.e., they rob themselves of predictive potential
because of purely ideological prejudices and self-imposed fears).



But if an opponent underestimates you,
you have more chances to land an unexpected blow. So I am not too disturbed by
the underestimation of the Theory of a Multipolar World among IR theorists.





In
the western world, the divide between academia and policy is often either
lamented ('ivory tower') or, in light of the ideal of academic independence,
deemed absent. This concerns a broader debate regarding the relations between
power, knowledge and geopolitics. How are academic-policy relations in Russia
with regards to IR and is this the ideal picture according to you?



I think that in our case both positions
have been taken to their extreme. On one hand, today's authorities in Russia do
not pay the slightest attention to scholars, dispatching them to an airless and
sterile space. On the other hand, Soviet habits became the basis for servility
and conformism, preserved in a situation when the authorities for the first
time demand nothing from intellectuals, except for one thing: that they not
meddle in socio-political processes. So the situation with science is both
comical and sorrowful. Conformist scholars follow the authorities, but the
authorities don't need this, since they do not so much go anywhere in
particular as react to facts that carry themselves out.





If
your IR theory isn't based on politically and philosophically liberal
principles, and if it criticizes those principles not from the left but from
the right, using the language of large spaces or Grossraum, is it a fascist theory of international relations? Are scholars who characterize your thought as 'neo-fascism',
like Andreas Umland and Anton Shekhovstov, partially correct? If not, why is that characterization
misleading?



Accusations of fascism are simply a
figure of speech in the coarse political propaganda peculiar to contemporary
liberalism as the third totalitarianism. Karl Popper laid the basis for this in
his book The
Open Society and its Enemies, where he reduced the critique of
liberalism from the right to fascism, Hitler, and Auschwitz, and the criticism
of liberalism from the left to Stalin and the GULAG. The reality is somewhat
more complex, but George
Soros,
who finances Umland and Shekhovstov and is an ardent follower of Popper, is
content with reduced versions of politics. If I were a fascist, I would say so.
But I am a representative of Eurasianism and the author of the Fourth Political
Theory. At the same time, I am a consistent and radical anti-racist and
opponent of the nation-state project (i.e. an anti-nationalist). Eurasianism has
no relation to fascism. And the Fourth Political Theory emphasizes that while
it is anti-liberal, it is simultaneously anti-communist and anti-fascist. I
think it isn't possible to be clearer, but the propaganda army of the 'third
totalitarianism' disagrees and no arguments will convince it. 1984 should be
sought today not where many think: not in the USSR, not in the Third Reich, but
in the Soros Fund and the 'Brave New World'. Incidentally, Huxley proved to be
more correct than Orwell. I cannot forbid others from calling me a fascist,
although I am not one, though ultimately this reflects badly not so much on me
as on the accusers themselves: fighting an imaginary threat, the accuser misses
a real one. The more stupid, mendacious, and straightforward a liberal is, the
simpler it is to fight with him.





Does
technological change in warfare and in civil government challenge the
geopolitical premises of classical divisions between spaces (Mackinder's view
or Spykman's) heartland-rimland-offshore continents)? And, more broadly
perhaps, does history have a linear or a cyclical pattern, according to you?



Technological development does not at all
abolish the principles of classical geopolitics, simply because Land and Sea
are not substances, but concepts. Land is a centripetal model of order, with a
clearly expressed and constant axis. Sea is a field, without a hard center, of
processuality, atomism, and the possibility of numerous bifurcations. In a
certain sense, air (and hence also aviation) is aeronautics. And even the word
astronaut contains in itself the root 'nautos', from the Greek word for ship.
Water, air, outer space—these are all versions of increasingly diffused Sea.
Land in this situation remains unchanged. Sea strategy is diversified; land
strategy remains on the whole constant. It is possible that this is the reason
for the victory of Land over Sea in the last decade; after all, capitalism and
technical progress are typical attributes of Sea. But taking into consideration
the fundamental character of the balance between Leviathan and Behemoth, the
proportions can switch at any moment; the soaring Titan can be thrown down into
the abyss, like Atlantis, while the reason for the victory of thalassocracy becomes the source of its
downfall. Land remains unchanged as the geographic axis of history. There is
Land and Sea even on the internet and in the virtual world: they are axes and
algorithms of thematization, association and separation, groupings of resources
and protocols. The Chinese internet is terrestrial; the Western one, nautical.





You
have translated a great number of foreign philosophical and geopolitical works
into Russian. How important is knowledge transaction for the formation of your ideas?



I recently completed the
first release of my book Noomachy,
which is entirely devoted precisely to the Logoi of various civilizations, and
hence to the circulation of ideas. I am convinced that each civilization has
its own particular Logos. To grasp it and to find parallels, analogies, and
dissonances in one's own Logos is utterly fascinating and interesting. That is
why I am sincerely interested in the most varied cultures, from North American
to Australian, Arabic to Latin American, Polynesian to Scandinavian. All the
Logoi are different and it is not possible to establish a hierarchy among them.
So it remains for us only to become familiar with them. Henry Corbin, the French
philosopher and Protestant who studied Iranian Shiism his entire life, said of
himself 'We are Shiites'. He wasn't a Shiite in the religious sense, but
without feeling himself a Shiite, he would not be able to penetrate into the
depths of the Iranian Logos. That is how I felt, working on Noomachy or translating philosophical
texts or poetry from other languages: in particular, while learning Pierce and
James, Emerson and Thoreau, Poe and Pound I experienced myself as 'we are
Americans'. And in the volume devoted to China and Japan, as 'we are
Buddhists'. That is the greatest wealth of the Logos of various cultures: both
those like ours and those entirely unlike ours. And these Logoi are at war;
hence, Noomachy, the war of the
intellect. It is not linear and not primitive. It is a great war. It creates
that which we call the 'human', the entire depth and complexity of which we
most often underestimate.





Final
question. You call yourself the 'last philosopher of empire'. What is
Eurasanism and how does it relate to the global pivot of power distributions?



Eurasianism is a developed worldview, to
which I dedicated a few books and a countless number of articles and
interviews. In principle, it lies at the basis of the Theory of a Multipolar
World and the Fourth Political Theory, combined with geopolitics, and it
resonates with Traditionalism. Eurasianism's main thought is plural
anthropology, the rejection of universalism. The meaning of Empire for me is
that there exists not one Empire, but at minimum two, and even more. In the
same way, civilization is never singular; there is always some other
civilization that determines its borders. Schmitt called this the Pluriverse
and considered it the main characteristic of the Political. The Eurasian Empire
is the political and strategic unification of Turan, a geographic axis of history
in opposition to the civilization of the Sea or the Atlanticist Empire. Today,
the USA is this Atlanticist Empire. Kenneth Waltz, in the context of neorealism
in IR, conceptualized the balance of two poles. The analysis is very accurate,
although he erred about the stability of a bipolar world and the duration of
the USSR. But on the whole he is right: there is a global balance of Empires in
the world, not nation-States, the majority of which cannot claim sovereignty,
which remains nominal (Stephen Krasner's (Theory
Talk #21) 'global hypocrisy'). For
precisely that reason, I am a philosopher of Empire, as is almost every
American intellectual, whether he knows it or not. The difference is only that
he thinks of himself as a philosopher of the only Empire, while I think of
myself as the philosopher of one of the Empires, the Eurasian one. I am more
humble and more democratic. That is the whole difference.





Alexander Dugin is a Russian philosopher,
the author of over thirty books on topics including the sociology of the
imagination, structural sociology, ethnosociology, geopolitical theory,
international relations theory, and political theory, including four books on
the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. His most recent books, only available
in Russian at the moment, are Ukraine: My
War and the multi-volume Noomachia:
Wars of the Intellect. Books translated into English include The Fourth Political Theory,
Putin vs. Putin: Vladimir Putin Viewed
From the Right, and Martin Heidegger: The Philosophy of
Another Beginning.






Related links





Who is Alexander Dugin? Interview with Theory Talks editor Michael Millerman (YouTube)
TheFourth Political Theory website (English): 
Evrazia.tv
(Russian) 
Evrazia.tv
(English) 
Geopolitics.ru
(English version)
InternationalEurasian Movement (English version)
Centerfor Conservative Studies (Russian)

