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This article examines the relationship between the classical Marxist tradition and the conceptual roots of totalitarianism. Here totalitarianism is understood to entail the attempt to frame the developmental impulses of modernity within the logic of a premodern political imaginary—defined as internally homogenous and transparent to itself. In the first part, we take issue with those who try to distinguish between the thought of Marx and Engels, and who insist that it is only in Engels's thought that the traces of a totalitarian politics might be found. In the second section, we outline briefly the context within which Marx's thought was developed, after which we argue that Marx's vision of communism is dependent on the three-phase vision of historical process which he inherited from Hegel. Without denying the historical peculiarities of the imposition of communism in Russia, we conclude that it is out of this latter vision of history that the conceptual roots of totalitarianism must be located.

This article examines critically Popper's arguments for a "unity of method" between natural science and social science. It discusses Popper's writings on the goals of science, the objects of scientific inquiry, the logic of scientific method, and the value of objectivity The major argument is that, despite his unifying intention, Popper himself provides good reasons for treating the two sciences differently. Popper proposes that social scientists follow a number of rules that are not required for, and that have no direct equivalent in, natural science. For most of the cases examined here, these requirements are not simply marginal amendments to a basic methodological core; they are essentially moral or ethical in character and mark out a radically different intellectual and political enter prise. From this perspective, much of Popper's work on social science method ology has the character of an ethical treatise. It is argued further that Popper's accounts of the differences between natural and social science, and his call for moral responsibility, are based largely upon his understanding of the distinctive political threat that social science poses for the conduct of critical reason.

While the ethics and the sociology of The Open Society can stand up to criticism after 50 years, it is argued that Popper's thesis that closed societies are prompted and promoted by "historicism" cannot. Moreover, Popper's conceptions of "historicism" and of "developmental law" are based on a misunderstanding of our knowledge of history, the practice of historical writing, and the discipline of sociology. In conclusion there is an attempt to explain why, of all people Popper ever criticized for their historicism, Darwin alone was singled out by him for exoneration.

Popper's view of the enemies of the open society is held to rest upon psycholo gism, a view of the very great dangers of misguided intellectuals, and a cyclical view of historical process. While there is something to these claims, they are treated here skeptically. But the purpose of the article is less to attack than to reconstruct. To that end, key elements of a sociology appropriate to an open society are offered.