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A Vietnamese 'cultural commissar' reports on the success achieved in destroying undesirable publications, films, and other 'decadent cultural products' One of the major tasks facing the Communist authorities after their victory in April 1975 over South Vietnam was how to deal with culture and the arts, which they classified as 'neo-colonialist, decadent, pornographic and counter-revolutionary'. A programme of 'purification of culture' (thanh loc) was soon adopted. This included the classification of books and other publications in public and university libraries (see Index 4/1978). A significant number of publications and authors (Vietnamese and foreign alike) were confiscated and banned. Private cinemas and theatres were closed down. This was also true of private newspapers and publishing houses. And many writers were put in prison or re-education camps (see Index 6/1978). The programme of 'purification of culture' was later extended to private bookshops, teahouses, discos and private households. The following is the progress report of the programme by Tran Tho, a cultural commissar, published in Tap Chi Con San (communist magazine), the ideological organ of the Vietnamese Communist Party, in October 1981.

Alan James makes a noble effort to rescue me from my puzzlement concerning Martin Wight, but I confess myself still confused. As he implies, probably the root of the matter lies in differences of temperament and experience. This being the case, it then becomes the task of the academic to pursue the argument back to the basic point at which one party asserts one set of premisses and the other another, but neither side can offer further justification of these premisses, or at least not in terms which would be acceptable to the other. This I shall endeavour to do at the end of this note. Where Alan James's article is particularly helpful is that it makes it a little clearer that Wight was a part of an intellectual tradition and that this sort of 'private pacifism' may be less uncommon than I had supposed, partly, presumably, becauseit is private. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it rests on, at best, a curious set of premisses; but about this later. There are some initial points to make.

During the past fifteen years, several economists, historians and sociologists have propounded a sectoral model of economic growth and change in the United States. According to this analysis, as large-scale, monopolistic enterprises began to emerge in the late nineteenth century, different investment considerations and labour market requirements were also evolving. A dual economy was beginning to be formed. The large-scale capital sector, and the small-scale capital sector each had its own economic environment of conduct. Each sector tended, too, to develop its own corresponding labour market, with monopoly sector or 'core' firms holding out certain economic advantages for employees: money, job security, benefits, and opportunities for advancement within the firm. Thus, the work experience in these two sectors increasingly diverged. Even if the large-scale capital sector did offer economic advantages, growth tended to be capital-intensive, and the growth of employment in this sector slowed down, and then stopped by the end of the Second World War. Employment shifted to trades and services, with lower wage rates, and, of course, to the public sector, which currently employs nearly a third of the American workforce.

The U.S. textile industry has, over the last 20 years, been transformed from a small-scale, unintegrated, predominantly family-owned industry producing standardized fabrics and yarns in the Northeast to a large-scale, more concentrated, capitalintensive, technologically advanced, and internationally competitive industry located primarily in the Southeast. Pressure for this transformation came from a variety of sources. Primary among them was competition from foreign low-cost producers, initially of cotton textile products and later of man-made textile products. The other major source of pressure came from internal competition by domestic producers intent on introducing structural reforms and technical change. The industry's response to these foreign and domestic pressures took the form of both political and economic measures. The outcome of these measures is a healthier, more profitable, and more competitive textile industry. In view of the performance of the U.S. textile industry—excluding apparel—in world trade and its relative level of efficiency, further protection appears to be unjustified. Consequently, the United States should adopt a more flexible trading position and seek to split off textiles from apparel in the renewed Multifiber Arrangement (MFA).

In the history of relations between the worlcfs leading states since the end of the eighteenth century certain features stand out prominently. One is that infrequent wars have alternated with long periods of peace. From the 1760s to the 1790s these states were at peace; from the 1790s to 1815 they were at war; from 1815 to 1854, peace; 1871 to 1914, peace; 1914 to 1918, war; 1918 to 1939, peace; 1939 to 1945, war; and since 1945 another 36 years of peace already. Another feature, no less pronounced, is that each of these infrequent wars has been more demanding and devastating for all participants, more nearly total, than that which preceded it. In these respects, as also in a third on which I shall enlarge later on, international conduct in the past 200 years has differed from international conduct in all earlier times, when states were more or less continuously engaged in wars that remained limited in scale – and so much so that the rise of the modern system may safely be traced back to the end of the eighteenth century.

