Suchergebnisse

The governments of all countries of the world have faced up with the health crisis caused by the Covid 19 virus pandemic in the previous and current year. This crisis turned into an economic crisis, considering that it was necessary to provide huge financial resources to overcome it. Governments "pumped" additional amounts of money by supplying the economy and the population with new liquidity through subsidies and one-time assistance in the form of "helicopter money". This has contributed to the deterioration of the fiscal performance of the world economies. The paper analyzes the economic and fiscal performance of the world leading economies such as the European Union, the United States, China and Russia. The aim of this paper is to point out the consequences of the applied measures in the domain of monetary and fiscal policy and influence on the increase of the budget deficit and public debt in the world. ; Vlade svih država sveta suočile su se sa zdravstvenom krizom izazvanom pandemijom kovida-19 u prethodnoj i tekućoj godini. Ova kriza je prerasla u ekonomsku krizu, s obzirom na to da je za njeno prevazilaženje bilo neophodno obezbediti ogromna finansijska sredstva. Osim toga, vlade su "upumpavale" dodatne količine novca snabdevajući privredu i stanovništvo novom likvidnošću kroz subvencije i jednokratne pomoći u vidu "novca iz helikoptera".Sve ovo je doprinelo pogoršanju fiskalnih performansi ekonomija u svetu. U radu su analizirane ekonomske i fiskalne performanse vodećih ekonomija sveta poput Evropske unije, SAD, Kine i Rusije. Cilј rada je da ukaže na posledice primenjenih mera u domenu monetarne i fiskalne politike na rast budžetskog deficita i javnog duga u svetu.

Purpose: Financial banking intermediaries are sensitive to changes in market interest rates. The volatility of market interest rates affects the level of bank net interest income and determines the bank interest rate policy. Banks are actively managing structural interest rate risks to mitigate the negative effects of changes in market interest rates. The post-crisis period is characterised by unconventional monetary policy, and one of the basic objectives of the monetary instrument is a negative interest rate policy. This paper researches the effects on the bank net interest income structure with an impact on bank performance indicators. The basic research hypothesis is that during the financial crisis and a negative interest rate policy, the movement of bank interest income does not converge compared to a bank interest expense. Methodology: According to the characteristics of the dataset, which includes 32 listed banks from Great Britain, Switzerland and the European Union for the period 2002-2019, panel data analysis is applied. To analyse the effect of the interest rate level on total interest income and total interest expense, we formed two models. Fixed-effects models were used for parameter estimation. Results: A bank interest expense is more sensitive to unconventional macroeconomic policy than bank interest income. Conclusion: The traditional interest earning customer related business can enable banks to stabilise the bank performance indicator during market disruption.

Purpose: Financial banking intermediaries are sensitive to changes in market interest rates. The volatility of market interest rates affects the level of bank net interest income and determines the bank interest rate policy. Banks are actively managing structural interest rate risks to mitigate the negative effects of changes in market interest rates. The post-crisis period is characterised by unconventional monetary policy, and one of the basic objectives of the monetary instrument is a negative interest rate policy. This paper researches the effects on the bank net interest income structure with an impact on bank performance indicators. The basic research hypothesis is that during the financial crisis and a negative interest rate policy, the movement of bank interest income does not converge compared to a bank interest expense. Methodology: According to the characteristics of the dataset, which includes 32 listed banks from Great Britain, Switzerland and the European Union for the period 2002-2019, panel data analysis is applied. To analyse the effect of the interest rate level on total interest income and total interest expense, we formed two models. Fixed-effects models were used for parameter estimation. Results: A bank interest expense is more sensitive to unconventional macroeconomic policy than bank interest income. Conclusion: The traditional interest earning customer related business can enable banks to stabilise the bank performance indicator during market disruption.

