Suchergebnisse

The World Bank published a Public Expenditure and Institutional Review (PEIR) of the Bulgarian justice sector entitled "Resourcing the Judiciary for Performance and Accountability: A Judicial Public Expenditure and Institutional Review" in 2008. The objective of the present study is to conduct an assessment of the spending and institutional changes in Bulgaria's judiciary from 2008 onwards. The current report examines the principal trends in resourcing Bulgaria's judiciary since 2008, while comparing the expenditure and judicial performance with those of other European countries. The report provides a set of conclusion and recommendations for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of Bulgaria's judiciary and the judicial budget process.

International audience ; Ubérisation, plateformes juridiques, legal tech, smart contract, blockchain… la révolution numérique déferle sur toutes les professions du droit, y compris le notariat. L'un des derniers chantiers lancés par la profession notariale est celui de la digitalisation de la relation client (prise de rendezvous en ligne, plateformes collaboratives de travail permettant au client de participer à la constitution de son dossier puis de le suivre à distance, réception de l'acte par visioconférence….). Ce mouvement de dématérialisation de la relation entre les notaires et les usagers du service notarial n'est nullement propre au notariat, ni même aux professions juridiques. Il concerne également les relations que les services publics entretiennent avec les citoyens. Les pouvoirs publics sont effectivement engagés dans la construction de l'« e-administration » (ou « administration électronique ») dont l'objectif est de permettre aux usagers de procéder en ligne à l'ensemble de leurs démarches administratives. Concernant le service public de la publicité foncière, le déploiement de l'« e-administration » ne saurait prospérer sans la participation des notaires, qui en sont les principaux usagers. En effet, 90% des actes déposés aux services de la publicité foncière en vue d'une publication ou inscription le sont par les notaires et 90% des demandes de renseignements hypothécaires sont adressées aux SPF par les notaires. Ces professionnels, usagers actifs de la publicité foncière, sont dès lors naturellement placés au centre du nouvel accès automatisé au fichier immobilier (ANF). Le rôle central du notariat dans ce mouvement de dématérialisation est par ailleurs reconnu dans le rapport de la Commission de réforme de la publicité foncière, que le professeur Laurent Aynès a remis au Garde des Sceaux le 12 novembre 2018 2. Ainsi, tant le dispositif ANF qui place les notaires au coeur de l'évolution numérique actuelle de la publicité foncière (I), que les projets de réforme qui positionnent le notariat à la tête des prochaines évolutions numériques (II), envisagent la profession notariale comme un leader de la dématérialisation de la publicité foncière. I. L'ANF au coeur de l'évolution numérique actuelle Le numérique permet désormais aux notaires d'avoir un accès direct au fichier immobilier, et ce grâce à une application informatique qui leur est dédiée : l'ANF (Accès des Notaires au Fichier). Ce dispositif a été lancé conjointement par la Direction générale des finances 1 Cet article reprend une partie des analyses consacrées à « la publicité foncière à l'heure du numérique » que Manuella Bourassin et Corine Dauchez ont présentées lors de la conférence organisée par l'ACSEN (Association des anciens d'études supérieures notariales) le 20 juin 2019 sur le thème : « La publicité foncière dans tous ses états ».

Since 2022 an external factor has threatened Ukraine's existence: the full-scale Russian invasion. Now internal factors—namely, the need to renew Ukrainian government's mandate with the help of democratic elections—have added to Ukraine's problems. The essence of the dilemma is as follows. On the one hand, there are legal grounds, popular consent and elites' agreement that trying to hold elections during wartime could hinder internal stability. On another, external and internal elements could use the exhausted legitimacy of Ukrainian government to accuse democratic Ukraine of formal disrespect of democratic principles. This last factor may become damaging, especially in the attrition phase of the war and in view of the West's need to respond to the increasing number of wars around the globe. Constitutional and Administrative ChallengesUkraine's constitution holds that the country may not hold parliamentary elections until martial law, in effect since February 24, 2022, is lifted, and for six months thereafter. Several laws would need to be changed in order for presidential elections to be held, which raises its own problems. Even if a legal solution could be found, security, financial, and organizational obstacles to holding free, fair, and representative elections are far more serious. President Zelensky is not opposed to holding elections but insists they must be held in accordance with the highest standards of democratic elections possible and should not detract from the country's national defense efforts. Many Ukrainian civic organizations promoting free and fair elections agree on the need to held elections only when the right conditions are present to ensure the integrity of the process and results.Security is an overarching concern. Almost 20 percent of Ukraine's territory is occupied. Some settlements are entirely destroyed, while others lack the necessary infrastructure to enable voting. With Russian military forces targeting civilian infrastructure, ensuring the safety of voters, election officials, and observers is simply impossible. President Zelensky has suggested that Western election advocates share in the risks, perhaps by stationing election observers in the trenches to assure the world of the legitimacy of the elections.Funding the elections is another major problem. According to the Central Election Committee's 2023 calculations, the presidential elections are estimated to cost around $196.7 million, while the parliamentary elections may require approximately $135.9 million. At the same time, Ukraine's 2024 budget anticipates $43.7 billion in revenues but almost twice that, $82.3 billion, in expenditures, without including election costs. The difference is projected to be covered by international loans and grants.President Zelensky has stated that he will not hold elections on credit, nor will he "take money from weapons and give it to elections." Instead, he has suggested that Western countries, especially the United States, that are pressing Ukraine to hold elections could help fund them, in this way sharing the financial risk. With funding and security assured, the country could potentially develop a legal framework to hold elections during wartime, he implied.That said, Ukraine has learned the hard way that the essence of elections extends beyond the voting day; it encompasses extended campaigns during which society can have honest debates on a range of divisive issues. To preserve national unity for a people facing existential threat is a life-and-death matter. Even antagonistic political forces are reluctant to gain office at the expense of losing the country.This is why the Ukrainian parliament's opposition leaders signed a joint statement that both parliamentary and presidential elections should take place after the cessation of the war and the conclusion of martial law. The document indicates a consensus among major political parties regarding the need for an appropriate period of time to prepare for elections and favorable conditions for campaigning and voting.What Do Voters Think?For the general population, holding elections under current conditions would be problematic. For example, in a November survey conducted by Kyiv's International Institute of Sociology, over 80 percent of respondents expressed a preference for deferring elections until the war had ended.The voters' views on holding elections can be explained by the fact that they understand the challenges of trying to participate in wartime elections. Voter dispersal across Ukraine and outside the country further complicates any electoral effort. With six million internally displaced citizens alone, updating the list of voters would be a daunting task. The right to vote should also be ensured for over eight million Ukrainian refugees, 60 percent of whom are eligible voters. Currently Poland hosts about 1.6 million refugees and Germany more than a million. In the 2019 Ukrainian parliamentary elections, there were only a small handful of overseas polling places. Moreover, current registration procedures could easily paralyze the work of consulates and embassies. For example, host countries wanting to help Ukraine hold elections by opening polling stations on their own territory might have to change their national laws.This opinion is supported by over 100 leading election and human rights CSOs, which in a joint statement emphasized the impossibility of holding elections during the active war phase. The statement urges international partners to increase support for Ukraine to finally conclude the war, making democratic elections feasible (at least six months after the end of martial law).Why It MattersUkraine's elections spark debates in the United States and Europe. The absence of elections is now being cited as a reason to withhold aid or to question Ukraine's democratic status. Observers believe such a stance is a political ploy on the part of members of the U.S. Congress designed to secure changes to immigration policy governing the U.S. border with Mexico.Ukraine is a democracy at war. It needs to deal with the external threat and then to hold elections. As Olga Ayvazovska, head of the board of the civil network OPORA and an expert in elections, rightly stresses, Ukraine has a record of hewing to a high standard for free and fair elections, but it is impossible to adhere to that standard in wartime. Instead of further entangling in the dilemma, a clear plan is needed. First, Ukraine and West together must resolve the external threat. Second, Ukrainians must elect a new government, continue Ukraine's democratic development, and start the needed postwar socioeconomic recovery. The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute

Since 2022 an external factor has threatened Ukraine's existence: the full-scale Russian invasion. Now internal factors—namely, the need to renew Ukrainian government's mandate with the help of democratic elections—have added to Ukraine's problems. The essence of the dilemma is as follows. On the one hand, there are legal grounds, popular consent and elites' agreement that trying to hold elections during wartime could hinder internal stability. On another, external and internal elements could use the exhausted legitimacy of Ukrainian government to accuse democratic Ukraine of formal disrespect of democratic principles. This last factor may become damaging, especially in the attrition phase of the war and in view of the West's need to respond to the increasing number of wars around the globe. Constitutional and Administrative ChallengesUkraine's constitution holds that the country may not hold parliamentary elections until martial law, in effect since February 24, 2022, is lifted, and for six months thereafter. Several laws would need to be changed in order for presidential elections to be held, which raises its own problems. Even if a legal solution could be found, security, financial, and organizational obstacles to holding free, fair, and representative elections are far more serious. President Zelensky is not opposed to holding elections but insists they must be held in accordance with the highest standards of democratic elections possible and should not detract from the country's national defense efforts. Many Ukrainian civic organizations promoting free and fair elections agree on the need to held elections only when the right conditions are present to ensure the integrity of the process and results.Security is an overarching concern. Almost 20 percent of Ukraine's territory is occupied. Some settlements are entirely destroyed, while others lack the necessary infrastructure to enable voting. With Russian military forces targeting civilian infrastructure, ensuring the safety of voters, election officials, and observers is simply impossible. President Zelensky has suggested that Western election advocates share in the risks, perhaps by stationing election observers in the trenches to assure the world of the legitimacy of the elections.Funding the elections is another major problem. According to the Central Election Committee's 2023 calculations, the presidential elections are estimated to cost around $196.7 million, while the parliamentary elections may require approximately $135.9 million. At the same time, Ukraine's 2024 budget anticipates $43.7 billion in revenues but almost twice that, $82.3 billion, in expenditures, without including election costs. The difference is projected to be covered by international loans and grants.President Zelensky has stated that he will not hold elections on credit, nor will he "take money from weapons and give it to elections." Instead, he has suggested that Western countries, especially the United States, that are pressing Ukraine to hold elections could help fund them, in this way sharing the financial risk. With funding and security assured, the country could potentially develop a legal framework to hold elections during wartime, he implied.That said, Ukraine has learned the hard way that the essence of elections extends beyond the voting day; it encompasses extended campaigns during which society can have honest debates on a range of divisive issues. To preserve national unity for a people facing existential threat is a life-and-death matter. Even antagonistic political forces are reluctant to gain office at the expense of losing the country.This is why the Ukrainian parliament's opposition leaders signed a joint statement that both parliamentary and presidential elections should take place after the cessation of the war and the conclusion of martial law. The document indicates a consensus among major political parties regarding the need for an appropriate period of time to prepare for elections and favorable conditions for campaigning and voting.What Do Voters Think?For the general population, holding elections under current conditions would be problematic. For example, in a November survey conducted by Kyiv's International Institute of Sociology, over 80 percent of respondents expressed a preference for deferring elections until the war had ended.The voters' views on holding elections can be explained by the fact that they understand the challenges of trying to participate in wartime elections. Voter dispersal across Ukraine and outside the country further complicates any electoral effort. With six million internally displaced citizens alone, updating the list of voters would be a daunting task. The right to vote should also be ensured for over eight million Ukrainian refugees, 60 percent of whom are eligible voters. Currently Poland hosts about 1.6 million refugees and Germany more than a million. In the 2019 Ukrainian parliamentary elections, there were only a small handful of overseas polling places. Moreover, current registration procedures could easily paralyze the work of consulates and embassies. For example, host countries wanting to help Ukraine hold elections by opening polling stations on their own territory might have to change their national laws.This opinion is supported by over 100 leading election and human rights CSOs, which in a joint statement emphasized the impossibility of holding elections during the active war phase. The statement urges international partners to increase support for Ukraine to finally conclude the war, making democratic elections feasible (at least six months after the end of martial law).Why It MattersUkraine's elections spark debates in the United States and Europe. The absence of elections is now being cited as a reason to withhold aid or to question Ukraine's democratic status. Observers believe such a stance is a political ploy on the part of members of the U.S. Congress designed to secure changes to immigration policy governing the U.S. border with Mexico.Ukraine is a democracy at war. It needs to deal with the external threat and then to hold elections. As Olga Ayvazovska, head of the board of the civil network OPORA and an expert in elections, rightly stresses, Ukraine has a record of hewing to a high standard for free and fair elections, but it is impossible to adhere to that standard in wartime. Instead of further entangling in the dilemma, a clear plan is needed. First, Ukraine and West together must resolve the external threat. Second, Ukrainians must elect a new government, continue Ukraine's democratic development, and start the needed postwar socioeconomic recovery. The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute

El presente trabajo busca analizar y demostrar las tensiones originadas entre la institucionalidad del control fiscal y el Poder Público Legislativo, por la expedición de normas que posiblemente limitan su autonomía e independencia funcional. Además, investigar a través del análisis del Estado social y democrático de derecho, la institucionalidad del control fiscal, para establecer si es o no pilar fundamental del sistema de pesos y contrapesos. La institucionalidad estatal colombiana, tiene establecido un mecanismo consubstancial a la existencia del Estado, como es la función de control fiscal, que contribuye a consolidar su proceso de legitimación. Como una desafortunada característica de la democracia contemporánea, se registra un decreciente desarrollo orgánico y una ilegitimidad funcional de los poderes públicos; auspiciada por el sufragio universal de una ciudadanía que cada día cree menos en los integrantes del Poder Público Legislativo colombiano; hoy por hoy, objeto de señalamientos y críticas por el aumento de las condenas y sanciones judiciales disciplinarias a las que se han hecho acreedores. En este contexto, puede afirmarse que la función de control político actualmente es ejercida por un Poder Público Legislativo cada vez más deslegitimado. De hecho, las actuaciones son de un porcentaje superior al 35% de sus miembros, en la pasada conformación de ese cuerpo colegiado; está al margen de la ley. Ello es comprobado por las condenas que determinan su responsabilidad en la ocurrencia de delitos. Esa situación pone de manifiesto un inconformismo generalizado, frente a las acciones que han debido adelantarse para depurar y disciplinar al Poder Público Legislativo colombiano. A la luz de estas digresiones, nadie niega que "la existencia de una amplia y eficaz red de controles sea un elemento indispensable del Estado Constitucional democrático"1. Sin embargo, la debilidad de algunos de ellos, en especial el de control político2, que sólo se ha enfocado en debates ideológicos;3 no ha procurado que las afectaciones económicas de esos descalabros, se traduzcan en medidas sancionatorias/resarcitorias hacia el patrimonio público, tendiente a mantener su indemnidad. Lo que resulta ser un grave problema que debe ser solucionado. La función de control fiscal ha sido elevada a rango constitucional, a partir de la Constitución Política de 1991, desagregada desde la ley, para la evaluación de la gestión fiscal de servidores públicos y/o particulares, que administren bienes o recursos del Estado. Eso producido, desde el análisis de los efectos de la aplicación de las atribuciones de los poderes públicos del Estado colombiano y de la función pública de control fiscal. A fin de determinar la existencia de tensiones constitutivas de limitantes a este último. Si ellas tienen la entidad de evitar el ejercicio adecuado de tal función, objeto de la presente investigación. Para tal propósito, se plantea un examen orientado a la caracterización de elementos conceptuales que permitan el conocimiento de las debilidades del sistema actual, desde la determinación del establecimiento y accionar de la Función Constitucional, Administrativa y Orgánica de este control. Puntualmente analizar cuál es la funcionalidad de un sistema que no previene el inadecuado manejo de los recursos públicos ; The present work seeks to analyze and demonstrate the tensions originated between the institutionalization of fiscal control and the Legislative Public Power, by the issuance of norms that possibly limit their autonomy and functional independence. Also investigate through the analysis of the social and democratic state of law, the institutionality of fiscalcontrol, to establish whether or not it is a fundamental pillar of the system of checks and balances. The Colombian state institutions have established a mechanism that is consubstantial to theexistence of the State, as is the function of fiscal control, which contributes to consolidate its process of legitimation. As an unfortunate characteristic of contemporary democracy, there is a decreasing organic development and a functional illegitimacy of the public powers; sponsored by the universal suffrage of a citizenship that every day believes less in the members of the Colombian Legislative Public Power; today, object of accusations and criticism for the increase in sentences and judicial-disciplinary sanctions to which they have become creditors. In this context, it can be affirmed that the function of political control is currently exercised by a Legislative Public Power that is increasingly delegitimized. In fact, the actions are of a percentage higher than 35% of its members, in the last conformation of that collegiate body; it is outside the law. This is proven by the sentences that determine their responsibility in the occurrence of crimes. This situation reveals a widespread nonconformity, as opposed to the actions that have had to be taken to purge and discipline the Colombian Legislative Public Power. In light of these digressions, no one denies that "the existence of a broad and effective network of controls is an indispensable element of the democratic Constitutional State." However, the weakness of some of them, especially the one of political control, which has only focused on ideological debates; it has not sought to ensure that the economic effects of these setbacks are translated into sanctioning / compensatory measures towards the public patrimony, in order to maintain its indemnity. What turns out to be a serious problem that must be solved. The fiscal control function has been elevated to constitutional rank, starting with the Political Constitution of 1991, disaggregated by law, for the evaluation of the fiscal management of public and / or private servants, who administer goods or resources of the State. That produced, from the analysis of the effects of the application of the attributions of the public powers of the Colombian State and of the public function of fiscal control. In order to determine the existence of tensions constitutive of limitations to the latter. If they have the entity to avoid the proper exercise of such a function, object of the present investigation. For such purpose, an examination oriented to the characterization of conceptual elements that allow the knowledge of the weaknesses of the current system, from the determination of the establishment and action of the Constitutional, Administrative and Organic Function of this control, is proposed. Punctually analyze what is the functionality of a system that does not prevent the inadequate management of public resources

