Author's introductionListening to popular music, accessed via Web 2.0 technologies, such as P2P networks and pay‐per‐track sites, and played‐back on MP3 players, is a central, arguably defining activity of contemporary youth consumer culture. For example, how many of our current undergraduates do not possess some kind of MP3 device, via which they can access their preferred choice of music whenever they want? Very few, I suspect. The above article explored the difficulties we currently face in trying to explain this example of apparently mundane youth practice. Because as soon as we begin to ask why this form of music consumption is popular, what it might mean to individual listeners, and the processes that make it possible and even desirable as something to do, we realize that the extant approaches that could provide possible answers, lie across a range of disciplines: youth studies, popular music studies and media communications. And this is because this taken‐for‐granted contemporary youth consumer practice, is actually the most visible point in a complex set of overlapping industry and organizational practices that make possible the production, mediation and consumption of popular music, in this form. The problem the above‐referenced article raised was that the hitherto existing academic subject domains of youth studies, popular music and media communications, all clearly have a part to play in providing a possibly adequate explanation of this phenomena. Or at least they would be able to do so, if they could be more fruitfully integrated. Because of their origins and development they have remained more or less separate areas of enquiry, with different theoretical and methodological values and concerns, which has resulted in a lack of integration of key areas, such as the relationship between the cultural and structural in youth music consumption and the role of media industries in 'framing' such a process; areas that would appear to be essential to explaining the production, mediation and 'uses' of youth music consumption. However, in the article, I also suggest that there are signs of the emergence, in some recent popular music and culture textbooks, of a more integrated approach, one that examines popular music as a media culture industry that serves a youth demographic. The value of this, is that it appears to offer a way of bringing youth studies, popular music and media studies closer together in the ways in which it is possible to explore the linkages between production, mediation and consumption of music commodities and youth consumer practices. In what follows I identify and comment on these texts and also those texts that offer accessible accounts of popular music and the music industries as well as youth consumption.Author recommendsWall, Tim. 2003. Studying Popular Music Culture. London, UK: Arnold.This book presents itself as an undergraduate 'text book' with panels on case studies, suggestions for student projects and the like. But unlike perhaps other examples of this style the author offers an innovative combination of popular music and media culture approaches, taking the form of concise summaries, analytical points (sometimes with models) and applied thinking‐through of ideas. For example, the section on Popular music histories and the frameworks that inform them, offers a range of student activities based around empirical analysis (historical schematics), theory (models of emergence, innovation, revolution, incorporation and decline), and applied thinking. Accessible to all undergraduates.Longhurst, Brian. 2007. Popular Music and Society. Oxford, UK: Polity, 2nd edn.Another would‐be undergraduate core text. Well‐organized and very clearly written, again using topic‐based panels but in this volume comparatively substantial exerts from classic texts are included with questions. Longhurst's strength is the way the book is informed by knowledge of social theory happening in different areas. This is evident in the section on audiences (in the revised edition), which provides a balanced but also critically informed overview of the most up‐to‐date work in (so‐called) post‐subcultural studies. Accessible to all undergraduates.Osgerby, Bill. 2004. Youth Media. London, UK: Routledge.Osgerby is a cultural historian who is not surprisingly strong on narratives of periods and points of change. The scope of this book is impressive and so is the detail and range of references. Despite the fact that the book is narrative driven the author also pays attention to shifts and changes in theoretical arguments. It also offers a useful guide to further reading. Accessible to all undergraduates.Frith, Simon and Andrew Goodwin. (eds) 1990. On Record: Rock, Pop and the Written Word. London, UK: Routledge.This classic text is still probably the best collection of popular music and music industry related articles and chapter extracts. It includes seminal work that is not easily available elsewhere, such as many pieces mentioned in my article. Another plus point is that the pieces are not edited down, an unfortunate aspect of many newer volumes. I am at a loss as to understand why a 2nd updated version of this text has never emerged. For advanced undergraduates.Bennett, Andy, Jason Toynbee and Barry Shank. 2006. The Popular Music Studies Reader. London, UK: Routledge.This volume offers itself as an update to research in the field of popular music studies in the absence of a revised edition of Frith and Goodwin's tome (p. 6). I think it largely does meet its remit, offering a wide range of themed sections, of which the section on the music industry and music media are especially relevant to the points in my article, as well as the section on Popular music and Everyday life (see the chapters by De Nora and Bull, for example). Each of the themed sections has an editor introduction, which is useful. The selection of texts is generally representative of (mostly) recent work, although occasionally eclectic. Also the volume, despite or perhaps because of its impressive breadth, does drastically edit down material to fit. For advanced undergraduates.Negus, Keith. 1995. 'Popular Music: Between Celebration and Despair.' Pp. 379–93 in Questioning the Media, edited by John Downing, Ali Mohammadi and Anabelle Sreberny‐ Mohammadi. London, UK: Sage.I can't think of a better piece to begin a popular music and media course than this one, although the imaginative use of Sinead O'Connor's song and video 'Nothing Compares to You', to illustrate the theory of 'articulations', may now be somewhat time‐bound. Showing the video (its on You Tube) helps! Accessible to all undergraduates.Negus, Keith. 1996. Popular Music in Theory. Cambridge, UK: Polity.This book explicitly sets out to provide a guide to theory and debates in popular music studies and, as one of the few 'theory' books in this area, it achieves an impressive level of clarity and accessibility, without compromising on debate. I have found Negus consistently useful in my own attempts to guide students through areas of debates. The sequence of topics, beginning with Audiences, although integral to the way the book develops, does not always map onto the ways that courses are taught in this area. But an essential theory book accessible to undergraduates.Nixon, Sean. 1997. 'Circulating Culture.' Pp. 177–220 in Production of Culture/Cultures of Production, edited by Paul Du Gay. London, UK: Sage.An elegant theoretical attempt to re‐model the structure/culture/biography 'circuit of culture' framework inherited from Birmingham CCCS work and part of a volume concerned with the folding back of consumption into the flexible production of post‐Fordist or late‐capitalist niche product‐driven markets. See also the extended debate about cultural intermediaries in Cultural Studies (2002) vol. 16. For advanced undergraduates.Peterson, Richard A. 1994. 'Cultural Studies through the Production Perspective: Progress and Prospects.' Pp. 163–189 in The Sociology of Culture: Emerging Theoretical Perspectives, edited by Diane Crane. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.An impressive, accessible and wide‐ranging discussion of the Culture of Production approach from one of its originators. For advanced undergraduates.Miles, Steven. 2003. 'Researching Young People as Consumers: Can and Should We Ask Them Why?' Pp. 170–185 in Researching Youth, edited by Andy Bennett, Andy Cieslik and Steven Miles. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmilan.Although Miles has written full‐length texts on Consumption (1998) and Youth Lifestyles (2000) it is this short think‐piece that I would recommend, not least because I quote it and borrow some of its insights in my article, but also because it represents a thoughtful attempt to try and develop an approach to youth studies that foregrounds the cultural meanings surrounding commodity consumption as the link between media‐industries/commerce and the meaning frameworks/structural situation of youth. For advanced undergraduates.Willis, Paul. 1990. Common Culture: Symbolic Work at Play in the Everyday Cultures of the Young. Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press.Although the examples in this survey and summary of research into youth and commodity culture now seem dated (cassette taping culture, for example), nonetheless it represents a seminal attempt to re‐think subcultural theory in terms of ordinary everyday cultural practices. Obviously, given its perspective 'from below' it has very little to say about the media culture industries themselves. For advanced undergraduates.Online materialsCamp Chaos Entertainment (1998) Napster Bad video (uploaded May 2000):http://www.campchaos.com/blog‐archives/2006/05/napster_bad.htmlCamp Chaos Entertainment (1998) Sue All the World video (uploaded July 2000): http://www.campchaos.com/blog‐archives/2006/05/napster_bad_sue_all_the_world.htmlAs is well‐known, a number of high profiles music artists got involved in the debate about 'free' music, the most lampooned of which is Lars Ulrich (of Metallica) who became (literally) a cartoon effigy of apparent music company greed and control when he threatened to sue fans. These two wickedly satirical animations are great to use as stimulus material for students beginning to think about these issues. But beware – some Metallica fans will not be amused!History of R&B indies: http://www.history‐of‐rock.com/independent.htmThis site relates to the material on Indie Case Studies (see Sample Lect 6), in this case US R&B, blues and soul indies.Progressive rock labels: http://www.my‐generation.org.uk/harvest.htm Great site on the progressive rock labels (with cool images of vinyl – if you happen to be a vinyl fetishist, like me), both genuine indies, pseudo indies and notable artists and brief history.Reynold's on Post‐Punk: http://www.simonreynolds.net/Music journalist, Simon Reynolds on the neglect of the post‐punk 'indie' project and the idea of an alternative mainstream. Some good links to debates, notes and interviews.RIAA link: http://www.riaa.com/The Recording Industry Association of America records data (in terms of unit sales) of artists and albums, in the largest single popular music market in the world – the US. Very useful in trying to determine the relative popularity of artists/genres/and particular albums….EveyHit WebPage: http://www.everyhit.co.uk/EveryHit.com is a UK search engine/data base that allows analysis of artists, chart positions and duration of Top 20, Top 10 and No. 1s. This can be very useful in trying to decide things like how diverse markets are, how volatile, how consistent artists, genres and trends are; the composition of top 20s over time, etc.BPI site: http://www.bpi.co.uk/index.aspThe home page of the British Phonographic Institute – UK equivalent to the RIAA. Although data breakdown is only available to subscribers the site does offer year‐end reports on sales and artists which can be e‐mailed to your account or printed.Global Artists Sales: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Best_selling_music_artists#World.27s_best_sellerThis link tries to categorise artists in terms of units of global sales but does not have the precision of the RIAA. Useful for all kinds of arguments, like who is the globally highest selling rap artist?Rock bottom: The music industry in trouble by Charles Shar Murray: http://www.independent.co.uk/arts‐entertainment/music/features/rock‐bottom‐the‐music‐industry‐in‐trouble‐656952.htmlA contemporary 'think piece' by a former doyen of the United Kingdom 'national' rock press, bemoaning the corporate–logic driving a 'worried' music business and the 'narrow‐cast' nature of music consumption, essentially separate markets connected by niche media.Sample syllabusWeek 5Lecture: industryOver the next two sessions we are going to be looking at research into the music business. As Keith Negus has argued 'whether in the words of academic theorists, journalists, fans or musicians, the music industry frequently appears as villain: a ruthless corporate 'machine' that continually attempts to control creativity, compromises aesthetic practices and offers audiences little real choice' (1996: 36). This week's lecture will survey the research that has underpinned and fed into such arguments, from the seminal Peterson and Berger model of how oligopoly = lack of diversity in music markets, to those studies that have sough to continue, revise and update this model to take account of the contemporary global music business. While it is clearly the case that popular music production is currently in the hands of even fewer global media corporations this is not necessarily repeating the same patterns of production and consumption as in the past. While clearly the overall aims of such firms is to exercise as much control as possible over the production of popular music, as in the past, this strategy has not always produced the standardized and stylistically conservative sounds, aimed at a homogenized mass audience, that critics have claimed. One of the ways to begin to explore this is to look at the changing relationship between majors and independents over time and how the strategies of both have lead to an increasingly more complex commercial relationship between the two. This does not mean that the idea of the big, bad music business has gone away or that arguments do not continue to rage over: commerce versus creativity, independents vs. majors and production determining consumption, as we will see. Seminar: The case of the Sony/BMG merger. Reading Longhurst, Brian. 1995. Popular Music and Society Oxford: Polity. Pp. 29–53 in 'The Pop Music Industry.'Negus, Keith. 1996. Popular Music in Theory. Pp. 36–65 in 'Industry.' Cambridge: Polity, ch. 2.Rowe, David. 1995. Popular Cultures: Rock Music, Sport and the Politics of Pleasure. pp. 18–49 in 'Rock industry: Song and Business Cycle.' London: Sage.Frith, Simon. 1988/2005 'The Industrialization of Popular Music.' Pp. 231–8 in The Popular Music Studies Reader, edited by A. Bennett, B. Shank and J. Toynbee. London: Routledge, ch. 26.Chapple, S. and Garofalo, R. 1977. Rock 'n' Roll is Here to Pay: The History and Politics of The Music Industry. Chicago: Nelson Hall.Harker, Dave. 1980. One for the Money: Politics and the Popular Song. London: Hutchinson.Hull, Geoffrey, P. 2000. 'The Structure of the Recorded Music Industry.' Pp. 76–98 in The Media and Entertainment Industries: Readings in Mass Communications Needham Heights, edited by A.N. Greco. MA: Allyn & Bryce.Sanjek, R and Sanjek, D. 1991. The American Popular Music Business in the 20th Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Burnett, Robert. 1996. The Global Jukebox: The International Music Industry. London: Routledge.Hesmondhalgh, David. 2002. The Cultural Industries. London: Sage, pp. 1–24.Week 6Lecture: Indies vs. MajorsThis second lecture on the music business shifts the emphasis away from political economy models to those that focus on the micro picture of the organizational logic that informs the typical record company within the wider logic of the record industry. Hirsch's (1972/1990) seminal model of the record company as a cultural system that selects and filters product along a linear production line, is relevant here. This is because the inherent instability of popular taste and the difficulty faced by big corporations in anticipating changes in taste, result in the formation of two contradictory tendencies. First, an attempt to control the stages of production, through horizontal and vertical integration and the like. Second the attempt to strategically manage artist and repertoire, genre categories and output itself. It is the second dimension that has become subject to more recent research scrutiny in terms of the 'management of creativity' within the music business and more specifically, the role of record company personnel as 'cultural intermediaries'. This revised theoretical model and a number of case studies of significant independent companies, such as those associated with punk and post‐punk, indie and dance labels, has led to a revised account of the relationship between the smaller or independent labels and the big corporations in terms of concepts such as niche markets, symbiosis and flexible specialization. Seminar: The progressive underground and the post‐punk indie experiment: what have we learned? Reading Longhurst, Brian. 1995. Popular Music and Society. Pp. 55–90 in 'The Social Production of Music.' Oxford: Polity.Negus, Keith. 1992. Producing Pop: Culture and Conflict in the Popular Music Industry. Pp. 135–150. London: Arnold, 'Between Success and Failure: Collaboration in the Music Industry.' Pp. 38–61. 'Priorities and prejudice; Artist and Repertoire and the Acquisition of Artist., Pp. 62–79 'Images, Identities and Audiences.'Negus, Keith. 1995. 'Where the Mystical Meets the Market: Creativity and Commerce in the Production of Popular Music'Sociological Review43(2): 316–341.Rowe, David. 1995. Popular Cultures: Rock Music, Sport and the Politics of Pleasure. Pp. 18–49 in 'Rock Industry: Song and Business Cycle.' London: Sage.Indie case studies – from R&B pioneers, through the Progressive rock underground to Post‐Punk DIY, Hardcore/Alt, DanceIndustrial to Rap:George, Nelson. 1988. The Death of Rhythm and Blues. Pp 147–169 in 'Crossover.' New York: Plume.Ward, Brian. 1998. Just My Soul Responding: Rhythm and Blues, Black Consciousness and Race Relations. Pp. 21–29 in 'Majors and Independents.' London and New York: Routledge.Stump, Paul. 1998. The Music's All that Matters: A History of Progressive Rock. 'Samplers, Subsidiaries and Showmen.' London: Quartet, ch. 3.Reynolds, Simon. 2005. Rip it Up and Start Again: Post‐Punk 1978–84. London: Faber and Faber.Young, Robert. 2006. Rough Trade. London: Black Dog Publishing.Hesmondhalgh, David. 1998. 'The British Dance Music Industry: A Case Study in Independent Cultural Production,'British Journal of Sociology49(2): 234–51.Goshert, John, C. 2000. 'Punk' after the Pistols: American Music, Economics and Politics in the 1980s and 1990s. Popular Music & Society Spring, 24(1): 85–106.Wilson, Tony. 2002. 24 Hour Party People: What the Sleeve Notes Never Tell You. Oxford: 4 Books Pan Macmillan.Hesmondhalgh, David. 1996. 'Flexibility, post‐Fordism and the Music Industries'Media, Culture and Society18(3): 469–88.Negus, Keith. 1999. 'The Music Business and Rap: Between the Street and the Executive Suite.'Cultural Studies13(3): 488–508.Week 9Lecture: consumptionThe dominant characterization of the popular music consumer in administrative and 'effects' research has been overwhelmingly the vulnerable, gullible, easily influenced and therefore potentially 'dangerous' individual especially as this characterization coincided and reinforced images of damaged children, dangerous adolescents and troubling youth found in moral panics accompanying the spread and popularity of popular music cultures. Left and radical theories did not fare much better since they too, following Adorno, tended to characterize the consumer of popular music culture as a potential recruit of authoritarian politics or at the very least a passive conformist to the status quo. More recently such views have been challenged by the rise of 'active audience' theories. But it remains the case that we know very little of the detail of how people actually consume music and therefore of the sorts of connections that exist between this activity and other issues such as changing conceptions of social identity, gender and ethnicity, locality and age. Seminar: Exploring music consumption: technologies and 'uses' . Reading Longhurst, Brian. 1995. Popular Music and Society. Pp. 195–225 in 'Effects, Audiences and Subcultures.' Oxford: Polity.Shuker, Roy. 1994. Understanding Popular Music. Pp. 225–36 in 'My Generation': Audiences, Fans and Subcultures.' London: Routledge, ch. 9.Shuker, Roy. 2001 Understanding Popular Music. Pp. 193–206 in 'My Generation': Audiences and Fans, Scenes and Subcultures.' London: Routledge, 2nd edn., ch.11.Hesmondhalgh, David. 2002. 'Popular Music Audiences and Everyday Life.' Pp. 117–130 in Popular Music Studies, edited by D. Hesmondhalgh and K. Negus. London: Arnold.DeNora, Tia. 2000. Music in Everyday Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.DeNora, Tia. 2005. 'Music and Self‐identity.' Pp. 141–147 in The Popular Music Studies Reader, edited by A. Bennett, B. Shank and J. Toynbee. London: Routledge, ch. 16.Bull, Michael. 2005. 'No Dead Air! The iPod and the Culture of Mobile Listening'Leisure Studies, 24(4): 343–55, October.Willis, Paul. and Team. 1996. Moving Culture. Pp. 19–26. Buckingham: Open University Press, 'Music.' London: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, ch. 4.Peterson, Richard A. 1994. 'Measured Markets and Unknown Audiences: Case Studies from the Production and Consumption of Music.' in. Pp. 171–85. Audience Making: How the Media Create the Audience, edited by, J.S. Ettima and D.C. Whitney. London: Sage.Du Gay, Paul and Negus, Keith. 1994. 'The Changing Sites of Sound: Music Retailing and Composition of Consumers.'Media, Culture and Society16(3): 395–413.Music Consumers (ideologies of consumption):Adorno, Theodor. 1990/1941. 'On Popular Music.' Pp. 301–314 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin. London: Routledge.Adorno, Theodor. 1991. 'On the Fetish Character of Music and the Regression of Listening' in The Culture Industry: Selected Essays On Mass Culture. London: Routledge.Gendron, Bernard. 1986. 'Theodore Adorno Meets the Cadillacs.' Pp. 18–36 in Studies in Entertainment, edited by T. Modleski. Bloomington: Bloomington Indiana Press.Riesman, David. 1990/1950 'Listening To Popular Music.' Pp. 5–13 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin. London: Routledge.Horton, Donald. 1990/1957. 'The Dialogue of Courtship in Popular Song.' Pp. 14–26 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin London: Routledge.Hall, Stuart and Whannel, Paddy. 1990/1964. 'The Young Audience.' Pp. 27–37 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin. London: Routledge.Buxton, David. 1990/1983. 'Rock Music, the Star System, and the Rise of Consumerism.' Pp. 427–40 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin. London: Routledge.Frith, S. and Goodwin, A. 1990. 'From Subcultural to Cultural Studies.' Pp. 39–42 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin. London: Routledge.Studies of listening/consuming music and 'meaning':Cavicchi, David. 1998. Tramps Like Us: Music and Meaning Among Springsteen Fans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Adams, Rebecca G. 2000. Deadhead Social Science: You ain't Gonna Learn What You Don't Want to Know. AltaMira Press.Williams, Christina. 2001. 'Does it Really Matter? Young People and Popular Music.'Popular Music20(2): 223–42.Week 10Lecture: subcultures, scenes & tribesFor many years the concept of subculture was thought to provide the most consistent explanation of how class based youth groups were able to make a youth culture out of materials they 'borrowed' from the dominant commercial culture. The resultant style that such groups exhibited was understood to comprise a combination of dress, argot and ritual. It was assumed that this framework could also explain the connections to types of music preference and its use within particular subcultures, such as Ska in the skinhead culture or R&B in the Mod type. This musical connection seemed to become more explicit with Punk – the first post‐war youth subculture to be defined explicitly by the music it preferred. However, after Punk, it became apparent to a growing number of theorists that music based mass movements, like acid house and rave, did not sit very well within the subculture framework and that subsequent changes in youth styles and activities pointed to features – like the cross‐class, mixed ethnic and gender camaraderie of outdoor rave culture and the fluid and changing composition of groups – that were not easily accommodated within the old subcultural model. This impasse has led a number of contemporary theorists to offer a range of alternative ways of understanding youth practices, particularly in relation to urban dance cultures, such as: bunde, neo‐tribe, pseudo‐tribe, scene and post‐subculture. However, it remains the case that the CCCS model of subculture still casts a long shadow over the study of youth and this has lead some commentators to argue that the study of popular music would be better of without it. Others have responded to this position by arguing that what is needed is a greater integration of youth theories with more detailed empirical work on the ordinary consumption of youth that might tease out the connections between music, meaning and identities. Seminar: Subcultural styles: I can't hear the music over the theory! Reading Longhurst, Brian. 1995. Popular Music and Society. Pp. 210–25 in 'Culture, Subculture and Music.' Oxford: Polity.Shuker, Roy. 1994. Understanding Popular Music. Pp. 237–50 'Youth Subcultures, Style and Rock.' London: Routledge.Shuker, Roy. 2001. Understanding Popular Music. Pp. 206–16 in 'Subcultures and Style.' London: Routledge, 2nd edn.Brown, Andy R. 2003. 'Heavy Metal and Subcultural Theory: A Paradigmatic Case of Neglect?,' Pp. 209–22 in The Post‐Subcultures Reader, edited by D. Muggleton and R. Weinzierl. Oxford: Berg.Brown, Andy R. 2007. 'Rethinking the Subcutural Commodity: Exploring Heavy Metal T‐Shirt Culture(s).' Pp. 63–78 in Youth Cultures: Scenes, Subcultures and Tribes, edited by P. Hodkinson and W. Deicke. London: Routledge.Frith, Simon. 1978. The Sociology of Rock. Pp. 37–58 in ch.3, 'Youth and Music.' London: Constable.Frith, Simon. 1983. Sound Effects: Youth, Leisure and the Politics of Rock. Pp. 202–234 in ch.9 'Youth and Music,' London: Constable.Willis, P. 1990/1978. 'The Golden Age.' Pp. 43–55 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin. London: Routledge.Willis, Paul. 1978. 'Profane Culture.' London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Hebdige, Dick. 1990/1979. 'Style as Homology and Signifying Practice.' Pp. 56–65 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin. London: Routledge.McRobbie, Angela. 1990/1980. 'Settling Accounts with Subcultures: A Feminist Critique.' Pp. 66–80 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin. London: Routledge.Clarke, Gary. 1990/1981. 'Defending Ski‐Jumpers: A Critique of Theories of Youth Subcultures.' Pp. 81–95 in On Record, edited by S. Frith and A. Goodwin. London: Routledge.Wicke, Peter. 1990. Rock Music: Culture, Aesthetics and Sociology. Pp. 73–90 in 'My Generation: Rock Music and Sub‐cultures.' Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 4.Negus, Keith. 1996. Popular Music in Theory. Pp. 99–135 in 'Identities,' Cambridge: Polity, ch. 4.Thornton, Sarah. 1995. Club Cultures: Music, Media and Subcultural Capital. Cambridge: Polity,Thornton, Sarah. 1997. 'The Social Logic of Subcultural Capital.' Pp. 200–209 in The Subcultures Reader, edited by K. Gelder and S.Thornton. London: Routledge.Bennett, Andy. 1999. 'Subcultures or Neo‐Tribes? Rethinking the Relationship Between Youth, Style and Musical Taste'Sociology33(3): 599–561.Hodkinson, Paul. 2002. Goth: Identity, Style and Subculture. Oxford: Berg, Pp. 9–33.Weinzierl, Rupert and Muggleton, David. 2003. 'What is "Post‐subcultural Studies" Anyway?' Pp. 3–23 in The Post‐Subcultures Reader, edited by D. Muggleton and R. Weinzierl. London: Berg.Purcell, Nancy, J. 2003. Death Metal Music: The Passion and Politics of a Subculture. North Carolina and London: McFarland and Co.Laughey, Dan. 2006. Music & Youth Culture. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.Hesmondhalgh, David. 2005. 'Subcultures, Scenes or Tribes? None of the Above.'Journal of Youth Studies8(1): 21–40.
This paper aims to examine how effective Cuba's national security services were in working with drug traffickers to obtain their national goals, how exactly the Cuban government was involved and when these drug operations began, as well as the level of culpability on the part of the Castro brothers and legal veracity of the drug trials. Given the extreme lack of academic study into Cuban intelligence and their potential involvement in the drug trade, this research (utilizing interviews with persons who have direct involvement and insight, analyzing declassified files and memorandums) is highly instrumental in determining how effective Cuba has been in making effective foreign policy in addition to offering insights into how Cuba's military and intelligence agencies have performed covert action operations. ; Winner of the 2021 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Graduate category. ; CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY "Trafficking for a Cause": Cuban Drug Trafficking Operations as a Foreign Policy Alan Chase Cunningham Norwich University Advisor: Gamze Menali 01 June 2021 CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham ABSTRACT A capable intelligence service and military force is immensely integral to the national security policy of any nation, regardless of their political ideology or international activity. Cuba's national security apparatuses have proven themselves time and again to be exceptional at accomplishing the Republic's foreign policy goals. From the nation's early beginnings, in the 1960s and 70s, elements of the Cuban government were involved in the drug trade, either on an official or unofficial basis, utilizing drug trafficking as a form of aiding likeminded non-state actors, acquiring small arms and other weaponry, gaining U.S. currency, and making war against the United States. In the 1980s, following increased international outcry, multiple members of Cuba's military and intelligence forces were arrested, tried, and either executed or sentenced to prison for their roles in the drug trade. Many international observers, alongside defectors from Cuba's military and intelligence services and foreign governments, claimed that these trials were for show designed to protect the Castros. This paper aims to examine how effective Cuba's national security services were in working with drug traffickers to obtain their national goals, how exactly the Cuban government was involved and when these drug operations began, as well as the level of culpability on the part of the Castro brothers and legal veracity of the drug trials. Given the extreme lack of academic study into Cuban intelligence and their potential involvement in the drug trade, this research (utilizing interviews with persons who have direct involvement and insight, analyzing declassified files and memorandums) is highly instrumental in determining how effective Cuba has been in making effective foreign policy in addition to offering insights into how Cuba's military and intelligence agencies have performed covert action operations. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham ACKNOWLEDGMENT I would first like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Gamze Menali, at Norwich University. She provided exceptional advice and support that was highly integral to the completion of this thesis and my degree. Her comments were always well-received and significantly bolstered my paper's overall effect and allowed my research to take on a professional quality. A better advisor could not have been provided nor found. I additionally must thank those persons who sacrificed their time and allowed themselves to be interviewed for my final project. Bobby Chacon of the FBI, Fulton Armstrong of the Intelligence Community, Harry Sommers of the DEA, Mike Powers of the DEA, Pierre Charette of the DEA, Richard Gregorie of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, Mike Waniewski of the DEA, Harry Fullett of the DEA, and Seth Taylor of the U.S. Customs Service. This work is intended to honor them and their years of service and dedication to the U.S. government. I would also like to thank two professors whom were of immense importance in my academic career; Professor Jonathan Brown and Assistant Professor Joshua Frens-String of the University of Texas. Both sparked my interest in Latin American affairs and guided me on how to conduct historical research. They were inspirations and role models for me as a historian. Finally, I would like to offer special thanks to both my mother and father who supported me in more ways than one through my entire educational career. My family, importantly Kaytlynn Lopez, were a source for comfort, relaxation, and support throughout this endeavor. I could not have done this without any of them. I hope this work looks well upon all of those who helped and inspired me and allows a new generation of researchers and scholars to better understand this period in Cuban history. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham Table of Contents Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….01 A Basic History of Cuba's Military and Intelligence Services……………………………….03 Early Beginnings: Cuba and Drugs in the 1960s…………………………………………….07 A Change in Policy: Cuba and Drugs in the 1970s………………………………………….16 The Cocaine Boom: Cuba and Drugs in 1980s……………………………………………….21 The Question of Culpability on the Part of the Castros…………………………………….52 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………61 CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham1 Introduction Cuba's intelligence and military services are among the best in the world. They have been described in laudatory terms by intelligence professionals, national security theorists, and academics alike. Brian Latell, a former National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Latin America and career Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst, agrees and recounts how veteran counterintelligence officers from all areas of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) would, "stand in awe of how Cuba, a small island nation, could have built up such exceptional clandestine capabilities and run so many successful operations against American targets".1 The CIA's former Chief of Counterintelligence, James M. Olson, agrees, writing, "no foreign intelligence service rankled me more than [Cuba's]…It was ruthless, it was devious, and worst of all, it was very, very good".2 Analysts from the research and analysis think tank CNA agree with Latell, writing, "[Cuba's] intelligence services are widely regarded as among the best in the world – a significant accomplishment given the country's meager financial and technological resources".3 The longtime lead historian of Cuban affairs, Jorge I. Dominguez, wrote in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, "Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)…have been among the world's most successful military".4 Longtime attorney and the Chief of Narcotics for the U.S. 1 Brian Latell, Castro's Secrets: The CIA and Cuba's Intelligence Machine (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 01, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/733231302. 2 James M. Olson, To Catch A Spy: The Art of Counterintelligence (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2019), p. 31, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/1055568332. 3 Sean Durns, "Castro's dead, but his spies live on," The Hill, Capitol Hill Publishing, published 05 December 2016, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/308811-castros-dead-but-his-spies-live-on. 4 Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuban Military and Politics," Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press, published 29 May 2020, https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1810. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham2 Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (USAO-SDFL) during the early 1980s, Richard Gregorie, has said that Cuba's intelligence services "is better than the CIA in Miami".5 It is apparent that, across multiple fields and specialties, Cuba is a well-regarded foreign power with a highly effective intelligence apparatus and robust military force. Not only that, but Cuba has been able to maintain effective relationships with like-minded state and non-state actors. Throughout the Cold War, Cuba maintained effective relationships with Latin American states by encouraging leftist revolutions amongst foreign populaces and aligning with foreign political parties6, becoming a benefactor to various regimes, political parties, and revolutionary groups in places like Venezuela, Angola, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. These relationships were maintained in a variety of ways from the providing of covert financial and military aid to the physical commitment of Cuban troops to ground warfare. It is well documented that, one of these relationships included the providing of security to drug traffickers and the usage of Cuba as a weigh station for drug traffickers. Through this almost three decade long covert operation, Cuba was heavily entrenched in building up beneficial relationships with non-state actors like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and legitimate nation states like Manuel Noriega's Panama, finding a steady source of income, and being able to make war against their age old adversary, the United States of America. By efficiently coordinating these operations and working to traffic illicit substances abroad, Cuba was able to improve their standing in Latin America and assist in the making of revolution abroad, essentially using the trafficking of drugs and other narcotics as a form of positive foreign policy. 5 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. 6 "Castro and the Cold War," American Experience, Public Broadcasting Service, published 2005, republished November 2015, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/comandante-cold-war/. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham3 Despite the fact that this incident offers a great deal of information as to how Cuba has conducted themselves in a foreign policy sense and has made war against the United States, it has been only minimally studied. In researching this area, one can find only a few academic papers and books written from the late 1990s which covers this issue in depth, with other books on Cuban history or drug trafficking in Latin America failing to cover this area or devoting only a paragraph or two to the entire ordeal. By examining this issue in depth, one can be able to determine just how intricate and involved Cuba's foreign policy endeavors were in addition to better understanding Cuba and the Castro's commitment to the exportation of revolution. This research chronologically catalogs how Cuba engaged in the drug trade, where they expanded and how they altered plans to most effectively suit their own needs. This research also intends to determine the level of knowledge Fidel and Raul Castro, Cuba's most well-known and high ranking officials, had of the operation and show how Cuba's drug trafficking efforts either succeeded or failed in bringing about the results desired by the island nation. A Basic History of Cuba's Military and Intelligence Services To fully and best understand Cuba's involvement in the drug trade, one must first come to understand the nation's intelligence and military infrastructure. The history of the FAR began when Fidel Castro and the military arm of his 26th of July Movement (M26) returned to the nation in December of 1956.7 Though soundly crushed by Fulgencio Batista's forces, Castro's rebellion was able to persevere by launching successful guerilla raids upon important military targets and acquiring a devoted following of students and lower to middle-class Cuban citizens, eventually becoming militarily superior to Batista's forces and claiming the country in January of 1959.8 The rebel army, under the command of Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, 7 Marc Becker, Twentieth-Century Latin American Revolutions (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), p. 111. 8 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham4 purged the military corps of Batista's regime, executing, exiling, or simply discharging various officers before officially creating the FAR in October of 1959.9 The FAR was initially under the control of the Ministry of Defense, yet this was renamed to the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) and was headed by Raul Castro, Fidel's brother and later Vice President.10 Between 1959 and 1961, Castro populated the FAR with officers and enlisted personnel who would remain loyal to the new government, implemented educational programs which served to expose the military to Communist and Marxist teachings, and established militias which bridged the gap between Cuba's military and societal structures.11 Cuba's intelligence service, the Dirección General de Inteligencia (until 1989, the service went by the acronym DGI, before being changed to DI; the acronym DGI will be used when referring to this service), was created sometime in 1961, the actual date being unclear, as placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior (MININT).12 What is clear with the DGI, however, is their connections to the Soviet Union and the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezposnosti (KGB). Immediately following the Bay of Pigs crisis, the KGB assisted Cuba in infiltrating Cuban exile groups in Florida and New York to determine if the Kennedy administration would try and oust Castro from power again.13 In March of 1962, the KGB set up an "operations base in Havana to export revolution across Latin America,"14 while later beginning an information 9 Damián J. Fernández, "Historical Background: Achievements, Failures, and Prospects," in The Cuban Military Under Castro, ed. Jaime Suchlicki (Miami, FL: University of Miami Graduate School of International Studies, 1989), p. 05. 10 Ibid. 11 Fernández, "Historical Background: Achievements, Failures, and Prospects," in The Cuban Military Under Castro ed. Jaime Suchlicki, p. 07-08. 12 "Cuba, Intelligence and Security," in Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security, ed. K. Lee Lerner & Brenda Wilmoth Lerner (Farmington Hills, MI: The Gale Group, 2004), p. 292, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/55960387. 13 Oleg Kalugin, Spymaster: My Thirty-Two Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West (United States of America: Basic Books, 2009), p. 51-53. 14 Christopher Andrew & Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (United States of America: Basic Books, 2001), p. 184, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/727648881. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham5 sharing operation with the Cubans and even putting in place a KGB liaison officer within the DGI.15 Since the beginning of Cuba's foray into the world of counterintelligence and foreign intelligence collection, the KGB has been heavily invested and taken a special interest in Cuban intelligence operations. Early Beginnings: Cuba and Drugs in the 1960s Stratfor, a private geopolitical intelligence firm based in Austin, Texas, wrote in 2008 that, "While seeking refuge from Batista forces in the hills outside Havana, the future dictator was sheltered by marijuana farmers. Castro promised the growers protection for their hospitality".16 While trying to corroborate this claim about Castro's promise is difficult, it is well-documented that the Sierra Maestra mountain range, where Castro and his 26th of July Movement carried out guerilla attacks against the Batista regime, "had been traditional outlaw country long before Castro – rife with smuggling, marijuana growing…".17 Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade seemingly sometime shortly after the DGI was founded in 1961. A declassified Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD – the precursor to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)) document details how, in 1961, a meeting was held between Che Guevara (then the President of Cuba's National Bank and head of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA)18), Ramiro Valdes (Che's deputy during the revolution and now head of the "[state's] security and intelligence apparatus"19), a Captain from Valdes' outfit, and Salvador Allende, then a Senator from Chile.20 The meeting first revolved 15 Ronald Young, "Cuba," in Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), p. 186, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/436850527. 16 "Organized Crime in Cuba," Stratfor, Rane Corporation, published 16 May 2008, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/organized-crime-cuba. 17 Gil Carl Alroy, "The Peasantry in the Cuban Revolution," The Review of Politics Vol. 29, No. 01 (1967), p. 97, https://www-jstor-org.library.norwich.edu/stable/1405815?seq=4#metadata_info_tab_contents. 18 Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York, NY: Grove Press, 2010), p. 424. 19 Anderson, Che Guevara, p. 368. 20 Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1990), p. 24. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham6 around Chilean politics, "but soon Comandante Valdes turned the talk to setting up a cocaine-trafficking network in order to raise money to help finance Allende…Valdes…suggested that Roberto Alvarez, chief of Cuban espionage, head the new organization".21 While attempts were made to gain access to this document via a FOIA request to the DEA, the DEA was unable to provide the document by the time of publication. This is not the only document which alleges Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade during the early 1960s. Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN - the precursor to the BNDD and therefore the DEA) Henry Giordano specified in multiple letters and internal memoranda that the FBN and BNDD had located, "a "pattern of Cuban nationals," who were "suspected Castro sympathizers . . . dominating the traffic" and "operating in Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile to distribute large quantities of cocaine throughout the United States",".22 This mirrors what Giordano's predecessor, Harry J. Anslinger, seemed to believe in early 1961, that "the island nation [was] trying to subvert the United States with drugs".23 The BNDD too apparently, "investigated a purported Cuban government operation to sponsor marijuana and heroin crops in Cuba's Oriente province, using a secret department within the country's National Institute of Agrarian Reform".24 While both these incidences mention drug trafficking/production on the part of INRA and within Chile, seemingly backing up what the defector alleged to the BNDD, Giordano and Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury David Acheson both changed their opinions in the mid-1960s. The two officials believed that while individual Cubans were involved in the drug trade, this was not government 21 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 24-25. 22 William L. Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine: How U.S. Foreign Policy Has Created a Thriving Drug Industry in Central and South America (Chicago, IL: Chicago Review Press, 2010), p. 92, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/592756109. 23 William O. Walker III, Drugs in the Western Hemisphere: An Odyssey of Cultures in Conflict (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1996), 171, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/33132446. 24 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 91. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham7 sanctioned and was of such a tiny scale that it would be "too small to have much of an effect on the supply of dollars to that country".25 Naturally, for a government official to change their personal opinion (especially those with the highest access to sensitive documents), they must have been exposed to some form of information which detailed to them that their previously held notion of Cuban involvement was faulty. This being said, evidence collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), individual FBN agents, and allegations by Soviet defectors, seem to corroborate the investigations by federal agencies, pointing to drug trafficking endeavors sanctioned by the Cuban government. According to a letter penned by J. Edgar Hoover, the longtime director of the FBI, "several Colombian airplanes taken to Cuba in 1967 were hijacked on behalf of the Cuban government for the purpose of obtaining the cargo—smuggled heroin".26 The Federal Bureau of Narcotics also agreed with the FBI's assessment and even estimated the total worth of the heroin was in the twenty million dollar range.27 Also in 1967, "a Cuban trained Venezuelan intelligence officer established…Cuban link of drugs for guerrilla weapons in the hemisphere," detailing this information before the Organization of American States (OAS), "providing a major connection between Havana, the guerilla movements, and narcotics".28 Acting Federal Narcotics Commissioner and long-time FBN agent Charles Siragusa also claimed in March of 1962 that six Cuban drug traffickers arrested in Miami and New York were transporting cocaine from Cuba to the U.S. for the purposes of "raising money [and] 25 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 92. 26 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 93. 27 Ibid. 28 Ralph E. Fernandez, "Historical Assessment of Terrorist Activity and Narcotic Trafficking by the Republic of Cuba," The Law Offices of Ralph E. Fernandez and Associates, P.A., Ralph E. Fernandez, P.A., published 22 January 2003, p. 02. