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Whereas Eric Voegelin's main works from the 1950s to the 1980s are well known and have been widely discussed, his early work has gained academic attention only recently. Voegelin scholars have now entered into a wide-ranging discussion of the specific nature of those early writings. The following reflections seek to contribute to this general discussion by focusing on one of the most interesting—and, at the same time, the most puzzling—of Voegelin's early unpublished texts. Concentrating on the fragment entitled the Theory of Governance, this article will also present certain sources that have not yet appeared in English. Its aim will be to clarify some of the crucial questions and principles of Voegelin's early conception of political science in general. After presenting that conception, the article will indicate that Voegelin's later critique of the modern ideologies of political collectivism has not yet come into focus in this early text.

Today's organizations perform evaluations in order to demonstrate their trustworthiness to the outside world and in order to produce information for use by management. In the planning and application of specific evaluations, different participants or stakeholders very often have different or conflicting agendas. In recent years, the use of evaluations in organizations has grown rapidly and we have witnessed the rise of a new bureaucratic instrument in the realm of knowledge production: the internal evaluation. Such evaluations produce a set of data as part of the evaluation process, and the long-term impact of the use of these data on organizational activities is not normally given serious consideration when the use of evaluations in organizations is discussed. These evaluations have become a major factor in the management of organizations, but the academic literature on evaluation very rarely discusses the impact of this instrument of governance on the behaviour and activity of members of the organization.

The aim of this article is to clarify the nature of the management style most suited to the emergence of networked governance. The paradigms of traditional public administration and new public management sit uncomfortably with networked governance. In contrast, it is argued the public value management paradigm bases its practice in the systems of dialogue and exchange that characterize networked governance. Ultimately, the strength of public value management is seen to rest on its ability to point to a motivational force that does not solely rely on rules or incentives to drive public service practice and reform. People are, it suggests, motivated by their involvement in networks and partnerships, that is, their relationships with others formed in the context of mutual respect and shared learning. Building successful relationships is the key to networked governance and the core objective of the management needed to support it.

In the area of not‐for‐profit organisations the role, scope and desirability of governance is an emerging field. Both in academic literature and in practice the attempts to provide for governance of not‐for‐profit organisations are currently discrete and disparate. This is set to change with the publication by the National Hub of Expertise in Governance of a Code for organisations within the sector. This article examines the appropriateness of the new Code as a tool of regulation for the not‐for‐profit sector. In particular it focuses upon the challenges facing codes of practice for not‐for‐profit organisations, such as the identification of shareholders and organisational vision, and the purposes that such codes could have in the not‐for‐profit sector. The article concludes that whilst there is much of value in the new Code as a governance and regulatory tool, significant aspects the Code remain unclear; particularly the extent of the Code's constituency and the balance to be struck on the issue of compliance.

This paper provides empirical evidence on how external governance mechanisms (e.g. the reporting and monitoring mandated under government funding contracts) and internal governance mechanisms (e.g. the adoption of corporate governance codes and traditional charity governance mechanisms) are related to the efficiency with which large UK charities meet their charitable spending objects. The evidence indicates that government funding and governance requirements, and traditional charity structures, are positively related to efficiency, whereas the adoption of business‐type corporate governance codes is not.

Drawing upon recent progress in development economics and political science, the book provides fresh analysis of the Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) countries transition to a market economy by tracing the impact of natural resource endowment. The book examines the synergies between energy-rich and energy-poor states and highlights the practical consequences of both well-managed and poorly-managed deployment of energy. Featuring contributions from prominent specialists on resource-driven economies, the book argues that unless CCA elites change the way in which they deploy natural resource, revenues regional development will fall short of its potential with possible disastrous consequences. The contributors apply the experience of the developing market economies to demonstrate that the region still holds considerable potential to become an important, stable supplier of raw materials and a source of industrial demand to the global economy. However, the CCA is equally likely to become a threat to the global economy as a consequence of the misuse of energy revenues to promote the interests of predatory political elites.

