Suchergebnisse

The ending of pregnancy is an issue that keeps attracting great attention even today, at the beginning of the 21st century. Since the 1970s, abortion legislation has moved steadily towards liberalization, especially in developed countries around the world. In Europe, only a few countries still prohibit abortion on request. Yet neither the current legislation nor the relevant case law of supreme and constitutional courts have brought about consensus on the justification thereof. An exceptionally delicate matter made so by a wealth of moral, ethical, philosophical, medical, religious, economic, legal and other aspects, abortion is a bone of contention in the general public and many an expert community. The reasoning provided in constitutional reviews of law is lambasted in equal measure by the pro-choice and the pro-life camps, the latter of which are felt in presence and influence despite the ever-growing liberalization. The paper primarily examines the matter of abortion in comparative and Croatian constitutional law and legislation from the perspective of human rights.

The ending of pregnancy is an issue that keeps attracting great attention even today, at the beginning of the 21st century. Since the 1970s, abortion legislation has moved steadily towards liberalization, especially in developed countries around the world. In Europe, only a few countries still prohibit abortion on request. Yet neither the current legislation nor the relevant case law of supreme and constitutional courts have brought about consensus on the justification thereof. An exceptionally delicate matter made so by a wealth of moral, ethical, philosophical, medical, religious, economic, legal and other aspects, abortion is a bone of contention in the general public and many an expert community. The reasoning provided in constitutional reviews of law is lambasted in equal measure by the pro-choice and the pro-life camps, the latter of which are felt in presence and influence despite the ever-growing liberalization. The paper primarily examines the matter of abortion in comparative and Croatian constitutional law and legislation from the perspective of human rights.

The problems raised in the doctrine of constitutional law related to the implementation of a decision taken in a referendum in matters of particular importance to the state, as well as the generally marginal use of the institution of popular vote in the constitutional prac-tice, give rise to reflection on the introduction of the institution of a referendum law into the Polish constitutional system. In this article the author considers the advantages and disadvantages of such a solution, analyzing at the same time contemporary normative regulations concerning such acts in other countries. The research leads to the conclusion that despite the risks involved, the refer-endum law should appear in the Polish constitutional system in the future, as it would not only give a chance for a more complete reflection of the will of the collective subject of sovereignty without the necessity of its decoding by the parliament, but it could also be an impulse for the development of the referendum practice in the Republic of Poland. However, it is important to introduce proce-dural barriers that will prevent depreciation of this institution.