This paper investigates whether macroeconomic shocks, such as the UK's referendum decision to leave the European Union ("Brexit"), the 2008 Financial Crisis, the 1992 ERM Crisis ("Black Wednesday"), and the 1987 stock market crash ("Black Monday"), had a positive impact on portfolio risk diversification. We estimate weekly dynamic conditional correlations and then optimal sectoral portfolio allocations between 1973 and 2019. Our results show that correlations of equity returns increased as a consequence of economic integration among European countries from the mid-1980s until the late 2000s, and decreased in the United Kingdom after Black Wednesday and the Brexit referendum. We tested the existence of a correlation change-point on June 27, 2016 by applying Wied et al. (2012)'s [Econometric Theory, 28(3), 570–589] correlation structural break test, which we modified to account for dynamic conditional correlations. Application of this test confirms that the referendum date was a break-point in nearly all UK manufacturing industries. The failure of Lehman Brothers and the 1987 stock market crash were also identified as structural breaks in equity correlations. Moreover, our findings suggest that the Brexit vote may constitute a long-term trend reversal of the convergence of equity return correlations in European markets, akin to Black Wednesday, rather than a shock like the 1987 and 2008 financial crises, which merely intensified a historical upward trend in correlations of European equity returns.

There have been many multi-national studies on the role of commodity prices on emerging economies. There is less research on specific index price impacts on domestic growth, exchange rates, and price fluctuation within a commodity dependent national economy. When prices change, the global commodity marketplace has a significant impact on those nations, specifically stability and growth in the domestic economy. The country of Brazil responded to several internal and external events, particularly the years following the Argentinian crisis of 2002, global financial crisis of 2008, and regional political unrest in 2014. The impact of these was a part of a larger economic response in Brazil that incorporated both monetary and fiscal policy that the Brazilian Central Bank used to respond to financial crises. I use a Structural Vector Auto Regressive (SVAR) model to estimate the shocks of commodity prices on growth and exchange rate with both the US and China. Likewise, this study analyzes the role of monetary policy on the domestic economy. This approach depends on and uses the robustness tests to specify impulse response functions and structural variance decompositions to estimate the relationship amongst the variables in both the short run and long run. The results produced reflect similar trends as previous research, showing that commodity price shocks along with Brazil Central Bank policy impact money supply, sustainable growth, and exchange rates with trading partner currencies.

In this piece I look at the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as rivals of the West, united more by circumstance than by intent. It emerged as a seemingly innocuous banker's gimmick referring to the 'emerging market' potential of the countries thus thrown together, but due to the aggressive Western response to independent policies, the BRICS have slowly moved towards solidifying their cohesion. Comprising half the world's population, the bloc on the eve of the financial crisis of 2008 was closing in on the West. In Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, China's GDP was three-quarters the size of the US economy, and India no. 4 behind Japan, whilst Brazil and Russia were catching up with the main EU states (Armijo 2007: 12). The 2008 financial collapse in the West contracted China's export markets and speculation that the BRICS were passé, was rife (Sharma, 2012: 6). However, China and India soon recovered, surpassing the US and Japan, respectively, whilst Russia and Brazil are trailing just behind Germany (World Bank 2016).This (uneven) recovery of the BRICS bloc in turn has provoked an even less benevolent response, increasingly amounting to a straightforward confrontation policy. My argument is that once the crisis forcedChina, the bloc's locomotive, to slow down and the global commodity boom ended, a Western strategy of isolating it from the other BRICS ensued. This is most obvious in the case of the NATO siege on Russia.

This study investigates the impact of various resources, specifically both tangible and intangible ones, together with capabilities of Malaysian listed firms, on their performance. This empirical study attempts to enrich the understanding of the resources-performance relationship, which is one of a business process within the firm, as well as filling the gaps in present knowledge. Firms, which are not able to develop and sustain their performance, are associated with the vulnerability and adverse performance result, especially during various periods of economic crisis (three sub-periods of major shocks, i.e., The Volcker Shock (Commodities Shock) of early 1980s, Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s, and the Global Financial Meltdown of 2008). Hence, this research intends to explore which resources matter the most to firm profitability and its success. Drawing upon the combination of Donabedian's structure process outcome and resource-based theories of the firm a conceptual framework is developed. Data for the study were collected from a sample of 250 publicly traded companies listed on Bursa Malaysia (MYX). In order to achieve the objective and response to the study question, partial least square and regression analysis are applied. Findings indicate that tangible resources have no impact, while intangible resources have positive and significant impact on firm performance. In addition, results show that efficient allocation of intangible resources is crucial to achieving good performance.