The article deals with the problems associated with the peculiarities of a single legal field development in the Russian state during the epoch of the early modern era (traditionally associated in Russian historiography with the times of a single centralized state formation and development and the emergence of autocracy as a kind of early absolutism). Using a number of provisions of modern concepts for the development of early modern states in Europe, the authors of the article put forward the thesis of a single legal field development in the Russian state during the period under consideration based on the analysis of Russian law monuments at the end of the XVth century (The Code of Law of Ivan III in 1497) and the 16th century (first of all, the code of law by Ivan IV, as well as a number of other legislative and legal acts) and judicial practice. In their opinion, this incompleteness was related with the following circumstances. First of all, the development of political and legal institutions in the early modern Russian state was of an evolutionary nature and, therefore, denied radical changes. Secondly, the poverty of the state caused the relative weakness and a slow development of "sinews of power" and,therefore, prevented the establishment of a more stringent administrative and legal control by the supreme power over the actions of local authorities. Finally, the weakness of the mentioned "sinews of power" conditioned the need of cooperation mode establishment between the supreme authority and local elites, while retaining the access to the exercise of power functions on the ground - also through the preservation of the old legal customs and traditions. Naturally, all this contributed to the preservation and the reproduction of the legal "antiquity" and, consequently, the incompleteness of legal centralization process and the formation of a single legal field throughout the country. The legal field, in the opinion of the authors of the article, had at least 2-level character all this time, the fragmented nature and the dispersion at the low-rank level. ; El artículo trata los problemas asociados con las peculiaridades de un desarrollo de campo legal único en el estado ruso durante la época moderna temprana (tradicionalmente asociado en la historiografía rusa con los tiempos de una formación y desarrollo estatal centralizado único y el surgimiento de la autocracia como una especie de absolutismo temprano). Usando una serie de disposiciones de conceptos modernos para el desarrollo de los estados modernos tempranos en Europa, los autores del artículo presentaron la tesis de un desarrollo de campo legal único en el estado ruso durante el período bajo consideración basado en el análisis de monumentos de derecho rusos a fines del siglo XV (El Código de Derecho de Iván III en 1497) y el siglo XVI (ante todo, el código de leyes de Iván IV, así como una serie de otros actos legislativos y jurídicos) y la práctica judicial . En su opinión, este estado incompleto estaba relacionado con las siguientes circunstancias. En primer lugar, el desarrollo de las instituciones políticas y legales en el estado ruso moderno temprano fue de naturaleza evolutiva y, por lo tanto, negó los cambios radicales. En segundo lugar, la pobreza del estado causó la debilidad relativa y un lentodesarrollo de "tendones de poder" y, por lo tanto, impidió el establecimiento de un control administrativo y legal más estricto por parte del poder supremo sobre las acciones de las autoridades locales. Finalmente, la debilidad de los mencionados "nervios de poder" condicionó la necesidad del establecimiento del modo de cooperación entre la autoridad suprema y las elites locales, mientras se mantiene el acceso al ejercicio de las funciones de poder sobre el terreno, también a través de la preservación de las viejas costumbres legales y tradiciones Naturalmente, todo esto contribuyó a la preservación y reproducción de la "antigüedad" legal y, en consecuencia, a la incompletitud del proceso de centralización legal y la formación de un solo campo legal en todo el país. El campo legal, en opinión de los autores del artículo, tenía al menos un carácter de dos niveles todo este tiempo, la naturaleza fragmentada y la dispersión en el nivel de bajo rango. ; O artigo trata os problemas associados com as peculiaridades de um curso de campo legal no estado ruso durante a época moderna temático (tradicionalmente associado à historiografia rusa com os tempos de uma formação e desenvolvimento estatal centralizado único e o surgimento da autocracia como una especie de absolutismo temprano). Using una serie de disposiciones de conceptos modernes para o desenvolvimento dos estados modernos templos na Europa, os autores do artigo apresentando a tese de um curso de campo legal no estado do ruso durante o período considerado de base na análise de pontos de vista ruses a fins del siglo XV (O código de direito de Iván III em 1497) e o século XVI (ante, o código de leyes de Iván IV, como uma série de atos legislativos e jurídicos) e a prática judicial. Em sua opinião, este estado incompleto está relacionado com as circunstâncias circunstanciadas. Em primeiro lugar, o desenvolvimento das instituições políticas e jurídicas no estado atual temprano naturalidade evolutiva e, por isso, os dois cambios radicais. Em segundo lugar, a pobreza do estado causou a debilidade relativa e um lento desenvolvimento de "tendões de poder" e, por que tanto, impiedoso o estabelecimento de um controle administrativo e jurídico mais estrito por parte do poder supremo sobre as ações das autoridades locales. Finalmente, a debilidad das perdas "nervos de poder" é a necessidade do estabelecimento do modo de cooperação entre a supremacia e as elites locais, mientras se mantém o acceso ao exercicio das funções de poder sobre o terreno, tambem a través de la preservación de las viejas costumbres legales y tradiciones Naturalmente, todo esto contribuído a la preservación y reproducción de la "antigüedad" legal y, en consecuencia, a incompletitud del proceso de centralización legal y la formación de un solo campo legal en todo el país . O campo legal, na opinião dos autores do artigo, com o menos um carácter dos niveles todo este tempo, a natureza fragmentada e a dispersão no nivel de bajo rango.

