Suchergebnisse

Aus der Dokumentation werden viele Einzelheiten des Niedergangs der Jugoslawischen Volksarmee sowie der Dilettantismus und der Zynismus der führenden Politiker Jugoslawiens ersichtlich. Bei ihren Ausführungen stützen sich die Autoren insbesondere auf zwei Veröffentlichungen von Personen, die in der Phase 1989 bis 1991 im Zentrum der politischen Macht standen: die bereits 1994 publizierten Memoiren des damaligen Verteidigungsministers Veljko Kadijevic und die 1995 veröffentlichten Tagebuchnotizen des unter Milosevic zum serbischen Nationalisten evoluierten Altkommunisten Borisav Jovic. (BIOst-Mrk)

At the end of 2013, there were about 3.3 million people who remained forcibly displaced within the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa. Of these, 82 percent were internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 18 percent refugees; 64 percent were under 18 years old. This Report analyzes the extent, causes, and character of this forced displacement, with particular attention to certain situations.

An independent and comprehensive justice system is the bedrock of any democracy, emblematic of the rule of law and public trust in government. A country's judicial efficacy is a measure of its standing in international relations, influencing its ability to ensure national security as well as the integrity of the alliances it is part of. For Ukraine, currently engaged in a tumultuous conflict and aspiring for NATO integration, bringing its military justice system in line with international standards transcends legal necessity and becomes a strategic imperative.Current State and ChallengesThe historical backdrop of the Ukrainian judiciary is marked by repeated reform efforts of varying success and compromised by corruption and inefficiency. This becomes especially relevant in the context of the ongoing war. It is not surprising that the majority of corruption cases revolve around armament and aid supplies. A more recent source of discontent is the controversial drafts of conscription legislation, which have sparked widespread debate and criticism from both officials and the public, largely because potential draftees fear losing their rights and facing injustice as a result of the lawless behavior of conscription officers and law enforcement agencies.War usually increases executive power and reduces personal freedoms, making the judiciary as the main protector of individual rights.Analyzing public support for military operations is pivotal for policymakers. Recent research has highlighted the lack of data from non-Western and minor powers (NWMP), which have been principal actors in post-World War II conflicts. If similar surveys were conducted in Ukraine, it is likely that a major deterrent to conscription would be the uncertainty of the environment, particularly the absence of law. Although public data of this nature are unavailable, it is reasonable to hypothesize that a credible military justice system would positively address this issue.Ukraine's Military Justice System TodayThe military justice system in Ukraine has often been viewed as anachronistic. Key components, such as military courts and the military prosecutor's institute, were systematically dismantled in 2010 and 2019, respectively. Despite these changes, the military justice framework has been retained and now consists of three main bodies.The first is the Military Law Enforcement Service (MLES) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), which essentially functions as a military police service with significantly reduced capabilities. The MLES cannot investigate crimes. Its functions are limited to initiating investigations, supporting legal enforcement activities, and enforcing administrative punishments and judgments.Second is the Special Defense Prosecutor's Office, founded as a department in May 2023 by Andriy Kostin, who exploited a legislative loophole regarding prosecutors that allows the prosecutor general to establish special departments within the office.Finally, the Code of Internal Service of the AFU outlines the expansive role of the deputy brigade commander on legal matters, tasked with addressing the wide range of remaining legal issues.It is notable that