Print version of this Talk (pdf) Russian version

v. 750. V -- Vallejo L -- v. 751. Vallejo M -- Vans -- v. 752. Vänt -- Vážn -- v. 753. Vazo -- Venezuela Com -- v. 754. Venezuela Con -- Vereim -- v. 755. Verein -- Vers L -- v. 756. Vers M -- Victor M -- v. 757. Victor O -- Vigd -- v. 758. Vige -- Vinea -- v. 759. Vineb -- Vision R -- v. 760. Vision S -- Voice C -- v. 761. Voice D -- Voso -- v. 762. Vosp -- Vz -- v. 763. W -- Wagner, Richard A -- v. 764. Wagner, Richard B -- Walker, William F -- v. 765. Walker, William G -- Walz -- v. 766. Wam -- Ward A -- v. 767. Ward B -- Warsh -- v. 768. Warsi -- Waso -- v. 769. Wasp -- Water Supply Engineering B -- v. 770. Water Supply Engineering C -- Weak -- v. 771. Weal -- Wedk -- v. 772. Wedl -- Welc -- v. 773. Weld -- Wenzel R -- v. 774. Wenzel S -- West Virginia I -- v. 775. West Virginia J -- Whare -- v. 776. Wharf -- White E -- v. 777. White F -- Whittier L -- v. 778. Whittier M -- Wijg -- v. 779. Wijh -- William B -- v. 780. William C -- Willis S -- v. 781. Willis T -- Wimh -- v. 782. Wimi -- Winters G -- v. 783. Winters H -- Wit and Humor, American R -- v. 784. Wit and Humor, American S -- Woh -- v. 785. Woi -- Woman-Employment-U.S.T -- v. 786. Woman-Employment-U.S.U -- Wood G -- v. 787. Wood H -- Woold -- v. 788. Woole -- World Politics, 1919- T -- v. 789. World Politics, 1919- U -- World War, 1939-1945 EC -- v. 790. World War, 1939-1945 ED -- World War, 1939-1945 Ph -- v. 791. World War, 1939-1945 Pi -- World War, 1939-1945 Regional C -- v. 792. World War, 1939-1945 Regional D -- Wright G -- v. 793. Wright H -- Wz -- v. 794. X -- Yeast V -- v. 795. Yeast W -- Young C -- v. 796. Young D -- Yz -- v. 797. Z -- Zehn J -- v. 798. Zehn K -- Zimmerman C -- v. 799. Zimmerman D -- Zoology A -- v. 800. Zoology B -- Zy. ; v. 730. U -- Underdeveloped Areas A -- v. 731. Underdeveloped Areas B -- Union of South Africa So -- v. 732. Union of South Africa Sp -- United States Adu -- v. 733. United States Adv -- United States Army R -- v. 734. United States Army S -- United States Commerce C -- v. 735. United States Commerce D -- United States Division S -- v. 736. United States Division T -- United States Foreign Relations R -- v. 737. United States Relations S -- United States Historic -- v. 738. United States History -- United States History-Revolution-Poetry S -- v. 739. United States History-Revolution-Poetry T -- United States History-Civil War-Military-Regimental History L -- v. 740. United States History-Civil War-Military-Regimental History M -- United States History-Yearbooks -- v. 741. United States Ho -- United States Justice Department Ac -- v. 742. United States Justice Department Ad -- United States National Aeronautic and Space Administration R -- v. 743. United States National Aeronautic and Space Administration S -- United States Politics, 1865-1897 J -- v. 744. United States Politics, 1865-1897 K -- United States Rac -- v. 745. United States Rad -- United States State Department P -- v. 746. United States State Department Q -- United States War Information Office A -- v. 747. United States War Information Office B -- Université S -- v. 748. Université T -- Urban O -- v. 749. Urban P -- Uz. ; v. 703. T -- Tall -- v. 704. Talm -- Tariff I -- v. 705. Tariff J -- Taxation-Jurisprudence F -- v. 706. Taxation-Jurisprudence G -- Taylor Jer -- v. 707. Taylor Jes -- Tecn -- v. 708. Teco -- Television C -- v. 709. Television D -- Tena -- v. 710. Tenb -- Tess -- v. 711. Test -- Textile Machinery S -- v. 712. Textile Machinery T -- Their -- v. 713. Theis -- Thern -- v. 714. Thero -- Thomas V -- v. 715. Thomas W -- Thorpe B -- v. 716. Thorpe C -- Tidev -- v. 717. Tidew -- Tires -- v. 718. Tiret -- Tokio G -- v. 719. Tokio H -- Torl -- v. 720. Torm -- Towards E -- v. 721. Towards F -- Trade Unions G -- v. 722. Trade Unions H -- Transcendentalism B -- v. 723. Transcendentalism C -- Treason-Trials H -- v. 724. Treason-Trials I -- Trial -- v. 725. Triam -- Trotzky, Lev G -- v. 726. Trotzky, Lev H -- Tube R -- v. 727. Tube S -- Turin C -- v. 728. Turin D -- Tuw -- v. 729. Tux -- Tz. ; v. 636. S -- Safe -- v. 637. Saff -- Saint Louis G -- v. 638. Saint Louis H -- Saler -- v. 639. Sales -- Salvation Army R -- v. 640. Salvation Army S -- Sanchez L -- v. 641. Sanchez M -- Sans -- v. 642. Sant -- Sarl -- v. 643. Sarm -- Savar -- v. 644. Savas -- Schaa -- v. 645. Schab -- Schid -- v. 646. Schie -- Schmidt B -- v. 647. Schmidt C -- Scholl S -- v. 648. Scholl T -- Schopf E -- v. 649. Schopf F -- Schulze F -- v. 650. Schulze G -- Science Col -- v. 651. Science Com -- Scoa -- v. 652. Scob -- Scott -- v. 653. Scotu -- Seals and Seal Fisheries C -- v. 654. Seals and Seal Fisheries D -- Sedl -- v. 655. Sedm -- Sell -- v. 656. Selm -- Sericulture A -- v. 657. Sericulture B -- Sever G -- v. 658. Sever H -- Shakers L -- v. 659. Shakers M -- Shakespeare A -- v. 660. Shakespeare B -- Sheldon S -- v. 661. Sheldon T -- Shipping G -- v. 662. Shipping H -- Shórn -- v. 663. Shoro -- Shrub -- v. 664. Shruc -- Sigg -- v. 665. Sigh -- Simek -- v. 666. Simel -- Singing Q -- v. 667. Singing R -- Skinner B -- v. 668. Skinner C -- Slavs B -- v. 669. Slavs C -- Smith A -- v. 670. Smith B -- Smith, William A -- v. 671. Smith, William B -- Social D -- v. 672. Social E -- Socialism, 1923-1933 H -- v. 673. Socialism, 1923-1933 I -- Societe Al -- v. 674. Société AM -- Societies R -- v. 675. Societies S -- Sociology T -- v. 676. Sociology U -- Solís -- v. 677. Solit -- Sonh -- v. 678. Soni -- Sousa A -- v. 679. Sousa B -- Southgate V -- v. 680. Southgate W -- Spain-Foreign Relations F -- v. 681. Spain-Foreign Relations G -- Spanish America-History-to 1600 -- v. 682. Spanish America-History-after 1600 -- Speech O -- v. 683. Speech P -- Spirit F -- v. 684. Spirit G -- Spuc -- v. 685. Spud -- Stage-France O -- v. 686. Stage-France P -- Stanford R -- v. 687. Stanford S -- Statement F -- v. 688. Statement G -- Sted -- v. 689. Stee -- Stel -- v. 690. Stem -- Stevenson I -- v. 691. Stevenson J -- Stockholders F -- v. 692. Stockholders G -- Storg -- v. 693. Storh -- Straus D -- v. 694. Straus E -- Struc -- v. 695. Strud -- Stuer -- v. 696. Stues -- Sueb -- v. 697. Suec -- Summ -- v. 698. Sumn -- Surim -- v. 699. Surin -- Swan H -- v. 700. Swan I -- Swey -- v. 701. Swez -- Symbolism in Architecture R -- v. 702. Symbolism in Architecture S -- Sz. ; v. 603. Q -- Quek -- v. 604. Quel -- Qw -- v. 605. R -- Radio in Politics B -- v. 606. Radio in Politics C -- Railways Ab -- v. 607. Railways Ac -- Railways D -- v. 608. Railways E -- Rak -- v. 609. Ral -- Rape -- v. 610. Rapf -- Raymond V -- v. 611. Raymond W -- Recei -- v. 612. Récéj -- Reed V -- v. 613. Reed W -- Régim -- v. 614. Regin -- Reiner I -- v. 615. Reiner J -- Religion I -- v. 616. Religion J -- Rentm -- v. 617. Rentn -- Retail Trade R -- v. 618. Retail Trade S -- Revue S -- v. 619. Revue T -- Rhodesia, Northern L -- v. 620. Rhodesia, Northern M -- Richl -- v. 621. Richm -- Rihs -- v. 622. Riht -- Ritter C -- v. 623. Ritter D -- Roads-U.S.M -- v. 624. Roads-U.S.N -- Robinson J -- v. 625. Robinson K -- Rodrigues G -- v. 626. Rodrigues H -- Rolfe F -- v. 627. Rolfe G -- Rome (City)-P -- v. 628. Rome (City)-Q -- Rord -- v. 629. Rore -- Ross C -- v. 630. Ross D -- Rousseau L -- v. 631. Rousseau M -- Roźd -- v. 632. Roze -- Rul -- v. 633. Rum -- Russia Ar -- v. 634. Russia As -- Russia-Social Conditions, 1917 K -- v. 635. Russia-Social Conditions, 1917 L -- Rz. ; v. 548. P -- Pagg -- v. 549. Pagh -- Paintings-Collections R -- v. 550. Paintings-Collections S -- Paleography L -- v. 551. Paleography M -- Palmer K -- v. 552. Palmer L -- Pann -- v. 553. Pano -- Pap -- v. 554. Paq -- Paris E -- v. 555. Paris F -- Parkh -- v. 556. Parki -- Parties, Political D -- v. 557. Parties, Political E -- Patd -- v. 558. Paté -- Paul J -- v. 559. Paul K -- Pearce C -- v. 560. Pearce D -- Pei -- v. 561. Pej -- Pennsylvania F -- v. 562. Pennsylvania G -- Pén [i.e. Pénz] -- v. 563. Peo -- Periodicals C -- v. 564. Periodicals D -- Periodicals-U.S.I -- v. 565. Periodicals-U.S.J -- Persia C -- v. 566. Persia D -- Peru -- v. 567. Perv -- Petri R -- v. 568. Petri S -- Pfeiffer E -- v. 569. Pfeiffer F -- Philip G -- v. 570. Philip H -- Philology S -- v. 571. Philology T -- Phok -- v. 572. Phol -- Phrom -- v. 573. Phron -- Picb -- v. 574. Picc -- Pik -- v. 575. Pil -- Pioneer Life-U.S.V -- v. 576. Pioneer Life-U.S.W -- Pittsburgh S -- v. 577. Pittsburgh T -- Plas -- v. 578. Plat -- Plup -- v. 579. Pluq -- Poetry, American A -- v. 580. Poetry, American B -- Poetry, American Wis -- v. 581. Poetry, American, Wit -- Poetry, Dutch S -- v. 582. Poetry, Dutch T -- Poetry, English, Hist. & Crit., 20th Cent. C -- v. 583. Poetry, English, Hist. & Crit., 20th Cent. D -- Poetry, Hungarian A -- v. 584. Poetry, Hungarian, B -- Poetry, Spanish P -- v. 585. Poetry, Spanish Q -- Poland F -- v. 586. Poland G -- Polish Literature, Hist. & Crit. O -- v. 587. Polish Literature, Hist. & Crit. P -- Polska Akademja Umiejetnosci A -- v. 588. Polska Akademja Umiejetnosci B -- Popar -- v. 589. Popas -- Portrait S -- v. 590. Portrait T -- Postage Stamps R -- v. 591. Postage Stamps S -- Poula -- v. 592. Poulb -- Pram -- v. 593. Pran -- Press, Liberty of H -- v. 594. Press, Liberty of I -- Prier -- v. 595. Pries -- Printing G -- v. 596. Printing H -- Privies N -- v. 597. Privies O -- Proj -- v. 598. Prok -- Protection V -- v. 599. Protection W -- Prussia-History-Frederick II C -- v. 600. Prussia-History-Frederick II D -- Psyk -- v. 601. Psyl -- Puli -- v. 602. Pulj -- Pyz. ; v. 509. N -- Nan -- v. 510. Nao -- Nash -- v. 511. Nasi -- National C -- v. 512. National D -- National Sh -- v. 513. National Si -- Natural History R -- v. 514. Natural History S -- Naval E -- v. 515. Naval F -- Navy R -- v. 516. Navy S -- Ned -- v. 517. Nee -- Neh -- v. 518. Nei -- Netherlands (Kingdom, 1815- ) O -- v. 519. Netherlands (Kingdom, 1815- ) P -- Neud -- v. 520. Neue -- New England D -- v. 521. New England E -- New K -- v. 522. New L -- New York (city) B -- v. 523. New York (city) C -- New York (city) L -- v. 524. New York (city) M -- New York N -- v. 525. New York O -- New York (state) H -- v. 526. New York (state) I -- New Zealand C -- v. 527. New Zealand D -- Newspapers E -- v. 528. Newspapers F -- Nicol -- v. 529. Nicom -- Ninn -- v. 530. Nino -- Nole -- v. 531. Nolf -- North Am -- v. 532. North An -- Northwestern O -- v. 533. Northwestern P -- Noth -- v. 534. Notti -- Numismatics C -- v. 535. Numismatics D -- Nz -- v. 536. O -- Occupations C -- v. 537. Occupations D -- Oese -- v. 538. Oesf -- Ohio H -- v. 539. Ohio I -- Old L -- v. 540. Old M -- Omaha R -- v. 541. Omaha S -- Oor -- v. 542. Oos -- Oratory R -- v. 543. Oratory S -- Organic R -- v. 544. Organic S -- Orrego L -- v. 545. Orrego M -- Ostl -- v. 546. Ostm -- Outs -- v. 547. Outt -- Oz. ; v. 450. M -- Mccol -- v. 451. Mccom -- Mcgrad -- v. 452. Mcgrae -- Mackenzie G -- v. 453. Mackenzie H -- Macq -- v. 454. Macr -- Maga -- v. 455. Magb -- Maic -- v. 456. Maid -- Malat -- v. 457. Malau -- Maml -- v. 458. Mamm -- Mana -- v. 459. Manb -- Mannk -- v. 460. Mannl -- Many -- v. 461. Manz -- Marc -- v. 462. Mard -- Maris -- v. 463. Marit -- Marriage F -- v. 464. Marriage G -- Martens E -- v. 465. Martens F -- Martr -- v. 466. Marts -- Masc -- v. 467. Masd -- Massachusetts I -- v. 468. Massachusetts J -- Mathematics K -- v. 469. Mathematics L -- Matthews D -- v. 470. Matthews E -- Max -- v. 471. May -- Meb -- v. 472. Mec -- Medic -- v. 473. Medid -- Mej -- v. 474. Mek -- Memory R -- v. 475. Memory S -- Meq -- v. 476. Mer -- Merv -- v. 477. Merw -- Meteorology C -- v. 478. Meteorology D -- Metropolitan M -- v. 479. Metropolitan N -- Mexico G -- v. 480. Mexico H -- Meyk -- v. 481. Meyl -- Mich -- v. 482. Mici -- Mikn -- v. 483. Mikó -- Military L -- v. 484. Military M -- Milla -- v. 485. Millb -- Milton L -- v. 486. Milton M -- Mines and Mining G -- v. 487. Mines and Mining H -- Mirac -- v. 488. Mirad -- Missions, Foreign E -- v. 489. Missions, Foreign F -- Mitb -- v. 490. Mitc -- Modn -- v. 491. Modo -- Moll -- v. 492. Molm -- Money F -- v. 493. Money G -- Monof -- v. 494. Monog -- Monteiro L -- v. 495. Monteiro M -- Mónu -- v. 496. Monv -- Mord -- v. 497. More -- Morl -- v. 498. Morm -- Morse E -- v. 499. Morse F -- Motd -- v. 500. Mote -- Mountaineering M -- v. 501. Mountaineering N -- Moving Pictures R -- v. 502. Moving Pictures S -- Mufs -- v. 503. Muft -- Municipal C -- v. 504. Municipal D -- Murk -- v. 505. Murl -- Music B -- v. 506. Music C -- Music T -- v. 507. Music U -- Mutt -- v. 508. Mutu -- Mz. ; v. 414. L -- Labor G -- v. 415. Labor H -- Labour Party, Gt. Br. D -- v. 416. Labour Party, Gt. Br. E -- Lagd -- v. 417. Lage -- Lamm -- v. 418. Lamn -- Land, Public-U.S.N -- v. 419. Land, Public-U.S.O -- Lang O -- v. 420. Lang P -- Lapk -- v. 421. Lapl -- Latg -- v. 422. Lath -- Latth -- v. 423. Latti -- Law S -- v. 424. Law T -- Law, Maritime A -- v. 425. Law, Maritime B -- Leadh -- v. 426. Leadi -- Lebn -- v. 427. Lebo -- Lefk -- v. 428. Lefl -- Lehm -- v. 429. Lehn -- Lenc -- v. 430. Lend -- Leroy E -- v. 431. Leroy F -- Letters E -- v. 432. Letters F -- Levn -- v. 433. Levo -- Liberalism K -- v. 434. Liberalism L -- Libraries (Place) N -- v. 435. Libraries (Place) O -- Lich -- v. 436. Lici -- Lighthouses H -- v. 437. Lighthouses I -- Lincoln A -- v. 438. Lincoln B -- Lior -- v. 439. Lios -- Literature P -- v. 440. Literature Q -- Living Expenses G -- v. 441. Living Expenses H -- Locomotives A -- v. 442. Locomotives B -- Loll -- v. 443. Lolm -- London U -- v. 444. London V -- Lord R -- v. 445. Lord S -- Louis XVI -- v. 446. Louis XVII -- Lowe S -- v. 447. Lowe T -- Ludwig O -- v. 448. Ludwig P -- Lutg -- v. 449. Luth -- Lz. ; v. 363. I -- Idn -- v. 364. Ido -- Illumination of Books and Manuscripts S -- v. 365. Illumination of Books and Manuscripts T -- Impos -- v. 366. Impot -- Independence D -- v. 367. Independence E -- India, History E -- v. 368. India, History F -- Indians, Central America, Tribes L -- v. 369. Indians, Central America, Tribes M -- Indians, North America S -- v. 370. Indians, North America T -- Indib -- v. 371. Indić -- Industrial Arts (Place) E -- v. 372. Industrial Arts (Place) F -- Industries (Place) U -- v. 373. Industries (Place) V -- Inl -- v. 374. Inm -- Institut M -- v. 375. Institut N -- Insurance I -- v. 376. Insurance J -- Intellectuals (Place) F -- v. 377. Intellectuals (Place) G -- International Ch -- v. 378. International Ci -- International LaC -- v. 379. International Lad -- Internationalism B -- v. 380. Internationalism C -- Iowa R -- v. 381. Iowa S -- Irish L -- v. 382. Irish M -- Isa -- v. 383. Isb -- Italian Language H -- v. 384. Italian Language I -- Italy, History to 1815 -- v. 385. Italy, History-After 1815 -- Iz -- v. 386. J -- Jagem -- v. 387. Jagen -- Jansen T -- v. 388. Jansen U -- Jard -- v. 389. Jaré -- Jels -- v. 390. Jelt -- Jesuits and Jesuitism U -- v. 391. Jesuits and Jesuitism V -- Jews, Anti-Semitic Writings M -- v. 392. Jews, Anti-Semitic Writings N -- Jews So -- v. 393. Jews Sp -- Johnm -- v. 394. Johnn -- Jolk -- v. 395. Joll -- Jorg -- v. 396. Jorh -- Journey B -- v. 397. Journey C -- Juk -- v. 398. Jul -- Juvenile Literature, Drama, American C -- v. 399. Juvenile Literature, Drama, American D -- Jz -- v. 400. K -- Kampe -- v. 401. Kampf -- Karo -- v. 402. Karp -- Keem -- v. 403. Keen -- Kennedy J -- v. 404. Kennedy K -- Kets -- v. 405. Kett -- Kinf -- v. 406. King -- Kirr -- v. 407. Kirs -- Kloo -- v. 408. Klop -- Kobd -- v. 409. Kobe -- Kolor -- v. 410. Kolos -- Kor -- v. 411. Kos -- Kreus -- v. 412. Kreut -- Kuer -- v. 413. Kues -- Kz. ; v. 330. H -- Hahm -- v. 331. Hahn -- Hall J -- v. 332. Hall K -- Hamilton J -- v. 333. Hamilton K -- Handwriting R -- v. 334. Handwriting S -- Harbors M -- v. 335. Harbors N -- Harper V -- v. 336. Harper W -- Hartmann K -- v. 337. Hartmann L -- Hathaway E -- v. 338. Hathaway F -- Hawkins L -- v. 339. Hawkins M -- Heart's T -- v. 340. Hearts U -- Hegel H -- v. 341. Hegel I -- Heller J -- v. 342. Heller K -- Henry of K -- v. 343. Henry of L -- Heredity R -- v. 344. Heredity S -- Hertling O -- v. 345. Hertling P -- Hibben S -- v. 346. Hibben T -- Hiller F -- v. 347. Hiller G -- Historia A -- v. 348. Historia B -- History, General-18th Century Works B -- v. 349. History, General-18th Century Works C -- Hodge B -- v. 350. Hodge C -- Hog -- v. 351. Hoh -- Holr -- v. 352. Hols -- Hond -- v. 353. Hone -- Horn L -- v. 354. Horn M -- Hot R -- v. 355. Hot S -- Housing-Working Class H -- v. 356. Housing-Working Class I -- Howl -- v. 357. Howm -- Hughes F -- v. 358. Hughes G -- Humo -- v. 359. Hump -- Hunting N -- v. 360. Hunting O -- Hut -- v. 361. Huu -- Hygiene, Public L -- v. 362. Hygiene, Public M -- Hyz. ; v. 291. G -- Gall L -- v. 292. Gall M -- Gandía E -- v. 293. Gandía F -- Gardiner G -- v. 294. Gardiner H -- Gases A -- v. 295. Gases B -- Gazs -- v. 296. Gazt -- General E -- v. 297. General F -- Geography As -- v. 298. Geography At -- Geology O -- v. 299. Geology P -- Geometry S -- v. 300. Geometry T -- Gerk -- v. 301. Gerl -- German Literature S -- v. 302. German Literature T -- Germany C -- v. 303. Germany D -- Germany-History 1847 -- v. 304. German-History 1848 -- Gerom -- v. 305. Geron -- Giac -- v. 306. Giad -- Gilds G -- v. 307. Gilds H -- Girk -- v. 308. Girl -- Glay -- v. 309. Glaz -- Godf -- v. 310. Godg -- Gold Mines and Mining-Al -- v. 311. Gold Mines and Mining-Am -- Gol [i.e. Golz] -- v. 312. Gom -- Gook -- v. 313. Gool -- Goula -- v. 314. Goulb -- Grad -- v. 315. Grae -- Grang -- v. 316. Granh -- Great Britain I -- v. 317. Great Britain J -- Great Britain-Description and Travel,1800-1850 -- v. 318. Great Britain-Description and Travel, 1850-1900 -- Great Britain-Govt. B -- v. 319. Great Britain-Govt. C -- Great Britain-Hist., 19th cent. F -- v. 320. Great Britain-Hist.,19th cent. G -- Great Britain-Politics, 1660-1714 R -- v. 321. Great Britain-Politics, 1660-1714 S -- Great Britain-Trade, Board of U -- v. 322. Great Britain-Trade, Board of V -- Greece (Modern)-History, 1830 M -- v. 323. Greece (Modern)-History, 1830 N -- Greene H -- v. 324. Greene I -- Grey N -- v. 325. Grey O -- Grog -- v. 326. Groh -- Grunds -- v. 327. Grundt S -- Gueu -- v. 328. Guev -- Gumo -- v. 329. Gump -- Gzow. ; v. 249. F -- Fairs F -- v. 250. Fairs G -- Fans -- v. 251. Fant -- Fascism-Germany B -- v. 252. Fascism-Germany C -- Fearh -- v. 253. Feari -- Felln -- v. 254. Fello -- Ferrari -- v. 255. Ferrarj -- Fev -- v. 256. Few -- Fiction, American Ham -- v. 257. Fiction, American Han -- Fiction, American Will -- v. 258. Fiction, American Wilm -- Fiction, Dutch A -- v. 259. Fiction, Dutch B -- Fiction, English Kim -- v. 260. Fiction, English Kin -- Fiction, Flemish L -- v. 261. Fiction, Flemish M -- Fiction, German A -- v. 262. Fiction, German B -- Fiction, Lettish J -- v. 263. Fiction, Lettish K -- Fiction, Swiss-German B -- v. 264. Fiction, Swiss-German C -- Filmr -- v. 265. Films -- Finance, U.S., 1813 -- v. 266. Finance, U.S., 1814 -- Finland R -- v. 267. Finland S -- Fischa -- v. 268. Fischb -- Fishing A -- v. 269. Fishing B -- Flanders G -- v. 270. Flanders H -- Flora F -- v. 271. Flora G -- Flya -- v. 272. Flyb -- Folklore N -- v. 273. Folklore O -- Fond -- v. 274. Fone -- Før N -- v. 275. For O -- Forestry-Germany S -- v. 276. Forestry-Germany T -- Forter -- v. 277. Fortes -- Fourm -- v. 278. Fourn -- France Ar -- v. 279. France As -- France-Foreign Relations R -- v. 280. France-Foreign Relations S -- France-History-Revolution O -- v. 281. France-History-Revolution P -- France-Statistics M -- v. 282. France-Statistics N -- Frank E -- v. 283. Frank F -- Frederick I, King of Prussia -- v. 284. Frederick II, King of Prussia -- Freemasons P -- v. 285. Freemasons Q -- French Language-Dictionaries D -- v. 286. French Language-Dictionaries E -- Fresco Paintings B -- v. 287. Fresco Paintings C -- Friends, Society of. L -- v. 288. Friends, Society of. M -- Früh [i.e. Fruh] -- v. 289. Frui -- Funck J -- v. 290. Funck K -- Fyz. ; v. 214. E -- Eastern Col -- v. 215. Eastern Com -- Ecole B -- v. 216. Ecole C -- Economic History-Chile F -- v. 217. Economic History-Chile G -- Economic History I -- v. 218. Economic History J -- Economic History-U.S.F -- v. 219. Economic History-U.S.G -- Economics, 1848-1889 E -- v. 220. Economics, 1848-1889 F -- Edel -- v. 221. Edem -- Education E -- v. 222. Education F -- Education O -- v. 223. Education P -- Education-U.S.-N.J.T -- v. 224. Education-U.S.-N.J.U -- Egypt C -- v. 225. Egypt D -- Eisenstein I -- v. 226. Eisenstein J -- Electric M -- v. 227. Electric N -- Electrons B -- v. 228. Electrons C -- Ellis S -- v. 229. Ellis T -- Emigration, Canada N -- v. 230. Emigration, Canada O -- Enchanted R -- v. 231. Enchanted S -- Engineering Ch -- v. 232. Engineering Ci -- English Language-Dictionaries G -- v. 233. English Language-Dictionaries H -- English Literature S -- v. 234. English Literature T -- Epitaphs T -- v. 235. Epitaphs U -- Ero -- v. 236. Erp -- Espl -- v. 237. Espm -- Essays P -- v. 238. Essays R -- Ethics G -- v. 239. Ethics H -- Etr -- v. 240. Ets -- Europe-History H -- v. 241. Europe-History I -- European War, Aerial Operations M -- v. 242. European War, Aerial Operations N -- European War, Economic Aspects Germany K -- v. 243. European War, Economic Aspects Germany L -- European War, Neutrality R -- v. 244. European War, Neutrality S -- European War, Regimental History F -- v. 245. European War, Regimental History G -- European War, Great Britain G -- v. 246. European War, Great Britain H -- Evero -- v. 247. Everp -- Exhibitions C -- v. 248. Exhibitions D -- Ez. ; v. 177. D -- Dale C -- v. 178. Dale D -- Dancing F -- v. 179. Dancing G -- Danzig G -- v. 180. Danzig H -- Dauw -- v. 181. Daux -- Dawn -- v. 182. Dawo -- Debray -- v. 183. Debraz -- Defei -- v. 184. Defel -- Delaware C -- v. 185. Delaware D -- Democracy-U.S.B -- v. 186. Democracy-U.S.C -- Denton, Name [i.e. Denton (Name)] -- v. 187. Denton, County [i.e. Denton County] -- Desmares -- v. 188. Desmaret -- Deutsche J -- v. 189. Deutsche K -- Dewar M -- v. 190. Dewar N -- Dickens, Charles F -- v. 191. Dickens, Charles G -- Dikes H -- v. 192. Dikes I -- Disaster Relief B -- v. 193. Disaster Relief C -- Divo -- v. 194. Divr -- Dog L -- v. 195. Dog M -- Donato L -- v. 196. Donato M -- Douglas P -- v. 197. Douglas R -- Drama, American A -- v. 198. Drama, American B -- Drama, American Mi -- v. 199. Drama, American Mo -- Drama C -- v. 200. Drama D -- Drama, English Hol -- v. 201. Drama, English Hom -- Drama, English Translations From . R -- v. 202. Drama, English Translations From . S -- Drama, French J -- v. 203. Drama, French K -- Drama, German Bas -- v. 204. Drama, German Bat -- Drama, German, Low German D -- v. 205. Drama, German, Low German E -- Drama, L -- v. 206. Drama, M -- Drama, Spanish Ger -- v. 207. Drama, Spanish Ges -- Drama, Walloon W -- v. 208. Drama, Walloon X -- Dreu -- v. 209. Drev -- Dublin U -- v. 210. Dublin V -- Duke O -- v. 211. Duke P -- Duper -- v. 212. Dupes -- Dutch Language D -- v. 213. Dutch Language E -- Dz. ; v. 107. C -- Cah -- v. 108. Cai -- Cale -- v. 109. Calf -- California V -- v. 110. California W -- Cameron, I -- v. 111. Cameron, J -- Canada B -- v. 112. Canada C -- Canada Statistics Bureau M -- v. 113. Canada Statistics Bureau N -- Canaq -- v. 114. Canar -- Capeh -- v. 115. Capei -- Cardif -- v. 116. Cardig -- Carm -- v. 117. Carn -- Carrik -- v. 118. Carril -- Case A -- v. 119. Case B -- Castles R -- v. 120. Castles S -- Cathedrals S -- v. 121. Cathedrals T -- Catholic Church Roman L -- v. 122. Catholic Church Roman M -- Cauch -- v. 123. Cauci -- Cement and Concrete M -- v. 124. Cement and Concrete P -- Ceo -- v. 125. Cep -- Chah -- v. 126. Chai -- Chand -- v. 127. Chane -- Charities I -- v. 128. Charities J -- Charz -- v. 129. Chas -- Chemical Industries I -- v. 130. Chemical Industries J -- Chemm -- v. 131. Chemn -- Chicago B -- v. 132. Chicago C -- Children AC -- v. 133. Children AD -- Chile T -- v. 134. Chile U -- Chinese A -- v. 135. Chinese B -- Christ L -- v. 136. Christ M -- Christianity E -- v. 137. Christianity F -- Church Al -- v. 138. Church Am -- Church I -- v. 139. Church J -- Chyz -- v. 140. Ci -- Cities-Plans-D -- v. 141. Cities-Plans-E -- Civil R -- v. 142. Civil S -- Claq -- v. 143. Clar -- Classification K -- v. 144. Classification L -- Clergy F -- v. 145. Clergy G -- Club T -- v. 146. Club U -- Cobb -- v. 147. Cobd -- Coi -- v. 148. Coj -- Collection K -- v. 149. Collection L -- Collim -- v. 150. Collin -- Colonies and Colonization A -- v. 151. Colonies and Colonization B -- Columbia University Q -- v. 152. Columbia University R -- Coml -- v. 153. Comm -- Commerce Am -- v. 154. Commerce An -- Commerce-New York -- v. 155. Commerce-New Zealand -- Commis -- v. 156. Commit -- Competition-Unfair F -- v. 157. Competition-Unfair G -- Cone -- v. 158. Conf -- Congres H -- v. 159. Congres I -- Conr -- v. 160. Cons -- Continuation L -- v. 161. Continuation M -- Cookery B -- v. 162. Cookery C -- Cooperation S -- v. 163. Cooperation T -- Copyright M -- v. 164. Copyright N -- Coronations G -- v. 165. Coronations H -- Cortazar C -- v. 166. Cortazar D -- Cotner T -- v. 167. Cotner U -- Country Life-United States -- v. 168. Country Life-Uruguay -- Cowper W -- v. 169. Cowper Family -- Creation-Biblical Account-H -- v. 170. Creation-Biblical Account-I -- Criminal H -- v. 171. Criminal I -- Crip -- v. 172. Criq -- Crosby G -- v. 173. Crosby H -- Cua -- v. 174. Cub -- Cunningham A -- v. 175. Cunningham B -- Cux -- v. 176. Cuy -- Cz. ; v. 52. B -- Bader -- v. 53. Bades -- Baker, I -- v. 54. Baker, J -- Ballads, E -- v. 55. Ballads, F -- Banco P -- v. 56. Banco R -- Banks and Banking-Gt. Br. S -- v. 57. Banks and Banking-Gt. Br. T -- Baptists-U -- v. 58. Baptists-V -- Barlac -- v. 59. Barlad -- Barry, I -- v. 60. Barry, J -- Basr -- v. 61. Bass -- Baud -- v. 62. Baue -- Beac -- v. 63. Bead -- Beck -- v. 64. Becl -- Beh -- v. 65. Bei -- Belk -- v. 66. Bell -- Bend -- v. 67. Bene -- Benz -- v. 68. Beo -- Berlin F -- v. 69. Berlin G -- Berr -- v. 70. Bers -- Bet -- v. 71. Beu -- Bible. Zulu -- v. 72. Bible. Selections -- Bible. N.T.: Crit -- v. 73. Bible. N.T.-D -- Bible. O.T. Pr -- v. 74. Bible. O.T. Ps -- Bibliography-O -- v. 75. Bibliography-P -- Bibliotheca O -- v. 76. Bibliotheca P -- Bik -- v. 77. Bil -- Bio -- v. 78. Bip -- Bisl -- v. 79. Bism -- Blai -- v. 80. Blaj -- Blis -- v. 81. Blit -- Bob -- v. 82. Boc -- Bog -- v. 83. Boh -- Bolr -- v. 84. Bols -- Bolz -- v. 85. Bom -- Bon -- v. 86. Boo -- Bool -- v. 87. Boom -- Bor -- v. 88. Bos -- Botany-R -- v. 89. Botany-S -- Bouq -- v. 90. Bour -- Boyd -- v. 91. Boye -- Bram -- v. 92. Bran -- Brazil D -- v. 93. Brazil E -- Brer -- v. 94. Bres -- Brid -- v. 95. Brie -- British E -- v. 96. British F -- Brom -- v. 97. Bron -- Brov -- v. 98. Brow -- Brt -- v. 99. Bru -- Bryc -- v. 100. Bryd -- Budget-E -- v. 101. Budget F -- Building C -- v. 102. Building D -- Bulle -- v. 103. Bullf -- Burgf -- v. 104. Burgg -- Burrow, M -- v. 105. Burrow, N -- Buss -- v. 106. Bust -- Bz. ; v. 1. A -- Aben -- v. 2. Abeo -- Académie de F -- v. 3. Académie du G -- Achm -- v. 4. Achn -- Adams, D -- v. 5. Adams, E -- Ador -- v. 6. Adós -- Aeronautics-Ac -- v. 7. Aeronautics-Ad -- Aesoph -- v. 8. Aesopi -- Africa, So -- v. 9. Africa, Sp -- Agar -- v. 10. Agas -- Agriculture-Economics-F -- v. 11. Agriculture-Economics-G -- Agriculture-C [i.e. Agriculture (Place) C] -- v. 12. Agriculture-D [i.e. Agriculture (Place) D] -- Air-E -- v. 13. Air-F -- Alabam -- v. 14. Alaban -- Alcaraz, Em -- v. 15. Alcaraz, En -- Alexan, F -- v. 16. Alexan, G -- Aliens-H -- v. 17. Aliens-I -- Allied J -- v. 18. Allied K -- Alphabet, S -- v. 19. Alphabet, T -- Alz -- v. 20. Am -- America M -- v. 21. America-N -- American Fab -- v. 22. American Fac -- American Languages-Q -- v. 23. American Languages-R -- American Pio -- v. 24. American Pip -- Americans in L -- v. 25. Americans in M -- Amy -- v. 26. Amz -- Anderson, S -- v. 27. Anderson T -- Angle S -- v. 28. Angle T -- Annal -- v. 29. Annam -- Anthon -- v. 30. Anthoo -- Apar -- v. 31. Apas -- Aqueb -- v. 32. Aquec -- Arauco, C -- v. 33. Arauco D -- Architectural D -- v. 34. Architectural E -- Architecture, Ecclesiastical-F -- v. 35. Architecture, Ecclesiastical-G -- Arens -- v. 36. Arent -- Aristoc -- v. 37. Aristod -- Armitage, R -- v. 38. Armitage, S -- Army, R -- v. 39. Army, S -- Arres -- v. 40. Arret -- Art-Essays and Misc. G -- v. 41. Art-Essays and Misc. H -- Art Per [i.e. Art Pers]-- v. 42. Art, Peru -- Arz -- v. 43. As -- Assat -- v. 44. Assau -- Assz -- v. 45. Ast -- Athenaeum I -- v. 46. Athenaeum L -- Attention M -- v. 47. Attention N -- Auq -- v. 48. Aurauco D -- Austria B -- v. 49. Austria-C -- Authorship T -- v. 50. Authorship U -- Auy -- v. 51. Auz -- Az. ; Mode of access: Internet.