Se demuestran las falencias e insuficiencias de los tres títulos tradicionales de imputación de responsabilidad al Estado por las actuaciones judiciales para garantizar el derecho a la indemnidad de los ciudadanos, teniendo en cuenta el rol actual del juez y los postulados teóricos a los cuales debería responder esta institución jurídica. Al confrontar la responsabilidad del Estado por las actividades administrativas y por las actuaciones judiciales, a la luz de las reflexiones sobre los fundamentos teóricos de la responsabilidad civil y de la identidad del juez en el Estado contemporáneo, surge la necesidad de replantear esta institución, con el propósito de que sea expresión de las teorías de la justicia que le subyacen, garantice el derecho a la indemnidad de los ciudadanos y responda a la concepción actual de la judicatura. La estructura del texto consta de tres capítulos teóricos y uno propositivo en el cual se responden las preguntas de investigación planteadas, haciendo uso de la información reseñada al inicio de la investigación. El primer capítulo desarrolla los fundamentos filosóficos y jurídico políticos de la responsabilidad, empleando como método una aproximación teórica conceptual con un componente histórico o contextual, cuya función es la de ser un objetivo investigativo en sí mismo y servir de base para el análisis de las reglas jurisprudenciales expuestas posteriormente, de tal forma que logre llamar la atención sobre la importancia de que el Estado responda equitativamente a los ciudadanos por los daños antijurídicos que le cause con independencia de la rama del poder público que los ocasione, así como sobre las exigencias del Estado social de Derecho a la responsabilidad estatal. El segundo capítulo, denominado "Quién es el juez", empleando la metodología de la primera parte, desarrolla los siguientes aspectos: el rol del juez en los Estados liberal, constitucional y neoconstitucional; los pilares teóricos para develar la identidad del juez en el Estado contemporáneo; y los órganos de cierre en el ordenamiento jurídico colombiano, resaltando el aumento en la importancia de la labor de este sujeto y que las decisiones judiciales son una expresión de los modelos de Estado. En este capítulo se identifica quién es el juez, cómo actúa, cómo se controlan sus actuaciones y de qué forma el Estado asume las consecuencias de estas. Por su parte, el tercer acápite, llamado "Cómo responden el juez y la administración pública", situado en el ordenamiento jurídico colombiano, expone los elementos de la responsabilidad en general, para posteriormente confrontar el desarrollo legal y jurisprudencial de la responsabilidad del Estado por las actuaciones de la administración con la responsabilidad por las actuaciones judiciales, haciendo uso del método comparativo con variables y un componente evolutivo. De esta forma se busca analizar el desempeño de la jurisprudencia; determinar la correspondencia entre la praxis judicial, los fundamentos teóricos y el mandato de indemnidad; y recorrer el camino de la lógica evolutiva de la responsabilidad, según el cual el aumento en las actividades e intervención estatal potencializa la posible causación de daños antijurídicos, como sucede con la creciente importancia del juez en el Estado contemporáneo. Finalmente, el cuarto capítulo, consiste en un diagnóstico cruzado, aplicando a la jurisprudencia las teorías contenidas en los dos primeros capítulos, a raíz de lo cual surgen algunos aspectos propositivos. Este acápite fue titulado "desafíos de la responsabilidad del Estado por las actuaciones judiciales" y se subdivide en tres partes: el análisis de las perspectivas filosóficas que subyacen al desarrollo jurisprudencial de la responsabilidad estatal en Colombia; la explicación de la importancia de que el Estado responda por las actuaciones del juez teniendo en cuenta su identidad en el Estado contemporáneo y los desafíos que ello presenta; y el planteamiento de nuevos escenarios de responsabilidad del Estado juez, distintos a la privación injusta de la libertad, el error judicial y el defectuoso funcionamiento de la administración de justicia. Los desafíos encontrados para el reconocimiento de la responsabilidad del Estado juez son la intangibilidad de la cosa juzgada, la independencia judicial y la responsabilidad de los órganos de cierre de la jurisdicción. De otra parte, los nuevos escenarios de responsabilidad planteados son la responsabilidad por la ejecución de sentencias internacionales, por la adopción de laudos arbitrales y por el cambio de línea jurisprudencial, profundizando en los dos últimos. Con esta propuesta se pretende ajustar la institución estudiada al modelo actual de Estado, respondiendo a fenómenos contemporáneos como la internacionalización del derecho, la privatización de la justicia y la alteración de las fuentes del derecho. ; The lacks and insufficiencies of the three traditional titles for the allocation of responsibility to the State for the legal proceedings in order to guarantee the right to indemnity of the citizens are demonstrated; taking into account the current role of the judge and the theoretical postulates to which this Legal institution should response. When facing the responsibility of the state for the administrative activities and for the legal actions, in the light of the reflections upon the theoretical basis of the civil liability and the identity of the judge in the contemporary State, the need for restating the responsibility of the judge - State arises; with the purpose that this become an expression of the theories of justice that underlie it, guarantees the right to indemnity of the citizens and respond to the current concept of the judiciary The structure of the text consists of three theoretical chapters and a propositional one, in which the research questions are answered. This, using the information referred at the beginning of the research. The first chapter develops the philosophical, legal and political bases of the liability, using as method, a conceptual theoretical approach with a historical or contextual component; which function is to be a research objective itself and serve as a base for the analysis of the jurisprudence rules explained later on; in such a way that it can call the attention about the importance that the state respond equally to the citizens for the wrongful damages that it causes regardless of the branch of public power that cause them, as well as on the exigencies of the Social State of Law to the State liability. The second chapter, called "Who is the judge", using the methodology of the first part, develops the following aspects: the role of the judge in the liberal, constitutional and neoconstitutional states; The theoretical pillars to unveil the identity of the judge in the contemporary state; And the closing bodies in the Colombian legal system, highlighting the increase in the importance of the role of the judge and that the judicial decisions are an expression of the state models. This chapter identifies who the judge is, how he or she acts, how his or her actions are controlled, and the way in which the State assumes the consequences of its actions. As for the third section, called "How the Judge and the Public Administration Respond", located in the Colombian legal system, it exposes the general elements of the responsibility, to confront the legal and jurisprudential development of State responsibility for the actions of the administration with the responsibility for the judicial proceedings, using the comparative method with variables and an evolutionary component. In this way, the aim is to analyze the performance of jurisprudence; to determine the correspondence between judicial praxis, the theoretical foundations and the mandate of indemnity; And to follow the path of the evolutionary logic of responsibility, according to which the increase in activities and state intervention optimize the occurrence of wrongful damages, as with the increasing importance of the judge in the contemporary State. Finally, the fourth chapter consists of a cross-diagnosis, applying to jurisprudence the theories contained in the first two chapters, as a result of which some propositional aspects arise. This section was entitled "Challenges of State Responsibility for Judicial Proceedings" and is divided into three parts: the analysis of the philosophical perspectives that underlie the jurisprudential development of state responsibility in Colombia; The explanation of the importance that the State respond for the actions of the judge, considering its identity in the contemporary State and the challenges that it presents; And the establishment of new scenarios of responsibility of the State-judge, other than the unjust deprivation of freedom, the judicial error and defective functioning of the administration of justice. The challenges encountered for the recognition of the responsibility of the State judge are the intangibility of res iudicata, the judicial independency and the responsibility of the closing bodies of the the jurisdiction. On the other hand, the new scenarios of responsibility presented are the responsibility for the execution of international judgments, for the adoption of arbitration awards and for the change of jurisprudential line, deepening into the last two. This proposal aims to adjust the institution studied to the current state model, responding to contemporary phenomena such as the internationalization of law, the privatization of justice and alteration of the sources of law.

International audience ; Les fonds d'investissement sont désignés dans le code monétaire et financier par l'expression "organismes de placement collectif" qui comprend deux catégories : les organismes de placement collectif en valeurs mobilières (OPCVM) et les fonds d'investissement alternatifs (FIA). Les premiers ont pour objet exclusif le placement collectif en valeurs mobilières de capitaux recueillis auprès du public et les seconds lèvent des capitaux auprès d'un certain nombre d'investisseurs en vue de les investir, dans l'intérêt de ces investisseurs, conformément à une politique d'investissement préalablement définie. Ainsi, dans le monde du droit des affaires, à côté des sociétés traditionnelles dont l'objet est d'affecter à une entreprise commune des biens ou leur industrie en vue de partager le bénéfice ou de profiter de l'économie qui pourra en résulter, il existe des organismes qui regroupent des personnes en vue de réaliser des investissements dans différents secteurs de l'économie, ces investissements étant effectués dans l'objectif d'en faire bénéficier les investisseurs.Les fonds brassés par ces organismes sont remarquables, ce qui a conduit à la mise en place d'un encadrement juridique conséquent élaboré au niveau européen. Deux directives importantes le fondent (directive 2009/65/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 13 juillet 2009 portant coordination des dispositions législatives, réglementaires et administratives concernant certains organismes de placement collectif en valeurs mobilières [OPCVM] ; directive 2011/61/UE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 8 juin 2011 sur les gestionnaires de fonds d'investissement alternatifs qui est venu modifier des textes préexistants). Elles sont complétées par d'autres directives et règlements européens, les transpositions nationales, les normes des régulateurs européens et nationaux pour la mise en œuvre. Ces textes donnent des indications sur les secteurs d'intervention des OPC (sphères bancaire, financière, immobilière, financement direct des entreprises industrielles et commerciales) et tiennent compte de la nature de l'activité qu'ils conduisent.Il apparaît que les OPC ont trois caractéristiques importantes : ils ne poursuivent pas un objet commercial ou industriel général ; ils mutualisent des capitaux levés auprès de leurs investisseurs aux fins d'un investissement réalisé en vue de générer un rendement collectif pour lesdits investisseurs ; les porteurs de parts ou les actionnaires des OPC – en tant que groupe collectif – n'exercent pas un pouvoir discrétionnaire sur les opérations courantes.Ainsi, contrairement à ce qui se passe dans les sociétés commerciales, les investisseurs ont peu de pouvoir légaux sur les investissements réalisés, conçus et proposés par des gestionnaires. Leur protection passe par un encadrement législatif et réglementaire plus étoffé des conditions dans lesquelles les OPC peuvent investir. Cette politique d'investissement « délimitée » a été caractérisée par différents critères (élaborés par l'AMF) tels l'acquisition de certaines classes d'actifs, la poursuite de stratégies particulières, l'investissement dans des zones géographiques particulières, les restrictions dans l'utilisation de l'effet de levier ou la diversification des risques que l'on retrouve dans les textes adoptés à cet égard. Plus précisément, ces textes édictent des obligations relatives à la composition des actifs et aux ratios d'investissement (1re partie) ainsi que des obligations concernant la gestion des risques liés aux investissements (2e partie).