the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Security Service, and the National Police have retained their jurisdiction over the investigation of certain crimes. This leads to jurisdictional overlap and additional procedural issues, ultimately resulting in justice failures.Russia's full-scale invasion exposed the deficiencies of this system. Reports of human rights violations within the military have become a toxic issue for the Ukrainian government and highlighted the issue. The absence of a structured military justice system undermines not only the discipline and efficacy of the armed forces but also public trust in the military as an institution. It also gets in the way of Ukraine realizing its NATO aspirations.Legislative Initiatives and AnalysisRecent legislative efforts, particularly the Draft Law on the Military Justice of Ukraine (MJU), demonstrate a recognition of the problem. However, the draft law falls short in several key areas. It lacks clarity in defining the roles and responsibilities of the proposed MJU, especially concerning its advisory capacity in operational and international law. Moreover, the draft law does not provide for credible oversight mechanisms or ethical standards. This gap is critical, as a military justice system devoid of robust oversight and ethical governance is susceptible to the same pitfalls of corruption and inefficiency that have historically plagued Ukraine's judiciary. Additionally, the draft's silence on international cooperation limits its potential to align with common, established standards, a crucial aspect for Ukraine's defense strategy and international relations.Among other initiatives we can mention the efforts of the Ministry of Defense to develop military police, yet the details of this initiative are unknown.JAG Corps Model as a SolutionTo address these gaps, Ukraine might consider established military justice models such as the U.S. Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAG Corps), the legal branch of each uniformed service. The JAG model offers a comprehensive approach to military legal services, encompassing a range of functions essential for a modern military force. These functions include providing advice on administrative and operational law and guidance for commanders on the law of war, interpreting rules of engagement, handling government contracts, and providing legal assistance to service members, including aid in personal legal matters and ensuring their rights are protected.Adopting a similar model would require Ukraine to address several key areas. It would entail, first, establishing clear roles and functions for military legal officers across various fields of practice, including litigation, general advisory, commercial law, international relations, and operational law. Second, the model must incorporate a framework for continuous legal education and training for both the troops and the officers of the proposed MJU. Third, integrating a model akin to the JAG into both the existing military structure and the procedural rules would require meticulous legal drafting.Why It Matters Reforming Ukraine's military justice system can and should address both immediate and long-term needs. Enhancing the draft law to clearly articulate the functions and authority of the MJU, combined with essential Rules of Procedures and establishing credible oversight mechanisms and ethical standards, is crucial for maintaining integrity and public trust in the military justice system.Ukraine might also seek international guidance in this regard from NATO-aligned countries to better align its military justice practices with international standards, implementing a model akin to the JAG Corps. This would not only ensure that Ukraine's military justice system was equipped to handle the complexities of modern military operations while upholding the highest standards of legal and ethical conduct, it would also reinforce Ukraine's commitment to the rule of law and democratic values.Reforming the military justice system in Ukraine is an urgent matter and a strategic imperative that demands immediate attention and action, of a piece with Ukraine's broader goals of democratic reform.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute

An independent and comprehensive justice system is the bedrock of any democracy, emblematic of the rule of law and public trust in government. A country's judicial efficacy is a measure of its standing in international relations, influencing its ability to ensure national security as well as the integrity of the alliances it is part of. For Ukraine, currently engaged in a tumultuous conflict and aspiring for NATO integration, bringing its military justice system in line with international standards transcends legal necessity and becomes a strategic imperative.Current State and ChallengesThe historical backdrop of the Ukrainian judiciary is marked by repeated reform efforts of varying success and compromised by corruption and inefficiency. This becomes especially relevant in the context of the ongoing war. It is not surprising that the majority of corruption cases revolve around armament and aid supplies. A more recent source of discontent is the controversial drafts of conscription legislation, which have sparked widespread debate and criticism from both officials and the public, largely because potential draftees fear losing their rights and facing injustice as a result of the lawless behavior of conscription officers and law enforcement agencies.War usually increases executive power and reduces personal freedoms, making the judiciary as the main protector of individual rights.Analyzing public support for military operations is pivotal for policymakers. Recent research has highlighted the lack of data from non-Western and minor powers (NWMP), which have been principal actors in post-World War II conflicts. If similar surveys were conducted in Ukraine, it is likely that a major deterrent to conscription would be the uncertainty of the environment, particularly the absence of law. Although public data of this nature are unavailable, it is reasonable to hypothesize that a credible military justice system would positively address this issue.Ukraine's Military Justice System TodayThe military justice system in Ukraine has often been viewed as anachronistic. Key components, such as military courts and the military prosecutor's institute, were systematically dismantled in 2010 and 2019, respectively. Despite these changes, the military justice framework has been retained and now consists of three main bodies.The first is the Military Law Enforcement Service (MLES) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), which essentially functions as a military police service with significantly reduced capabilities. The MLES cannot investigate crimes. Its functions are limited to initiating investigations, supporting legal enforcement activities, and enforcing administrative punishments and judgments.Second is the Special Defense Prosecutor's Office, founded as a department in May 2023 by Andriy Kostin, who exploited a legislative loophole regarding prosecutors that allows the prosecutor general to establish special departments within the office.Finally, the Code of Internal Service of the AFU outlines the expansive role of the deputy brigade commander on legal matters, tasked with addressing the wide range of remaining legal issues.It is notable that the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Security Service, and the National Police have retained their jurisdiction over the investigation of certain crimes. This leads to jurisdictional overlap and additional procedural issues, ultimately resulting in justice failures.Russia's full-scale invasion exposed the deficiencies of this system. Reports of human rights violations within the military have become a toxic issue for the Ukrainian government and highlighted the issue. The absence of a structured military justice system undermines not only the discipline and efficacy of the armed forces but also public trust in the military as an institution. It also gets in the way of Ukraine realizing its NATO aspirations.Legislative Initiatives and AnalysisRecent legislative efforts, particularly the Draft Law on the Military Justice of Ukraine (MJU), demonstrate a recognition of the problem. However, the draft law falls short in several key areas. It lacks clarity in defining the roles and responsibilities of the proposed MJU, especially concerning its advisory capacity in operational and international law. Moreover, the draft law does not provide for credible oversight mechanisms or ethical standards. This gap is critical, as a military justice system devoid of robust oversight and ethical governance is susceptible to the same pitfalls of corruption and inefficiency that have historically plagued Ukraine's judiciary. Additionally, the draft's silence on international cooperation limits its potential to align with common, established standards, a crucial aspect for Ukraine's defense strategy and international relations.Among other initiatives we can mention the efforts of the Ministry of Defense to develop military police, yet the details of this initiative are unknown.JAG Corps Model as a SolutionTo address these gaps, Ukraine might consider established military justice models such as the U.S. Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAG Corps), the legal branch of each uniformed service. The JAG model offers a comprehensive approach to military legal services, encompassing a range of functions essential for a modern military force. These functions include providing advice on administrative and operational law and guidance for commanders on the law of war, interpreting rules of engagement, handling government contracts, and providing legal assistance to service members, including aid in personal legal matters and ensuring their rights are protected.Adopting a similar model would require Ukraine to address several key areas. It would entail, first, establishing clear roles and functions for military legal officers across various fields of practice, including litigation, general advisory, commercial law, international relations, and operational law. Second, the model must incorporate a framework for continuous legal education and training for both the troops and the officers of the proposed MJU. Third, integrating a model akin to the JAG into both the existing military structure and the procedural rules would require meticulous legal drafting.Why It Matters Reforming Ukraine's military justice system can and should address both immediate and long-term needs. Enhancing the draft law to clearly articulate the functions and authority of the MJU, combined with essential Rules of Procedures and establishing credible oversight mechanisms and ethical standards, is crucial for maintaining integrity and public trust in the military justice system.Ukraine might also seek international guidance in this regard from NATO-aligned countries to better align its military justice practices with international standards, implementing a model akin to the JAG Corps. This would not only ensure that Ukraine's military justice system was equipped to handle the complexities of modern military operations while upholding the highest standards of legal and ethical conduct, it would also reinforce Ukraine's commitment to the rule of law and democratic values.Reforming the military justice system in Ukraine is an urgent matter and a strategic imperative that demands immediate attention and action, of a piece with Ukraine's broader goals of democratic reform.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute

Waiting for the Revolution to End explores the Syrian revolution through the experiences of citizens in exile. Based on more than three years of embedded fieldwork with Syrians displaced in the border city of Gaziantep (southern Turkey), the book places the Syrian revolution and its tragic aftermath under ethnographic scrutiny. It charts the evolution from peaceful uprising (2011) to armed confrontation (2012), descent into fully fledged conflict (2013) and finally to proxy war (2015), to propose an understanding of revolution beyond success and failure.

While the Assad regime remains in place, the Syrian revolution (al-thawra) still holds a transformational power that can be located on intimate and world-making scales. Charlotte Al-Khalili traces the unintended consequences of revolution and its unexpected consequences to reveal the reshaping of Syrian life-worlds and exiles' evolving theorizations, experiences and imaginations of al-thawra. She describes the in-between spatio-temporal realm inhabited by Syrians displaced to Turkey as they await the revolution's outcomes, and maps the revolution's multidimensional and multi-scalar effects on their everyday life. By following the chronology of events inside Syria and Syrians' geography of displacement, the book makes the relation between revolution and displacement its centerpiece, both as an ethnographic object and an analytical device.

Praise for Waiting for the Revolution to End

'Waiting for the Revolution to End is essential reading for scholars and students wanting to understand the temporal and affective orientations at play in the aftermath of the Syrian revolution. Al-Khalili presents a lucid ethnography of revolutionary hopes, defeat, and displacement hereby offering a sustained theoretical engagement with the social, political and religious forces that undergird Syrian existence.'
Andreas Bandak, University of Copenhagen

'Although so much has been said about the Syrian revolution, surprisingly little has been written about what it did to the selves, hopes, and lives of those who joined it but were defeated. Waiting for the Revolution to End is a very important and urgently needed contribution that tells the story of the revolution as it is understood by ordinary Syrians who turned into revolutionaries by participating in the uprising from its beginnings in 2011 and 2012, when the possibility of a non-violent overcoming of a violent regime still appeared within reach. Writing through the experience of living among displaced Syrians in Gaziantep, Al-Khalili tells us something that political analyses from above so often miss: the transformational power of participation in the revolution, and the cosmogonic change it effected in the minds and lives of people while they were tragically defeated. Speaking of defeat rather than failure of Syrian revolutionaries, Waiting for the Revolution to End *weaves a rich, emphatic, convincing, tragic yet also hopeful story of the possibility of dignity.'
Samuli Schielke, Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient

'Charlotte Al-Khalili's stunning and moving ethnography is a landmark in the study of revolution, social change and mobility. Through an extraordinary portrayal of the lives, hopes and fears of Syria's exiled revolutionaries in their "capital", Al-Khalili transforms understandings of how migration shapes revolutionary subjectivity, how grassroots revolutionary activists theorize revolutionary outcomes, and how revolutionaries reorganize families and networks to keep ideals of social transformation alive.'
Alice Wilson, University of Sussex

Last month, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted to advance the FY2025 NDAA to the Senate floor, which includes a significant provision that would establish a regional contingency stockpile of U.S. weapons in Taiwan. This stockpile could mirror the shortcomings observed in the War Reserve Stockpile Allies-Israel (WRSA-I) program, and could have equally disastrous consequences for accountability. The Israel-based reserve's lack of oversight, transparency, and accountability mechanisms serves as a cautionary tale for why such a model should not be replicated in Taiwan.Insufficient checks, balances, and transparencyThe Israel-based reserve does not have the necessary checks and balances to ensure end use monitoring of stockpiled weapons by Israeli forces. This absence of oversight mechanisms has allowed for withdrawals of military equipment without public documentation or congressional scrutiny. In Taiwan, a similar lack of oversight could result in the unregulated transfer and use of U.S. weapons, which carries with it potential to stoke regional tensions with additional military activity and use of force.The Israel-based reserve's operations are also shrouded in secrecy, with no public inventory or clear policy guidance on allowable transfers of materials. This opacity has enabled unknown amounts of weapons transfers, in the shadow of ongoing conflict and civilian harm, without any public or legislative scrutiny. Establishing a similar stockpile in Taiwan at a time of heightened geopolitical strain in the Taiwan Strait, could diminish transparency further and erode trust in U.S. foreign policy decisions.Legal, ethical, and escalatory concernsOne of the most concerning aspects of the Israel-based reserve program is its potential to embolden aggressive Israeli military actions by providing easy access to advanced weaponry. In the volatile context of Taiwan, where tensions with China are perpetually high, the presence of a U.S. weapons stockpile could encourage more confrontational postures. This in turn could trigger an arms race, destabilizing the region and posing significant risks to global security.The legal frameworks governing the Israel-based reserve, such as the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act, have also proven inadequate in ensuring comprehensive reporting and accountability. Recent legislative efforts, such as the emergency supplemental H.R.815 and the 2023 Securing American Arms Act, have further eroded these constraints, reducing oversight and allowing for more discretionary transfers of defense articles. Replicating this flawed legal and operational structure in Taiwan could similarly lead to U.S. arms being used in violation of international law and human rights standards, or otherwise being diverted to unintended end users.Enhanced oversight and transparencyTo avoid replicating the dangers of WRSA-I, any consideration of a U.S. weapons stockpile in Taiwan must be accompanied by stringent oversight and transparency measures. Congress should mandate comprehensive reporting on all arms transfers and establish robust mechanisms to ensure these weapons are used in accordance with international law and ethical standards. Without such measures, the risks of unchecked militarization and regional instability far outweigh any perceived strategic benefits.The shortcomings of the Israel-based reserve program provide a clear warning against establishing a similar weapons stockpile in Taiwan. The lack of oversight, transparency, and accountability, coupled with the potential for human rights abuses and regional destabilization, make such a stockpile a highly risky and potentially disastrous proposition. The U.S. must learn from the WRSA-I experience and enact responsible arms transfer policies that promote stability, not undermine it.

