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The post Contingency in International Law appeared first on Völkerrechtsblog.

The post Rewarding in International Law appeared first on Völkerrechtsblog.

This article is a plea for adopting a reinvigorated, analytic perspective on contemporary international law, building on MacCormick's powerful insights into law's essential structure. The article proposes that international law as whole forms an institutional normative order. The idea of institutional normative order has certain conditions. These link a normative conception of international law with the means of achieving it. The article makes three arguments on these conditions. It first argues that the function of international law is to create order in the sense of orderliness for its principal users, States and international organizations. It then claims that international law establishes normative order through international rules that are binding from the viewpoint of States and international organizations. An international process of rule-making embedded in State practice turns norms into such rules. The process is being held as a bindingness-creating mechanism because it formalizes rules through recognized means and organizes collective consent to authorize them. States and international organizations then apply these rules by exercising international legal powers under a defeasible presumption of legality. Third, the article argues that this normative order becomes institutionalized. The institutions of international law are grounded in ideas about agencies, arrangements, and master-norms that integrate the mass of international rules and principles. The article exemplifies these arguments for UN-driven international law with the relating recent jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and Annex vii tribunals, and the Court of Justice of the European Union. The upshot of this idea of international law as institutional normative order is unity, or indeed a system. No part of international law can be seen outside of this context and hence the burden of argumentation is on those wishing to make the case for divergence.

Cover -- Half Title -- Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Foreground: revolutionary times? -- Critical times -- critical scholarship -- A materialist approach to international law -- Revolutions of all shapes and sizes -- The structure of the book -- Why law anyway? -- 1 Revolution and revolutionary praxis -- I: Introduction -- II: Revolution in existing scholarship -- III: The conceptual history of revolution -- IV: Marxist revolution - political and social -- bourgeois and proletarian -- V: Revolutionary agency -- VI: Conclusion -- 2 International law and international legal praxis -- I: Introduction -- II: The ambiguous promise of international law -- III: The politics of law and fundamental legal indeterminacy -- IV: Pashukanis and the commodity form theory of law -- V: The brutal heart of law -- VI: Revolutionary praxis in law -- VII: Conclusion -- 3 The Soviet relationship to international law -- I: Introduction -- II: Background - revolution, foreign policy and the law -- III: The Soviet 'approach' to international law -- IV: The view from without -- V: Common international legal practice? -- VI: Understanding the Soviet 'approach' -- VII: Revolutionary legal praxis and the Soviet example -- VIII: Conclusion -- 4 The Third World and the New International Economic Order -- I: Introduction -- II: Background -- III: The Third World relationship to international law -- IV: Bandung -- Non-Aligned Movement and the G77 -- UNCTAD -- V: OPEC: commodities, commodity booms and oil - the exception -- VI: Resolutions -- VII: Revolutionary legal praxis and the Third World - an assessment -- VIII: Conclusion -- Conclusion -- Counter-revolutionary times -- The importance of reclaiming revolution -- The possibility of revolutionary praxis as legal praxis -- Fundamental legal relations.