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham8 demoralizing Americans and discrediting Cuban exiles in Miami".29 An FBN agent involved in the investigation and raid also confirmed this.30 A 2003 historical assessment focusing on the Cuban government's involvement in the drug trade and terrorism published by the law offices of Ralph E. Fernandez in Tampa, Florida indicated that Juvenito Pablo Guerra, the Miami group's ringleader, was an intelligence officer.31 Among the evidence that this cell was linked to the Cuban government and that Guerra was an intelligence officer includes "a supply of Communist literature and pictures of Cuban premier Fidel Castro in Guerra's apartment".32 While this piece of information is highly circumstantial in trying to link Castro to the drug ring, it does indicate that this cell was most likely not a grouping of exiled Cubans, ones who fled following Castro's claiming power in 1959, but rather were supporters of the Castro regime. Upon being sentenced in June of 1962 to "fifteen years in prison [for] narcotics conspiracy and assault with intent to kill a Federal officer…an undercover narcotics agent testified that Guerra was closely associated with Premier Castro and has been a member of a ring that had smuggled cocaine into this country from Cuba to obtain arms for Dr. Castro during the revolution".33 Also in the early 1960's, a FBN agent named Salvatore Vizzini was involved in the arrest of, "two Cuban agents…in Miami with large amounts of cocaine in their possession".34 29 "Cuba Plot Is Cited in Narcotics Raids," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 31 March 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/03/31/archives/cuba-plot-is-cited-in-narcotics-raids.html?searchResultPosition=78. 30 "Big Cocaine Seizure Held Cuban in Origin," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 30 March 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/03/30/archives/big-cocaine-seizure-held-cuban-in-origin.html?searchResultPosition=106. 31 Fernandez, "Historical Assessment of Terrorist Activity and Narcotic Trafficking by the Republic of Cuba," The Law Offices of Ralph E. Fernandez and Associates, P.A, p. 02. 32 "Big Cocaine Seizure Held Cuban in Origin," The New York Times. 33 "U.S. Jails 2 in Narcotics Case; One Reported Close to Castro," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 02 June 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/06/02/archives/us-jails-2-in-narcotics-case-one-reported-close-to-castro.html?searchResultPosition=12. 34 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 25. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham9 Recounting the arrest in a 1978 letter to Morley Safer of CBS' 60 Minutes, Vizzini detailed that the subsequent investigation proved conclusively that the arrestees (Ramon Diaz and Jose Barrel) were both working for the Cuban government and were either selling the cocaine for profit or were involved in trading the coke for weapons.35 Throughout Vizzini's law enforcement career, this would not be the only time he would encounter evidence of Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade. Writing in his 1972 memoirs, Vizzini recounted one undercover operation in which he was sent to San Juan, Puerto Rico and received a teletype by HQ. The teletype contained "a lot of unconfirmed rumor" which included headquarters' suspicion, "that Castro and his boys were secretly involved in the smuggling [of narcotics]," while also including the names of two Cuban expats, Luis Valdez and Caesar Vega.36 Eventually being able to infiltrate the Puerto Rican underworld and meet with Valdez and Vega, Vizzini bought $750.00 USD for an ounce of cocaine. While the eventual arrests of those involved failed to capture both Valdez and Vega, the San Juan Police Department's Narcotics Squad seemed to believe the two had already fled back to Cuba.37 While the FBN seemingly was never able to confirm their suspicions about Valdez and Vega's relationships to the Castro government, it is worth pointing out that, in early Summer 1959, a Cuban Major similarly named Cesar Vega was in charge of a Castro sanctioned operation to overthrow the Panamanian government.38 Vizzini it seems held that, "there was reason to believe the operation was being carried on with the knowledge of Fidel Castro, that his supporters were running it, and that the profits were getting back to shore up the dictator's shaky 35 Sal Vizzini, letter to Morley Safer, 27 February 1978. 36 Sal Vizzini, Vizzini: The Secret Lives of America's Most Successful Undercover Agent (New York, NY: Pinnacle Books, 1972), p. 284. 37 Vizzini, Vizzini, p. 309. 38 Robert L. Scheina, Latin America's Wars: The Age of the Professional Soldier Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2003), p. 56. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m0 government".39 In an extension of remarks placed in the Congressional Record in May of 1965, the CIA's view of these allegations and claims comes through. DeWitt S. Copp, a CIA analyst, detailed additional evidence concerning Castro and the Cuban government's culpability in the drug trade in a paper titled, "Castro's Subversion in the United States". Copp writes, "In December 1964, three Castro agents were arrested at Miami Airport – one of them a Cuban, Marlo Carabeo Nerey…On January 15, 1965, Oscar H. Reguera and Elidoro Martinéz were taken into custody in a New York motel with $3 million worth of cocaine in their luggage. Martinéz is believed to be a Cuban agent," while also making the claim that Cuba was engaging in narcotics trafficking in order "to finance an insurrection in Puerto Rico".40 The CIA, while any comment on the arrests of Juvenito Guerra's cell or the other arrests listed was unable to be found, certainly seemed to investigating that Cuba was, on some level, involved in the trafficking of narcotics to better support their own desires and machinations. This would also not be the last time that a group of drug traffickers would be alleged to be aligned with Cuba in the 1960s as well. In September of 1967, it was reported that, following an investigation conducted by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and Queens District Attorney's Office, six persons were arrested for their involvement in a drug ring which brought in, "$2.88 million [of cocaine]…from Cuba to Montego Bay, Jamaica and then to New Orleans for the flight to New York".41 According to law enforcement officers, Cuban governmental officials knew about this drug trafficking ring yet, "did not interfere in the 39 Vizzini, Vizzini, p. 282. 40 Representative Craig Hosmer, Extension of Remarks, on 25 May 1965, "Castro's Subversion in the United States – Part I," 89th Cong., Congressional Record, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75-00149R000400100003-7.pdf. 41 "6 Are Seized Here With Cocaine Worth Nearly $3-Million," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 10 September 1967, https://www.nytimes.com/1967/09/10/archives/6-are-seized-here-with-cocaine-worth-nearly-3million-cuban-did-not.html?searchResultPosition=156. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m1 narcotics ring's activities and, in return, ring members supplied the Cuban government with information about anti-Castro elements in the United States," with members posing, "as fundraisers for anti-Castro elements," and then transmitting the contributor's information back to Cuba.42 Attempts to access the NYPD's files or interview detectives with relevant knowledge of the case were unsuccessful. In the late 1960s as well, it appears that some measure of involvement by the Cuban military in the drug trade was occurring within South Florida. Around 1969, two agents from the FBN/BNDD's Miami Field Office (FO) went undercover as local drug dealers to meet with a Cuban contact at a dock behind the Playboy Club in Miami at 7701 Biscayne Boulevard. According to former DEA Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge (ASAC) Pierre Charette, "the two agents did meet with a Cuban general and had discussed using Cuba as an entry point [for drugs]".43 Charette, who was not himself involved in the meeting but was close with one of the agents who was present, also confirmed that the Cuban general was an "active-duty [officer] with Castro's forces" and that the conversation was audio recorded by one of the agents.44 What one can see here is Cuba utilizing drug trafficking, not as a way of gaining an upper hand against the United States or to gain a better financial standing, but rather as a form of information gathering and intelligence collection on potential political and national security threats. By aligning themselves with a non-state actor able to work abroad in foreign land without arising suspicion from counterintelligence organizations, the Cuban government was able to better defend from foreign threats by Batista supporters and anti-Castro groups. In the form of gaining the upper hand on adversaries and gathering intelligence, this is an ingenious 42 Ibid. 43 Pierre "Pete" Charette (retired Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 16 March 2021. 44 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m2 tactic. In the late-1960s, a defector alleged that "Raúl Castro and/or his associates within the Cuban Defense Ministry actively discussed the issue of drug trafficking as an ideological weapon to be used against the United States [and that] Czech intelligence operatives trained Cuban agents to produce and distribute drugs and narcotics into the United States".45 This claim was made by Major General Jan Sejna, a military officer in the Czechoslovak People's Army and, "chief of the political wing of the Czech Defense Ministry and…member of the Communist Party's General Staff and the National Assembly, the country's legislative body".46 Sejna defected in 1968 following the "Prague Spring" under allegations of embezzlement by reformist Communists led by Alexander Dubček, a political opponent of Sejna's "patron, Antonin Novotny".47 Following Sejna's defection, both the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) kept Sejna on their payroll as a counterintelligence analyst and consultant.48 Throughout the 1960s, it is apparent that Cuba was, at the least, a way station for drug traffickers to resupply before heading on into the United States (as the island nation had served since the mid-1500s)49 or, at the most, was officially sanctioning the trafficking of narcotics into the U.S. for profit. Given the fact that Cuba was a newly created country and was in dire need of economic stability, it makes sense that Castro's regime would engage in some form of drug 45 Emilio T. González, "The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking and the Castro Regime," CSA Occasional Paper Series Vol. 02. No. 06 (1997), p. 01-02, https://scholarship.miami.edu/discovery/delivery?vid=01UOML_INST:ResearchRepository&repId=12355424610002976#13355471490002976. 46 Louie Estrada, "Gen. Jan Sejna, Czech Defector, Dies," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 27 August 1997, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1997/08/27/gen-jan-sejna-czech-defector-dies/0aa7916b-1005-4595-9a2e-5dc51012dbf5/. 47 David Stout, "Jan Sejna, 70, Ex-Czech General and Defector," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 30 August 1997, https://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/30/world/jan-sejna-70-ex-czech-general-and-defector.html. 48 "Gen. Jan Sejna, Czech defector, dead at 70," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 26 August 1997, https://apnews.com/article/395f04eda00526846fb4d3cfff44f726. 49 T.J. English, The Corporation: An Epic Story of the Cuban American Underworld (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2018), p. 04, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/990850150. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m3 production and trafficking to provide a certain level of income. Additionally, it also would allow the new nation to craft strong foreign ties to non-state actors and individual governmental officials abroad who could prove valuable in other, more legitimate matters. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April of 1961, in which the United States and the Cuban governments became more antagonistic towards one another, one can see (based upon U.S. documents and defector testimony) that Cuba began taking further actions of trafficking narcotics into the U.S. as a method of covert action, "those activities carried out by national governments or other organizations…to secretly influence and manipulate events abroad".50 Sejna's allegations, if true, corroborate a great deal of what the FBN/BNDD and FBI found during the course of their criminal investigations, that the Cuban government was involved in the creating of narcotics and the trafficking of drugs throughout the Latin America region. Given the abundance of evidence surrounding Cuba and the drug trade in the 1960s, it would be logical to believe that some elements of the Cuban government (either individual ministers, agency heads, etc.) or Fidel and Raul Castro themselves, were involved in the trafficking or shipping of narcotics to the United States from Cuba. While the amount of evidence conclusively linking the Castros to the drug trade in the 1960s is minimal (with perhaps the most concrete evidence being the undercover agent's testimony during the Guerra trial), given the fact that Castro exerted a tight grasp upon the daily functions of the government and was heavily involved in minute details of military operations, foreign policy endeavors, and domestic matters, it is hard to envision that Castro was not aware of these operations or was completely oblivious to them. These operations to traffic drugs, throughout the 1960s, do not appear to be a large scale 50 Loch K. Johnson & James J. Wirtz, "Part IV: Covert Action," in Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies: An Anthology, ed. Loch K. Johnson & James J. Wirtz (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 237. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m4 policy stance. It did not appear to be organized nor a prominent feature of the Cuban government's foreign policy or income. The usage of drug trafficking by governmental entities and the allowing of drug traffickers to ply their trade within the island nation indicates this was done in an effort to garner additional currency, gather intelligence on threatening groups, or temporarily assist foreign allies. These operations do not seem to be large scale or integral to the overall conduct of the Cuban government, but are instead minor and almost done in a tentative way, perhaps out of fear of reprisal from the U.S. or the Soviet Union had their activities been uncovered. A Change in Policy: Cuba and Drugs in the 1970s Throughout the 1970s, the solidifying of the relationship between the Cuban state and non-state actors became more apparent. It was at this time that the Cuban government began making more long-lasting and profitable strides into the global drug trade while also greatly increasing their alignment with non-state actors and strengthening their foreign policy goals. At this time in Cuban history, Cuba was involved in a variety of foreign policy endeavors and military conflicts. Having failed in the 1960s to become self-sufficient economically, the island, "turned to the Soviet Union for support…[increasing] its subsidies for the Cuban economy through running trade deficits with the island and paying above-market prices for its sugar", further cementing the Soviets' presence in the nation-state.51 Given the fact that Cuba was in need of hard currency and did not desire to be too reliant upon the Soviets, Cuba can be seen as somewhat increasing their drug trafficking and security operations significantly in the mid to late-1970s. Evidence of Cuban involvement in the 1970's drug trade came through in the early-mid 51 Becker, Twentieth-Century Latin American Revolutions, p. 127. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m5 1980s and onward, with multiple defectors and arrested drug traffickers from Cuban military/intelligence organizations and Latin American cartels respectively offering this information to the U.S. government. Cuban defectors and drug cartel associates arrested in the 1980s indicated "in late 1975, some of Colombia's best-known and biggest cocaine kingpins met secretly in Bogotá…with the Cuban ambassador Fernando Ravelo-Renendo…Havana not only was prepared to ignore drug-laden mother ships operating in its waters but also to provide fueling and repair services to its ports…Havana also offered to escort the narcotics boats upon leaving Cuban ports, as well as provide Cuban flags to disguise their origin all the way to feeder vessels stationed off the Florida Keys," in return for roughly "$800,000 per vessel".52 In her book Narco-Terrorism, Rachel Ehrenfeld, then a research scholar at New York University School of Law, claims that Ravelo-Renendo was a Cuban intelligence operative from the Departamento América53, a "parallel intelligence apparatus"54 headed by Manuel Piñeiro Losada. It does seem that Ravelo-Renendo was a Cuban intelligence operative of sorts as, upon his death in July of 2017, a former Cuban Army officer wrote a detailed obituary documenting Ravelo-Renendo's services to Cuba, mentioning his entry into Cuba's intelligence service and his tenure during the 1970s as Cuba's Ambassador to Colombia.55 According to Dirk Krujit, professor emeritus of development studies at Utrecht University, the Departamento América was a unit which, "conducted Cuba's secret foreign 52 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 29-30. 53 Ibid. 54 Nora Gámez Torres, "He now hunts Cuban human-rights abusers in the U.S. Was he one himself?" Miami Herald, The McClatchy Company, published and updated 12 July 2018, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article214754450.html. 55 Alfredo García, "Cuban internationalist veteran Fernando Ravelo dies," Colarebo, Colarebo, published 04 July 2017, https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=https://colarebo.wordpress.com/2017/07/04/fallece-veterano-internacionalista-cubano-fernando-ravelo/&prev=search&pto=aue. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m6 relations under the direct supervision of, and access to, Fidel Castro"56 with these secret foreign relations techniques coming in the form of "[supplying] arms, money, intelligence, guidance, and a rear base to a variety of leftist guerilla movements in Latin America that wanted to duplicate the Cuban model".57 Manuel Piñeiro Losada too was a close friend of both Fidel and Raul Castro, having solidified his position as a loyal intelligence officer during the revolution.58 An interview with retired Resident Agent-in-Charge (RAC) of the DEA's Tampa office, Mike Powers, also was able to shed some light on how important Cuba was in the Colombian drug trade. He relayed an incident detailed to him by a smuggler arrested sometime in the 1980s who later became an informant. According to the smuggler, in the early 1970s, "he was flying a load of marijuana from Colombia to Florida…As he was almost across [Cuban airspace], a Cuban MiG came up, flew next to him and signaled to follow him and land. At that point, he [the smuggler] held up a bale of marijuana and the pilot laughed and signaled [him to] go ahead [through Cuban airspace]".59 While this incident does not indicate official government sanctioning of the drug trade nor some larger effort by the Cuban government to enter into the drug trade, this piece of information is indicative of how important Cuban airspace was in the drug trade and also how individual Cuban military officers or officials may have begun engaging in the drug trade to attain either larger foreign policy goals or as an extra source of income. This information is all quite interesting as this is the first time there is some form of evidence, albeit tangentially, in which Cuban officials and members of drug cartels met to 56 Dirk Krujit, Cuba and Revolutionary Latin America: An Oral History (London, UK: Zed Books, 2017), p. 05, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/964892858. 57 Larry Rohter, "Manuel Pineiro, Spymaster For Cuba, Is Dead at 63," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 13 March 1998, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/13/world/manuel-pineiro-spymaster-for-castro-is-dead-at-63.html. 58 Dirk Krujit, "Cuba and the Latin American Left: 1959-Present," Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina Vol. 28, No. 02 (2017), p. 32, http://eial.tau.ac.il/index.php/eial/article/view/1519/1623. 59 Mike Powers (retired Resident Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 20 December 2020. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m7 discuss a potential relationship revolving around the drug trade. However, this information must be treated with care in that these come from the mouths of defectors who must be listened to warily and have their claims treated with suspicion given the facts they, on occasion, will say anything in order to be given a lesser sentence or protection. Attempts to try and access CIA or other IC members' files were largely unsuccessful. However, declassified files were able to shed some light on the area. According to a declassified November 1983 document from the CIA, the Agency documented a series of claims revolving around Cuba and the drug trade, including one which mentioned how "Cuban officials, including Fidel Castro, has considered a scheme in 1979 to deal with narcotics smugglers in order to obtain hard currency for Cuba and contribute to the deterioration of US society".60 The CIA did mention as well that "not all of [these reports] have been corroborated", though were comfortable enough with the totality of the reports that they did endorse the belief that Cuba was involved, in some measure, with drug traffickers.61 The American non-profit, Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba (FHRC), produced a historical work in 2019 documenting Cuba's involvement in Venezuela, including a section on Cuba's alleged involvement in the international drug trade. They allege that Cuba's official entry into the narcotics trade began in 1978, "with the creation of a department for [MININT] operations inside the Cuban corporation CIMEX [Corporación de Industrias Mixtas de Exportación], for money laundering and marijuana trafficking".62 The FHRC cites Norberto 60 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Drug Trafficking: The Role of Insurgents, Terrorists, and Sovereign States (Langley, November 1983), p. 05-06, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00283R000300010008-6.pdf. 61 Ibid. 62 Juan Antonio Blanco, Rolando Cartaya, Luis Domínguez, & Casto Ocando, "Cubazuela: Chronicle of a Cuban Intervention," Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba, Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba, published April 2019, p. 87, https://www.fhrcuba.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/CUBAZUELA-CUBAN-INTERVENTION-English.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m8 Fuentes, an original member of the Cuban Revolution and Castro historian, as the source for the claims. While Fuentes' exact statements were unable to be accessed, it is known that a defector from Cuba's Ministry of the Interior, Major Jose Rodriguez Antonio Menier, too claimed that CIMEX was "linked to the drug trade" while even going a step further and stating that Castro had knowledge of general drug trafficking and CIMEX operations, using the profits to "support and opulent lifestyle [and fund] off-budget projects".63 Maria C. Werlau, an independent scholar and Cuban human rights activist, speaking to other anonymous defectors from the DGI, confirmed that CIMEX had a department entirely under the control of MININT in addition to making the allegation that, "100% of their revenue went into Fidel Castro's accounts".64 In testimony before Congressional subcommittees during the late-1980s, two convicted drug traffickers provided similar statements on Cuban involvement in the drug trade. One of them, Luis Garcia, testified that, in either "late-1979 or early-1980, Cuban officials offered him use of airstrips for refueling drug flights" and though he did not accept, "he was aware of other smugglers who did".65 Another trafficker named George Morales claimed that during a 1979 meeting in Cuba, he was sold planes which were seized by the Cuban government (presumably, Morales either stripped these planes for parts or would use them in his own drug trafficking endeavors) before eventually getting the Cubans to agree "to allow his pilots overflight rights through Cuban airspace".66 Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 63 Don Podesta, "Ex-Cuban Officer Says Castro Profited from Drug Trafficking," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 26 August 1989, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/08/26/ex-cuban-officer-says-castro-profited-from-drug-trafficking/5f7a23ba-b4ad-4bc6-b8ec-fbea4470bac5/. 64 Maria C. Werlau, "Fidel Castro, Inc. A Global Conglomerate," Cuba in Transition Vol. 15 (2005), p. 379, https://ascecuba.org//c/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/v15-werlau.pdf. 65 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., December 1988, p. 64. 66 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m9 Narcotics, and International Operations, did however call Morales' statements "obviously incomplete", indicating that Morales' assertions required additional substantiation either through federal investigations, informants, or defectors.67 Attempts to find further evidence of Cuban involvement in the Western Hemispheric drug trade during the 1970s was minimal. It does appear that a top-secret, interagency, criminal investigation, initially codenamed "Operation Delta", was being conducted by the FBI, DEA, NYPD, and Chicago Police Department with the stated goal of "[digging] into the burgeoning Cuba-to-Florida narcotics trade and the distribution of drugs out of Miami".68 The details of this operation, however, are incredibly marginal, with attempts to access the records of this operation failing, despite multiple FOIA requests to the relevant agencies. It is possible that Cuba was not as active in the drug trade during this time due to the other foreign policy endeavors the nation-state was undertaking at that time (extensive military operations in Angola, South Africa, and Ethiopia). Due to the immense pressures going on with the nation, it is highly possible and logical even that Cuba toned down any drug trafficking activities that may have been going on. However, with the Soviet Union's death becoming more imminent and Cuba's foreign policy becoming more Latin American focused in the 1980s, Cuba seems to have significantly increased their ability at trafficking and providing security for drugs shipments as the crack epidemic swept into the U.S. during that time. The Cocaine Boom: Cuban and Drugs in the 1980s The 1980s saw a boom of drug trafficking and use throughout the Western Hemisphere. During the late 1970s, cocaine "[surged] in popularity…[being] associated with celebrities, high 67 Joan Mower, "Witness Claims Contra Drug Smuggling, Payoffs To Cuban, Bahamian Officials With," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 15 July 1987, https://apnews.com/article/5f5dd485a6d6825e88496281a2b1711c. 68 "Drugs gangs here, terrorist linked," Chicago Sun-Times, Sun-Times Media Group, published 16 April 1979, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/drugs/faln-drugs.htm. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m0 rollers and glamorous parties" with this continuing into the 1980s before peaking in 1985 and being declared a nationwide epidemic.69 Throughout this time period, cocaine (and the even more popular derivative crack cocaine) was trafficked into the United States predominantly by organized criminal elements utilizing "a distribution system that imported cocaine from South America into the U.S. market using sea and air routes via the Caribbean and the South Florida coast" in addition to trafficking drugs through Mexico.70 While these trafficking routes are now largely managed and controlled by Mexican cartels like the Gulf Cartel or the Los Zetas, in the 1980s, the Colombians were the largest drug traffickers in the Western Hemisphere. The Medellín and Cali Cartels were the two largest players in the drug trade, with the Medellín Cartel being the dominant organized criminal element until 1993 with the death of Pablo Escobar.71 While both the Medellín and Cali Cartels are now extinct, they were incredibly powerful at the time, with the Medellín Cartel raking "up to $60 million daily in drug profits"72 and the Cali Cartel, by 1992, being "responsible for seventy percent of the cocaine sold in the United States, as well as for the extraordinary growth of the cocaine market in Europe".73 Because of the massive influence these organizations had and their wide area of operations throughout Central and North America, these cartels, mainly the Medellín, also joined forces with legitimate state enterprises such as Manuel Noriega's Panama to drastically increase their 69 Jason Ferris, Barbara Wood, & Stephanie Cook, "Weekly Dose: cocaine, the glamour drug of '70s, is making a comeback," The Conversation, The Conversation, published 08 March 2018, updated 12 March 2018, https://theconversation.com/weekly-dose-cocaine-the-glamour-drug-of-the-70s-is-making-a-comeback-88639. 70 Deonna S. Turner, "Crack epidemic," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 08 July 2016, updated 04 September 2017, https://www.britannica.com/topic/crack-epidemic. 71 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Strategic Intelligence Section, The Cocaine Threat to the United States (Springfield, VA, 19 July 1995), p. 04, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/154678NCJRS.pdf. 72 Sara Miller Llana, "Medellín, once epicenter of Colombia's drug war, fights to keep peace," The Christian Science Monitor, Christian Science Publishing Society, published 25 October 2010, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2010/1025/Medellin-once-epicenter-of-Colombia-s-drug-war-fights-to-keep-the-peace. 73 Juan E. Méndez, Political Murder and Reform in Colombia: The Violence Continues (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, April 1992), p. 82. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m1 drug trafficking abilities.74 During the 1980s, many organized elements utilized the Caribbean to traffic narcotics either into Europe or into North America. It is without question that Cuba was one of these locations in which both air and sea craft landed to refuel and resupply before continuing on their way with payloads of narcotics.75 The first instance of Cuban involvement in the drug trade came in 1982 and 1983, with the apprehension and subsequent investigation of three persons with firsthand knowledge of these operations. These persons were Mario Estebes Gonzalez, an associate of Cuban intelligence, Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian weapons and drug smuggler, and Johnny Crump, a Colombian lawyer and drug smuggler. Mario Estebes' story was first reported on in the New York Times in April of 1983. According to Selwyn Raab, Estebes "was arrested by the Coast Guard on Nov. 29, 1981, while he was transporting 2,500 pounds of marijuana in a speedboat off the Florida coast. He was indicted on a charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and faced a maximum prison term of 15 years".76 Facing many years in prison, Estebes decided to turn state's evidence and inform, in returning for immunity from some criminal charges, delivering rather explosive testimony. Estebes' testified that his mission priorities included, "disrupting Cuban exile groups and performing economic espionage, but that his principal mission was the distribution of cocaine, marijuana, and methaqualone[sic] tablets in New York, northern New Jersey, and 74 Mimi Yagoub, "How Panama's Criminal Landscape Has Changed Since the Days of Narco-Dictator Noriega," InSight Crime, InSight Crime, published 30 May 2017, https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/how-panama-criminal-landscape-changed-since-narco-dictator-noriega/#. 75 Robert Filippone, "The Medellin Cartel: Why We Can't Win the Drug War," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 17, Iss. 04 (1994), p. 332, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576109408435960. 76 Selwyn Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 04 April 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/04/04/nyregion/a-defector-tells-of-drug-dealing-by-cuba-agents.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m2 Florida" and returned multiple millions of dollars back to Cuba.77 He also testified that "heroin and other narcotics were shipped to the New York area inside vans with concealed compartments to hide the drugs" in addition to claiming "he saw Vice Admiral [Aldo] Santmaria give orders permitting the unloading of narcotics at Paredon Grande [a small island off the Northern Coast of Cuba] brought in by a reputed international narcotics trafficker, Jaime Guillot Lara".78 In May of that same year, Estebes spoke before the United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control in a joint hearing, testifying that the Cuban government, "used the 1980 Mariel boatlift to send as many as 7,000 spies to the United States, some of whom were ordered to help drug smugglers ''flood'' this country with illegal narcotics [and that] some agents were in this country for propaganda purposes and others were to create ''chaos'' in the event of war".79 Estebes expanded upon his earlier allegations and stated, "one scheme [involved] 23,000 pounds of marijuana and 10 million methaqualone tablets [being] shipped from Cuba to Florida," the profits of which were to be split between Cuban officials and the smugglers themselves.80 Jaime Guillot Lara is perhaps the most important of the three. Guillot Lara was a well-known drug/arms smuggler in Colombia who also happened to be "a close personal friend of the leader of the M-19 guerilla group, Jaime Bateman".81 As far as his smuggling habits, Guillot Lara, according to the DEA who had been keeping tabs on him as far back at 1975, "he was delivering over 400,000 pounds of marijuana, more than 20 million illicit methaqualone pills and 77 Alex Larzelere, Castro's Ploy-America's Dilemma: The 1980 Cuban Boatlift (Fort. Lesley J. McNair: National Defense University, 1988), p. 229-230, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/23/2002287258/-1/-1/0/LARZELERE_MARIEL_BOATLIFT.PDF. 78 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. 79 "Cuban Ties Boatlift To Drug Trade," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 01 May 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/01/us/cuban-ties-boatlift-to-drug-trade.html. 80 Ibid. 81 LT. Timothy J. Doorey, "The Cuban Interventionary Forces: The Growing Strategic and Regional Threat to the United States and NATO" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1986), p. 115, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a180123.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m3 thousands of pounds of cocaine to U.S. markets each year" while also acquiring an impressive fleet of ships for trafficking purposes.82 Guillot Lara first became introduced to the Cuban ambassador to Colombia, Ravelo-Renendo, through their mutual friend, Johnny Crump, during a meeting (conducted at Gonzalo Bassols' apartment, the number two at the Cuban Embassy in Colombia) which resulted in a profitable relationship between Guillot Lara and the Cubans. While Crump would also corroborate this meeting between the following members, Guillot Lara's girlfriend, who was there when the meetings took place, corroborated many aspects, while also testifying that Bassols "told Mr. Guillot-Lara that the drug scheme had been cleared by a high Cuban official" which Bassols then identified was Fidel Castro.83 Either during or immediately after this introduction, according to Congressional testimony from Francis M. Mullen, Jr., the Administrator of the DEA in the early 1980s, Guillot Lara "began to receive official Cuban protection for the movement of his drug-ladened[sic] vessels to the United States…[in addition to transporting and delivering] arms which were ultimately destined for the Colombian terrorist group, M-19" on Cuban behalf.84 Not only did Guillot Lara traffic weapons to Cuban aligned rebels and allow the Cubans in on his drug trafficking endeavors, it appears he "also transferred funds to the guerillas through an employee of a Panamanian bank" acting as something of a go-between.85 From 1980 to 1981, Guillot Lara 82 Nathan M. Adams, "Havana's Drug-Smuggling Connection, Reader's Digest, Reader's Digest Association, Inc., published July 1982, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/drugs.htm. 83 Extensions of Remarks, Cuba's Active Role in Drug Trafficking to the United States, 98th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 130, pt. 24B: 10400, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1984-pt8/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1984-pt8-2-3.pdf. 84 Leslie Maitland Werner, "U.S. Officials Link Castro and Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 10 November 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/10/us/us-officials-link-castro-and-drugs.html. 85 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication. Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency in the Western Hemisphere, edited by Colleen Sussman, (Washington, D.C., 12 March 1982), p. 02, https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QafYFT9344IVwbKAk5KG_OJydGlr3Q7oZPpK8WHGSx3JeWsUS431ZZwaW55TaMUk3UvHW4jiCHRb9Utgv1_TsoAFZD6FOi8njL3jjxp8gSVFo2zCTKSLLP0KOTaXLPl9ZdycsUgqn7e8ud91hnk09ZPGbYZ0QYrbwbNypMoakmWoqtvZNPGG0e9cQ33AwwDL7jITmBXQF CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m4 and the Cubans entered into a cozy relationship, though one that quickly became fraught with complications. In March of 1981, Colombian authorities found a "cache of M-19 weapons" and, with captured M-19 fighters implicating Cuban involvement, the Colombian government "[broke] off diplomatic relations with Havana and [expelled Ambassador Ravelo] and his staff".86 From midsummer to November of 1981, two Guillot Lara operated boats and one aircraft (the aircraft and one of the boats carried weapons for M-19) were apprehended by both the Colombian Coast Guard and United States Coast Guard; the capture of three M-19 rebels by the Colombian military also resulted in smuggling operations being significantly damaged.87 Guillot Lara fled Colombia, facing criminal charges, before being arrested by Mexican authorities.88 Awaiting extradition by the Mexicans to either the United States or Colombia, Guillot Lara revealed to both Mexican and U.S. investigators that he had "been involved in trafficking operations to Colombia for the M-19 on behalf of the government of Cuba. The latter provided the funds for the purchase of the arms".89 Following his revelations, however, Guillot Lara was released from Mexican custody and disappeared; according to the Colombian daily newspaper El Tiempo, Guillot Lara died in early April 1991 in Cuba of a myocardial infarction having "been detained on the island for twelve years".90 xujwOix6ni7j0-eT0RVti430wKPH9bicd8LdzulTZPXR8JDPGMTsyF2guKz20_HFjQkKlW8r6xpBfdR4TEC5SqWHYuetwHCl4rS7YWkCl0. 86 Adams, "Havana's Drug-Smuggling Connection, Reader's Digest. 87 John Dorschner & Jim McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine, The Miami Herald, KnightRidder, published 20 November 1983, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/crump.htm. 88 Edna Buchanan, "Miami drug smuggler ran drugs for Castro to guerillas, agents say," Miami Herald, Knight Ridder, published 24 January 1982, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00552R000303490005-9.pdf. 89 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 90 "Guillot Died of a Infarction," El Tiempo, Casa Editorial El Tiempo S.A., published 13 April 1991, https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-61284. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m5 Johnny Crump is where the public first became aware of a Cuban connection to the drug trade, though the last defector to be arrested by U.S. authorities. Crump, according to investigative reporter Ernest Volkman, was a Colombian lawyer of American descent who "went into the narcotics racket, running a large-scale cocaine and marijuana-smuggling operation" following the failing of his family's ranch in the late-1970s.91 Being politically well-connected, he was asked to serve as a guide for the newly appointed Cuban Ambassador to Colombia, the aforementioned Fernando Ravelo-Renendo, in 1975, the two quickly becoming friends.92 The two became so close that Crump even asked Ravelo to be his newborn daughter's godfather.93 At one point in 1979, in both federal testimony and statements made to Miami Herald journalists John Dorschner & Jim McGee, Crump detailed a meeting he had between Ravelo in which the ambassador detailed, "was dealing with some Chileans who needed help…seeking American weapons, not traceable back to Cuba, to use in the fight to overthrow Augusto Pinochet," to which Crump agreed and offered assistance.94 Following this, Crump tried to arrange a deal in which a plane would transport marijuana into the country, however, few pilots were willing to enter Cuba's Camaguey airport where Ravelo had arranged for refueling.95 In a previously mentioned meeting between Ravelo, Crump, 91 Ernest Volkman, "The Odd Couple: Castro and Vesco: The Cocaine Alliance," The Gadsden Times, Edward Marsh, published 29 April 1984, https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1891&dat=19840428&id=jKkfAAAAIBAJ&sjid=etYEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5242,6122535. 92 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 93 NBC Nightly News, "The Cuban Connection," featuring Roger Mudd, Brian Moss, Johnny Crump, and George H.W. Bush, aired 29 September 1982, transcript, NBC Network, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88-01070R000100380010-3.pdf. 94 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 95 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991, transcript, Public Broadcasting System, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/archive/cubaandcocaine.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m6 and Guillot Lara, the four agreed to transport the drugs via boat to Cuba with protection from Cuban Navy and Coast Guard forces.96 In a 1991 interview with PBS Frontline, Crump detailed the finalization of the first watercraft drug shipment to Cuba, discussing how he disembarked from "the plane to a Cuban government car that was waiting for us in the airport. I mean, there's no way that you can go to any country with no passport, with nothing like that, landing from another country in an international airport and have a car waiting for you right there in the field. It has to be with the OK of that government, that country… Everything was paid by the Cuban government. The hotel, you had to sign, like, you are a guest from the Cuban government because they don't let me pay for the hotel"; while Crump left the country before he personally could see any drugs entering the country, he was reassured by Ravelo that the drugs indeed touched down on Cuban soil.97 From that point onward, Crump became very involved in trafficking narcotics and arms with the Cubans, doing so via air and seacraft and aiding the Cubans larger foreign policy goals in aiding left-wing insurgent groups through Central and South America. In January of 1982, however, Crump was arrested in a joint Customs-DEA operation "at the Omni Hotel in Miami…on drug trafficking charges".98 At the time, Crump was acquiring arms and other weaponry "to be sent to an unspecified group in Bolivia" via his friend Jaime Guillot Lara.99 Much like Estebes, Crump was facing heavy prison time and began cooperating with federal 96 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 97 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991, accessed through vault, Public Broadcasting System, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/cuba-and-cocaine/. 98 Buchanan, "Miami drug smuggler ran drugs for Castro to guerillas, agents say," Miami Herald. 99 U.S. Department of State. Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency in the Western Hemisphere, edited by Colleen Sussman, p. 02. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m7 authorities, providing them "with details of his meetings and alleged drug dealings with Cuban government officials in Bogota and Havana".100 Much of Estebes, Guillot Lara, and Crump's claims are astounding, however, it must be kept in mind that these persons are convicted drug traffickers and defectors from Colombian drug cartels or are in some way associated with Cuba's military respectively. Despite this, many prosecutors and U.S. government agencies found some, if not a sizeable portion of their claims, credible. In Estebes' case, Richard Gregorie commented at the time on Estebes' validity as a witness describing how his comments were "very credible" and had been "independently corroborated".101 In an interview with Gregorie, the former attorney stressed he "found him credible because of that [outside and additional] corroboration".102 The Senate Chair of one committee also stated that Estebes' credibility was "checked out…with the Justice Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration".103 As far as Guillot Lara's credibility goes, the CIA's opinion of him seems to be rather high. According to a CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate from 1983, "[t]he Guillot Lara case…is proof that Cuba has used Colombian drug smuggling networks move arms to Colombian insurgents. In this case, Cuban officials and Colombian drug traffickers were clearly associated in facilitating narcotics shipments to the United States. Guillot paid the Cubans in hard currency and used his vessels and smuggling networks to move arms to Colombia for the insurgents. On the other hand, Cuba rather routinely searches some drug-smuggling ships found 100 NBC Nightly News, "The Cuban Connection," featuring Roger Mudd, Brian Moss, Johnny Crump, and George H.W. Bush, aired 29 September 1982, transcript. 101 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. 102 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. 103 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m8 in Cuban waters, confiscates drugs found and often imprisons the crew".104 Through this excerpt, the CIA seems to endorse the view that the overall claims about drug traffickers smuggling weaponry and drugs in collusion with Cuban figures and through Cuban waters is true and based in fact. While the CIA did seem to treat the accounts and his entire involvement with legitimacy, the agency was careful to note they were unsure of "the extent to which Cuba has continued to facilitate drug trafficking, either for money or arms".105 While the following document is not exactly an intelligence estimate or official analysis, an August 1982 conference report conducted by the CIA and the National Intelligence Council (NIC) stated, "Given the involvement of senior Cuban officials and at least two Cuban embassies, we believe this activity was approved at the highest levels of the Cuban Government. It almost certainly was not a case of corruption by mid- or low-level Cuban officials…Given the level of Guillot's Cuban contacts and the political implications of the arrangements, the operation was almost certainly approved at the highest levels of the Havana government" though the document was clear in stating that the U.S. government was uncertain as to who was behind the operation.106 These three witnesses were able to corroborate a great deal of information that the U.S. federal government, mainly the DEA and U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), had been investigating since the late 1970s. With this testimony from defectors and arrested drug traffickers who were seemingly vetted and verified, the U.S. government finally was able to bring forth official charges against certain members of the Cuban government and military. 104 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Implications for the United States of the Colombian Drug Trade Vol. II (Langley, 28 June 1983), p. 02, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00302R000600990002-9.pdf. 105 Ibid. 106 U.S. Intelligence Community, National Intelligence Council and Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Cuban Involvement in Narcotics and Terrorism (Langley, August 1982), p. iii, 3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83B00851R000100160008-1.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m9 On 05 November, 1982, an indictment brought by the USAO-SDFL in Miami, Florida charged that certain drug traffickers and members of the Cuban government did "knowingly, willfully and unlawfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree, together with each other, and with diverse other persons who are both known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to commit certain offenses against the United States" in the importation and possession of methaqualone tablets and marijuana and "used and caused to be used facilities in interstate and foreign commerce, including the telephone, and traveled and caused others to travel in interstate and foreign commerce between the Southern District of Florida, Colombia, Cuba and elsewhere, with the intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on and facilitate the promotion, management, establishment and carrying on of an unlawful activity, said unlawful activity being a business enterprise involving controlled substances".107 The persons charged in this indictment brought forth by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida included Jaime Guillot Lara, Fernando Ravelo-Renendo, Gonzalo Bassols-Suarez, Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado, Rene Rodriguez-Cruz, and David Lorenzo Perez, Jr. alongside multiple other, predominantly, Miami-based drug traffickers.108 Neither Crump or Estebes were charged as both had testified for the prosecution and received either partial or full immunity in addition to new identities and federal protection. The Cuban Interests Section in Washington, Cuba's foreign policy arm operating as an independent section of the Czechoslovakian Embassy, commented that the charges against Ravelo, Bassols, Santamaria, and Rodriguez-Cruz were "all lies"109; a January 1982 letter from 107 United States v. Jaime Guillot Lara et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE (S.D. Fla., 05 November 1982), http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/drugs/indictment-82.htm. 108 Ibid. 109 George Volsky, "U.S. Drug Charges Cite 4 Cuban Aides," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 06 November 1982, https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/06/us/us-drug-charges-cite-4-cuban-aides.