An educational model is especially something to be compared, to achieve a paradigm and a practical guide to guide the behavior of those involved in educational and administrative goals of the institution. The educational model forms a state of permanent reference which nouns and adjectives processes of the University, originating at the ends of education given in the Constitution, are described in the Education Act and are raised, framed to be Fulfilled in the organic law of the University statutes, regulations, and generally, the systems that regulate and indict. The educational model, despite its complexity and length, should be considered first as an indicative standard of the institution, but also as the sum of the accepted customs, unwritten codes of conduct and a way of being politically quirky conferred a distinctive college seal. The Dimensions of Model Following the definitions and conditions above, the educational model is made and harmonizes with what has been called "Dimensions", as if his background and his form had an almost geometric connotation, indicating the direction of the actions and covers the hallmarks of a whole, as an integrated whole. To achieve different approaches, containing the reasons for philosophical, educational, social, regulatory, political and operational with the educational work of the University is built adopting. The conformation of the model in dimensions is performed by the need to consolidate into one conceptual base of knowledge articulated objects that make up the essence and University activities. Accordingly, each dimension is used to group correlated and ideas that support the results. A dimension is a conceptual map that locates and lists the primary objects, ideas, ways to access them; functions and processes; subjects to apply as social entities (students and teachers) and linked to the means to apprehend knowledge; references to its scope and characteristics obey a default order and delimited; and the rules and decisions to achieve it, coupled with the resources and procedures for practice and operations. Philosophical Dimension: Institutional and educational philosophy as a starting point of the educational model, education as a product of human thought Pedagogical Dimension: It is stated, as a reference, the adoption of pedagogical and psychological potentialities associated with the current purposes of the university. Sociological Dimension: express the basics to sustain, in the sociological field, a comprehensive look at the corporate level, starting from the premise that the university, being the product of society, is a public good, a social heritage; and both his corporeal expression or material as intangible or spiritual, is the product of men and serves them. The Legal Dimension: presents the legal structure of the University. Here the bodies of rules derived from two guiding principles of the institution are: a culture of respect for the law: justice and truth, of which the Legal Dimension considers another fundamental principle is clear. The Political Dimension: represents the summary of the policy wisdom of the institution, its ability to develop networks of concepts to establish lines of congruence between the guiding principles, settled in the Philosophical Dimension; the plot of educational theory, methods, and academic and administrative processes of the academic work. The last operational dimension of the Dimensions Educational Model poses institutional conditions to be created to synthesize and guide the efforts of the University, around the transition from reality to a stage of full development, while searching for the desired future scenarios will be guided by the Mission and Vision towards the light of the educational model. ; Un modelo educativo es sobre todo, algo con que compararse, un paradigma por alcanzar y una guía práctica para orientar el comportamiento de quienes participan en los hechos educativos y administrativos de la institución. El Modelo Educativo conforma un estado de referencia permanente sobre el cual se articulan los procesos sustantivos y adjetivos de la Universidad, que parten de los fines de la educación propuestos en la Constitución, se describen en la Ley General de Educación y son planteados, para ser cumplidos, en la ley orgánica de la Universidad, sus estatutos, reglamentos, y en general, los ordenamientos que la encausan y regulan. El Modelo Educativo, pese a su complejidad y extensión, debe ser considerado primero como una norma indicativa de la institución, pero también como la suma de sus costumbres aceptadas, códigos de conducta no escritos y un modo de ser peculiar en lo político que le confiere un sello distintivo a la universidad. Las Dimensiones del ModeloSiguiendo las definiciones y condiciones anteriores, el Modelo Educativo se compone y armoniza mediante lo que se ha denominado "Dimensiones", como si su fondo y su forma tuvieran una connotación casi geométrica, que indica la dirección de las acciones y abarca las características distintivas del conjunto, como un todo integrado. Para lograrlo se adoptan diversos enfoques, que contienen las razones de orden filosófico, pedagógico, social, normativo, político y operativo con que se construye el quehacer educativo de la Universidad. La conformación del Modelo en Dimensiones se realiza por la necesidad de agrupar en una sola base conceptual articulada los objetos del conocimiento que conforman la esencia y quehacer de la Universidad. En consecuencia, cada Dimensión sirve para agrupar y correlacionar las ideas que la sustentan con los resultados. Una Dimensión es un mapa conceptual que ubica y relaciona los objetos primordiales, las ideas, con las vías para acceder a ellos; las funciones y procesos; los sujetos a quienes se aplican como entes sociales (educandos y educadores) y el conocimiento ligado a los medios para aprehenderlo; las referencias para que sus alcances y características obedezcan a un orden predeterminado y delimitado; y las normas y decisiones para lograrlo, aunadas a los recursos y procedimientos para la práctica y las operaciones. Dimensión Filosófica: La filosofía institucional y educativa como punto de partida del Modelo Educativo, La educación como producto del pensamiento humanoDimensión Pedagógica:Se enuncia, como referencia, la adopción de corrientes pedagógicas y psicológicas asociadas a las potencialidades de los fines universitarios.Dimensión Sociológica: expresa los conceptos básicos para sustentar, en el campo de lo sociológico, una visión integral de alcance institucional, partiendo de la premisa de que la universidad, al ser producto de la sociedad, es un bien público, un patrimonio social; y tanto su expresión corpórea o material como intangible o espiritual, es producto de los hombres y está al servicio de ellos.La Dimensión Jurídica:presenta la estructura jurídica de la Universidad. En ella se muestran los cuerpos de normas que derivan de dos principios rectores de la institución: la justicia y la verdad, de los cuales se desprende la Dimensión Jurídica que considera otro principio fundamental: la cultura de respeto a la ley.La Dimensión Política:representa el resumen de la sabiduría directiva de la institución, de su capacidad para desarrollar redes de conceptos que establezcan líneas de congruencia entre los principios rectores, asentados en la Dimensión Filosófica; la trama de las tesis educativas, los métodos y procesos académicos y administrativos del quehacer académico.Dimensión operativaLa ultima de las Dimensiones del Modelo Educativo plantea las condiciones institucionales que deben crearse para sintetizar y orientar el esfuerzo de la Universidad, en torno a la transición de la realidad, hacia un estadio de pleno desarrollo, en tanto que la búsqueda de los escenarios del futuro deseado será guiada por la Misión y hacia la Visión, a la luz del Modelo Educativo.