This study builds upon the explorative study of Hoekstra (2006), who puts forward an argument for coordination at the global level in 'water governance'. Water governance is understood here in the broad sense as 'the way people use and maintain water resources'. One of the factors that give water governance a global dimension is 'virtual water trade' between nations, i.e. the trade in water in virtual form through trade in water-containing products. Virtual water trade involves advantages as well as disadvantages. The development of institutional arrangements to account for these disadvantages has not kept pace with the enhancement of international trade in general and virtual water trade in particular. The objective of this study is to design alternative institutional arrangements to deal with the global dimension of water governance. The study elaborates three arrangements: a Water Pricing Protocol, a Business Agreement on Sustainability Reporting of water-intensive goods, and a system of Water Footprint Permits. The three institutional arrangements are aimed to improve the ecological sustainability, economic efficiency and social equity of water governance. The arrangements aim to influence change agents in the virtual water chain (the production chain of water-containing products). Behavioural mechanisms bring about behavioural change of other agents in the virtual water chain.

Pure mainstream economics, based on methodological and sociological individualism usually ignores politics; development economics, on the contrary frequently integrates social and political factors in order to explain economic progress. Within this branch of economics, politics can mainly be dealt in two different approaches. The classical and neoclassical approach takes politics essentially as an obstacle to the expression of agents' rationality, and, therefore considers it a disturbance. A more heterodox approach of development, on the contrary, puts politics at the heart of the process, development being an economic as much as a political process. Those, like A. Sen, that take human rights, both as a means and an end to development do not separate the two processes as well. Be that as it may, and despite the opposed ways in which these approaches take politics, all consider governance, and its democratic or authoritarian character, a key factor in the development process. The main purpose of this paper is to discuss the importance of the issue of democratic governance within the development process. In the first part of the paper I will make a review of the main literature concerning the impacts of democracy on economic development and the importance of promoting democracy. In the second part of the paper the analysis will focus on the political economy of democratization, namely on the obstacles standing before democracy, and on the economic policies and reforms needed to facilitate democratization. The diagnosis states that democratization needs to deal with inequality of income distribution, with institutional design in order to overcome cultural divisions within the nations, with diversification of the sources of income and with a new economic order characterized by an erased debt burden and a more equitable distribution of the benefits of international trade.

In den letzten Jahren haben sich im Bereich der Entwicklungsökonomie zwei Debatten entwickelt, die im folgenden Beitrag verknüpft werden sollen. Zum einen wird im Rahmen der Geography vs. Institutions Debatte darüber diskutiert, in welchem Ausmaß geographische oder institutionelle Charakteristika fundamentale Entwicklungsursachen darstellen können, zum anderen hat die Diskussion um Good und Bad Governance die Bedeutung der Regierungsführung für den Entwicklungsprozess deutlich gemacht. Dieser Beitrag analysiert, inwieweit die Erkenntnisse der Geography vs Institutions Debatte zur Erklärung von Governance-Strukturen herangezogen werden können. Die Analyse erfolgt an Hand eines einfachen Entscheidungsmodells, mit dem der Einfluss verschiedener geographischer und institutioneller Faktoren auf das Verhalten von Politikern untersucht werden kann. Eine anschließende empirische Überprüfung der gewonnenen Hypothesen zeigt zwar, dass geographische Charakteristika offenbar tatsächlich zur Erklärung der Governance-Qualität beitragen können. Diese Ergebnisse müssen jedoch auf Grund von Unzulänglichkeiten bei der Messung der Governance-Qualität mit äußerster Vorsicht interpretiert werden.

We use a panel of 4979 cross-border and domestic takeovers to test the relation between host country corruption and premiums paid for local targets. Host country corruption is negatively associated with target premiums, after correcting for other governance related factors such as political stability, legal systems, and financial disclosure standards. We estimate that deterioration in the corruption index by one point (on a ten point scale) is, on average, associated with a reduction of 21% of local targets' premiums. Our results do not support the notion that local corruption constitutes a significant market barrier to foreign investors. It rather represents a discount on local takeover synergies, which affects foreign and domestic acquirers alike. However, we find that the major effects of corruption can alternatively be explained by government effectiveness, pointing towards an endogenous relationship between bribery and bureaucracy.