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m0 Cuba's Ministry of Foreign Relations (MINREX) denied Cuba ever utilized drug traffickers to transport arms to rebels in Latin America, never gave arms to guerillas in Colombia, and denied that Guillot Lara had ever set foot in Cuba or received any monies from the Republic of Cuba.110 The denial by Cuba of having never gave arms to Colombian guerillas was roundly criticized, most notably in a 1990 interview with former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Thomas Boyatt.111 Among those charged were high level Cuban officials, some of whom have already been discussed including the Cuban Ambassador to Colombia Ravelo-Renendo and his "minister-counsel" at the Cuban Embassy in Colombia Bassols-Suarez.112 In addition to these figures, the indictment also charged Vice Admiral (VADM) of the Cuban Navy Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado and Rene Rodriguez-Cruz a "member of the Cuban Community Party Central Committee and president of the Cuban Institute of Friendship With The Peoples [ICAP]" with the same charges.113 It is worth noting that the ICAP was described by the CIA in a 1984 brief as being an organization which, in addition to bringing in foreign youths interested in Communism, Socialism, or Cuba also "provided Cuban intelligence services with a registry of aliens who might prove useful for intelligence collection efforts and operations in their homelands".114 110 "Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Drugs," Minister of Foreign Affairs Isidoro Malmierca Peoli (28 January 1982), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin America Report, Cuba, JPRS L/10334, 18 February 1982, p. 03-04, heading: Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Drugs, Republic of Cuba, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Latin America Report, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030043-6.pdf. 111 Ambassador Thomas D. Boyatt (Ret.), interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 08 March 1990, p. 48, https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Boyatt,%20Thomas%20D.toc.pdf?_ga=2.264396167.981542772.1592939617-1066174783.1588020094&_gac=1.137161348.1589401103.EAIaIQobChMIgqnAwtSx6QIVSx-tBh2tGgsJEAAYASAAEgKALvD_BwE. 112 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Directory of Officials of the Republic of Cuba (Langley, October 1979), p. 224, https://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/AA/00/07/66/14/00003/AA00076614_00003.pdf. 113 Mary Thornton, "Four Cuban Officials Indicted in Drug Smuggling," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 06 November 1982, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/11/06/four-cuban-officials-indicted-in-drug-smuggling/d70ed042-0adc-42d2-971b-23475f7adc83/. 114 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba: Castro's Propaganda Apparatus and Foreign Policy (Langley, November 1984), p. 13, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000972183.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m1 David Lorenzo Perez, Jr. is an interesting figure within this legal case as he, in December of 1982, pled guilty to the first count of the criminal indictment.115 In his plea, Lorenzo Perez indicated culpability on Guillot Lara's part to "purchase, receive, store, and possess with intent to distribute approximately eight and one-half million methaqualone tablets" while indicating "that Jaime Guillot-Lara would provide ships to transport methaqualone tablets from Columbia[sic] with the knowledge of the Cuban governmental officials".116 Lorenzo Perez admitted he assisted Guillot Lara in all of these actions while also admitting he "traveled by private vessel from the Southern District of Florida to Paredon Grande, Cuba [and] met with Cuban government officials" including Santamaria and Rodriguez-Cruz.117 In Congressional testimony, Lorenzo Perez also testified that that "Cuban government was also to receive one-third of the profit of the marihuana[sic] sale" yet this did not go through as it appears Guillot Lara kept the profits [just under half a million USD] to himself.118 This case was the most significant development in the long standing allegations against Cuba on the area of narcotics trafficking. However, it is incredibly important to note that there was no evidence linking the Castros to the drug trade. The lead attorney who personally handled the case for the DOJ, Richard Gregorie, stated "Was Fidel Castro involved? At this point, no…[I] can't honestly say I saw that open Cuban involvement [and] did not come up with anyone who spoke directly to Fidel in those early cases".119 115 United States v. David Lorenzo Perez, Jr., et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE (S.D. Fla., 09 December 1982), p. 01, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/perez-jr.htm. 116 United States v. David Lorenzo Perez, Jr., et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE, p. 02, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/perez-jr-1.htm. 117 Ibid. 118 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 30 April 1983, p. 33. 119 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m2 Also around this time, many officials from the DOJ and U.S. Department of State (DOS) changed their previously emphasized opinions on the extent of Cuban involvement in the drug trade. In an October 1983 hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, DEA Administrator Mullen stated, "I moved very cautiously at first wanting to have evidence before publicly stating I was convinced that the Cuban Government was involved in drug trafficking. I am now convinced, as I have stated in prior sessions, that there is Cuban Government involvement in drug trafficking", bringing forth the above indictments and other "[classified and confidential] information" to support his reasoning.120 The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, James H. Michel, stated before Congress also in May of 1983 "the evidence clearly indicates more than a case of corruption by local or mid-level security officials in Cuba…Narcotics trafficking has apparently been sanctioned by Cuba as a means to finance subversion in Latin America".121 These comments were found by the Washington Post to, "fit in with a Reagan administration campaign to rally public and congressional support for its Central American policies, including more aid for El Salvador's army".122 Michel was not the only State Department official to make this claim either. The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger stated in May of 1983 that he "would find it very difficult to believe that the Cuban Government itself is not 120 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Impact of the South Florida Task Force on Drug Interdiction In The Gulf Coast Area, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 October 1983, p. 16, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/97516NCJRS.pdf. 121 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, Cuban Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking, edited by Colleen Sussman, (Washington, D.C., 30 April 1983), p. 02, https://www.google.com/books/edition/Cuban_Involvement_in_Narcotics_Trafficki/NItKAQAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0. 122 Edward Cody, "Castro Ties To Drugs Suggested," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 01 May 1983, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/05/01/castro-ties-to-drugs-suggested/242170fe-a930-4bc4-b30c-18016f794497/. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m3 involved… [The evidence is] really quite clear that there is major Cuban involvement in the drug traffic in this country", while also accusing the Castro government of playing a role in this.123 However, this appears to be more Eagleburger's own personal opinion as a more senior State Department official stated later that no agency had been able to prove "personal involvement by Fidel Castro".124 A spokesman for the Cuban Interests Section responded to the comments by Mullen and Michel by stating, "[This is] propaganda against the Cubans…We [the Cuban government] are refusing this accusation. We have consistent fighting against drug traffic. There are many American people who are put in Cuban jails for drug trafficking".125 At this stage, in relation to the Guillot Lara/Crump case, these definitive comments that Castro or the Cuban government officially was involved seemed to an extreme jump and other officials protested against this characterization. Stanley Marcus, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida and the attorney whose office brought forth the indictments against the four Cuban officials, stated before Congress "I think it is a fair and accurate statement to say some of the major organs and institutions of the Cuban state and some high-ranking officials of those organs and institutions of the state are involved in drug-running to the United States".126 William H. Webster, then Director of the FBI, also spoke about this in a television interview, stating the majority of the evidence currently being used by some officials to make judgements "[came] from one set of 123 Kenneth B. Noble, "Official Ties Cuba to U.S. Drug Traffic," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 02 May 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/02/world/official-ties-cuba-to-us-drug-traffic.html. 124 Ibid. 125 Werner, "U.S. Officials Link Castro and Drugs," The New York Times. 126 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Security, The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 30 April 1983, p. 15. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m4 sources and should be viewed with care".127 At this juncture, there was a great deal of conflicting views upon the established evidence, some most likely based upon political and individual biases based upon preconceived notions on both the nature of Communism and Latin America in general. While the evidence linking Castro or the Cuban government as a whole is very minimal (mostly relegated to evidence that would be considered hearsay in a U.S. court of law), it is undeniable that sections of the Cuban government, including areas of Cuba's diplomatic and intelligence services, were utilizing drug traffickers to achieve larger foreign policy goals within the Latin American region. As the 1980s progressed, additional evidence of Cuban involvement in the drug trade became even more apparent with defectors from Noriega's Panama, Cuba's DGI, and the arrests of multiple drug traffickers all speaking to U.S. officials. During this time as well, many criminal investigators of the U.S. federal government found or came across evidence of drug trafficking on Cuba's part along with the U.S. IC coming to a more solid conclusion on the matter. Prior to these November 1982 indictments, an FBI investigation into Cuban involvement in the drug trade was underway. In October of 1982, a U.S. Customs plane near Corpus Christi, Texas intercepted a Cessna aircraft that was having a mechanical malfunction and tracked it to Cleburne, Texas. The pilot, an American, "was arrested with 877 pounds of marijuana onboard" with "Chemical analysis [showing the marijuana] almost certainly was grown in Cuba".128 Following the pilot's conviction in April of 1983, federal investigators detailed "the ring operated for two years in violation of government embargoes on trade with Cuba by shipping computers and other equipment. Some of the return flights carried high-grade Cuban 127 Ibid. 128 "Did Cuba get computers in return for marijuana?" The Miami Herald, KnightRidder, published 02 April 1983, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/computers.htm. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m5 marijuana".129 The evidence necessary to make the claim that this ring was operating with the explicit approval of Cuban government officials or the Castros themselves is very lacking, however, what this does indicate is that there were individual smugglers beyond large metropolitan centers who were found to have ties to Cuba and that Cuba seemingly was involved in producing drugs in some quantity. In December of 1984, the CIA released an interagency intelligence memorandum stating outright, "Cuba is currently supporting drug trafficking…We judge that Fidel Castro is fully cognizant of and condones the drug-related activity that is taking place with the support of Cuban officials…The key Cuban participants are officers of the Interior Ministry or America Department of the Cuban Communist Party's Central Committee…Their participation strongly indicates a sanctioned government policy, rather than an arrangement for personal gain".130 While a good portion of this document is redacted, this is the first time in which an intelligence agency, or the CIA at least, has openly accused the upper echelon of the Cuban government and Castro himself of playing some role or in some way supporting the activities occurring. During this period, many criminal investigations uncovered more information on Cuban involvement in the drug trade, with additional evidence of Castro involvement becoming more apparent. In addition to this, many Congressional hearings and panels were convened with the goal of exploring the Latin American drug trade, during which many witnesses were called. Among these witnesses was Diego Viafara Salinas, an M-19 physician who infiltrated an armed civilian group with ties to members of the Medellín Cartel.131 Salinas held the belief he would be 129 Ibid. 130 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuban Government Involvement in Drug Trafficking (Langley, December 1984), p. 03, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87T00217R000700140002-5.pdf. 131 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 12-13 September 1989, p. 70, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/146771NCJRS.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m6 killed due to his past association with M19 and began providing evidence to the Colombian government, which eventually resulted in the deaths of many prominent Medellín Cartel leaders.132 In testimony before the U.S. Congress, Salinas recalled that, "[on November 22, 1988] two pilots flying a Commander 1000 aircraft were planning to stop and refuel in Cuba. They were leaving from an estate [in the Department of Cordoba] …When the seats of the plane were removed to load the cocaine, I saw the navigation charts, which indicated they were flying over the southern coast of Cuba. These pilots commented that they had to be sure to carry some amount of U.S. dollars with them to leave in Cuba as prearranged payment for the stopover".133 While the pilots Salinas spoke with never identified who gave them clearance to fly over Cuba with drugs, Salinas did testify "that it [the drug trafficking operation] was all the way up to Fidel Castro" with this information apparently coming from Fidel's spokesman.134 It is worth noting that this piece of testimony would effectively qualify as hearsay in a U.S. court of law. Many informants also came forward with information that would prove to be incriminatory to many persons with ties to the drug trade, including certain high-ranking Cuban leaders. On such source, a confidential informant for the DEA, who, after being arrested in 1985 on conspiracy charges, provided information on much of the Medellín's drug trafficking activities to the U.S. government.135 In a request for payment from the DEA's Asuncion Country Office, the agency noted the source's decades of service to the United States, describing him as having led "successful 132 U.S. Congress, Senate, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, p. 73. 133 U.S. Congress, Senate, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, p. 71-72. 134 Ibid. 135 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Asuncion Country Office, REQUEST for PAYMENT under 28 U.S.C. 524 (C)(1)(B) for CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE (CS #####) (Asuncion, post-2009), p. 01. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m7 negotiations for landing rights and refueling operations in [among other countries] Cuba…[the source] purchased a birthday surprise (an airplane bought in the U.S.) for Fidel CASTRO's[sic] birthday, which he personally handed over to Castro's brother Raúl (then Cuba's Minister of Defense) during lunch".136 This information is quite damning to the Castro regime and, if true, would prove that, at the least, Raúl Castro did have knowledge of Cuban involvement in the drug trade and condoned those operations. While it cannot be emphasized enough that this confidential source pled "nolo contendere to the conspiracy charges in 1986", it does speak volumes that the DEA found him an essential and trustworthy source to continue using well into the 21st century.137 At this same time, another development implicated an American fugitive with close ties to the Castro regime in the drug trade. In April of 1985, appearing "before the Senate subcommittee on children, family, and drugs" (which was investigating Nicaraguan governmental involvement in the drug trade) were two convicted smugglers who provided further information on Cuban involvement in the drug trade.138 One of them was smuggler James A. Herring, Jr. who, while insisting he never transported drugs for the Cubans or Nicaraguans, detailed his smuggling activities with the Cubans in an interview with PBS Frontline, saying, "When I would go into Varadero with boatloads of equipment, we would be received by marked vessels that the Cuban navy, so to speak, utilized, their military gunboats. They would escort us into the gunboat dockage there at Varadero. From there they would offload. We would stay as long as we felt necessary to refuel us, wined and dined us. And when we were ready to return to 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 "Witnesses Testify on Vesco Link to Drug trafficking in Nicaragua, Cuba," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 19 April 1985, https://apnews.com/article/09e42836a8f58d76da155fa155da7847. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m8 the Keys, they would take and escort us out".139 In addition to this, Herring also claimed that the DGI, "would even offer drugs in lieu of the cash. [They] had the availability of enormous amounts of drugs that they had warehoused through seizures that they had made in their country on drug operations that weren't paying protection for their air space or their waterways. So they had a readily available amount of drugs in the form of cocaine, Qualudes[sic] and marijuana".140 Herring also testified that "he worked with Cuban Government officials and [Robert Vesco] to help the Nicaraguan government build a cocaine-processing laboratory near Managua".141 Vesco had been a successful businessman in the United States, creating a hundred-million-dollar manufacturing empire by 1970 before being twice indicted on federal charges for "defrauding thousands of investors [of $224 million USD]" and "for making illegal contributions totaling $250,000" to Richard Nixon's re-election campaign in 1972 and 1976 respectively.142 Following this, Vesco fled to numerous Latin American countries (including Nicaragua) before settling in Cuba around 1984.143 In a March 1996 profile for Vanity Fair, Vesco's immediate family indicates a friendly relationship to Fidel and Raul Castro in addition to a partnership to traffic narcotics with Col. Antonio De La Guardia, a high-ranking figure in the DGI and an important part of Cuba's overall foray into the drug trade.144 Eventually, however, Vesco attracted the eye of U.S. federal law enforcement for his 139 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 140 Ibid. 141 Joel Brinkley, "Panel Hears Details Linking Managua and Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 20 April 1985, https://www.nytimes.com/1985/04/20/world/panel- hears-details-linking-managua-and-drugs.html. 142 Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, "Robert L. Vesco," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 20 July 1998, updated 30 November 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Robert-L-Vesco. 143 Ibid. 144 Ann Louise Bardach, "Vesco's Last Gamble," Vanity Fair, Condé Nast, published March 1996, https://archive.vanityfair.com/article/1996/3/vescos-last-gamble. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m9 alleged participation in drug trafficking and, though some convicted drug traffickers and Cuban intelligence defectors implicated him in criminal acts, the "FBI and [DEA] denied he had any role" in certain elements of the drug trade, disproving these traffickers and defectors' claims.145 Ultimately, Vesco was arrested and sentenced to prison in Cuba in 1996 "for economic crimes against the government of Fidel Castro".146 Since at least April of 1987, the DEA's Miami Office was actively pursuing an investigation against Cuban government and military officials. Harry Sommers, a newly minted DEA agent to the Miami FO and later Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) of the Atlanta FO, was the lead investigator on the case and detailed his investigation in an April 1990 academic work for Florida International University. According to Sommers, in April of 1987, "two pilots [an American and Cuban national] flew approximately 480 pounds of cocaine from Colombia to [Varadero Military Base, Cuba]…where the cocaine was transferred to Cuban military officers".147 According to Sommers, the pilots were both questioned by U.S. officials and, in this interview, both pilots claimed they had stopped in Cuba to make "emergency repairs" and "presented documentation from the Cuban government confirming their story".148 The drugs were then placed upon a boat named the "Flerida" and, while attempting to enter Florida waters that April, was intercepted by the DEA. In the ensuing interviews with the boat's operators (all Cubans who were "residing in 145 Jim McGee, Pierre Thomas, Guy Gugliotta, & Jerry Knight "Vesco Held In Cuba," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 09 June 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/06/09/vesco-held-in-cuba/874c16d3-81a5-4700-84ce- 6a4e8300fdab/. 146 Douglas Farah, "Vesco Gets 13-Year Sentence in Cuba," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 27 August 1996, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/08/27/vesco-gets-13-year-sentence-in-cuba/77271414- 9219-4efe-b68c-5d30b0f9b11b/. 147 Harry Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," (graduate paper, Florida International University, 23 April 1990), p. 07. 148 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 08. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m0 Miami"), the DEA found the boat was "[initially] met at sea by a Cuban Coast Guard vessel and escorted to the military base in Varadero [where the] crew members were housed and fed until the cocaine was loaded onto the vessel" upon which the boat was escorted out of Cuban waters by a Coast Guard ship.149 Additional evidence showing U.S.-based drug traffickers of Cuban descent docking and landing at Varadero and interacting heavily with Cuban military officers was uncovered through further investigations in May and November of 1987.150 This investigation led to the federal indictments of various figures in late 1988, including Reinaldo and Rueben Ruiz, a Cuban father and son drug trafficking team operating out of the South Florida.151 Reinaldo Ruiz, facing a sentence of life imprisonment, agreed to make a deal with the government in return for a lighter sentence.152 In a television interview with PBS Frontline before his death, Ruiz detailed his involvement in the drug trade and his associations with the Cuban government. According to Ruiz, he would transport a boat from Florida to Varadero where "everything had been arranged in advance [by Colonel Pardo, Chief of Command of Naval Operations in Varadero]" while his son, Rueben, would fly the cocaine from Colombia to Varadero which, upon landing, would be transferred to Ruiz's boat by members of the Cuban military and MININT.153 In this interview, Ruiz also stated "Every time that I went over there, I was completely sure that I was a 100 percent backing[sic], all the way to the top, otherwise I never, ever touch a thing out there". 154 149 Ibid. 150 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 08-10. 151 Buddy Nivens, "Jury Links Cuba To Drug Smuggling," South Florida Sun Sentinel, Tribune Publishing, published 27 February 1988, https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-1988-02-27-8801120759-story.html. 152 Richard Cole, "Prosecutors: Trafficker Implicated More Top Cuban Officials," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 21 August 1989, https://apnews.com/article/348da22ca41fd9a7e77c7ab9226c504e. 153 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 154 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m1 Despite Ruiz's comment, he never once indicated to federal investigators he met Fidel or Raul Castro; the closest Ruiz got to implicating either senior leader was a secret recording made by a DEA informant in which Ruiz claimed "The [payoff] money went in Fidel's drawer".155 Again, Ruiz never identified this person as being Fidel Castro and, if he did, the information would have come from someone who had heard this information from someone else, effectively being inadmissible evidence. What is quite serious about Ruiz's allegations and testimony however are his connections to Cuban intelligence. According to Harry Sommers and confirmed by other federal investigations, Ruiz was a "cousin of Miguel Ruiz-Poo…a Cuban captain in the Ministry of the Interior" who was working in Panama when he met Reinaldo Ruiz.156 While they initially began transporting U.S. goods and products to circumvent the embargo, Reinaldo Ruiz eventually floated the idea of trafficking cocaine through Cuba which resulted in Ruiz-Poo informing his superior Major Amado Padrón Trujillo and Colonel Antonio "Tony" de la Guardia, both members of the Moneda Convertible (MC) Department, a division meant to "circumvent the United States embargo and earn Cuba hard currency".157 This is where Ruiz's involvement in shipping boats and aircraft filled with cocaine and other narcotics to Cuba and then on to Florida began. According to esteemed journalist Andres Oppenheimer, shortly after de la Guardia and Ruiz initially met, Ruiz asked de la Guardia if Fidel Castro was aware of their arrangement to traffic narcotics to which de la Guardia replied in the affirmative. Oppenheimer writes however 155 "Secret Drug Case Tape Talks of 'Fidel' Payoffs" Associated Press, Associated Press, published 09 March 1988, https://apnews.com/article/0800e600293914df73901e1fe452316b. 156 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 11. 157 González, "The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking and the Castro Regime," CSA Occasional Paper Series Vol. 02. No. 06 (1997), p. 10. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m2 "It is unclear whether Tony de la Guardia had personally discussed his cocaine-trafficking plans with Castro. The Commandante, with his instinctive revulsion for money matters, seldom got involved in dirty business deals. That was Interior Minister Abrantes's job…De La Guardia's statement to Reinaldo Ruiz may have reflected the colonel's assumption that Abrantes never would have okayed something as hot as a drug operation without Fidel's blessing".158 Also around this time was the federal indictment against Manuel Noriega, the dictator of Panama who had become an increasing annoyance to the U.S. government. Despite having initially been friendly to the U.S., providing information to the CIA and DEA159, his involvement in substantial drug trafficking and racketeering efforts (in addition to the significant corruption and general abuses of his regime) had made him a liability.160 Among the witnesses who provided information against Noriega was Jose Blandón Castillo, a former key member of Noriega's intelligence service and a "consul general in New York".161 Blandón provided first-hand knowledge of incidences, confirming some of what was already suspected by American officials and investigators on Noriega's activities, but also claimed Fidel Castro mediated a dispute between Noriega and the Medellín Cartel in the Darién Province of Panama. According to Blandón, he "met with Castro in Havana on June 21 or 22, 1984 [and] Castro recommended that Noriega return the $5 million in protection money and return the plant, personnel, and equipment to the Cartel" and on either June 27th or 28th, "Noriega and Castro met 158 Andres Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour: The Secret Story Behind the Coming Downfall of Communist Cuba (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 29. 159 Robert L. Jackson, "Noriega Gave DEA Limited Aid for 5 Years, Officials Say," Los Angeles Times, Times Mirror Company, published 16 December 1991, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-12-16-mn-517-story.html. 160 Philip Shenon, "Noriega Indicted by U.S. For Links to Illegal Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 06 February 1988, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/06/world/noriega-indicted-by-us-for-links-to-illegal-drugs.html. 161 Stephen Engelberg with Elaine Sciolino, "A U.S. Frame-Up of Nicaragua Charged," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 04 February 1988, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90M00005R001100160023-3.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m3 directly" and Noriega agreed to go forward with Castro's suggestions, resulting in the release of numerous prisoners.162 While this information was used in indictments against senior Cuban officials and Manuel Noriega, some have found reason to doubt Blandón's claims. John Dinges, a noted investigative journalist and current Professor Emeritus of International Journalism at Columbia University, documented Blandón's claims in his 1991 book Our Man in Panama, stating, "There was no independent corroboration for the story…No other witnesses, including [Floyd Carlton Caceres, Noriega's personal pilot], had any knowledge of the Cuban meeting. If investigators had checked flight records and even press clips in Panama, they might have discovered that Blandón had gotten some basic facts of the Darién incident wrong: the dates for the trip to Cuba were wrong, and the prisoners supposedly released at Castro's urging had been freed more than one month before Blandón and Noriega went to Cuba".163 Richard Gregorie, who met with Blandón, disagrees with Dinges' assertions, saying, "Blandón provided the US government with valid evidence that was corroborated, but Blandón volunteered his cooperation and no one knew his true motivation. He was caught, prior to trial, recording his interviews by agents… The photos and information he provided were valid, but whether this was a lure by some foreign intelligence service or an attempt to sell his story for personal gain made him untrustworthy as a witness".164 Castro was interviewed around this time by Maria Shriver of NBC News and wholeheartedly rejected "José Blandón's charge" while also "[inviting] the Congressional committee [which heard Blandón's claims] to visit Cuba to receive evidence that Blandón was 162 U.S. Congress, Senate, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, p. 66. 163 John Dinges, Our Man in Panama: The Shrewd Rise and Brutal Fall of Manuel Noriega (New York, NY: Random House, 1991), p. 292, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/232993288. 164 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m4 lying to Congress".165 In this interview, he also "[denied] that the Medellín drug cartel has ever trafficked drugs through Cuba to the United States".166 Despite Castro's invitation to the committee, subcommittee chairman Senator John Kerry approached the Cuban Interests Section in D.C. and requested to visit Cuba on the conditions that "staff [be] permitted to advance the trip and…the Cubans agreed to discuss the drug trafficking problem in general" along with being able to meet Robert Vesco; the trip never materialized as "The Cubans never replied to any of these requests and never made any further arrangements for the visit".167 The concentrated U.S. criminal investigations, Congressional hearings, and federal indictments, the intense media speculation and reporting, along with seeming pressure from the Soviet Union168 forced the Cuban government's hand. On 12 June, 1989, multiple high-ranking members of Cuba's military and intelligence services were arrested. These members included General Arnaldo T. Ochoa Sanchez,169 Brigadier General Patricio de la Guardia, Colonel Antonio "Tony" de la Guardia (twin brother to Patricio), Colonel Antonio Rodriguez Estupinan, Captain Jorge Martinez Valdes, Lieutenant Colonel Alexis Lago Archoa, and Major Amado Padrón Trujillo.170 Also charged were Captain Leonel Estevez-Soto, Captain Antonio Sanchez-Lima, First Lieutenant Jose Luis Pineda-Bermudez, Captain Miguel Ruiz-Poo, Captain Rosa Maria Abierno-Gobin, and Captain Eduardo Diaz-Izquierdo.171 165 Jane Franklin, Cuba and the United States: A Chronological History (New York, NY: Ocean Press, 1992), p. 239, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/944186211. 166 Ibid. 167 U.S. Congress, Senate, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, p. 66-67. 168 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, International Narcotics Situation Report (Langley, VA: May 1989), p. 13, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91M01043R002200150004-9.pdf. 169 Robert Pear, "Cuba Arrests Top General on Corruption Charges," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 16 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/16/world/cuba-arrests-top-general-on-corruption-charges.html?searchResultPosition=8. 170 Robert Pear, "Cuba Seizes 6 More Officers Amid Signs of Big Shakeup," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 17 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/17/world/cuba-seizes-6-more-officers-amid-signs-of-big-shakeup.html. 171 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 14. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m5 The majority of these persons were members of Cuba's Ministry of the Interior and intelligence services, though Estupinan and Martinez were both former aides-de-camp to General Ochoa.172 Save for Archoa and Trujillo, who were not charged with any crime, the other persons were charged with a variety of public corruption crimes, including money laundering, drug trafficking, and treason. As well, though all were arrested rather simultaneously, there were two separate cases going on which involved the drug trade in Cuba. The first involved, "[Antonio "Tony"] de la Guardia, Major Padrón, and six other officers who worked at [the MC Department] … The Cuban government charged that de la Guardia's group arranged for six tons of cocaine to be sent from Colombia through Cuba to the United States in the two years after April 1987, and that they were paid $3.4 million for doing so".173 The second case involved primary Ochoa and his aide-de-camp Martinez (in addition to "several others") in which the Cuban government charged that "[Ochoa] enriched himself in black-market trading, using army resources, when he was stationed in Angola in 1988, and to have neglected his military duties…[stole] $161,000 from Nicaragua's Sandinista army through a failed weapons deal…[and] was said to have conceived of a scheme to send major cocaine shipments to the United States, and for that purpose to have sent Martínez secretly to Medellín, Colombia, in 1988 to meet with Pablo Escobar Gaviria, a magnate of the drug cartel".174 The charges against Ochoa did not allege he was involved in de la Guardia's operations nor ever took part in a drug deal, alleging only he engaged in treason and efforts to gain private funds for either independent military operations or for personal use. 172 Ibid. 173 Julia Preston, "The Trial that Shook Cuba," The New York Review of Books, NYREV, Inc., published 07 December 1989, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1989/12/07/the-trial-that-shook-cuba/. 174 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m6 The trial (which aired on public television throughout Cuba) began on 25 June, 1989, thirteen days after Ochoa had initially been arrested, with the first hearing beginning on the 26th of June.175 Throughout the course of the trial, numerous witnesses were called who testified in regards to the charges, in some cases admitting culpability and accepting responsibility for individual actions which were illegal while also implicating others such as Ochoa and the de la Guardia brothers in the illegal activities they had been charged with. Both Patricio and Tony de la Guardia and Arnaldo Ochoa admitted their involvements in drug trafficking and treasonous activities, respectively, before the trial had commenced.176 At the trial's conclusion, the prosecutor for the government recommended to the Honor Tribunal, a board of 47 high-ranking Cuban military officers (one of whom was Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado, who had been charged with drug trafficking by the U.S. in 1982)177, that "Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, Antonio de la Guardia Font, Jorge Martinez Valdez, Amado Bruno Padron Trujillo, Antonio Sanchez Lima, Alexis Lago Arocha, and Eduardo Diaz Izquierdo [receive] the death penalty…[for] the most serious crimes in this indictment, which are drug trafficking and treason against the fatherland".178 The prosecutor also recommended "30 years imprisonment for defendants Patricio de la Guardia Font and Rosa Maria Abierno Gobin, 25 years imprisonment for defendants Gabriel Prendes Gomez, Leonel Estevez Soto, Miguel Ruiz 175 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 03, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a347578.pdf. 176 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 07, 154, 164. 177 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 44. 178 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 187. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m7 Poo, and Luis M. Pineda Bermudez, and 15 years imprisonment for defendant Antonio Rodriguez Estupinan".179 The Honor Tribunal agreed unanimously on 11 July 1989, with the stripping of ranks coming later on 12 July 1989.180 On 13 July 1989, Ochoa, Tony de la Guardia, Valdez, and Trujillo were all executed by way of firing squad.181 During and following the trial, Cuba's Ministry of the Interior and the Cuban government as a whole was revamped; Diocles Torralba Gonzalez, Cuba's Minister of Transportation "was dismissed [on 14 June 1989] for "improper conduct" – suggesting he may have been engaged in corruption"182 while Cuba's Minister of the Interior, Brigadier General Jose Abrantes Fernandez, "was dismissed [on] June 26" and then arrested on 31 July 1989 alongside "Brig. Gen. Roberto Gonzalez Caso, a former head of immigration; Oscar Carreno Gomez, former customs chief; Lt. Col. Rolando Castaneda Izquiero, and Hector Carbonell Mendez, director of a state-owned company that dealt in foreign currency".183 Five more Brigadier Generals of the Cuban military, presumably aligned with the Ministry of the Interior, were also "demoted to colonel and retired".184 Both Abrantes and Torralba would later receive twenty year prison sentences, with Abrantes dying in 1991 of a heart attack.185 Replacing Abrantes in the MININT was "trusted four-star general Abelardo Colomé Ibarra" who quickly revamped much of MININT's capabilities.186 179 Ibid. 180 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 208-209. 181 Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour, p. 01-03. 182 Jim Anderson, "U.S.: High-level shakeup may be under way in Cuba," United Press International, United Press International, published 14 June 1989, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/06/14/US-High-level-shakeup-may-be-under-way-in-Cuba/4954613800000/. 183 Isaac A. Levi, "Five Senior Cuban Officers Arrested in Drug Scandal," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 31 July 1989, https://apnews.com/article/0782d185225919535cf3aa518ed550a9. 184 Ibid. 185 Richard Gott, Cuba: A New History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 285. 186 Krujit, Cuba and Revolutionary Latin America, p. 183. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m8 During and after the trial, the charges and convictions were heavily criticized. Some cast doubt on the trial's veracity in regards to having a military officer who had allegations of drug trafficking leveled against him187, while others (Cuban human rights activities, American journalists, and international human rights advocacy and monitoring groups) took offense to the lack of questions asked by the defendants' military appointed prosecutors (in addition to the rather loaded way in which some questions were asked).188 Jaqueline Tillman, a member of the National Security Council, was quoted as saying, "The evidence of Cuban involvement in narcotics trafficking was becoming so abundant that the regime moved to protect Fidel Castro by dissociating him from those activities" while Frank Calzon, a member of the human rights group Freedom House stated that either of the Castros, either Fidel or Raul, "had to approve of this activity, or at least [look] the other way".189 Even civilians of the island nation, according to former diplomat Wayne Smith, were "questioning the official explanation and arguing that there has to be a lot more to this than what is contained in the official announcement".190 Following the trials and into the 1990s, however, Cuba seemingly became more committed to halting drug traffic in Cuba. Fulton Armstrong, a former NIO for Latin America and two-time Director for Inter-American Affairs for the NSC, has stated that "Since Ochoa, collaboration has been good" mentioning that, since 1997, a formal relationship between the United States and Cuba exists, with both the U.S. and Cuba "[identifying] this as a matter of 187 Richard Cole, "Admiral's Role Calls Cuba Drug Crackdown Into Question," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 29 June 1989, https://apnews.com/article/9ef279d0c5de07e958d53e9c1a7bea5b. 188 Preston, "The Trial that Shook Cuba," The New York Review of Books. 189 Robert Pear, "Cuba Discloses A Drug Network Of Top Officials," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 24 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/24/world/cuba-discloses-a-drug-network-of-top-officials.html. 190 Larry Rohter, "Castro Is Anxious About His Military," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 25 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/25/weekinreview/the-world-castro-is-anxious-about-his-military.html?searchResultPosition=10. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m9 national interest".191 Pierre Charette, the ASAC for the DEA's Caribbean division during the late-1980s, identified that into the early-1990s, cooperation with the Cuban government has been "fantastic [with] drug trafficking through go-fast boats dropping significantly" and that this productive relationship remains in place today.192 In 1991, the U.S. Customs Service detailed to Frontline that "[drug, arms, and other illicit] trafficking had declined since the trial, but…not stopped".193 The DEA's Administrator194 and Chief of International Operations195, in 1996 and 1999 respectively, both testified before Congress that, despite large profile cases in the media, the Cuban government itself nor senior officials were not involved in drug trafficking. Also in 1996, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs "recognized cuban[sic] counter-drugs efforts, stating that the cuban[sic] government was giving anti-narcotics policies higher public profile in the face of growing narcotics transshipments and consumption".196 General Barry McCaffrey, who served as Commander of U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and was President Clinton's Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ODNCP) from 1994 to 2001, recalled in 2015 "Cuba's a police state, and I don't believe the Cuban government wants to be a hub for drug smugglers. They saw it as a 191 Fulton Armstrong (retired National Intelligence Officer for Latin America with NSC) in discussion with the author, 13 January 2021. 192 Pierre "Pete" Charette (retired Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 16 March 2021. 193 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 194 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Statement by: Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, 104th Cong., 06 June 1996, https://fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/h960606c.htm. 195 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Statement by: William E. Ledwith, Chief of International Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration, 106th Cong., 17 November 1999, https://fas.org/irp/congress/1999_hr/ct111799.htm. 196 Isabella Bellezza-Smull, "Will Cuba Update its Drug Policy for the Twenty First Century?," Igarapé Institute, Igarapé Institute, published 29 December 2017, https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/08-11-2017-NE-29-Cuba-Drog-Policy.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m0 threat to their children, the workforce, their economy, their government" while noting that though cooperation was imperfect, there was constant communication with the Cubans throughout his time in terms of combating drug trafficking.197 The Question of Culpability on the Part of the Castros The involvement on the part of Fidel and Raul Castro in the drug trade is something that has long been debated and speculated. Since the 1960s, individual criminal investigations, U.S. federal government memorandums, Cuban intelligence defectors, convicted criminals, and congressional hearings have included testimony that has tried to implicate Fidel, Raul, or both Castros in the drug trade. With the 1989 trials, these speculations have increased and, in some cases, due to the handling of the trials, been given more credence. At least two U.S. Congressional hearings have been conducted since 1989, both of which focused on continuing drug traffic in Cuba.198 199 Into the 1990s, more evidence of possible involvement by the Castro regime was revealed. First were the allegations of Carlos Ledher, an experienced drug trafficker and pilot and co-founder of the Medellín Cartel.200 Ledher, upon his arrest and extradition in 1987, was "convicted…on charges of conspiracy and running a criminal enterprise as well as other charges related to the importation and sale of cocaine" in May of 1988.201 Due to this, Ledher began 197 Joshua Partlow & Nick Miroff, "In fight against drugs, Cuba and U.S. on same team," The Washington Post, Nash Holdings, LLC., published 05 January 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-fight-against-drugs-cuba-and-us-on-same-team/2015/01/05/6416305a-90fc-11e4-a66f-0ca5037a597d_story.html. 198 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Cuba's Link to Drug Trafficking, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 November 1999, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=2027. 199 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Drug Trafficking in the Caribbean: Do Traffickers Use Cuba and Puerto Rico As Major Transit Locations For State-Bound Narcotics?, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess., 3-4 January 2000, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg69521/pdf/CHRG-106hhrg69521.pdf. 200 Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2001), p. 45, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/45086854. 201 Patricia Bauer, "Carlos Ledher," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 18 June 2018, updated 03 September 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Carlos-Lehder. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m1 cooperating with the U.S. government for a lesser sentence. In federal testimony during the Noriega trial, Ledher claimed "that Castro mediated a bitter 1984 dispute between Noriega and Colombia's Medellin cartel that saved Panama's strongman from probable assassination…and bribed Cuban government officials to ship tons of cocaine into the United States".202 Lieutenant Colonel Luis del Cid, a close aide to Manuel Noriega, alleged during Noriega's trial that he "accompanied Noriega on a flight to Cuba and met Castro following the raid [in which Panamanian troops raided a cocaine lab in Darién province Colombia]" though specified he did not attend the meeting in question.203 While both Ledher and del Cid's testimonies seem to corroborate what Blandón had previously testified in regards to Castro's connections to Noriega and the Medellín Cartel, it must be noted that both del Cid and Ledher testified in exchange for reductions in their sentences (which numbered into the hundreds of years for each of them) and also could easily have become aware of Blandón's testimony in any of the three years prior to their providing evidence to the U.S. government. Two former officials who defected from Cuba two years before the trials, Oscar Valdes from the Ministry of Trade and Manuel de Beunza from the Ministry of the Interior, offered their insights on the trial, claiming the trials were for "show" and were more politically motivated as Castro desired to remove opponents whom he saw as a threat to his power.204 This allegation that the drug trials were a show trial meant to snub out political opponents of Castro's hold on Cuba has become a very prominent. 202 Robert L. Jackson, "Cartel Leader Reveals Secrets of Drug World," The Los Angeles Times, Time Mirror Company, published 21 November 1991, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-11-21-mn-404-story.html. 203 Richard Cole, "Former Aide Tells of Drug Cash, Castro, and Prostitutes," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 24 September 1991, https://apnews.com/article/0b7fcac1c0842630af2d1cc758ab1acd. 204 Jim Anderson, "Defectors: Cuba trials about politics, not drugs," United Press International, United Press International, published 27 July 1989, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/07/27/Defectors-Cuba-trial-about-politics-not-drugs/2648617515200/?spt=su. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m2 Other defectors, including those from the DGI who defected, also voiced their views on the trial. Jorge Masetti, a DGI officer and Tony de la Guardia's son-in-law who defected from Cuba in 1990, claimed in an interview, "If this operation really existed, it could only have existed if Fidel and Raúl Castro knew about it. They made these accusations, which were supposed to make the case against Ochoa. Arnaldo Ochoa was never proven to have smuggled drugs. The direct evidence does not exist, but they accused Ochoa, and why? Because Fidel wanted to send a message to all the officials with high authority".205 Juan Reinaldo Sánchez, a seemingly credible defector206 from Cuba's MININT who was the personal bodyguard to Castro for seventeen years, wrote in his book The Double Life of Fidel Castro that Castro had knowledge of subordinates' involvement in the drug trade and sanctioned it. Sánchez recalls overhearing a conversation in 1988 between Minister of the Interior Jose Abrantes and Castro in "centered on a Cuban [drug trafficker] living in the United States" who wanted to travel to Cuba to visit his parents; Castro approved the trip along with allowing the trafficker to, as a cover, say he was a Cuban intelligence operative while also requesting that Tony de la Guardia handle "the logistics of the trip".207 This conversation, while innocuous, seems to indicate that Castro did maintain a friendly relationship with some drug traffickers, yet reveals no legitimate information of Castro's involvement in the drug trade. Into the 1990s, working off the indictments against the Ruiz Family in 1988 and the 1992 Noriega trial, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida began investigating senior level members of the Cuban government. In 1993, the USAO-SDFL "drafted a [proposed 205 The Cuba Libre Story, season 1, episode 7, "Secrets and Sacrifices," directed by Emmanuel Amara, Kai Christiansen, & Florian Dedio, aired 11 December 2015, https://www.netflix.com/title/80109535. 206 Edward A. Lynch, "All Socialists Are Equal, but Some Are More Equal Than Others," Military Review (November-December 2019), p. 124, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/ND-19/ND-19-Book-B.pdf. 207 Juan Reinaldo Sánchez with Axel Gyldén, The Double Life of Fidel Castro: My 17 Years as Personal Bodyguard to El Líder Máximo (New York, NY: St. Martin's Griffin, 2015), p. 230. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m3 indictment that] would have charged Raul Castro and 14 other top Cuban officials [including Manuel Piñeiro, head of the Departamento América] with conspiracy and racketeering for allegedly providing safe passage for Medellin cartel cocaine loads, including permission to fly over Cuba and use its waters".208 Among others allegedly involved in this large enterprise was Abelardo Colomé Ibarra, the Minister of the Interior who replaced Jose
