Sexual Harassment and Wrongful Communication
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 31, Heft 4, S. 525-537
ISSN: 1552-7441
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In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 31, Heft 4, S. 525-537
ISSN: 1552-7441
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 31, Heft 4, S. 459-487
ISSN: 1552-7441
This analysis examines fundamental questions at the intersection of social science and social technology as well as problems of disciplinary divisions and the challenge of cross-disciplinary cooperation. Its theoretical-empirical context is provided by post-communist transformations, a set of profound societal changes in which institutional design plays a central role. The article critically reappraises the contribution of Karl Popper's philosophy to this problem context, examines neoliberalism as social science and social technology, and examines the role of experts and disciplinary divisions in the reform process. Building on Mario Bunge's social philosophy, it sketches basic elements of a cross-disciplinary approach to "social change by design."
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 279-301
ISSN: 1552-7441
This article deals with two aspects of psychoanalytic history. The first is the history of ideas, specifically the notions of a one- and two-person psychology that are in such wide use today. Second, the authors attend, much more critically, to a disturbance of memory (repeated distortion, omission, selective representation, and misrepresentation) that has accompanied scholarly discussion of these ideas for the past 50 years. Finally, the authors attempt to restore the original meaning of the person-psychology concept and illustrate its relevance for contemporary psychoanalytic debate.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 404-423
ISSN: 1552-7441
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 395-403
ISSN: 1552-7441
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 424-453
ISSN: 1552-7441
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 386-394
ISSN: 1552-7441
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 361-385
ISSN: 1552-7441
This article is a defense of Michael Ruse's sociobiological account of the origins and nature of morality. In the piece, the author provides a summary explanation of Ruse's views and arguments. Then he goes on to explain and critically discuss a variety of objections that have been made against sociobiological accounts of morality. He argues that the criticisms that have been made often work against less sophisticated sociobiological theories but that Ruse's theory is immune to the criticisms. The author responds to the arguments of the following critics of sociobiology: Kitcher, Flew, Flanagan, Nagel, Miles, Singer, and Jacquette.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 323-360
ISSN: 1552-7441
In this article, the author argues that complexity theories have limited use in the study of society, and that social processes are too complex and particular to be rigorously modeled in complexity terms. Theories of social complexity are shown to be inadequately developed, and typical weaknesses in the literature on social complexity are discussed. Two stronger analyses, of Luhmann and of Harvey and Reed, are also critically considered. New considerations regarding social complexity are advanced, on the lines that simplicity, complexity that can be modeled, and incondensible complexity permeate society simultaneously. The difficulty of establishing complexity models for processes involving ongoing interpretation is discussed. It is argued that the notions of system and environment need recasting in social studies. Existing social studies and literature, it is argued, reflect a polymorphous, contextual, contingent, labyrinthine, dramatic and political face to social complexity. Students of social complexity must be literate in such studies.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 302-322
ISSN: 1552-7441
In this article, Thomas Kuhn's theory of incommensurable paradigms learned through exemplars is discussed as a theory of acculturation akin to those of cultural anthropology. Yet his hermeneutic approach results in a classic problem, referred to here as the paradox of objective relativism. A solution, at least for observers of contemporary cultures, is drawn from Kuhn's own writings: a fieldwork method of "going native." It is argued that Kuhn's views are as important a corrective for anthropologists studying native systems of knowledge as they have been for philosophers and sociologists of science. The epistemological and disciplinary implications of such a methodology are discussed.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 267-274
ISSN: 1552-7441
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 139-162
ISSN: 1552-7441
In a series of recent works, Ian Hacking has produced a model of social causation in mental illness and begun to sketch in outline how this might be integrated with the medical model of psychiatry. This article elaborates and revises Hacking's model of social forces, criticizes him for attempting a merely semantic resolution of the tension between the social and the biological, and sketches an alternative approach that builds upon his substantial insights.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 252-253
ISSN: 1552-7441
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 163-186
ISSN: 1552-7441
One branch of Alvin Goldman's proposed "scientific epistemology" is devoted to the scientific study of how folk epistemic evaluators acquire and deploy the concepts of knowledge and justified belief. The author argues that such a "descriptive epistemology," as Goldman calls it, requires a more sophisticated theory of interpretation than is provided by the simulation theory Goldman adopts. The author also argues that any adequate account of folk epistemic concepts must reconstruct the intersubjective conceptual roles those concepts play in discursive practices. In other words, descriptive epistemology also requires a theory of communicative action and an account of the practical abilities agents must have to engage in discursive practices.
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 224-238
ISSN: 1552-7441
In this article, the author focuses on Philip Kitcher's and Alvin Goldman's economic models of the social character of scientific knowledge production. After introducing some relevant methodological issues in the social sciences and characterizing Kitcher's and Goldman's models, the author goes on to show that special problems arise directly from the concept of an agent invoked in the models. The author argues that the two distinct concepts of agents, borrowed from economics and cognitive psychology, are inconsistent. Finally, the author discusses some of the normative implications that arise from adopting economic concepts of agents in the study of science.