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Personal freedom is the essence of human life. It is not created by legislation or laws. It is rather regulated by laws to reconcile its various aspects and achieve the common good of the community. It, therefore, does not accept restrictions except those that are necessary. The freedom of people should always be maintained; it is not permissible to arrest or detain any person except in accordance with the law. Accordingly, the Jordanian legislator was keen to put in place the procedural rules of administrative detention in terms of setting clear conditions for the practice of this detention and the reasons for resorting to it in order to reduce the abuse of this exercise by the authorities and to reduce the vulnerability of individuals at risk of such a practice. It is well-known that these actions result in a restriction of personal freedom but also it is known that these measures are aimed to protect society from risks. Detainees in this type of arrest are taken without trial, and it is exercised by the executive authority under the powers granted to it by the law. If all these precautions are meant to protect personal freedom and maintain its integrity, then how can the executive authority intervene in personal freedom and exercise maximum restrictions on it and tries to repeal it, given that this type of arrest is essentially a precautionary punitive measure? However, in this sense, it is in stark violation of the principle of legality of crimes and punishments, and it violates constitutional and legal warrantees. Despite all these principles about the sanctity of personal freedoms and the warrantees against excessive use of executive detention, it should be acknowledged that it is sometimes necessary for authorities to administer such a measure. This perplexing situation makes us endeavor to study the provisions and terms governing this kind of arrest and investigate its reasons, in an attempt to state the legal basis that calls for its justification. The study also addresses the main principles governing the behavior of authorities while exercising this detention and the main effects of such a practice.

Even though Russia's new Code of Criminal Procedure of 2001 had from the very beginning contained the article titled 'Preclusive Effects,' it was not until a decision by the Constitutional Court of 2008 that the doctrine of issue preclusion was, in its proper sense, reinstated in Russian criminal law, barring facts definitively established in a civil trial from relitigation in criminal proceedings. Despite heavy criticism that came down on the Constitutional Court for what was seen by law enforcement agents as unwarranted judicial activism, the Russian Parliament soon amended the article in line with the interpretation offered by the Court. This, however, did not end the controversy as critics raised a valid point: an automatic transfer of facts from civil proceedings with a priori more lenient requirements of proof is likely to distort outcomes, harming defendants, the prosecution, and, ultimately, societal interests. This article will turn for apotential solution to common law, which has been able to avoid this problem by clearly distinguishing between different standards of proof applicable in civil v. criminal litigations. It will be shown, using the United States as an example, how courts can effectively use issue preclusion to pursue a number of legitimate objectives, such as consistency of judgments and judicial economy, with due account for the interests of parties in proceedings. At the same time, issue preclusion appears an inappropriate and ineffective means to combat arbitrariness of the judiciary – the end which Russia's Constitutional Court and law makers arguably had in mind when introducing the doctrine into Russian law.

Even though Russia's new Code of Criminal Procedure of 2001 had from the very beginning contained the article titled 'Preclusive Effects,' it was not until a decision by the Constitutional Court of 2008 that the doctrine of issue preclusion was, in its proper sense, reinstated in Russian criminal law, barring facts definitively established in a civil trial from relitigation in criminal proceedings. Despite heavy criticism that came down on the Constitutional Court for what was seen by law enforcement agents as unwarranted judicial activism, the Russian Parliament soon amended the article in line with the interpretation offered by the Court. This, however, did not end the controversy as critics raised a valid point: an automatic transfer of facts from civil proceedings with a priori more lenient requirements of proof is likely to distort outcomes, harming defendants, the prosecution, and, ultimately, societal interests. This article will turn for a potential solution to common law, which has been able to avoid this problem by clearly distinguishing between different standards of proof applicable in civil v. criminal litigations. It will be shown, using the United States as an example, how courts can effectively use issue preclusion to pursue a number of legitimate objectives, such as consistency of judgments and judicial economy, with due account for the interests of parties in proceedings. At the same time, issue preclusion appears an inappropriate and ineffective means to combat arbitrariness of the judiciary the end which Russia's Constitutional Court and law makers arguably had in mind when introducing the doctrine into Russian law.