In: Decision analysis: a journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, INFORMS, Band 7, Heft 4, S. 404-410
ISSN: 1545-8504
Ali Abbas (" From the Editors… ") is an associate professor in the Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign. He received an M.S. in electrical engineering (1998), an M.S. in engineering economic systems and operations research (2001), a Ph.D. in management science and engineering (2003), and a Ph.D. (minor) in electrical engineering, all from Stanford University. He worked as a lecturer in the Department of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford and worked in Schlumberger Oilfield Services from 1991 to 1997, where he held several international positions in wireline logging, operations management, and international training. He has also worked on several consulting projects for mergers and acquisitions in California, and cotaught several executive seminars on decision analysis at Strategic Decisions Group in Menlo Park, California. His research interests include utility theory, decision making with incomplete information and preferences, dynamic programming, and information theory. Dr. Abbas is a senior member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) and a member of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). He is also an associate editor for Decision Analysis and Operations Research and coeditor of the DA column in education for Decision Analysis Today. Address: Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, 117 Transportation Building, MC-238, 104 South Mathews Avenue, Urbana, IL 61801; e-mail: aliabbas@uiuc.edu . Matthew D. Bailey (" Eliciting Patients' Revealed Preferences: An Inverse Markov Decision Process Approach ") is an assistant professor of business analytics and operations in the School of Management at Bucknell University, and he is an adjunct research investigator with Geisinger Health System. He received his Ph.D. in industrial and operations engineering from the University of Michigan. His primary research interest is in sequential decision making under uncertainty with applications to health-care operations and medical decision making. He is a member of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) and the Institute of Industrial Engineers (IIE). Address: School of Management, Bucknell University, 308 Taylor Hall, Lewisburg, PA 17837; e-mail: matt.bailey@bucknell.edu . Anthony M. Barrett (" Cost Effectiveness of On-Site Chlorine Generation for Chlorine Truck Attack Prevention ") is a risk analyst at ABS Consulting in Arlington, Virginia. He holds a Ph.D. in engineering and public policy from Carnegie Mellon University, and he also was a postdoctoral research associate at the Homeland Security Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) at the University of Southern California. His research interests include risk analysis, risk management, and public policies in a wide variety of areas, including terrorism, hazardous materials, energy and the environment, and natural hazards. Address: ABS Consulting, 1525 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 625, Arlington, VA 22209; e-mail: abarrett@absconsulting.com . Manel Baucells (" From the Editors… ") is a full professor at the Department of Economics and Business of Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. He was an associate professor and head of the Managerial Decision Sciences Department at IESE Business School. He earned his Ph.D. in management from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and holds a degree in mechanical engineering from Polytechnic University of Catalonia (UPC). His research and consulting activities cover multiple areas of decision making including group decisions, consumer decisions, uncertainty, complexity, and psychology. He acts as associate editor for the top journals Management Science, Operations Research, and Decision Analysis. He has received various prizes and grants for his research. In 2001, he won the student paper competition of the Decision Analysis Society. He is the only IESE professor having won both the Excellence Research Award and the Excellence Teaching Award. He has been visiting professor at Duke University, UCLA, London Business School, and Erasmus University. Address: Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain; e-mail: manel.baucells@upf.edu . J. Eric Bickel (" Scoring Rules and Decision Analysis Education ") is an assistant professor in both the Operations Research/Industrial Engineering Group (Department of Mechanical Engineering) and the Department of Petroleum and Geosystems Engineering at the University of Texas at Austin. In addition, Professor Bickel is a fellow in both the Center for International Energy and Environmental Policy and the Center for Petroleum Asset Risk Management. He holds an M.S. and Ph.D. from the Department of Engineering-Economic Systems at Stanford University and a B.S. in mechanical engineering with a minor in economics from New Mexico State University. His research interests include the theory and practice of decision analysis and its application in the energy and climate-change arenas. His research has addressed the modeling of probabilistic dependence, value of information, scoring rules, calibration, risk preference, education, decision making in sports, and climate engineering as a response to climate change. Prior to joining the University of Texas at Austin, Professor Bickel was an assistant professor at Texas A&M University and a senior engagement manager for Strategic Decisions Group. He has consulted around the world in a range of industries, including oil and gas, electricity generation/transmission/delivery, energy trading and marketing, commodity and specialty chemicals, life sciences, financial services, and metals and mining. Address: Graduate Program in Operations Research, The University of Texas at Austin, 1 University Station, C2200, Austin, TX 78712-0292; e-mail: ebickel@mail.utexas.edu . Vicki M. Bier (" From the Editors… ") holds a joint appointment as a professor in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering and the Department of Engineering Physics at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, where she has directed the Center for Human Performance and Risk Analysis (formerly the Center for Human Performance in Complex Systems) since 1995. She has more than 20 years of experience in risk analysis for the nuclear power, chemical, petrochemical, and aerospace industries. Before returning to academia, she spent seven years as a consultant at Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc. While there, her clients included the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Department of Energy, and a number of nuclear utilities, and she prepared testimony for Atomic Safety and Licensing Board hearings on the safety of the Indian Point nuclear power plants. Dr. Bier's current research focuses on applications of risk analysis and related methods to problems of security and critical infrastructure protection, under support from the Department of Homeland Security. Dr. Bier received the Women's Achievement Award from the American Nuclear Society in 1993, and was elected a Fellow of the Society for Risk Analysis in 1996, from which she received the Distinguished Achievement Award in 2007. She has written a number of papers and book chapters related to uncertainty analysis and decision making under uncertainty, and is the author of two scholarly review articles on risk communication. She served as the engineering editor for Risk Analysis from 1997 through 2001, and has served as a councilor of both the Society for Risk Analysis and the Decision Analysis Society, for which she is currently vice president and president elect. Dr. Bier has also served as a member of both the Radiation Advisory Committee and the Homeland Security Advisory Committee of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Science Advisory Board. Address: Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1513 University Avenue, Madison, WI 53706; e-mail: bier@engr.wisc.edu . Samuel E. Bodily (" Darden's Luckiest Student: Lessons from a High-Stakes Risk Experiment ") is the John Tyler Professor of Business Administration at the University of Virginia's Darden School of Business and has published textbooks and more than 40 articles in journals ranging from Harvard Business Review to Management Science. His publications relate to decision and risk analysis, forecasting, strategy modeling, revenue management, and eStrategy. He has edited special issues of Interfaces on decision and risk analysis and strategy modeling and analysis. Professor Bodily has published well over 100 cases, including a couple of the 10 best-selling cases at Darden. He received the Distinguished Casewriter Wachovia Award from Darden in 2005 and three other best case or research Wachovia awards. He is faculty leader for an executive program on Strategic Thinking and Action. He is the course head of, and teaches in, a highly valued first-year MBA course in decision analysis, has a successful second-year elective on Management Decision Models, and has taught eStrategy and Strategy. He is a past winner of the Decision Sciences International Instructional Award and has served as chair of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. He has taught numerous executive education programs for Darden and private companies, has consulted widely for business and government entities, and has served as an expert witness. Professor Bodily was on the faculties of MIT Sloan School of Management and Boston University and has been a visiting professor at INSEAD Singapore, Stanford University, and the University of Washington. He has a Ph.D. degree and an S.M. degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a B.S. degree in physics from Brigham Young University. Address: Darden School of Business, 100 Darden Boulevard, Charlottesville, VA 22903; e-mail: bodilys@virginia.edu . David Budescu (" From the Editors… ") is the Anne Anastasi Professor of Psychometrics and Quantitative Psychology at Fordham University. He held positions at the University of Illinois and the University of Haifa, and visiting positions at Carnegie Mellon University, University of Gotheborg, the Kellog School at Northwestern University, the Hebrew University, and the Israel Institute of Technology (Technion). His research is in the areas of human judgment, individual and group decision making under uncertainty and with incomplete and vague information, and statistics for the behavioral and social sciences. He is or was on the editorial boards of Applied Psychological Measurement; Decision Analysis; Journal of Behavioral Decision Making; Journal of Mathematical Psychology; Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition (2000–2003); Multivariate Behavioral Research; Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (1992–2002); and Psychological Methods (1996–2000). He is past president of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making (2000–2001), fellow of the Association for Psychological Science, and an elected member of the Society of Multivariate Experimental Psychologists. Address: Department of Psychology, Fordham University, Bronx, New York, NY 10458; e-mail: budescu@fordham.edu . John C. Butler (" From the Editors… ") is a clinical associate professor of finance and the academic director of the Energy Management and Innovation Center in the McCombs School of Business at the University of Texas at Austin, and the secretary/treasurer of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. Butler received his Ph.D. in management science and information systems from the University of Texas in 1998. His research interests involve the use of decision science models to support decision making, with a particular emphasis on decision and risk analysis models with multiple performance criteria. Butler has consulted with a number of organizations regarding the application of decision analysis tools to a variety of practical problems. Most of his consulting projects involve use of Visual Basic for Applications and Excel to implement complex decision science models in a user-friendly format. Address: Center for Energy Management and Innovation, McCombs School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712-1178; e-mail: john.butler2@mccombs.utexas.edu . Philippe Delquié (" From the Editors… ") is an associate professor of decision sciences at the George Washington University and holds a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Professor Delquié's teaching and research are in decision, risk, and multicriteria analysis. His work focuses on the interplay of behavioral and normative theories of choice, with the aim of improving managerial decision making and risk taking. His research addresses issues in preference assessment, value of information, nonexpected utility models of choice under risk, and risk measures. Prior to joining the George Washington University, he held academic appointments at INSEAD, the University of Texas at Austin, and École Normale Supérieure, France, and visiting appointments at Duke University's Fuqua School of Business. Address: Department of Decision Sciences, George Washington University, Funger Hall, Suite 415, Washington, DC 20052; e-mail: delquie@gwu.edu . Zeynep Erkin (" Eliciting Patients' Revealed Preferences: An Inverse Markov Decision Process Approach ") is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Industrial Engineering at the University of Pittsburgh. She received her M.S. and B.S. degrees in industrial engineering from the University of Pittsburgh and Middle East Technical University, Turkey, in 2008 and 2006, respectively. Her research interests include maintenance optimization and medical decision making. Address: Department of Industrial Engineering, University of Pittsburgh, 3600 O'Hara Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15261; e-mail: zee2@pitt.edu . Peter I. Frazier (" Paradoxes in Learning and the Marginal Value of Information ") is an assistant professor in the School of Operations Research and Information Engineering at Cornell University. He received a Ph.D. in operations research and financial engineering from Princeton University in 2009. His research interest is in the optimal acquisition of information, with applications in simulation, medicine, operations management, neuroscience, and information retrieval. He teaches courses in simulation and statistics. Address: School of Operations Research and Information Engineering, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853; e-mail: pf98@cornell.edu . L. Robin Keller (" From the Editors… ") is a professor of operations and decision technologies in the Merage School of Business at the University of California, Irvine. She received her Ph.D. and M.B.A. in management science and her B.A. in mathematics from the University of California, Los Angeles. She has served as a program director for the Decision, Risk, and Management Science Program of the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF). Her research is on decision analysis and risk analysis for business and policy decisions and has been funded by NSF and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Her research interests cover multiple-attribute decision making, riskiness, fairness, probability judgments, ambiguity of probabilities or outcomes, risk analysis (for terrorism, environmental, health, and safety risks), time preferences, problem structuring, cross-cultural decisions, and medical decision making. She is currently Editor-in-Chief of Decision Analysis, published by the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). She is a Fellow of INFORMS and has held numerous roles in INFORMS, including board member and chair of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. She is a recipient of the George F. Kimball Medal from INFORMS. She has served as the decision analyst on three National Academy of Sciences committees. Address: The Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-3125; e-mail: lrkeller@uci.edu . Lisa M. Maillart (" Eliciting Patients' Revealed Preferences: An Inverse Markov Decision Process Approach ") is an associate professor in the Industrial Engineering Department at the University of Pittsburgh. Prior to joining the faculty at the University of Pittsburgh, she served on the faculty of the Department of Operations in the Weatherhead School of Management at Case Western Reserve University. She received her M.S. and B.S. in industrial and systems engineering from Virginia Tech, and her Ph.D. in industrial and operations engineering from the University of Michigan. Her primary research interest is in sequential decision making under uncertainty, with applications in medical decision making and maintenance optimization. She is a member of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), the Society of Medical Decision Making (SMDM), and the Institute of Industrial Engineers (IIE). Address: Department of Industrial Engineering, University of Pittsburgh, 3600 O'Hara Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15261; e-mail: maillart@pitt.edu . Jason R. W. Merrick (" From the Editors… ") is an associate professor in the Department of Statistical Sciences and Operations Research at Virginia Commonwealth University. He has a D.Sc. in operations research from the George Washington University. He teaches courses in decision analysis, risk analysis, and simulation. His research is primarily in the area of decision analysis and Bayesian statistics. He has worked on projects ranging from assessing maritime oil transportation and ferry system safety, the environmental health of watersheds, and optimal replacement policies for rail tracks and machine tools, and he has received grants from the National Science Foundation, the Federal Aviation Administration, the United States Coast Guard, the American Bureau of Shipping, British Petroleum, and Booz Allen Hamilton, among others. He has also performed training for Infineon Technologies, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, and Capital One Services. He is an associate editor for Decision Analysis and Operations Research. He is the information officer for the Decision Analysis Society. Address: Department of Statistical Sciences and Operations Research, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284; e-mail: jrmerric@vcu.edu . Phillip E. Pfeifer (" Darden's Luckiest Student: Lessons from a High-Stakes Risk Experiment ") is the Richard S. Reynolds Professor of Business at the University of Virginia's Darden School of Business, where he teaches courses in decision analysis and direct marketing. A graduate of Lehigh University and the Georgia Institute of Technology, his teaching has won student awards and has been recognized in Business Week's Guide to the Best Business Schools. He is an active researcher in the areas of decision making and direct marketing, and he currently serves on the editorial review board of the Journal of Interactive Marketing, which named him their best reviewer of 2008. In 2004 he was recognized as the Darden School's faculty leader in terms of external case sales, and in 2006 he coauthored a managerial book, Marketing Metrics: 50+ Metrics Every Executive Should Master, published by Wharton School Publishing, which was named best marketing book of the year by Strategy + Business. Address: Darden School of Business; 100 Darden Boulevard; Charlottesville, VA 22903; e-mail: pfeiferp@virginia.edu . Warren B. Powell (" Paradoxes in Learning and the Marginal Value of Information ") is a professor in the Department of Operations Research and Financial Engineering at Princeton University, where he has taught since 1981. He is the director of CASTLE Laboratory (Princeton University), which specializes in the development of stochastic optimization models and algorithms with applications in transportation and logistics, energy, health, and finance. The author or coauthor of more than 160 refereed publications, he is an INFORMS Fellow, and the author of Approximate Dynamic Programming: Solving the Curses of Dimensionality, published by John Wiley and Sons. His primary research interests are in approximate dynamic programming for high-dimensional applications and optimal learning (the efficient collection of information), and their application in energy systems analysis and transportation. He is a recipient of the Wagner prize and has twice been a finalist in the Edelman competition. He has also served in a variety of editorial and administrative positions for INFORMS, including INFORMS Board of Directors, area editor for Operations Research, president of the Transportation Science Section, and numerous prize and administrative committees. Address: Department of Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; e-mail: powell@princeton.edu . Mark S. Roberts (" Eliciting Patients' Revealed Preferences: An Inverse Markov Decision Process Approach "), M.D., M.P.P., is professor and chair of health policy and management, and he holds secondary appointments in medicine, industrial engineering, and clinical and translational science. A practicing general internist, he has conducted research in decision analysis and the mathematical modeling of disease for more than 25 years, and he has expertise in cost effectiveness analysis, mathematical optimization and simulation, and the measurement and inclusion of patient preferences into decision problems. He has used decision analysis to examine clinical, costs, policy and allocation questions in liver transplantation, vaccination strategies, operative interventions, and the use of many medications. His recent research has concentrated in the use of mathematical methods from operations research and management science, including Markov decision processes, discrete-event simulation, and integer programming, to problems in health care. Address: Department of Health Policy and Management, University of Pittsburgh, Graduate School of Public Health, 130 De Soto Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15261; e-mail: robertsm@upmc.edu . Ahti Salo (" From the Editors… ") is a professor of systems analysis at the Systems Analysis Laboratory of Aalto University. His research interests include topics in portfolio decision analysis, multicriteria decision making, risk management, efficiency analysis, and technology foresight. He is currently president of the Finnish Operations Research Society (FORS) and represents Europe and the Middle East in the INFORMS International Activities Committee. Professor Salo has been responsible for the methodological design and implementation of numerous high-impact decision and policy processes, including FinnSight 2015, the national foresight exercise of the Academy of Finland and the National Funding Agency for Technology and Innovations (Tekes). Address: Aalto University, Systems Analysis Laboratory, P.O. Box 11100, 00076 Aalto, Finland; e-mail: ahti.salo@tkk.fi . Andrew J. Schaefer (" Eliciting Patients' Revealed Preferences: An Inverse Markov Decision Process Approach ") is an associate professor of industrial engineering and Wellington C. Carl Fellow at the University of Pittsburgh. He has courtesy appointments in bioengineering, medicine, and clinical and translational science. He received his Ph.D. in industrial and systems engineering from Georgia Tech in 2000. His research interests include the application of stochastic optimization methods to health-care problems, as well as stochastic optimization techniques, in particular, stochastic integer programming. He is interested in patient-oriented decision making in contexts such as end-stage liver disease, HIV/AIDS, sepsis, and diabetes. He also models health-care systems, including operating rooms and intensive-care units. He is an associate editor for INFORMS Journal on Computing and IIE Transactions. Address: Department of Industrial Engineering, University of Pittsburgh, 3600 O'Hara Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15261; e-mail: Schaefer@pitt.edu . George Wu (" From the Editors… ") has been on the faculty of the University of Chicago Booth School of Business since September 1997. His degrees include A.B. (applied mathematics, 1985), S.M. (applied mathematics, 1987), and Ph.D. (decision sciences, 1991), all from Harvard University. Prior to joining the faculty at the University of Chicago, Professor Wu was on the faculty at Harvard Business School. Wu worked as a decision analyst at Procter & Gamble prior to starting graduate school. His research interests include descriptive and prescriptive aspects of decision making, in particular, decision making involving risk, cognitive biases in bargaining and negotiation, and managerial and organizational decision making. Professor Wu is a coordinating editor for Theory and Decision, an advisory editor for Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, on the editorial boards of Decision Analysis and Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, and a former department editor of Management Science. Address: Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637; e-mail: wu@chicagobooth.edu .
V dizertaciji sem poskušal raziskati, kako oskrba z energijo v vsaki od štirih svetovnih velesil (EU, ZDA, Ruski federaciji, Ljudski republiki Kitajski) vpliva na njihovo zunanjo energetsko politiko, kateri od treh elementov energetske politike (konkurenčnost, varnost oskrbe, trajnostnost) odraža zunanjo energetsko politiko teh držav in kako lahko različne regionalne iniciative iyhajajoče iz zunanje energetske politike teh držav pojasnjujemo s teorijo neofunkcionalizma. Prvo poglavje želi predstaviti neofunkcionistično teorijo kot teorijo regionalne integracije. Najprej analizira poskus Jeana Monneta za spodbujanje evropske integracije, ki so jo po drugi svetovni vojni ilustrirale Evropske skupnosti: Evropska gospodarska skupnost, Euratom in Evropska skupnost za jeklo in premog. Neofunkcionalizem je teorija, ki razlaga proces integracije na regionalni ravni glede na naraščajoče vzajemne gospodarske odnose med državami. Analizira sposobnost regionalnih organizacij za reševanje sporov in oblikovanje mednarodnih pravnih režimov, znotraj katerih lahko nadnacionalna tržna pravila nadomestijo nacionalne regulatorne režime. Integracijo pojasnjuje tudi s specializacijo elit in s pozitivnim učinkom prelitja (spill over effect), ki se kaže v nujnosti sodelovanja med sektorji, povezanimi s tistim sektorjem, v katerem se je regionalno sodelovanje prvič začelo. Drugo poglavje na kratko predstavlja 130 let zgodovine regulacije za zaščito konkurence na energetskih trgih, približno 80 let izzivov glede varnosti oskrbe in prestopa te teme v politiko ter približno 70 let stremljenja k trajnostnosti v sodobni energetski politiki. Tretje poglavje predstavlja strukturo oskrbe z energijo v vsaki od analiziranih svetovnih velesil. Očitno je, da so energetski trgi (nafta, plin, elektrika) v ZDA in EU zelo konkurenčni in učinkoviti. Velesili si prizadevata za trajnostnost in nenehno zmanjšujeta izpuste škodljivih emisij iz elektrarn, v prometu ter pri drugih dejavnostih. Medtem, ko je EU močno odvisna od uvoza (leta 2017 je uvozila več kot 55% vseh virov energije), so se ZDA v zadnjih 15 letih iz največjega uvoznika energetskih virov na svetu razvile v neto izvoznico in leta 2018 dosegle energetsko samozadostnost. Ruski indeks neto uvoza energije znaša -84%. Po podatkih iz leta 2014 je država ena največjih neto izvoznikov nafte (približno 10% svetovne proizvodnje) in plina (blizu 20% svetovne proizvodnje). Leta 2018 je bila izvožena količina energije skoraj enaka tisti, ki jo je država v tem letu porabila. Kljub energetskemu izobilju, ima Rusija močno regulirane in neučinkovite trge s plinom, nafto in električno energijo. Med štirimi analiziranimi velesilami daleč najmanj učinkovito izrablja svoje energetske vire. Monopol državnega podjetja Gazprom postaja vedno bolj vprašljiv zaradi vse manjših koristi, ki jih tako stanje prinaša Rusiji. Posledično naraščajo pritiski na Moskvo za reformo energetskega (zlasti plinskega) sektorja. Do zdaj je ruska vlada bolj ali manj odklanjala strukturne reforme in se poskušala prilagajati novim okoliščinam s prerazporejanjem obstoječih dohodkov. Kitajska počasi liberalizira svoj trg s plinom. Reforma, ki je v devetdesetih pritegnila v proizvodnjo električne energije nove, zasebne vlagatelje, je bila vmes že odpravljena, zasebni vlagatelji pa izrinjeni. Plin, premog, nafto ter proizvodnjo električne energije v glavnem nadzirajo državna podjetja, ki praviloma ne dopuščajo konkurence. Kitajska je leta 2017 porabila 22% vseh svetovnih virov energije in je bila tako daleč največji porabnik energije na vsem svetu. Kitajska izkoplje in sežge približno polovico svetovnega premoga in je tako močno netrajnostno usmerjena. Količina izpustov škodljivih emisij iz elektrarn ostaja visoka in stabilna, emisije CO2 pa se nenehno povečujejo. Se pa Kitajska v zadnjih letih veliko bolj osredotoča na storitveno ekonomijo in proizvodnjo elektrike iz obnovljivih virov. Kitajski indeks neto uvoza energije je 15%, kar kaže na zmerno odvisnost od uvoza. Četrto poglavje je namenjeno analizi zunanje energetske politike EU v globalnem kontekstu zapletenih energetskih odnosov. Energetika je že zelo dolgo politično občutljiv sektor in je kot tak tesno povezan z državno suverenostjo in nacionalnimi interesi. Posledično so se bruseljska prizadevanja za oblikovanje skupne zunanje energetske politike, ob delitvi pristojnosti z državami članicami in ob upoštevanju skrbno pripravljenega kompromisa iz člena 194 Pogodbe o delovanju EU, izkazala za zelo zahteven in težko dosegljiv cilj. Dejstvo, da je Evropska unija močno odvisna od tujih dobaviteljev energije (med katerimi ima Rusija s svojo vizijo političnim ciljem podrejene energetske politike najpomembnejšo vlogo), dodatno omejuje težnje EU po uvedbi univerzalnih tržnih pravil v energetskem sektorju. Pri promociji tržnih pravil kot osnovi energetske politike je EU vseeno uspelo doseči nekaj napredka, zlasti z ustanovitvijo Evropskega gospodarskega prostora in Energetske skupnosti. V zadnjih letih, ki jih zaznamujeta zmanjšan pomen multilateralizma in povečan pomen bilateralnih odnosov, je EU začela oblikovati svojo lastno zunanjo energetsko politiko (po moji oceni od 2015 dalje) in takoj, tako kot druge velesile, v svojo zunanjo energetsko politiko vnesla elemente dominantnosti. Neofunkcionalistična teorija, ki evropsko integracijo razlaga z učinkom prelitja, se je izkazala za uporabno tudi pri razlagi procesov oblikovanja zunanje energetske politike EU in povečane vloge in avtonomije Evropske komisije v tem procesu. Po teoriji Nye-ja o štirih stopnjah pri oblikovanju regionalne integracije EU trenutno prehaja iz tretje stopnje (redukcija alternativ) v četrto (eksternalizacija). Peto poglavje skuša pokazati kako je ameriška energetska politika skozi zgodovino doživela več sprememb. ZDA so si v začetku dvajsetega stoletja, tako kot mnogo let od krize v Sueškem prekopu sredi 70-ih let 20.stoletja, prizadevale za konkurenco, ki naj bi omogočila ustrezen dostop do virov energije s ciljem, da bi ohranile sprotno zadovoljevanje svojih energetskih potreb. Od sredine osemdesetih let je postala ameriška energetska politika bolj večstranska, z vedno večjo skrbjo glede okoljskih vprašanj, vendar sta varnost oskrbe in konkurenčnosti še vedno na prvem mestu. Medtem, ko je ameriško energetsko politiko v dvajsetem stoletju vodil strah pred pomanjkanjem energije, je tako imenovana nekonvencionalna revolucija pri pridobivanju plina in nafte iz škrilavcev v drugem desetletju enaindvajsetega stoletja spremenila odnos Washingtona do zunanje energetske politike in močno vplivala na mednarodne trge nafte in plina. Obdobje nenehno rastoče skrbi glede pridobivanja energetskih virov je tako nadomestila doba energetske obilnosti. V dobi energetske obilnosti v ZDA si je Trumpova administracija zastavila cilj, da ZDA postanejo energetsko dominantne. Zaradi tega je Trumpova administracija začela podpirati politične posege v kreacijo cen na naftnem trgu in odmik od multilateralizma, ki je poprej omogočal globalno konkurenco. Kljub temu, da so ZDA dosegle status največje svetovne proizvajalke nafte in plina, se zdi, da Washington še vedno ne odstopa od ciljev, ki jih tradicionalno zasleduje s svojo zunanjo energetsko politiko: zagotavljanje zalog na svetovnih naftnih trgih in zmanjševanje motenj pri dobavi ; spodbujanje zaveznikov, da diverzificirajo lastne energetske vire, kjer je bila Evropa v glavnem v središču prizadevanj ZDA ; in s svojo močjo kaznovati države izvoznice plina in nafte ter jim ukazati, naj spremenijo politike, z uporabo možnosti uvedbe sankcij. Uvajanje sankcij ima vse pomembnejšo vlogo v ameriški zunanji politiki, saj je vedno bolj vprašljivo, kdaj, in če sploh, uporabiti vojaško silo za politične cilje. Nova doba obilja energije ZDA omogoča, da k uvedbi sankcij pritegnejo tudi druge države ter jih tako skupaj lažje uvedejo koordinirajo. Po drugi strani pa je zelo verjetno, da bi odločitev ZDA, da izkoristijo svoj položaj energetskega dobavitelja in začnejo izvoz energije uporabljati v politične namene, lahko delovala proti njihovim lastnim interesom in zmožnosti doseganja njihovih zunanjepolitičnih ciljev. ZDA nikoli niso sodelovale v nobeni gospodarski organizaciji, ki bi omogočala prenos suverenosti glede energetske politike v roke neke nadnacionalne strukture in neofunkcionalizem v njihovi zunanji energetski politiki nima nobenega odmeva. Šesto poglavje, ki je posvečeno Rusiji, raziskuje, kako njena bogata baza energetskih virov zagotavlja davčno osnovo za državno porabo, devizne prihodke in vzvod (zlasti v primeru dobave plina) v mednarodnih odnosih. Zahvaljujoč visokim cenam nafte iz obdobja pred pandemijo COVID-19 je Rusiji uspelo obnoviti gospodarstvo in povečati svojo geopolitično trdnost. Zaradi izjemne odvisnosti od energetskih prihodkov za ruski državni proračun je neugodna kombinacija nizkih cen nafte in finančnih sankcij ZDA in EU skupaj z naraščajočo konkurenco v proizvodnji nafte in plina povzročila postopno zmanjševanje ruskega vpliva v mednarodni politiki. Rusija nima veliko možnosti, da bi v bližnji prihodnosti postala pomemben igralec na azijskih trgih. Tako se je država usmerila k širitvi in osvežitvi svojih energetskih vezi z Evropo. Kljub temu pa Moskva vzporedno s tem spodbuja svoj konkurenčni integracijski projekt Evroazijske ekonomske unije (EAEU), katerega namen je povsem nasproten cilju evropskih integracijskih projektov, po katerih se vsaj formalno zgleduje. S tem projektom želi Rusija, med drugim, v energetskem sektorju zaščiti svoj prevladujoči položaj v postsovjetskem prostoru. Kljub formalni podobnosti EAEU z EU tam ni mogoče pričakovati učinkov prelitja na nadnacionalni ravni v skladu s teorijo neofunkcionalizma, saj gre za združitev neenakopravnih partnerjev z močnim ruskim vodstvom, ki ne dovoljuje socializacije neke nove, nadnacionalne elite. Sedmo poglavje predstavlja kako je zaradi hitro rastočega gospodarstva in povečanega povpraševanja po energiji Kitajska povečevala vpliv na svetovnih energetskih trgih. Na energetsko politiko kitajske vlade je močno vplivalo vse večje povpraševanje po nafti in odvisnost države od uvoza le-te. Naftna in plinska industrija sta zaslužni za zagotavljanje oskrbe, za zadosten proračunski dohodek in tudi za delovna mesta. Kitajska državna podjetja skušajo svoje poslovanje prilagoditi svetovnim praksam, vendar je bil do sedaj njihov manevrski prostor vedno omejen z državnim nadzorom. Pod sedanjim vodstvom kitajska podjetja sodelujejo v mednarodnem prodoru z velikimi, neposrednimi naložbami. Prvi poskus takega prodora je bila iniciativa 16+1 (sedaj 17+1) [e pred sedanjim predsednikom Xi Jinpingom. Njegov prihod na oblast je sprožil še obsežnejšo iniciativo. Prosor v svetovnem merilu je bil pred kratkim zasnovan kot Iniciativa pasu in ceste (Belt and Road Initiative - BRI). Kljub temu, da v BRI sodeluje skoraj 70 držav, pomen iniciative ostaja nejasen. BRI zagotavlja zaščito kitajskih trgovskih poti in oskrbe z energijo ter omogoča državi, da svoje industrijske presežke in gradbene kapacitete učinkovito izvaža po vsem svetu. Z BRI kitajska zunanja politika prek gospodarske diplomacije poskuša povečati svoj vpliv. Ta projekt je treba razumeti kot dolgoročno, globalno iniciativo, ki nima samo gospodarskega cilja. BRI in iniciativa 17+1 sta še dve obliki mednarodnega sodelovanja, ki sta neprimerljivi s postopkom vključevanja v EU in v njiju zaradi dominantnosti Kitajske ni prelitja funkcij na nadnacionalno raven kot ga opisuje neofunkcionalistična teorija. ; In the study, I tried to explore how characteristics of energy supply in each of the four global superpowers (EU, US, Russian Federation, People's Republic of China) influences their foreign energy policy, which out of the three elements of energy policy (competitiveness, security of supply, sustainability) primarily reflects it and how and if different forms of foreign energy policy regional initiatives can be explained with the theory of neofunctionalism. The first chapter aims to present the neofunctionalist theory as a theory of regional integration. It first analyzes Jean Monnet's attempts for European integration, at that time illustrated by the European Communities: European Economic Community, Euratom and the European Steel and Coal Community. Later, it was further developed to be able to explain processes like territorial growth of a regional integrated area and also processes of its shrinking, i.e. Brexit. Neofunctionalism is a theory explaining the process of integration on a regional level with reference to growing reciprocal economic relationships in-between nations. It also analyzes capacity of a regional organization in dispute resolution and creation of international legal regimes, within which the supranational market rules may replace national regulatory regimes. It explains also integration by positive spillover effects as necessities to cooperate in sectors, which are indirectly related to the sector where regional cooperation first started. I briefly present also intergovernmentalism as an alternative theory. The first chapter also briefly presents 130 years of history of regulation to protect competiveness on energy markets, some 80 years of security of supply challenges and their translation into political decisions and some 70 years of history of creation of sustainability in modern energy policy. The second chapter presents the structure of energy supply and the market structure in each of the analyzed global superpowers. It is evident that energy markets (oil, gas, electricity) in the US and the EU are highly competitive and efficient. Both superpowers strive also towards sustainability and are constantly decreasing harmful emissions from fossil fuel power plants as well as transport and other energy consuming activities. While the EU is highly import dependent (in 2017 imported more than 55% of all energy sources), the United States in the last 15 years developed from the biggest importer of energy sources globally into a net exporter, reaching energy self-sufficiency in 2018. Russia has a net energy imports index at -84%. It is one of the biggest net exporters of oil (some 10% of global production) and gas (close to 20% of global production), according to data from 2014. In 2018, it exported almost the same amount of energy as was consumed in the country. Despite its energy abundance, Russia has heavily regulated and inefficient gas, oil and electricity markets. Among the four analyzed superpowers, it has far the least energy efficient use of its energy resources. The position of Gazprom, which enjoys a monopoly on pipeline gas exports to Russia's neighbors, has been increasingly challenged. Consequently, pressures on Moscow to reform its energy (particularly gas) sector have been rising. So far, the Russian government has shown reluctance with regard to implementing structural reforms in its energy sector and has rather been trying to adjust, react and adapt to created circumstances. China is slowly liberalizing its gas market. Reform that attracted new private investors into electricity generation in the 1990s has backslid. Gas, coal, electricity generation and oil sectors are primarily controlled by state-owned companies and do not allow much room for competition. China in 2017 consumed 22% of all energy sources globally and was by far the biggest energy consumer worldwide. China extracts and burns around half of all coal being extracted worldwide and is heavily unsustainable. Its harmful emissions from power plants remain high and stable, while CO2 emissions are in constant ascent. However, in recent years, the country has been focusing much more on services-based economy and renewable energy. Additionally, taking into account the combination of effects of factors like structural changes in the economy, growing efficiency within the energy industry and demographic changes, total growth of the energy demand up until the year of 2040 will be comparable to the one that China experienced from 2008 to 2016. Its net energy imports index is 15% and shows moderate dependence on import. The third chapter aims at analyzing the EU's emerging foreign energy policy in a global context of imperfect energy relations. Energy, being an increasingly politicized sector, still remains closely linked with state sovereignty and national interest. Consequently, Brussels's efforts to shape a coherent foreign energy policy, while sharing competences with the Member States and taking into account the carefully drafted compromise of article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, has proved to be increasingly challenging. Moreover, Europe, being highly dependent on foreign energy suppliers (among which Russia, with its contrasting vision of energy policy, plays the most important role) has been further undermining the EU's aspirations of introducing universal, market-based norms in global energy relations. Against this backdrop, the EU managed to make some achievements in its foreign energy policy, particularly, by the means of the European Economic Area and the Energy Community, which was a successful example of what Europe aspired to achieve globally. In recent years marked by the decreased role of multilateralism and the increased role of bilateral relations, also the EU introduced elements of dominance into its foreign energy policy despite opposition to such behavior when performed by other superpowers. The neofunctionalist theory explaining European integration by spillover effect has proven to be usable also in explaining processes of creation of EU foreign energy policy in the years from 2015 on and increased role and autonomy of the European Commission in it. The fourth chapter attempts to demonstrate that US energy policy has gone through multiple changes throughout history. While in the beginning of the twentieth century, the US pursued competitive access to energy sources to sustain the strong growth of its demand, after the Suez Canal crisis and the subsequent oil crisis in the mid-seventies, the US energy policy became centered on ensuring the security of supply. Since the mid-eighties, it became much more multi-sided, with growing concern about environmental issues, yet without detriment to the importance given to security of supply and competitiveness. While American energy policy throughout the twentieth century has been driven by fears of energy scarcity, the so-called unconventional revolution of the past decade changed Washington's attitude towards its foreign energy policy and also considerably impacted international oil and gas markets. An atmosphere of continuously growing competition for resources has, thus, been replaced by the age of energy abundance, where the Trump's US administration has set the objective of the United States becoming energy dominant, supporting political interventions into the creation of prices on the oil market and moving away from multilateralism, which enabled global competition. Despite the fact that the US achieved the status of being the biggest producer of oil and gas in the world, Washington does not seem to withdraw the objectives traditionally pursued by its foreign energy policy. Namely, ensuring supplies on the global oil markets and minimizing disruptions ; encouraging allies to diversify their own energy resources, where Europe has usually been the main focus of US efforts ; and using its power to punish countries and to command them to change policies, using the possibility of imposing sanctions on gas and oil exporting nations. With latest Biden's administration US seems to reposition its focus on sustainability and multilateral cooperation again. Despite that sanctions play increasingly important role in US foreign policy, since it is more and more questionable when and if at all to deploy military force. New energy abundant age enables the US to get on board other nations to collectively impose multilateral sanctions easier than in previous times. ON the other side it is very possible that US decision to become energy dominant and start using energy exports for political purposes could work against their interests and ability to achieve their objectives. The US never participated in any economic organization that would tend to transfer sovereignty over energy policy to a supranational structure. The fifth chapter dealing with Russia explores how its vast energy resource base provides the fiscal basis for state spending, foreign exchange earnings, and leverage (especially for gas) in international relations. Thanks to the high oil prices of the pre COVID-19 pandemic decade, Russia managed to recover its economy and increase its geopolitical assertiveness. Nevertheless, due to its extreme dependence on energy revenues, following the unfavorable combination of low oil prices, financial sanctions of the West combined with the rising competition in production resulted in Russia's gradually diminishing economic leverage. Russia, with unlikely prospects to become a prominent player in Asian markets in the foreseeable future, has turned to expanding and refreshing its energy ties with Europe. Yet, in parallel, Moscow has been pushing forward its competing integrationist project of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which aims to conflict and overlap with the European integrationist projects, inter alia, in the sector of energy in order to safeguard its dominant position in the post-Soviet space. Despite the formal similarity of the EAEU with the EU, there is no spillover effect since it is an association of unequal partners with strong Russian leadership. Country's fast-growing economy and rapid increase in energy demand has lead China to gain more influence in global energy markets. The energy policy of the Chinese government has been strongly influenced by the increasing demand for oil and country's dependence on oil imports. The oil and gas industry has remained a strategic asset for the Chinese government. This industry is responsible for ensuring supplies of oil and gas, for sufficient budget income as well as for employment. With closer integration into global markets, Chinese state-owned companies have been seeking to adapt their operations to global practices, yet, the room for maneuver has always been limited by state control. Under the present leadership, Chinese companies have been engaged in large-scale outward direct investments. This process was recently soon packed as a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The fact that nearly 70 countries are participating in the BRI does not improve the perception that its label remains unclear. There is still no exact definition of the qualification of a BRI project Yet, half a decade after the launch of one of the most ambitious geo-economic projects of recent history, some more things became clearer. To name a few, BRI is not only responsible for securing China's trade routes and energy supplies, it is also accountable for the fact, that the country is being able to export worldwide several construction projects due to its industrial overcapacities. The BRI became a major component of China's grandiose foreign policy agenda aimed at increasing Chinese influence in the BRI region and beyond. The past years have proven that the BRI project is to be understood as a long-term, global and not having only an economic goal. Yet, challenges regarding to the future success of the BRI are many and of different nature: technical, political, financial and regulatory, to name a few. Both suspicion and skepticism concerning its real motives and viability remain high, especially among those countries who have been the main designers of today's global financial system and international trade rules. The Belt and Road Initiative is yet another form of international cooperation which is incomparable with the EU integration process and neofunctionalist theory cannot be used for its explanation. The thesis confirmed that characteristics of energy supply in a country are directly and with the same attitude reflected in the foreign energy policy. Foreign energy policy is additionally held up by whichever tool of dominance being available to one of the four studied cases. The thesis also confirmed that Haas' theory of neofunctionalism is still supportive in explanation of regional integration of all initiatives proposed in and by the four global superpowers. EU is creating its own foreign energy policy entering externalization as the last, fourth stage of regional cooperation, according to Nye.