I«rt*\tmiw**$*n**t+mt*0m*m*0tmm***** PRGOHV MARCH, 1906 YOL. XIY. BTO. 1 GETTYSBURG COLLEGE GETTYSBURG, PA. I ! GETTYSBURG "NEWS" PRIWT. ■ • HELP THOSE WHO HELP US. The Intercollegiate Bureau or Academic Costume. Cotrell & Leonard, ALBANY, N. Y. Makers of Caps, Gowns and Hoods t" the American Colleges and Universities from the Atlan-u tic to the Pacific' Class contracts a specialty. I^i'cli .eir, bv any b"y or fir! in the re'mo e>t I anilct. or ai.y / teacher or otiiuul anyvvnere, and * prepaid firand new, complete alphabetical t atalogue^/r^.of school books at a// (i publisheri, it you mention this ad. HINDS & WOBLE -31-33-35 W\ loth St., New York City. r PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISERS. dJIIIIIIIIIIMIIIIMIIIIIIIIIIMIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIMIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIILi I Scligman I I & Brehm [ I Are Gettysburg's Most | | Reliable | I TAILORS I And sbow their appreciation of your patronage by giving you full value for your money, and closest attention to the wants of every customer. r / | Give Them J | YOUF Patronage J ^iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiMiiiiiiiiiiiiiMiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiuiir? PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISERS. Weave** Pianos and Organs Essentially die instruments for critical and discriminating buyers. Superior in every detail of construction and superb' instruments for the production of a great variety of musical effects and the finest shades of expression. ::::( Price*. Eajv Term:. Old Isitrameats Ixehi»£ed. WEAVER ORGAN AND ?PIANO CO., MANUFACTURERS, YORK, PA., U. S. A. Students' Headquarters —FOR-HATS, SHOES AND GENT'S FURNISHING Sole Agent for WALK-OVER SHOE Eckert's Store. Prices always right The Lutheran puMicafajSocietiJ No. 1424 Arch Street PHILADELPHIA, PA. Acknowledged Headquarters for anything and everything in the way of Books for Churches, Col-leges, Families and Schools, and literature for Sunday Schools. PLEASE REMEMBER That by sending your orders to us you help build up and devel-op one of the church institutions with pecuniary advantage to yourself. Address HENRY. S. BONER, Supf. ' THE MERCURY. "ODE ALGERICAS CONFERENCE." H. BRUA CAMPBELL. '06. ON January 16th, 1906, at Algericas, a Spanish town of about 13000 inhabitants, six miles west of Gibralter, the opening session of the conference of the Powers with re-ference to the Moroccan question was held, and at this writing the conference is still in session, only matters of secondary im-portance having as yet been adjusted. The Moroccan affair is one that is of vital importance from an international standpoint and the questions pertaining thereto have been a matter of dispute for a number of years. Several decades ago the powers of Europe found it necessary to call a halt to the abuses that existed in Morocco, and to that end summoned a conference at Madrid in 1 880 to consider the re-forming of that country. At this conference the Powers form-ally undertook the work of improving Morocco's condition. But this convention, however, was not successful in finally ad-justing matters. Since that time France has continued to in-crease her influence and power in Moroccan affairs. At first with the tacit approval of all the powers, but lately to the great dissatisfaction of her bitter rival in colonization, Germany.— In the fall of 1905 events reached a crisis and in order to settle the discussion, the Algericas conference was called. At this conference are represented, France, Germany.United States, Austria, Italy, Great Britian, Sweden, Holland, Spain and Por-tugual. Denmark and the new kingdom of Norway refused to enter, the Austrian delegate is also acting for the Pope, who desires to present a proposition for freedom of worship in Morocco. The subjects which are now being discussed at the confer-ence are : " The organization of a police force, regulations for the surveillance and suppression of the contraband trade in arms, financial reforms, consisting chiefly in the establishment of a State bank, in the study-of the best tariff measures and in the creation of new revenues, and finally, in the fixation of certain principles designed to safeguard economic liberty."— THE MEKCURV. These in brief are the reforms which are being debated upon by the envoys, and there is not the slightest doubt but that they are badly needed in Morocco, the internal affairs of that nation approaching a loose and even chaotic condition. There-fore the question of paramount importance is, not whether these reforms mentioned shall or shall not be provided for, but who shall carry out these reforms. Let us look at the attitude of the various powers with refer-ence to this all important question. Finance has been and is predominant in Moroccan affairs. She regards Morocco " as an island surrounded by French influence and destined inevit-ably to be absorbed in the French African Empire." Germany on the other hand recognizes the interests of the French in the policing of the frontiers but is unalterably opposed to French control over the cost regions, which she claims' should be guarded by an international police. Germany likewise desires to exercise control over the crown dominions which were given as securitv for the loan of two million dollars made by Spanish banks to the Sultan of Morocco. However Germany, as I have said, while not attempting to deny that France should have the right to police the Moroccan territory adjoining her Alger-ian possessions, is firmly opposed to giving France regulative control over the rest of the Sultan's domain. The attitude of Great Britian may be stated as being in favor of the French' contention, that France and not an international gendarmerie should police Morocco. Great Britian in 1904 resigned all her claims in Morocco to France,in consideration of the relinguish-ment by France of her right in New Foundland and Egypt. With respect to the positions of Spain, France can count on that nation's support in view of the convention of April 8th, 1904, in which France gave to Spain a number of concessions, the particulars of which were not made public. The support of Italy was won,by an agreement made with that country ,in which France was to keep Italy in Tripolo in return for aid given to France in Moroccan affairs. Thus France is assured of the support in the conference, of Great Britian, Spain and Italy. With respect to the attitude of other powers, nothing certain is THE MERCURY. 5 known. It is believed that Austria is not concerned with the political aspect of the question, but only with its commercial side. With respect to the position of the United States much has been said, the subject having only recently been exhaust-ively discussed by the U. S. Senate. Our government can be considered merely as a disinterested party in the conference, and as having no political axe to grind. It is thought that our representative will insist upon the " open door " in Morocco and will stand for the protection of the Jews and naturalized citizens of foreign countries. Then the stand taken by the Sultan of Morocco is of importance. The Sultan's delegates will make no proposals to the conference and are not endowed with powers to accept finally,the reforms adopted by the conference. It has been declared, however, that these delegates will approve all of the unanimous findings of the conference, provided that they do not affect the soverign rights of the Sultan or the in-tegrity of the country ; and that the introductions of the re-forms and their execution likewise be not entrusted to any one country. As a result of this position we can easily see that Germany, Austria, or in fact any one power, may very success, fully block the whole conference. Having seen that the point at issue is whether France shall have the right to police Morocco or whether that power shall be placed in the hands of an international gendarmerie, let us inquire into the relative strength of these two claims. When we consider the lact that Algeria, France's possession, which borders Morocco on the east, has for a number of years been troubled by disorders along the boundary, by some lawless Moroccan tribes ; and that France has been attempting to ex-tend her influence over Morocco,primarily to maintain order in Algeria, and secondarily to secure influence and trade in Morocco, we cannot fail to admit in part at least the justice of Frances' claims. In 1904, the French minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Delecasse duly communicated the scope of the agreements, made by France with Great Britain, Spain and Italy, to Germany and explicitly made known the intention of France to place Morocco within her sphere of influence. At THE MEKCLKV. that time the German embassador at Pans declared that France's declarations,with respect to Morocco, were " sound and reason-able." But very soon after Russia's serious defeats in the East by Japan, the German Kaiser, evidently eager to supplant France in Morocco and to acquire a controlling influence in this " priceless pawn on the chess board of world power," stepped in. and declared that Germany would protect her commercial inter-ests, and the integrity of Morocco must be preserved. This-action of the Kaiser has deceived no one. His uncalled for interference in the matter can be attributed to no other cause-than jealousy of France's growing influence in Morocco. Sur-rounded as that country is by French possessions, it is but just and reasonable that France should strive to establish a protec-torate over the territory of the Sultan. Germany on the other hand bases her claims upon no other grounds than the fact that German commercial interests, aggregating in all a few mil-lion dollars, are located there. This does not seem a good and sufficient reason for seeking to frustrate France's ambition to acquire control over Moroccan affairs, inasmuch as the latter country undoubtedly is supported by international law. At present France and Germany have deadlocked the con-ference by failure to agree on this most vital point, the polic-ing of Morocco. What the outcome will be it is difficult to say, but it is to be hoped that justice will prevail and that sel-fish greed for territory, unsupported by any valid and reason-able claim, will not prevail over the manifest validity of France's contention. THE MERCURY. / SOME ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A SALESMAN. E. G. HESS, '06. HAVING made a somewhat extended study of the funda-mental principles underlying successful salesmanship, I regard this an opportune moment to share with you a few in-significant fragments of what investigation and experience teach as some of the essential characteristics of a salesman. My definition of the term does not include the easy going automaton, measuring silks and satins in a department store. Neither do I refer to him, who dressed in snowy white, on a sunshiny sultry summer day manipulates the soda-water foun-tain or hands the refreshing " Moxie " to the ever-thirsting crowds, and with ease, registers the cash. Nor do I refer to any, to whom the prospective customers, with bulging purses, come, having a definite intention to purchase. But the parti-cular class concerning whom I shall speak are those who solicit buyers and generally meet their customers determined not to purchase. Perhaps nothing portrays the situation more accu-rately than that old and well known Jewish saying.which reads as follows: " To sell a coat to a man who wants a coat, that is nothing: but, when you sell a coat to a man that don't want a coat, that is business." This, paraphrased and expressed in more refined language, reads : offer not merely what people want, but offer something better and convince them of its value. To have conscientious convictions concerning the goods to be sold, stands as a pre-eminent requisite. The salesman must feel, from the depth of his heart, that the article offered is use-ful and better than any other of its kind ; that, while it may have imitations, there is no substitute ; in short, that it stands unique. Have you ever noticed the vast difference there is between something good and something just a little better ? For ex-ample, there is a trotting horse that covers a mile in 2.10. You say, that is a fine animal and valued highly. But there is 8 THE MERCURV. another horse trotting a mile in 2.08. You say, what difference can two seconds make in going to church ? Before you can look at the clock the seconds.are gone. The latter horse is, however, valued about $10,000 more than the former, for the simple reason that it is just a little better. So with the goods, they must be just a little bit better. He must also conscientiously believe that the article is worth the money received for it. For who could be so scandulous as to rob people in every business transaction ? Also it is evident that a thorough knowledge of the goods is absolutely necessary. The salesman needs to know at least a hundred times as much as he expects to tell any customer. Goods handled by drummers are either entirely new or posess some new and especially valuable property. People generally of their accord recognize the common properties of goods ; therefore it becpmes the salesman's business to differentiate and demonstrate conclusively the superior merits of his goods. He represents a new idea expressed in material form. Conse-qently he must introduce into a community that new idea. He necessarily must expect other people's ideas to differ from his own. He becomes an educator or a missionary, and this determines the spirit in which he engages in his work. There are some, however, who consider salesmanship trick-ery. It is absolutely foolish to try to sell by tricks. A sales-man can be known, in a large measure, by the controlling prin-ciples of his business. There is, perhaps, no characteristic that manifiests itself so clearly as a powerful will. Let us, however, not mistake stub-borness, obstinacy or temper for strong will. Such demonstra-tions and characteristics are the result of an uncontrolled will. The true will has the force and the continuity to stick persistently to a purpose and steadily perserve until it is accomplished. This gives ability to throw great energy and enthusiasm into the work and keep it there until the end is attained. One may have spasmodic outbursts and throw enormous energy into one special effort. But this is no cri-terion and does not indicate strength, which is tested by the THE MERCURY. ability to carry out a continuous course of so strenuous a character. He must also be able to make immediate and final decisions. A salesman cannot afford to doubt or even to hesitate betweert two opinions. He must sometimes, instantaneously, decide to do or not to do, and having thus-decided, his determination must become invincible, his purpose fixed, and then death or victory. Those who study this department of activities find some who fluctuate from one opinion to another. These opinions are usually furnished to them gratuitously by some kindly-disposed person, who had rather he were transacting business elsewhere, lest perchance, some money might be taken out of that partic-ular vicinity. They drift upon the free thought of the com-munity and are tossed about like a cork on the rolling billows t)f the mighty deep. These generally complain of being buf-feted by the world, and they erroneously conclude that they are not adapted for this particular sphere of business activity. Let us, therefore, consider what adaptability has to do with successful salesmanship. When one transacts business in New York he must have the Democratic spirit of a New Yorker; when in Boston, that of the Puritanic Bostonian ; when in Phila-delphia, that of brotherly love of the Philadelphian. Emerson says: "Nature is not slow to equip us in the prison uniform of the -party to which we adhere. We come to wear one cut of face and figure. But for non-conformity the world whips us with its displeasure. Therefore, a man must know how to estimate a sour face. It becomes easy enough for the firm man, who knows the world, to brook the rage of the cultivated classes." This principle of conformity, nevertheless, also has its limita-tions. It must be adhered to until the salesman has found a point of contact or mutual interest. But, when he presents his cause, he must know his own worth and keep things under his feet. He then becomes himself. So logically and forcibly does he argue, that the prospective customer loses his vantage-ground and is uplifted to a new and more beautiful realm of thought. In this happy state it is infinitely more easy for him to compensate by handing you a check than to see you go empty-handed. A good salesman is said to be like a good cook; he can create an appetite when the buyer isn't hungry. IO THE MERCURY, "CHINESE" GORDON. HESSE, '09. EVERY truly great man exerts an influence for good, and becomes a public benefactor. He', who aids another to conquer his own evil nature, or who rescues the plains and forests of the earth from barrenness and unfruitfulness, de-serves the highest praise and an undying fame. Each nation of the dim past, as it raised to prominence, dis-closed some man, who, by his genius, his energy, or his self sacrifice, stood preeminent among his fellows. The nations of antiquity have not alone become famous for their great leaders ; for the nineteenth century and modern Europe have contributed in Charles Gordon, "The hero of three continents," a man, who as a soldier, a statesman, an explorer, and a Christian missionary, brought light to darkest Africa, relief to oppressed China, and by his unselfish devotion to duty, became a worthy example for all succeeding ages. Gordon stands to-day the product of freedom and Christian morality, the son of an illus-trious race. The history of his ancestors is the story of man on the altar of self sacrifice, and the deeds of his illustrious Highland clan have become famous in the annals of Scotland. When a young man, Charles Gordon entered the Loyal Mili-tary Academy, but with no desire of becoming a soldier. He first entered Her Majesty's'service at the out break of the Cri-mean war, where, by his bravery and soldierly bearing, he won the confidence of his superior officers. During the one year's siege of Sabastopal, incessant guard by day and night, hard labor in the trenches, scarcity of food, and an unhealthy climate, tried his courage and disclosed that endurance which, later made him famous. At the close of this bloody struggle the young soldier was appointed to locate the boundaries between Russia and Turkey, and while there, got a glimpse of an infamous trade which later was to receive from him such a deadly blow. Four years thus spent in active service and travels, gave Gordon such knowledge and wisdom as seldom comes to one so young. He had seen and lived with both the oldest and THE MERCURY. II newest among the nations of men, and his thoughts, running •deep into the unwritten volumes of nature, equipped him well ' for his later and more difficult tasks. Our hero next appears in China, that ancient and solitary nation.which for centuries had been consuming all its wealth in the producing of a terrestial paradise. As an officer of the English arm}- he took part in the so called " Opium War," but when the capture of Pekin put an end to hostilities, and the Chinese government found its very existence threatened by the great Taping rebellion, this obscure Englishman, an enemy, was chosen to lead the Imperial Army and to protect the three hun-dred million inhabitants of China. The service he rendered to the Empire of China we can not fully estimate. He gave vigor to their plans, thought to their councils, rapidity to their action, and courage to their soldiers. His indomitable resolu-tion, inexhaustible resources, and sleepless activity, prevented the spread of the insurrection, and the overthrow of the oldest empire in the world. Honest sincerity, love of justice, humility and a superior knowledge of mankind were his master quali-ties ; and yet, while the government and ruling classes of China honored Gordon as the saviour of their country, the people of England looked upon him as a fanatic or mad man. At the close of the rebellion he returned to England, and for six years devoted himself to the aiding of the poor in his native land. In the year eighteen hundred and seventy four, this unselfish soldier accepted an offer from the Khedive of Egypt to penetrate the upper regions of the Nile, to explore that unknown land, and to overthrow the power of the slave dealer. There, in the pit of man's lowest degredation, in that region made dark by the long absence of Christian civilization, were displayed an intense feeling of sympathy toward the de-graded black man, and a bodily energy or power of endurance, which made him a master of physical toil. The course of the river led him due South into the very heart of darkest Africa. Day after day, and month after month, he traveled on through that vast rainless region, and then came to the home of the African negro, who had so long been the spoil of his stronger 12 THE MERCURY. brother. All his companions soon died, and by the last of December Gordon was the only white man in that vast region called the Soudan. Where is there a more pathetic picture than that of this lonely solitary being, fighting both man and nature, and hoping almost against hope for the overthrow of slavery ? After enduring untold sufferings and exposure, Charles Gordon accomplished his mission of organizing that region,, more vast than all Europe, and returned to the Khedive at Cairo. A second time, as Gov. General of the entire Soudan, he penetrated those vast equitorial wastes and day after day he could have been seen, mounted on a fleet camel, traversing the long wilderness of ridge and gorge, plain and valley, and seek-ing in every possible way to thwart the Arab slave traders and check their nefarious traffic. Gordon aimed to lighten the load of human misery wherever he might find it; to establish order where there was anarchy ; to unbind the slave and restore to him his lost manhood. The wretchedness of the poor people of the country was beyond description, for war, famine, and slavery had truly made it the Dark Continent. It seemed at that time that Gordon's long and speedy jour-neys about the country, and his ardent toil, were all in vain, but no: no sacrifice for the sake of humanity is ever in vain. The African slave trade, with its attendant evils, has now been overthrown, and all Christian nations vie with each other in opening Africa's fertile regions to the civilization of the world. Now Charles Gordon was not permitted to reap this hard earned reward of his labor, for jealous officials reported to the govern-ment of England, that this great son ot hers was not only in-solent, disobedient, and insubordinate, but that he was mad. His knowledge and outspoken convictions regarding England's-foreign policy in India, Egypt and South Africa soon placed-him in disfavor with all political parties, and this man, who had devoted his life to the service of his fellow man, was appointed as a mere secretary at the legation in Bombay. Deserted by - his countrymen, and ignored by his fellow-soldiers, Gordon • THE MERCURY. 13 again went to China, and while there, succeeded in preventing the threatened war with Russia. When this friend of the oppressed again returned to England, he came face to face with the most unnatural system of slavery ever tolerated by a Christian nation, and in his bold and fear-less way, urged the English people to right the wrongs of Ireland. He was listened to, when he spoke in the cause of some distant race in Central Africa ; he had legions of admir-ers, when he painted the road to right and justice for some? nameless tribe in the remote Soudan; but was ridiculed when, he told the people of England, that within twelve hours of the capitol there existed a deeper misery and a more unnatural injustice. Such bluntness of speech and honest expressions of conviction were not pleasing to either people or government; so Gordon was again forced to retire from public life. How-ever, he was soon sought and urged by a helpless ministry to again take up the burden in the equitorial regions, and rescue England's garrisons from impending destruction. The appalling mismanagement of affairs in Egypt, and the numerous successes of the fanatic, Mohammedon Mahdi, were threatening to cause the complete destruction of Britain's au-thority in Africa; so, bidding a last farewell to the land of his birth, Gordon set out to rescue the garrisons he himself had es-tablished in the Soudan. Having advanced into the upper re-gions of Egypt, he made his headquarters at Khartoum, and with half a dozen Englishmen and a few thousand Egyptians soldiers, sought to stem the tide of Mohamedian fanaticism, and rescue the land he had so often sought to save. Month after month the forces of the Arabs increased, but daily the food supply and the number of his faithful followers lessoned. De-serted by many of his" Egyptian troops, and abandoned to his fate by his government at h/>me; this lone hero fought on, hop-ing against hope for the success that never came. After a siege often months, when every morsel of food had been ex-hausted and every hope disappointed, the city fell; and this king of men, the greatest of England's heroes fell—a martyr at the post of duty. 14 THE MERCURY. Many a year has gone by since the kith of Charles Gordon first heard from Highland hilltop the signal of battle ; but never in Celtic hero's long record of honor, has such answer been sent back to Highland or Lowland, as when this great heart ceased its beating in the dawn at Khartoum. The dust of Gor-don is not laid in English earth, nor does the ocean hold in its vast and wandering grave, the bones of England's greatest hero. Somewhere, far out in the immense desert, whose sands so of-ten gave him rest in life, or by the banks of that river, which was the scene of so much of his labor, his ashes now add their wind-swept atoms to the mighty waste of the Soudan. IS THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTEST BEING RUN TO EXCESS? SAMUEL E. SMITH, '07. THE life of man is a continual struggle. From the cradle to the grave he is always fighting for his very existence. In childhood his frail physical organism is battling all the time with the diseases which blot out the lives of so many before they reach their teens. As a young man he is ever striving against the forces which would destroy him. And how many do succomb to the temptations and ambitions of young man-hood ! When he is married and has a home of his own, it is again a never ceasing struggle to provide bountifully for his dear ones and educate them properly. No wealth, no position can guarantee to a man a life free from struggle. With the rich it is a constant fight to keep from being defrauded, while with the poor it is an every day struggle to procure the neces-sities of life. Since the question is of such breadth it will be impossible for us, in the space allotted, to present anything like a conclusive argument, unless we»will limit ourselves to some particular period of life and examine its relation to this ques-tion with much thoroughness. An understanding has been reached with the negative to this effect, and in pursuance of such an agreement it is the purpose to debate,—is the principle of contest being carried to excess in college life ? THE MERCURV. I 5 Even narrowing the question down as we have narrowed it, there are so many phases of college activity, that it is almost a problem to find a proper point for our argument to begin. However there are four worlds, as it were, in which the student with normal tendencies moves, and these will serve our purpose for an outline. The intellectual realm is the first to be considered. The chief occupation of the student is, or should be, study. How is the principle of contest affecting the intellectual pursuits of the student? In a very vital way to be sure. Indeed the entire education of man is a contest of his higher self with the plastic materials of his lower nature; that the strong and beauti-ful fabric of a vigorous mentality may be fashioned. The word education is most significant in this respect, being from educo, whose root means the one who leads an army. Our present system of education makes study a continual con-test tor most students, and it is well that such is the case. The student must be careful or he will make poor recitations and* that means poor marks. He must keep the examinations in view and for a week before the last of the term the contest becomes more strenuous. Then there are prizes to be con-tended tor, and the love of intellectual war, so to speak, is felt so little that only a few ever struggle tor prizes with real effort. Inter-class debates and inter-society debates afford a further means of contest. However, so few are interested in these, as a rule, that the principle of contest is practically inoperative in the intellectual realm. On this account the regular college re-quirements should be higher, in order that the great majority of students would be required to fight harder for success. As we pass from the intellectual to the physical world we find the principle of contest operative to a greater degree. This brings about many and beneficial results. The athlete has ever, and justly so, received great honor, although we can scarcely approve of the almost universal custom of making more of physical prowess than of intellectual supremacy. At college a man must work hard to reach a high place in the athletic world, and in striving for success in sports certain very i6 THE MERCURV. definite results are achieved. Many a boy who is too lazy to do any useful work, enters the field of athletics, thinking of glory only and never considering the work. Soon he discovers that there is a great deal of hard work, but under the excite-ment of the principle of contest he keeps on and finally a change is produced ; he forgets his former aversion to effort of any kind and at length becomes a useful member of society. Thus the principle of contest is beneficial. In the social circle the principle of contest is a real problem with the student and is of a decided benefit to him. Some are born gentlemen and associate with men and women, and never feel the slightest embarassment. But the great majority of young men find it, for a time at least.a veritable struggle to ac-quire the little niceties and the tact which society so rigorously exacts from those who would become factors in a college com-munity and have entrance to the best homes of college towns. Many a student has developed from a bashful, uncouth, and vulgar country boy into a master of men and a perfect gentle-man. through his continual struggle for social recognition. It may seem surprising that the principle of contest should be considered as applicable to the religious life of a college. But we believe it to be a very important element in religious 'growth and consider its absence in the present age, to be in a great degree responsible for the indifference toward sacred things. In other words it is too easy for a man to be a Chris-tian. He has nothing to directly oppose any religious tenden-cies which may be present in his nature Everyone about him believes in a Divine Father, etc. To be brief there is no direct opposition to strengthen his religious nature. There is no open battle for him to fight as there are in his other spheres of life. To be sure there are temptations and evil ambitions, as no doubt by this time you are ready to suggest, but they are like the rust which slowly gathers upon the steel unbright-ened by frequent encounters with direct opposition. If the principle of contest were more in evidence in religious life, if it meant a direct fight, with tangible forces of evil, to be a Chris- THE MERCURY. 17 tian, there would be more out and out Christians than there are under the present circumstances. Until this point we have only mentioned the possible bene-fits of, and as it were, the conditions under which, the principle of contest is in evidence to-day in the college world. You may-say what have we proved? There has been no final argument as we admit. We have just been making the staves and heads, if we may liken our argument to a barrel on which we will now place the hoops.in order that you may see the finished fabric of our argument. Taking all the ages of the past for examples, we may affirm certain things which are so evident that ex-tended proof is unnecessary. The general truth may be stated thus, where the principle of contest has been operative to the greatest degree, the finest types havebeen produced. Thus, in Athens, whose great men possessed the mightiest intellects of all times, such rigorous methods ot intellectual culture were resorted to as would notbe endured today. The Indian, pro-bably the finest type of physical manhood ever produced, at-tained his perfection in the wilderness where it was a constant struggle with nature. To day when conditions are changed and the principle of contest is no longer operative, the Indian is rapidly dying out. In social intercourse the masters of men are those who must deal most with their kind in a constant stru-ggle. The truest Christians were those whose faith led them to the stake. We believe we have shown you, first,the possibilities of im-provement which the student has in struggling with the forces about him, and second, that such a principle of contest is nec-essary to the highest culture as demonstrated by the experience of men from immemorial lime. ^HMHUHBI iS THE MERCURY. FIRE BY NIGHT. BY W. WISSUSR HACKMAN, 'OS. Hark, hear the bells boys, Hear the terrible sound Fire, fire, fire, fire, Hurry the engine along. Clang, clang, wild alarm and clang of bell, Clamor of men and shouts across the twilight fell, Clangor of bells, with iron knell, Wild agonies their tones foretell, And shrinking fears their shrill alarms compel. Now thru streets but late so silent, Bursts the crowd all turbulent, Cries, the peacefull twilight rend And to the night their panic lend. On swerving wheels The engine reels, Its strident gong hurls warning peals, And over all the deepening darkness steals. Oh, Fire ! Thou art a fearful thing, What carest thou that wild bells ring, Thou, thou alone art king, And to the world thy challenge fling : " Ring out ye bells for what reck I, I'l fling my banners to the sky, All now that dares athwart my path Shall bow its crest before my wrath. Ring, ring ye bells for I am nigh, Your petty strength I may defy, Nor heed your harsh alarm ; so ring, ring And to the conflict all your forces bring. My flashing hosts gleam fiercely bright, Their flashing light Shall put to flight The dusky warders of the night— King, king am I And boldly do defy Aught that would stay my reign, Or check the ardor of my flame." Fierce the joy in the muffled roar Of the wild flames that heavenward soar, The lurid gleams wierd shadows throw, And cast an elfish light on all below. THE MERCURY. 