The right to a good and healthy environment is one of the human rights which has been regulated in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia as a state constitution. As a constitutional mandate, the government has ratified several laws and regulations relating to the management and preservation of the environment. The ability of the state to enforce laws relating to the environment has not been carried out optimally. The type of research used in this study is qualitative which seeks to uncover and analyze how law enforcement for environmental damage in the fulfillment of human rights. This type of research is normative research. The results of the study show that not fulfilling the right to a healthy environment is a violation of human rights, so the state needs to enforce the law in order to protect and fulfill the rights to the environment as the responsibility of the state. Law enforcement efforts that need to be done are by changing environmental regulations, synchronizing the environmental management law with the Human Rights Law, as well as the active role between the government, law enforcement and the community in handling environmental issues based on the principles of justice and transparency
The Supreme Court often claims that the First Amendment reflects an original judgment about the proper scope of expressive freedom. After a century of academic debate, however, the meanings of speech and press freedoms at the Founding remain remarkably hazy. Many scholars, often pointing to Founding Era sedition prosecutions, emphasize the limited scope of these rights. Others focus on the libertarian ideas that helped shape opposition to the Sedition Act of 1798. Still more claim that speech and press freedoms lacked any commonly accepted meaning. The relationship between speech and press freedoms is contested, too. Most scholars view these freedoms as equivalent, together enshrining a freedom of expression. But others assert that the freedom of speech, unlike press freedom, emerged from the legislative privilege of speech and debate, thus providing more robust protection for political speech. This Article argues that Founding Era elites shared certain understandings of speech and press freedoms, as concepts, even when they divided over how to apply those concepts. In particular, their approach to expressive freedom was grounded in a multifaceted understanding of natural rights that no longer survives in American constitutional thought. Speech and press freedoms referred, in part, to natural rights that were expansive in scope but weak in their legal effect, allowing for restrictions of expression to promote the public good. In this respect, speech and press freedoms were equivalent concepts with highly contestable implications that depended on calculations of the public good. But expressive freedom connoted more determinate legal protections as well. The liberty of the press, for instance, often referred specifically to the rule against press licensing, while the freedom of speaking, writing, and publishing ensured that well-intentioned statements of one's views were immune from governmental regulation. In this respect, speech and press freedoms carried distinct meanings. Much of our modern confusion stems from how the Founders—immersed in their own constitutional language—silently shifted between these complementary frames of reference. This framework significantly reorients our understanding of the history of speech and press freedoms by recognizing the multifaceted meanings of these concepts, and it raises challenging questions about how we might use that history today. Various interpretive theories—including ones described as "originalist"—might incorporate this history in diverse ways, with potentially dramatic implications for a host of First Amendment controversies. Most fundamentally, however, history undercuts the Supreme Court's recent insistence that the axioms of modern doctrine inhere in the Speech Clause itself, with judges merely discovering—not crafting—the First Amendment's contours and boundaries.
Drawing on earlier scholarly works that deal with the legally relevant interface between local government and the constitutional environmental duties of the state, this case comment ventures into an outline of the factual background and judgment in RA Le sueur v Ethekwini Municipality 2013 JDR 0178 (KZP) as far as it concerns the execution of original and assigned municipal powers regarding the conservation of natural resources and the protection of biodiversity. The authors further share their observations on what the facts and the judgment of this case may mean from the perspectives of the objectives of South African environmental law and the entire state's constitutional duty towards the environment.
Drawing on earlier scholarly works that deal with the legally relevant interface between local government and the constitutional environmental duties of the state, this case comment ventures into an outline of the factual background and judgment in RA Le sueur v Ethekwini Municipality 2013 JDR 0178 (KZP) as far as it concerns the execution of original and assigned municipal powers regarding the conservation of natural resources and the protection of biodiversity. The authors further share their observations on what the facts and the judgment of this case may mean from the perspectives of the objectives of South African environmental law and the entire state's constitutional duty towards the environment.