Cass Sunstein has a lovely New York Times essay that tries to give us back the word "Liberal." I hope it works. "Liberal" from "Libertas" means, at bottom, freedom. In the 19th century, "liberals" were devoted to personal, economic, and increasing social freedom from government restraint.  "Conservatives" wanted to maintain aristocratic privileges, and government interventions in the traditional way of doing things. The debate was not so obvious. Conservatives defended their view of aristocratic power in a noblesse-oblige concern for little people that the unfettered free market might leave behind, in a way quite  reminiscent of today's elites who think they should run the government in the name of the downtrodden (or "nudge" them, if I can poke a little fun at Sunstein's earlier work). But by the 1970s, the labels had flipped. "Liberals" were advocates of big-state interventionism, in a big tent that included communists and marxists. It became a synonym of "left." "Conservatives" became a strange  alliance of free market economics and social conservatism. The word "classical liberal" or "libertarian" started to be used to refer to heirs of the enlightenment "liberal" tradition, broadly emphasizing individual liberty and limited rule of law government in both economic and social spheres. But broadly, "liberal" came to mean more government intervention and Democrat, while "conservative" came to mean less state intervention and Republican, at least in rhetoric.  But a new force has come to the fore. The heirs of the far-left marxists and communists are now, .. what shall we call them.. perhaps "censorious totalitarian progressives." Sunstein calls them "post liberals." The old alliance between center-left and far left is tearing apart, and Oct 7 was a wake up call for many who had skated over the division. Largely, then, I read Sunstein's article as a declaration of divorce. They are not us, they are not "liberals." And many of you who call yourselves "conservatives," "free marketers" or even "libertarians" should join us to fight the forces of illiberalism left and right, even if by now you probably completely gave up on the New York Times and read the Free Press instead. Rhetoric: Sunstein is brilliantly misleading. He writes what liberalism "is" or what liberals "believe," as if the word were already defined his way. It is not, and the second part of this post quotes another NYT essay with a quite different conception of "liberal." This is an essay about what liberal should mean. I salute that. It's interesting that Sunstein wants to rescue the traditional meaning of "liberal," rather than shade words in current use. "Classical liberal," is mostly the same thing, but currently shades a bit more free market than he'd like. "Neoliberal" is an insult but really describes most of his views. People have turned insults around to proud self-identifiers before.   "Libertarian," probably has less room for the state and conservativism than Sunstein, and most people confuse "libertarian" with "anarchist." It's interesting he never mentions the word. Well, let's rescue "liberal." Here are some excerpts of Sunstein's 37 theses. I reorganized  into topics. What is "liberalism"? 1. Liberals believe in six things: freedom, human rights, pluralism, security, the rule of law and democracy....6. The rule of law is central to liberalism. ...It calls for law that is prospective, allowing people to plan, rather than retroactive, defeating people's expectations. It requires conformity between law on the books and law in the world. It calls for rights to a hearing (due process of law)....Liberalism requires law evenly applied, not "show me the man, and I'll find the crime." It requires a legal system in which each of us is not guilty of "Three Felonies a Day," unprotected unless we are trouble to those in power. 10. Liberals believe that freedom of speech is essential to self-government....11. Liberals connect their opposition to censorship to their commitment to free and fair elections, which cannot exist if people are unable to speak as they wish. ...They agree with ... "the principle of free thought — not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate."   It's freedom, individual dignity, equality before the law and the state. Economics On economic matters, "liberalism" starts with the basic values of the laissez-faire tradition, because the right to transact freely is one of the most basic freedoms there is:15. Liberals prize free markets, insisting that they provide an important means by which people exercise their agency. Liberals abhor monopolies, public or private, on the ground that they are highly likely to compromise freedom and reduce economic growth. At the same time, liberals know that unregulated markets can fail, such as when workers or consumers lack information or when consumption of energy produces environmental harm.On the latter point, Sunstein later acknowledges room for a variety of opinion on just how effective government remedies are for such "failures" of "unregulated markets." I'm a free marketer not because markets are perfect but because governments are usually worse. A point we can respectfully debate with fact and logic.16. Liberals believe in the right to private property. But nothing in liberalism forbids a progressive income tax or is inconsistent with large-scale redistribution from rich to poor. Liberals can and do disagree about the progressive income tax and on whether and when redistribution is a good idea. Many liberals admire Lyndon Johnson's Great Society; many liberals do not.I endorse this as well, which you may find surprising. Economics really has nothing to say about non-distorting transfers. Economists can only point out incentives, and disincentives. Redistribution tends to come with bad incentives. "Liberals" can and do argue about how bad the disincentives are, and if the purported benefits of redistribution are worth it. Cass allows liberals (formerly "conservatives") who "do not" admire extensive federal government social programs, because of their disincentives. Me.17. Many liberals are enthusiastic about the contemporary administrative state; many liberals reject itI also agree. I'm one of those who largely rejects it, but it's a matter of degree on disincentives, government competence, and the severity of the problems being addressed. "Liberals" can productively debate this matter of degree.  Liberalism is a framework for debate, not an answer to these economic questions. Integrating ConservativismIntegrating "conservative" into "liberal" is one of Sunstein's charms, and I agree. He is also trying to find a common ground in the "center," that tussles gently on the size of government while respecting America's founding enlightenment values, and unites many across the current partisan divide. 2...Those who consider themselves to be leftists may or may not qualify as liberals. You can be, at once, a liberal, as understood here, and a conservative; you can be a leftist and illiberal. 22. A liberal might think that Ronald Reagan was a great president and that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was an abomination; a liberal might think that Roosevelt was a great president and that Reagan was an abomination.   "Conserativism" properly means conserving many of the traditions of our society, rather than burning it down once a generation striving for utopia, and having it dissolve into tyranny. Sunstein's "liberalism" is conservative 24. Liberals favor and recognize the need for a robust civil society, including a wide range of private associations that may include people who do not embrace liberalism. They believe in the importance of social norms, including norms of civility, considerateness, charity and self-restraint. They do not want to censor any antiliberals or postliberals, even though some antiliberals or postliberals would not return the favor. On this count, they turn the other cheek. Liberals have antiliberal and postliberal friends.26. .. if people want the government to act in illiberal ways — by, for example, censoring speech, violating the rights of religious believers, preventing certain people from voting, entrenching racial inequality, taking private property without just compensation, mandating a particular kind of prayer in schools or endorsing a particular set of religious convictions — liberals will stand in opposition.The latter includes, finally, a bit of trends on the right that "liberals" do not approve of, and they don't. 28. Some people (mostly on the right) think that liberals oppose traditions or treat traditions cavalierly and that liberalism should be rejected for that reason. In their view, liberals are disrespectful of traditions and want to destroy them. Nothing could be further from the truth. Consider just a few inherited ideals, norms and concepts that liberals have defended, often successfully, in the face of focused attack for decades: republican self-government; checks and balances; freedom of speech; freedom of religion; freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; due process of law; equal protection; private property.29. Liberals do not think it adequate to say that an ideal has been in place for a long time. As Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. put it: "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." Still, liberals agree that if an ideal has been with us for a long time, there might be a lot to say in its favor.A lover of freedom can also admire rule of law, tradition, and custom. Why do we have private property? A illiberal, like many college students fresh to the world, might start from basic philosophical principles, and state that all of the earth's bounty should be shared equally, and head out to the ramparts to seize power. As a philosophical principle, it can sound reasonable. But our society and its laws, traditions, and customs, has thousands of years of experience built up. A village had common fields. People over-grazed them. Putting up fences and allocating rights led to a more prosperous village. The tradition of property rights, and their quite detailed specification and limitation that evolved in our common law, responding to this experience,  along with well-educated citizens' conception of right and virtue, the moral sense of property right that they learn from their forebears, can summarize thousands of years of history, without us needing to remember each case. This thought is what led me in the past to characterize myself as an empirical, conservative, rule-of-law, constitutional and pax-Americana (save that one for later) libertarian, back when the word "liberal" meant something else. But, as Holmes points out, a vibrant society must see that some of this laws and traditions are wrong, or ineffective, and thoughtfully reform them. Property rights once extended to people, after all. Most of all, the 1970s "liberal" but now  "illiberal" view has been that government defines the purpose and meaning of life and society, be it religious purity, socialist utopia, or now the vanguard of the elite ruling on behalf of the pyramid of intersectional victimization. The role of the government is to mold society to that quest. "Conservatives" have thought that the purpose of life and society is defined by individuals, families, churches, communities, scholars, arts, culture,  private institutions of civil society, via lively reasoned debate; society can accommodate great variety in these views,  and the government's purpose is just to enforce simple rules, and keep the debate peaceful, not to define and lead us to the promised land. I read Sunstein, correctly, to restore the word "liberal" to this later view, though it had largely drifted to the former.  Who isn't liberal? The progressive leftWho isn't a "liberal," to Sunstein? If you've been around university campuses lately, you know how much today's "progressives" ("post-liberals") have turned politics into a tribal, warlike affair. This is who Sunstein is really unhappy with, and to whom this essay is a declaration of divorce: 5. ...liberals ... do not like tribalism. ... They are uncomfortable with discussions that start, "I am an X, and you are a Y,"... Skeptical of identity politics, liberals insist that each of us has many different identities and that it is usually best to focus on the merits of issues, not on one or another identity.I would add, liberals evaluate arguments by logic and evidence, not who makes the argument. Liberals accept an enlightenment idea that anything true can be discovered and understood by anyone. Truth is not just listening to "lived experience." 18. Liberals abhor the idea that life or politics is a conflict between friends and enemies.23. Liberals think that those on the left are illiberal if they are not (for example) committed to freedom of speech and viewpoint diversity. They do not like the idea of orthodoxy, including on university campuses or social media platforms. Ad of course, 30. Liberals like laughter. They are anti-anti-laughter.Old joke from my graduate school days: "How many Berkeley marxist progressives does it take to screw in a light bulb?" Answer: "I don't think that kind of humor is appropriate." ****In case you think everyone agrees on this new definition of "liberal," the essay has a link below it to another one by Pamela Paul, "Progressives aren't liberal." Paul's essay also covers some of the history of how the word was used, but in the end uses it in a quite different way from Sunstein.  In the 1960s and 70s, the left proudly used the word in self-description. In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan, who often prefaced [liberal] with a damning "tax and spend," may have been the most effective of bashers. ...Newt Gingrich's political organization GOPAC sent out a memo, "Language: A Key Mechanism of Control," urging fellow Republicans to use the word as a slur.It worked. Even Democrats began avoiding the dread label. In a presidential primary debate in 2007, Hillary Clinton called herself instead a "modern progressive." She avoided the term "liberal" again in 2016.I think Clinton was trying to position herself to the right of what "liberal" had become by 2016.  "Progressive" has come to mean something else. But I may be wrong. Never Trump conservatives tout their bona fides as liberals in the classical, 19th century sense of the word, in part to distinguish themselves from hard-right Trumpists. Others use "liberal" and "progressive" interchangeably, even as what progressivism means in practice today is often anything but liberal — or even progressive, for that matter.In the last sentence she is right. Sunstein is not, as he appears, describing a word as it is widely used today,  but a word as it is slowly becoming used, and as he would like it to be used. liberal values, many of them products of the Enlightenment, include individual liberty, freedom of speech, scientific inquiry, separation of church and state, due process, racial equality, women's rights, human rights and democracy.Here you start to think she's got the same basic big tent as Sunstein.  But not so -- this essay is testament to the enduring sense of the "liberal" word as describing the big-government left, just please not quite so insane as the campus progressives: Unlike "classical liberals" (i.e., usually conservatives), liberals do not see government as the problem, but rather as a means to help the people it serves. Liberals fiercely defend Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Obamacare, the Voting Rights Act and the National Labor Relations Act. They believe government has a duty to regulate commerce for the benefit of its citizens. They tend to be suspicious of large corporations and their tendency to thwart the interests of workers and consumers.Sunstein had room for disagreement on these "fierce" defenses, or at least room for reasoned argument rather than profession of essential belief before you can enter the debate. "Tout their bona fides" above also does not have quite the reach-across-the aisle non partisan flair of Sunstein's essay. I don't think Paul welcomes never-Trump classical liberals in her tent. For Paul, the divorce between "liberal" and "progressive" is real, as for many other "liberals" since the October 7 wake up: Whereas liberals hold to a vision of racial integration, progressives have increasingly supported forms of racial distinction and separation, and demanded equity in outcome rather than equality of opportunity. Whereas most liberals want to advance equality between the sexes, many progressives seem fixated on reframing gender stereotypes as "gender identity" and denying sex differences wherever they confer rights or protections expressly for women. And whereas liberals tend to aspire toward a universalist ideal, in which diverse people come together across shared interests, progressives seem increasingly wedded to an identitarian approach that emphasizes tribalism over the attainment of common ground.It is progressives — not liberals — who argue that "speech is violence" and that words cause harm. These values are the driving force behind progressive efforts to shut down public discourse, disrupt speeches, tear down posters, censor students and deplatform those with whom they disagree.Divisions became sharper after the Oct. 7 Hamas attack, when many progressives did not just express support for the Palestinian cause but, in some cases, even defended the attacks as a response to colonialism, and opposed retaliation as a form of genocide. This brings us to the most troubling characteristic of contemporary progressivism. Whereas liberals tend to pride themselves on acceptance, many progressives have applied various purity tests to others on the left, and according to one recent study on the schism between progressives and liberals, are more likely than liberals to apply public censure to divergent views. This intolerance manifests as a professed preference for avoiding others with different values, a stance entirely antithetical to liberal values.Yes. But no Republicans, please. Unlike Sunstein, Paul's "Liberalism" remains unabashedly partisan. I hope Sunstein's version of the word prevails. In any case, it is nice to see the division between the Woodstock Liberals, previously fellow travelers, from the extreme progressive left, and it is nice to see this word drift back to where it belongs. This is an optimistic post for the future of our country. Happy Thanksgiving. Update: I just ran across Tyler Cowen's Classical Liberals vs. The New Right. Excellent. And I forgot to plug my own "Understanding the Left," which I still think is a great essay though nobody seems to have read it.  