19 With wild exultant leaps it glides along. Its fitful flare reveals the throng Of upturned faces silent and subdued, Awed to silence by the ruthless power viewed. Yet he, that one whom thou disdain, Shall overthrow thy fiery reign, Shall bind thee with an icy chain, And quench the ardor of thy flame. The sovereign mind of man shall halt thy sway, And conqueror shall steal thy blazing crown away, To dust and ashes shall thy reign descend, Already is thy vaunted fury spent. Thy gorgeous canopy of smoke is rent, And with thy allabsorbing ether blent, Only smouldering coals—hissing hate— Are left to testify thy fate. A few faint sparks, A smoking wall Thy pathway marks, And over all The black night pitying throws her pall, And Silence, Nights twin sister, over all, Her mantle of oblivion lets fall. THE RUINS OF TIME. KOPP, '09. HOW full of instruction are the wrecks, the ruins and the the revolutions of time! They are the oracles of ages ; they speak with a voice of thunder to the heart, with a voice more impressive than the tongue of Tully, more harmonious than the harp of Homer, more picturesque than the pencil of Apelles. Imagine you see the venerable shade of Time as he stands for a moment on the pedestal of years, his aged hand pointing to the ruins of empires, and his trembling form bend-ing over the tombs of Oriental genius. Roll back the billowy tide of time; unroll the moldering records of ages. What wonderful scenes are presented to the startled imagination of man! He beholds his own destiny and the doom of his nob-lest achievements. He builds a colossal empire of his renown ; he dedicates it to other ages ; but, behold, triumphant Time hurls it with all its grandeur to the dust. 20 THE MERCURY. So it is with man himself, and so it is with the nations oi the earth ; they rise, they flourish, and pass away as if they had never been. Where now is ancient Egypt, the land of science and of sacred recollections ? Where are her hundreds of cities, her Memphis, her Thebes, her oracle of Ammon f The strong red arm of the Vandal and Goth has leveled them with the dust; the serpent now dwells in the temple where the worshipper once bent a knee of adoration. The oracle has been silent for ages, and the priestess long since fled from her shrine. And where are the pyramids of Egypt that stretch into the upper light and mock from their cloud-capped pinnacles all objects beneath them ? Alas! they stand as mournful monuments of human ambition. The kings who planned them, and the millions of wretched slaves who erected them have gone down to their graves and the tall grass now waves over the sepulchre of their bones. And such shall be the fall of those pyramids which have stood tor ages as bea-cons of misguided ambition ; the wave of time shall roll over them and buryjhem forever in the general mausoleum of ages. Mournful to the minds oi men are the records of departed greatness. Imagine you are seated amid the melancholy ruins of Rome. Around you are strewn the crumbling fragments of other ages, and before you are the tumbling temples once hal-lowed by the footsteps of the Caesars. The cottage of Romu-lus, the golden palace of Nero, and the shrine of Apollo and the Muses are mingling with the wrecks of other times. But where is the great Roman Forum in which the thunder of Cicero's eloquence once struck terror to tyrants ? There the shepherd boy now roams with his fleecy flocks. There, where the Comitium, the Curia and the Rostrum once stood, the lean lizard now crawls, and the tall grass waves in the night breeze. And where is that stupendous pile, the Coliseum, which stood in ancient days like a mountain of marble, where the strong-armed gladiator bled and where the untamed tigers of the forest died ? Alas ! it still stands tottering in decay, but the thousands of spectators have departed. The footsteps of the solitary traveler now echo alone where THE MERCURY. 21 the mighty Caesars once applauded and where the clash of the combat sounded. But is this all ? Alas ! Rome is still eloquent in ruins: the City of the Seven Hills is strewn with the frag-ments of other ages. Go, muse over the fallen forms of Trajan, Nerva and Domitian; a few pillars of Parian marble alone re-main to tell the world that they once have been. Go, gaze on the ruins of the palaces of the Caesars; descend into the catacombs and ruminate amid the bleaching bones of the early Christians, persecuted by the demon of superstition even to death. Go, climb the lofty towers of Rome and survey the melancholy me-- mentos of other times and other men. And is this the mighty Rome that once stood against the legions of Carthage led by the victorious Hannibal ? It is the same, though fallen. Carthage too is buried in the vortex of oblivion. Such are a few instances of the ravages of time. And not less has our own loved country been the scene of desolation. Here may be seen the ruins of an Indian empire, more extended than the empires of the East; and though they left no monuments of sculpture, painting and poetry, yet great were they in their fall, and sad is the story of their wrongs. They once had cities but they are swept from the face of the earth. They had their Temple of the Sun, but the sanctuary is broken down. It is true, they worshiped the Great Spirit, but the sacred pages of revelation had never been unrolled to them ; the gospel of the Saviour had never sounded in the ears of the poor children of the forest. Here along these shores the council fires blazed, and the war-whoop echoed among their native hills. Here the canoe of the dark brown Indian was once seen to glide over his own-loved lakes. Centuries passed away and they still roved, the undisputed masters of the Western world. But at length a pilgrim bark came darkening on their shores. They yielded not their empire tamely, but they could not stand against the sons of light: they Bed. With slow and solitary steps they took up their westward march and yielded with a broken heart their native land to another race. They left their homes and the graves of their fathers to explore the Western woods, where never human foot had trod and never human eye had pene-trated. From time to time they have been driven back and the next move will be into the bosom of the stormy Pacific. 22 THE MERCURY. REMINISCENCES. " The late snow, with its crowd of yelling, snow-balling boys, brings back our own boyhood," said an old man as he sat be-fore the fire in the engine-house. " Yes, boys ain't what they used to be," sighed another, old geezer. " Aw, ring off," said a young fellow, who had been listening. " You make me weary. Why, I'll bet your ma tanned you mighty frequently in the dim and distant past, and you could have had more and not been imposed on." The old men looked at each other shame-facedly for a mo-ment, and then the elder said, " Well, I kinder reckon we did cut up a little, didn't we, Bill," and the two gray heads chuckled at the reminiscence. "I kin remember very well," said Bill, " when we used ter go out swimming.' At breakfast pa 'ud say, ' William, my boy, I want you to stay and help yer ma,' an' I'd say, ' Yes, pa,' so meek that Moses' chin-whiskers must have curled with jealousy. Then dad would hustle off to work, leavin' me to-the tender mercies of ma. . " ' Willie, just you go down and cavort around the woodpile, and don't you let me catch you outside.' " Of course, bein' full of virtue and worldly ambition, I'd hie me to the woodpile aforesaid and cavort. Pattin' myself on the back, figeratively speakin', I'd make chips fly like a good 'un. ' O, no, William,' says I to myself, ' you ain't hankerin' after no swimmin' holes ; you don't care for no nuts or no apples. You air an honest boy and will be President some day or own a hand-organ and a b'ar.' And says I, ' William, if those there Campbell boys come down the alley, you will treat them with scorn. You won't go swimmin'.' By this time the day is rather warm and somehow the charm of ownin' a hand-organ and a b'ar cant hold a candle to your desire to get into the cool water. Satan about this time through his per-sonal agents, as rna always believes, puts temptation before me in the shape of the Campbell boys and Bill Black. A shrill whistle, I look! Again the whistle, and there at the back end THE MERCURY. 23 of the lot you see Bill Black cautiously hold up two fingers like the forks on a shooting flappy. It is the sign, the great masonic highball, to boys in distress. It means, ' Will you go swimmin' ?' Even now I feel a queer feelin' of surprise and pleasure when I see it, and when I was a boy, wild hosses couldn't keep me still at the sight. Then ma's Willie would look at the house, then at the fence, then at the house again. All wuz still, no sight of ma. The ax dropped quietly, and away I'd sneak, along the grape-arbor, behind the barn, over the fence and then away." "You don't need to tell me what followed," said old man Strong. " You clawed your bare legs on briar bushes, treed a squirrel or two, ripped all the buttons off your trousers, fell in the swamp in the chase of bull frogs, ate Henry Igo's apples in the field by the Slate Hole and was well warmed if the old man caught you, and other things too numerous to mention." " Yep," said Bill, " that's me, only I never could see the use of goin' home to dinner nor why big rocks wuz always in my way to stub my toes on. Then, too, John, you fergit how we used to argie with Jim and Bill Mulholland, and I ain't for-got how my feelin's used to oppress me as the sun went into the west behind the mountains. At them moments my con-science 'ud become painful, and the thought of mother standin' lonely ' beckonin' me from the wigwam,' as that Longfeller poet says about Higherwather, would move me to tears almost. Mother'd be sure to overcome the ' almost' though. " She allus said it hurt her more than it did me, but I could never bring myself to look at it in that way. But we ain't allus got the making of the way and it wuz better to go home than to sleep in the woods. Somehow, the world didn't seem so bright jest then as it had in the mornin', this same darken-in' being produced no doubt by the idee of the whalin' you'd get when you'd arrive at your humble domicile. " But I put on a bold front, and when near home, I'd pick up a few sticks of kindlin' and carry them as if I wuz old At-las in the geography carryin' the world. Arrivin' at home, with the rest of the family at supper, and goin' in like a lamb 24 THE MERCURY. to slaughter, thinkin' thereby to melt the hard heart of a par-entess. It wasn't no use. The neighbors would soon think the Turks were murderin' some more Armenians, and I'd think a boy wuz the most abused and mistaken bein' alive. And I'd wish I wuz dead, and think how they would wail over me and say es how they never had appreciated William. And I thought if I could swear like Bill Black, how much better I'd feel. But it wa'nt no use. Next day wuz just like yesterday." " Do you mind old man Cassiday? " says old man Strong. "Mind him! Wall I wonder! Bill Black's stepdaddy? An old soldier? Yes! Him and Bill used to have some powerful tussles. Wait till I light my pipe," said old Bill as he produced a corncob about whose strength there could be no question, carefully tearing off a strip of newspaper, lit it at the fire, started it going, and began. " Yes old Cassidy war a terror. He war a beer peddler you know, and when Bill ud swipe a keg would hang him up by the thumbs for half a day. You can't expect none of the vices and all of the virtues from a boy raised in them surroundings. After old man Cassiday wuz arrested and fined he wouldn't stay in them parts, where good liquor weren't appreciated. So he buys a farm off in the hills about two miles out of town and moves there, chattels, personal property, wife, Bill and the goat." " I ruther calculate Bill wuz more trouble to the old man than them articles above mentioned." " Wall, Bill waren't constructed to do hard bone labor. He war a quiet, mannerly lad when your eye war glued on him, but all but that when it warn't. So when in the bootitul dawn, old man Cassiday would interduce Bill to a hoe and then inter-duce the pair of them to a twenty-acre cornfield, why, I am free to remark a field like that would discourage a youth with more grit than Bill had, and on Bill the effect was simply paralizin.' He hoed like the old man was after him fur a spell, and then'd resign and head for the icedam. This icedam were appreciated by boys. It was one hundred steps square with high banks and seven feet of clear cool water all over. A springin' board THE MERCURY. 25 *, wus rigged up, and there, guiltless of clothes, the boys would swim until their backs looked like b'iled lobsters. " All around the outside of the dam vvuz swamp where muskrats had bored until they let water out of the dam. " Hither Bill would come and be received with yelps of de-light. Bill wuz no believer in clothes, or if he wuz didn't prac-tice what he preached. After Bill hed shed his shift, a cap, and a pair of badly torn trousers held up by a string over the shoulders, he was ready for a swim. " It was not exactly Bill's ability as a swimmer that 'ud cause him to be welcomed, but we all knew that when old man Cassiday found out that Bill and the hoe had become divorced the icedam would be right in the fire-zone for a few minutes, sure 'nough, about the time Bill was divin' and jumpin out about the center of the dam, old man Cassiday would hie him in sight and there'd be a wild scramble by them as was in the water to get ashore. Old Cassiday allus come prepared. In one hand he carried a long, limber willow stick forked at one end (for he was a connussier on matters of discipline,) and in his other mit he had a few selected pebbles, gathered like David's , from the brook just beyond. "'Come hyer, you sneak, come hyer!' he'd yell. There wuz no attraction fur Bill on that there bank just then, but after considerable persuasion, aided and abetted by the pebbles lighting near his head, and because of the fact that he couldn't duck the rocks and swim all day, Bill he'd crawl out of the water an' make a rush for his wardrobe, grab it in one hand, and with old Cass arisin' a big welt at every jump, go flying through the swamp, across the crick, through a clump of briars .and away to the farm , Bill a little in the lead, with old Cass a good second, and a urgin' him on occasion'ly." " Ah, me," said old man Strong, " boys ain't what they used to be." And the young man said nothing. " Yes, and Bill would sometimes come back the afternoon of the same day. Poor Bill! He's gone now. It's gettin' dark now and my old woman has early supper so I think I'll be goin' now." " Me too," says Bill, and in silence they left the fire-house, tottering as they went. " Queer old codgers," said the youth. " Yep," said the fire captain. THE MERCURY Entered at the Postoffice at Gettysburg as second-class Matter Vol. XIV GETTYSBURG, PA., MARCH, 1906 No. 1 -Editor-in -ch ief WARD B. S. RICE, '07 Exchange Editor THOS. E.SHEARER, '07 Business Manager THOMAS A. FAUST, '07 Ass't Bus. Managers. HENRY M. BOWER, '08 H. WATSON DAVISON, 'OS Associate Editors GEO. W. KESSI.ER. 'OS J. K. ROBB, 'oS EDMUND L. MANGES, '08 Advisory Board PROF. J. A. HIMES, LITT.D. PROF. G. D. STAHLEY, M.D. PROF. J. W. RICHARD, D. D. Published each month, from October to June inclusive, by the joint literary societies of Pennsylvania (Gettysburg) College. Subscription price, one dollar a year in advance; single copies 15 cents. Notice to discontinue sending the MERCURY to any address must be accompanied by all arrearages. Students, Professors and Alumni are cordially invited to contribute. All subscriptions and business matter should be addressed to the Busi-ness Manager. Articles for publication should be addressed to the Editor. Address THE MERCURY, GETTYSBURG, PA. EDITORALS. To the members of the retiring staff we turn with a feeling of thanks and gratitude, in the name of both the friends of the MERCURY, and the newly elected staff. The editors have shown a keen interest in maintaining the standard of this publication, one which commands respect wherever it goes and is a credit to its alma mater. On the other hand the business management calls forth our highest admiration, when we consider the con-dition in which this department of the paper was found at the beginning of the school year, and the unceasing energy which must have been put forth to set it again on a firm basis. The MURCURY, on this its fourteenth birthday again finds it-self in new hands, which we hope will prove worthy of their THE MERCURY. 27 trust. It is of such tender age, and possesses such a high state •of development, that they, in view of the duties which must fall upon them and the lack of wide experience, have a tendency to shrink ; but memory steps in and recalls inspiring words : " Wherever there is a will there is a way." Therefore it will ever be their aim during the coming year, to train this child of literature, to the best of their knowledge, according to the maxims of the past and the growing wisdom of the future. ONE of the mottoes on the walls of the temple at Delphos was : " Know thy opportunity." How significant these words must have been in those ancient days when the loss of a single opportunity often meant a blighted career. An opportunity is the small moment, the exact point, the critical minute on which success in every good work so much depends. A latin writer has said: "She has hair in front; behind she is bald: if you sieze her by the forelock, you may hold her; but if suffered to escape, not Jupiter himself can catch her." The man of today has opportunities on every side ; indeed they sometimes appear to attempt to force one to seize them ; yet thousands of men die leaving the world unimproved by their having lived in it. They seem to have used this superabundance of opportuni - ties as children do at the seashore—They fill their little hands with sand, and then let the grains fall through, one by one, until all are gone. Today there is scarcely a person who does not have vast opportunities, and especially we who are college student^. The chance of having a college education has been made almost universal, yet how small a per cent, of the coming generation are taking this advantage. By a college education we do not mean the memorizing of books an'd the thoughts of others, but the development of our own inventive powers. There are dif-ferent institutions connected with a college career, which offer this opportunity: The literary societies, the Bible classes, the Y. M. C. A., and still another very importont one, the college publications. This last one is a branch of our work in which all should be very much interested. 28 THE MERCURY. Let us take tor example the MERCURY. It should be the pride of every student to have his writings published in it. There should be enthusiastic competition for its space. When such a spirit shall have been manifested, how much higher will the standard of the paper be raised, and how much wider will our literary experience be. Nor should we be discouraged if our contributions are not always used, but should try again ; many an ancient writer spent his whole life in literary pursuits, gaining the much coveted prize only a few times ; yet history heralds his name to the future. Therefore let us make this op-portunity to compare our work with others a prize; even though we often fail, we will be compensated when we suc-ceed. When we write even for class work, we should do it with the intention of giving it for publication ; in that way we would not only see them in print but would raise our class marks. Then do not wait to be asked for what you have written, but promptly give it to some member of the staff; nor should one be modest in doing this, for it is our com-mon interest and they will be glad to see you. WE have closed what may be regarded a very successful basketball season, although we have played a harder schedule than ever before. We also recall the unprecedented record of this year's football team. Now what has the baseball season in store for us ? Let us make it unusually successful too ; let us make the whole year one round of athletic success. In order to do this, a keen interest must be manifested, and some hard work must be done. There is plenty of work for all, do not think that you are not needed. If you cannot help any other way, do it financially. Be at all the games and show a lively college spirit; good " rooting " helps wonderfully. But {f.possible be on the field. Come put,for practice every day. If you don't make the' team, this year you may the next. Then do not think that it is impossible to make a position because another played it last year, his position is not guaranteed and each position is looking for one who can play it just a little better than the one who now holds it. Choose a position apd THE MERCURY. 29 play for it, even if you don't make it, you will make him work harder who does. If last year's players are made to feel that there are others to take their places, they will work harder and thus the team will be considerably strengthened. So you see that if a proper effort is put forth, even if you do not make the team, you have aided very materially in making it what it is, and you can justly claim a share of the honors in the event of victory. EXCHANGES. The Feb. number of " The Haverfordian," being the last in Vol. XXVII, contains a loose-leaf table of contents of the Vol. In glancing over this, one is surprised at the amount of material published by the magazine in the course of a year. In the volume there are nineteen essays, twenty pieces of fiction, twenty poems, seventeen sketches, and thirty-two editorials covering a wide range of subjects. In this number the article " Medicine as a Profession " by Dr. Tyson, '60, now of U. of P, while of special interest and value to those contemplating the study of medicine, is, nevertheless, interesting and instruc-tive to others also. This article is one of a series, written by prominent alumni on the subject of choosing a profession, which " The Haverfordion " has been publishing throughout the year. " Undergraduate Life at Oxford " is interesting to us as it brings out some ot the contrasts between English and American University lite. " The Philosophy of Optimism " is one of those " casual calls from a prophet of hope to rally round the standards of those who believe that 'all's right with the world.' " The issue contains some entertaining fiction also, among which is a good ghost story. The "State Collegian," of Feb. 22nd, contains in an ex-change an interesting summary of the cut systems employed in some fourteen colleges and universities. The number of absences allowed, average about 10 per cent, per term. Some striking exceptions are U. of P. and U. of N. Y, The former allows 20 per cent, absences, and the latter requires the student 30 THE MERCURY. to hand in a thousand-word theme on a prescribed subject for every fifteen cuts from chapel. " First American Newspapers " in the " Dickinsonian," of Feb. 21, is one of the most interesting articles that we have re-viewed this month. " The Mountaineer " contains several good stories and an ex-cellent translation in verse of Horace's " Ode to Thaliarchus." The article " The Poetry of William Collins " shows a fine ap-preciation of the poetical on the part of the writer and also the ability to express this appreciation in words. The "Lesbian Herald" is a magazine of superior quality— better this month than the general run of our exchanges. It contains strong articles on " Carlyle's French Revolution," " Browning as a Writer of Love Poems," " Schiller, the Man " (conclusion), and also several good poems, the " Sonnet " par-ticularly appealing to us. We have also reviewed with pleasure and profit the " Juniata Echo," the " Susquehanna," " Otferbein Aegis " and the "Mid-land." To the last named, we would suggest that a table of contents would, doubtless be a convenience for its readers! Editing a college paper is a nice thing. If we publish jokes people say we are fossils. If we publish original matter, they say we don't give them enough selections. If we give them selections they say we are too lazy to write. If we don't go to church, we are heathen. If we do, we are hyprocrites. If we remain at the office, we ought to be out looking for news items. If we go out then we are not attending to business. If we wear old clothes they laugh at us. If we wear good clothes they say we' have a pull. Now what are we to do ? Just as.likely as not some one will say we stole this from an exchange. So we did. .,.- ■■ " • ■ ' .'.,-■'-.,. ■ •',''/■!;; . . • :■-'-:,,'. .-■■■■ ': '.I'-'--:.;. ; I '; *■"■'■- . 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R.R. mm 46 THE MERCURY. A PHANTASY. CHARI.ES WELSEY WEISER, '01. ; 5 WO spirits floating through the air Leave their mark of passing there. The spirit of the scentless spring, And summer's scented spirit bring Their breath of life and breath of love, And wave ethereal wings above The weary brow. With soothing hand They stir to life the waiting land. The azure sky, the sun and flowers, The bursting bud of woodland bowers, The tender grass, the songsters' strain Compose for life love's sweet refrain Of fellowship. (lI 'Tis evening and the twilight gray Creeps o'er the half-forgotten way, As passing on in pensive mood, Through the ancient hemlock wood, I see beneath the massive trees, Fanned by the evening breeze, A stalwart man reposing lay Beside the lonely grassy way. Tall and brawny, noble., fair, With beaming eyes and wavy hair, He forms a picture good to see— Nature's perfect mastery Commanding all. He speaks—the tones in clarion notes Upward through the branches float. He smiles—and wins with glances bright, Fellowship's most welcome light. "Nature," says he, "perfect, strong, Note and strive for ; and prolong Your days ; and usefulness, and peace, And love, from life shall ne'er cease." I fain would speak, but wake to see 'Tis only a bright phantasy Wrought by Spring-tide on the mind, That seeks in life and love to find The perfect whole. I V* . THE MERCURY 47 "RABBI BEN EZRA." ABDEL R. WENTZ, '04. [Graeff Prize Essay.] ROBERT Browning's Rabbi Ben Ezra is a transcript from the natural experience of a human soul. The struggle between lower and higher ideals has already been fought on the battleground within the soul. The conflict between faith and doubt is over. Faith stands victorious. We have here por-trayed a picture not of action but of a soul in intellectual fer-mentation, the concomitant of action. The poet speaks from emotional imagination in expressing the wish of his soul to be in touch with the infinite. And the passion here described is one that is universal to mankind and one that is deepest and most widely felt in loving human nature. Other poets have attained the same depth of thought, a number have expressed somewhat the same ideas as are here set forth, but probably no poem stands in exactly the same relations as Rabbi Ben Ezra. We propose, therefore, to inquire briefly concerning the Rabbi and his part in the poem, to examine in a general way Brown-ing's philosophy of life as unfolded in the body of his religious poetry, to analyze the thought of this poem and see how the philosophy of life is here set forth, to ascertain what relation the poem sustains to the teachings of Christianity, and to make some observations concerning its rhetorical composition. Abraham ben Meir ben Ezra is the full name of the Rabbi to whom Browning assigns this monologue, but he is more commonly known as Ibn Ezra. Born in Toledo, Spain, about 1088, he started to travel early in life and visited all parts of western and southern Europe and northern Africa. His last days were spent in Rome and here he died in 1167. He was an earnest student of astronomy and won much fame not only as an astronomer but also as an astrologer and physician. In him the Platonic philosophy had an able advocate. Wherever he went he became distinguished for his great learning and his varied accomplishments, but his chief renown seems to have I im 48 THE MERCURY. been as grammarian, biblical commentator, and poet. But great as was the scholarship of the Rabbi, his piety was even greater. From all his writings and from the account of his life we gather that he was a man of extraordinary spiritual rectitude under the complete guidance of the word of God. Such was the man to whom Browning here attributes the philosophy of life. So thoroughly is Ibn Ezra adapted to the expression of such a philosophy and so well do the sentiments here expressed ac-cord with the writings of the Rabbi that the question has been raised whether Browning meant Rabbi Ben Ezra to serve as a statement of his own philosophy or that of Ibn Ezra. There are, indeed, a number of Jewish elements contained in the poem ; as, for instance, the abiding trust in a central righteous-ness. But Browning was specially fond of weaving such ele-ments into the woof of his thought; in fact, in his own nature, both spiritual and intellectual, he was not entirely free from cer-tain Jewish characteristics. Moreover, a great many of his il-lustrations and traditions are taken from among the Jews and no other English poet, with the single exception of Shakespeare, commands for the Jew the same admiration and compassion that Browning does. It seems only reasonable therefore that the poet in presenting his own views concerning life should draw some of his less important ideas from the writings of the Rabbi and thus weave into the poem sufficient coloring to ac-count for the idiosyncrasies of the individual whom he has chosen to give expression to those views. But the strongest proof that Rabbi Ben Ezra expresses Browning's own theory of life, lies in the fact that it is prac-tically a recapitulation of the very sentiments expressed in many of his other poems, as witness Sordello, Abt Vogeler, Saul, The Pope, A Death in the Desert, Reverie, and quite a number of others, all of which develop the same life-philosophy as Rabbi Ben Ezra does. Just as Cicero made use of the venerable Cato as his lay figure in setting forth his views on "Old Age," so Browning has used different personages to develop his philoso-phy, in each case adapting some of the incidentals to the indi- » ■ > THE MERCURY. 49 * * vidual personage. In Jochanan Hakkadosh we have another instance where Browning uses a Jew as his mouthpiece to give utterance to his theory of life. And in the poem under con-sideration he has placed this theory in the mouth of the Rabbi for no other purpose than merely to furnish it with a back-ground; for Browning himself explained of Sordello: "My stress lay on the incidents in the development of a soul; little else is worth study." Being assured then that Rabbi Ben Ezra is merely a restate-ment of Browning's theory of life, it may be well before pro-ceeding to the thought analysis of the poem to try to gain some idea concerning his philosophy of life as developed in the rest of his religious poetry. This philosophy begins in his very first publication, Pauline, where its crude outlines are to be seen; it is more carefully developed and at much greater length in his next production, Paracelsus, and then re-appears from time to time among his productions, and receives its final utterance in his very last poem, Reverie. It is a noteworthy fact that Browning formed this view of lite in his youth, and that no-thing in his life experiences gave him occasion to change it, so that traces and reiterations of it are to be seen in poems cover-ing a period of sixty years of his life. The whole trend of his philosophy might be summarized in the statement that the aspiration towards divine Power and Love is the most exalted ideal for the human soul. The intensity of the universal passion of human love reaching out towards some object which shall satisfy aspiration gives him the conception of God as infinite Love and of the future life as one in which Love incarnate shall have a place. This earthly life is merely a period of probation; man here is in constant pre-paration for another life. Past influences constitute the cri-terion by which to judge of the future, and our development here is determinative of our hereafter, either for growth or de-cay. But in this life we are surrounded by innumerable lim-itations and conditions. All our attainments are bounded by the finite. The divinity at the root of man's nature is too great for the sphere which contains him, arid yet it is this very di-vinity which gives rise to aspiration. Aspiration in turn causes ' ill i. 111 , ,., ,.j,i;iMl8M ■ 50 THE MERCURY. discontent, difficulties, and failures, and these point to infinite success and goodness. Thus we are made to realize the limi-tations and imperfections of our finite existence and to strive ever onward and upward to infinite freedom and perfection. It is precisely this imperfect nature in man which gives him the susceptibility to infinite growth and development; and this is "Man's distinctive mark alone," that which raises him higher in the scale than the brute and places him "a little lower than the angels." Only by our temporal failures are we led to see the possibility of eternal success. Internal dissatisfaction with our attainments on earth induces aspiration towards the divine. Man is "a living personality linked to the principle of restless-ness;" he must recognize his limitations and work within them, never losing sight of the infinite beyond nor ever ceasing to as-pire toward that perfection of freedom. To become content with even the highest attainable per-fection in this earthly life would mean to renounce all noble de-sires and to deny the inner light. This present state must not be regarded as an end in itself and submission to the conditions which it imposes would only result in fatal loss. To fail to recognize our imperfect nature would be to deny the possibility of spiritual growth. No, we must never be satisfied with this earth and its meagre successes; we must never rest content with this stage of imperfection. We must recognize the possi-bility of higher results than any attainable on earth and must aspire to something beyond the limits of time and space. "A man's reach should exceed his grasp, Or what's a heaven for?" It is this very quality—this constant discontent with earthly attainments, this endless aspiration for something higher—that makes life a struggle and the earth a bivouac of strife. Man must be actuated by a constant and conscious impetuosity to-wards the divine, drawing new impulses out of each failure, ever realizing with Tennyson, that, "Men may rise on stepping-stones From their dead selves to higher things." THE MERCURY. Si Each failure should give rise to greater effort and higher aspira-tion. According to Abt Vogeler, the musician accepts the pro-longed pause as an earnest of sweet music, and the discords as an evidence of more highly-prized harmony to follow. The limitations of this life are only suggestions of the infinitude of the life beyond. These. temporal barriers shall become the doors opening to the eternal life of infinite beauty, happiness, knowledge and love. The little mountain rill, as it flows down, has many rough places to cross, many obstacles to encounter, many rocks and precipices to pass, but continually receiving new life from other streams it grows deeper and stronger until at last it becomes a great, deep river, and, undisturbed now by the huge boulders beneath its surface, it flows calmly on to join the peaceful, powerful ocean. So the soul, weak at first and prone to despair, must work within its limitations and by an endless succession of aspirations and failures, each failure stimu-lating stronger endeavor, make its way to God and to the real-ization of perfect Power and Love. Having thus gotten a view of the philosophy of life as Brown-ing held it, we will be better able to follow in analysis the thought of Rabbi Ben Ezra, where this philosophy is stated with greater conciseness, perhaps, than anywhere else in Brown-ing. But -first it must be said, by way of explanation, that Rabbi Ben Ezra is not argumentative in its character; it is merely the statement of facts of positive knowledge. Its view is intuitive and it states conclusions without employing courses of reasoning. We shall not expect, therefore, that the thought of the different stanzas will in every instance be arranged in strict logical sequence. Mellowed with years, the venerable Rabbi gives to the young man the cheerful assurance, " The best is yet to be," and in the quietude of life's evening hour proposes a retrospect of the day and a prospect to the tomorrow. Bidding us to trust in God te reveal His whole plan, he first considers youth. This is a period of hesitation and ambition, of "hopes and fears." All of youth's brief years are passed in doubt and indecision. But for this the Rabbi has no remonstrances, for this very doubt is S2 THE MERCURY. the actuating influence—the "troubling spark"—which distin-guishes us from the brute creation; brutes have their end of living in self-satisfaction, and in the gratification of sense are free from care and doubt. But man's greatest glory and that which attests his affinity with the great Provider lies in his noble desires and lofty aspirations which can never be satisfied on earth; this is the disturbing spark that proves his spiritual nature. We should therefore endure with good cheer the lim-itations that are here placed upon us, and, despite life's difficul-ties and discomforts, ever strive and learn and dare. For the seeming failures of this earthly life simply prove our suscepti-bility to the achievement of eternal success. Our aspiration to the unattainable raises us higher in the scale than the unpro-gressive brute, and he, who hopes to succeed in his flesh and to that end subordinates soul to body, can scarcely deserve the noble name of man. And yet the body is not without its use; all past experi-ences in the flesh serve to teach valuable lessons in this train-ing- school for eternity, and the heart of the Rabbi beats in sin-cere gratitude for the opportunity of living as a man, a part in the one great plan of perfect Power and Love. He trusts him-self implicitly to the will of his Creator and hopes thus to gain the victory over low ideals and ignoble desires. For the soul is prone to yield to its rosy garment of flesh in the desire for rewards commeasurable with bodily endowments and physical attainments. But we should not measure ourselves by the ground gained in spite of flesh; we should realize that while flesh and soul are both subject to limitations here on earth, yet neither is to be despised as all is for the best. Youth must have its struggles and disappointments but old age reaps rich fruit in consequence. For here if is that the complete man is produced and that the tendency to God be-gins. The Rabbi, ripe with age, awaits the fight with death, the only struggle now before him. "Fearless and unperplexed" he contemplates the battle with perfect serenity of soul, for his experiences have taught him what weapons and what armor to employ. Now that his youth is ended he is in a position to L4fc THE MERCURY. 