In this piece I look at the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as rivals of the West, united more by circumstance than by intent. It emerged as a seemingly innocuous banker's gimmick referring to the 'emerging market' potential of the countries thus thrown together, but due to the aggressive Western response to independent policies, the BRICS have slowly moved towards solidifying their cohesion. Comprising half the world's population, the bloc on the eve of the financial crisis of 2008 was closing in on the West. In Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, China's GDP was three-quarters the size of the US economy, and India no. 4 behind Japan, whilst Brazil and Russia were catching up with the main EU states (Armijo 2007: 12). The 2008 financial collapse in the West contracted China's export markets and speculation that the BRICS were passé, was rife (Sharma, 2012: 6). However, China and India soon recovered, surpassing the US and Japan, respectively, whilst Russia and Brazil are trailing just behind Germany (World Bank 2016).This (uneven) recovery of the BRICS bloc in turn has provoked an even less benevolent response, increasingly amounting to a straightforward confrontation policy. My argument is that once the crisis forcedChina, the bloc's locomotive, to slow down and the global commodity boom ended, a Western strategy of isolating it from the other BRICS ensued. This is most obvious in the case of the NATO siege on Russia.

AbstractThe global financial crisis has served to highlight serious weaknesses in global governance, revealing fault lines in the international financial architecture and its accompanying regulatory apparatus. Most glaringly, the spotlight has fallen on Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs)—key governance agencies in the pre-crisis domestic and international regulatory structures, and ones directly linked to the subprime mortgage debacle. The aim of this article is to provide a critical appraisal of CRAs as a mechanism of global governance in the light of their role in the subprime mortgage debacle and to evaluate the case for stricter regulation of CRAs. In this respect, special emphasis is placed on the recent EU attempt—by way of a new Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies—to bring rating agencies within the regulatory fold. It is argued that while the EU Regulation has serious implications for the operation of CRAs within the Community, the reform measure is potentially illustrative of a growing dissonance between EU and US responses to global governance issues more generally.'[Securitisation led to the belief among many that] poor quality assets … assembled as a portfolio … could somehow by alchemy be converted into something stronger than they were'.1'The crap had become cake.'2'In January 2008, there were 12 triple A-rated companies in the world. At the same time, there were 64,000 structured finance instruments, like CDO tranches, rated triple A.'3

Draws on the work of Paul Baran & Paul Sweezy (1966) & Harry Magdoff (eg, with Sweezy, 1987) to argue that the world has moved into a new phase of capitalism. Baran & Sweezy's notion of the monopoly stage of capitalism is outlined, highlighting the assertion that the normal state of the monopoly capitalist economy is stagnation. The crisis of the 1970s was marked by the emergence of stagflation, the rise of the period of neoliberal globalization, & growth of a fragile credit-debt system. The concept of financialization is then defined as a shift away from production to finance; Sweezy saw financialization in the late 1980s & 1990s as a "permanent tendency of advanced monopoly capitalism." Aspects of financialization are delineated. It is asserted that the Great Financial Crisis was, in a general way, foreseen by certain scholars, & its character is briefly described. It is contended that the financial system's recovery is being driven by the effort of advanced capitalist states to reinstate financialization. The dangers of this are discussed. It is suggested that in the present phase can be seen the weakening of capitalist production at the advanced capitalist core resulting from a process of maturation of the accumulation process, ie, the stagnation-financialization trap, which is deemed unstable. The main problems at this time are seen as centered on financialized globalization. Adapted from the source document.