Not Available ; The land resource inventory of Kamanuru-2 microwatershed was conducted using village cadastral maps and IRS satellite imagery on 1:7920 scale. The false colour composites of IRS imagery were interpreted for physiography and these physiographic delineations were used as base for mapping soils. The soils were studied in several transects and a soil map was prepared with phases of soil series as mapping units. Random checks were made all over the area outside the transects to confirm and validate the soil map unit boundaries. The soil map shows the geographic distribution and extent, characteristics, classification, behavior and use potentials of the soils in the microwatershed. The present study covers an area of 274 ha in Koppal taluk and district, Karnataka. The climate is semiarid and categorized as drought - prone with an average annual rainfall of 662 mm, of which about 424 mm is received during south –west monsoon, 161 mm during north-east and the remaining 77 mm during the rest of the year. An area of about 88 per cent is covered by soils, 4 per cent water bodies, settlements and others and 7 per cent by rock lands. The salient findings from the land resource inventory are summarized briefly below. The soils belong to 12 soil series and 20 soil phases (management units) and 4 land use classes. The length of crop growing period is 150 cm) soils. About 26 per cent area has clayey soils, 37 per cent loamy soils and 26 per cent sandy soils at the surface. About 67 per cent of the area has non-gravelly (200 mm/m) in available water capacity. About 66 per cent area has very gently sloping (1-3%) and 23 per cent area has gently sloping (3-5%) lands. An area of about 26 per cent has soils that are slightly eroded (e1) and 63 per cent moderately eroded (e2) lands. An area of about 21 per cent has soils that are slightly to moderately acid (pH 5.5- 6.5), 32 per cent soils are neutral (pH 6.5-7.3), 36 per cent are slightly to moderately alkaline (pH 7.3 to 8.4) and 1 per cent are strongly alkaline (pH 8.4-9.0). The Electrical Conductivity (EC) of the soils is 0.75%) in organic carbon. Available phosphorus is medium (23-57 kg/ha) in about 70 per cent and high (>57 kg/ha) in 19 per cent area of the microwatershed. About 69 per cent of the soils are medium (145-337 kg/ha) and 20 per cent of the soils are high (>337 kg/ha) in available potassium content. Available sulphur is low (1.0 ppm) in about 4 per cent. Available iron is sufficient (>4.5 ppm) in 52 per cent and deficient (0.6 ppm) in about 21 per cent area. Available manganese and copper are sufficient in all the soils. The land suitability for 28 major agricultural and horticultural crops grown in the microwatershed were assessed and the areas that are highly suitable (S1) and moderately suitable (S2) are given below. It is however to be noted that a given soil may be suitable for various crops but what specific crop to be grown may be decided by the farmer looking to his capacity to invest on various inputs, marketing infrastructure, market price and finally the demand and supply position. Land suitability for various crops in the microwatershed Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Sorghum 82 (30) 58 (21) Pomegranate 82 (30) 96 (35) Maize 38 (14) 72 (26) Guava 80 (29) 72 (27) Bajra 84 (31) 69 (25) Jackfruit 82 (30) 71 (26) Red gram 82 (30) 53 (19) Jamun 42 (15) 135 (49) Bengalgram 25 (9) 115 (42) Musambi 82 (30) 96 (35) Groundnut 80 (29) 91 (33) Lime 82 (30) 96 (35) Sunflower 82 (30) 53 (19) Cashew 80 (29) 88 (32) Cotton 44 (16) 95 (35) Custard apple 84 (31) 158 (58) Chilli 84 (31) 26 (9) Amla 84 (31) 158 (58) Tomato 84 (31) 26 (9) Tamarind 42 (15) 91 (33) Drumstick 82 (30) 96 (35) Marigold 80 (29) 59 (22) Mulberry 82 (30) 155 (56) Chrysanthemum 80 (29) 59 (22) Mango 42 (15) 66 (24) Jasmine 80 (29) 34 (13) Sapota 82 (30) 71 (26) Crossandra 80 (29) 29 (11) Apart from the individual crop suitability, a proposed crop plan and drainage line treatment plan has been prepared for the 4 identified LUCs by considering only the highly and moderately suitable lands for different crops and cropping systems with food, fodder, fibre and other horticulture crops that helps in maintaining productivity and ecological balance in the microwatershed. Maintaining soil-health is vital to crop production and conserve soil and land resource base for maintaining ecological balance and to mitigate climate change. For this, several ameliorative measures have been suggested for these problematic soils like saline/alkali, highly eroded, sandy soils etc., Soil and water conservation treatment plan has been prepared that would help in identifying the sites to be treated and also the type of structures required. As part of the greening programme, several tree species have been suggested to be planted in marginal and submarginal lands, field bunds and also in the hillocks, mounds and ridges. That would help in supplementing the farm income, provide fodder and fuel, and generate lot of biomass which in turn would help in maintaining the ecological balance and contribute to mitigating the climate change. SALIENT FINDINGS OF THE SURVEY The data indicated that there were 73 (53.68%) men and 63 (46.32%) women among the sampled households. The average family size of landless farmers' was 4.6, marginal farmers' was 4.33, small farmers' was 4.25, semi medium farmers' was 5.13 and medium farmers' was 4. The data indicated that, 23 (16.91%) people were in 0-15 years of age, 57 (41.91%) were in 16-35 years of age, 44 (32.35%) were in 36-60 years of age and 12 (8.82 %) were above 61 years of age. The results indicated that Kamanuru-2 had 31.62 per cent illiterates, 25.74 per cent of them had primary school education, 8.09 per cent of them had middle school education, 22.06 per cent of them had high school education, 7.35 per cent of them had PUC education, 0.74 per cent of them did ITI, and 1.47 per cent of them had degree education. The results indicate that, 60 per cent of households practicing agriculture, 26.67 per cent of the households were agricultural laborers and 13.33 per cent were general labourers. The results indicate that agriculture was the major occupation for 38.97 per cent of the household members, 21.32 per cent were agricultural laborers, 9.56 per cent were general labour, 2.21 per cent had household industry, 5.15 per cent were in private, 16.91 per cent were students, 3.68 per cent were housewives and 2.21 per cent were children. The results show that 100 per cent of the population in the micro watershed has not participated in any local institutions. The results indicate that 10 per cent of the households possess thatched house, 63.33 per cent of the households possess Katcha house and 26.67 per cent of them possess pucca house. The results show that 100 per cent of the households possess TV, 80 per cent of the households possess Mixer grinder, 40 per cent of the households possess bicycle, 43.33 per cent of the households possess motor cycle, and 100 per cent of the households possess mobile phones. The results show that the average value of television was Rs.6333, mixer grinder was Rs.1666, bicycle was Rs. 1916, motor cycle was Rs.34384, auto was Rs.100000 and mobile phone was Rs.1435. About 3.33 per cent of the households possess bullock cart, 13.33 per cent of them possess plough, 36.67 per cent of them posses sprayer, 93.33 per cent of them possess weeder, and 13.33 per cent of them possess chaff cutter. The results show that the average value of bullock cart was Rs.20000, plough was Rs.416, the average value of sprayer was Rs.2579, the average value of chaff cutter was Rs.2000, and the average value of weeder was Rs.63. 2 The results indicate that, 13.33 per cent of the households possess bullocks, 16.67 per cent of the households possess local cow, 3.33 per cent of the households possess crossbred cow, 3.23 per cent of the households possess buffalo and 3.33 per cent of them possess sheep. The results indicate that, average own labour men available in the micro watershed was 1.84, average own labour (women) available was 1.36, average hired labour (men) available was 7.28 and average hired labour (women) available was 6.60. The results indicate that, 83.33 per cent of the households opined that the hired labour was adequate. 16. The results indicate that, households of the Kamanuru-2 micro watershed possess 16.54 ha (46.93%) of dry land and 18.70 ha (53.07%) of irrigated land. Marginal farmers possess 3.63 ha (100%) of dry land. Small farmers possess 10.88 ha (92.76%) of dry land and 0.85 ha (7.24%) of irrigated land. Semi medium farmers possess 2.02 ha (15.91%) of dry land and 10.70 ha (84.09%) of irrigated land. Medium farmers possess 7.15 ha (100%) of irrigated land. The results indicate that, the average value of dry land was Rs. 356656 and average value of irrigated land was Rs. 459783. In case of marginal famers, the average land value was Rs. 633333 for dry land. In case of small famers, the average land value was Rs. 275567 for dry land and Rs. 940952 for irrigated land. In case of semi medium famers, the average land value was Rs. 296400 for dry land and Rs. 504653 for irrigated land. In case of medium famers, the average land value was Rs. 335483 for irrigated land. The results indicate that, there were 6 functioning and 4 de-functioning bore wells in the micro watershed. The results indicate that, there was 1 functioning and 1 defunctioning open well in the school. The results indicate that, bore well was the major irrigation source in the micro water shed for 20 per cent of the farmers, open well and tank each formed the source of irrigation for 3.33 per cent of the farmers. The results indicate that, the depth of bore well was found to be 29.36 meters and the depth of open well was found to be 3.56 meters. The results indicate that, small, semi medium and medium farmers had irrigated area of 0.85 ha, 8.86 ha and 5.80 ha respectively. The results indicate that, farmers have grown bajra (1 ha), bengalgram (1.62 ha), cotton (0.85 ha), groundnut (7.12 ha), maize (11.21 ha), mango (6.11 ha), navane (2.11 ha), paddy (1.82 ha), redgram (1.73 ha) and sugarcane (1.21 ha). Marginal farmers have grown bajra, groundnut, maize, navane, paddy. Small farmers have grown Bengalgram, cotton, maize, groundnut, navane and redgram. 3 Semi medium farmers have grown groundnut, maize, mango and paddy. Medium farmers have grown maize, mango and sugarcane. The results indicate that, the cropping intensity in Kamanuru-2 micro watershed was found to be 85.27 per cent. In case of marginal and small farmers it was 100 per cent, in case of semi medium farmers it was 99.36 per cent, and medium farmers had cropping intensity of 53.73 per cent. The results indicate that, 86.67 per cent of the households have bank account and 53.33 per cent of the households have savings. The results indicate that, 46.67 per cent of the households have availed credit from different sources. The results indicate that, 31.25 per cent of the households availed loan from commercial bank, 12.50 per cent availed loan from friends/relatives, 87.50 per cent availed loan from money lender and 6.25 per cent of the households obtained loan from SHGs/CBOs. The results indicate that, landless, marginal, small, and semi medium farmers have availed Rs.60000, Rs.87000, Rs.155714, and Rs.243333 respectively. The results indicate that, 100 per cent of the households have borrowed loan from institutional sources for the purpose of agricultural production. The results indicate that, the main purpose of borrowing credit from private sources was agricultural production which accounted for 57.14 per cent of those who borrowed credit. Another 28.57 per cent of the households borrowed for social functions and 14.29 per cent of the households borrowed for the purpose of construction of house or cattle shed. The results indicated that 100 per cent of the households did not repay their loan. Results indicated that 75 per cent of the households partially paid their loan and 25 per cent of the households did not repay their loan. The results indicate that, around 31.58 per cent of the households opined that the rate of interest was higher in institutional sources; another 52.63 per cent opined that the loan amount helped to perform timely agricultural operations and 15.79 per cent of the households said that they were forced to sell the produce at low price to repay the loan in time. The results indicate that, around 12.50 per cent of the households opined that credit was easily accessible, 25 per cent of the households opined that loan amount was adequate to fulfill the requirements, 37.50 per cent of the households opined that the credit helped to perform timely agricultural operations and 12.50 per cent opined that they were forced to sell the produce at low price to repay loan in time. The results indicate that, the total cost of cultivation for maize was Rs. 22649.48. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 26066.86. The net income from 4 Maize cultivation was Rs. 3417.39, thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.15. The total cost of cultivation for bajra was Rs. 28310.12. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 28904.72. The net income from bajra cultivation was Rs. 594.59. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.02. The total cost of cultivation for mango was Rs. 36079.54. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 35197.50. The net income from mango cultivation was Rs. -882.04. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:0.98. The total cost of cultivation for bengalgram was Rs. 44731.17. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 61379.50. The net income from bengalgram cultivation was Rs. 16648.33. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.37. The total cost of cultivation for groundnut was Rs. 41425.25. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 45304.12. The net income from groundnut cultivation was Rs. 8671.21. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.24. The total cost of cultivation for cotton was Rs. 32163.01. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 68571.91. The net income from cotton cultivation was Rs. 36408.90. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:2.13. The total cost of cultivation for tomato was Rs. 36338.34. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 111921.87. The net income from tomato cultivation was Rs. 75583.53. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:3.08. The total cost of cultivation for navane was Rs. 17541.23. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 29078.64. The net income from navane cultivation was Rs. 11537.41. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.66. The total cost of cultivation for paddy was Rs. 50986.93. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 110091.43. The net income from paddy cultivation was Rs. 59104.50. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:2.16. The total cost of cultivation for sugarcane was Rs. 35639.63. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 177840. The net income from sugarcane cultivation was Rs. 142200.37. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:4.99. The results indicate that, 23.33 per cent of the households opined that dry fodder was adequate and 6.67 per cent of the households opined that green fodder was adequate. Around 6.67 per cent of the households opined that dry fodder was inadequate. The results indicate that the average annual gross income was Rs.123600 for landless farmers, for marginal farmers it was Rs.69908, for small farmers it was Rs.120494, for semi medium farmers it was Rs.101725, and for medium farmers it was Rs.68833. The results indicate that the average annual expenditure is Rs. 14,600. For landless households it was Rs. 4,566.67, for marginal farmers it was Rs. 7,427.08, 5 for small farmers it was Rs. 9,156.25, for semi medium farmers it was Rs. 12,111.11, and for medium farmers it was Rs. 8,980. The results indicate that, sampled households have grown 48 coconut, 80 custard apple, 1748 mango, 2 lemon and 1 sapota tree in their fields. The results indicate that, households have planted 1 teak trees, 45 neem trees and 5 tamarind trees in their field. The results indicate that, the average additional investment capacity with the households for land development was Rs.1733, for irrigation facility Rs.966, for improved crop production Rs.1000 and for improved livestock management Rs.700. The results indicate that, loan from bank was the source of additional investment capacity for 10 per cent of the households for land development, 3.33 per cent for irrigation facility and 3.33 per cent for improved livestock management. Own funds was the source of investment for 10 per cent for irrigation facility, 6.67 per cent for improved crop production and 3.33 per cent for improved livestock management. Soft loans was the source of funds for 6.67 per cent for land development, 3.33 per cent for irrigation facility, 10 per cent for improved crop production and 6.67 per cent for improved livestock management. The results indicated that, Bengalgram, cotton, maize, mango, navane and paddy were sold to the extent of 100 per cent. Bajra was sold to the extent of 94.44 per cent, groundnut to the extent of 83.33 per cent and sugarcane to the extent of 44.44 per cent. The results indicated that, about 50 per cent of the famers have sold their produce in regulated markets and 40 per cent have sold their produce to local/village merchants. The results indicated that, 70 per cent of the households have used tractor as a mode of transportation for their agricultural produce, 13.33 per cent have used truck and 6.67 per cent have used cart as a mode of transportation. The results indicated that, 30 per cent of the households have experienced soil and water erosion problems in the farm i.e., 16.67 per cent of marginal farmers, 12.50 per cent of small farmers, 62.50 per cent of semi medium farmers and 66.67 per cent of medium farmers have experienced soil and water erosion problems. The results indicated that, 90.32 per cent have shown interest in soil test. The results indicated that, piped supply was the major source of drinking water for 96.67 per cent of the households and bore well was the source of drinking water for 3.33 per cent of the households. The results indicated that, 87.10 per cent used fire wood and 12.90 per cent of the households used LPG. Electricity was the major source of light for 100 per cent of the households in micro watershed. 6 The results indicated that, 70 per cent of the households possess sanitary toilet i.e. 20 per cent of the landless, 16.67 per cent of the marginal, 100 per cent of the small, 100 per cent of the semi medium and 100 per cent of the medium farmers. The results indicated that, 93.33 per cent of the sampled households possessed BPL card, and 6.67 per cent did not possess PDS card. The results indicated that, 43.33 per cent of the households participated in NREGA programme. The results indicated that, cereals were adequate for 100 per cent of the households, pulses were adequate for 53.33 per cent, oilseeds were adequate for 13.33 per cent, vegetables were adequate for 56.67 per cent, fruits were adequate for 56.67 per cent, milk was adequate for 86.67 per cent, eggs were adequate for 83.33 per cent and meat was adequate for 56.67 per cent of the households. The results indicated that, pulses were inadequate for 46.67per cent, oilseeds were inadequate for 86.67 per cent, vegetables were inadequate for 46.67 per cent, fruits were inadequate for 40 per cent, milk was inadequate for 13.33 per cent, eggs were inadequate for 16.67 per cent and meat was inadequate for 43.33 per cent of the households. The results indicated that, lower fertility status of the soil was the constraint experienced by 83.33 per cent of the households, wild animal menace on farm field (83.33%), frequent incidence of pest and diseases (70%), inadequacy of irrigation water (70%), high cost of fertilizers and plant protection chemicals (80%), high rate of interest on credit (86.67%), low price for the agricultural commodities (86.67%), lack of marketing facilities in the area (80%), lack of transport for safe transport of the agricultural produce to the market (86.67%), less rainfall (13.33%) and inadequate extension services (63.33%). ; Watershed Development Department, Government of Karnataka (World Bank Funded) Sujala –III Project
Not Available ; The land resource inventory of Irakallaguda microwatershed was conducted using village cadastral maps and IRS satellite imagery on 1:7920 scale. The false colour composites of IRS imagery were interpreted for physiography and these physiographic delineations were used as base for mapping soils. The soils were studied in several transects and a soil map was prepared with phases of soil series as mapping units. Random checks were made all over the area outside the transects to confirm and validate the soil map unit boundaries. The soil map shows the geographic distribution and extent, characteristics, classification, behavior and use potentials of the soils in the Microwatershed. The present study covers an area of 654 ha in Koppal taluk and district, Karnataka. The climate is semiarid and categorized as drought - prone with an average annual rainfall of 662 mm, of which about 424 mm is received during south –west monsoon, 161 mm during north-east and the remaining 77 mm during the rest of the year. An area of about 87 per cent is covered by soil, 8 per cent by rock out crops, 150cm) soils. About 2 per cent is sandy (loamy sand) at the surface, 37 per cent loamy (sandy loam and sandy clay loam) and 48 per cent has clayey (sandy clay and clay) soils at the surface. About 32 per cent of the area has non-gravelly (200mm/m) in available water capacity. An area of about 4 per cent has nearly level (0-1%) lands, 83 per cent has very gently sloping (1-3%) and 0.75%) in 85 per cent area of the soils. Available phosphorus is medium (23-57 kg/ha) in 8 per cent and high (>57 kg/ha) in 78 per cent of the soils. Available potassium is low (337 kg/ha) in 19 per cent of the soils. Available sulphur is low (4.5 ppm) in 53 per cent of the area. Available zinc is deficient (0.6 ppm) in 58 per cent of the microwatershed. Available manganese and copper are sufficient in the entire area. The land suitability for 28 major agricultural and horticultural crops grown in the microwatershed was assessed and the areas that are highly suitable (class S1) and moderately suitable (class S2) are given below. It is however to be noted that a given soil may be suitable for various crops but what specific crop to be grown may be decided by the farmer looking to his capacity to invest on various inputs, marketing infrastructure, market price, and finally the demand and supply position. Land suitability for various crops in the microwatershed Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Sorghum 77 (12) 210 (32) Pomegranate 46(7) 227(35) Maize 52 (8) 255 (39) Guava 46(7) 177(27) Bajra 143(22) 247(38) Jackfruit 46(7) 177 (27) Redgram 46(7) 147 (22) Jamun - 243(37) Bengal gram 28(4) 244(37) Musambi 71 (11) 202(31) Groundnut 46(7) 383 (59) Lime 71(11) 202 (31) Sunflower 71 (11) 147 (23) Cashew 49(7) 191(29) Cotton 25(4) 263 (40) Custard apple 190(29) 292(45) Chilli 125(19) 112(17) Amla 165(25) 317 (49) Tomato 128(20) 109(17) Tamarind - 111(17) Drumstick 86(13) 223 (34) Marigold 46(7) 240(37) Mulbery 86(13) 299(46) Chrysanthemum 46(7) 240(37) Mango - 86(13) Jasmine 46(7) 191(29) Sapota 46 (7) 177(27) Crossandra 46(7) 216(33) Apart from the individual crop suitability, a proposed crop plan has been prepared for the 9 identified LMUs by considering only the highly and moderately suitable lands for different crops and cropping systems with food, fodder, fibre and other horticulture crops. Maintaining soil-health is vital for crop production and conserve soil and land resource base for maintaining ecological balance and to mitigate climate change. For this, several ameliorative measures have been suggested to these problematic soils like saline/alkali, highly eroded, sandy soils etc., Soil and water conservation and drainage line treatment plan has been prepared that would help in identifying the sites to be treated and also the type of structures required. As part of the greening programme, several tree species have been suggested to be planted in marginal and submarginal lands, field bunds and also in the hillocks, mounds and ridges. That would help in supplementing the farm income, provide fodder and fuel, and generate lot of biomass which in turn would help in maintaining the ecological balance and contribute to mitigating the climate change. SALIENT FINDINGS OF THE SURVEY The data indicated that there were 113 (54.59%) men and 94 (45.4%) were women among the sampled households. The average family size of marginal farmers was 4.19, small farmer were 5, a semi medium farmer was 4.33, medium farmers were 4 and for large farmers it was 4.22. There were 32 (15.24%) people were in 0-15 years of age, 83 (39.52%) were in 16- 35 years of age, 35.24 (35.24 %) were in 36-60 years of age and 21 (10%) were above 61 years of age. The Irakallaguda had 18.10 per cent illiterates, 4.76 per cent functional literates, 18.1 per cent of them had primary school education, 8.10 per cent of them had middle school education, 27.62 per cent of them had high school education, 10 per cent of them had PUC education, 0.95 per cent of them had diploma, 0.95 per cent of them had ITI, 5.24 per cent of them had degree education and 6.19 per cent of them had masters education. The results indicate that, 87.86 per cent of households practicing agriculture and 10.20 per cent of the household heads were agricultural labourers. The results indicate that agriculture was the major occupation for 64.76 per cent of the household members, 9.05 per cent were agricultural labourers, 0.95 per cent were general labours, 3.81 per cent of them were in private sector and 13.8 per cent of them were students. The results shows that 2.86 per cent of them participated in self help groups, 0.95 per cent of them participated in user groups and 96.19 per cent of them have not participated in any local institutions. About 4.5 per cent of landless farmers have participated in self help groups and 95.24 per cent have not participated in any local institutions. Marginal farmers participated in self help group (12.50%) and user groups (12.5%). The results indicate that 16.33 per cent of the households possess thatched house, 79.59 per cent of the households possess Katcha house and 4.08 per cent of them possess pucca house. The results shows that 6.12 per cent of the households possess radio, 77.55 per cent of the households possess TV, 67.35 per cent of the households possess Mixer grinder, 32.65 per cent of the households possess bicycle, 36.73 per cent of the households possess motor cycle, and 83.37 per cent of the households possess mobile phones. The average value of radio was Rs.366, television was Rs.3828, mixer grinder was Rs.1312, was Rs.837, motor cycle was Rs.37333 and mobile phone was Rs.2139. About 18 per cent of the households possess plough, 4.08 per cent of them possess tractor and 6.12 per cent of the households possess sprayer. The average value of 2 plough was Rs.759, the average value of tractor was Rs. 475000 and the average value of sprayer was Rs.2666. The results indicate that, 6.12 per cent of the households possess bullocks, 14.29 per cent of the households possess local cow, 10.20 per cent of the households possess crossbred cows, 10.20 per cent of the households possess buffalo, 10.20 per cent of the households possess sheep and 4.08 per cent of the households possess goat. Average own labour men available in the micro watershed was 2, average own labour (women) available was 1.78, average hired labour (men) available was 4.44 and average hired labour (women) available was 2.11. The results indicate that, 34.38 per cent of the household opined that hired labour was adequate and 65.63 per cent of the households opined that hired labour was inadequate. The results indicate that, 5 (2.38%) persons were migrated from the micro watershed which includes 9.52 persons from landless category and 3 persons from marginal farmers' category. People have migrated on average of 353.33 kms and average duration was months 11.33. Landless have migrated 260 kms and on an average 12 months in a year. Marginal farmers have migrated 400 kms and on an average 11 months in a year. Job/work was the reason for migration for all the migrants. Improved quality of the life was the major Positive consequences of migration for 100 per cent of the persons migrated from landless households, 33.33 per cent of migrated from marginal farm households. Households of the Irakallaguda micro watershed possess 32.11 ha (60.93%) of dry land and 21.33 ha (39.10%) of irrigated land. The average value of dry land was Rs. 560644 and average value of irrigated was Rs.697749. There were 16 live bore wells and 11 dry bore wells among the sampled households in Irakallaguda micro watershed and one defunct open well reported among the sampled households in the micro watershed. Bore well was the major irrigation source for 4.55 per cent of the marginal farmers, 30 per cent of the small farmers, 100 per cent of the semi medium farmers, 100 per cent of medium farmers. The results revealed that bore well was major irrigation source for 32.65 per cent of the households. Marginal farmers had irrigated area of 0.88 hectares, small farmers had 2.51 hectares, semi medium farmers had 20.39 hectares of irrigated land and medium farmers had 5.22 hectares of irrigated land. Farmers have grown arecanut (0.45 ha), chilly (0.4 ha), coconut (0.61ha), cotton (10.34ha), groundnut (17.92 ha), horsegram (0.81 ha) and ragi (5.17ha). Marginal farmers have grown arecanut (0.45 ha), cotton (1.74ha), ground nut (5.32 ha), and 3 ragi (3.76ha). Small farmers have grown cotton (1.88ha), ground nut (3.72ha), and ragi (1.42 ha). Semi medium farmers have grown chilly (0.4 ha), coconut (0.61 ha), cotton (2.31ha), ground nut (7.76 ha), horsegram (0.81 ha) and ragi (0.2ha). Medium farmers have grown cotton (4.41ha). Large farmers have grown groundnut (1.11ha). The cropping intensity in Irakallaguda micro watershed was found to be 41.54 per cent. In case of marginal farmers it was 41.53 per cent, for small farmers it was 39.31 per cent, in case of semi medium farmers it was 42.42 per cent, medium farmers had cropping intensity of 34.21 per cent and large farmers had 40.49 per cent. The results indicate that, 95.92 per cent of the households possess bank account and 59.18 per cent of them have savings. With respect to category wise account, 100 per cent of land less, 90.91 per cent of marginal, 100 per cent of small, semi medium, medium and large farmers possesses bank account. With respect to savings, 80 per cent of land less, 63.64 per cent of marginal, 30 per cent of small, 55.56 per cent of semi medium farmers and 100 per cent of large farmers had savings in the bank account. The results indicate that, 40 per cent of landless, 62.64 per cent of marginal, 50 per cent of small, 66.37 per cent semi medium, 50 per cent of medium farmers and 100 per cent of large farmers have borrowed credit from different sources. The results indicate that, 79.31 per cent have availed loan in commercial banks, 3.45 per cent have availed loan in cooperative bank, 10.43 per cent have availed loan from friends and relatives, 3.45 per cent have availed loan from moneylender and 24.41 per cent have availed loan from SHGs/CBOs. Landless, marginal, small, semi medium, medium and large farmers have availed Rs.120000, Rs.137857, Rs. 113000, Rs.196666, Rs. 215000 and Rs.10000 respectively. The results indicate that, 72.41 per cent of the households have borrowed loan (institutional source) for agriculture and 3.45 per cent of them have borrowed loan for animal husbandry. Half of the land less have borrowed loan for animal husbandry. 78.57 per cent of marginal farmers, 80 per cent of small farmers, 83.33 per cent of semi medium farmers and 100 per cent of the medium farmers availed loan for agriculture production. About 50 per cent of small and landless have availed loan for animal husbandry. The results indicate that, agriculture was the main propose for which credit (private source) is borrowed for 60 per cent of the households which includes 60 per cent of the marginal farmers, 100 per cent of the small farmers. About 10 per cent of them borrowed credit for Bore well/irrigation related equipments which includes 50 per cent of Semi medium farmers. About 10 per cent of them borrowed credit for Construction-cattle shed which includes 20 per cent of marginal farmers. 4 Landless have borrowed loan for household consumption and 20 per cent of marginal farmers have borrowed for education. The results indicate that, 70.83 per cent of the households have repaid institutional source credit partially which includes 100 per cent of landless, 66.67 per cent of marginal farmers, 50 per cent of small farmers, 80 per cent of semi medium farmers and 100 per cent of medium farmers. The data also shows that 29.17 per cent of the farmers have not repaid which includes 33.33 per cent of marginal and 50 per cent of small farmers. Results indicated that 90.91 per cent of the households have paid private source credit partially which includes 100 per cent of landless, 100 per cent of marginal and large farmers, and 50 per cent of small farmer. About 9 per cent of the households have not paid which includes 50 per cent of marginal farmers. The results indicate that, 54.17 per cent of the households opined that credit helped to perform timely agricultural operations and 4.17 per cent of them opined that credit has higher rate of interest, 29.17 per cent opined that credit was easily accessible and 12.50 per cent. The results indicate that, 90.91 per cent have opined that credit was easily available, 9.09 opined that credit helped them to perform timely agricultural operations. The results revealed that 100 per cent of landless, 100 per cent of marginal, small and large farmers opined that credit was easily available. About 50 per cent of marginal farmers opined that credit helped them to perform timely agricultural operations. The results indicate that, the total cost of cultivation for groundnut was Rs. 18902. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 11699.64. The net income from ground nut cultivation was Rs. -7203.0, thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:0.62. The total cost of cultivation for redgram was Rs. 12205. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 18965. The net income from redgram cultivation was Rs. 6760. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.55. The results indicate that, the total cost of cultivation for ragi was Rs. 13661. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 15882. The net income from ragi cultivation was Rs. 2221, thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.16. The total cost of cultivation for cotton was Rs. 47444. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 20430. The net income from cotton cultivation was Rs. -27013. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:0.6. The results indicate that, 28 tones of dry fodder available among the sampled households and it is available 142 days in a year. About 7 tonnes of green fodder available among the households and it is available for 18 days in a year. The results indicate that, 18.37 per cent of the households opined that dry fodder was adequate which includes 22.73 per cent of marginal, 20 per cent of small, 50 5 per cent of medium and 100 per cent of large farmers. The data revealed that only 6.12 per cent of the households have opined that the green fodder is adequate which includes 4.55 per cent of marginal and 22.22 per cent of semi medium farmers. Sampled households have grown 496 coconut trees among them marginal farmers have grown 70, small farmers have grown 50 and semi medium farmers have grown 366. The results indicate that, households have planted teak, 4 Neem trees, 8 tamarind, 81 Pongamia and 1 banyan trees. Marginal farmers have planted 2 Neem, 3 tamarind, 47 Pongamia trees and 1 banyan tree. Small farmers have planted 4 tamarinds. Semi medium farmers have planted 2 Neem, 1 tamarind and 4 Pongamia trees. Medium farmers have planted 30 Pongamia trees. The results indicated that for land development 8.16 per cent depends on loan from bank, 65.31 per cent depends on own funds and 2.04 per cent depends on soft loan. For irrigation facility, 30.61 per cent expects government subsidy, 8.16 per cent anticipates loan from bank and 6.12 per cent depends on own funds. For improved crop production, 2.04 per cent depends on government subsidy, 14.29 per cent depends on loan from bank and 6.12 per cent through own funds. For iimproved livestock management, 8.16 per cent expects government subsidy and loan from bank and 14.29 per cent depends own funds. Arecanut, chilly, cotton, groundnut, horsegram and redgram was sold to the extent of 100 per cent. Ragi was sold 60.26 per cent of total production. The results indicated that, 2.04 per cent of the households have sold agricultural produce to agents/traders includes 4.55 per cent of marginal farmers. About 8 per cent of the households have sold agricultural produce to the local/village merchants includes 4.55 per cent of the marginal farmers, 11.11 per cent of the semi medium farmers and 50 per cent of the medium farmers. About 10 per cent of the households have sold in regulated markets includes 4.55 per cent of marginal farmers, 10 per cent of small farmers, 50 per cent of the semi medium farmers and 100 per cent of the large farmers. About 4.08 per cent of the households have sold the agricultural produce to contract markets, which includes 4.55 per cent of the marginal farmers, 11.11 per cent of the semi medium farmers. The results indicated that 2.04 per cent of the households have use head load as mode of transport, 12.24 per cent have used cart, 65.31 per cent have used tractor, 4.08 per cent have used truck. The results indicated that, the results indicated that, 26.53per cent of the households have experienced the soil and water erosion problems i.e. 36.36 per cent of marginal farmers, 30 per cent of small farmers, 11.11 per cent of semi medium farmers, 50 per cent of medium farmers have faced soil and water erosion problem. 6 The results indicated that, 89.90 per cent of the households have shown interest in soil testing i.e. 100 per cent of marginal farmers, 100 per cent of small farmers, 100 per cent of semi medium, 100 per cent of medium farmers and 100 per cent large farmers have shown interest in soil testing. The results indicated that, 61.22 per cent of the households have adopted field bunding. Summer ploughing was adopted by 89.90 per cent of the households about 8 per cent of the households have adopted mulching. Contour cultivation was adopted by 48.98 per cent of the households. The results indicated that, 7 per cent of the households who adopted field bunding opined that bunds are good, 23.0 per cent opined that bunds are slightly damaged, and 43.0 per cent of the households opined that bunds are severely damaged and 27 per cent opined that the bunds required full replacement. Piped supply was the major source for drinking water for 95.92 per cent includes 100 per cent of landless, 95.45 per cent of marginal, 100 per cent of small farmers, 88.89 per cent of semi medium and 100 per cent of medium and large farmers. Electricity was the major source of light for all the households in micro watershed. Kerosene was major source of light for 4.08 per cent of the households. The results indicated that,91.84 per cent of the households possess sanitary toilet i.e. 100 per cent of landless, 68.18 per cent of marginal, 100 per cent of small, 88.89 per cent of semi medium and 100 per cent of medium and large farmers had sanitary toilet facility. The results indicated that, 95.92 per cent of the households sampled possessed BPL card. The results indicated that, Lower fertility status of the soil was the constraint experienced by 85.71 per cent of the households, wild animal menace on farm field (65.31%), frequent incidence of pest and diseases (67.35%), inadequacy of irrigation water (67.35%), high cost of Fertilizers and plant protection chemicals (63.27%), high rate of interest on credit (73.47%), low price for the agricultural commodities (81.63%), lack of marketing facilities in the area (81.63%), inadequate extension services (63.27%), lack of transport for safe transport of the agricultural produce to the market (87.76%). ; Watershed Development Department, Government of Karnataka (World Bank Funded) Sujala –III Project