53 pass sentence on that period of life. The fires of'youth have culled out the gold from the dross and the life-struggle can now at length be estimated at its true value. In youth all was un-certainty ; with age comes knowledge absolute. Each sunset brings its certain moment which suddenly calling the glory from the gray announces the death of the day and invites esti-mation of its worth. So the period of old age, tinted with glory and free from the strife of youth, affords the opportunity to prove the past, pronounce judgment on its errors and pro-prieties, and thereby "sustained and soothed" to face the future. And more than this is not possible for man ; his highest duty is to practice tomorrow the lessons of today, to follow intently "the great Artificer of all that moves" and thus catch hints of real handicraft, of true workmanship. Youth is the proper time for growth and aspiration, the proper time to "strive to-ward making," and though the efforts to make be uncouth and seeming failures, nevertheless they are eminently successful in that they secure for old age exemption from strife and the blessed privilege of knowledge. Death can then be awaited without fear. Here the mind is not harassed by arguments of "Doctor and Saint"'as in youth, but the knowledge of the Right and Good and Infinite is as absolute as the knowledge of the possession of one's own hand. Age vindicates youth by defining and separating "great minds from small" and by determining whether the principles of Right were properly ap-plied in youth. Thctruth is revealed and peace of soul secured. But who shall act as judge to pass the sentence? It is no easy task, for men of very similar traits and qualities hold widely different views. Who shall decide? The answer: each man must be his own arbiter; he alone understands the circum-stances of his own life struggle. For life is not to be judged by its deeds and attainments, else others could pass the sentence. "Men appraise the outward product," but this vulgar mass, so easily recognized and valued by the low world, is not the proper standard to use in making up the main account. True, our "work" is pleasing in the eyes of our fellow-men and quickly plumbed and tested by the world's coarse thumb and finger, but 54 THE MERCURY. the true reckoning of man's worth takes into account all our undeveloped instincts tor good, all our unfulfilled purposes. These no one can know but ourselves and these God weighs and considers. He finds value in our thoughts which we were not able to express in a mere act and His records contain even our fleeting fancies :— "All I could never be, All, men ignored in me, This, I was worth to God. whose wheel the pitcher shaped." These lines contain the one great lesson of the poem, the very-theme of its thought, namely, the manifestation of God's love in his dealings with man. Our doubts He overrules for faith; our failures He overrules for success. Our aspirations to the impossible become the essentials of our spiritual growth. It is on the wings of God's love that the spirit of man mounts from earth to heaven. This thought pervades the entire poem. The thought that man is the pitcher shaped by the wheel of God leads to the expanding of that beautiful metaphor of the potter and the clay, and this occupies the concluding verses of the poem. We are invited to examine the metaphor and learn why time passes away so rapidly while our souls lie passive. Hugest folly is the proposition that nothing endures and that the past has no bearing on the present or the future. All that has ever really existed, lasts forever. The wheel indeed may vary as it turns, but potter and clay endure. So life fleets and earth changes, but God and Soul remain forever. We are not mere shadowy existences destined to pass into nothingness; we are eternal realities. But the changing motion of the wheel is needful to give the clay its proper form and make it useful; no less are the buffetings and evanescent influences of this life's dance intended by the all-wise Creator to give our souls their proper bent and temper and fit them for their highest useful-ness. What matters it, so far as the usefulness of the cup is concerned, if the potter in the course of his work ceases to adorn it with the beautiful figures wrought around its base and fashions stern, grim scull-things about the rim? And what I THE MERCURY. 55 matters it if our Maker diminish our pleasures and make this temporal life less attractive? Not in the decorations however beautiful is to be found the proper use of a cup; no more is the highest usefulness of the soul to be found in the pleasures and ornaments of life. Heaven's consummate cup has no need therefore of earth's wheel; his only need is the Potter, to amend the lurking flaws and use His work. The Rabbi declares that never once in the whole dizzy course of his lite with all its im-perfections and failures—never once did he lose sight of his end as a vessel to slake his Maker's thirst. Just as in the opening stanza he expressed his firm assurance of a better life to come, aud his abiding confidence in God's goodness, "Our times are in His hand," so after maintaining this sentiment through the entire poem, he reiterates it once more in his eloquent closing prayer: "So, take and use Thy work : Amend what flaws may lurk, What strain o' the stuff, what warpings past the aim ! My times be in Thy hand! Perfect the cup as planned ! Let age approve of youth, and death complete the same[" These noble sentiments, though expressed by a Jewish Rabbi, are entirely in accord with the teachings of Christianity. An eminent writer on ethics has pronounced Rabbi Ben Ezra to be "one of the completest descriptions of the ethical life in English literature." But it is even more than that; it is a statement of pure theism and a description of sublime religious faith. It abounds in Christian sentiment and contains numer-ous allusions to Scripture of both the Old and New Testament. If Rabbi Ben Ezra were a part ot the Bible, every sentence in the entire poem would long since have been quoted in substan-tiation of some Christian teaching. One of the salient teach-ings of the poem is that of absolute submission to the Divine will. This, one of the great teachings of our New Testament, is forcibly set forth in the poem. Moreover, Christ's mission on earth was to reveal the Father not only as Power but more specifically as Love. In the light of this fact, the sentiment 56 THE MERCURY. which the Rabbi expresses becomes quite striking, especially when he says, "I, who saw power, see now Love perfect too." L^fc, The Christian religion is preeminently a religion of love, and Rabbi Ben Ezra has its very basis on God's love for man. Then, too, Christianity is essentially a romantic religion. Literature furnishes numerous instances of Christian romance. And what can be more romantic than this idea of a future life with earthly hopes and aspirations realized and Love perfected, as developed in the poem ? This hope of future existence gives to the Chris-tian religion the very source of its life. And in Holy-Cross Day we have another instance where Browning represents this same Ben Ezra as a direct advocate of Christ and Christianity. When Rabbi Ben Ezra was first published (1864), the world stood in great need of just such a message of hope and faith as the poem conveys. That was a time when skepticism and des-pondency were rapidly growing. Matthew Arnold was busy promulgating his own unbelief. Fitzgerald had just published his'beautiful translation of Omar Khayyam, and this message o doubt was being very widely read. Epicureanism and sensualism were spreading. To all these Rabbi Ben Ezra was a check. It inculcated cheerfulness and hope, destroying doubt and set-ting up faith preeminent. Some readers of Browning find in him nothing more than what is purely humanitarian and ethical, while others narrow their vision to the romantic and Christian. In reality, Brown-ing includes both. His message is twofold : he treats both the Here and the Hereafter. An so Rabbi Ben Ezta combines the humanitarian and the ethical, on the one hand, with the roman-tic and Christian on the other, and sets forth a lofty type of Christian faith as held by a man of God. In rhetorical composition Rabbi Ben Ezra is typical of Brown-ing's religious poetry. Browning is noted for his great com-prehensiveness of meaning. Few writers have used single words with such great effect. In fact, so great is his conscise- THE MERCURY. 57 ness that he is often charged with being obscure, and the num-ber of his readers is comparatively small because not many peo-ple will take the trouble to disengage the poet's real thought irom the close-plaited web of his expression. Rabbi Ben Ezra is no exception to the rule. True, it is one of the most widely known of Browning's poems and has been considered one of the easiest, but its apparent simplicity disappears before any serious effort to drain it of its meaning. The poet thinks at lightning speed and records his thoughts as they occur to him, and nothing short of an alert mind and an open spirit will suf-fice to draw from the poem its full meaning. It is recondite almost to the extreme, in places even bordering on the verge of solecism. And yet it is only natural that such" sublime, weighty thought should receive striking expression. Every sentence is pregnant with vigorous meaning. And while the poem shows in its structure no regard whatever for symmetry or proportion and no view to clearness, beauty, or nobleness of form, yet it presents the greatest consistency of teaching from first to last. This poem will be read as long as the human race endures, because it has to do with a passion that is common to all man-kind. It deals with man's growth to the infinite in a spirit of the most healthful optimism, and inspires men everywhere to high and noble thinking. Browning himself gives an estimate of the loftiness of the theme when he says in a letter to a friend: "It is a great thing—the greatest—that a human being should have passed the probation of life, and sum up its experi-ence in a witness to the power and love of God." What Long-fellow contributes to literature in his "Psalm of Life," what Ten-nyson contributes in his "In Memoriam"-—this and more Brown-ing epitomizes in his Rabbi Ben Ezra. And the late Professor Everett of Harvard pronounces it "one of the most exalted of the poems of Browning * * * * one of the most exalted in the whole range of literature." 5« THE MERCURY. RUSSIAN AGGRESSION. [Second Prize in the Inter-Collegiate Oratorical Contest] W. W. BARKXEY, '04. PASSING events in the Far East draw the eyes of the world once more toward those parts which have engaged more or less constant attention for many years. The Asiatic question with its many difficulties and complications presents the unsolved international problem of the twentieth century. How shall the equilibrium of the East and the- integrity of China be maintained? How shall the commercial powers of the world preserve the equality of trading privileges along China's inviting coast? How shall the threatening advance of Russia upon Asia be checked? Shall Anglo-Saxon civiliza-tion or the civilization of the Muscovite stamp itself upon east-ern peoples ? The last two inquiries are primary and essential, it will be admitted, in dealing with the first two. Statesmen prophets have prophesied, but struggle is no longer a thing of the future. The foretold contest is on. and it is critical. Potent energies are now at work in the Orient. Asia is evidently un-dergoing transition. Pressing circumstances must soon force a solution of the grave problem of the East and provide answers to our questions. While grim-visaged war is raging between the little island empire of the Pacific and that gigantic nation of the north, it will not be untimely to follow the course of that ceaseless, un-tiring advance which has brought Russia all the way across the Eurasian continent from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok and Port Arthur. The declaration of open hostilities between these two con-flicting nations was no surprise, but rather was expected. War was inevitable in the face of Russian aggression and dogged-ness. The current strife is only one of a series of events which have been shaping themselves for years, yes for centuries, in the history of Russia. It is the natural, logical outcome of a policy of greed and grasp which has been at the bottom of THE MERCURY. 59 every national move which Russia has made since the days of her first note-worthy monarch, "Ivan the Terrible." The real cause of the war waging today can be clearly traced to this governing policy. Insatiate Russia is not satisfied with her tight grip on Manchuria which she now practically owns and controls, but looks with a covetous eye on the independent but small empire of Korea over which Japanese influence should justly extend. In fact it was reported, previous to the outbreak with Japan, that she already had obtained large interests in the important timber regions of the Yalu Valley, and that her rep-resentative stood over the weak and pliable Emperor at Seoul with almost dictatorial power. Such is her impudence and boldness. Will Russia recede from the prominent position she has taken in northeastern China ? Never, voluntarily ! She may make clever pretensions and employ shrewd diplomatic schemes, as is her custom, but she will never withdraw from an acquisi-tion which has been the object of her ambition for three cen-turies and more, until Japan or some other power drives her back into the north from whence she came. And then she will not remain there; onward, advance, conquer and expand have been the watchwords of this aggressor of nations since the close of the Middle Ages when the terrible autocrat of the six-teenth century assumed the ambitious title of Czar and began to push the lines of his government out in all directions. When Ivan came to the throne Russia was "a semi-savage, semi-Asiatic power, so hemmed in by barbarian lands and hos-tile races as to be almost entirely cut off from intercourse with the civilized world." Since then her growth in territory and power has been marvelous and amazing. From the compara-tively small and insignificant state in Central Europe, she has gradually extended her boundaries until now she dominates about one-half of the land area of Eurasia. The Tartars were attacked and driven beyond the Ural river, and thus the entire Volga and Caspian regions were acquired. An advance was started toward the Ural mountains and the Euxine. Under the powerful and energetic despot, Petet the Qreat, the Black and Baltic sea regions were both gained; Siberia was explored and 6o THE MERCURY. conquered from the Ural mountains to Kamtschatka, and afterwards colonized; far-reaching reforms were brought about, and Russia was lifted to a place among the first-class powers of Europe. Today her dominion extends from the borders of Per-sia, Afghanistan, and India on the south to Sweden and the Arctic ocean on the north ; and from the Chinese Empire and the Pacific on the east to Germany and Austria-Hungary on the west. What giant strides she has taken in territorial devel-opment ! What a magnificent stretch of country she has been able to consolidate into one sovereign State! No other nation in the history of the world has been able to secure such abso-lute control over so large an empire and that in the compara-tively short period of four centuries. Russia's advance is steady and never ceases. Her policy is well-outlined and the goal of her ambition is clearly defined., Her real governing purpose may be deduced from her actions. Russia needs some warm water harbors on the Pacific. She proposes first to secure, if possible, these advantageous outlets without which she can never develop her almost limitless na-tural resources. Secondly, Russia evidently aims to become the arbiter and controller of the East; and, therefore, she en-deavors to stamp her order of civilization on Asia, and obtain for herself the preponderance of power in the Far East. Back of these exalted aims and ambitions is a thorough conviction among her people that the day of Russian supremacy is near at hand. "Her students everywhere claim that the world had bee?i under the Romance type of civilization and that gave way in time to the Anglo- Teutonic type under which the world is now developing and this is about to give way to Slavonic civilization to which the future belongs." Surely, if written history and current actions count for anything in judging a nation, no other than these stupenduous designs and hopes, we have briefly stated, are the basis of her aggressive spirit. Surely no other than these form the main-spring of Russia's late historical movements. Russia's political,-.commercial and industrial interests demand a more extensive seacoast, and more and better harbors. Tur-r_* r THE MERCURY. 61 key and the Powers control the Bosphorus and deny her ingress to Mediterranean waters. The Baltic is ice-bound part of the year and that seriously hinders navigation there. Port Arthur and Vladivostok also present serious obstacles to successful commerce. Where shall Russia turn, if not southward along China's coast and toward the Persian gulf, in which directions the high wave of her influence and sovereignty has been roll-ing, now slowly, now rapidly, but ever rolling for almost four hundred years ? What does the construction of her great trans-Siberian railroad mean, which now stretches across an en-tire continent, if not easier access to the Pacific ? What does a similar trunk line mean, which is now being planned to extend from the Baltic to the Arabian sea, if not a freer outlet to the world's waters ? What does her sly seizure of Manchuria, her pretended foothold on Korea, signify ? What does a war with Japan signify, if not a fixed determination to extend her power along the Chinese seaboard and gain possession of China's warm water harbors? Russia aspires to be a great sea power, but as yet she is comparatively weak along that line, as was evinced too plainly by her recent defeats at the hands of Japanese sea-warriors. In order to be prepared in time of war she must have a stronger navy, and safer inlets to harbor it. That she may develop her boundless natural resources properly, both in Europe and Siberia, and thereby increase her wealth, she must be given an opportunity to open up her industries and enlarge her trade. To hold and maintain her place among the nations, she must establish herself on the sea. Russia's prophet states-men are shrewd and wide-awake to these facts. They look far ahead, see in Russia the nation of the future, and may be ex-pected to plan their every action in accordance with their in-tense ambition to make her glorious and paramount. There is no more room for doubt. The spread of Slavonic domination in Asia is truly alarming. No observer who has followed the course of current affairs in the East will have failed to notice that glacier-like movement of Russian power over Chinese territory. England sees it; Japan resents it. It is too evident, notwithstanding her cunning diplomacy, her insincere 62 THE MERCURY. promises and agreements, and her round-about manoeuvers at times, that Russia means to retain every foot of ground she possesses and that she will never cease to advance until she has conquered and absorbed and assimilated the whole of the Chi-nese Empire, Persia, and Afghanistan; stands triumphant on the summits of the lofty Himalyas, and looks with a threaten-ing eye down upon the rich and splendid empire of India, un-less, perchance, the Anglo-Saxon shall not delay longer, but come forth to contest such wholesale occupation of Asia. Some years ago, when it was proposed to retreat from the mouth of the Amur river, Emperor Nicholas said, "Where Russia's flag is carried once, there it shall remain forever." That shows the spirit of the nation. Russia is active; Russia is greedy; Rus-sia is strong and persistent. Give her the chance she seeks to relieve her latent energies and develop her dormant resources, and she will become the most influential, the wealthiest of world powers. Give her the opportunity she covets and she will scatter broadcast over the Orient her despotic principles of autocracy with its brutality, ignorance, and oppression; force her Greek Catholicism with its error and intolerance upon the unfortunate subjects of her conquest, and carry with her a spirit of exclusiveness and selfishness deadly to the advance of pure Christian civilization everywhere ig the world. Give her the right of way and she will attain the strategic points she desires and crush out of existence the Anglo-Saxon order of civiliza-tion, which means constitutional government, the Protestant religion, liberty, equality, and education characteristic of all Anglo Saxon peoples. Stand aside, and Holy Russia will rule the world. But will the rest of the world stand aside, passive and indif ferent, and let the great Czar forward his schemes of encroach-ment and aggrandizement unhindered? Japan says No! Japan acts promptly and firmly, and all hail! to the bravp little nation who with courage stout and strong goes out to battle with this giant aggressor of the north. We admit her claims be-cause we know they are just; we glory in her victories because we know she is right; deservedly do we give her our sympathies THE MERCURY. 63 because she has put herself in line with twentieth century progress and civilization and with dignity faces an avaricious foe still moved by the customs and principles of the sixteenth century. But can she stand against such might in the ultimate contest ? Can Japan alone hold Russia in check and stop the perilous ad-vance ? It is not to be expected. If not, what will England do, England who has check-mated Russia so often in Europe, and who now has such vast commercial interests on the coast and in the heart of China, and stands guardian over such a mighty empire as India, will she allow China to be Russianized and India to be menaced ? It would seem that the final struggle must be between Russia and England. Two great orders of modern civilization have met and are ready to clash, yes they have clashed, for Japan's prototype is England, and her civil-ization is Anglo-Saxon. On the one hand, Russia, who be-lieves thoroughly that the future lies with the Slav. On the other hand, the English-speaking nations, who contend that the future rests with the Anglo-Saxon. Both stand ready to fight, if need be, for the world's supremacy. One is a supremacy of personal absolutism and oppression; the other, a supremacy of democracy with its liberty and justice. Which shall it be? Should the struggle come now, Russia would likely be crushed ;• later, after she has had time to grow and strengthen to her full proportions, who shall prophesy the end and declare which shall rule the world, Anglo-Saxon or Slav ? THE PASSION FOR SCHOLARSHIP. PROF. OSCAR G. KXINGER. THE mental attitude of a man towards his vocation is all important. Tell me this and I will tell you the degree of success which he has won or will win. Where there is a lively interest there will be also the enthusiasm and tireless energy so necessary to the perfect performance of a task. A lackadaisical spirit defeats any enterprize. The captains of in- 64 THE MERCURY. dustry have always been men with a genius for hard work. The same is true of those who have won eminence in any of the learned professions. They have mounted high because they have been in love with their vocation. To the student who aims at some notable achievement in the domain of knowledge, an absorbing passion for scholarship is the first essential. By such a passion, I mean an insatiable desire to know the truth of things at first hand. Others may be satisfied to take their information on faith. He must get at the heart of reality ; he must know things in themselves and in their relations; and to attain this he must be willing to sacrifice everything— "To scorn delights and live laborious days." Unless this passion dominate him there will be lacking the fire and enthusiasm which are necessary to prolonged effort. To think is the most difficult task a man can ever set himself. It means absorption, critical acumen, a nice balancing of facts and unerring inference; in a word, it means the analysis of a fact or truth to its ultimates and a synthesis of these ultimates into a positive thought. The process prolonged wears out the brain and exhausts the nerves. To keep it up until the end demands a will which is animated by a passion for knowledge as burning as the desire to live. Then and then only can the mind come to its full stature and utter truth which men must hear whether they will or not. This longing to know is often inborn, but may be acquired in some degree by even the dullest. The main trouble with the latter sort of student is that his mind has never been a-wakened. About his intellect a dense haze has gathered and he cannot see his way nor does he know precisely where he is. A dull ambition stirs in his heart but he cannot discover its meaning. Intelligent study is to him unknown. He tries to go through his tasks but what he gets means little to him. Often it happens that young men of naturally capable minds almost finish their course before they acquire the mental aware-ness which is the first condition of successful study. When THE MERCURY. 65 they do wake up their progress is phenomenal. Perhaps therefore, the highest function of the teacher is to awaken mind and by his helpfulness keep it awake. ' No higher reward can come to him than the consciousness that he has set one intel-lect on fire with the passion to know. Before this is possible, however, a serious obstacle must be removed. It is a motion wellnigh unusual among students and grows out of a mistaken conception of education. The student finds the college equipped with a faculty of men more or less learned who are to be his teachers in the various subjects which the curriculum offers. He expects them to set him tasks for each day's performance. In the recitations they question him on the lessons and make the necessary explanations or pffer additional information. Consequently the idea is general and perhaps inevitable that the professors educate the pupil. How-ever natural, this notion is pernicious and works incalculable harm. In the sense that the teacher acts as guide and makes easier the road to intellectual development, it is true that he is an educator ; in any other sense it is misleading. The men-tal development zvhich any man gets is always the lesult of his own specific effort. A teacher helps, stimulates, guides, "but achieves nothing without the earnest response of the pupil.' This erroneous view is largely responsible for a wrong use of the textbook. The student imagines that doing his task-work in memoriter fashion is genuine study. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Even a parrot is capable of such exercise of memory and the world has no use for human "Pollys!" A memory stored with knowledge is a great boon, but will not go far in promoting a' man's interests. Some of the greatest failures have been walking encyclopedias of facts and theories. A bookworm always has a hard time to find enough to eat. The world demands men who can think and plan and execute,—practical men who can use their knowledge to meet and solve the intricate problems of business and poli-tics. "What new truth have you to offer?" is the question asked of every graduate and on his answer depends his sta-tion. A well written article which reproduces only the •ii% 66 THE MERCURY. thoughts of other men finds its way into the editor's waste bas-ket or into the pages of the cheapest magazine. The pulpit ■which is no longer a teaching platform will face empty pews. The "dead-line" in any profession is drawn where invention dies; years have nothing to do with it. The man who keeps pace with progress and is able to interpret to others the heart of the movement will never want a hearing. Such a man is never the product of a mere textbook. For a text in any sub ject is the resume of one man's interpretation of a body of facts. Its value depends wholly on the authority of its author. At best it is only an outline. Any student, therefore, who ac-cepts the teaching without examining the facts and bringing the theory to the test of facts, is doing two things—-depriving himself of the pleasure which comes with reasoned conviction, and missing the power which such additional research confers. Either is a great mistake. The worship of the textbook induces another grievous habit which when acquired blights original work in a literary way. When a theme has been adopted as the subject of an essay the student at once searches through the library for material which when found constitutes the subject matter of his essay. Of testing, of meditation, there is little or 'none. What he says is not what the subject means to him but to another. He is like a phonograph endowed with the power of changing the form of expression without altering the thought. It were well if the saying of Isocrates were written in letters of light above every alcove: "What has been said by one is not of equal value to him who repeats it; but he seems to be the most skillful who finds in a subject topics which have escaped the notice of others." Here is the truth in a nut-shell. Let a young man determine at the outset that he will not repeat what has once been uttered except as a quotation, but will give to the world his own thought tested and tried by an appeal to things, and what he has to say on any subject will command the attention of men. Servile devotion to the textbook; re-producing the thought of others; failure to experience the truth that is presented; these are the fatal rocks on which THE MERCURY. 67 many a promising career has been wrecked. There is, too, an ethical aspect of the case which must not be overlooked. No one has the moral right to ask another to spend time in read-ing or hearing what to him is old. Truth which concerns man is so illimitable in every direction and our knowledge of it so infinitesimal that he who repeats what is common to all is guilty of a grave wrong to his reader or hearer. This passion to know fully and at first hand, if it could be-come the dominant element in the college atmosphere, would transform college life. It would quickly bring men face to face with the mystery of things and take away the indolence, the trifling, the present tendency to follow the line of least resis-tance. The four years of effort would produce scholars whom the world would welcome and of whom the college could be proud. The spirit of the scholar can be acquired and cultivated and its possession means success, as its absence means failure, in all that is highest in life. COURTESY TO STRANGERS. H. S. DORNBERGKR, '06. A stranger,'no matter where he goes, is bound to receive a certain amount of courtesy. I will attempt to show in this essay that this amount of courtesy is increasing rather than decreasing. During all ages and especially the feudal age, every stranger was sure of receiving food and shelter if he stopped at any house or castle. This was due chiefly to the fact that hotels were not very common until our own age, nor did every village or hamlet have its hotel or inn as is now the case. Then as there were no newspapers until quite recently, a stranger was also received for the news he might bring. It might also be added that the number of travelers at that time cannot be com-pared with the number of the present time. At present this hospitality to strangers is not nearly so evi- '• J Uii. 68 THE MERCURY. dent as it was in former times. The chief cause of this is our modern hotel system. Everywhere one goes he will find some kind of a hotel, no matter what be the size of the place. It may also be stated here that travelers, in most cases, would much rather pay their hotel bills than trouble some one else with entertaining them during their sojourn in the locality. Even among friends one sees this. Very often a friend will come to your vicinity and, rather than bother you, will go to a hotel. Now let us consider whether a stranger would be welcomed did he ask for our hospitality. The ordinary beggar will serve as a good example of this. It is very difficult, indeed, for one to find a home where a beggar will not receive a good meal if he goes and asks for it. Who is so cold hearted that he would refuse anyone shelter from the'cold in winter or the rain in summer? Who would not offer his bed to a sick or wounded person at his door and strive to comfort the unfortu-nate being? In some countries a stranger was always regarded as an enemy unless he could prove himself a friend. In some in-stances it even went so far as to cause the person's death, could he not do this. As we come to more modern times this feel-ing of hostility toward strangers gradually diminished until it has passed entirely out of existence, except among semi-civi-lized peoples. Another example of the growth of courtesy toward strangers is the downfall of absolute monarchism and the rise of more democratic forms of government. This last example may be regarded as not exactly on the subject by some but as it con-sists of the regard of man for man, in my opinion it is after all nothing but courtesy. A still better example is the increase of the value of human life. At the dawn of history the life of a man was held less sacred than a mere dog's life is today. This brings up still another point. In former ages, capital punishment was the mode of exacting justice. Since that time the inflicting of capital punishment has been gradually modi- THE MERCURY. 69 fied from unspeakable tortures to the entire abandonment of this form of justice except in some few cases. The modern rules of etiquette require us to be courteous to strangers. We exert ourselves in every way to please them and try our best to make them feel at home. We even go so far as to deny ourselves comforts for their pleasure. We do not allow them to spend their money. We introduce them to our friends who try to outdo us in their courtesy toward these strangers. Take for example the visit of a noted person to a city or town. Arrangements for his reception are begun al-most as soon as the the news of his intended visit becomes known. Banquets and receptions are given in his honor. He is met at the railroad station by a committee and escorted to his stopping-place. He is cheered by the crowds that gather merely to get a glimpse of him. I believe that courtesy toward strangers is increasing rather than decreasing for we of the present day are just as hospitable toward strangers as were our brethern of former times; and I believe therefore that as the world becomes more civilized, mankind will become more courteous. da I In an up-to-datest tailor-made gown,U-pi-de-i-da The boys arc wild, and prex is, too, You never saw such a hulla-ba-loo. CHORUS. — U-pi-dee-i-dee-i-da 1 etc. Her voice is clear as a soaring lark's, And her wit Is like those trolley-car sparks I When 'cross a muddy street she flits. The boys all have conniption fits I The turn of her head turns all ours, too. There's always a strife to sit in her pew; 'Tis enough to make a parson drunk, To hear her sing old co-ca-che-lunk! The above, and three other NEW verses to U-PI-DEIi, '.'. and NEW WORDS, catchy, up-to-date, to manv fp others of the popular OLD FAMILIAR TUNES; be- ■■ ' JfflHf sides OLD FAVORITES ; and also many NEW SONGS. J*W uull S0NGS OF ALL THE COLLEGES. JjWJ Copyright, Pricei $rjo, postpaid. fa mm if IJLU HINDS & NOBLE, Publishers, New York City. ^ ft ft Schoolbooks of all publishers at one store. ff1' ■> Rupp Building, YORK, PENN'A. Watch for his Representative when he visits the College PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISERS. Geo. E. Sparkler, PIANOS, ORGANS, MUSICAL MERCHANDISE MusiC Rooms, - York St. Telephone 181 GETTYSBURG C. B. KITZMILLE,R. DEALER IN HATS, CAPS, BOOTS AND DOUGLAS SHOE.S. McKnight Building, Baltimore St. Gettysburg, Pa. k M. AMrEMAN, Manufacturer's Agent and Jobber of Hardware, Oils, paints and (jueensware Gettysburg, Pa. THE ONLY JOBBING HOUSE IN ADAMS COUNTY W.F.Odori, ^DEALER IN^k- SPECIAL RATES TO CLUBS. mm* York Street, Gettysburg:, Pa. 1

