Suchergebnisse

Abstract
The re-adoption of trial by jury in Russia in 1993 was heralded as a significant break with the discredited legal system of a crumbling regime. However, in less than twenty years the jury in Russian criminal trials has been significantly undermined; that process is particularly evident in the field of counterterrorism. This article examines the history of trial by jury in Russia, the constitutional and legislative provisions adopted in the 1990s, and the rolling back of these provisions in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Given the adoption of jury trial in a number of democracies in the early 1990s the underlying causes of the rapid Russian retrenchment are of significance beyond the Rus­sian Federation. The jury was not a legal transplant in Russia and it was hoped that conditions were fertile for the jury to flourish. This has not proven to be the case: Russian jury trial may have a long history but it has shallow roots.

Citizens deserve to know, and in some cases need to know, what their governments — including their courts — are up to. Governments like to be able to, and in some situations need to be able to, gather information about what "the governed" are up to. In recent times the fear generated by an unknown enemy with unknown resources rightly leaves state authorities anxious to preserve whatever advantage they might enjoy in combating terror. at the end of the day the test of a democratic legal system is not whether it permits secret proceedings, or gives the state the power to discover private information: obviously for any sovereign authority to function in a meaningful way it must be able do these things, at least some of the time. Our focus should be on the procedures in place to require the justification of these two departures from the (unattainable) democratic ideal of the perfectly unintrusive, transparent state I tend to the view that the Supreme Court of Canada has, by and large, struck an appropriate balance in matters related to the flow of information between and about state and individual. The judgments in Tessling and Mann are consistent with the Court's previous jurisprudence and continue to approach issues of privacy and search in a principled, responsible manner. Section 8 guarantees only a reasonable expectation of privacy, a standard which requires an internal balancing of the state's interest in the prompt and expeditious investigation of crime against the democratic ideal of an unintrusive government. Too broad a reading of reasonable expectation of privacy runs the risk of creating excessive and unnecessary hurdles to investigations without any significantly increasing the scope of democratically meaningful privacy.

In the article under consideration, the author proves facts in a number of scientific provisions that are important for the practice of criminal law. After analyzing the scientific works on this issue, it was proved, that the study of the principle of equality is relevant given the distorted understanding of the principle in Ukraine. The article proves the thesis about the role of the principle of equality before the criminal law during the crime qualification. They can be described by the following provisions: 1) compliance with the rules of criminal law qualification of the act and application them to persons regardless of their racial, national, social origin, religion, social or political views, professional status, etc .; 2) at the same time, law enforcement bodies during the criminal-legal qualification must take into account both the objective, legal differences of the persons, whose action is qualified, and the individual characteristics of the act itself. Such consideration of objective differences requires «differentia equality». Violations of the principle of equality before the criminal law will be errors or abuses of law enforcement agencies. Such errors or abuses are of two types: 1) different criminal-legal qualification of the act in the case of similar legal situations; 2) the same criminal-legal qualification of the act in the case of different legal situations; 3) ignoring the features that have legal significance for the qualification. These errors or abuses can be considered a violation of the principle of equality before the criminal law only if they discriminate against certain categories of subjects on certain grounds. Therefore, not any errors or abuses in qualifications can be considered a violation of the principle of equality before the criminal law, but only discriminatory. Such errors are unintentional. Instead, abuse is always intentional, often due to non-legal material factors

This article is encouraging this problem solving with finding and analyzing the formulation of the criminal offense criteria to punishable by death in Indonesian criminal law and reformulation of setting the criminal offender measurement that sentenced to death from the perspective of ius constituendum. The article based on normative legal research by examining primary and secondary legal materials by collecting legal-materials using a card system. The analytical approach uses legislation, concepts, and comparisons. The research analysis was present in the form of descriptive analysis with evaluative, systematic, formulating, and argumentative techniques in this article. The results of this research that conducted are the Indonesian criminal law does not regulate the criminal act criteria that punishable by death so that the execution of the death penalty results in injustice to both the perpetrator, the victim, and the community. The reformulation of Indonesian criminal law shall focus on the objectives and guidelines for the punishment of perpetrators of criminal offenses punishable by death refers to the Draft Criminal Code and the involvement of the victim and the community in their interests if in the execution of capital punishment there is a change to imprisonment or life imprisonment

Primary resources: Federal statutes; Federal regulations; Federal agencies; Federal case law; State laws/regulations; State agencies/commissions -- Secondary resources: American law reports; Legal encyclopedias; Wikipedia; Congressional Research Service; Organizations, blogs, and websites; Legal publications, law journals & books; Law school and library databases; Westlaw; Handbooks, guides & compliance reports.