Not Available ; The land resource inventory of Hasgal-1microwatershed was conducted using village cadastral maps and IRS satellite imagery on 1:7920 scale. The false colour composites of IRS imagery were interpreted for physiography and these physiographic delineations were used as base for mapping soils. The soils were studied in several transects and a soil map was prepared with phases of soil series as mapping units. Random checks were made all over the area outside the transects to confirm and validate the soil map unit boundaries. The soil map shows the geographic distribution and extent, characteristics, classification, behavior and use potentials of the soils in the Microwatershed. The present study covers an area of 508 ha in Koppal taluk and district, Karnataka. The climate is semiarid and categorized as drought - prone with an average annual rainfall of 662 mm, of which about 424 mm is received during south –west monsoon, 161 mm during north-east and the remaining 77 mm during the rest of the year. An area of about 71 per cent is covered by soil, 24 per cent by rock outcrops and 5 per cent by habitation and water body. The salient findings from the land resource inventory are summarized briefly below The soils belong to 14 soil series and 34 soil phases (management units) and 7 land management units. The length of crop growing period is 150cm) soils. About 17 per cent sandy (loamy sand), 44 per cent loamy (sandy loam and sandy clay loam) and 10 per cent has clayey (sandy clay and clay) soils at the surface. About 29 per cent of the area has non-gravelly (200 mm/m) in available water capacity. An area of about 2 per cent is nearly level (0-1%), 68 per cent is very gently sloping (1-3%) and 0.75%) in 53 per cent area of the soils. Available phosphorus is medium (23-57 kg/ha) in the entire area of the microwatershed. Available potassium is low (337 kg/ha) in 6 per cent area of the soils. Available sulphur is low (4.5 ppm) in 64 per cent area of the microwatershed. Available zinc is deficient (0.6 ppm) in 5 per cent area of the microwatershed. Available manganese and copper is sufficient in the entire area of the microwatershed. The land suitability for 31 major agricultural and horticultural crops grown in the microwatershed was assessed and the areas that are highly suitable (class S1) and moderately suitable (class S2) are given below. It is however to be noted that a given soil may be suitable for various crops but what specific crop to be grown may be decided by the farmer looking to his capacity to invest on various inputs, marketing infrastructure, market price, and finally the demand and supply position. Land suitability for various crops in the microwatershed Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Crop Suitability Area in ha (%) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Highly suitable (S1) Moderately suitable (S2) Sorghum 34(7) 101(20) Sapota 34(7) 77(15) Maize 34(7) 101(20) Pomegranate 34(7) 130(25) Bajra 54(11) 145(28) Musambi 34(7) 130(25) Groundnut 54(11) 155(31) Lime 34(7) 130(25) Sunflower 34(7) 73(14) Amla 54(11) 246(48) Redgram 34(7) 73(14) Cashew - 112(22) Bengal gram 54(11) 87(17) Jackfruit 34(7) 77(15) Cotton - 135(27) Jamun - 164(32) Chilli 34(7) 48(10) Custard apple 54(11) 246(48) Tomato 34(7) 48(10) Tamarind - 87(17) Brinjal 20(4) 215(42) Mulberry 34(7) 232(45) Onion 20(4) 215(42) Marigold 34(7) 101(20) Bhendi 20(4) 215(42) Chrysanthemum 34(7) 101(20) Drumstick 34(7) 140(27) Jasmine 34(7) 48(9) Mango - 34(7) Crossandra 34(7) 48(9) Guava 34(7) 77(15) Apart from the individual crop suitability, a proposed crop plan has been prepared for the 7 identified LMUs by considering only the highly and moderately suitable lands for different crops and cropping systems with food, fodder, fibre and other horticulture crops. Maintaining soil-health is vital for crop production and conserve soil and land resource base for maintaining ecological balance and to mitigate climate change. For this, several ameliorative measures have been suggested to these problematic soils like saline/alkali, highly eroded, sandy soils etc., Soil and water conservation and drainage line treatment plan has been prepared that would help in identifying the sites to be treated and also the type of structures required. As part of the greening programme, several tree species have been suggested to be planted in marginal and submarginal lands, field bunds and also in the hillocks, mounds and ridges. That would help in supplementing the farm income, provide fodder and fuel, and generate lot of biomass which in turn would help in maintaining the ecological balance and contribute to mitigating the climate change. SALIENT FINDINGS OF THE SURVEY The data indicated that there were 125 (53.42%) men and 109 (46.58%) women among the sampled households. The average family size of landless farmers' was 4.1, marginal farmers' was 4, small farmers' was 5.06, semi medium farmers' was 4.4 and medium farmers' was 6.4. The data indicated that, 52 (22.22%) people were in 0-15 years of age, 96 (41.03%) were in 16-35 years of age, 67 (28.63%) were in 36-60 years of age and 19 (8.12 %) were above 61 years of age. The results indicated that Hasgal-2 had 26.92 per cent illiterates, 0.85 per cent functional literates, 34.62 per cent of them had primary school education, 10.68 per cent of them had middle school education, 14.53 per cent of them had high school education, 6.41 per cent of them had PUC education, 0.85 per cent did diploma, 0.43 per cent of them did ITI, 2.14 per cent of them had degree education and 0.43 per cent were in masters. The results indicate that, 76 per cent of households practicing agriculture, 4 per cent of the households were agricultural labourers, 20 per cent were general labourers, 2 per cent of them were housewives and 2 per cent of them were children. The results indicate that agriculture was the major occupation for 48.72 per cent of the household members, 8.12 per cent were agricultural laborers, 12.39 per cent were general labour, 2.56 per cent were in private, 23.50 per cent were students, 1.71 per cent were housewives and 2.14 per cent were children. The results show that 100 per cent of the population in the micro watershed has not participated in any local institutions. The results indicate that 14 per cent of the households possess thatched house, 74 per cent of the households possess Katcha house 4 per cent of them possess pucca house and 8 per cent of them possess semi pucca house. The results show that 84 per cent of the households possess TV, 56 per cent of the households possess Mixer grinder, 46 per cent of the households possess bicycle, 38 per cent of the households possess motor cycle, 4 per cent of them possess landline and 88 per cent of the households possess mobile phones. The results show that the average value of television was Rs.7571, mixer grinder was Rs.1846, bicycle was Rs. 3347, motor cycle was Rs.37315, landline phone was Rs.3333 and mobile phone was Rs.1653. About 20 per cent of the households possess bullock cart, 34 per cent of them possess plough, 2 per cent of them possess tractor, 22 per cent of them possess sprayer, 2 per cent of them possess sprinkler, 80 per cent of them possess weeder, 4 per cent of them possess harvester, 2 per cent of them possess thresher, 10 per cent of them possess chaff cutter and 2 per cent of them possess JCB/Hitachi. 2 The results show that the average value of bullock cart was Rs.21200, plough was Rs.1016, the average value of tractor was Rs.300000, the average value of sprayer was Rs.2844, the average value of sprinkler was Rs. 3300, the average value of harvester was Rs.6942, the average value of thresher was Rs.50000, the average value of chaff cutter was Rs.2800, and the average value of weeder was Rs.77. The results indicate that, 36 per cent of the households possess bullocks, 16 per cent of the households possess local cow, 6 per cent of the households possess buffalo, 4 per cent of them possess sheep, 2 per cent of the households possess goat and 2 per cent of them possess poultry birds. The results indicate that, average own labour men available in the micro watershed was 8.85, average own labour (women) available was 5.55, average hired labour (men) available was 11.40 and average hired labour (women) available was 10.79. The results indicate that, 80 per cent of the households opined that the hired labour was adequate. The results indicate that, households of the Hasgal-2 micro watershed possess 42.85 ha (64.97%) of dry land and 23.11 ha (35.03%) of irrigated land. Marginal farmers possess 4.80 ha (84.35%) of dry land and 0.89 ha (15.65%). Small farmers possess 18.34 ha (91.39%) of dry land and 1.73 ha (8.61%) of irrigated land. Semi medium farmers possess 8.38 ha (37.95%) of dry land and 13.70 ha (62.05%) of irrigated land. Medium farmers possess 11.33 ha (62.53%) of dry land and 6.79 ha (37.47%) of the farmers possess irrigated land. The results indicate that, the average value of dry land was Rs. 293003 and average value of irrigated land was Rs. 514763. In case of marginal famers, the average land value was Rs. 470674 for dry land and Rs.1347272 for irrigated land. In case of small famers, the average land value was Rs. 414210 for dry land and Rs. 925526 for irrigated land. In case of semi medium famers, the average land value was Rs. 155120 for dry land and Rs. 474298 for irrigated land. In case of medium famers, the average land value was Rs. 123500 for dry land and Rs.382717 for irrigated land. The results indicate that, there were 14 functioning and 2 de-functioning bore wells in the micro watershed. The results indicate that, there was 1 functioning open well in the micro watershed. The results indicate that, bore well was the major irrigation source in the micro water shed for 28 per cent of the farmers, and open well was the source of irrigation for 2 per cent of the farmers. The results indicate that, the depth of bore well was found to be 24.14 meters and the depth of open well was found to be 1.83 meters. 3 The results indicate that, marginal, small, semi medium and medium farmers had irrigated area of 0.81 ha, 3.72 ha, 13.91 ha and 5.51 ha respectively. The results indicate that, farmers have grown bajra (11.62 ha), cotton (1.78 ha), groundnut (5.15 ha), horsegram (1.21 ha), maize (21.74 ha), navane (1.70 ha), paddy (2.83 ha), redgram (1.62 ha), sorghum (2.18 ha), tomato (0.89 ha), and watermelon (2.91 ha). Marginal farmers have grown bajra, maize, watermelon and groundnut. Small farmers have grown bajra, cotton, groundnut, maize, navane, paddy and watermelon. Semi medium farmers have grown bajra, cotton, maize, paddy, sorghum, tomato, watermelon and groundnut. Medium farmers have grown bajra, groundnut, horsegram, paddy, redgram sorghum and maize. The results indicate that, the cropping intensity in Hasgal-2 micro watershed was found to be 98.20 per cent. In case of marginal and semi medium farmers it was 100 per cent, in case of small farmers it was 101.67 per cent, and medium farmers had cropping intensity of 87.23 per cent. The results indicate that, 62 per cent of the households have bank account and 40 per cent of the households have savings. The results indicate that, 44 per cent of the households have availed credit from different sources. The results indicate that, 31.82 per cent of the households availed loan from commercial bank, 13.64 per cent availed loan from cooperative bank, 22.73 per cent availed loan from grameena bank, 13.64 per cent availed loan from money lenders and 36.36 per cent of the households obtained loan from SHGs/CBOs. The results indicate that, marginal, small, semi medium and medium farmers have availed Rs.19285, Rs.90714, Rs.104285, and Rs.50000 respectively. The results indicate that, 100 per cent of the households have borrowed loan from institutional sources for the purpose of agricultural production. The results indicate that, the main purpose of borrowing credit from private sources was agricultural production which accounted for 63.64 per cent of those who borrowed credit. Another 18.18 per cent of the households borrowed for social functions, 9.09 per cent of the households borrowed for the purpose of construction of house or cattle shed and 9.09 per cent borrowed for household consumption. The results indicated that 80 per cent of the households did not repay their loan borrowed from institutional sources, 13.33 per cent of the households partially paid and 6.67 per cent of the households fully repaid their loan. Results indicated that 81.82 per cent of the households partially paid their loan borrowed from private sources, 9.09 per cent of the households did not repay their loan and 9.09 per cent of the households fully paid their loans. 4 The results indicate that, around 46.67 per cent of the households opined that the rate of interest was higher in institutional sources; another 40 per cent opined that the loan amount helped to perform timely agricultural operations. The results indicate that, around 9.09 per cent of the households opined that credit was easily accessible, 18.18 per cent of the households opined that the credit helped to perform timely agricultural operations and 27.27 per cent opined that the rate of interest was high in non institutional source of credits. The results indicate that, the total cost of cultivation for sorghum was Rs. 37771.28. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 70523.07. The net income from Sorghum cultivation was Rs. 32751.80, thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.87. The total cost of cultivation for groundnut was Rs. 46621.42. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 67059.85. The net income from groundnut cultivation was Rs. 20438.43. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.44. The total cost of cultivation for navane was Rs. 16260.02. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 23523.81. The net income from navane cultivation was Rs. 7263.79. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.45. The total cost of cultivation for maize was Rs. 32823.70. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 38634.10. The net income from maize cultivation was Rs. 5810.40. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.18. The total cost of cultivation for bajra was Rs. 22880. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 20415.02. The net income from bajra cultivation was Rs. - 2464.98. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:0.89. The total cost of cultivation for redgram was Rs. 18070.78. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 46930. The net income from redgram cultivation was Rs. 28859.22. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:2.6. The total cost of cultivation for horsegram was Rs. 19107.60. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 29640. The net income from horsegram cultivation was Rs. 10532.40. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.55. The total cost of cultivation for watermelon was Rs. 53952.66. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 1264061.94. The net income from watermelon cultivation was Rs. 1210109.29. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:23.43. The total cost of cultivation for cotton was Rs. 29826.92. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 84288.75. The net income from cotton cultivation was Rs. 54461.83. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:2.83. the total cost of cultivation for paddy was Rs. 41184.13. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 71007.93. The net income from paddy cultivation was Rs. 29823.79. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:1.72. 5 the total cost of cultivation for tomato was Rs. 24868.79. The gross income realized by the farmers was Rs. 158304.54. The net income from tomato cultivation was Rs. 133435.75. Thus the benefit cost ratio was found to be 1:6.37. The results indicate that, 40 per cent of the households opined that dry fodder was adequate and 34 per cent of the households opined that green fodder was adequate. The results indicate that the average annual gross income was Rs. 88,100 for landless farmers, for marginal farmers it was Rs. 113,218.75, for small farmers it was Rs. 107,086.67, for semi medium farmers it was Rs. 167,966.67, and for medium farmers it was Rs. 134,600. The results indicate that the average annual expenditure is Rs. 7,539.89. For landless households it was Rs. 7,100, for marginal farmers it was Rs. 7,000, for small farmers it was Rs. 4,611.85, for semi medium farmers it was Rs. 8,368.06, and for medium farmers it was Rs. 16,080. The results indicate that, sampled households have grown 19 coconuts and 27 mangoes in their fields. They have also grown 5 coconut and 1 mango tree in their backyard. The results indicate that, households have planted 23 teak trees, 79 neem trees, 4 tamarind trees, 2 acacia trees and 1 peepul tree in their field. The results indicate that, the average additional investment capacity with the households for land development was Rs. 1,280, for irrigation facility Rs. 260, for improved crop production Rs. 720 and for improved livestock management Rs. 420. The results indicate that, loan from bank was the source of additional investment capacity for 16 per cent of the households for land development, 4 per cent for irrigation facility, 12 per cent for improved crop production and 14 per cent for improved livestock management. Soft loan was the source of funds for 2 per cent of the households for improved crop production. The results indicated that, bajra, cotton, horsegram, maize, navane, paddy, redgram, tomato and watermelon were sold to the extent of 100 per cent. Groundnut was sold to the extent of 77.37 per cent. The results indicated that, about 30 per cent of the famers have sold their produce in regulated markets, 38 per cent have sold their produce to local/village merchants, 24 per cent of the farmers have sold through agents/traders and 8 per cent of the farmers have sold their produce in cooperative marketing society. The results indicated that, 84 per cent of the households have used tractor as a mode of transportation for their agricultural produce, 2 per cent have used truck and 12 per cent have used cart as a mode of transportation. The results indicated that, 20 per cent of the households have experienced soil and water erosion problems in the farm i.e., 12.50 per cent of marginal farmers, 33.33 6 per cent of small farmers, 8.33 per cent of semi medium farmers and 60 per cent of medium farmers have experienced soil and water erosion problems. The results indicated that, 58 per cent have shown interest in soil test. The results indicated that, 96 per cent used fire wood and 8 per cent of the households used LPG. Piped supply was the major source of drinking water for 86 per cent of the households and bore well was the source of drinking water for 12 per cent of the households. Electricity was the major source of light for 100 per cent of the households in micro watershed. The results indicated that, 42 per cent of the households possess sanitary toilet i.e. 50 per cent of the landless, 50 per cent of the marginal, 26.67 per cent of the small, 25 per cent of the semi medium and 100 per cent of the medium farmers. The results indicated that, 96 per cent of the sampled households possessed BPL card, 2 per cent of the sampled households possessed APL card and 2 per cent did not possess PDS card. The results indicated that, 54 per cent of the households participated in NREGA programme. The results indicated that, cereals were adequate for 96 per cent of the households, pulses were adequate for 56 per cent, oilseeds were adequate for 16 per cent, vegetables were adequate for 56 per cent, fruits were adequate for 52 per cent, milk was adequate for 90 per cent, eggs were adequate for 84 per cent and meat was adequate for 66 per cent of the households. The results indicated that, cereals were inadequate for 4 per cent, pulses were inadequate for 46 per cent, oilseeds were inadequate for 80 per cent, vegetables were inadequate for 42 per cent, fruits were inadequate for 40 per cent, milk was inadequate for 6 per cent, eggs were inadequate for 6 per cent and meat was inadequate for 24 per cent of the households. The results indicated that, lower fertility status of the soil was the constraint experienced by 58 per cent of the households, wild animal menace on farm field (72%), frequent incidence of pest and diseases (48%), inadequacy of irrigation water (42%), high cost of fertilizers and plant protection chemicals (50%), high rate of interest on credit (54%), low price for the agricultural commodities (52%), lack of marketing facilities in the area (50%), lack of transport for safe transport of the agricultural produce to the market (56%), less rainfall (20%), inadequate extension services (44%), and source of agri-technology information (newspaper/TV/mobile) (12%). ; Watershed Development Department, Government of Karnataka (World Bank Funded) Sujala –III Project
THE ANTI-SQUIZOPHONIC SONOSPHERIC PERFORMANCE. RHIZOMATIC AND POLITIC POTENCIALITY Resumen:En este artículo proponemos una deliberación alrededor de la conformación de un performance rizomático o deleuziano basado en una sonoesfera construida con sonidos relacionados con los afectos. Esta sería una composición artística de resistencia a la sonoesfera ensordecedora del mundo urbano industrial y digital. Palabras clave: Performace, sonoesfera, esquizofonía, rizoma, Deleuze, Sloterdijk. Abstract:In this paper we propose a deliberation around the conformation of a rhizomatic or Deleuzian performance, based on a sonosphere constructed with sounds related to affects. This would be an artistic composition of resistance to the deafening sonosphere of both the industrial and digital urban world. Keywords: Performance, sonosphere, schizophonia, rhizome, Deleuze, Sloterdijk. * * * * * "La lujuriante isla humana está llena de olores y ruidos que podrían definirse […] como el soundscape característico de un grupo: un paisaje sonoro, una sonoesfera que atrae a los suyos como hacia el interior de un globo terráqueo psicoacústico." En el mismo barco. Ensayo sobre la hiperpolítica.Peter Sloterdijk 1. Introducción Edgar Morin (citado por Gil, 2007, p. 5), propone que un sistema ortodoxo es aquel que "destruye los conjuntos y las totalidades, aísla todos los objetos de sus ambientes. No puede concebir el lazo inseparable entre el observador y la cosa observada." Estos principios nos motivan a imaginar una construcción performativa basada en un sistema que podamos calificar como no ortodoxo. A partir de esta inquietud, el presente artículo propone una reflexión sobre el sistema filosófico deleuziano, considerado en general un tipo de pensamiento de esas características, en relación con una creación performativa a partir del sonido. Deleuze postula procedimientos cuyo axioma central sería conservar "lo que aumenta el número de conexiones" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980, pág. 517), vale decir por lo tanto, eliminar aquello que las reduce en pos de lograr multiplicidades, aspecto que se resume en la noción de rizoma expuesta por Deleuze y Guattari como introducción a su proyecto Capitalismo y esquizofrenia, a partir de la imagen del rizoma botánico, configuración que puede ramificarse e interconectarse en cualquier punto y en cualquier dirección en una red multidireccional, y que constituye una contrapropuesta a la imagen arbórea del mundo, es decir, a su representación en base a un tronco central de jerarquizaciones, crecimiento unidireccional y ramificaciones secundarias por mecanismos de división dicotómica. Deleuze y Guattari (1976), proponen que dos formas heterogéneas con funcionalidades diferentes en un sistema, que se interrelacionan en busca de una multiplicidad marcada por conexiones de diversas dimensiones y naturalezas, configuran un rizoma, sistema en el que: "cualquier punto "[…] puede ser conectado con cualquier otro, y debe serlo" (pág. 17), cualquier ruptura o interrupción siempre se recupera según "[…]ésta o aquella de sus líneas, y según otras" (pág. 22), el desarrollo "[…]no responde a ningún modelo estructural o generativo" (pág. 27), por lo cual, el azar se mantiene como una de sus condiciones articuladoras y determina un desenvolvimiento imprevisible. El rizoma como imagen de los procesos vitales, y en consecuencia también de los flujos de la creación artística, propone una imagen del mundo en permanente proceso de metamorfosis, del ser como devenir. A partir de estos conceptos centrales, presentamos a continuación una reflexión que nos permita imaginar un performance de orden deleuziano, para lo cual exponemos unas propuestas acerca de cuáles deberían ser algunas de sus características particulares. Posteriormente, proponemos una hipótesis sobre un tipo peculiar de performance deleuziano, imaginado a partir de la sonoesfera como configuración sonora que envuelve a los participantes de un hecho performativo, para finalmente deliberar sobre las posibles connotaciones que esa construcción artística tendría en términos de resistencia al ambiente sonoro ensordecedor que el capitalismo ha configurado en el mundo urbano industrial y digital. 2. Desarrollo 2.1 El devenir deleuziano como experiencia estética en el performance Los postulados deleuzianos nos parecen en general fundamentales para la producción artística. Según Rajchman (2000, pág. 129), el filósofo francés propone en este ámbito una idea central: el arte "es sensación y nada más", y la sensación, a su vez, "no está determinada por la representación". Esta postura frente al arte resuena con la perspectiva que propone Féral (1982), de forma específica con respecto al performance, definiéndolo como un género que "[…] no significa nada y no persigue un sentido único y específico, pero intenta, por el contrario, revelar lugares de pasaje"[1] (pág. 174), en base a lo cual, Cull (2009, pág. 18), concluye que el performance es una expresión profundamente relacionada con el sistema filosófico de Deleuze, puesto que la idea de pasaje resuena con el postulado del devenir deleuziano, como noción del ser en permanente proceso de metamorfosis. Según esto, la calidad rizomática de un performance se configuraría en su capacidad para originar "procesos en marcha [sobre los que] no tenemos un conocimiento claro de su principio ni de su final" (Cage citado por Gil, 2007, pág. 5), que mantienen la condición experiencial y transformadora de su desarrollo como eje central. Particularmente sugestiva para la reflexión acerca de una construcción performativa desde esta imagen, resulta la noción de que el rizoma origina un traspaso de código entre las formas en interrelación, mecanismo que Deleuze y Guattari (1980, pág. 49), definen como la adopción por parte de una forma de los modos de codificarse y descodificarse de la otra. En el caso del encuentro entre actuantes y expectantes[2] - instancia fundamental de las artes vivas, en la cual es posible imaginar el surgimiento de un rizoma-, esa transferencia generaría un devenir actuante del expectante y un devenir expectante del actuante. El sistema de Deleuze configura, por lo tanto, una invocación en el plano actuante-expectante a un tipo de performance que constituya una experiencia estética colectiva en la que participen estos dos frentes heterogéneos en un devenir colectivo que permita superar las fijaciones dicotómicas en términos de sujeto-objeto. 2.2 El cuerpo como sustrato político en lo performativo y la sonoesfera paleopolítica En la búsqueda de un contexto específico para la indagación de estos entendimientos y posibilidades rizomáticas en la creación performativa, nos acercamos a la obra En el mismo barco. Ensayo sobre hiperpolítica de Peter Sloterdijk (1993, pág. 22), quien propone un análisis del desarrollo del sentido de lo político a través de tres estadios: la paleopolítica, la política clásica y la hiperpolítica. Con relación a la paleopolítica y los procesos básicos de socialización humana y de instauración de una noción originaria de lo político, como lo relativo a la convivencia y organización social, el pensador alemán postula que: Tanto las hordas primitivas como sus sucesores […] socializan a sus miembros en una continuidad psicoesférica y sonoesférica en la que existencia y correspondencia mutua aún son dimensiones casi indiferenciables. La sociedad más antigua es una bola mágica pequeña y parlanchina, una invisible carpa de circo que, tensada sobre su troupe, viaja con ella. Cada uno de sus miembros está unido con mayor o menor continuidad al cuerpo de sonidos del grupo a través de un cordón umbilical psicoacústico. […] "Corresponderse" mutuamente, en este caso pertenecer al mismo grupo, en efecto, no significa de entrada más que escucharse juntos -y en eso consiste, hasta el descubrimiento de las culturas de la escritura y de los imperios, el vínculo social por antonomasia—. (Sloterdijk, 1993, págs. 30-31) En el planteamiento del filósofo alemán encontramos una invocación a un sentir primigenio de lo político a partir de la percepción del sonido, por medio del cual podemos establecer un puente que nos permita provocar un encuentro entre el performance como expresión artística desde el cuerpo y la voz, y la sonoesfera como construcción permanente de la realidad sonora que nos envuelve, recordándonos los principios básicos de la pertenencia y el sentido de comunidad. Surge la hipótesis acerca de si es posible que creaciones artísticas que pretendan activar vinculaciones con la sonoesfera paleopolítica originaria -que a manera de una impronta arcaica, todos llevaríamos en nuestra memoria individual y colectiva-, provocarían la activación del sentido originario de lo político, expresado en el reconocimiento primario de nuestra común pertenencia -independientemente de las funcionalidades que cumplimos en un conjunto social- y, por lo tanto, de nuestra común responsabilidad frente al devenir colectivo. Al respecto del tema del sentimiento de pertenencia comunitaria y su génesis en un escucharse juntos, Juan Gil, compositor de música contemporánea, postula que una significativa parte de la: […] memoria, ya sea individual o colectiva, es el resultado de la sedimentación en la que participa de forma determinante la auralidad. Cada entorno y cada situación, pero también cada acto y cada instante, están vinculados inexorablemente a unos sonidos concretos que los caracterizan y los identifican, o los individualizan, frente a las acústicas de otros espacios y contextos. (2007, pág. 3) En este marco, una creación artística alrededor de la invocación a la sonoesfera originaria paleolítica apelaría a una suerte de afinidad aural colectiva, a una familiaridad arcaica, que posibilite la activación del expectante en el proceso de su construcción, dando lugar así, aun cuando sea por un instante, a una utopía política: la comunidad igualitaria de actuantes y expectantes en el marco de un devenir transformador que dé cuenta de un estado de cosas en el que sea factible la participación de todos sobre fundamentos de igualdad. Por lo tanto, es preciso cuestionarse sobre las características que debería poseer la sonoesfera como acción performativa para potenciar sus posibilidades rizomáticas y convocar a la constitución de lo que Gil (2007, pág. 6), define como un espacio de "la mayor horizontalidad posible". Es decir, para la configuración de una sonoesfera performativa como construcción de una utopía comunitaria[3]. 2.3 Resistir al ensordecedor mundo urbano industrial y digital La decisión de prestar atención a la sonoesfera como espacio para la construcción de un performance con los propósitos enunciados proviene, en parte, de las características específicas de su configuración sonora. Truax (citado Gil, 2007, p.4), considera que una sonoesfera como género de expresión artística debe constituirse con "sonidos originales" los cuales deben "permanecer identificables" de manera que la obra pueda "invocar asociaciones contextuales y simbólicas" en quienes la escuchan. Gil (2007, pág. 4), subraya esta definición de sonoesfera y especifica que una particularidad importante de una construcción sonora de este tipo es que no destruye "los vínculos con la fuente o con el entorno originario", dando lugar a "una reflexión individual sobre los hábitos cotidianos de la escucha." Al respecto, nos parece especialmente importante la tesis de Gil (2007, pág. 3), acerca de que "sólo ahora empezamos a comprender que las sociedades no se definen sólo por lo que producen, sino que también lo hacen, en ocasiones con mayor determinación, por lo que desechan, por el resultado residual de sus hábitos y de sus actos" (énfasis nuestro), a través de lo cual concluye que los "sonidos presumiblemente irrelevantes, silenciados durante largo tiempo en beneficio de aquellos otros ordenados", portadores de "información evidente y premeditada, léase el habla o la música", expresan de manera profunda y abundante lo que ocurre con quienes los producen. Corresponde preguntarse, entonces, cuáles son algunas sonoridades que terminan siendo residuales o marginales en el espacio sonoesférico público del mundo contemporáneo urbano, industrial y digital, y que, al mismo tiempo, son capaces de decirnos mucho sobre nosotros mismos, constituyéndose en expresiones cuya ausencia es símbolo del vacío creciente de un sentido político originario en el espacio colectivo y cuya presencia, en el plano artístico, es por lo tanto, también un accionar de resistencia política frente al modelo civilizatorio del capitalismo que ha transfigurado profundamente la sonoesfera global. Según Gil (2007, pág. 3), hoy nos enfrentamos a: La amplitud ensordecedora de una sonoesfera drásticamente modificada por los radicales cambios que la industrialización introdujo en los paisajes sonoros urbanos de la modernidad, así como del incremento de los eventos sonoros que forman parte de la existencia cotidiana marcando las pautas de nuestras acciones o multiplicados ad infinitum en una "reproductividad técnica" sin precedentes. En este marco civilizatorio, ¿qué sonoridades pueden contribuir a la imaginación de una sonoesfera como base performativa de resistencia al ensordecedor mundo urbano de la sociedad capitalista? Una posible respuesta a esta interrogante proviene de la reflexión acerca de sonoridades humanas que activen conexiones con las nociones mencionadas anteriormente: la sonoesfera paleopolítica originaria y la capacidad de metamorfosis del cuerpo individual y colectivo. En este contexto, consideramos que las sonidos vinculados a acciones y circunstancias de profunda significación afectiva tendrían la capacidad de provocar esos eslabones, pues consideramos que aquellas sufren una presión de marginalización que las recluye cada vez con mayor intensidad en el espacio íntimo individual y las aleja, por lo tanto, del espacio de convivencia social colectiva y pública. Carcajadas, sollozos, gritos, gemidos, jadeos, estertores, resoplidos, respiraciones sonantes, etc., por ejemplo, son sonoridades paulatinamente extrañas, como producción viva y directa, en el ambiente sonoro urbano y público. En este marco, una sonoesfera que acuda para su construcción en vivo como hecho artístico performativo, a dichas sonoridades humanas desplazadas, se posicionaría en un plano de contraposición a aquello que el compositor canadiense Murray Schafer (1977), define como "Esquizofonía[4] […], el rompimiento entre el sonido original y su transmisión o reproducción electroacústica"[5] (pág. 133), (traducción propia al español). Schafer (1977, pág. 133) propone que este fenómeno se ha consolidado en el siglo XX, puesto que todos los sonidos eran originales en un inicio y estaban firmemente vinculados a los mecanismos productores, tanto espacial como temporalmente, dando lugar, por lo tanto, a que cada sonido fuese irrepetible, ya que incluso un fonema expresado dos veces por la misma persona nunca es exactamente igual. De acuerdo a estas definiciones, entonces, un performance configurado en base a sonoridades vinculadas a afectos y producidas en vivo desde el cuerpo, sería una creación antiesquizofónica que se postularía como un acto de resistencia a la sonoesfera dominante, la cual se caracteriza por una saturación de sonoridades de producción o manipulación tecnológica e industrial. 2.4 La estrategia aural de inmersión frente al abismo de lo ocular Acudir a la sonoesfera paleopolítica presupone, entonces, recuperar la memoria de un estado en el cual la percepción aural era la base de un sentido de pertenencia mutua, la cual ha sido desarticulada en el marco de una forma de desarrollo civilizatorio que según Sloterdijk (1993, pág. 286), estaría marcado por la consistencia ocular del pensamiento occidental, aspecto que tiene unos mecanismos que debemos analizar con la finalidad de imaginar algunas características de la sonoesfera perfomática como un espacio de resistencia. En este contexto el pensador alemán postula que la metafísica occidental es definitivamente una "ontología ocular", cuyo origen está en la "sistematización de una vista exterior e interior." Esta calidad implica entre otras cosas una mecánica fundamental de distanciamiento: Para ver algo, el vidente tiene que estar a una distancia abierta frente a lo visible. Ese estar espacialmente separado y enfrentado sugiere un abismo entre sujetos y objetos que, a la postre, no solo entra en consideración espacial sino ontológica […]. (pág. 287) Diríamos que la matriz ocular, entonces, es tal que implica una dependencia de la separación entre quien percibe y lo que es percibido, lo cual promueve la objetualización de lo observado. Esto estaría en contraposición con la matriz aural que, por su parte, propone como eje procesual una mecánica de inmersión, que Sloterdijk (1993) describe de la siguiente manera: […] es característico de la naturaleza de la audición no verificarse de modo diverso al ser-en-el-sonido. Ningún oyente puede creer estar en la esquina de lo audible. El oído no conoce ningún enfrente; no se muestra "vista" frontal alguna en el objeto exterior, porque sólo hay "mundo" o "materias" en la medida en que se está en medio del suceso auditivo; también se podría decir: en tanto se está suspendido o inmerso en el espacio auditivo. (pág. 287) Podríamos concluir entonces, que en nuestro mundo de matriz ocular y abismos, los sonidos producidos a partir de profundos estados afectivos han terminado por convertirse en expresiones socialmente inaceptables, incómodas de observar, socialmente incorrectas, no expresables en el espacio de la colectividad, lo cual daría cuenta de que, para la identidad aural contemporánea occidental urbana -vista desde un esquema de apreciación de lo útil y lo desechable-, se trata de sonidos que han ido perdiendo su valor de utilidad, por lo que deben mantenerse en el espacio personal íntimo. Cabría decir, entonces, que son sonoridades que se encuentran en una suerte de cuarentena, como elementos que pueden contaminar el espacio público, afectándolo y desequilibrándolo de una forma inútil. Al respecto, Nancy (2002) postula que "lo visual sería tendencialmente mimético, y lo sonoro, tendencialmente metéxico (es decir, del orden de la participación, el reparto o el contagio)"[6] (pág. 27), (traducción propia al español), pues el sonido es "omnipresente, desde que está presente y su presencia nunca es mero ser ahí o estado de cosas, sino que es siempre, a la vez avanzada, penetración, insistencia, obsesión o posesión"[7] (pág. 25), (traducción propia al español). La potencialidad rizomática de la sonoesfera performativa se consolida, por lo tanto, por la propia naturaleza de lo sonoro que propone ambientes de inmersión. Los expectantes al entrar en la situación en la que la sonoesfera es perceptible auralmente, tienen solamente la opción de estar en ella. Percibirla implica estar ya inmerso en su sonoridad, asunto que proporciona una circunstancia favorable a la instauración de un estado peculiar de atención, concentración y precepción, que es fundamental para la activación de un proceso rizomático entre los actuantes y los expectantes. Esta capacidad que tiene lo sonoro es plenamente reconocida por ejecutantes y creadores que utilizan esta material para sus procesos artísticos. En este sentido la inmersión como mecanismo de lo sonoro con la potencialidad para provocar dinámicas rizomáticas, plantea consideraciones relevantes ante la pregunta acerca de: "¿Cómo el sonido posee una incidencia tan particular, una capacidad de afectar que no se asemeja a ninguna otra, muy diferente de aquella que compete a lo visual o al tocar?"[8] (Criton citada por Nancy, 2002, pág. 27), (traducción propia al español). 3. Conclusión Desde las perspectivas propuestas a partir de las sonoridades de los afectos, en relación con las definiciones de un performance de características rizomáticas y de la sonoesfera paleopolítica, consideramos que es posible proponer una convocatoria al expectante a enfrentarse con el marcaje de poder de la matriz ocular y las presiones aurales del mundo urbano industrial y digital contemporáneo. Una creación que se articule desde los sonidos originados en los afectos y desde el entendimiento de ese proceso como acción corporal directa, sin ayuda de instrumentos o tecnología adicional, es decir desde sonidos propios, únicos y originales, resonaría con la propuesta que hacen Bull y Les Back (citados Gil, 2007, pág. 3) acerca de la urgencia de "replantearse el significado, la naturaleza y la relevancia de nuestra experiencia social" lo cual incluye decididamente la indagación de "cómo nos relacionamos con los otros, con nosotros mismos y con los espacios y lugares que habitamos" y recapacitar sobre "nuestra relación con el poder." En este contexto, corresponde concluir que alrededor de la condición efímera y única de esos sonidos originales, la cual nos remite, además, de manera inmediata al sentido esencial de lo performativo, se constata una circunstancia cada vez más notoria: en un mundo de matriz esquizofónica, las artes de la acción sonora viva y directa, constituyen espacios de resistencia, que intentan hacer audible lo que corre el riesgo de dejar de serlo, en este caso, la dinámica vital del proceso afectivo humano. Un performance sonoesférico antiesquizofónico construido a partir de los sonidos de los afectos se enmarcaría en estas consideraciones y resonaría desde lo aural con la apreciación que hace Deleuze (1980, pág. 346) de una invocación postulada por Paul Klee para el arte pictórico: "[…] se trata de elaborar un material encargado de captar fuerzas de otro orden: el material visual debe captar fuerzas no visibles. Hacer visible, decía Klee, y no hacer o reproducir lo visible." [1] "[…] a performance means nothing and aims for no single, specific meaning, but attempts instead to reveal places of passage" (Féral, 1982, pág. 174)[2] Proponemos el uso de los adjetivos actuante y expectante como alternativas a las palabras actor y espectador por la connotación más intensa que proponen acerca de una condición activa de los participantes de un hecho escénico.[3] Cabe mencionar que sobre este propósito ha tenido una influencia significativa el performance Lips of Thomas de Marina Abramoviç ejecutado en Innsbruck en el año 1975, en el cual, conforme lo propone Fischer-Lichte (2004, págs. 23-25) se produjo una articulación de conexiones no solo estéticas, sino también éticas. Según nuestro entender, en dicho performance también se establecieron eslabones afectivos y políticos.[4] De los vocablos griegos esquizo y fono, disociar y voz respectivamente.[5] "Esquizofonia refere-se ao rompimento entre um som original e sua transmissāo ou reproduçăo electroacústica." (Schafer, 1977, pág. 133)[6] "[…] le visuel serait tendanciellement mimétique, et le sonore tendanciellement méthexique (c´est-á-dire dans l´ordre de la participation, du partage ou de la contagion) " (Nancy, 2002, pág. 27)[7] "[…] le sonore est omniprésent, dès qu´il présent, et sa présence n´est jamais simple être-là ou état des choses, mais elle est toujours à la fois avancée, pénétration, insistance, obsession ou possession" (Nancy, 2002, pág. 25).[8] "Comment le son a-t-il une incidence si particulière, une capacité d´affecter qui ne ressemble à aucune autre, très différente de ce qui relève du visuel e du toucher ? " (Nancy, 2002, pág. 27)
Untersuchungen zur Rohstoffeffizienz der Forst-Holz-Kette vor dem Hintergrund der Forstreform in Ghana Im Jahr 1994 wurde in Ghana eine Forstreform durchgeführt, mit dem Ziel, das Artenspektrum der kommerziell nutzbaren Bäume zu vergrößern, den Holzverlust in der Forst-Holz-Kette zu reduzieren sowie die Verarbeitungsprozesse in der Holzindustrie zu optimieren. Um den Erfolg dieser politisch motivierten Ziele sicherzustellen, wurden ein Exportverbot für Rundholz und Mindestpreise für den Verkauf von Holz auf dem Stock erlassen, die an die internationalen Marktpreise angepasst waren. In dieser Arbeit soll die Effizienz dieser Maßnahmen genauer beleuchtet werden. In einem ersten Abschnitt werden die Auswirkungen des Exportverbots von Rundholz (LEB=log export ban) ab 1995 auf die weiter verarbeitende Industrie, die Preisentwicklung auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene sowie die Nutzung des vorhandenen Artenspektrums mit statistischen Methoden untersucht. Dafür standen zwei Zeitreihen der Timber Industry Development Division (TIDD), einer Abteilung der Forstkommission von Ghana, zur Verfügung. Der erste Datensatz umfasst den Zeitraum von 1984 bis 2005, während der zweite, detailliertere Datensatz die Periode von 1995 bis 2005 abdeckt. Im zweiten Abschnitt der Arbeit wurde die bei Holzerntemaßnahmen erzielte Rundholzausbeute analysiert. Dazu wurden im Rahmen von Fallstudien Holzerntemaßnahmen mit detaillierten Untersuchungen begleitet. Verglichen wurden die aufgrund der Dimension und der Qualität der eingeschlagenen Bäume verwertungstechnisch objektiv nutzbaren Holzmengen mit denjenigen Rundholzmengen, die tatsächlich zur Verarbeitung gelangten. In die Untersuchung wurde die Kontrolle und Ausführung der Arbeit miteinbezogen. Aus den Ausbeutedaten wurden Modelle zur Berechnung eines angemessenen Stockpreises sowohl für einzelne Baumarten als auch als Durchschnittswerte entwickelt. Ein weiterer Arbeitsschritt befasste sich mit der Schnittholzausbeute im Sägewerk. Ebenfalls im Rahmen von Fallstudien wurden das eingesetzte Rundholz und das daraus erzeugte Schnittholz hinsichtlich Volumen und Qualität verglichen und die Gründe für Ausbeuteunterschiede analysiert. Die Analyse des Produktionsprozesses deckte dabei auf, welche Faktoren bei welchen Arbeitsschritten zu den beobachteten Verlusten bei der Schnittholzausbeute beitragen. Dabei wurden sowohl technische Faktoren als auch Motivation und Ausbildungsstand der Arbeiter berücksichtigt. Auswirkungen des Exportverbots – Entwicklung der Exportmengen In dem Zeitraum vor Inkrafttreten des Rundholzexportverbots in den Jahren 1984 bis 1985 betrug das Gesamtexportvolumen von Holz und Holzprodukten ca. 5,7 Mio. m³. Daran hatten Rundholz- und Sägeholzexporte einen Anteil von 55% bzw. 39%, während die Anteile von veredelten Produkten deutlich niedriger waren: Furnier 4,1%, Sperrholz 0,4% und Fertigwaren aus Holz 1,4%. In den Jahren zwischen 1996 und 2005, in denen sich das Rundholzexportverbot auswirkte, betrug das exportierte Gesamtvolumen von Holz und Holzprodukten 4,5 Mio. m³. Daran hatte das Sägeholz einen Anteil von 54%, während der Anteil weiterverarbeiteter Produkte deutlich zunahm: Furnier 21,3%, Sperrholz 10,5% und Hobelware bzw. Holzprodukte 14,2%. Die Analyse der Wirkung des Exportverbots für Rundholz aus Ghana zeigt, dass durch diese Maßnahme ein deutlich höherer Anteil der Wertschöpfung im Land verbleibt. Vor allem die Herstellung von Furnieren, Sperrholz und veredelten Holzprodukten stieg deutlich an. In dieser Hinsicht wird die Hypothese gestützt, dass ein Exportverbot von Rundholz die Produktion von höherwertigen Waren im Inland fördert. Weitere Faktoren für die beobachtete quantitative Zunahme und den Wertzuwachs bei den verarbeiteten Produkten dürften auch die Verknappung des Rundholzangebots, die hohen Exportzölle auf Halbfertigwaren (Sägeholz) und finanzielle Investitionsanreize seitens des Staates sein. Preisentwicklung für Exportprodukte Die Untersuchung zeigte, dass der aggregierte Preisindex für alle Holzprodukte, die vor Inkrafttreten des Rundholzexportverbots exportiert wurden, in der Zeit von 1984 bis 1995 inflationsbereinigt um 129% anstieg, während der aggregierte Preisindex nach Inkrafttreten des Rundholzexportverbots im Zeitraum von 1996 bis 2005 um 3% fiel. Dabei stiegen die Exportpreise für die verschiedenen Produkte in unterschiedlichem Ausmaß: Sägeholz um 109%, Furnier um 238%, Sperrholz um 142% und verarbeitete Holzprodukte um 102%. Im Zeitraum nach Eintreten des Rundholzexportverbots ergaben sich demgegenüber folgende Veränderungen in den Preisen: Sägeholz +14,8%, Furnier -21,9%, Sperrholz -47% und verarbeitete Holzprodukte -31,7%. Während die Exportpreise für Furnier an stärksten anzogen, fielen die Preise von Sperrholzprodukten aus tropischen Hölzern, da billige Sperrhölzer auf Nadelholzbasis den Markt eroberten. Auch der stetig ansteigende Einsatz von Holzwerkstoffen wie MDF und OSB im Möbelbau und im konstruktiven Bereich verdrängen tropische Sperrhölzer aus dem Markt. Ein weiterer Grund ist schließlich der starke Konkurrenzdruck auf diese Produkte durch Sperrholz aus chinesischer Produktion. China war bis vor kurzem noch ein wichtiger Importeur von tropischem Sperrholz, ist heute aber bereits einer der größten Exporteure. Die Ursachen für die Preisrrückgänge sind vermutlich auch in globalen Ereignissen zu sehen, wie beispielsweise dem Zusammenbruch der asiatischen Märkte in den Jahren 1997 und 1998, sowie der schwachen Nachfrage nach Waren auf internationalen Märkten zwischen 2000 und 2001, die u. a. aus der wirtschaftlichen Rezession der drei stärksten Volkswirtschaften (USA, Japan, Deutschland) resultierte. Anteil weniger genutzter Baumarten (LUS) Der Anteil der weniger genutzten Baumarten (LUS – lesser used species in Ghana, auch als "Pink" und "Green"-Baumarten bezeichnet) an der Exportmenge blieb auch während des Exportverbots für Rundholz relativ gering. An der Gesamtexportmenge (ca. 4,1 Mio. m³) der sechs Hauptprodukte, die zwischen 1995 und 2005 aus Gahana ausgeführt wurden, betrug der Volumenanteil der "Pink" und "Green" Baumarten nur 12,5% bzw. 1,3%. Die marktgängigen "Scarlet" und "Red"-Baumarten nahmen dagegen einen Mengenanteil von 49% bzw. 29,4% ein, während sonstige Baumarten zu 7,7% beitrugen. Detaillierte Analysen der Statistiken zeigen, dass veredelte Produkte wie Fußböden und Paneele nahezu vollständig aus "Scarlet" und "Red"-Baumarten hergestellt wurden. Der Anteil dieser Baumarten macht bei diesen Produktgruppen 87% bzw. 90% aus. Beide Produktgruppen gehören zu den höchstbezahlten Exportprodukten. In der Regel fordern Kunden und Verbraucher die spezifischen Holzeigenschaften dieser Holzartengruppen, woraus die hohen Anteile bei den hochwertigen Produkten zu erklären sind. Es steht zu erwarten, dass diese Holzarten auch in Zukunft in Produktgruppen dominieren. Wie erwartet, hat der Mengenanteil von luftgetrockneten Sägeholz aus "Scarlet" Baumarten von 83 % im Jahr 1995 auf etwa 6 % im Jahr 2005 abgenommen, während luftgetrocknetes Schnittholz aus den weniger genutzten "Pink"-Baumarten gegenläufig von 6 % im Jahr 1995 auf 22 % in 2005 anstieg. Die Substituierung von "Scarlet" durch "Pink" Baumarten