Gene Healy


Last week, the New York Times ran a front-page story admiring President Biden's political acumen on culture-war issues ("Biden Sidesteps Any Notion That He's a 'Flaming Woke Warrior'", NYT, July 4, 2023). You've got to hand it to him, apparently: Biden has "deftly avoided becoming enmeshed in battles over hotly contested social issues" like transgender rights. "At a moment when the American political parties are trading fierce fire," we're told, "the president is staying out of the fray."
The claim is pure malarkey. In fact, Biden has repeatedly engaged the full powers of the presidency in an attempt to impose a forced settlement on issues where the American people are deeply divided.
The analysis, by Times reporter Reid Epstein, is entirely style over substance. Being elderly and somewhat out of touch is the president's secret superpower on social issues, the argument goes. Biden is "white, male, 80 years old, and not particularly up-to-date on the language of the left"; Epstein writes; "the president has not adopted the terminology of progressive activists," and sometimes seems confused by it.
To be fair, it's tough even for non-octogenarians to stay abreast of the ever-proliferating jargon in this area. Last month, Biden's Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, warned unsuspecting Americans of the perils of "biphobia" and "interphobia,"; and last week brought new "health equity" guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on "chestfeeding" infants. (Epstein got a little confused himself; the original version of the article included this perplexing sentence: "[Biden] also does not always remember the words most American politicians use to describe same-sex people.")
But even if, as the Times piece insists, "Mr. Biden has never presented as a left-wing culture warrior," what the president is actually doing with the weapons of executive power ought to count for something. For example:
the president's proposed Title IX edicts would give him the power to make national rules about which kid gets to use which bathroom and who gets to play on the girls' team for every K-12 public school and practically every college in America;
a rulemaking put forward by Biden's Department of Health and Human Services would require doctors and hospitals to provide "gender-affirming care"— puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and "top" and "bottom" sex-change surgeries—including for minor children. Private insurers—and the taxpayer, via Medicaid—will be required to foot the bill;
and in the president's June 2022 "Executive Order on Advancing Equality for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and Intersex Individuals," he proposes sending the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) after doctors practicing "conversion therapy," which may be defined broadly enough to include psychologists who resist immediately forking over puberty blockers.
"Staying out of the fray"? C'mon, man.
Millions of Americans believe that medical intervention for trans-identifying minors is compassionate "gender-affirming care"; millions more believe it amounts to experimenting on children in the midst of social contagion. The state of the medical evidence here is "worryingly weak"; but even if it wasn't, the debate's not likely to be settled by telling people to shut up and "trust the science."
Biden's attempt to force a settlement on transgender issues points to a larger problem with "the deformation of our governmental structure" toward one-man rule. The original constitutional design required broad consensus for broad policy changes, but as law professors John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport warn in an important recent article, "Presidential Polarization":
"now the president can adopt such changes unilaterally…. Domestically, Congress's delegation of policy decisions to the executive branch allows the President's administration to create the most important regulations of our economic and social life. The result is relatively extreme regulations that can shift radically between administrations of different parties."

Florida Governor Ron DeSantis is running for president, and he has his own views on medical treatment for gender dysphoria: he says it amounts to making children "guinea pigs" and "mutilating them." If elected, he'll certainly take inspiration from Biden's FTC move—maybe he'll even encourage a few creative prosecutions under the federal Female Genital Mutilation law.
Alexander Hamilton supposed that "energy in the executive" would lead to "steady administration of the laws." In the service of presidential culture-warring, that energy can mean whipsawing between "compulsory" and "forbidden" in four to eight-year cycles, depending on which party manages to seize the White House.
Worse still, as McGinnis and Rappaport note:
The imperial administrative presidency also raises the stakes of any presidential election, making each side fear that the other will enjoy largely unchecked and substantial power in many areas of policy.

That fear encourages the dangerous sentiment that every election is a "Flight 93 Election": charge the cockpit, do or die. The relentless growth of federal power—and its concentration in the executive branch—has made our government a catalyst of social strife.
Having a president who actually stays out of the culture-war fray isn't just a worthy goal: under current conditions it may be essential to the "domestic Tranquility" our federal government is supposed to ensure. But unless we expect them to refrain out of the goodness of their hearts, we'll need structural reforms that limit their power to intervene.

