Suchergebnisse

This essay attempts to clarify certain notions that the author finds useful for the discussion of relativism and then to show what kinds of relativism about values, rationality, and truth are and are not coherent.

Accounts of normal appearances in Goffman's Stigma and Garfinkel's "Passing and the Managed Achievement of Sex Status in an Intersexed Person" are compared. It is found that in these two classic interactionist texts the formulation of stigma requires the production of normal appearances that occlude interactants' selves. In effect, selves are stigmatized. The essay reads Goffman and Garfinkel in terms of each other, and in certain emergent paradoxes rediscovers the missing (stigmatized) selves.

Michel Foucault's genealogies, due to their reliance on Nietzschean accounts of the violent origins of human culture, present a problematic description of the emergence of patterns of resistance and domination. By creating a parallel fiction of emergence that replaces Nietzschean originary violence with Richard Dawkins's account of the centrality of cultural transmission in human survival we can release emergence from the unitary Foucauldian drama. It is then possible to reconstruct Foucault's genealogies, anchoring the will to knowledge in an active agent dedicated to the transgression of sociocultural limits.

Many methodologists are firmly convinced that Popper's arguments concerning the status of the rationality principle (RP) are incoherent or incompatible with the essentials of falsificationism. The present essay first shows that the accusation of incompatibility of situational logic with falsificationism does not hold up to scrutiny but then shows that Popper's arguments are nonetheless flimsy if not indefensible. For it seems that one can distinguish between two different versions of the RP in Popper's writings. If the first version is plainly "objectivist" and can be characterized with Popper as empirically false, the second one is rather "subjectivist" and is not falsifiable as such. The essay shows that this second reading of the RP is the one that Popper finally adopts but that, unfortunately enough, this formulation of the RP looks more like a metaphysical statement than like an empirical law. It could then be held to be a priori valid as such, by analogy with Popper's line of argument concerning the principle of causality. If this is correct, then Popper's thesis on the empirical status of the RP is confuted.