It speaks volumes that the death of Henry Kissinger, announced on Wednesday, drew major news obituaries that rivaled those of late American presidents' in length and depth. The news was met with equal parts of vitriol and paeans across social media, the former reflected in words like "war criminal" and "monster," the latter, "genius" and "master."His intellectually-driven, hard-nosed statecraft and strategy has long been embraced by realists who appreciate Kissinger's rejection of ideological doctrine in favor of interest-driven realpolitik. They credit him with détente and managing the Soviet threat in the Cold War. His critics say his approach was responsible for government-led massacres in developing nations and Washington's scorched earth policies in Indochina. Humanity suffered while the "great game" was played, no matter how well, from the Nixon White House and in later presidencies (12 total) for which Kissinger advised.But was his impact on U.S. foreign policy ultimately positive or negative? We asked a wide range of historians, former diplomats, journalists and scholars to pick one and defend it.Andrew Bacevich, George Beebe, Tom Blanton, Michael Desch, Anton Fedyashin, Chas Freeman, John Allen Gay, David Hendrickson, Robert Hunter, Anatol Lieven, Stephen Miles, Tim Shorrock, Monica Duffy Toft, Stephen WaltAndrew Bacevich, historian and co-founder of the Quincy InstituteI met Kissinger just once, at a small gathering in New York back in the 1990s. When the event adjourned, he walked over to where I was sitting and spoke to me. "Did you serve in the military?" "Yes," I said. "In Vietnam?" "Yes." His tone filled with sadness, he said: "We really wanted to win that one."I did not reply but as he walked away, I thought: What an accomplished liar.George Beebe, Director of Grand Strategy, Quincy InstituteHenry Kissinger's impact on American foreign policy, although controversial, was on balance overwhelmingly positive. As he entered office in 1968, America was overextended abroad and beset by domestic political conflict. An increasingly powerful Soviet Union threatened to achieve superiority over America's nuclear and conventional arsenals. The United States needed to extract itself from Vietnam and focus on domestic healing, yet any retreat into isolationism would allow Moscow a free hand to intimidate Western Europe and spread communism through the post-colonial world. Kissinger's answer to this problem, conceived in partnership with President Nixon, was a masterwork of diplomatic realism. Seeing an opportunity to exploit tensions between Moscow and Beijing, he orchestrated a surprise opening to Maoist China that reshaped the international order, counterbalancing Soviet power and complicating the Kremlin's strategic challenge. In parallel, the United States pursued détente with Moscow, producing a landmark set of trade, arms control, human rights, and confidence-building arrangements that helped to constrain the arms race and make the Cold War more manageable and predictable.By comparison to 1968, the scale of the problems we face today seems more daunting. The Cold War architecture of arms control and security arrangements is in tatters. Our middle class is more distrustful and disaffected, our international reputation more damaged, and our ability to manage the challenges of a peer Chinese rival more limited. A statesman with Kissinger's strategic acumen and diplomatic skill is very much needed. Tom Blanton, Director, National Security Archive, George Washington UniversityThe declassified legacy of Henry Kissinger undermines the triumphant narrative he labored so hard to build, even for his successes. The opening to China, for example, turns out to be Mao's idea with Nixon's receptiveness, initially dissed by Kissinger. His shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East did reduce violence but it took Anwar Sadat and then Jimmy Carter to make the peace that Kissinger failed to accomplish. The 1973 Vietnam settlement was actually available in 1969, but Kissinger mistakenly believed he could do better by going through Moscow or Beijing. Meanwhile, Kissinger's callousness about the human cost runs through all the documents. Millions of Bangladeshis murdered by Pakistan's genocide while Kissinger stifled dissent in the State Department. A million Vietnamese and 20,000 Americans who died for Kissinger's "decent interval." Some 30,000 Argentines disappeared by the junta with Kissinger's green light. Thousands of Chileans killed by Pinochet while Kissinger joked about human rights. Untold numbers of Cambodians dead under Kissinger's secret bombing.Adding insult to all these injuries, Kissinger cashed in over the past 45 years through sustained influence peddling and self-promotion, paying no price for repeated bad judgments like opposing the Reagan-Gorbachev arms cuts, and supporting the 2003 Iraq invasion. A dark legacy indeed.Michael Desch, Professor of International Relations at the University of Notre Dame Almost all of the obituaries for Henry Kissinger characterize him as the quintessential realist, harkening back to a bygone era of European great power politics in which statesmen played the 19th century version of the board game Risk otherwise known as the balance of power. Kissinger seemed straight out of central casting for this role with his deep, sonorous voice and perpetual Mittel-Europa accent. All that was missing was a monocle and a Pickelhaube. But in reality, Kissinger was at best an occasional realist. His best scholarly book — "A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22" — came out in 1957 and was more of a work of history than an articulation of a larger realpolitik theory of global politics in which power is used, and more importantly not used, to advance a country's national interest.And while his (and Richard Nixon's) opening to the People's Republic of China in 1972 remains a masterstroke of balance of power politics in action, at the drop of an egg-roll dividing the heretofore seemingly monolithic Communist Bloc, he was more often an inconstant realist.At times Kissinger embraced a crude might-makes-right approach (think of the Athenians bullying of the Melians in Book V of Thucydides) epitomized by the escalation to deescalate the war in Vietnam by invading Cambodia and the meddling in the fractious politics of Third World countries like Chile, seemingly to no other end than that's what great powers do. More recently, he's worked to remain the indispensable statesman through an embarrassingly obsequious pattern of making himself indispensable to nearly every subsequent president, whether or not they were really interested in sitting at the knee of the master realpolitiker. His hedged endorsement of George W. Bush's disastrous Iraq war is exhibit A on this score.Kissinger kept himself in the limelight for much of his career but not as a consistent voice of realism in foreign policy.Anton Fedyashin, associate professor of history, American UniversityIn his long and distinguished career, Henry Kissinger made many decisions that history may judge harshly, but oversimplifying and exaggerating complex geopolitical issues was not one of them. With their instinctive aversion to the trap of conceptual binarism, Kissinger and Nixon applied their flexible realism to China and the USSR in 1972. Abandoning the assumption that all communists were evil forced Beijing and Moscow to outbid each other for U.S. favors. Treating the USSR as a post-revolutionary state that put national interests above ideology, Nixon and Kissinger decided to bring the Soviets into the American-managed world order while letting them keep their hegemony in Eastern Europe.In Kissinger's realist version of containment, statesmanship was judged by the management of ambiguities, not absolutes. As Kissinger put it in an interview with The Economist earlier this year, "The genius of the Westphalian system and the reason it spread across the world was that its provisions were procedural, not substantive." Kissinger's realist wisdom would serve American leaders well as they navigate the rough waters of transitioning to a multipolar world order. The era of great power balancing is back, and non-binarist realism can help Washington manage hegemonic decline rather than catalyzing it.Ambassador Chas Freeman, visiting scholar at Brown University's Watson Institute for International and Public AffairsKissinger embodied a global and strategic view and because it was global, it often offended specialists in regional affairs. Because it was strategic, he often made tactical sacrifices for strategic gain. And the tactical sacrifices that he made were often rather ugly at the regional or local level. The classic example of that is the refusal to intervene in the war in Bangladesh. Obviously, he had nothing but contempt for ideological foreign policy. This has led ideologues, of which we have an abundance, to see him as an enemy, and you're seeing this now with some of the coverage after his passing.Kissinger's achievement of detente at a crucial point in the Cold War will be remembered for its brilliance, as will his significant scholarship. His statecraft and scholarship were inseparable. He was a very good negotiator and probably had more experience negotiating great power relations than any secretary of state since early in the Republic. He was moderately successful in the short term. He was not successful in the long term because his interlocutors correctly perceived that he was manipulative. If one wishes to keep relationships open to future transactions, one must not cheat on current transactions. But this problem is not uncommon. It's very typical in American politics. For example, Jim Baker was famously uninterested in nurturing relationships. He was interested in immediate results in his dealings with foreign governments. He left a lot of anger and dissatisfaction in his wake. Kissinger less so, but the same for different reasons, reflecting his personality, his character, and the character of the president he served.John Allen Gay, Executive Director, John Quincy Adams SocietyKissinger's legacy in the Third World commands the most attention and criticism. He has been made the face of the tremendous toll the Cold War took on the wretched of the earth. Yet his work on great power relations deserves more regard. The opening to China he engineered with President Richard Nixon was a masterstroke to exploit division in the Communist world. Granted, the Sino-Soviet split had happened long before, and the opening was more a Nixon idea, but Kissinger set the table. And Kissinger was also a central figure in détente with the Soviet Union.Both policies were deeply unpopular with the forerunners to the neoconservative movement, but reflected the Continental realist mindset that Kissinger, along with thinkers like Hans J. Morgenthau, brought into the American foreign policy discourse. The opening to China and détente were, in fact, linked. As Kissinger pointed out, the opening to China challenged the Soviet Union to prevent the opening from growing; contrary to the advice of Sovietologists, this did not prompt new Soviet aggression, but made the Soviets more pliable. As Kissinger wrote in his 1994 book "Diplomacy" — "To the extent both China and the Soviet Union calculated that they either needed American goodwill or feared an American move toward its adversary, both had an incentive to improve their relations with Washington. […] America's bargaining position would be strongest when America was closer to bot communist giants than either was to the other." And so it was. Today's practitioners of great-power politics would do well to borrow more from this happier part of Kissinger's legacy. They have instead helped drive China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea together, and have no answer to this emerging alignment beyond lectures and sanctions. The19th century European statesmen Kissinger admired would have seen the failure of such a policy. David Hendrickson, author, "Republic in Peril: American Empire and the Liberal Tradition"The great oddity of Nixon and Kissinger's record in foreign policy is that they gave up as unprofitable and dangerous the pursuit of ideological antagonism with the Great Powers (the Soviet Union and China), but then pursued the Cold War crusade with a vengeance against small powers. Kissinger's diplomatic career reminds me of the charge that Hauterive (a favorite of Napoleon's) brought against the confusions of the ancien regime, that it applied "the terms sound policy, system of equilibrium, maintenance or restoration of the balance of power . . . to what, in fact was only an abuse of power, or the exercise of arbitrary will."Parts of Kissinger's record, like the bombing of Cambodia, are indefensible, but there are good parts too: had Henry the K been in charge of our Russia policy over the last decade, we could have avoided the conflagration in Ukraine. He was sounder on China and Taiwan than 90 percent of the howling commentariat. He was, in addition, a serious scholar who wrote some good books about the construction of world order (A World Restored, Diplomacy). Young people should take his thought seriously, not consign him to the ninth circle.Robert Hunter, former U.S. Ambassador to NATOLike all outstanding teachers, Henry Kissinger was also a showman — and he could be fun. He used his accent and self-deprecating humor as weapons for his policies and getting them taken seriously. Journalists might at times scorn what he was doing and how he did it, but they were still charmed and tended so often to give him the benefit of the doubt — as well as the credit, even when not deserved. Everyone recalls his roles in promoting détente with the Soviet Union and, even more, the opening to China, with Richard Nixon following in his wake. In fact, both policies sprang from Nixon's mind. But when the dust settled, Kissinger was the Last Man Standing."Henry," we could call him who never worked for him (!), made intelligent and literate speeches on foreign policy that everyone could understand, bringing it into the limelight. A man of great ego, he still recruited and inspired talented acolytes at the State Department and White House — matched only by Brent Scowcroft and Zbig Brzezinski. He had other policy positives in the Middle East ("shuttle diplomacy") but major negatives in Chile, in prolonging the Vietnam War, and bombing Cambodia.Take him altogether, a true Man of History.Anatol Lieven, Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy InstituteThe problem about any just assessment of Henry Kissinger is that the good and bad parts of his record are organically linked. His Realism led him to an awareness of the vital interests of other countries, a willingness to compromise, and a prudence in the exercise of U.S. power that all too many American policymakers have altogether lacked and that the United States today desperately needs. This Realist acceptance of the world as it is however also contributed to a cynical disregard for basic moral norms — notably in Cambodia and Bangladesh — that have forever tarnished his and America's name.When in office, reconciliation with China and the pursuit of Middle East peace took real moral courage on Kissinger's part, given the forces arrayed against these policies in the United States. But in his last decades, though he initially criticized NATO expansion and called for the preservation of relations with Russia and China, he never did so with the intellectual and moral force of a George Kennan.Perhaps in the end the best comment on Kissinger comes from an epithet by his fellow German Jewish thinker on international affairs Hans Morgenthau: "It is a dangerous thing to be a Machiavelli. It is a disastrous thing to be a Machiavelli without Virtu" — an Italian term embracing courage, moral steadfastness and basic principle.Stephen Miles, President, Win Without WarNearly as many words have been spilled marking the end of Henry Kissinger's life as the lives he's responsible for ending, but let me add a few more. It would be easy to simply say that the devastating impact of Kissinger on U.S. foreign policy was clearly and wholly negative. As Spencer Ackerman noted in his essential obituary, few Americans, if any, have ever been as responsible for the death of so many of their fellow human beings. But Kissinger's true impact was not just in being a war criminal but in setting a new standard for doing so with impunity. Earlier this year, he was feted with a party for his 100th birthday attended not just by crusty old Cold Warriors remembering 'the good ole days,' but also by a veritable who's who of today's elite from billionaire CEOs and cabinet members to fashion megastars and NFL team owners. Sure, he may have been responsible for a coup here or a genocide there, but shouldn't we all just look past that and recognize his influence, power, and intellect? Does it really matter what he used those talents for?And in the end, that's the benefit of Kissinger's horrific life and decidedly not-untimely death. By never making amends for the harm he did and never being held accountable for the horrors he caused, he made clear just how truly broken and flawed U.S. foreign policy is. Perhaps now that he has finally left the stage, we can begin to change that. Tim Shorrock, Washington-based journalistKissinger nearly destroyed three Asian countries by causing the deaths of thousands in U.S. bombing raids, covertly intervened to subvert democracy in Chile, and encouraged an Indonesian dictator to invade newly independent East Timor and inflict a genocide upon its people. These were criminal acts that should have made him a pariah. Instead, he is lauded as a visionary by our ruling elite. And it was mostly accomplished through lies and deceit, in the name of corporate profit.I'll never forget in 1972 watching Kissinger declare "peace is at hand" in Vietnam. After years of protesting this immoral war, I truly thought that Vietnam's suffering, and my own countrymen's, was finally over; they had won and we had lost. But my hope was shattered that Christmas, when Kissinger and Nixon ordered B-52s to carpet-bomb Hanoi in an arrogant act of defiance and malice. Afterwards, a shaky peace agreement was signed that could have sparked an honorable U.S. withdrawal. But it took 3 more years of bloodshed before the United States was forced out.Kissinger broke my trust in America as a just nation and overseas sparked a deep hatred of U.S. foreign policy. Few statesmen have caused such harm.Monica Duffy Toft, Professor of International Politics and Director, Center for Strategic Studies, Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityI have a pair of midcentury teak chairs once belonging to the late eminent scholar Samuel P. Huntington in my office. Sam was a colleague and friend of Henry Kissinger's, and a mentor to me. Sam and I sat in these chairs discussing world politics and the everyday challenges of running a scholarly institute. When a new set of chairs arrived, Sam insisted I take the old ones, but not before emphasizing their significance — reminders of the hours he and Kissinger spent in deep debate and casual banter. These chairs have history.Henry Kissinger was, and shall remain, a controversial figure. His gifts were two. First, across decades of U.S. foreign policy challenges, he remained consistent in his conception of power, and how U.S. power should be used to enhance the security of the United States. Second, he was gifted at assembling, mentoring, and deploying cross-cutting networks of influential people. Like many of my colleagues who study international politics, there are policies — his support of Salvador Allende's ouster in Chile, for example — I find odious. I am also uncomfortable with Kissinger's elitism: his preferred policies favored those with wealth and political power at the expense of those without.But what I admire about Kissinger's U.S. foreign policy legacy and, by extension, international politics, was his profound grasp of the importance of historical context: a thing as important to sound U.S foreign policy today as it is rare; and of which I am pleasantly reminded every time I sit in one of Sam's chairs.Stephen Walt, Quincy Institute board member, professor of international affairs at the Harvard Kennedy SchoolHenry Kissinger was the most prominent U.S. statesman of his era, and that era lasted a very long time. His main achievements were not trivial: a long-overdue opening to China, some high-wire "shuttle diplomacy" after the 1973 October War, and several useful arms control treaties during the period of détente. But he was also guilty of some monumental misjudgments, including prolonging the Vietnam War to no good purpose and expanding it into Cambodia at a frightful human cost. His diplomatic acrobatics in the Middle East were impressive, but they were only necessary because he had missed the signs that Egypt was readying for war in 1973 in order to break a diplomatic deadlock that he had helped orchestrate. His indifference to human rights and civilian suffering sacrificed thousands of lives and made a mockery of U.S. pretensions to moral superiority.Kissinger owed his enduring influence not to a superior track record as a pundit or sage but to his own energy, unquenchable ambition, unparalleled networking skills, and the elite's reluctance to hold its members accountable. After all, this is a man who downplayed the risks of China's rise (while earning fat consulting fees there), backed the disastrous invasion of Iraq in 2003, opposed the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, and dismissed warnings that open-ended NATO enlargement would make Europe less rather than more secure. Kissinger also perfected the art of transmuting government service into a lucrative consulting career, setting a troubling precedent for others. Debates about his legacy will no doubt continue, but one suspects that the reverence that his acolytes exhibit today will gradually fade now that he is no longer here to sustain it.Dear RS readers: It has been an extraordinary year and our editing team has been working overtime to make sure that we are covering the current conflicts with quality, fresh analysis that doesn't cleave to the mainstream orthodoxy or take official Washington and the commentariat at face value. Our staff reporters, experts, and outside writers offer top-notch, independent work, daily. Please consider making a tax-exempt, year-end contribution to Responsible Statecraft so that we can continue this quality coverage — which you will find nowhere else — into 2024. Happy Holidays!