The paper analyses nine Roma families who lived in Stupnik Municipality; more precisely, in the villages of Žitarka and Razborišće, on the eve of World War II. The research draws from a questionnaire used by the municipal authorities in late August 1939 to survey and register the Roma men and women from those families, seeking to implement a policy of the Banovina authorities aimed at better controlling the migration of Roma people. Nowadays, these files are kept at the State Archives in Zagreb, in the holdings of the Administrative Municipality of Stupnik. The analysis of these data served as a basis for examining the demographic and socio-economic structure of individual Roma families in inter-war Croatia, more specifically, in the Banovina of Croatia. The first piece of data from the 1939 census of Stupnik Roma that can be analysed is their demographic structure. The average age of the total of 30 registered Roma was 26.9 years, which indicates a middle age structure. Roma parents were on average 35.2 years old, while the average age of their children was 16.4 years, which merely confirms their middle age structure. These data correspond to the age structure of Roma in other areas of inter-war Croatia, where approximately 44% of all Roma registered in the Sava Banovina in 1931 were between 20 and 59 years old. The family structure shows that the nine registered Roma families had an average of 3.5 members, while three families had no children. Almost all families consisted of a married couple with or without children, while only one family included a mother-in-law (husband›s mother). This file also reveals whether the Roma were legally married or lived in a "concubinage", i.e. in an extramarital union. Half of the Roma couples were legally married, while the other half were unmarried. The issue of marriage legality is followed by the issue of their attitudes to religion, especially when it comes to the baptism of children. All Roma interviewed stated that they had been baptised, as well as their children, which suggests that the registered Roma from Stupnik were religious insofar as they and their children had been baptised, but the documents themselves provide no insight into their personal attitude toward religion. A review of the data from the Roma census enables an analysis of their economic position and migration routes. All registered Roma people stated that they were engaged in agriculture on small plots of land. When it comes to migration, it is important to point out that those Roma lived a sedentary lifestyle. Comparison between the birthplace of the registered Roma and the place of their residence in Stupnik municipality shows that they had been migrating only within the wider Zagreb area. In addition, data were collected on their plans to emigrate from their (Stupnik) municipality, with all registered Roma stating that they intended to stay in that area, which further underlines the high level of their social integration. The final question of the interviews with the Roma was related to military service. These data reveal that a part of the Roma served in the army during World War I, while the second part was declared unfit for the army, although some of them also took part in military operations during the war. The analysis of the above data leads to certain conclusions. In 1939, nine Roma families with a total of 27 members lived in Stupnik municipality. They were permanent residents of the villages of Žitarka and Razborišće. Their average age of 26 corresponds to the average age of registered Roma in the Sava Banovina. Most Roma families consisted of a mother and father with children, while only one of them included a mother-in-law. Half of the Roma partners were legally married, while the other half were unmarried or living in concubinage. It is interesting to note that all registered Roma had been baptised, which can be explained by a certain level of adaptation to the local environment. The analysis of the above data reveals that the majority of Roma households were engaged in agriculture, while a minor part were workers. The Stupnik authorities were particularly interested in where the Roma had immigrated from and whether they intended to stay or relocate. All registered Roma were born and lived near Stupnik municipality, mostly in the areas of Sv. Klara, Sv. Nedjelja and Samobor. The question concerning military service also reveals the attitude of the Roma towards state authorities. These data are diverse, too. While some stated that they had actively fought in World War I, others had been declared unfit. Further research into the history of the Stupnik Roma shows that the municipal authorities registered Roma twice in two years (in May 1940 and in July 1941). That was in line with the local provisions of official authorities for resolving the issue of relations with the Roma. Those Roma were also victims of the Ustasha genocidal policy of Roma extermination. In early June 1942, they were forcibly evicted and deported to the Jasenovac concentration camp, where they were killed. This historicaldemographic and socio-economic analysis of the Roma community in a certain area aims to contribute to a better understanding of the history of the Roma in Croatia.

ABSTRAK Pemberdayaan potensi-potensi di sektor pertanian daerah untuk meningkatkan kemakmuranmembutuhkan kajian perwilayahan komoditas pertanian. Kajian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui karakteristik kelembagaan dan merumuskan langkah-langkah strategis pemberdayaannya untuk mendukung perwilayahan komoditas pertanian. Hasil kajian mengenai kelembagaan pertanian di Kabupaten Manggarai Barat (KMB), khususnya kelembagaan pertanahan adat menunjukkan bahwa sistem kelembagaan yang berlaku di kalangan masyarakat perkotaan (urban community) dan juga masyarakat pinggiran kota (periferi) telah terjadi dualisme. Sebagian mengacu pada hukum positif sedangkan yang lain mengacu pada hukum adat. Dan di kalangan pedesaan, semuanya masih lembaga pertanahan adat. Struktur Lembaga pertanahan adat tersebut secara hirarkhis (dari atas ke bawah) terdiri dari Tua Golo, Tua Beo, dan Tua Batu. Fungsi dari masing-masing komponen, yaitu: Tua Golo merupakan kepala wilayah sebuah perbukitan (golo), pemilik tanah dan pemegang kekuasaan pemerintahan tertinggi. Dalam urusan pertanahan, TuaGolo dibantu oleh Tua Teno yang bertugas dalam pembagian tanah di wilayah kekuasaannya ini kepadawarga masyarakat yang ingin memilikinya, baik untuk pemukiman maupun untuk lahan pertanian. Tua Beo adalah kepala-kepala wilayah yang berada di bawahkekuasaan seorang Tua Golo. Wilayah pemerintahan mereka mencakup beberapa kampung. Sedangkan Tua Batu merupakan pemegang kekuasaan pemerintahan terendah yaitu pada level sebuah kampung atau komunitas pertanian, dimana warganya terdiri dari beberapa rumpun keluarga petani yang senasab, atau memiliki hubungan kekerabatan terdekat diantara sesama mereka. Masyarakat Manggarai Barathingga dewasa ini masih mengakui eksistensi kekuasaan banyak Tua Golo yang tersebar di seluruh wilayah KMB. Dalam rangka perwilayahan komoditas pertanian, maka eksistensi dari kelembagaan pertanahan adat ini merupakan modal social yang potensial. Sekurang –kurangnya ada dua hal yang perlu diperhatikan dalam rangka pemberdayaannnya, yaitu :Pertama, pemetaan penyebaran Tua Golo dan Tua Teno serta wilayah kekuasaannya atas lahan pertanian yang tersebar di berbagai wilayah kecamatan,termasuk jumlah petani, luas lahan pertanian, serta kesesuaian lahan dengan jenis-jenis komoditas pertanian.Kedua, pembenahaan sistem norma pertanahan yang sesuai dengan perkembangan mutakhir, yang bertujuan untuk: mengendalikan jual-beli tanah dengan "pihak luar", serta mencegah alih fungsi lahan pertanian,mengendalikan penggunaan lahan sesuai kelas-kelas kemampuan tanah, mengkoordinasikan kegiatan petani untuk menggunakan lahan pertanian potensial dengan berusahatani jenis-jenis komoditas yang direkomendasikan. Ketiga, memberdayakan para pemangku adat dalam kelembagaan pertanahan adat agar mereka bertanggungjawab atas kelestarian sumberdaya alam dan lingkungan hidup. Kata kunci : Perwilayahan komoditas, lembaga pertanahan adat, pemberdayaan. ABSTRACT The empowerment of the region's agricultural potential sector to increase social prosperity, requires a scientific study of agricultural commodity routes. This study aims to determine the characteristics of the institution and formulate strategic steps for its empowerment to support zoning of agricultural commodities. The results of a study on agricultural institutions in West Manggarai Regency (KMB), especially tribal agrarian institutions, shows that the institutional system prevailing in urban communities (urban communities) and also suburban communities (periphery) has occurred dualism. Some of them refer to positive law while others refer to customary/traditional law. Meanwhile, among rural areas, all of them are still refer to customary/traditional land institutions. This tribal agrarian institution hierarchically (from top to bottom) consists of Tua Golo, Tua Beo, and Tua Batu. The function of each component, namely: Tua Golo is the head of a hilly area (golo), the owner of the land and the holder of the highest power. In land affairs, Tua Golo, assisted by Tua Teno, who distributes land in his territory to residents who want to own it, both for settlement and for agricultural land. Tua Beo are regional heads who are under the control of an Tua Golo. Their administrative area includes several villages. While Tua Batu is the holder of the lowest governmental power, namely at the level of a village or agricultural community, where the residents consist of several clumps of peasant families who are similar, or have the closest kinship among themselves. The people of West Manggarai (KMB) until now are willing to acknowledge the existence of the power of many Tua Golo who are well known throughout the KMB area. In the framework of zoning agricultural commodities, the existence of this tribal agrarian institutionis a potential social capital. There are at least two things that need to be considered in the framework of their empowerment, namely: First, mapping the distribution of Tua Golo and Tua Teno and their territory over agricultural land which is scattered in various sub-districts, including the number of farmers, the area of agricultural land, and the suitability of land according to types of agricultural commodities. Second, reforming the land norm system in accordance with the latest developments, which aims to: control the sale and purchase of land with "outsiders", as well as prevent the conversion of agricultural land functions, control land use according to land capability classes, coordinate farmer activities to use land agricultural potential by cultivating the recommended types of commodities. Third, empowering tribal stakeholders in tribal agrarian institutions so that they are responsible for the preservation of natural resources and the environment. Keywords : Commodity zoning, tribal agrarian institution, empowerment