Suchergebnisse

I present a history of Kuhn's discovery of paradigms, one that takes account of the complexity of the discovery process. Rather than emerging fully formed in Structure, the concept paradigm emerged through a series of phases. Early criticism of Structure revealed that the role of paradigms was unclear. It was only as Kuhn responded to criticism that he finally articulated a precise understanding of the concept paradigm. In a series of publications in the 1970s, he settled on a conception of a paradigm as a concrete exemplar that functions as a guide to future research.

When stripped to the bare bone, there are only 11 foundational paradigms in social sciences. These foundational paradigms are like flashlights that can be utilized to shed light on different aspects of human society, but each of them can only shed light on a limited area of human society. Different schools in social science result from different but often incomplete combinations of these foundational paradigms. To adequately understand human society and its history, we need to deploy all 11 foundational paradigms, although more limited combinations of them may be adequate for understanding more specific social facts.

This Companion to the philosophy of science reflects fairly well the gloomy state of affairs in this subfield at its best—concerns, problems, prejudices, and all. The field is still stuck with the problem of justification of science, refusing to admit that there is neither need nor possibility to justify science and forbid dissent from it.

In his struggle to constitute sociology as a natural science, Durkheim fought against finalism, Gabriel Tarde's general project, efforts at theoretical synthesis unconnected to specific empirical problems, and ideological analysis. The article dwells on these four "epistemological battles," especially on Durkheim's (unfortunately failed) effort toward purging the social sciences from ideological analysis.

The paucity of literature on the economics of science renders this book valuable. Also, it includes a few interesting papers. Education and research may become more efficient, and their economic aspects want explanations. The explanations may offer suggestion for improvements. The discussions here are mostly unserious and the serious ones are not far-reaching.They concern patent laws more than seems reasonable and ignore many economic aspects of science, mainly its poor communication systems, including university presses, most of which are inept. Practical proposals should address the worst problems and their implementation need repeated checking. For this, they must be transparent and democratically controlled. The book totally ignores all this.

Contemporary cognitive psychology is dominated by an individualistic and mentalistic approach to the mind.This Cartesian heritage is evident in studies of social understanding, that is, how we understand others. It is argued that this approach and metaphors like reading minds have failed, and should be replaced with a discursive approach, where public and shared socio-linguistic intenand normative activities order and shape individual mental activities.

In this book, Ronald Giere seeks to resolve the opposition between objectivism and constructivism by suggesting a third way, perspectival realism, according to which both sides are partly right. To prove his case, Giere reconstructs some of the acknowledged puzzle pieces in the philosophy of science (theory, observation, etc.). To my mind, of most interest is the piece Giere calls "representional model." Constituting the basis of every science, it functions as a template that governs data collection as well as theory development. Throughout the book, Giere illustrates his various propositions with examples taken from the natural sciences. I contend that the propositions are just as relevant for the social sciences and present some examples in order to indicate this. Especially, the concept of model is useful both for a better understanding of social science and for increasing its cumulativity.

Hutchinson, Read, and Sharrock have provided an important analysis of the work of Peter Winch. They succeed in rescuing his philosophy from many of the distorting characterizations and categorizations to which it has been subjected, and they provide a fresh account of its relevance for thinking about the theory and practice of social science.

Kroeber's "The Superorganic" (1917) stands as the first extreme statement of cultural holism. Some have compared it to Durkheim, the majority to Boas; some have denied any evolutionary message, others read in it a theory of "emergent evolution" arising from his transcendental holism. What was it, exactly? When understood as part of a trilogy comprising two other articles (one from 1915, the other from 1919), it emerged that his extreme brand of cultural holism was a necessary tool to carry out a relatively hidden evolutionary agenda. This led me to rethink his evolutionism, to deny that he was a cultural determinist, to understand this part of his anthropology in terms of "epistemological obstacles" (Bachelard 1938), and show that it reemerges in Appadurai's understanding of globalization (1996).

Raimo Tuomola has complained that my critical review of his The Philosophy of Sociality is superficial, that I have not presented, even that I have misrepresented his work, and that I have neglected its virtues, which others have praised. I reject his complaint about the content of my review as unwarranted in an open society, as he demands that I take his work on his own terms. I defend my view of the place of his work in the analytic tradition, my analysis of his work as essentialist and not explanatory, my argument that his analytic method is weak, and my appraisal that the framework he offers for current social scientific research is not needed and not very useful.

The paper is a response to some critical points and omissions in John Wettersten's review of my recent book The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View (Oxford University Press, 2007). I point out in this short paper that the reviewer has not discussed the most central notions in the book relating to its "we-mode" approach, i.e. collective acceptance, group reasons, the collectivity condition, collective commitment and their role in accounting for e.g. cooperation, social institutions, cultural evolution. I also clarify the ontological commitments of my broadly naturalistic approach and show e.g. that we-mode social groups do exist as social systems but not a full-blown collective agents, although it is conceptually and instrumentally central to view them as collective agents. Also questions of we-mode versus I-mode explanations of collective action are considered in the paper.

Nancy Cartwright claims that "Causality is a hot topic today both in philosophy and economics." She may be right about philosophers, but not when it comes to economists. Cartwright talks about "economics" but nothing she says about it corresponds to what is taught in economics classes. Today, economics is dominated by model builders—but not all models involve econometrics. While all model builders do respect an endogenous-exogenous distinction between variables, this distinction will not be on the basis of which type of variable "causes" which, but on which variables are "determined" (and hence explained) by the model and those which are not.

In his early experimental work with Suppes, Davidson adopted rationality assumptions, not as necessary constraints on interpretation, but as practical conceits in addressing methodological problems faced by experimenters studying decision making under uncertainty. Although the content of their theory has since been undermined, their methodological approach—a Galilean form of methodological rationalism—lives on in contemporary psychological research.This article draws on Max Weber's verstehen to articulate an account of Galilean methodological rationalism; explains how anomalies faced by Davidson's early experimental work gave rise to his later, canonical claims about rationality and interpretation; and reclaims this Galilean framework for use in contemporary psychological research.

Deliberative democratic theorists typically use accounts of public reason— that is, constraints on the types of reasons one can invoke in public, political discourse—as a tool to resist political exclusion; at its most basic level, the aim of a theory of public reason is to prevent situations in which powerful majority groups are able to justify policy choices based on reasons that are not even assessable by minority groups. However, I demonstrate here that a type of exclusion I call "conceptual exclusion" complicates this picture. I argue that the possibility of conceptual exclusion creates the potential for public reason constraints to further exclude already marginalized groups— contrary to the standard view—and thus that taking conceptual exclusion seriously requires both a revision of traditional accounts of public reason and a reconceptualization of our civic obligations.