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Ned
Lebow on Drivers of War, Cultural Theory, and IR of Foxes and Hedgehogs









Drawing
on classical political theories, International Relations is dominated by
theories that presuppose interests or fear as dominant drivers for foreign
policy. Richard Ned Lebow looks further back into the history of ideas to conjure up a
more varied set of drives that underpin political action. In this Talk, Lebow, among others, elaborates on
the underpinnings of political action, discusses how war drives innovations in
IR theorizing in the 20th century, and likens himself to a fox,
rather than a hedgehog.





Print version of this Talk (pdf)








What
is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current IR?
What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?







Well, the big challenge in international politics is always
how do we keep from destroying one another and that's the negative question.
But it is mirrored by a positive question which is, how do we build community
and tolerance and peace? And that's not exactly the flip side, but that's
always been the big question in IR. And part of that, I think, is how we learn
to manage threatening change. Because in my perspective, that's the driving
force of conflict: ultimately, both World Wars can be attributed to
modernization and its destabilizing consequences. That is also the reason why
it is a falsehood to base theory on that little select slice of history during
the World Wars, extrapolate it, and try to think its universal. Yet that is
what IR theory does: so many theorists, and so many of the people you recently
interviewed, are guilty of doing that. So that's the big question and
certainly, that's what drove me to study IR in the hope that I could make some
small contribution to figuring out some of the answers or partial answers to
these questions.