A legal monster of the twentieth century: from technological warfare to its humanistic overcoming?
ABSTRACT: The Author attempts to reconsider the dispute that has opened between Russie and Ukraine in the light not only of the evident flagrance of an abrupt, illegitimate 'punitive expedition' by Moscow towards a key territory for the control of the Black Sea, but also in the context of the great game of a power confrontation, never really concluded, between the two military blocs, despite the agreements on nuclear desarmament stipulated between Reagan and Gorbachev in the constituent phase of an unprecedented Russian Federation, after the passage from the start of a troubled liquidation of the Stalinism to the announced overcoming of the blockade policy. A context, against which NATO's failure to comply with the mutual commitment of the two parties to the complete cessation of mutual hostile conduct, prior to perestroika, seems full and flagrant. The essay recognizes in the event the clear failure of an apparent opening of trust towards the post-communist counterpart, internal to the substantial maintenance of an armed peace with a world to be kept for a long time in a sort of quarantine on the margins of "Western civilisation", for an indefinite period and under the strict control of an internationalized military apparatus of exorbitant dimensions. A dead-end road, destined to produce even partial moments of exploitation of the repressive functions of the UN, rather than supporting its fundamental role of "saving future generations from the scourge of war". To such a logic the A. tries to escape, in an attempt to bring the cooperation relationships laboriously woven into the fabric of international relation back to a framework of substantial good faith, from human subjects whose trust and honor always seem due, until rigorously proven otherwise; in the belief that progressive success can only come to these relations by restoring a framework that favours the basic ethical choices on the UN statute, as an indispensable background for constructive settling of potential situations of conflict of interest, which arise between member states in the course of their peaceful cooperation towards an orderly sharing of the planet's resources.
SOMMARIO: 1. Preambolo - 2. La guerra 'giusta' in Occidente. Tra Tarda Antichità e Medioevo del diritto - 3. (segue) Evoluzione del problema nell'età dell'imperialismo - 4. Interrogativi sulla resistenza non violenta come verità più profonda sull'uomo - 5. (segue) Fra realismo politico e profezia del Regno (Mt. V, 38-48) - 6. Centralità della Croce: l'imitazione del processo a Gesù negli "Acta martyrum" - 7. (segue) Fede e ragione. Il doppio registro dell'economia salvifica - 8. Quadro sintetico dei residui ostacoli sulla via di un mondo diverso e solidale - 9. (segue) Sull'incompatibilità tra deterrenza e trattativa. L'ammonimento cinese - 10. Etica confuciana, diritto romano, diritto canonico. La Cina, oggi - 11. Dal 'maschio alfa' al giudice. Agli albori del divieto di vendetta privata - 12. (segue) Su un'Autorità addetta al controllo dell'aggressività interstatale - 13. Verso una nuova guerra 'giusta'? Dubbi di fondo sulla nozione di aggressione - 14. Una NATO senza legge verso un gioco, di cui nessuno è responsabile? - 15 (segue) Sottrarre la neutralizzazione all'autonomia degli stati? - 16. È già irricevibile una tardiva 'actio finium regundorum' sotto garanzia ONU? - 17. Quali altre vie per la missione di una 'Russia eterna', nella fraternità dei popoli? - 18 (segue) Quasi una conclusione.

