Clientelism or something else?: Squatter politics in Montevideo
In: Latin American politics and society, Band 54, Heft 1, S. 37-63
ISSN: 1531-426X
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In: Latin American politics and society, Band 54, Heft 1, S. 37-63
ISSN: 1531-426X
World Affairs Online
In: Latin American politics and society, Band 54, Heft 1, S. 37-64
ISSN: 1531-426X
In: The Indian political science review, Band 4, Heft 4, S. 455-494
ISSN: 0019-6126
In: International political science review: IPSR = Revue internationale de science politique : RISP, Band 4, Heft 4, S. 455
ISSN: 0192-5121
In: Comparative politics, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 149
ISSN: 2151-6227
In: Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 10-26
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Working paper
In: Oxford studies in democratization
In: Oxford scholarship online
In: Political Science
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 60, Heft 2, S. 436-455
ISSN: 0092-5853
During electoral campaigns in new democracies, parties and candidates often employ clientelist strategies such as vote buying to mobilize electoral support. The academic consensus is that when voters are offered gifts or money in exchange for their votes, it has detrimental consequences for democratic and economic development. Therefore, it is imperative to explore to what extent, why, and how does clientelism occur in new democracies? A framing paper and four articles address this question using new survey data from South Africa and cross-country data from Africa and Latin America. The framing paper develops a conceptual framework of vote buying as a four-step process, validates why South Africa is a relevant setting for the study of clientelism and outlines the extensive data collection conducted for this dissertation. Using an unobtrusive measurement technique called the list experiment, the first article explores the level of vote buying during the 2016 municipal election campaign in South Africa. Furthermore, the first article provides a methodological contribution to the literature by conducting an experimental test of an augmented version of the list experiment against the classic list experiment and showing that the augmented procedure produces biased results. The second article examines why candidates employ vote buying as a strategy to mobilize electoral support when the ballot is nominally secret, which enables voters to renege on their vote bargain commitments and vote as they please. The third article explores why voters vote for corrupt candidates, which enhances our understanding of how clientelism can mitigate voters' willingness to punish corrupt politicians. The fourth article examines how the character of the electoral system affects the relationship between poverty and vote buying in Africa and Latin America. Overall, this dissertation increases our theoretical understanding and empirical knowledge of how widespread clientelism is in the developing world and why and under what conditions it flourishes. This dissertation contributes conceptually, methodologically, empirically, and substantially to the literature on clientelism and vote buying and has important implications for policy makers seeking to reduce the prevalence of clientelism in new democracies.
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In: Program on Governance and Local Development Working Paper No. 14
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Working paper
In: Democratization, Band 18, Heft 5, S. 1193-1215
ISSN: 1351-0347
In: This is the Author Manuscript. Version on Record published in STUDIES IN INDIAN POLITICS, Band 6 issue: 2
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Working paper
In: Studies in Indian politics, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 247-266
ISSN: 2321-7472
In this article, we examine the role of intermediaries in sustaining political clientelism in rural Saharanpur, Uttar Pradesh. Drawing from fieldwork and electoral data, we show that clientelism in Saharanpur is based around providing three specific guarantees to the voter—security from or by the police, facilitation in the tehsil and mediation in cases that would otherwise go to court—which we collectively refer to as guardianship. We explain how guardianship, more than most other forms of clientelistic exchange, requires intermediaries. In the case of Saharanpur, these intermediaries are usually individuals occupying formal positions of power within various circles of Panchayati Raj Institutions. Finally, we argue that it is the concentric nature of constituencies provided by the decentralized political structure which is ultimately responsible for the sustenance of intermediary networks as well as the perpetuation of clientelism in rural Saharanpur.
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 58, Heft 2, S. 415-432
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: CDDRL Working Paper No. 119
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Working paper