Las funciones públicas, en ocasiones se desarrollan a través de personas que se conocen como "autoridad o agentes de la misma", que en la mayoría de los supuestos implican una compulsión o amenaza de compulsión sobre las personas, llegando incluso a situaciones de riesgo para su integridad física o para su vida, bien social este último que no puede claudicar ante el interés social o el bien común salvo en casos perfectamente deslindados, tasados y extraordinarios restringidos. Paradójicamente, el "status" de autoridad pública en sus diversas manifestaciones (administrativa, judicial, legislativa, etc.), no ha recibido del legislador ni de la doctrina una atención parecida a la de la cualidad funcionarial, y es paradójico, proque la función de autoridad es más enérgica y restrictiva para los derechos individuales más trascendentes. Es cierto que en el fondo de esta cuestión laten consideraciones de naturaleza política, pero también lo es que el jurista debe resistirse a que la "razón política" pueda ser "leitmotiv" que cuartee el Estado de Derecho y otorgue un pase de corso a los últimos detentadores del poder.

The conflict between East & West, & deep underlying issues, are explored through a case study of Rudyard Kipling's attitude toward India. Kipling's early life was one of intense involvement with Indian society & more distant relations with his parents & English culture; he was sent to England for his later upbringing. Kipling felt himself to be a victim of violence & unable to fight back; his work is shaped by contempt for this weakness, & by justification of violence toward other victims, including subjugated Indians. Despite this, he remained attracted to India. This exemplifies a tendency to oppose East & West, characteristic of the West, which disregards crucial elements in both cultures. Indian society has treated the West as a transient ruler to be adapted to, preserving beneath this an underlying self. This self was the source, for example, of Gandhi's approach to freeing India from British rule through shrewd perception of Western self-doubts. Indian society in fact has been characterized by survival through superficial adaptation. Kipling himself was influenced by this approach, though his adult life was spent in rebellion against it. W. H. Stoddard.

Juvenile New Holland honeyeaters that hatched in autumn commenced a moult in the following spring
when about 6 months old. This moult was complete, and the sequence of feather replacement was the
same as that of adults; all the primary coverts were replaced. Juveniles that hatched in spring commenced
a moult in the summer when 2-6 months old. This moult was usually incomplete; many birds
commenced on the second, third or fourth primary, and moult of primaries then proceeded regularly
outwards to the tenth primary. Moult of secondaries and rectrices was often incomplete and irregular,
and tertiaries were usually all replaced. The primary coverts were rarely replaced. A few spring-hatched
juveniles replaced no flight feathers. The later the moult began in spring-hatched juveniles, the more likely
it was to start on a more distal primary, and to be less complete in other tracts. Differences in the timing
and extent of the moult in different populations and years appeared to be related to food levels. When
carbohydrate sources were scarce, the frequency of arrested moult, fault bars and short feathers was
higher. Juveniles replaced primaries at a slower rate than adults.

In his classic study of decentralisation and development, Henry Maddick argued that economic growth and social modernisation depend in part on the ability of Third-World govenments to diffuse responsibility for development planning and administration, to expand participation in economic activities, and to promote new centres of creativity within society. Over-concentration of administrative authority stifles development, Maddick insisted; it leads to waste and corruption, delays action, and creates irrational and inefficient management practices, the costs of which developing countries cannot afford.1 To illustrate his point, Maddick cited the effects of the centralised supply system in the Sudan in the late 1950s, through which 'shoes made in Fasher were sent 400 miles by rail to Khartoum where the whole shoe supply was concentrated. When Fasher wanted shoes for school children and government personnel it had to send to Khartoum for them.' He also noted that school desks and equipment for the provincial city of Juba had to be ordered from Khartoum, which was 900 miles away and connected only by inefficient river transport, even though the wood from which the furniture was made originally came from Juba.2

Obviously, literature is a question of quality rather than quantity. In a speech given on 19 June 1961, which was only published in theLiterary Gazette(Wenyi bao) in February 1979 as the cultural testament of the late premier, Zhou Enlai drew a crude parallel between literary and industrial outputs: "Certain laws governing material production also hold good for mental production. When pressed too far mental production will suffer, perhaps even more seriously. Quotas and pressures of time are vexing problems for mental workers. Take the writing of poetry as an example. Among our leading cadres, Comrade Chen Yi likes to write poems. He composes very quickly and is a prolific writer. He is a genius in this respect. But, it is different with Chairman Mao. He writes only after much deliberation. Though he writes less, he writes with such magnificence and vitality and produces extremely concentrated poems. We should not demand a poem a day from Chairman Mao, nor should we interfere with Comrade Chen Yi and ask him to write less. Mental work cannot be uniform."