Статтю присвячено нетривалому періоду панування Директорії Української Народної Республіки в повітовому центрі Херсонської губернії м. Єлисавет (українізована назва міста Єлисаветград). Ідеться про перехід міста і повіту під владу Директорії, про антигетьманський переворот, здійснений сотником Михайлом Вербицьким за підтримки місцевого осередку «Українського національного союзу», а також формування збройних сил УНР у місті та повіті. Розглядається діяльність різних органів місцевого самоуправління та їхні взаємини зі збройними силами Директорії, а також процес поступового поширення анархії, перебіг основних збройних конфліктів на території повіту між різними політичними угрупованнями, а також конфлікт із німецьким контингентом, що мав за умовами Комп'єнського перемир'я залишити територію повіту. У статті також ідеться про падіння влади Директорії та спробу організувати повстання проти петлюрівських військ. Невдалий початок повстання призвів до масштабного єврейського погрому та пограбування міського майна. Спростовується найбільш поширена версія про керівництво повстання з боку більшовиків, пояснюється основна мотивація керівництва повстанням. ; The article is dedicated to a short period of the power of the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic in the city of Elizavetgrad, a district center of Kherson province, in November 1918 – February 1919. In November 1918, the city was under the control of the government of the Hetman of the Ukrainian State Pavlo Skoropadsky. However, in rural communities of Elizavetgrad district, the insurgent movement had already grown in strength, which eventually led to the downfall of the Ukrainian State. The anti-Hetman coup d'état led by Captain Mikhail Verbitsky, which was supported by the local branch of the «Ukrainian National Union», had a peaceful character to establish control over the city and district, as well as military formations under the authority of the Directory of the UPR. In this article, there were demonstrated main measures of the UPR military command to conduct military conscription in the district, as well as material resources for the defence of the UPR. The article also concerns the multi-power system in the district: the military authorities of the Directory of the UPR, the local self-government, and the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. The City Council was directly concerned on the city economy, as well as maintaining law and order. For this purpose, there was created a committee for public safety, which commanded the home guards (city voluntary police) and the former Hetman's guard. The Soviet of Workers' Deputies was virtually inactive, but exploiting the trade unions, it struggled for the signing of a collective workers' agreement under the leadership of the Elvorty plant. In December 1918 – January 1919, anarchy gradually spreads in the district. Numerous armed formations and criminal gangs spring up and conflict with the German contingent which had to evacuate the territory of the district according to the Compiegne Armistice. Under these circumstances, the military leadership of the UPR began to take the necessary measures to mobilize its units and overcome anarchy in the city and the district. However, since the end of January, the situation in the province was aggravated due to the activation of the Bolsheviks, the White Guards and the anarchists. The details of the offensive of the Military Revolutionary Committee against the UPR and of the pogrom of Jews, 1–5 February 1919 are also showed in this article. The cause of the Red uprising and the reasons for its defeat are demonstrated. The paper also concerns the downfall of the UPR and the establishment of the Soviet power in the city.

The present article is the result of reflecting, from social bioethics, on gender conflicts and the need to link masculinities both to gender studies and to social movements and public policies. A genealogy of certain social forces that have invigorated gender studies from the understanding of gender-based violence, public health, food and environmental degradation is presented in terms of differences and bio-problems. From this perspective, there are some challenges that society faces in connecting these understandings and change strategies, when it comes to building a horizon of political action. From public policies, society and academia, it is necessary to continue working on the structural factors that perpetuate violence against women, the legitimization of violence among men and their enrollment in armed groups, as well as the promotion of the exercise of paternity and the ethics of care and their impact on politics and the economy. These topics need to be debated in order to build more egalitarian societies. ; El presente artículo es el resultado de un ejercicio de reflexión desde la bioética social de los conflictos de género y la necesidad de vincular las masculinidades tanto en el campo de estudios de género como en los movimientos sociales y las políticas públicas. Se presenta una genealogía de algunas fuerzas sociales que han dinamizado los estudios de género a partir de comprender la violencia basada en el género, la salud pública, la alimentación y la degradación ambiental, en clave diferencial y de bioproblemas. Desde esta perspectiva se plantean algunos retos que enfrenta la sociedad al vincular estas comprensiones y estrategias de cambio, si de construir un horizonte de accionar político se trata. Desde las políticas públicas, la sociedad y la academia, es necesario continuar un trabajo frente a los factores estructurales que hacen que permanezcan las violencias contra las mujeres, la legitimación de violencia entre hombres y la vinculación a grupos armados, así como la promoción del ejercicio de las paternidades y las éticas del cuidado y la incidencia de estas en la política y la economía, como puntos del debate necesario para la construcción de sociedades más igualitarias. ; Este artigo é o resultado de um exercício de reflexão a partir da bioética social dos conflitos de gênero e da necessidade de vincular as masculinidades tanto no campo de estudos de gênero quanto nos movimentos sociais e nas políticas públicas. Apresenta-se a genealogia de algunas forças sociais que vêm dinamizando os estudos de gênero a partir de compreender a violencia baseada no gênero, na saúde pública, na alimentação e na degradação ambiental, em termos diferenciais e bioproblemáticos. Sob essa perspectiva, expõem-se alguns desafios que a sociedade enfrenta ao vincular essas compreensões e estratégias de mudança, quando de construir um horizonte de atuação política se trata. Das políticas públicas, da sociedade e da academia, é necessário continuar o trabalho diante dos fatores estruturais que fazem com que permaneçam as violências contra as mulheres, a legitimação de violência entre homens e a vinculação a grupos armados, bem como a promoção do exercício das paternidades e das éticas do cuidado e a incidência destas na política e na economia, como pontos do debate urgente para a construção de sociedades mais igualitárias.

