Suchergebnisse

This study is intended to answer the question of how political polarization is related to social media users' posts about Covid-19. The researchers chose health cases related to Covid-19 instead of political issues (e.g. elections) to prove that this political polarization has spread to many areas. The research also wants to see the relationship between this political polarization and selective exposure. Theories applied in this study are polarization, filter bubble, and selective exposure. The study applied two methods: social media network analysis and content analysis. The network analysis included 82,156 posts, while the content analysis was carried out on 4,050 social media accounts. The research outcome proves the occurrence of political polarization. Social media users were divided into two major groups, namely pro-Jokowi and anti-Jokowi. Each group interacted with fellow users who had the same political choices and shared the same message content. Users with certain political choices tend to receive the same information as their political choices, and ignore information from other political parties. Another interesting finding from this study is how this polarization was sharpened by the use of hashtags. Each party (supporters and oppositions of Jokowi) uses hashtags to create solidarity and mobilization from each supporter. Research also proves the validity of the selective exposure and filter bubble hypothesis in the Indonesian context.

Does exposure to social media polarize users or simply sort out like-minded voters based on their preexisting beliefs? In this paper, we conduct three survey experiments to assess the direct and unconditioned effect of exposure to tweets on perceived ideological polarization of candidates and parties. We show that subjects treated with negative tweets see greater ideological distance between presidential nominees and between their parties. We also demonstrate that polarization increases with processing time. We demonstrate a social media effect on perceived polarization beyond that due to the self-selection of like-minded users into different media communities. We explain our results as the result of social media frames that increase contrast effects between voters and candidates.

This study examines the framing of the social movement in Iran launched on 29 December 2017, by analyzing the news texts of six national Turkish newspapers. It discusses the movement in the context of news framing, focusing on problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation. The findings suggest that each newspaper has reported the social movement in Iran quite differently. The most obvious difference is that the left-wing, anti-government press mainly explained the events in terms of political, economic, and social factors while the right-wing, pro-government press attributed the events to 'foreign forces' and reflected the dominant discourse of political power while framing the news. Thus, the way Turkish newspapers frame a social movement outside the country reveals the intense polarization in the Turkish press.

Abstract
We define two types of religious polarization and investigate the extent to which they are present across European countries, based on data from the 2008 to 2017 European Values Study and hierarchical linear modeling. The first type is polarization by religiosity, with declines in the middle ground between the actively religious and the nonreligious as secularization reaches an advanced stage. The second type is issue polarization, with the religious and secular taking different positions on a range of socio-political values, including social conservatism and ethnic nationalism. We find limited evidence of bimodality in the distribution of religiosity. We find more evidence, however, of issue polarization between the religious and secular in Europe, especially in social conservatism. Religious polarization should thus be understood as a multidimensional concept where one dimension may be more prevalent than others in society.

Briefly sketches the history of formal education in major institutes and professional associations and international co-operation in the social sciences in Ireland. Concludes that its development has been relatively late, slow and small when compared with the metropolitan countries of Europe. (GAW)

The aim of this article is the evaluation whether social and economic policy implemented after the Polish accession to the European Union led to a reduction in income disparities of households in Poland. Variations of those disparities were analyzed by assessing changes in the degree of economic polarization. In addition, changes in income inequality were evaluated. Analyses of changes in the degree of income polarization and income inequality of households in Poland were carried out for the years 2000—2014. In the analysis of the polarization process polarization indices were applied and changes in income inequality were analyzed using inequality coefficients.

I'll start by answering a question in a comment on my last post:  where can you get these data?  One way is to download the data from the American National Election Studies data center and then analyze them using a statistics program; the other is to analyze them online from the SDA (Survey Documentation and Analysis) site.  I use both, but usually SDA--it's faster for simple analyses.  The ANES survey has thermometers for the parties, the presidential candidates, and liberals and conservatives.  A few years ago, I showed the correlation between ratings of the Democratic and Republican parties.  Here's the figure updated to include 2020:There was a substantial drop between 2000 and 2004, and no consistent change since then.  That's kind of surprising, since the general perception is that polarization has increased substantially in the last 10-15 years.  From 1964 to 1982, the ANES asked about ratings of Democrats and Republicans.  The correlations:The first time it was asked was after the Johnson-Goldwater race, when there was large ideological gap between the parties.  But even if you leave that aside, polarization declined (since a negative correlation indicates polarization, an upward slope is a decline in polarization) from the 1960s to the 1970s.  There are also thermometers for the presidential candidates starting in 1972:In contrast to the questions on the parties, this shows a substantial recent increase in polarization.  The correlation between ratings of Trump and Biden in 2020 was -.787, which is remarkably high for individual-level data (the correlation between ratings of the parties in 2020 was -.48).  Questions on liberals and conservative in 1964:There isn't much trend through 2008, then a big increase in polarization in 2012, with smaller increases in 2016 and 2020. What I find most striking in these figures is that polarization was probably lower, and certainly not higher, in 2016 than in 2012.  The substantial increase between 2000 and 2004 is also noteworthy.