Suchergebnisse

The theory of issue evolution predicts that the dimensional space of party competition is simple. We contrast this prediction with the expectation that a complicated multi-party system, such as the one in France, produces a more complicated dimensional structure. To test this claim, we examine the longitudinal structure of the policy preferences that underlie public opinion in France. Using surveys of preferences as a basic data source, we are able to extract two latent dimensions that almost fully explain the reported preferences. Both dimensions are defined by the left–right structure of the French party system. Whereas one is the traditional socioeconomic domain, the other comprises a wide array of new cultural issues. The orthogonal solution, however, does not produce the expected socioeconomic and cultural dimensions. Thus we impose our prior belief in the socioeconomic and cultural content and rotate the two dimensions independently to maximize fit with the two prior dimensions. We show that the same two-dimensional structure is also present in cross-sectional data, and can be used to position parties in the two-dimensional space. Moreover, we find that the two dimensions are closely connected, despite their completely different content. The explanation, which arises from the theory of issue evolution, is that the meaning of left–right is dynamic as well as elastic and incorporates new issues as they arise.

The literature on new modes of governance suffers from a gap between the normative and the positive approaches to legitimacy. This article addresses this gap by studying the patterns of national stakeholders' support for the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). The results of our survey demonstrate that the OMC receives greater support than previously assumed and that the support of national stakeholders is largely associated with their involvement in national procedures. These findings corroborate the assumptions of normative theories of participatory democracy about the importance of involvement. Furthermore, the study's findings underline the pivotal role that national stakeholders play regarding matters of legitimacy in the EU's multi-level system of governance.

This article examines the political economy of selective immigration policy in a model where decision makers are uncertain about the characteristics of migrants. The analysis focuses on two questions: first, how does a selective immigration policy affect the number of immigrants who are admitted by the receiving country; second, how does a selective immigration policy in one country affect immigration policies in other countries. We find (i) that countries with selective immigration policies ceteris paribus tend to admit more migrants than countries without such policies, and (ii) that neighbouring countries will follow each other in implementing selective immigration policies, i.e. there is diffusion. These theoretical findings are supported by evidence from an econometric panel analysis of immigration policies in 15 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in the period from 1980 to 2005. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]