Статтю присвячено нетривалому періоду панування Директорії Української Народної Республіки в повітовому центрі Херсонської губернії м. Єлисавет (українізована назва міста Єлисаветград). Ідеться про перехід міста і повіту під владу Директорії, про антигетьманський переворот, здійснений сотником Михайлом Вербицьким за підтримки місцевого осередку «Українського національного союзу», а також формування збройних сил УНР у місті та повіті. Розглядається діяльність різних органів місцевого самоуправління та їхні взаємини зі збройними силами Директорії, а також процес поступового поширення анархії, перебіг основних збройних конфліктів на території повіту між різними політичними угрупованнями, а також конфлікт із німецьким контингентом, що мав за умовами Комп'єнського перемир'я залишити територію повіту. У статті також ідеться про падіння влади Директорії та спробу організувати повстання проти петлюрівських військ. Невдалий початок повстання призвів до масштабного єврейського погрому та пограбування міського майна. Спростовується найбільш поширена версія про керівництво повстання з боку більшовиків, пояснюється основна мотивація керівництва повстанням. ; The article is dedicated to a short period of the power of the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic in the city of Elizavetgrad, a district center of Kherson province, in November 1918 – February 1919. In November 1918, the city was under the control of the government of the Hetman of the Ukrainian State Pavlo Skoropadsky. However, in rural communities of Elizavetgrad district, the insurgent movement had already grown in strength, which eventually led to the downfall of the Ukrainian State. The anti-Hetman coup d'état led by Captain Mikhail Verbitsky, which was supported by the local branch of the «Ukrainian National Union», had a peaceful character to establish control over the city and district, as well as military formations under the authority of the Directory of the UPR. In this article, there were demonstrated main measures of the UPR military command to conduct military conscription in the district, as well as material resources for the defence of the UPR. The article also concerns the multi-power system in the district: the military authorities of the Directory of the UPR, the local self-government, and the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. The City Council was directly concerned on the city economy, as well as maintaining law and order. For this purpose, there was created a committee for public safety, which commanded the home guards (city voluntary police) and the former Hetman's guard. The Soviet of Workers' Deputies was virtually inactive, but exploiting the trade unions, it struggled for the signing of a collective workers' agreement under the leadership of the Elvorty plant. In December 1918 – January 1919, anarchy gradually spreads in the district. Numerous armed formations and criminal gangs spring up and conflict with the German contingent which had to evacuate the territory of the district according to the Compiegne Armistice. Under these circumstances, the military leadership of the UPR began to take the necessary measures to mobilize its units and overcome anarchy in the city and the district. However, since the end of January, the situation in the province was aggravated due to the activation of the Bolsheviks, the White Guards and the anarchists. The details of the offensive of the Military Revolutionary Committee against the UPR and of the pogrom of Jews, 1–5 February 1919 are also showed in this article. The cause of the Red uprising and the reasons for its defeat are demonstrated. The paper also concerns the downfall of the UPR and the establishment of the Soviet power in the city.