From the beginning of our constitutional life, the Supreme Court has articulated principles that structure the juridical relationship between international law and domestic law. These principles purportedly offer rules of decision for resolving in domestic courts the potential in-consistencies between external and internal sources of law, and they do so with the surface simplicity of axioms. Treaties, for example, cannot trump constitutional norms.' Customary international law can provide a rule of decision at least in the absence of controlling legislative or executive acts. In the case of an irreconcilable conflict between a treaty and a statute, the latter-in-time prevails. When Congress incorporates conventional or customary norms into a statute, those norms become directly enforceable and in the absence of any other applicable principle, United States statutes should be read "where fairly possible" so as not to violate international law. These principles have been criticized variously as innocuous, anomalous, and asymmetrical.' But they also reflect the Court's insistence hat domestic and international law be accommodated, not necessarily as equals, but as two legitimate sources of norms binding on the United States and enforceable in its courts. Doctrinal purity may have been sacrificed, but the Court's accommodationist imperative has had the advantage of avoiding both dualist and monist extremes. As a result of the Supreme Court's approach, the debate persists about the proper way to characterize the relationship between international and domestic law in the United States.
This book explores the tension in East Asia between the trend towards a convergence of legal practices in the direction of a universal model and a reassertion of local cultural practices.
The article is devoted to the prospects use an interdisciplinary approach to the science of constitutional law. The example of such interdisciplinary areas as «constitutional political science», «constitutional economics», «constitutional sociology», «сonstitutional conflictology», «constitutional engineering», «electoral engineering», «electoral technologies», «constitutional сultural», discusses the conclusion the impact of constitutional-legal studies conducted at the intersection with other sciences. ; Статья посвящена перспективам применения междисциплинарного подхода в науке конституционного права. На примере развития таких междисциплинарных направлений, как «конституционная политология», «конституционная экономика», «конституционная социология», «конституционная конфликтология», «конституционная инженерия» «избирательная инженерия», «электоральные технологии», «конституционная культурология», аргументируется вывод о результативности конституционно-правовых исследований, проведенных на стыке с другими науками. ; Стаття присвячена перспективам застосування міждисциплінарного підходу в науці конституційного права. На прикладі розвитку таких міждисциплінарних напрямів, як «конституційна політологія», «конституційна економіка», «конституційна соціологія», «конституційна конфліктологія», «конституційна інженерія», «виборча інженерія», «електоральні технології», «конституційна культурологія», аргументується висновок про результативність конституційно-правових досліджень, проведених на стикові з іншими науками.
Did the civil rights movement impact the development of the American state? Despite extensive accounts of civil rights mobilization and narratives of state building, there has been surprisingly little research that explicitly examines the importance and consequence that civil rights activism has had for the process of state building in American political and constitutional development. Through a sweeping archival analysis of the NAACP's battle against lynching and mob violence from 1909 to 1923, this book examines how the NAACP raised public awareness, won over American presidents, and secured the support of Congress. In the NAACP's most far-reaching victory, the Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional rights of black defendants were violated by a white mob in the landmark criminal procedure decision Moore v. Dempsey. This book demonstrates the importance of citizen agency in the making of new constitutional law in a period unexplored by previous scholarship
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One of the most fundamental and cherished concepts advocated for any government is that "rightness" should be defined by the "rule of law"; that is, the basic design and operations of governments as stated in constitutions, enacted laws, the enduring structure of the national justice system, a body of common laws and precedents, and a legal structure of governments in which the powers and authorities are both authorized and limited. Citizen's rights are protected and their obligations defined under these laws, and usually include the right to take legal action to protect themselves. The rule of law has long been considered as the principal means by which governments are kept within proper limits. Even totalitarian governments attempt to hide their arbitrary motives by issuing finely worded constitutions that appear to guarantee a rule of law but that in reality are doomed to be disregarded at the pleasure of the State.Charles F. Bingman spent 30 years as a U. S. government official in NASA, the Transportation Department and the Executive Office of the President, and he has since taught public management at the George Washington University and the Johns Hopkins U. Washington Center. He has undertaken consulting assignments in more than a dozen countries including China. His most recent book is "Why Governments Go Wrong", iUniverse, 2006.[1] Concept of the supremacy of regular, as opposed to arbitrary, power; c. the exercise of these powers by those in authority; d. the doctrine that any person is subject to the ordinary laws of the region; e. the As used in this paper, the rule of law is: a. A set of substantive legal principles and laws; b. the doctrine that the general constitutional/legal principles are the result of judicial decisions determining the rights of private individuals in the courts.