"Die Zukunft des Sozialen Rechtsstaates in Europa" ist zweifellos eine brisante topaktuelle Frage, die Gegenstand des Zehnten, Jubiläumskongress der Societas Iuris Publici Europaei (SIPE) in Athen war.Die gegenwärtige Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise ist gleichzeitig eine politische und soziale Krise, die der europäischen Konstruktion droht. Sie stellt die Zukunft des sozialen Rechtsstaats vor neue theoretische und praktische Herausforderungen. Außerdem könnte sie die Rolle der Gerichte in Frage stellen: Worin besteht die Rolle des nationalen, supranationalen und internationalen Richters, der die finanzielle, politische und soziale Realität zu bewältigen hat, ohne gleichzeitig die rechtsstaatlichen Prinzipien zu opfern, die unserer Rechtskultur innewohnen?Diese vielschichtigen und komplizierten Fragen wurden zwei Tage lang von Fachleuten aus Theorie und Praxis, namhaften Juristen, Wissenschaftlern und Richtern aus ganz Europa, im Akropolis Museum lebhaft diskutiert. Die Schwerpunktthemen hatten die Sicht derjenigen europäischen Akteure zum Gegenstand, die für den Schutz des Sozialstaats und der Grundrechte sozialen Charakters unmittelbar oder mittelbar die Verantwortung tragen: der Mitgliedstaaten, der Europäischen Union und des Europarats. Die Tagung endete mit einer der Brisanz des Gegenstands entsprechend lebhafte Podiumsdiskussion, die übergreifende Fragen wie den Schutz des sozialen Besitzstandes oder die Auswirkungen der Globalisierung auf den Sozialstaat zum Gegenstand hatte.Der Band enthält die schriftliche, überarbeitete Fassung der in Athen gehaltenen Referate zusammen mit den Beiträgen aus dem "Atelier Junger Wissenschaftler". Die Referate sind in der beim Vortrag jeweils verwendeten Sprache – stets eine der drei "offiziellen" SIPE-Sprachen, d.h. deutsch, englisch und französisch – abgedruckt

This article considers the effect of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the rule of spousal incompetency in criminal proceedings. The rule is arguably under-inclusive, in that it is not available to protect opposite-sex couples who are not legally married or same-sex couples; on the other hand, the rule is arguably offensive to the modem conception of marriage. The Charter arguments for each of these positions are considered, and it is submitted that the Charter requires the rule of spousal incompetency, whatever it is, to apply equally to legally married couples, to cohabitants, and to same-sex couples. A rule of spousal incompetency that arguably reconciles the modem conception of marriage with the interest protected by the rule of spousal incompetency is then considered. This rule would make the spouse a competent but not compellable witness for the prosecution. Various considerations of law and policy militate against giving the spouse this decision; the real choice is between maintaining the existing rule of incompetency and making the spouse competent and compellable for the Crown. It is submitted that the arguments on either side of this choice are so evenly balanced that any change should be made by Parliament rather than by the courts.

Self-help doctrines pervade the law. They regulate a legal subject's attempts to cure or prevent a perceived wrong by her own action, rather than through a mediated process. In their most acute form, these doctrines allow subjects to take what international lawyers call countermeasures – measures that would be forbidden if not pursued for redressive ends. Countermeasures are inescapable and invaluable. They are also deeply concerning, prone to error and abuse and to escalating cycles of vengeance. Disciplining countermeasures becomes a central challenge for any legal regime that recognizes them. How does American constitutional law meet this challenge? This Article contends that a robust set of unwritten, quasi-legal norms shapes and constrains retaliation as well as cooperation across the U.S. government, and it explores how these conventions of self-help correspond to regulatory principles that have emerged in public international law. Re-envisioning intragovernmental conflict through the lens of self-help gives us new descriptive and critical purchase on the separation of powers. By attending to the theory and practice of constitutional countermeasures, the Article tries to show, we can advance familiar debates over legislative obstruction and presidential adventurism, and we can develop richer models of constitutional contestation within and beyond the branches.?

Between 2015-2018, the Constitutional Court of Georgia consideredtwo cases with respect to religious organizations' Right onEquality and Non-discrimination. The Respondent Party, the Parliamentof Georgia, as one of its arguments, indicated that allegeddifferent treatment - exemptions and privileges granted exclusivelyto the Orthodox Church of Georgia, was justified by the 'SpecialRole of the Orthodox Church of Georgia in the History of Georgia'.In connection with that argument, the Court made valuableinterpretations, in particular, whether and to what extent the specialrole of a religious institution in the historical past of countrycan be used to pursue an aim to create the privileged status for it inthe present days. The present article considers this very issue fromthe perspective of the Constitutional Court of Georgia's Case Law.

Artykuł poszukuje odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy potrzebna jest rewizja karty praw jednostki zamieszczonej w Konstytucji RP z 1997 r. Punktem wyjścia są rozważania na temat aktualności ustawy zasadniczej z perspektywy dwudziestu lat jej obowiązywania. Ich konkluzją jest stwierdzenie, że Konstytucja RP spełnia kryteria nowoczesnego konstytucjonalizmu, na którym opierają się ustroje państw demokratycznych. Reforma polegająca na gruntownej rewizji obowiązującej konstytucji lub na zastąpieniu jej przez nową ustawę zasadniczą wymagałaby uzasadnienia poprzez spełnienie warunków "momentu konstytucyjnego", tak jak to pojęcie rozumie Bruce Ackerman. Rozważania poświęcone konstytucyjnej karcie praw skupiają się na ocenie wypełnienia przez nią kryteriów, które kierowały pracami nad jej redakcją, a mianowicie: adekwatności do dominujących w społeczeństwie ocen relacji między jednostką a wspólnotą; zgodności z międzynarodowymi standardami praw człowieka; uniwersalności treści; jurydyczności. Prowadzą one do wniosku, że karta praw zawarta w Konstytucji RP stanowi przykład nowoczesnej regulacji sytuacji prawnej jednostki, zgodnej z wymogami współczesnego konstytucjonalizmu. Ta generalna ocena nie oznacza jednak braku celowości rozważań nad możliwością czy potrzebą optymalizacji szczegółowych rozwiązań, które mogłyby zostać dokonane w ramach nowelizacji konstytucji, gdy ta okaże się niezbędna. Teza ta jest zilustrowana wybranym przykładami. ; The article seeks to answer the question whether it is necessary to revise the charter of rights of an individual included in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997. The starting point is the reflection on the topicality of the Basic Law from the perspective of 20 years of its applicability. The conclusion is that the Constitution meets the criteria of modern constitutionalism uponwhich the systems of democratic states are based. The reform consisting in a thorough revision of the existing Constitution or in replacing it with a new basic law would have to be justified by the ...