spiegelt die zunehmende Knappheit dieser verwertungstechnisch geschätzten Baumarten wieder. In den letzten Jahren wurden durch die Forstverwaltung erhöhte Abgaben auf einfaches, luftgetrocknetes Schnittholz erhoben, welches aus den zunehmend knapper werdenden Hauptbaumarten hergestellt wird. Auch darin könnte die wachsende Bevorzugung der weniger genutzten Baumarten in diesem Produktbereich erklärt werden. Entgegen der Erwartungen blieb jedoch der hohe Anteil der Hauptbaumarten im Bereich des kammergetrockneten Sägeholzes stabil. Die Bevorzugung der "Scarlet" Baumarten für diese Produkte ist nicht zuletzt auf deren deutlich besseres Verhalten bei der künstlichen Trocknung zurückzuführen. Forschungsvorhaben und verbesserte praktische Erfahrungen über die technische Trocknung der bisher weniger genutzten Baumarten könnten dazu beitragen, dass auch in diesem höherwertigen Bereich zunehmend eine Substitution stattfindet. Ausbeuteverluste und mögliche Ursachen in der Forst- Holz-Kette Die Frage der Ausbeuteverluste und ihrer möglichen Ursachen entlang der Forst-Holz-Kette wurde methodisch im Rahmen eines Fallstudien-Ansatzes untersucht. Dazu wurden die Nutzungsgebiete von drei unterschiedlichen Konzessionären (A, B, D) ausgewählt, die von ihrer geographischen Lage und ihrer Struktur her für die primäre Holzverarbeitung durch die Industrie in Ghana typisch sind. Insgesamt 135 Bäume aus neun Baumarten wurden für diese Studie ausgewählt. Dabei handelt es sich um die für die Vermarktung bedeutendsten Baumarten. Das theoretisch holzindustriell verwendbare Volumen aller Bäume in dieser Studie belief sich auf 2.177 m3, d. h. im Durchschnitt 16 m3 je Baum. Tatsächlich aufgearbeitet und zum Sägewerk transportiert wurden jedoch nur 1.638 m3 oder 12 m3 je Baum. Damit betrug die durchschnittliche Ausbeutequote 75+/-11,82%, während gut 25% (539 m3) des an sich industriell verwendbaren Holzes als Hiebsreste im Wald verblieben. Sowohl der Zopfdurchmesser als auch die Länge dieser Reststücke, wie auch ihre Qualität wären durchaus für eine weitere Bearbeitung im Sägewerk geeignet gewesen. Während der Feldaufnahmen konnten ungenügende Arbeitstechniken und mangelhafte Überwachung als die wichtigsten Gründe für diese geringe Rundholzausbeute identifiziert werden. Dabei spielt auch die herrschende Praxis, nach der der Stockpreis ermittelt wird, den die Firmen an den Staat entrichten müssen, eine Rolle: Da nur für das tatsächlich aus dem Wald exportierte Holz gezahlt werden muss, ergibt sich für die Konzessionäre kein finanzieller Anreiz dafür, die gefällten Bäume möglichst vollständig industriell zu nutzen. Aus diesem offensichtlichen Missstand wurde die Notwendigkeit abgeleitet, Modelle zu entwickeln, die zur Bestimmung der gesamten potentiell vermarktbaren Holzmenge eines stehenden Baumes herangezogen werden können, um so den Stockpreis (stumpage fee) rechnerisch zu bestimmen. Auf der Basis der Versuchsergebnisse wurden drei allometrische Funktionen berechnet, die für eine Schätzung des nutzbaren Volumens herangezogen werden können. Für die Bildung von baumartenspezifischen Modellen wurden drei in Ghana vom Mengenaufkommen her wichtige und markgängige Baumarten herangezogen: Akasaa (Chrysophyllum albidum), Wawa (Triplochiton scleroxylon) und Ofram (Terminalia superba). Darüber hinaus wurden auch generelle Modelle ohne spezifischen Bezug auf einzelne Baumarten entwickelt. Als Datengrundlage dafür wurden neben den drei genannten Hauptbaumarten die Arten von neun weiteren Baumarten herangezogen. Im Allgemeinen hatten artenspezifische Modelle eine bessere Vorhersagbarkeit als gemischte Modelle. Der Grund könnte in der höheren Homogenität der beobachteten und der vorhergesagten Variablen bei den artenspezifischen Modellen liegen. Die Modelle, die auf der Basis der Variablen Brusthöhendurchmesser (DBH) und kommerziell nutzbarer Schaftlänge (L) die nutzbare Holzmenge schätzen, waren jenen Modellen überlegen, die als Variable lediglich den DBH heranziehen. Allerdings ist eine zutreffende Ermittlung der kommerziell nutzbaren Schaftlänge stehender Bäume in der Praxis schwierig. Auch die nur auf dem DBH basierenden Modelle konnten die sägefähigen Stammholzanteile einschließlich stärkerer Kronenanteile mit hinreichender Genauigkeit schätzen. Ein so genanntes Log-Tracking-System, das in Ghana eingeführt werden soll, könnte die Anwendung dieser Modelle in der Praxis begünstigen. Wenn mit ihrer Hilfe die tatsächlich genutzten Stammvolumina zuverlässiger als bisher ermittelt werden, kann mittels der entwickelten Modelle auf das reale, nutzbare Volumen der Bäume auf dem Stock zurückgeschlossen werden, und eine realistische Bestimmung des Stockgeldes (stumpage fee) wäre so möglich. Die Nutzung der entwickelten Modelle in der Praxis zur Festsetzung eines realistischen Stockpreises haben jedoch ihre Grenzen: Wenn sich im Zeitablauf die Ausbeuterelationen fundamental ändern, müssen durch aktuelle Untersuchungen die hier aufgestellten Modelle neu parametrisiert werden. Ausbeuteverluste und mögliche Ursachen im Sägewerk Um die Ausbeute von Schnittholz in der weiteren Bearbeitungsstufe zu bestimmen, wurden im Rahmen der Fallstudie in 4 Sägewerken (A, B, C, D) insgesamt 189 Stämme eingeschnitten. Dazu wurden folgende, für Ausbeute und Qualität ausschlaggebende Faktoren aufgenommen: • Dimension und Volumen des eingesetzten Rundholzes • Zeitraum zwischen Fällung und Verarbeitung der Stämme • Risse, Fäule, Pilzbefall und sonstige Fehler am Rundholz • Schnittbild • Einschnitttechnologien • Qualität des Einschnitts (Maßhaltigkeit) • Volumen und Qualität des erzeugten Schnittholzes Die durchschnittliche Schnittholzausbeute lag bei 28,3% und war damit deutlich niedriger als die in vergleichbaren Studien angegebenen Werte. Die Ausbeute schwankte zwischen nur 1,9% für die Baumart Otie (Pycnanthus angolensis), die im Sägewerk A eingeschnitten wurde, bis hin zu 52.6% für Mahagonie (Khaya ivorensis), eingeschnitten in Werk B. Es konnte festgestellt werden, dass die geringe Qualität und die hohen Materialverluste überwiegend auf die lange Lagerzeit zwischen Fällung und Einschnitt zurückzuführen waren. Alle Otie-Stämme (Pycnanthus angolensis) und die meisten der Wawa –Sägestämme (Triplochiton scleroxylon) zeigten tiefe Risse an der Stirnseite sowie starken Pilzbefall, was zu hohen Ausbeuteverlusten führte. Für die Baumart Otie (Pycnanthus angolensis) wurden durchschnittliche Zeiträume von 6 Monaten vom Einschlag bis zum Einschnitt ermittelt, für Wawa immerhin noch 4 Monate. Eine entscheidende Schwachstelle ist also die mangelhafte logistische Planung. Die unflexible Ausrichtung in der Schnittholzproduktion auf nur wenige exportgängige Liefermaße verursachte einen hohen Volumenanteil an Sägeresthölzern, die bei einer entsprechenden Einschnittgeometrie und Sortierung durchaus zu Fußböden, Paneelen oder anderen Produkten hätten weiterverarbeitet werden können. Um die Maßhaltigkeit der verwendeten Einschnitttechnologien zu bestimmen, wurden zusätzlich an 267 Brettern in sägefrischem Zustand Breite und Stärke ermittelt. Die Ergebnisse der Studie zur Maßhaltigkeit des Schnittholzes weisen darauf hin, dass veraltete und schlecht gewartete Sägentechnik für große Volumenverluste beim Einschnitt verantwortlich sind. Schwankungen der Maßhaltigkeit von 2 bis 17% innerhalb eines Brettes konnten bei der untersuchten Schnittware festgestellt werden. Die Streuung der Maßhaltigkeit zwischen den Brettern war signifikant höher, was wiederum eine schlechte Wartung bzw. Justierung der Einschnittaggregate bestätigt. Abschließend muss kritisch angemerkt werden, dass mit 4 Fallstudien der Stichprobenumfang bei der Bestimmung der Einschlagvolumina sowie der Ausbeuteuntersuchungen bei Schnittholz im Sägewerk keine statistisch repräsentativen und auf ganz Ghana verallgemeinerbare Aussagen zulassen. Dennoch sind die Ergebnisse insofern richtungweisend, als dass Ursachen und Faktoren für die hohen Material- und Wertverluste entlang der Forst-Holz-Kette in Ghana aufgezeigt werden. Damit können Lösungsansätze für die logistischen und technischen Probleme erarbeitet, ein effizientes Controlling konzipiert und innovative Ansätze für eine erweiterte Produktpalette entwickelt werden. Diese Maßnahmen sind dringend notwendig, um eine nachhaltige Bewirtschaftung der Naturwälder Ghanas sicherzustellen und den knappen Rohstoff Holz effizienter zu nutzen. ; SUMMARY: Assessment of raw material utilisation efficiency of the forest-wood chain as influence by the forest sector reform in Ghana. The 1994 forest sector reform in Ghana placed priority on downstream processing, utilisation of lesser-used species (LUS) and improvement of processing efficiency in the timber industry of Ghana. To ensure the success of these policy goals, a ban on exportation of logs was introduced and stumpage fees were adjusted to reflect the realistic timber prices on the international market. This thesis was designed to assess the raw material utilisation efficiency under the influence of the forest sector reform and forest-wood processing chain. The thesis set out to investigate the effects of the log export ban (LEB) policy on the downstream processing, the growth of volume and the prices of the export wood products, and the utilisation of the various timber species. Two sets of time series data as compiled by the Timber Industry Development Division (TIDD) of the Forestry Commission of Ghana were analysed with statistical regressions. The first set of data spanned from 1984 to 2005 whilst the second more detailed data set was compiled from 1995 to 2005. This thesis further assessed, on a case study basis, logging recovery and examined the effect of lax supervision on the logging recovery, and thus justifying the need to develop models to predict the total merchantable volume and logically, the realistic stumpage volume and fees. It continued to assess the sawnwood processing recovery and quantified the volume loss due to sawnwood thickness over-sizing and sawing variation and investigated other factors that contribute to the low sawnwood recovery so as to provide managers and operators with insight into their operation performance and identify ways to improve production. Export market- Volumes Before the LEB policy in the years from 1984 to 1995, the total export volume of wood and wood products was about 5.7 million cubic metres. Out of this volume, log and sawnwood exports accounted for about 55 % and 39 % respectively whilst the contributions from veneer, plywood, and processed wood exports were 4.1 %, 0.4 % and 1.4 % respectively. In the years between 1996 and 2005, the total volume of wood and wood products exported during the LEB policy was about 4.5 million cubic metres. Veneer, plywood, and processed moulding showed increasing shares in the export market, contributing respectively 21.3 %, 10.5 % and 14.2 % during this period, whilst sawnwood accounted for 53.9%. The results of the study showed that the implementation of the log export ban policy in Ghana caused increases in the volume shares of the value-added products such as veneer, plywood and processed wood, which is in agreement with the theory that an LEB policy stimulates the production of value-added products. However, important factors such as shortage of timber supply, high export taxes on the primary products (sawnwood), and investment incentives may have played significant roles in increasing the volume of these products. Export market- Prices The study found that the aggregate price index of all the wood products exported before the LEB policy increased by 129 % compared to the decline of the aggregate price index by -3.9 % during the LEB policy. The growth in the export prices of sawnwood, veneer, plywood and processed wood before the LEB policy were respectively 109 %, 238 %, 142 % and 102 % compared to the corresponding growths or declines of 14.8 %, -21.9 %, -47 % and -31.7 % during the LEB policy. Whilst the export prices of veneer appear to have been bolstered by the increasing market share of re-constituted panels such as MDF and OSB, those of plywood from the tropical forests were eclipsed by the increasing substitution of tropical plywood by softwood plywood and other panels such as MDF and OSB in furniture, millwork, and mouldings production. Another important contributing factor to the decline in the prices of plywood is the intense competition from China, which until recently was a major importer of tropical plywood, and is now a major exporter of plywood. The need to find new markets for tropical plywood could help revive its export trade. These decline in prices also appears also to have been caused by such global factors as the collapse of the Asian economy in 1997 and 1998, and the weak demand for international commodity in 2000 and 2001, resulting from the economic recession of the world's three largest economies (U.S.A., Japan and Germany). Export volume of the traditional (scarlet and red) and the Lesser-Used Species (LUS) (pink and green) species During the LEB policy, the export volume shares of the LUS (pink and green species) stayed relatively low. Out of the total export volume of 4,074,570 m³ of the six main products exported from 1995 to 2005, pink and green species (LUS) contributed only 12.5 % and 1.3 % respectively. Furthermore, scarlet and red species had a respective volume share of 49 % and 29.4 % whilst "other species" contributed 7.7 %. The results indicated that flooring and moulding products were almost exclusively produced from the traditional timber species. About 87 % of the flooring and 90 % of the moulding products were produced from both the scarlet and red species. These two products are among the highly-priced export products. The flooring and moulding products are generally used for decoration purposes and the traditional and highly-valued timber species such as the scarlet and red species are expected to dominate the choice of species for these products. This fact probably explains the high volume contribution of the traditional timber species to the production of flooring and moulding products. In the face of a limited supply of the primary timber species, scarlet and red species obviously should be reserved for the highly-priced products such as flooring and moulding. As expected, the trend in the volume share of air-dried (AD) sawnwood produced from the scarlet species showed a substantial decrease from 83 % in 1995 to about 6 % in 2005, whilst air-dried sawnwood from the pink species increased from about 6 % in 1995 to about 22 % in 2005. The substitution of the scarlet species by the pink species reflects the increasing shortage of supply of the former. Another reason could be the result of systematic efforts by the stakeholders in forest management in Ghana to substitute the LUS species for the scarlet in the production of sawnwood (AD) by imposing levies on sawnwood (AD) produced from the primary timber species. Contrary to expectation, kiln-dried (KD) sawnwood had the most stable volume share from the scarlet species, decreasing only marginally from about 86 % in 1995 to about 84 % in 2005. Technical difficulties in developing kiln-drying schedules for the LUS species may explain a higher percentage volume share of the scarlet species used to produce sawnwood (KD). The logging efficiency and the development of allometric models to predict the realistic stumpage volume In a case study approach, a total of 135 trees from nine timber species were sampled from three logging sites of mills A, B and D to allow for the assessment of logging recovery and the development of models to predict the total merchantable volume. The mills were selected according to the prevailing sawmill industry structure in Ghana. The main species were selected on the basis of their forest availability and economic importance. Wawa (Triplochiton scleroxylon), for example, constitutes about 21 % of Forest Inventory Project (FIP) class 1 volume greater than 70 cm in diameter (see Ghana Forestry Department 1989) and hence justifies its higher selection percentage. The merchantable volume of all the trees sampled from the three studied mills totalled 2,177 m³, averaging 16.0 m³ per tree. The logs that were extracted from this total merchantable volume by the mills amounted to 1,638 m³, averaging 12 m³ per tree. The average logging recovery rate of the three studied logging sites was 75±11.82 % whilst 25 % (539 m³) of the merchantable volume was left at the logging site as residues. On the basis of the small-end diameter and length values, the merchantable wood residues were of sufficient quality to warrant their utilisation. For example, the small-end diameter of the residues ranged from 41 cm for ofram (Terminalia superba) to 60 cm for wawa (Triplochiton scleroxylon) whilst the average length of the residues also varied between 4.2 m for sapele (Entandrophragma cylindricum) and 8.5 m for wawa (Triplochiton scleroxylon). The study identified insufficient working techniques and lax supervision as one of the major causes of low logging recovery and the existing practice of fixing stumpage fees gives only weak economical incentives to improve volume recovery. Therefore the need to develop models to predict the total merchantable volume as a basis for adjusted stumpage fee calculation, was justified. To fix realistic stumpage fees, which take into account the true potential of the harvested trees, three allometric equations were developed to allow for comparison in terms of predictive accuracy. Three main species, namely akasaa (Chrysophyllum albidum), wawa (Triplochiton scleroxylon), and ofram (Terminalia superba) were sampled for the construction of the species-specific based models. The mixed-species based models were developed from the three main species and six additional tree species. In general, the species-specific models had a better predictive power than the mixed-species based models and this could be attributed to the relatively higher homogeneity of both the observed and predictor variables of the species-specific based models. Among the mixed-species based models, those that predicted the total merchantable volume indirectly from the log volume had the highest predictive power. The log tracking system which is being introduced in Ghana could benefit from these models. When logging data are available (through the log tracking system) the models could be used to predict the realistic stumpage volume. These models however, were found to perform relatively better for small-sized trees than for large-sized trees over (20 m³). The models that predicted the total merchantable volume from DBH and the total merchantable length had better fits than those that used only DBH as a predictor variable. Nevertheless they have little practical importance because of difficulty in measuring the total merchantable length in the forest. These models have however theoretically showed that, by including the merchantable branches, the general form of allometric equation did not substantially change. DBH as a predictor of the total merchantable volume has several advantages. It is easier and simpler to use since forest inventories include DBH measurements. For the mixed-species based models that predicted the total merchantable volume from DBH only, the site-specific models had a higher predictive power than a single model developed for all-sites, indicating that for a higher accuracy, DBH may be a good predictor of the total merchantable volume of tree species at a specific site. The use of these models, however, presents a limitation. If logging efficiency of individual mills changes substantially over time, the model may have to be validated periodically before it could be applied. Sawmill efficiency In order to determine sawnwood recovery in a case study approach, a total of 189 saw logs were sampled from four mills (Mills A, B, C and D). In order to assess the factors that affect sawnwood recovery, the following inquiries and observations were made and recorded: • Log dimensions (length, diameter at both ends) • Time between felling and processing of logs, • Prior to processing, each sampled saw logs was inspected for defects such as end-splits, rots and fungal blue stain. • Log breakdown technique, • Edging and trimming techniques and • Quality of trimming off-cuts The average sawnwood recovery (28.3 %) found in this study was substantially lower than the reported average recovery rate in the previous studies. The sawnwood recovery ranged from 1.9 % for the otie (Pycnanthus angolensis) processed at mill A to 52.6 % for the mahogany (Khaya ivorensis) processed at mill B. The study found that the poor log quality, resulting mainly from long storage periods between felling and processing, had a substantial effect on the sawnwood volume recovery. All of the otie (Pycnanthus angolensis) saw logs and most of the wawa (Triplochiton scleroxylon) saw logs sampled had end-splits and were severely infested with fungal blue stain and thus their low recovery was expected. The low sawnwood recovery reported in this study could be mainly attributed to a lack of proper management of logs and a lack of adequate logistic planning. For example, the period between felling and processing of the otie (Pycnanthus angolensis) logs was about six months whilst due to logistical problems and poor planning the period between felling and processing of the wawa logs sawn at mill D was about three months. In addition, 267 green sawn boards were sampled from the mills to quantify the sawnwood volume loss due to thickness over-sizing and sawing variation. The results of this study indicated that the volume that could have been gained by reducing the sawnwood thickness over-sizing and sawing variation ranged from about 2 % to 17 % in volume of the sampled sawnwood. The study also found that between-board sawing variation was substantially higher than within-board sawing variation indicating that lack of setworks repeatability could be the major cause of the loss in volume. It was observed that the studied mills concentrated their production on sawnwood in export dimensions and grades. Therefore, off-cuts and trim ends that could have been processed further into mouldings, battens, floorings, and other products were discarded or sold at cheaper prices. The limited supply of timber resources give every reason for sawmills in Ghana to optimise fibre recovery from every tree that is felled. Even though this thesis studied only a limited number of cases, which represent a small fraction of the forest and sawmill industry in Ghana, there is a reason to believe that conditions prevailing in other operations are not very different from those observed in these case study mills. Ghanaian sawmills stand to benefit economically if they could improve their logistical planning and integrate production lines devoted to recovering fibre from off-cuts and trimmings.
Part one of an interview with members of "La Banda" and others connected to the band.Topics include: Introductions to those present for the interview and a little information about their family histories. How the band was formed and why. Memories of learning to play instruments, being in the band, and receiving instruction. Family members, both past and present, that are also involved with music somehow, but not directly involved with La Banda. Examples of when and where La Banda performed. The evolution of the band name, from Banda Regione d'Italia to the Leominster Band. What the makeup of the band is now. Other local bands that members play in. ; 1 INTERVIEWER: Cindy Rosamund with the Center for Italian Culture. It's Wednesday, September 19th. We are at the home of Lucy and Mike Scaramuzzi in Leominster at 30 Elm Street. And we have invited people that are connected with, uh, the band from Leominster, La Banda – or at least it used it be called that. We have many people here gathered at Lucy and Mike's home. And at first I would like you to just introduce yourselves. If you could just tell me your name, when you were born, where you were born, and if you know when your parents came to this country. Okay. Yes. [Unintelligible - 00:00:44] Hold on. Oh you want to know… RESPONDENT: I think that they're in the hallway. INTERVIEWER: That's okay. You're a part of this discussion. And you're right. At first I thought I was coming here primarily to talk to people only in the band, but that's okay. I think all of you have some connection, if not with the band at least Leominster and that's what we're all about here. We're writing about the history of Leominster, particularly Italian-Americans. Okay? So first we'll start with you. RENA: Well, I'm Rena Bisceglia. And did you want – I forgot to say… INTERVIEWER: Oh that's okay. Just, um, introduce yourself, giving your entire name including your maiden name. RENA Okay. I'm… INTERVIEWER: If you would like to tell us when you were born, where and a little bit about your parents. RENA: Oh, I'm Rena Bisceglia, born here in Leominster September 16, 1922. And I'm married to Vincent Bisceglia and my father-in-law was Gaspare who started the Italian Colonial Band. And I am collecting um newspaper articles, whatever I can find of information to write down in a notebook. INTERVIEWER: Great.2 VINNIE: Oh yeah, I'm… my real name isn't what's put down in the birth certificate, which is [Regelio Vincenzo Bisceglia]. Because there were two Regelios, my cousin was named Regelio, I went by the name of Vincent. So I was ultimately known as Vincent Bisceglia. I was born in February 9, 1920 and my folks came over about 1909 I think. And they, my mother came over with her sisters and her uncle who's the chaperone to the four sisters. And the Bisceglia side tried to come over but they were stopped at Naples because my uncle had a little sty in his eye, so they wouldn't let the family come in. My grandfather had already been here. He was working in Connecticut somewhere, so they stayed in Naples; fortunately they had a relative there, Dorico, whom they stayed with. They stayed there six months until my grandfather went over and got them and brought them here. But can you imagine that a little sty in a kid's eye—and my uncle must have been around 9 or 10—and they stopped the whole family from coming over? [Laughs] INTERVIEWER: They came directly, well, they went to Connecticut and then they settled in Fitchburg? VINNIE: No, no my grandfather had been working in Connecticut, but then I think he moved to Leominster because there was an assortment of people from the old country to get a job with. This was known as a [unintelligible - 00:04:09] but my father's folks came in through Canada. And I think they stayed in Quebec for a number of months. In fact, they were thinking of settling in Quebec, but because they had so many relatives and friends here in Leominster, they finally came from Quebec here. INTERVIEWER: So which part… VINNIE: But they had a really roundabout route to here. INTERVIEWER: Right. Which part of Italy did they come from? VINNIE: San Giovanni, which is on the spur of the [unintelligible - 00:04:43] Antonio Gargano – the "spur of the boot." And it's, my 3 grandfather was born in Monte Saint'Angelo, which is a high mountain city, right on the spur of the boot. San Giovanni is a little lower down. They finally moved to San Giovanni. My grandfather was – besides being in La Banda in Italy under the direction of, he was famous at that time, Florante, who was a conductor of the local band. All the cities have bands in Italy. But he was a jeweler by trade. The whole family made jewelry and sold jewelry around the different towns. I remember one story my father told me. My grandfather was carrying his assortment of jewelry from Monte Saint-Angelo down to the seashore of Manfredonia, one of those seashore towns. And he was riding a donkey. Now my grandfather was pretty hefty, like a [unintelligible - 00:06:02] was, you know, good-sized height and very, very hefty. And he was riding the donkey, and the donkey was pretty smart. When my grandfather got on the donkey, he would walk right on the edge of the precipice. [Laughter] So my grandfather was afraid they would all topple down the precipice so he would get off the donkey. So when he got off, then the donkey would walk in a comfortable part. When he would get on again, he would walk on the precipice – pretty smart donkey. [Laughter] RENA: So he would get off. [Unintelligible - 00:06:42] making those trips and he went to live in San Giovanni and he married your grandmother. INTERVIEWER: Okay. So why don't we go to the next person and come back. ROLAND: Me. I'm Roland [Verson] and I was born 12-21-31 – December 21, 1931. I was from [unintelligible - 00:07:07] Italy. My father was from Foggia San Juan. VINNIE: San Juan. ROLAND: Provincia de Foggia, that's where the priest was from. Was it Pio?4 RENA: Father Pio. ROLAND: My mother was from Bisceglie, Italy – Bisceglie Bari, they call it. VINNIE: Yeah, we were there. ROLAND: You were there? VINNIE: I spent four days there when I was a kid in the summer. ROLAND: Oh yeah? VINNIE: Yeah, in [unintelligible - 00:07:49]. INTERVIEWER: Who traveled here to this country? Was it you? ROLAND: My father. INTERVIEWER: Your father. And what was his name? ROLAND: Michael [unintelligible - 00:08:00]. He, I think he was the first to come and then he sent for his mother and father and my… VINNIE: They all did it that way. INTERVIEWER: And they all come to Leominster first? ROLAND: Well, my mother was from Worcester when she came here. INTERVIEWER: And what was her name? ROLAND: Maria Misino. RENA: Misino, M-I-S-I-N-O. INTERVIEWER: Okay. ROLAND: All right. INTERVIEWER: Do you have a connection to the band? ROLAND: Oh yeah, boy, going on 50 years. INTERVIEWER: Okay. Well, I'll come back to you. Next. PELINO: My name is Pelino Masciongioli. I was October 15, 1939 in [unintelligible - 00:08:48], a province of Abruzzo in Italy. My mother and her family were here in the United States. My mother was born in Everett, Mass. in 1916. My maternal grandparents had come from Italy and they had their family, and in the early 20's they packed up and went back to Corfinio. My mother met my father, who was from Corfinio, and they got married in the late thirties. And then after the Second World War, my mother being 5 an American born citizen was allowed to come back into the country and bring me with her. We moved to Pennsylvania. That was in February 1949. In the fall of that year, my father and two younger sisters were able to join us in Pennsylvania. My father went to work in a coal mine. They had a lot of strikes at the time. We had other family here in Leominster and it was decided for the future of the family, and the children in particular, that we should move to Massachusetts, which we did, and both my folks worked in plastic factories and I was fortunate enough that they sent me to college. And moving to the United States, a younger brother was born in Pennsylvania and a younger sister was born in Leominster. It seems like every time my family moved [laughter] we got another member in the family. And I pretty much lived in Leominster since 1950. And all of the family is still in the area. INTERVIEWER: Now do you have a connection to the band? PELINO: No, I don't. INTERVIEWER: Okay. Let's go to the next… CHARLES: Charles Johns. I'm the oddball. I think I was the first non-Italian to join the Italian Colonial Band. I think I was about, I would say maybe age 12. I had been taking trumpet lessons from my [unintelligible - 00:10:59] old Fitchburg music store, and he decided to leave the area, so that night my father went looking around for somebody else to teach me and I ended up with John Bisceglia, who was Gaspare's brother. My mother was born in Canada and my father was born here in Leominster of English descent, so there's no Italian connection whatsoever. But my father got me started with lessons with John Bisceglia and after a little bit John suggested that I go down to their rehearsals at Lancaster Street School on Sundays and get some more experience. And I don't know, it must have been about two years and I was still wearing my Boy Scout uniform, they decided to let 6 me play in a band concert and I was playing [unintelligible - 00:12:11]. I can distinctly remember making a mistake that very first night and Gaspare looked at me like I could have crawled through the boards in the bandstand. But it's been quite an experience, quite a learning experience. I learned a lot from playing with them. INTERVIEWER: Okay, thank you. We'll go to Mike. MIKE: No, Lucy. INTERVIEWER: Lucy. Okay. LUCY: I am Lucy [unintelligible - 00:12:57]. I am Roland's sister. You just heard from him, so my information is the same as his. My only connection to the band is that my father was in it and I think he just about started out with Gaspare and I have about five uncles in it -- had five uncles in it and maybe two or three cousins besides my brother. INTERVIEWER: Tell me the names of your uncles. You said there were about five. LUCY: John [unintelligible - 00:13:27]. [Unintelligible - 00:13:34] that's Morris. Lorenzo Predicelli. [Francio Julius] was in it at one time. And I think Frank [unintelligible - 00:13:49] was in it at one time, wasn't he? I thought I saw him in one of the pictures. How many was that, four? INTERVIEWER: That's five. [Unintelligible - 00:14:05] SPEAKER: Frank Junior? LUCY: I thought I saw his picture. Maybe he wasn't. No. [unintelligible - 00:14:19] Then there was Joseph Predicelli who was in it too. RENA: Tommy? LUCY: Tommy Predicelli. We had more than our share. VINNIE: You had more than the Bisceglias. INTERVIEWER: Okay. LUCY: The five of those brought their children and… ROLAND: My father was the manager.7 INTERVIEWER: Your father? ROLAND: Yeah. Michael Predicelli. I was just a little kid. INTERVIEWER: Do you remember the year, approximately? Was it right from the beginning, 1920? ROLAND: No. It was actually – no, I just remember, when I was 10 or 11, he was the manager and he trained John Predicelli. Remember him? LUCY: I sure do. ROLAND: And he showed him the ropes. Then he took it over. INTERVIEWER: So some of the questions I ask may be repetitive and there are a few rules for that. One being there are a lot of people here and sometimes I'm concentrating on something else even though you just said something. I have to be honest. So why don't we first talk about why the band was formed in the first place. I have heard someone mention that it was a tradition in Italy? So… ROLAND: As I said, I think a while ago every town in Italy has its town band. So my grandfather was Capo Banda. He was sort of like a concert master or – not the conductor but like a concert master. And I remember, I think we have pictures, but I remember they took a picture in Italy with my grandfather, and my uncle and my father were little boys sitting down with him with their instruments. So actually when they came over here, there were three of them that were musicians. And then they just had music in their system so they, my father… Well, another thing, my father was an apprentice to this bandmaster. They didn't have copy machines in those days, so one of his jobs was to copy out all the parts for the band. So he told me that when he started out, he made quite a few mistakes, and of course the way they were taught in Europe—the way I was taught too—when you made a mistake you got banged around. [Laughter] So after a few times of that kind of treatment, you didn't make mistakes anymore. But I remember I got the same 8 treatment when made too many mistakes playing. My father would put the fiddle down and whack me. Of course, my cousins got the same treatment too. But one time he didn't put the fiddle down, he broke the bow. [Laughter] INTERVIEWER: Do you think that helped you learn? ROLAND: Well, made me hate it. I hated music until I was 50. But, you know, I did it because I had to do it and because I knew how to do it. RENA: Tell the story about the time you were practicing and you were reading comics. ROLAND: Oh, yeah, I was in the room. I had to practice three hours a day. So to while away the time, I would get some comic books and I was just doodling on the fiddle, you know, reading the comics and not paying any attention to the music. My father, he came in and said that sounds funny. He came through the door and he saw what I was doing, that I was reading the comic book. He put my fiddle down and whacked me. [Laughter] RENA: You couldn't fool him. ROLAND: No, I couldn't fool my father. RENA: He wasn't in the room but he knew… ROLAND: He was too savvy for that. INTERVIEWER: Charlie, did you .get that treatment when you were taking lessons with him? CHARLIE: No. No. He was very nice, very kind, but I'd be practicing and I'd get frustrated. He would go and take the trumpet, put it in the case, put it in the closet and not say another word. A couple of days later, I'd say where's my trumpet and he would go dig it out and I would get it back. But he played the smart play, I guess. I'll tell you when his father looked at me if I made a mistake—I'm telling you—it looked like daggers were flying. CHARLES: Oh yeah.9 LUCY: Mike has an expression your father used. Mike, are you here? MIKE: Yeah. LUCY: Mike was in the band for a little while, a short while. Mike, tell them about the time you made mistake with the [unintelligible - 00:19:55], remember? MIKE: I wasn't with them that long. LUCY: I know you weren't with them. But what would he say? He'd say, "Who made that [unintelligible - 00:20:06]?" MIKE: Oh, I remember. [Unintelligible - 00:20:08] INTERVIEWER: Can you tell me what that word means? [Unintelligible - 00:20:20] CHARLES: Yeah, bitter onions, bitter onions. INTERVIEWER: Mike, you need to introduce yourself, because when you deferred to Lucy, I thought you weren't connected to the band but now I have it, well you were. MIKE: I'm [unintelligible - 00:20:32]. INTERVIEWER: Well, that's okay. MIKE: [Unintelligible - 00:20:43] Lucy's husband connected to the band because I was a little kid. My father used to play in it, way back when I was a kid, so I became interested in it and when I was in junior high school, I took up the alto horn and was old enough to go down there to join the rehearsals, like Charlie said, with the Colonial Band, but I really wasn't that great. Just a few months and then I got too old for them and all that, or so I thought. But other than that… LUCY: He went to the Eagle Drum Corp because there were girls there. [Laughter] INTERVIEWER: Is that how he met you? LUCY: No.10 VINNIE: The Eagles was all men. There were a couple of twirlers. And Charlie was in there [unintelligible - 00:21:41]. We had the music that… INTERVIEWER: So you said your father was in the band? MIKE: He was, back when they first started. He started with the trombone. The trombone had the valve, like Lucy said, [unintelligible - 00:21:56]. I think he played baritone for a while and that's why I picked up the alto horn. INTERVIEWER: And what was his name? MIKE: [Unintelligible - 00:22:12] INTERVIEWER: And did he come to this country by himself or did he travel with someone? MIKE: I think he came from Italy alone, because he met my mother here in the States when they got married. LUCY: He was the only one from the family to come, right? MIKE: Right. [Unintelligible - 00:22:40] my mother came on [unintelligible - 00:22:44]. She was a [unintelligible - 00:22:51]. There were four of them that came. They met and they got married. INTERVIEWER: And what year did they come to this country? MIKE: 1912 or in that area. He was in the same village with Lucy's father. They were in the same town, Foggia. They both came from there and [unintelligible - 00:23:12] father also. They all came from Foggia. INTERVIEWER: And it was the same. At the beginning most of the members of the band were from Foggia, Italy? MIKE: Yeah. Most of them would have been. What I heard is they followed your father here because they don't have anything. [Laughter]11 CHARLIE: [Unintelligible - 00:23:44] they made a mistake by getting on a couple of [unintelligible - 00:23:43] it's pretty common, or after the war in Italy in 1946 or '47 in school, including a stick. CHARLES: That's how they taught us, with a stick. INTERVIEWER: How things have changed, huh? VINNIE: You can't touch them now. [Laughter] CHARLES: [Unintelligible - 00:24:00] I was taught the old way. The first thing you had in [unintelligible - 00:24:05] you were taught to read music. VINNIE: Oh yeah [unintelligible - 00:24:14]. CHARLES: I did that for a year before I got an instrument. And when I was taking my lesson, your father never knew that I couldn't understand or speak Italian. [Laughter] And I never told him. And I used to take my lesson and he used to swear up and down. And I could hear your mother would be in the kitchen and she would be sighing. She would be crocheting and sighing. It was funny because he used to swear at me for not knowing the lesson, but then in English, in broken English, he would tell me how good I was. [Laughter] LUCY: I can remember when my brother was taking lessons before he got his instrument, he would have to beat out the music. They had to go la-dah-dah-dah. CHARLIE: That's the solfeggio. VINNIE: Right. You sing the notes. LUCY: He would, sat up in bed one night in his sleep and he was doing this. CHARLES: My mother thought I was sick; I was going da-la-la-la-la-la. INTERVIEWER: So tell us more about that, how you learned music. Was that typical that…? VINNIE: Yeah. Solfeggio is reading the music by name. Like if you want to play the Star Spangled Banner, you go "fa-re-do-re-fa-ti, re-do-12 ti-la-re" you sing the notes and beat time. And that way you learn conducting at the same time and also following any conductor, but you've had your time pattern while you sang the notes. And even in the conservatory they taught us to memorize, say we had to memorize a concerto we would do it by solfeggio. Memorize the notes by name because – it's pretty tough at first but it helps to impress it on your memory. INTERVIEWER: How long before you got an instrument? VINNIE: A year. INTERVIEWER: A year? How… VINNIE: Well, we did it even after we would get the instrument. It's just the brain work instead of tactile. Then when you played it, you had the additional memory assist by the feel of the instrument, but this way, here, it's in your brain. You sing the notes and keep the time. INTERVIEWER: Who determined when you were ready to pick up an instrument? CHARLIE: Oh, he did. [Laughter] INTERVIEWER: The father? VINNIE: He determined when I quit. He sent me to the nuns, to St. Cecilia's. I must have been 4 or 5, really young, having no knowledge doing it. And I remember taking lessons with Sister Mary who was, she was related to the royalty in England but she was a convert to Catholicism. So she would teach me and I would spend most of my time looking at her headdress. There was a slit in one corner of it and I was always trying to see what kind of hair she had. She had a crew cut, I remember. They wouldn't show their hair at all. They just had the headdress. That was my favorite – looking at it while I took the lesson. CHARLIE: Your father, was he also in strings or just brass? VINNIE: No, they were all brass men. It was funny how he chose the violin for me. I guess that's what I mean. He was able to teach on that. I don't know. He never, he just sent me to the nuns and then when 13 Carluccio came to town, you know, Carluccio was [unintelligible - 00:28:37]. He had had quite a role in playing violin. LUCY: He studied in Milan. VINNIE: So he finally started teaching me. Carluccio did. I didn't stay long with the nuns. maybe three years, and then I went to Carluccio. CHARLIE: Now Vinnie Longo did the same thing, then he went to the nuns, and went to Carluccio. INTERVIEWER: Did Vinnie ever play with the band? VINNIE: Violin? No. Not that I know of. CHARLIE: He was connected to the school band. INTERVIEWER: So who determined which instrument you would play? SPEAKERS: Gaspare. INTERVIEWER: Did he have that much influence over other band members, let's say their sons? VINNIE: He did. Well, I think so because whenever they needed instruments, he would probably suggest. But he didn't suggest to me. He told me to do it. [Laughs] CHARLIE: You know your father was very precise. VINNIE: Oh yeah. CHARLIE: When he directed. The beat was always there. You could always see it. Well, I grew up with your father there conducting, so when I started to play with other conductors I had no idea what the hell they were doing – really. VINNIE: Yeah, a lot of them are ballet dancers. CHARLIE: I won't mention his name, but he conducts [Axis]. My sister liked [unintelligible - 00:30:22] so the only thing he does for me is make me hungry. He looks like he's whipping up pizza. [Laughter] VINNIE: Well, that was one of the criticisms of Toscanini because he was one of the greatest conductors, but a lot of wise guys said he's just 14 a time beater. Well, what else is a conductor but a time beater? If you can't keep time, go home. [Laughter] You will hear that from a lot of people who don't know music. You know, they look at the conductor and they say, "Do you really need that guy up there?" Well, of course. MIKE: Was it fairly common for the kids to be sent to the nuns? Did they provide that kind of service in the community? CHARLES: Yeah. VINNIE: That was something they all did, the nuns did was teach music. ROLAND: They did. CHARLES: You got to pay them. VINNIE: Oh, yeah – of course, you pay them. MIKE: It wasn't just one nun. There was a group of them that all provided lessons [unintelligible - 00:31:19] instruments. INTERVIEWER: Which instruments? Can you tell us which ones they could teach? VINNIE: Well, because I only knew that they taught violin, that is what I learned; my cousins here took the other lessons. CHARLES: Sister Mary. VINNIE: The same one? I would think it would be violin and piano. I don't think they were in to band instruments. CHARLES: Maybe flute or something. INTERVIEWER: Now, Vinnie, which instrument did you play in the band? VINNIE: Well, when I went to school, I think junior high – I didn't play in the band until I got to junior high. Then I joined, they had an old flute hanging around and doing nothing so they gave it to me to play. So I learned it and, of course, I had already been playing violin so it wasn't too long before I could play it. So when I started with the flute, I joined my father's band and played flute in the band. And in fact later on, I kept playing flute and piccolo. When I was in the Army, I played flute and piccolo in the marching band. That's what I did for four years.15 SPEAKER 1: I know why you played the piccolo. It was the lightest instrument to carry. [Laughter] VINNIE: Yeah, my father would razz me a lot because when I played in his band I played the flute. It's a bigger instrument. So when we were marching along, there would be kids following us so I would have some kid carrying my flute until it was time to play and then I would pick it up. And my father used to say you're lazy to even carry your flute. Speaking of laziness, I had to practice three hours a day by the clock and so it sounded like a long time to me. So I practice maybe half an hour, look at that clock. So I go to the kitchen clock and advance it 10 minutes. Then I would go practice some more, errrr, got another two hours to go. I'd go to the kitchen clock and advance it 10 minutes. I kept doing that until three hours went by. And the strangest thing, nobody ever said anything. My father and my mother, they never caught on or told me they caught on what I was doing, but every day that clock would be fixed. I would probably advance it about an hour. [Laughter] INTERVIEWER: Roland, how did you learn your instrument and which instrument did you play? ROLAND: I played the clarinet and saxophone from Vinnie's father. INTERVIEWER: So he gave lessons too? ROLAND: Yeah, I took lessons from him. INTERVIEWER: So you also learned music first for about a year? ROLAND: Yeah, and went through high school and went to the Navy School of Music when I was in the service. VINNIE: Oh you played in the marching band too, huh? ROLAND: Yeah. We had a [unintelligible - 00:34:57] Washington, D.C., the police that were out there, they would come for the school and they would get half a dozen guys from the school and take us to the armory and they gave us uniforms and we would play twice a week. Once on the Capitol steps we would play a concert, like we 16 do here, and then [unintelligible - 00:35:28] place where cherry blossoms. Captain says it's a good duty. He said, "Every time you play you get two days off in a week. So if you want to be a policeman, you come and see me." [Laughter] No, I didn't want to be a policeman. It was a lot of fun. I made two world cruises playing in the band. INTERVIEWER: Now tell me more about your father, Roland. He was in the band also? ROLAND: Yeah, and he was… INTERVIEWER: And did he learn an instrument probably much the same, in the same way that you did? VINNIE: I don't know. It's possible my father and uncle [unintelligible - 00:36:15], you know, to play in the band when they [unintelligible - 00:36:20]. ROLAND: I think that's what happened. LUCY: We have a feeling all those who [unintelligible - 00:36:21] were born with these instruments in their hands. INTERVIEWER: But do you know if your father was in the band in Italy? ROLAND: Yeah. INTERVIEWER: He was. And what instrument did he play? ROLAND: He played trombone. In fact, he was in the Army for about three months, I guess, he was playing in the band. INTERVIEWER: Do either of you know if the traditions goes beyond that, for example your grandfathers? ROLAND: Yeah, my grandfather was a baritone player. VINNIE: Yeah, my grandfather was too. They were all brass men. RENA: Your grandfather played in America with your father. VINNIE: Oh yeah, he was part of the original band, my grandfather was. ROLAND: I got a story about your father. He used to go mushrooming in the war. And one day, we were just kids, [unintelligible - 00:37:20] and I, and someone else, I forget who, and your father was picking 17 up mushrooms, and all of the sudden he stood up and he smiled. And he always used to carry a little notebook in his shirt pocket and pencil, and all the sudden he took it out and he started writing like crazy. He heard this bird chirping and he wrote a tune out of it. VINNIE: Yeah, I know all about that. INTERVIEWER: Now, Vinnie, you said your grandfather actually played in this country. Maybe I missed something… VINNIE: He played with my father's band. INTERVIEWER: Your father's band here. VINNIE: But he also, he belonged to the band originally in Italy. INTERVIEWER: Did your grandfather live in Leominster? VINNIE: Oh yeah. INTERVIEWER: Did he move here? VINNIE: He started off in Connecticut then he moved to Leominster and then he brought his family here to Leominster. INTERVIEWER: Okay. ROLAND: So your father started a band and recruited his father to play? VINNIE: Yeah. I guess his father probably yelled at him. [Unintelligible - 00:38:39] RENA: He first came to this country alone. VINNIE: Yeah. RENA: And he was here for a while and someone wrote back to Italy that he was becoming very skinny, as your Aunt Grace put it, and so your grandmother got very alarmed about it and asked him about it. And she wanted him to send back a photo so she could see what he looked like. But he didn't have the money for a photo. So he drew… he stood in front of the mirror and drew a picture of himself and mailed it back to her so she could see what he looked like. [Laughter] And then after a year or so, I guess he went over there and came back with the whole family. 