Non-US firms have massively borrowed dollars (foreign currency, FX), which may lead to booms and crises. We show the real effects of capital controls, including prudential benefits, through a firm-debt mechanism. Our identification exploits the introduction of a tax on FX-debt inflows in Colombia before the global financial crisis (GFC), and administrative, proprietary datasets, including loan-level credit register data and firm-level information on FX-debt inflows and imports/exports. Our results show that capital controls substantially reduce FX-debt inflows, particularly for firms with larger ex-ante FX-debt exposure. Moreover, firms with weaker local banking relationships cannot substitute FX-debt with domestic-debt and experience a reduction in total debt and imports upon implementation of the policy. However, our results suggest that, by preemptively reducing pre-crisis firm-level debt, capital controls boost exports during the subsequent GFC, especially among financially-constrained firms. ; Project supported by a 2018 Leonardo Grant for Researchers and Cultural Creators, BBVA Foundation. This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 648398). Peydró also acknowledges financial support from the PGC2018-102133-B-I00 (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE) grant and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563)

The present thesis studies the consequences of the financial expansion initiated at the end of The Glorious Thirty to spur a declining economic growth. Incidentally, this work questions the issue of measuring economic regularities through econometric tools. Thus, the first chapter carries out an in-depth analysis of the methodology that guides a substantial part of the empirical literature on the finance-growth nexus. It highlights an array of statistical issues casting serious doubts on the reliability of previous results, including, in particular, the conclusion that the relationship between financial expansion and economic growth is non-linear. However, our estimates document an overall negative effect of expanding credit to the private sector on growth. This effect, which has intensified over time, appears to be more pronounced in advanced economies. The joint analysis of private and public debt, conducted in the second chapter, shows that public debt tends to be a drag on growth, not initially, but in the aftermath of a crisis if policy makers are unable to pursue a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. It is not the level of public debt but rather its trajectory that affects economic growth. Finally, the last chapter investigates the bailout of municipalities exposed to toxic structured loans. It illustrates a failure in the financial liberalization initiated in France in the 1980s to stimulate local governments' financing. This work highlights the ambivalence of the support funds. ; La présente thèse propose une étude des conséquences de l'expansion financière initiée à la fin des Trente Glorieuses comme nouveau ressort d'une croissance économique alors en perte de vitesse. De manière incidente, ce travail se penche sur la problématique de la mesure des régularités économiques par le biais des outils économétriques. Ainsi, le premier chapitre conduit une analyse approfondie de la méthodologie qui guide une grande partie de la littérature empirique sur la relation finance-croissance. Il lève le voile sur un ...

The present thesis studies the consequences of the financial expansion initiated at the end of The Glorious Thirty to spur a declining economic growth. Incidentally, this work questions the issue of measuring economic regularities through econometric tools. Thus, the first chapter carries out an in-depth analysis of the methodology that guides a substantial part of the empirical literature on the finance-growth nexus. It highlights an array of statistical issues casting serious doubts on the reliability of previous results, including, in particular, the conclusion that the relationship between financial expansion and economic growth is non-linear. However, our estimates document an overall negative effect of expanding credit to the private sector on growth. This effect, which has intensified over time, appears to be more pronounced in advanced economies. The joint analysis of private and public debt, conducted in the second chapter, shows that public debt tends to be a drag on growth, not initially, but in the aftermath of a crisis if policy makers are unable to pursue a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. It is not the level of public debt but rather its trajectory that affects economic growth. Finally, the last chapter investigates the bailout of municipalities exposed to toxic structured loans. It illustrates a failure in the financial liberalization initiated in France in the 1980s to stimulate local governments' financing. This work highlights the ambivalence of the support funds. ; La présente thèse propose une étude des conséquences de l'expansion financière initiée à la fin des Trente Glorieuses comme nouveau ressort d'une croissance économique alors en perte de vitesse. De manière incidente, ce travail se penche sur la problématique de la mesure des régularités économiques par le biais des outils économétriques. Ainsi, le premier chapitre conduit une analyse approfondie de la méthodologie qui guide une grande partie de la littérature empirique sur la relation finance-croissance. Il lève le voile sur un ...