The author states that constitutional law is a profiling branch of Ukrainian law, and therefore hardly any sectoral study – both constitutional and legal, and conducted within another field – is possible without recourse to the provisions of constitutional law, without the development of experts on constitutional law. A study of the legal status of religious organizations is no exception. In this regard, the article emphasizes the fact that the issue of the constitutional (constitutional and legal) status of religious organizations in Ukraine since independence has hardly been analyzed. Also, in the Ukrainian legal literature it is impossible to find the concept of the term "constitutional status of religious organizations". It is emphasized that the development in this direction is an important scientific task, given that an important practical task is to further improve the constitutional legislation in this area. It is proved that traditionally in the Ukrainian legal literature not a lot of attention is paid the problem of religious organizations. This is especially true, when it comes about the constitutional researches. The author proposes to connect this with the fact that for a long time the constitutions (especially the Soviet ones) did not reflect the problems of the church and religion at all. Relevant provisions of the Constitutions of the Ukrainian SSR of 1919, 1929, 1938 and 1978 are given as arguments. Using the hermeneutic method, author analyzes which elements together characterize the constitutional status of religious organizations in Ukraine and on the basis of generalizations proposed definition of the concept of "constitutional status of religious organizations in Ukraine" – established by constitutional legislation rights,obligations and legal liability of the religious communities, administrations and centers, monasteries, religious fraternities, missionary societies (missions), theological educational institutions, as well as associations consisting of the above-mentioned religious organizations. ; Автор констатує, що конституційне право є профілюючою галуззю права України, а тому навряд чи будь-яке галузеве дослідження – як конституційно-правове, так і таке, що проводиться в межах іншої галузі – є можливим без звернення до положень конституційного законодавства, без розробок фахівців з конституційного права. Не є виключенням і дослідження правового статусу релігійних організацій. У зв'язку з цим, у статті наголошується на тому факті, що питання конституційного (конституційно-правового) статусу релігійних організацій в Україні за часів незалежності майже не аналізувались. А також в українській юридичній літературі неможливо знайти поняття терміну «конституційний статус релігійних організацій». Підкреслено, що розробки у цьому напрямі є важливим науковим завданням з огляду на те, що важливим практичним завданням є подальше удосконалення конституційного законодавства у цій сфері. Доведено, що традиційно в українській юридичній літературі проблематиці релігійних організацій приділяється небагато уваги. Особливо це стосується конституційно-правових досліджень. Автор пропонує пов'язати це з тим, що протягом тривалого часу конституції (насамперед, радянські) майже взагалі не відображали проблематику церкви, та релігії. В якості аргументів наводяться відповідні положення КонституційУРСР 1919 р., 1929 р., 1938 р. та 1978 р. За допомогою герменевтичного методу проаналізовано, які елементи у сукупності характеризують конституційний статус релігійних організацій в Україні та на підставі проведених узагальнень запропоновано визначення поняття «конституційний статус релігійних організацій в Україні» – це встановлені положеннями конституційного законодавства права, обов'язки та юридична відповідальність релігійних громад, поза залежності від наявності або відсутності у них державної реєстрації, управлінь і центрів, монастирів, релігійних братств, місіонерських товариств (місій), духовних навчальних закладів, а також об'єднань, що складаються з вищезазначених релігійних організацій.

In this article we map the history of important changes in Australian legal education over the past 20 years, with a focus on the influence of the profession on legal education. Using Thornton's account of contemporary law schools 'jettisoning the critical' as a starting point we sketch out a vision of legal education that retains a strong focus on critical thinking. We also ask what spaces for critical pedagogy might be created and argue that even in the context of current constraints it is possible for legal academics to teach in ways that are consonant with their values and pedagogical philosophies. As evidence of this, we set out some of the ways that we are undertaking this project in our own compulsory and elective courses at the Adelaide Law School.

The ancient Roman legal maxim ubi ius remedium reminds us that the law provides many types of remedy for the breach of legal wrongs, including an inherent power of superior courts, in some situations, to fashion novel remedies where existing ones are inadequate to redress particular violations of rights. In this sense, and despite the strict conditions required by Article 230 EC, the ECJ has sometimes in the past accepted the standing of applicants in the name of the principle of effective judicial protection. This is exactly like the English common-law tradition, where the law does not provide a means of enforcing a right, equity will. However, we wonder if the Court's propensity to safeguard the fundamental principles of the Community legal order continues to have the same validity today in light of recent developments. Whereas the CFI and several AG pronounced in favour of a radical jurisprudential change by means of opening individual access to Community Courts, the ECJ – in the UPA and Jégo-Quéré cases – pronounced in favour of maintaining the traditional interpretation of person particularly affected, although, at the same time, inviting Member States to reflect upon the possibility of modifying the Treaty. This reflection has led to the introduction in the Constitution of a minimalist reform which will barely alter the position of the individual. The question arises, firstly, if this resistance to provide an essential change in the Constitution is really an issue of legal subsidiarity and, secondly, if the current interpretation really satisfies the essential requirements of the principle of effective judicial protection.

Heuristic techniques can serve to develop scientific research in constitutional justice. We argue that the practical knowledge of Law's application, also Constitutional one, will be more precise if in the scientific research we start, first of all, with the empirical study of case law, to complement it, secondly, with constitutional literature. We also present, as an example, an approach to democratic principles in the Spanish constitutional doctrine, using heuristic techniques. ; Las técnicas heurísticas pueden servir al desarrollo de la investigación científica en Justicia Constitucional. Aquí se defiende que el conocimiento práctico del funcionamiento del Derecho, tal y como se aplica, también del propio derecho constitucional, será más preciso si en la investigación partimos, en primer lugar, del estudio empírico de la jurisprudencia, para complementarlo, en segundo lugar, con la dogmática constitucional. Se pone como ejemplo práctico una aproximación a los principios democráticos en la doctrina constitucional española utilizando técnicas heurísticas.