This Article contributes to the development of adaptive governance theory by articulating and situating the role of formal law and government as the facilitator, but not central controller, of adaptive governance. To advance the understanding of adaptive governance, we argue that it can be understood in the broader context of scholarship covering the observed emergence of new governance, the efforts to develop theoretical understandings through decentered theory, and the refinement of constitutional understanding through democratic experimentalism. Synthesis of these three themes in turn informs the role of law and government in working with emergent governance responses to complexity to manage change and wicked problems. This inter- and transdisciplinary exercise reveals that the role of law and government in adaptive governance is to leave space for local innovation and private governance. Law and government must provide the catalyzation, facilitation, steering, and oversight essential for public and private institutions to respond at the rate and complexity of change in large-scale social-ecological systems, and they must do so while advancing good governance.

In recent years, in the attempt to achieve "fiscal responsibility", governments have decreased social assistance rates, reduced program eligibility, and terminated social services. As a result, more and more individuals have slipped into poverty. In order to prevent governments from cutting these services to below subsistence levels, this paper proposes that Canada take steps to achieve constitutional protection of a minimum level of assistance. The concept of a constitutionally protected minimum level of assistance has been considered. Most recently, advocates focused their efforts on achieving constitutional protection through the language of rights. However, both through the legislature and the judiciary, these efforts have failed. This paper will attempt to achieve protection without resorting to the language of rights. It will do so by examining the law of Hungary, a country whose Constitutional Court used the principles of legal certainty, legitimate expectations, and property protection to find legislation terminating a system of social welfare benefits unconstitutional.

South Korea heralds North Korea's Kaesong Special Economic Zone as a shining example of inter-Korean cooperation. South Korean corporations at Kaesong combine South Korean expertise with North Korean labor. However, Kaesong operations violate the North Korean workers' labor rights. This Comment explores the legal mechanisms available in South Korea to hold violative South Korean Kaesong corporations accountable. The South Korean Constitutional Court should entertain a constitutional petition from the North Korean workers. Such petition will compel the South Korean government to recognize the North Korean workers' rights under the South Korean Constitution and hold violative South Korean corporations at Kaesong accountable through stricter regulations and sanctions. Practical and procedural obstacles hinder Kaesong workers from pursuing relief in the South Korean Constitutional Court. First, the North Korean government bars the workers from leaving North Korea. Second, the South Korean Constitutional Court bars third parties in South Korea from filing a petition on behalf of the workers. Third, the court has no clear jurisdiction over constitutional claims brought by North Korean workers in North Korea. Fourth, the court bars suit under pseudonyms, leaving potential petitioners vulnerable to retaliatory employment action. Given these impediments, the Constitutional Court and the South Korean legislature should look to international developments in procedural law that facilitate transnational rights litigation. The court and legislature should adopt new court procedures that permit foreign petitioners physically absent in the jurisdiction to file in the Constitutional Court. Further, the South Korean government and South Korean shareholders of Kaesong corporations should take measures outside the courts to hold the corporations accountable.

It may appear immodest to note how appropriate it is that the Dalhousie Law Journal should include Saskatchewan in this survey of recent trends in Canadian legal education. Yet from an historical standpoint, the ties between the respective universities have always been strong, and the influence of native Maritimers on the development of the College of Law in Saskatoon, as my colleague Howard McConnell (himself a New Brunswicker) observes in Prairie Justice, "can hardly be overestimated".' The University's first President, Walter Murray, brought west in 1909 one of his former students at Dalhousie, Arthur Moxon, destined to become the College of Law's first Dean eleven years later. Initially, however, Moxon taught classics in the only charter College, Arts and Science. It fell to a fellow- Dalhousian and Professor of Philosophy and Political Science, Ira MacKay, to offer the first law classes (as part of the Political Science programme) in the University's second academic year, 1910-11. These initial offerings were Jurisprudence and Constitutional Government. In the following session were added classes in International Law, English Law and British and Canadian Constitutional Law.