Setting the framework for the protection of the environment through criminal law at the EC level ultimately leads to the adoption of Directive 2008/99/EC of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the environment through criminal law. The Directive establishes a minimum set of conducts that should be considered criminal offences throughout the EU when unlawful and committed intentionally (or with at least serious negligence). Inciting, aiding and abetting of such conducts will equally be considered a criminal offence. Directive 2008/99/EC must be implemented by Member States by 26 December 2010. Its adoption has been a debated and lengthy process. These debates occurred at the EU level (institutional conflict) and member state level, and were reflected into the legal scholars work. These debates concerned not as much the specific content of the Directive, but the institutional framework and in particular the use made of criminal law provisions in a first pillar legal instrument, as opposed to the normal use for these purposes of instruments provided for in the third pillar of the EU (police and judicial cooperation on criminal matters). The Directive, therefore, seemingly deviates from the general rule that "neither criminal law nor the rules of criminal procedure fall within the Community's competence". The Directive follows a Court of Justice's decision of 13 September 2005 (Case C176/03) to annul an EU Framework Decision on the protection of the environment on the grounds that it had been adopted on an erroneous legal basis. In its decision the Court upheld the Commission's submission, holding that the Commission may take measures in relation to the Member States' criminal law where the application of criminal penalties is an essential measure for combating serious environmental offences. Hence, a Directive, a first pillar instrument, including criminal law provisions could be adopted. This article discusses the Directive's institutional background and looks at the criminal law provisions in the Directive. It ends with a critical note on the presumed impact of the Directive.

This innovative text is shows how there has been a concerted effort, since the end of World War I, to curb a state's power and freedom of action through the concept of international accountability to a set of recognized rules and norms. A state not only is to adhere to these rules but also can be sanctioned by an international penal process through enforcement of international criminal law. Adoption of the Rome Statute and the creation of the International Criminal Court are the culmination of many years of effort to challenge the power of state action. Scholars and students of international law with an interest in international criminal law will find this volume an interesting narrative of how the developments of international penal mechanisms of the 20th century have contributed to a diminution of state sovereignty. Published under the Transnational Publishers imprint

Since David Luban's is the work on legal ethics that I admire and agree with most, there is an element of perversity in my vehement critique of his arguments on criminal defense. I am therefore especially thankful for his gracious and thoughtful response. Nevertheless, I remain convinced that Luban is mistaken in excepting criminal defense from much of the responsibility to substantive justice that we both think appropriate in every other sphere of lawyering.

Considering the important role of historical, cultural, social, and attitudinal aspects in the study of law, there has been a shift from instrumental law to constitutive law. While instrumental law considers law beyond the social and cultural spheres, constitutive law integrally embraces law, politics, ideology, and action. Legal consciousness is an important asset for marginalised people who are at high risk of discriminative treatments in occupational and social life. Not only will they are legally aware of their rights and obligations at works, they will have adequate knowledge of where and how to name, blame, and claim in case mistreatment do occur. Legally proficient will allow them build legal protection which is not adequately provided by the authorized bodies.

The legality principle characterizes all western legal systems, and it has become an integral part of the Western rule of law and the international human rights law. The principle dates back to enlightened jurists such as Cesare Beccaria and to social contract thinkers such as Charles de Secondat de Montesquieu, according to whom judges were to act only as the mouthpiece of the statutory law. Paul Johann Anselm von Feuerbach, the inventor of the famous maxim ›nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege‹, developed these thoughts further. The emergence of the legality principle links closely to the teachings on the division of powers. The studies of this volume cover most of Europe from England, Italy and Spain to Sweden, Russia and England, and both the South and North American continents. In most parts of Europe, the nineteenth-century criminal law reforms form an integral part of the ›liberal‹ agenda. These changes took place, however, at different times in different parts of the Western world, and for slightly different reasons. Comparative legal history shows, furthermore, that the roots of the principle date much further back in history than the eighteenth century. Before the formulation of the legality principle, written statutes already played a significant role in the criminal law in many parts of the Western world. The articles of the volume, written by the foremost experts on comparative legal history, demonstrate that the attitudes and practices toward written statutes as sources of criminal law varied greatly from one region to another. In most parts of the European continent judicial arbitration was carefully defined in legal scholarship (Italy, France), whereas in some regions written law played an important role from early on (Sweden). Although the nineteenth century was fundamental in shaping the legality principle, in some countries its breakthrough remained even then far from complete (Russia, the United States). / The legality principle characterizes all western legal systems, and it has become an integral part of the Western rule of law and the international human rights law. The principle dates back to enlightened jurists such as Cesare Beccaria and to social contract thinkers such as Charles de Secondat de Montesquieu, according to whom judges were to act only as the mouthpiece of the statutory law. Paul Johann Anselm von Feuerbach, the inventor of the famous maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, developed these thoughts further. The emergence of the legality principle links closely to the teachings on the division of powers. The studies of this volume cover most of Europe from England, Italy and Spain to Sweden, Russia and England, and both the South and North American continents. In most parts of Europe, the nineteenth-century criminal law reforms form an integral part of the ›liberal‹ agenda. These changes took place, however, at different times in different parts of the Western world, and for slightly different reasons. Comparative legal history shows, furthermore, that the roots of the principle date much further back in history than the eighteenth century. Before the formulation of the legality principle, written statutes already played a significant role in the criminal law in many parts of the Western world. The articles of the volume, written by the foremost experts on comparative legal history, demonstrate that the attitudes and practices toward written statutes as sources of criminal law varied greatly from one region to another. In most parts of the European continent judicial arbitration was carefully defined in legal scholarship (Italy, France), whereas in some regions written law played an important role from early on (Sweden). Although the nineteenth century was fundamental in shaping the legality principle, in some countries its breakthrough remained even then far from complete (Russia, the United States).