If we turn to what the central debate should be in
International Theory, well, I would frame this in two parts: the first should
be 'what are the different ways in which we can conceive of international
theory and how, by all of us pursuing it the way we feel comfortable with, we
can enrich the field without throwing bric-a-brac at each other and find ways
of learning from each other?'







A few years ago, I edited a book with Mark Lichbach (Theory and Evidence in Comparative Politics
and International Relations) as a rejoinder to King, Keohane and Verba's
book, which we found deeply offensive. It has the narrowest framework and then
they base their understanding on the Vienna school yet they seem to have forgotten
that Hempel and Popper would disavow the positions that King, Keohane and Verba
(KKV) are anchoring themselves in as epistemologically primitive. And the very
examples they give to illustrate 'good science'—Alvarez and his groupaddressing the problem of dinosaur extinction—they fail to see that what
these people did was in fact code on the dependent variable, which is the big
no-no for KKV! And the reason why Alvarez et al were taken seriously, was not because they went through the order
of research that KKV promoted, but rather because they came up with an
explanation for a phenomenon that people have long known about—yet explanations
don't figure at all in KKV's take; they had no interest in mechanisms, it was
all narrow correlations. It's absurd! So we edited the book, and we invited
people who represented different perspectives, but all of whom had evidence and
struggled to make sense of the evidence, to talk to one another and to look at
the problems they themselves find in their positions and how one could learn
broadly from considering this. That's the kind of debate that seems to me is a
useful one. Not who is right or wrong, but how can we learn collectively. And
secondly, I think maybe we need fewer debates, and more good research.











How did you arrive
at where you currently are in your thinking about IR?







I suppose it's a combination of people, books, and events, and
being a dog that constantly gnaws on bones and works it through. Very clearly the
Second World War and the Cold War were what brought me to the study of IR. I'm sure
in their absence, considering the counterfactual, I would have gone into Astrophysics,
which was the other field that really interested me.







I think the first concrete influence was as an undergraduate
and then as a graduate, being struck by certain individuals whose minds seemed
to sparkle; and I admired them for that and they became role models. And I
would make myself, intellectually, a little Hans Morgenthau, a little Karl
Deutsch; see the world through their eyes, and play with it. I never really wanted
to make myself into them, but rather to benefit by seeing what the world was
like when seen through their eyes. So in this sense, let me go back and draw on
Boswell, Hughes, and Mill for my answer. They all conceived of identity as
something that's a process of self-fashioning in which we mix and match the
characteristics that we observe in other people. And the purpose of society is
to throw up these role models and provide interaction with them so that we can
constantly be engaging in self-fashioning. And ultimately, we create something
that's novel that other people want to emulate or reject, as the case may be.
And I think that mixing and matching, and ultimately creating a synthesis of my
own, I developed my own approach to things.







The second element of this is to pick problems that engage
me, and stick with them. My first book in IR was about international crises and
I worked on this, it must have been 8, possibly even 9 years. I started out initially
convinced that deterrence theory made sense but wouldn't fit the historical evidence. Then one day, while
playing around, I realized the theory was wrong and by reversing it, I could
understand why it didn't work and see there were very different dynamics at
play. So working on a problem constantly and going back and forth between
theory and empirical findings, you gradually develop your own sense of the
field.







It also helps, over the course of an intellectual lifetime, to
work on different kinds of problems: I've just finished a book on the politics
and ethics of identity; I finished a manuscript up for review on the nature of
causation and different takes on cause; and the previous two books were on
counterfactuals and the origins of war. And I learned something theoretically
and methodologically by throwing myself into these problems and also, in some
cases, by going beyond what one would normally consider the domain of IR to look
for answers. I've often done philosophy and literature in the identity book. I
also go to musical texts: I have a reading of the Mozart Da Ponte Operas as a deliberate
thought experiment to test out ancient regime
and enlightenment identities under varying circumstances to expose what's wrong
with them and to work toward a better approach of Così fantutte. And I
read the music, not only the libretti,
to get at an answer. Of course, when you've been doing it a long time, it keeps
you alive and alert when you look at something new. I'm just finishing my 46th
year of University teaching. It's a long time!







Thirdly, there were a few pivotal books. I read George
Orwell's 1984 and Aldous Huxley's Brave New World in the early 50s. Both
of those were very powerful books. I also read in about 1950 - Life Magazine
produced a large volume on WWII and it had fabulous photographs and of course
Life was famous, Robert Capa's photographs, and
the text by John Dos Passos. A big big book that I read and re-read and that
was a powerful influence on me. I'd say the Diary of Anne Frank, when it came
out, which was not all that dissimilar but had a different ending from my own
war experience, and then in high school I read, or struggled to read—I don't
think I understood it—Ideology and Utopia
(full text here) by Karl
Mannheim, and then I read Politics among
Nations and the Twenty Year's Crisis.
And both those books made enormous sense to me at the time. But I think the
book that over the course of my lifetime has had the most influence on me of
anything is Thucydides' The History of
the Peloponnesian War (read full text here).











What would a
student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global
way?







I am tempted to give you a flippant answer that an expert is
somebody from out of town; what used to be with slides would now be with a PowerPoint
presentation. I think frankly you need to do two things: you need to be
analytically sophisticated and original on the one hand, but to do it well, you
have to have an empirical base. There has to be some problem or set of problems
that you've rolled up your sleeves, looked at the data, talk to the people who
are on the ground doing these things, and you need to go back and forth between
that empirical knowledge and conceptual one. That's success as a social scientist. 







And traditionally, there's
always been another key. You must have one foot in society in which you belong
and another foot outside so you can do it as an outsider as well as an insider.
That's terribly important. I think, in this sense, that Americans are more
parochial than other people. They are good insiders but they are not very good
outsiders and they just don't understand the rest of the world and when you
read what they write about the rest of the world, you wonder what planet they
are living on. If you don't see the rest of the world, you can't look at the
America from another perspective. It's like people who take hegemony seriously;
it's like believing in Santa Claus, except Santa Claus is benign. To gain a
deep experience of the world in itself is a pre-requisite. Do a year abroad in
some other culture. Learn a language. Have a relationship with someone from a
different culture—you begin to learn the languages and all the rest will come.
That's the way to start.











You are
most famous to most people for your Cultural
Theory of International Relations (2008). What does it comprise and can you
say something about its classical roots?







I return to classical theory of conflict and cooperation
because I find that in modern theory, all drives of human action have been
reduced to appetite, and reason to mere instrumentality. The Greeks, by
contrast, believed there were several fundamental drives—drives that affected
politics—and while these included appetite, they weren't just appetite. Reason was more than instrumentality; it also had
the goal of understanding what led to a happy life; then, next to reason and
appetite, the third drive was spirit or self-esteem (the Greek thumos), which is very different and
often opposed to appetite. It is about winning the approbation of others to
feel good about ourselves. The difference between honor and standing—two
variants of self-esteem—is that honor is status achieved within a fixed set of
rules, while standing is whenever you achieve status by whatever means.







Now most existing IR theories are either only built on
appetites—as liberalism and Marxism—or fear. And for the Greeks fear is not a
human drive but a powerful emotion which can become a motive. And when reason
loses control over either appetite or spirit, people begin to worry about their
own ability to satisfy their appetites, their spirit, or even protect
themselves physically. That's when fear becomes a powerful motive. Realism is
of course the paradigm developed around fear. I differ in that my theory
recognizes multiple motives, that are active to varying degrees at different
times. They don't blend the way a solution does in chemistry, but they retain
their own characteristics, even if jumbled together. So my theory expects to
see quite diverse and often conflicting behavior, whereas other theories only
pay attention to state behavior that seems to support their theory, and feel
the need to explain away other behavior inconsistent with their theory. I revel
in these variations. Second, I vary in describing what derives from these
motives as (Weberian) ideal types—which means, something you don't encounter in
the real world, but rather, an abstraction, a fictional or analytical
description, that helps to make sense of the real world but never maps onto it
exactly. So, a fear-based world gives you a very nice description of a
foundation of anarchy. But of course this is an ideal-type world. Fear is only
one motive. You have go to a place where civil order has broken down, like
Somalia or the trenches in WWII, to see fear-based models compete.







Starting from these three motives and the emotion of fear, I
argue that each of these generates a very different logic of cooperation,
conflict and risk-taking; and each is associated with a different kind of
hierarchy. And all of them except fear rely on a different principle of
justice. Just to give an example: for actors—whether individuals or
states—driven by self-esteem, they tend to be risk prone (because honor has to
be won by successfully overcoming ordeals and challenges); it leads to a
conflictual logic because you are competing with others for honor; and it can
be rule-based (although the rules can brake down and move into fear); and the
principle is one of fairness, in contrast to interest or appetite which has a
principle of equality. The hierarchy is one of clientelism, where people honor
those at the top, which, in return, provides practical benefits for those on
the bottom. The Greeks called this hegemonia;
the Chinese had a similar system.







But because any actual system is not an ideal type, we have
to figure out what that mixture is and we can begin to understand foreign
policies. And I try to give numerous examples in the book. And the big turning
point, I argue, is modernity, where it becomes more difficult to untangle the
motives and their discourses. Because in modernity both Rousseau and Adam Smith
try to understand why we want material things, so the two become connected. You
could argue that even in Egyptian times they were connected, in the pyramids,
which are nothing if not erections of self-esteem. But it becomes more
difficult and so, rather than saying, using literary texts, artistic works and
political speeches as a way of determining the relationship, I approached the
problem differently with the examples of the World Wars, the Cold War, and the
Anglo-American Invasion of Iraq. I said let's run a test of seeing how
carefully we can explain the origins and the dynamics of these conflicts on the
basis of interest, on the basis of fear, on the basis of self-esteem. And I
think that's methodologically defensible.



Now the interesting point is that the honor or self-esteem
explanation is gone completely from modern IR explanations but does at least
just a good a job—if not better—at explaining these conflicts I mention above. There is an important sense—and this is my latest book—in which going to war was the dominant way to get recognized as a great power, and I feel that the example of the war in Iraq illustrates that that principle is on the retreat.







I obviously use Greek thinking as a source here of—again, I
wouldn't use the word knowledge—but as a source of insight into human nature
and the recurring problems regardless of society. Some of the great writers and
thinkers cannot be surpassed as sources of knowledge that we as social
scientists are shadows on the cave by comparison. And I find the Greeks
particularly interesting for several reasons. One, they had a richer
understanding of the psyche that moderns who have adduced everything to appetite
and reason to a mere instrumentality, this is, to me, an incredibly narrow,
crude way of thinking of the human mind. And, for whatever reason, they were
gifted with tragedians who pierced to the core of things. So I find them as a
source of inspiration but it's by no way limited to the Greeks. You can pick
great authors from any culture, in any century, and read them and learn a lot.











How
should we understand your cultural theory of international relations in
relation to the 'big' paradigms?







My theory is constructivist, at every level. I can go even further and claim that my theory is
the only constructivist theory.
Alexander Wendt is not a constructivist. If anything, he's a structural
liberal. It did have preexisting identities and has a teleology as he believes
a Kantian world is inevitable— that's quite a statement to make! And I hope
he's right. On the other hand, I define constructivists in a broader way. Most
constructivists start with identities and identities are certainly an important
feature of my work, but my theory rests on a different premise, and that is the
notion of there being certain core values which are germane to politics, and
they vary in relative importance from society to society, and they find
expression in different ways. So it is constructivist, I think, in the Weberian
sense: we have to understand from within the culture what makes things
meaningful. And, in that sense, you could bring in the notion of
inter-subjective reality, but I go beyond it, because other values are always
present in this mix and therefore there's behavior that appears contradictory
that is often misunderstood if you apply the wrong lens to it. So there's a
lack of interdisciplinary understanding as well: you have to look at both to
see how the world works. So cultural theory is constructivist and it allows us
to reframe and expand what constructivism means.







If I apply this constructivist thinking to one of the core
principles in our approach to world politics: what is a cause? I start by
asking, what does 'cause' mean, in physics? Why physics? Because physics is
always the field that political scientists look at, we have 'physics envy', so
to speak. And interestingly, in physics, there is no consensus about what cause
means. Some physicists think that very notion of cause is unhelpful to what
they do. Others are happy with regularities and subscribe to causal thinking. Still
others thing that you need to have mechanisms to explain anything. Still others,
and here statistical mechanics can be taken as a case in point, invoke Kantian
understandings of cause. Within physics there's no argument between people
adhering to these different understandings of 'cause', because you should do
what works! They don't criticize one another. So if they have this diversity,
why shouldn't we? Why shouldn't we develop understandings of cause that are
most appropriate to what we do? So I develop an understanding I call 'inefficient
causation' (download full paper here),
sort of playing off of Aristotle. And it is a constructivist understanding, but
it also incorporates elements that are distinctively non-constructivist. And
identities are only a small piece of the puzzle.











Is
there any sense to make of the way IR has evolved over the 20th
century?







I think if you look at some of the central figures, it's
quite easy. There are 2 great cohorts of International Relations theorists.
Those born in the early years of the 20th century comprise Hans
Morgenthau, John Hertz, E.H. Carr, Harold Lasswell, Nicholas Spykman, Frederick Schuman, and Karl Deutsch—who was
on my dissertation committee together with Isaiah Berlin and John Hertz. The
second cohort is born between about 1939 and 1945, and it comprises Robert
Jervis (Theory Talk #12), Joseph Nye
(Theory Talk #7), Robert Keohane (Theory Talk #9), Oren Young, Peter
Katzenstein (Theory Talk #15), Stephen Krasner (Theory Talk#21), Janice Steinberg… And I'll tell you what I think the reasons are for
these groups to emerge at these particular moments: the first cohort lived
through World War I. And did so, fortunately, in at an age where they were too
young to be combatants for the most part, but they certainly had to deal
intellectually and personally with its consequences and then watch the horrors
unfold of the 1930s.







And the second, my own, cohort was born at the outset of the
Second World War. I think, in that group, I may be the only one of them born in
Europe (France). The rest of them were born in the US. And we came of age
during the most acute crisis of the cohort. So I was either in university or
graduate school during the Berlin crisis, during the Cuba crisis, and certainly
had an interest first in the consequences of WWII and how something like this
could happen, and then living through the horrors of the Cold War, not knowing
if indeed one would live through
them. And that created a very strong incentive and focus for our group of
people. Now a surprising number of this second group did their graduate studies
at Yale: Janice Stein, I, Oren Young, Bruce Russet, Krasner, later all at Yale
with Karl Deutsch. The rest, Jervis, Keohane and Krasner at Harvard with Samuel
Huntington. I think you have the odd person who's born somewhere in between –
so, Ken Waltz (Theory Talk #40), for
instance, is younger. He must be a 1920 person, almost exactly in between these
two, just as Ernst Haas.







And I wouldn't be surprised now if there is another cohort
emerging, the people of around the age of Stefano Guzinni, Jens Bartelson,
Patrick Jackson (Theory Talk #44).
What ties this third cohort together is that they all watched the end of the
Cold War and are coping with its aftermath. So I believe that it's probably two
things: the external environment and the extent to which you're in an
intellectually nurturing institution. And of course for our cohort, it
certainly helped that there were jobs. That was not true of the earlier cohort.
Almost all of them, except E.H. Carr, ended up in the US as refugees. Did you
know Morgenthau started as an elevator boy in New York? Then he got a job
teaching part-time at Brooklyn College because someone fell ill. His wife
cleaned other people's apartments to supplement their income. Then he got a job
at the University of Kansas City, which was a hellhole, and finally Harold
Lasswell got called to Washington for some war work and got Chicago to hire
Morgenthau to replace him.











What is
the issue with the discipline today if, as you noted before, we fail to ask the
most interesting questions and instead focus on method?







Well, it of course depends on which side of the pond you
sit. On the American side of the pond, positivist or game-theoretical
behaviorist or rationalist modeling approaches dominate the literature; it's
just silly, from my perspective. It's based on assumptions which bear no
relationship to the real world. People like it because it's intellectually
elegant: they don't have to learn any languages, they don't have to read any
history, and they can pretend they're scientists discussing universals.
Intellectually, it's ridiculous. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (Theory Talk #31) is a classic case in point. He's made a huge
reputation for himself with The War Trap (1981).
That book and the corresponding theory are based on a simple assumption,
namely, that there's a war trap compelling states into war, because initiators
win wars. But just look at the empirical record from 1945 to the present—initiators
lose between 80-90% of the wars they start. And that really depends on the
definition of victory. If you use the real definition, the Clausewitzian one,
you have to ask: do they achieve their political goals through violence? Then
the answer is, even fewer "victories". Well, let's cut them some slack, use a
more relaxed definition: did they beat the other side militarily? Initiators
still lose 78 or 82%—I forget exactly which percentage of their wars. And the
profession right now is so ignorant of history that nobody said 'Wait a
minute!' the day the book came out. Instead IR scholars all focus on this model
and fine-tuning it—it's ridiculous! And well, I don't want to go on with a
critique, but this is a serious problem, for it concerns a huge
misunderstanding regarding one of the most important problems out there.







But what happens now is this kind of thinking metastasizes
throughout the discipline because what students in International Relations or
Political Science more generally are taught are calculus, statistics—and I'm
not against this, one should learn them; I use them myself when I wear my
psychologist hat and do quantitative research and statistical analysis—but they
don't learn languages, they don't learn history, they don't learn philosophy.
They are so narrow! Much of this of course has to do with the reward structure
in the United States. It's clear that the statistical scientists are at the top
of the hill. So, economists transform themselves into scientists; but the
social scientists copy them because there are clear institutional rewards. If
you look at our salaries in comparison to the salaries of anthropologists,
historians—then if you sit at the edge of your chair and look over the abyss
you might see the humanists down there in terms of what they get. So very
clearly, there are strong institutional rewards. Once the positivist crowd got
a lock on various foundations and journals, if you want a job, if you want to
rise up through the profession, students tell me you have to do this stuff. IR
graduate students are bricklayers that get turned out of these universities.
That's the tragedy! It's no longer a serious intellectual enterprise. It's not
connected to anything terribly meaningful.







And mind you, I must say, while on the other, European, side
of the pond there is more diversity (one of the reasons I feel more comfortable
here), at the same time there is a strong tendency to go for a certain
heavy-handed brand of post-modernism. If you don't start an article with a
genuflection to Foucault or De Saussure or Derrida, you don't get published.
And by not looking beyond these 20th century thinkers, people in
Europe are often given credit for inventing things which were common knowledge
for hundreds and hundreds of years. Utterly ridiculous. But in between, there
are of course people who are trying to make sense of the world, including many
people in the positivist tradition who are doing good quantitative research and
trying to address serious problems in the world. The difficulty is that these
two extremes are often people who approach IR as a religion and they think that
their way of doing research is the only way
and they have no respect for others. And that's a kind of arrogance to which,
to me, is a violation of what the university is all about.







Ultimately, what is good theory? One approach would be to
say that a good theory is one that appears to order a domain in a way that is
conceptually rigorous - to the extent that that's even possible - that is
original and that raises a series of interesting questions which haven't been
asked before, but which are amenable to empirical research and finally it
should have normative implications. This is what Hans Morgenthau meant when he
said that the purpose of IR theory is not to justify what policymakers did, but
to educate them to act in ways that would lead to a better and more peaceful
world. And that, I think, is the ultimate goal of IR theory that we should not
lose sight of.











You
indicated that Isaiah Berlin was on your dissertation committee. He famously
tries to explain Tolstoy's philosophy of history (in War and Peace) through the parable of the hedgehog and the fox. If
theorists constraining themselves to one drive underpinning policy choices
would be hedgehogs, how would you see yourself? A fox or a hedgehog?







I am clearly a fox! I do different things. Whether I do them
well is debatable. But I certainly think that I'm a man of many tricks. Of
course the distinction also implies not believing in an overarching truth, and
indeed, I try hard not to think about truth because I don't think you can get
very far when you do. Epistemologically and eclectically, I'm a great believer
that we can never really establish a cause, truth, and knowledge. One of the
great problems here goes back to Plato who was shocked that craftsmen equated
technical ability to produce things with knowledge—Sofia, which is wisdom. And
today you have the problem one step up, so another category of knowledge for
the Greeks was episteme. Aristotle
would describe it as 'conceptual knowledge' or that which might even be
represented mathematically. And the people who would be 'expert' in episteme
think they have sofia and their claim
to being a hedgehog is the same kind of conceit, a form of hubris. Berlin's
distinction between hedgehogs and foxes is a very useful and nice concept to
play around with.







Yet it's a bit much to reduce Tolstoy to that tension. You
could do it as a game but it doesn't do much justice because there is so much
else in Tolstoy. He's tilting against the French historians of the 19th
century who have erected Napoleon into this strategic genius. And he does a
very convincing job of showing that what goes on on the battlefield has nothing
whatsoever to do with what Napoleon or anyone else who is wearing a general's
ebullience or theorists hat says. And also, and in this sense, one could see
him as the beginning of subaltern history of social science, he's telling the
story—admittedly about aristocrats, not commoners—but he's telling the story of
ordinary people on the battlefield, not the people making the decisions. So the
war is in a way a background to the lives of the people, focusing our attention
a very humanist way, on people. This, too, is revolutionary for his time.















Professor
Richard Ned Lebow Professor of International Political Theory at the Department
of War Studies, King's College London and James O. Freedman Presidential
Professor Emeritus at Dartmouth College. He is also a Bye-Fellow of
Pembroke College, University of Cambridge. He has taught strategy and the
National and Naval War Colleges and served as a scholar-in-residence in the
Central Intelligence Agency during the Carter administration. He has
authored and edited 28 books and nearly 200 peer reviewed articles.















Related
links








Read the
first chapter of Lebow's The Tragic
Vision of Politics (2003) here (pdf) 
Read
Lebow & Kelly's Thucydides and
Hegemony: Athens and the United States (Review of International Studies
2001), here (pdf) 
Read
Lebow's Deterrence and Reassurance:
Lessons from the Cold War (Global Dialogue 2001) here (pdf) 
Read
Lebow's The Long Peace, the End of the
Cold War, and the Failure of Realism (International Organization, 1994)
here (pdf) 
Read
Lebow's The Cuban Missile Crisis: Reading
the Lessons Correctly (Political Science Quarterly 1983) here (pdf) 



Print version of this Talk (pdf)