The article presents an analysis of the political value and social purpose of constitutions as a result of the historical evolution of states and a method of fixing the prospects for political and social development. In particular, questions are raised about the nature of the constitutional act in autocratic states and its social perception. The constitutional characteristics of the constitutional state of rights and justice and social state are subjected to detailed analysis, and their significance is assessed either, in first, as a principle, as a supreme value or a nationwide idea of political development or, in second, as a constitutional legal norm. The author draws attention to the fact that differently formulated constitutional provisions do not give rise to conceptual differences in the law-constitutional practice of states. It has also been noted that not every state that realistically and routinely ensures the rule of law and recognizes the inherent duty of the state to guarantee unconditional basic income as a guarantee of a decent life for citizens, is determined itself constitutional state of rights and justice and social state in its constitution. An important indicator of progressive political and legal development the author sees in the stability of the constitution and legislation. The author believes that there are much more legal grounds for describing the state as constitutional state of rights and justice and social state in constitutions in the form of principles - organizational ideas for creating appropriate conditions, and not as constitutional norms ; В статье представлен анализ политической ценности и социального назначения конституций как результата исторической эволюции государств и способа фиксации перспектив политического и общественного развития. В частности, ставятся вопросы о сущности конституционного акта в автократических государствах и о его социальном восприятии. Обстоятельному разбору подвергаются конституционные характеристики правового и социального государства, и оценивается их значение либо как принципа, высшей ценности или национальной идеи политического развития, либо как конституционной юридической нормы. Автор обращает внимание на то, что по-разному формулируемые конституционные положения в целом не порождают в конституционно-правовой практике государств отличий концептуального свойства. Замечено также, что не всякое государство, которое реально и повседневно обеспечивает верховенство закона и признает имманентной обязанностью государства гарантирование безусловного базового дохода как гарантии достойной жизни граждан, проявляет стремление именовать себя в собственной конституции правовым и социальным. Немаловажный показатель прогрессивного политико-правового развития автор видит в устойчивости конституции и законодательства государства. Автор считает, что имеется гораздо больше юридических оснований характеристики государства как правового и социального фиксировать в конституциях как принципы – организационные идеи для создания соответствующих условий, а не как конституционные нормы

As we gather at this Symposium to probe the definition of democracy in the coming century, it seems fitting to note that we are continuing a very old political conversation rather than initiating a new one. The meaning of democracy has long been contested. One of the most vexing aspects of the debate has always centered on whether and how to limit the majority's prerogative to act in ways that disadvantage minorities. Viewed from a different angle, the question is how to configure the relationship between majority preferences and equality norms. It is the basic dilemma of democratic equality: What kind and measure of equality does democracy require? Formal political equality alone? Social, economic, or cultural equality as an aspect of political equality? On what basis? Although a topic of lively debate among political theorists, these questions by no means constitute a purely academic exercise. Constitutional law regularly enters this debate as courts confront laws that reflect, create, or entrench social inequality, by which I mean group-based social subordination, stigmatization, or disadvantage. When courts decide whether majoritarian laws of this kind violate constitutional equality norms, judges necessarily-if only tacitly-join the enterprise of negotiating the relationship between democracy and social equality. Cases involving a range of constitutional provisions might be understood to pit democracy and social equality against one another, though none quite as conspicuously as equal protection cases. At least since the appearance of the famous footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products Co., the intersection of democracy and social equality has been a controversial one in constitutional law, and its contours remain unsettled. Footnote four's vision of democratic equality has gone largely unrealized. And, apart from scattered assertions by various justices simply pronouncing democracy to be inconsistent with discrimination without explaining why, the Supreme Court has never elaborated a clear ...