A financial transaction tax (FTT) compares to a value-added tax on financial transactions and financial services. This differs from the financial activity tax (FAT) that is raised on profits of financial companies or on profit-related remuneration of financial managers. An FTT is neither necessarily related to a certain kind of financial transaction or service, nor does it have a clear assessment base or a certain tax rate. These are decisions to be made during political discourse. Taxes, also an FTT, have the potential to reduce trading volumes. This can even lead to a closing down of markets that operated on small margins that can be devoured by an FTT. If such markets fulfill the economic assumptions of perfect competition, an FTT should be rejected by economic reasons. The fiscal aspect of an FTT depends on the participating countries, the assessment base and the tax rate. The European Union hasn't been able to design an EU-wide FTT; not even the complete Eurozone has agreed on an FTT so that ten countries are currently negotiating the project in an in-depth cooperation. The assessment base has already eroded, starting with shares, bonds and derivative products right after the world financial crisis, reaching a minimum compromise with only shares as an assessment base for the FTT. Negotiations are still ongoing so that even some exceptions from this assessment might be possible. Experience has shown that an FTT leads to evasive reactions. Sweden and France know very well about that, and that might be a reason why Sweden does not participate in the in-depth cooperation. The cooperation still lacks a decision about the tax rate, they still have to negotiate about the distribution of the tax revenues, as the smaller countries within the in-depth cooperation fear that the bureaucratic cost of an FTT might exceed their proceeds from this project. The successful implementation of an FTT - even only within the ten countries of the in-depth cooperation - seems doubtful.

Introduction -- Part I: Emergency, Exception and Normalcy -- Chapter 1. From Institutional Sovereignty to Constitutional Mindset: Rethinking the Domestication of the State of Exception in the Age of Normalization -- Chapter 2.Judicial Review and Emergencies in Post-Marcos Philippines -- Chapter 3. Constitution and Law as Instruments for Normalising Abnormalcy: The Sri Lankan and Indian Experience -- Chapter 4. Political Emergencies as Challenges to the Impartiality of Public Law -- Part II: Terrorism and Warfare -- Chapter 5. Human Rights in Times of Terror – A Judicial Point of View -- Chapter 6. Detaining Unlawful Combatants in Israel: A Matter of Misiniterpretation? -- Chapter 7. The Law Governing the Rights of Enemy Aliens' Access to Courts -- Chapter 8. Emergencies and Constitutional Rights in a Time of Terror Threat in the Czech Republic: Do We Need a New Dimension of Emergency? -- Part III: Constitution-Making and Constitutional Change -- Chapter 9. Authoritative Constitution-Making in the Name of Democracy? -- Chapter 10. Again: From 1867 to Today, Making a Constitution Under an Elite Umbrella in Turkey -- Chapter 11. Constitution-Making, Political Transition and Reconciliation in Tunisia and Egypt: A Comparative Perspective -- Chapter 12. Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste After the Constitutional Exception -- Part IV: Constitutionalism for Divided Societies -- Chapter 13. The Constitutionalism of Emergency: Multinationalism Behind Asymmetrical Constitutional Arrangements -- Chapter 14. The Paradox of Territorial Autonomy: How Subnational Representation Leads to Secessionist Preferences -- Chapter 15. Entrenching Hegemony in Cyprus: The Doctrine of Necessity and the Principle of Bicommunality -- Part V: Public Health, Financial and Economic Crises -- Chapter 16. The 'Judicialization' of Emergency: The Case of the Eurozone Crisis -- Chapter 17. Financial Crisis as a New Genus of Constitutional Emergency? -- Chapter 18. Public Health Emergencies and Constitutionalism Between the National and the International -- Chapter 19. Conclusion.