Investigations as to why people attend to mass communications have generally not dealt with one of the assumed basic concepts of uses and gratifications research, namely, expectations about gratification. Nor have studies i n the area shown much concern for the question of whether gratifications sought from exposure to media are subsequently obtained; and if so, or if not, how this affects later expectations and patterns of exposure. This article describes a cognitive theory of motivation, expectancy-value theory. It then derives an expectancy model of media exposure in the framework of uses and gratifications research-a model which utilizes expectancy-value measures of audience gratifications in order to be able to predict subsequent levels of exposure to media. The model is illustrated by a small set of three-time panel data, the results of which support the view that the model has predictive validity. The article concludes that expectancy-value theory holds promise for extending uses and gratifications research beyond studies of the "charting and profiling" of reasons for attending to the media.

Editor's Note: V.O. Key's article bemoaning "The Lack of a Budgetary Theory" was reprinted in the previous issue of Public Budgeting & Finance. The problems identified by Key are normative; they go to the basic values arid purposes of society and, hence, cannot be resolved by budgetary solutions alone. But a dozen years after Key wrote, Verne Lewis sought to anchor a theory of budgeting in marginal analysis, His article, printed here by permission of the American Society for Public Administration, first appeared in the Public Administration Review in 1952, Rather than seeking a full‐blown political philosophy. Lewis thought that budgetary choice could be rationalized at the margins, by comparing the marginal costs and benefits of competing claims on public resources, While his hopes for a theory of budgeting have not been fulfilled, Lewis laid the groundwork for forms of marginal analysis introduced by PPB and ZBB in later decades. Indeed, there is a remarkable affinity between the budgetary structure proposed by Lewis and the one used by zero‐base budgeting in the 1970s.

By forcing us to make better use of students' intelligence (and our own artfulness) in the design of instructional materials, the new mandate for cost effectiveness may enhance rather than diminish the educational value of existing as well as new educational media. The paper and demonstration will show that many of the capabilities for which we turn to the latest generation of electronic equipment, e.g., "intelligent" videodiscs and other computers, may be achieved with media long available in schools and/or homes: ordinary television sets, filmstrips, and 8mm films. Some of the capabilities to be discussed and demonstrated with film and videotape are: overt response and immediate feedback; process (vs. product) exposition and participation; multi-level use of a single program; moving images and psychomotor responses; and constant self-monitoring of constant (vs. intermittent) performance. Also, and bravely, specific head-tuning to use all the new electronic equipment more cost effectively will be suggested. (All of these media use rear-screen images whose relevance to the needs of those with visual as well as auditory impairment will be stressed.)

In a parable drawn fromThe Trial, Franz Kafka once etched the following chilling profile:Before the Law stands a doorkeeper on guard. To this doorkeeper there comes a man from the country who begs for admittance to the Law. But the doorkeeper says that he cannot admit the man at the moment. The man, on reflection, asks if he will be allowed, then, to enter later. "It is possible," answers the doorkeeper, "but not at this moment." Since the door leading into the Law stands open as usual and the doorkeeper steps to one side, the man bends down to peer through the entrance. When the doorkeeper sees that, he laughs and says: "If you are so strongly tempted, try to get in without my permission. But note that I am powerful. And I am only the lowest doorkeeper. From hall to hall keepers stand at every door, one more powerful than the other. Even the third of these has an aspect that even I cannot bear to look at." These are difficulties which the man from the country had not expected to meet; the Law, he thinks, should be accessible to every man at all times….

A new generation of advanced conventional arms developed during the late 1960s and 1970s, ranging from antitank guided missiles to scatterable land mines, promises to buttress the defensive capabilities of their possessors. Selective transfer of such new weapons in certain cases may be a useful nonproliferation tactic. However, the fungibility of selective arms transfers with other security related nonproliferation measures, and particularly with security guarantees, appears limited. Moreover, not only would that tactic have little impact on other compelling proliferation incentives, but it would incur important risks. Nonetheless, those risks may be less than the risks and costs of nuclear proliferation in conflict-prone regions. And they may be minimized by suitable policies. The dilemma of having to choose between so using arms transfers for nonproliferation purposes and continued pursuit of global conventional arms sales restraint has been overdrawn. In contrast with recent efforts to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons, efforts to foster multilateral conventional arms restraint have proved unavailing. Various factors explain that pattern of success and failure, not least of all the different international norms in the respective areas.