18 INTERVIEWER: Do you have any stories of perhaps a great-grandfather playing an instrument? VINNIE: No, I don't go back that far. I know my grandfather, but that's it. INTERVIEWER: Now do you want to talk about the great-grandfather who had the 20 children? VINNIE: Oh. [Laughter] When I was growing up, folks would tell me about my grandfather was one of 17 children. RENA: Now he's talking about the one we just talked about, Vincenzo. VINNIE: And I always took it with a grain salt, the 17 children. And they said that a couple of them were shot by bandits, so they always said, you know, fantastic number of children. So one time, just before he died, I asked Frank [Jethro] who grew up in that town. I said, "Hey, tell me the truth Frank, there weren't 17 children." He said, "No, no, no – there was 24." [Laughter] So there must have been some truth in this, but they're all scattered around the country. Some in Kansas City, Missouri, some in… RENA: They're probably… VINNIE: Arkansas, some in New York City. Let's see… RENA: A lot of them are optometrists and one of them got to be a Protestant minister in Kansas City and there's an Italian cultural center in his name in Kansas City. VINNIE: John Bisceglia. He had the same name as my uncle – Presbyterian minister. RENA: Well, they were befriended by this church when they came to this country and so they just turned around and went with them. Then there were others that were goldsmiths. VINNIE: Jewelers. RENA: Jewelers, goldsmiths, and optometrists. One of them wrote to Tony. I have a letter that he wrote to Tony, and Charles was his name, so it was the next generation. They sent all the kids to school. 19 ROLAND: Tony played in the band too. RENA: Yeah, he played clarinet. SPEAKER: Is he [unintelligible - 00:41:54]? RENA: Of course. VINNIE: And there was a Steve Bisceglia that was a football player I saw somewhere. I remember seeing his name somewhere. I remember seeing his name. He played for like Alabama? INTERVIEWER: University of Alabama. VINNIE: A few years back, he was playing for them. He was a well-known football player. He was one of those from that game… RENA: I saw it on television. I couldn't believe my eyes because my [uncle] is called Steve and he was about the same age. He was at the Naval Academy at the same time that this boy was in Alabama and I saw Steve Bisceglia #44 on the back of his shirt and he was playing football. So I had Kathy write him a letter and it developed that he is of the Bisceglia wine family in Fresno, California. VINNIE: Oh yeah, we went there once. RENA: So he invited my Steve to go visit him. He said, "We will compare and see if we use the same toothpaste." [Laughter] INTERVIEWER: Roland, tell me about your grandfather. Do you know if he played an instrument? ROLAND: Yes. He played baritone, brass instruments, but it wasn't long before I was alive. I knew your father knew him. VINNIE: Oh he knew your grandfather? INTERVIEWER: And what was your grandfather's name? ROLAND: Joseph, Josepe Nicole [Franson] – Joseph Nicholas Franison]. INTERVIEWER: Now did he live in Leominster? ROLAND: Yes. INTERVIEWER: Okay. 20 LUCY: Now, [my brother] I think has an interesting story. He played a duet with Franklin. Didn't you? Didn't you play with your grandson at a band contest? So, that would be my grandfather, my father, [Roly] and Roly's grandson. INTERVIEWER: That's where I was going. MIKE: You're remembering middle school. INTERVIEWER: So do any of you have brothers that also played in the band? ROLAND: I didn't have any brothers. INTERVIEWER: You don't have any brothers? ROLAND: Two sisters. I had cousins. [Unintelligible - 00:44:20] INTERVIEWER: But if you had brothers, they would be expected to play in the band? VINNIE: Oh yeah, they all took a turn. Tony played too. ROLAND: Everybody did. LUCY: Now, of course, the Piermarini family, Cleto was the father, and all of his sons, Alfonz, Carl, Stephen and even Paul. Did Clyde ever play? ROLAND: I think Clyde was a piano player. VINNIE: Yeah, in Las Vegas. INTERVIEWER: Okay. Now, Vinni, you mentioned that you really hated music until you were about 50. VINNIE: Oh yeah. INTERVIEWER: You [unintelligible - 00:44:58]. Tell me a little bit about that. Was that you didn't want to let your father down, the community down – what was it? VINNIE: Well, uh… ROLAND: He didn't want to get whacked. [Laughter] VINNIE: No, it was just something I had to do. I accepted it. Didn't like it but I accepted it and I did the best I could. Of course, it's not good in a way because you only do it when you're pressured to do it. Even now I won't practice until I have to play somewhere and I 21 have to get ready, and that threat makes me, pushes me to practice. But I never practiced until, unless I was forced. LUCY: You were a music teacher in Fitchburg. Wasn't music the way you earned your living? VINNIE: Oh yeah, but I didn't operate the same way as my folks did. In fact, maybe I went the opposite way. I never pushed any kid, in fact, not on my kids. I never pushed them into music. They all like it and they all dabbled in it but I never pushed one of them because I remembered, you know. I never pushed them. RENA: May I interrupt and say that now you love it? VINNIE: Oh I like music, hell, yeah. RENA: And you found out that you… VINNIE: Since I was… RENA: Really, really love it. VINNIE: I thank my father. RENA: He did you a favor. VINNIE: For doing me a favor, right? INTERVIEWER: Do you regret that you didn't push your own children, now that you have a love for it? VINNIE: Sometimes I regret it. RENA: But he did, we did sent one of them to U. Mass and he majored in oboe. That was an instrument he wanted to play. But Vinnie tried it for two years and gave it up because he realized it just was not for him. [Laughter] He went into business and he had been CEO of all the companies and live onto and he has done fabulously well in business. So he just realized that even though he had the opportunity to be a musician that it wasn't for him. But his son is at B.U. and he is majoring in music. So this is, his grandson is majoring in music. INTERVIEWER: So the tradition continues. Didn't you feel pressure from your father to teach your children?22 VINNIE: No, just the opposite. I didn't want any kid to go through what I… INTERVIEWER: No, what I'm saying is, didn't your father give you pressure to teach your children… his grandchildren? VINNIE: No, well he had passed on by that time. But speaking of children playing music, I know one time there was something going on at St. Anne's, the band played and then we went inside and they had a little program with kids and my son Steve and another kid—I won't mention names because they might be embarrassed—but they had to play a number. My Steve was about 12 or 13, and the other kid was about the same age. They were pals. One played the piano and Steve played the violin. So they played this number and it sounded great. And all of the sudden, the piano player, they were about three-quarters through, he just discovered that his music was upside down. [Laughter] So he quickly turned it right side up but you never knew it because the kid sounded great. I'll never forget that. RENA: He was a pro from the beginning. VINNIE: Yeah. INTERVIEWER: [Unintelligible - 00:49:24] LUCY: Vinnie, did your father finally find out that you loved music or had he passed on by that time? RENA: First, did he know you didn't like it? INTERVIEWER: Did he know that you didn't care for it? VINNIE: I never told him, no. I never told him I didn't like it. ROLAND: How old were you when you played with the San Antonio Symphony? VINNIE: Well, that was after the service. Wherever I was stationed I would play with the local symphony. I was Bangor and played with the Bangor Symphony. ROLAND: I thought you were there permanently.23 VINNIE: Went to Oklahoma and I played with the Oklahoma Symphony. But when the conductor at the Oklahoma became conductor of the San Antonio, the war was over, so then I went back as a civilian and played a couple of years with the San Antonio under the same conductor. ROLAND: Rena, tell your story about Vinnie, when he [unintelligible - 00:50:36]. I used to take my lessons on Saturday afternoon in Vinnie's living room. And I was taking my lesson and all of a sudden the phone rang and Vinnie's mother went to answer and was talking to Vinnie and then she says, "He wants to talk to you," talking to her husband, Vinnie's father. Vinnie was in New York, I guess – and you had joined the Navy without calling your folks. VINNIE: Oh yeah. ROLAND: So [unintelligible - 00:51:18]. VINNIE: You heard that? ROLAND: Yeah, I was taking my lesson. I was right there. RENA: Oh dear me. ROLAND: Your father used to sit at one of the dining room chairs and I had to stand up before he comes out breathing fire. So I'm standing there and I remember your father saying, "Well, you signed the papers; it's too late now. Be a good boy." [Laughter] VINNIE: I didn't know that. RENA: [Unintelligible - 00:51:54] I visited you in the barraks and he was saluting and everybody… VINNIE: Oh yeah. I was playing in Bangor, Maine, in the band, and they came up to visit me once here and of course everybody salutes anybody else. So he was starting to salute everybody, following the band. [Laughter] INTERVIEWER: So when the band was formed in Leominster, how – did you ever get the story of exactly how that happened? I understand that they, these people played instruments, they were carrying over the 24 tradition from Italy. But when was the decision made to gather together and create a band for the Italian community? VINNIE: Well, I guess my father was the one that decided right along, or actually with his father when he was an apprentice to this conductor in Italy, so it was his desire of being in band music. So I guess they had a few players that had played in bands overseas so he got them together. I think it was only 16. ROLAND: Yeah. That's what I already thought was all these musicians out there, they just got together here and started playing. RENA: Yeah. VINNIE: There were enough of them to start a band so they had this tradition of band playing… ROLAND: Then they grew as time went along. INTERVIEWER: When they created the band, was it to play for the Italian community? VINNIE: Well, initially I guess it was to play for the functions of the Italian community. INTERVIEWER: Give me some examples of when and where they played, when you were a youngster. VINNIE: They used to play up at St. Anthony's in Fitchburg, some religious feast of some kind; they had a procession with [unintelligible - 00:54:06] and people would pin money on a statute, on a flag, and we would march all the way up to St. Anthony's Church and back there, and then they would have a concert and then usually fireworks after the concert. But that was difficult. It had these religious processions. ROLAND: Did that in Boston too. VINNIE: It was in Boston, right? RENA: Worcester. ROLAND: We played in Worcester. INTERVIEWER: So the band played in Boston also for…25 VINNIE: Yeah, they went there [unintelligible - 00:54:46]. CHARLIE: Did they play in Worcester for the second time…? ROLAND: Plus the time we played in Boston, we played in the Worcester in the morning and got on a bus and went to Boston RENA: I remember one article they played in Rutland for veterans who were disabled and couldn't get out to see a concert, so they would go there where they were. And they were so appreciative. That was a nice -- Rutland, Vermont actually. INTERVIEWER: Vermont. CHARLES: When I started taking trumpet lessons from his Uncle John, my mother was working at Santa [Cloth Works]. VINNIE: Oh, yeah. My father and mother worked there. CHARLES: My mother knew of the association between John and Gaspare and she kept saying every so often, "[Unintelligible - 00:55:46] no music; you go around singing operas." I was working with John. When I started playing, I was still in school and I've got a severe narrow upper palate and this dentist wanted to take and pull some teeth out to see if he couldn't flatten it and I would say, "No way! I play trumpet, so leave my teeth alone." He said, "Well, we'll take one out in the back on this side and one out in the back on this side, and we'll see what happens." I was also playing some dance work occasionally and I was playing, like Vinnie said – oh, I can't say. Well, I got into the band; it was almost every other week during the summer I had to [unintelligible - 00:56:51], went up to Fitchburg, and by Sunday night I could take my front teeth and push them back and forth; they were actually loose. And actually I was just taking out the two lower teeth; my teeth was actually pushed back just from playing all that time. VINNIE: Really? INTERVIEWER: Now at the beginning of this interview today, you had mentioned that when you got frustrated with the trumpet –26 CHARLES: Practicing. INTERVIEWER: That your mother would just put it away. CHARLES: She would get mad. Well, she would get mad and say, "That's enough," put it in the case, close the case up, and put it in the closet. INTERVIEWER: It sounds like you had a different experience than Vinnie. CHARLES: Nobody ever slapped me around. I slapped myself around. [Laughs] INTERVIEWER: I didn't quite mean that, but did you feel as much pressure? Was anyone looking to you to join a band? CHARLES: No, no. When I was in school, I was in the band at school and then, like I say, John was giving me lessons and he said, well – and I was there and everybody was kind of [fumbling], "Well, why don't you start coming down to the rehearsals on Sundays down at [unintelligible - 00:58:05] school?" Okay. When I went down there, I was so frustrated when I left that first day. None of the music was trumpets. Everything was manuscript. You put this thing out past and started to play and I don't think will [unintelligible - 00:58:30] I didn't have a clue as to where I was. I sat down. But after a while, I kept on it and… VINNIE: Yeah, I remember when Charlie – because he was so small, his feet wouldn't touch the floor; they would just dangle over the edge. Of course, now he's a big six-footer. But I can remember him rehearsing and I would see everybody else kind of growing up, and there's Charlie; he's just barely over the edge of the chair and playing his trumpet – probably one of the youngest to ever get into the band. ROLAND: They remember Charlie as the band was growing and they were trying to bring in good musicians. And the only good ones were the kids. Charlie Johns, [unintelligible - 00:59:13] and that's when the band started picking up.27 CHARLES: If I had one thing to say that I was sorry about, as far as belonging to the Leominster Colonial Band, it's, typical stupid young kid, I never learned the language. I had a golden opportunity to learn. But one thing that used to get to me was, for some reason, something would go wrong and his father would start after somebody and they were going back and forth in Italian and I didn't have a clue what was going on, but I always thought it's my fault [unintelligible - 01:00:03]. [Laughter] INTERVIEWER: So I take… I'm sorry. SPEAKER 2: As far as the tradition of playing on feast days, you know, because most towns in Italy had patron saints, you know, as a church, so that was a fairly common occurrence and you could go from town to town playing in feasts. But some of these social clubs that we started here, you know, like my folks belonged to the [Cofigno] Club. CHARLIE: Sons of Italy. SPEAKER 2: Okay, Sons of Italy, you know, Faggio Club, [Salodini], I imagine that, as I remember, they used to have dinners on occasion and dances. And so, the local bands would've been called on to come in. CHARLIE: Oh yeah. SPEAKER 2: And play on a lot of those functions. Another way for people in the regions to get together, you know, they had common interests and backgrounds. SPEAKER 1: Oh great. SPEAKER 2: And we'd socialize. CHARLIE: I think it's a shame that that has gone by the books today, because a lot of the young people are never going to get to experience some of those things. INTERVIEWER: Are you talking about the social clubs or are you talking about the band?28 CHARLIE: No. Well, mainly the social clubs, but the bands – what Vinnie said, we used to go out… sometimes we'd play on a Friday night, then we'd go out on Saturday night, play another concert, [unintelligible - 1:01:25] on a Sunday; you'd march the society to church and then, God knows, we walked all over the water skirt barrier on a Sunday afternoon. SPEAKER 2: Oh yeah. CHARLIE: Went to [unintelligible - 1:01:37] and people will never get to see that anymore. It doesn't exist, except in Boston; you've got to learn to look down there. SPEAKER 2: They kept up the traditions better there. CHARLIE: Yeah. RENA: If I'm not mistaken, all those social clubs had a patron saint. CHARLIE: Right. RENA: And they would celebrate the feast of that saint by having a concert and dinners and so forth. VINNIE: They'd have a procession receiving everything. INTERVIEWER: Was the band paid a fee for performing? VINNIE: Oh yeah, oh yeah. They get paid the union dues, once we all joined the union, yeah. And they added up all the costs and that's how they charged the different societies. RENA: They joined the union in 1956, so before that? CHARLES: Well, they still got paid before '56. INTERVIEWER: By the Sons of Italy? CHARLIE: Because I went out to St. Louis in '53 and I was already in the union because I played out there a couple times. INTERVIEWER: You were in the union earlier? CHARLIE: '53, I think, I took the band out there in about '53 – because I was still in high school. When I got out of high school, then I transferred my union membership out there. RENA: Maybe the whole band wasn't in until a few years later.29 CHARLIE: I think the last time I played before I went out to St. Louis we had just joined the union then and played a concert in Barry. ROLAND: Before that, the city used to pay us. CHARLIE: Oh yeah, that's right, the city. ROLAND: And the pass was 3 dollars. [Laughter] RENA: I know, I know. [Laughs] ROLAND: And if you were just a kid, like Charlie and I were back then… CHARLIE: A buck-fifty. ROLAND: You got half price, a dollar fifty. [Laughter] CHARLIE: I remember when I put [unintelligible - 1:03:57]. RENA: And you rehearsed free of charge. CHARLIE: And the dagger looks when you made a mistake. [Laughter] VINNIE: His father could cut you off without touching you. He didn't have to slap you on the side of the head. CHARLIE: Well, I remember the first memory I had of the band; I was about 3 years old. My father used to take me to the band rehearsals. Now he would go to either Phillip [Carecci's house or my grandfather's house. But they didn't have a setup with stands or chairs. They all stood up. And, you know, they'd read out their lines. So it was just… quite a lack of room, out of the whole band, everybody's standing up. I was just barely 3, so I didn't know what to do with myself. So I see all these legs there, so I'm going under their legs like bridges; I'm going under this musician's legs and out the other one. I guess I kept it up too long, because my father stopped bringing me to the rehearsals. [Laughter] INTERVIEWER: How often did they rehearse? CHARLIE: How long? INTERVIEWER: How often? How many times? ROLAND: Oh once a week. INTERVIEWER: Once a week? ROLAND: Oh yeah that was set; every week there'd be a rehearsal. 30 CHARLIE: What was it, Sunday? ROLAND: Sunday morning. CHARLIE: Sunday morning, yeah. INTERVIEWER: Sunday morning? CHARLIE: I guess this [unintelligible - 01:05:27], down in the basement. RENA: And all the neighborhood kids would peer through the windows and watch. I remember going there. INTERVIEWER: So was it prestigious belonging to the band? VINNIE: Was there a procedure? INTERVIEWER: No prestigious. ROLAND: It was an honor. INTERVIEWER: Was it an honor? VINNIE: Oh yeah. I would guess. CHARLIE: I always considered it an honor, especially when I was the first one who couldn't speak the language. VINNIE: Until it was time to practice. [Laughter] CHARLIE: Yeah. SPEAKER 2: Everybody's seeing that a little kid in the Italian band. CHARLIE: Yeah, in the Boy Scout uniform. INTERVIEWER: So Charlie, when did you join the band? CHARLIE: I'd say it would have to be… oh, I'd say the late 40s. INTERVIEWER: And prior to that, there weren't any non-Italians? CHARLIE: Not that I know of. INTERVIEWER: And why was that? ROLAND: Well, it was an Italian band. It used to be made up of fathers and sons, you know, they came from Italy. It was the Leominster Italian Colonial Band. CHARLIE: Right. ROLAND: So then when Charlie came in, we had to change the name. [Laughter] No, [unintelligible - 1:06:47].31 INTERVIEWER: Now getting to the name change, are you saying that in jest? When it was no longer just Italians, is that when the name changed? VINNIE: Yeah. CHARLIE: Yeah. They started to get different, you know, out of the city there were very few. VINNIE: As the groups came in, so they decided to change it to just Leominster Band. CHARLIE: I can remember one time when they were playing, practicing, Roland was in there then, and something went wrong and then they got into a big feud about something. And Nicholas' father walked over behind him, standing right behind him and he's calling a mile a minute, and all of a sudden Roland reaches in his pocket, pulls out his handkerchief and puts it on the top of his head. [Laughter] I'd just sit there and I didn't have a clue as to what was going on. INTERVIEWER: Well, the band changed its name in about 1953? CHARLIE: No, I think it was later than that. RENA: Probably when they went on union – in 1956? But they made two changes: 1910 originally they were Banda Regione d'Italia, in honor of the people who backed them. And then the second time was 1916, I think, when they became Italian Colonial Band. INTERVIEWER: Was it the Italian or the Italian-American Colonial Band? RENA: I always heard of it as the Italian Colonial Band. VINNIE: Italian Colonial. RENA: Because it was still completely… VINNIE: Mostly Italian, yeah. RENA: And then in '53. VINNIE: They dropped the "Italian." RENA: Leominster Colonial Band. INTERVIEWER: Okay. Now why was the word "Colonial" chosen? Does anyone know?32 RENA: Because they were a colony of the Italians in the beginning, right? ROLAND: Yeah. INTERVIEWER: Because it was a colony? VINNIE: An Italian colony in Leominster. INTERVIEWER: Okay. And who chose the name? Did a group of people get together and talk about it or…? ROLAND: I don't know. Maybe the sponsoring group – who was it? Regione d'Italia was the sponsoring group? RENA: I have no idea about that. VINNIE: It just grew up that way. INTERVIEWER: Could it be your father did that too? VINNIE: Yeah. I think it was just common usage you know. RENA: You know, one thing I haven't found out yet is they had women come in. When did that happen? Who was it that was first in… is a girl? VINNIE: That was late [unintelligible - 1:09:40]. INTERVIEWER: Was she Italian? ROLAND: There were always men you know, that played in the thing way back then. RENA: But I think it was when you started; you started letting the girls come in. [Laughter] CHARLIE: Well, why not? INTERVIEWER: Did a woman approach you and want to join the band? CHARLIE: No, it just grew up that way. The kids at school were learning instruments and the girls were too. So then when you needed an instrument, a particular instrument, like a lot of the flute players. Yeah, some of my students that I taught flute now play in [unintelligible - 1:10:24] she played flute in the band. You know, [unintelligible - 1:10:32], I taught them flute. So when they needed flute players, you know, the girls could play flute, so they 33 came in. There was no specific move to put women in or include women; it just grew that way. ROLAND: Wasn't it that their high school and… they could play so then they decided to get in? CHARLIE: Yeah, they started playing… the girls started playing in high school, so then they… RENA: It's interesting that up to a point it was all male. CHARLIE: Yeah, it was originally, yeah. RENA: It's nice to see some girls join. ROLAND: Some of them, a lot of them are music teachers; they teach in a public school. CHARLIE: Yeah. INTERVIEWER: That are now members of the band? VINNIE: Oh yeah a lot of women in the band now. RENA: Yeah. INTERVIEWER: How many members are in the band now? CHARLIE: It usually is around 30. Isn't that about the number they use now? ROLAND: About 30, yeah. INTERVIEWER: Now is that typical? Is that how many there were when you were younger? RENA: No. CHARLIE: Probably a little smaller. INTERVIEWER: Smaller? CHARLIE: Probably around 20-something, or 28, 26 maybe. ROLAND: I noticed when I was a kid they used to have three tubas, and you know, probably the tradition of just-male membership came from Italy. CHARLIE: Oh yeah. ROLAND: And that tradition was carried over. And I would guess that the term "Colonial Band" is probably their attempt at translating to join, the Banda Regione d'Italia. Okay? Try to translate that to an 34 American, probably the word Colonial was placed in there to refer to the "Regione" which means region. RENA: Region. Yeah, that sounds possible. CHARLIE: Oh I've got to tell this story before we forget it. We were just a little small town band but there was one time we made the national news, all over the country. And I won't mention his name, please don't say it because he feels embarrassed. But we were marching to the center of Leominster… ROLAND: Oh, yeah. CHARLIE: You remember that? And from Evergreen Cemetery marching in Leominster, we'd take a right on West Street. Well, there was a player on the extreme left front end and we took the turn on West Street, but he was so engrossed in his music, he kept walking straight [laughter] towards Pleasant Street and he didn't notice until he was almost up to Pleasant Street. He turned around, there was no band there. [Laughter] He went all the way back and somebody had taped the whole thing and they sent it in to some news channel and they put it on television. That was the only time we ever made the national news. [Laughter] INTERVIEWER: If they taped it, it had to be pretty recent, right? CHARLIE: Well, it was quite recent. You guys remember. But he always felt so bad about it that I won't mention his name. But he made a statement. INTERVIEWER: About what year was that? Do you know? ROLAND: It would've been after the war, I would imagine. CHARLIE: Oh about 8 years ago, rather recent. ROLAND: Oh recent? CHARLIE: It was rather recent. ROLAND: You think so? INTERVIEWER: So it's kind of someone – home movie collection? CHARLIE: Somebody's got the tape.35 RENA: What is the program where they put on several funny ads and then people vote? INTERVIEWER: America's Funniest Home Video or something. RENA: Home videos. CHARLIE: I want to see that. RENA: Somebody should enter it in to that program. Did he know that that was sent in? CHARLIE: Well, he found out eventually. [Laughter] He always gets up and he gets mad when he hears about it. ROLAND: Actually, somebody asked him if they could do it on that home video TV program. And he said, "Well, you can but don't mention my name." It was funny because what the band would do is every year they would take a luck coming out of a mechanic strike. And then that was way back when they had the wooden bandstand and it was right in the middle of town. So you automatically figured you're going to take a left. This year, they decided they were going to march up by… RENA: West Street by the common. ROLAND: Yeah, where the city hall parking lot is. RENA: Yeah. ROLAND: And what he did, he automatically went to the left because they used to give their speeches and everything. And that was great. INTERVIEWER: Now there was a band in Fitchburg also, and that disbanded. So did some of those members come over to Leominster? CHARLIE: Well, they still have a band in Fitchburg. ROLAND: Yeah, I play with them; Charlie and I play with them. CHARLIE: Yeah, Fitchburg Military Band. INTERVIEWER: All right, so was there an Italian band in Fitchburg? VINNIE: Not specifically. Probably most of the same musicians played in that band too. Like how many – are there more than you two that play in the Fitchburg's Military from Leominster?36 ROLAND: There's Gene. VINNIE: Gene? CHARLIE: Yeah. ROLAND: And most of the brass players. CHARLIE: Yeah, there's a lot of exchange between town bands. VINNIE: John used to be in it? CHARLIE: Oh yeah, they used to play in the Townsend Band. My father played in the Townsend band. They all shared the bands around here. ROLAND: On Memorial Day we would play in the morning, and then in the afternoon we used to play in Greenfield. And it was all hills. And we remember once we did the same thing; we were going up this tall one, and I don't know if Charlie remembers, but Roger Pascarelli, he was, they used to put the clarinets up front. CHARLIE: Yeah, yeah. ROLAND: And he was on one end, and I forgot – John Pacceli was on the other end, and we were marching and we came to this fork. And the first time we played, we didn't know where we were going. And it was funny it was like somebody split the band up. [Laughter] And there were two guys there, engrossed in their music and they were going this way, and the other guys were going that way. Remember that, Charlie? CHARLIE: Yep. ROLAND: [Unintelligible - 1:18:14] road you're taking, right? RENA: You go that way. INTERVIEWER: So when did – did the music change over time, the repertoire of the band? ROLAND: Yeah it did. Because in those days, the music was really heavy; it was quite long and everything, you know.37 VINNIE: Yeah, there were a lot of operatic excerpts played by the band. Now they have regular concert band music, you know, worldwide. But in those days, it was mostly operatic excerpts. ROLAND: Manuscript. VINNIE: Arranged for the band. RENA: And some of the music is about 200 years old and it is still played by this band, although they do play the modern as well. But as I think I read in one of the articles, it's like preserving a museum piece in the museum and they have preserved this music. They still have it; they have the music and they can play it if they want to. But now they're beginning to play more and more of the show tunes. INTERVIEWER: Now I was wondering, are there any bylaws or something that tries to preserve the culture of the band, for example, the 200-year-old music? Is there something in place that will hopefully keep this music alive for generations to come? CHARLIE: Well, just in the light read…/AT/jf/kg/ee
The laws of history are as absolute as the laws of physics, and if the probabilities of error are greater, it is only because history does not deal with as many humans as physics does atoms, so that individual variations count for more. — Isaac Asimov, Foundation and Empire From a certain point onward there is no longer any turning back. That is the point that must be reached. — Franz Kafka, The Trial INTRODUCTION How ought we characterise the exercise of power in our societies? Are they societies that confine and discipline our bodies, or ones that control us in potentially subtler ways? This article adopts the framework for analysis used by twentieth century French philosopher Gilles Deleuze in his short but defining essay on the subject, 'Postscript on Societies of Control'.[1] It firstly considers the background to the concept of control, then provides a definition of the concept, and, finally, asks whether our society is one of control. It argues that Deleuze is correct to say control has replaced discipline as the primary mechanism of power in our era. ORTHODOXY In order to address the question of whether societies of control are increasingly replacing disciplinary societies, it is imperative first to understand what disciplinary societies are. Discipline is a concept developed most powerfully by Deleuze's contemporary, Michel Foucault.[2] Foucault's philosophy primarily concerns the technologies of power operating within society and their effect on human autonomy. He pursues this study via a genealogical approach; that is, he employs a historical critique to interrogate the workings of powers at play in modern society. In this way—despite his vocal opposition to Hegel—Foucault is very much Hegelian in his belief that close examination of historical parallels and events can clarify and deepen our understanding of present-day technologies of power and how they shape or restrict our autonomy.[3] Through his historical work, which spans various societal and public institutions, Foucault identifies a fundamental change in the mechanisms of power exercised by the state in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He articulates this shift as a transition away from sovereign power to technologies of discipline. This notion of discipline and disciplinary society is perhaps best exemplified by Foucault's enquiry into the French penal system in his Discipline and Punish.[4] The book opens with vivid depictions of public torture and execution in pre-eighteenth century France. Foucault explains that the physicality and the public nature of punishment in the French criminal system up until then was an essential aspect of the exercise of sovereign power. Yet, while brutal public spectacle instilled fear and awe, it also provided public fora for communities to revolt against the perceived injustices of the sovereign. By moderating power through the benevolent reform of the criminal, by the discipline of the docile body, and by the fragmentation of public space into discrete, segregated institutions, state power could be obscured and, thus, maintained. These forces are the hallmarks of a disciplinary society. REVISION In his 'Postscript', Deleuze—building on the work of Foucault—argues that the twentieth century has marked a shift from disciplinary societies to societies of control. A precise definition of control and societies of control has proven to be elusive;[5] it is therefore helpful to consider both the antecedents and critiques of Deleuze's analysis in addition to his work itself.[6] Antecedents Deleuze has attributed the concept of control to William Burroughs.[7] Burroughs, in turn, provides not a definition of control, but brief observations as to its exercise; in truth, his analogies are of only limited assistance when read in the context of mechanisms of power within society at large.[8] Nevertheless, there are two salient points to note. Firstly, Burroughs establishes that when one maintains total or absolute power over the actions of another, they can more accurately be said to be using them rather than controlling them. Secondly, Burroughs shows that control requires concessions and illusions: controllers must make concessions to the controlled in order to maintain the illusion of choice and free agreement, obscuring their true motives in order to avoid revolt. In contrast to Burroughs, Félix Guattari provides an analogy of control that usefully supports the conception Deleuze comes to advance: the gated home and community accessed and exited via electronic cards.[9] This has elements of discipline, as movement being granted or denied constitutes a form of confinement. But, as Deleuze argues, it also represents a departure from the disciplinary society, as 'what counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person's position […] and effects a universal modulation'.[10] Among his identified influences, Deleuze contends that Foucault sees as 'our immediate future' societies of control.[11] Deleuze particularly emphasises that Foucault's work on discipline is historical (focused on the exercise of power in the nineteenth century); we should, therefore, not be so naive as to assume Foucault would not have recognised the possibility of further historical change. Indeed, Deleuze says that Foucault concludes his Discipline and Punish with the explicit recognition that a prison as a physical space is becoming less important in the exercise of power. This, Deleuze suggests, presages a fuller analysis of a new sort of power.[12] Deleuze makes these forceful arguments as to Foucault's understanding of power in response to a critique by Paul Virilio that Foucault did not understand the nature of modern power. Ironically, that critique is also an important precursor to Deleuze's analysis. Virilio argues that the patrolling of the highway—and not the prison—exemplifies the exercise of police power. Deleuze concurs, adding that modern authorities possess predictive technologies that anticipate the movement of subjects and consequently have less need for confining subjects. Deleuzian societies of control That predictive power is a hallmark of control. In his 'Postscript', Deleuze fleshes out this position polemically. It must be noted that Deleuze never attributes any concrete definition to the notion of control itself; he is primarily concerned with how a society of control operates. This section will similarly consider the features and modes of operation that constitute a Deleuzian society of control. Much like with the disciplinary society, the technologies of power that govern a society of control cannot be boiled down to one single technology or mechanism. Instead, there are targeted and multi-faceted ways in which societies of control manage the lives of their subjects. Most fundamentally, there are no enclosures or strictly delineated confined spaces (like, for instance, the disciplinary society's schools, barracks, and factories, which are all subject to clear separation from one another). Instead, there is a single modulation, which allows for the coexistence and connection of various states (the corporation, the education system, and the army are all connected, one flowing into the other). This brings us to the next point: exploring how these spaces or states are connected. The disciplinary society operates on the basis that its subjects start over when they move from one space to another. Though it does recognise analogies between the spaces (the discipline of the school may be similar to the discipline of the army), the spaces and norms are ultimately distinct from each other, with one having little bearing on the other. Societies of control, on the other hand, are predicated on connection between spaces, such that 'one is never finished with anything.'[13] These connections encourage a culture of constant progression or improvement. The question this cultural attitude begs (to what ends is progression and improvement directed?) admits no answer. There are also differences in the conceptualisation and treatment of the person. The disciplinary society takes the individual and subjugates her through discipline so that she will conform to the mass. No such subjugation is necessary in societies of control. The individual is not viewed as a member of a mass, but as a data point, a market audience, a sample. This allows for targeted control to take shape, where compliance is not forced upon the individual (as with discipline) but facilitated. There are no overarching aims or requirements outlined by societies of control (no 'watchwords'). The society is governed merely by way of codes that function as 'passwords'; these can allow or deny the individual access to certain information or amenities. The control of access is presumably based on the conduct of the individual and is a means of exercising control over individuals' choices: the individual self-disciplines because of incentives and disincentives encoded within herself as a data-point. This, in turn, suggests (perhaps even necessitates) a degree of technological surveillance that goes beyond that of the comparatively simple model of the Benthamic Panopticon Foucault famously employs. Additionally, there are no clear hierarchies, if there are any at all. Unlike in disciplinary societies, power is not centralised or in the hands of a single 'owner' or state. Rather, control is exercised by a corporation—invested with its own personhood—comprising stockholders. The make-up of this corporation is transitory and fundamentally transformable. All of these technologies—singular modulation across singular space, an ethos of the relentless pursuit of progress, the 'dividualisation' or 'data-fication' of the individual, the facilitation of compliance, the use of codes as passwords, technological surveillance, and the absence of clear hierarchies of power—together create a society of control. Critiques Here we will explore three critiques of Deleuze's thesis: the privatisation of public space, the role of surveillance in control, and the telos of control. Privatisation Michael Hardt deals at length with the Deleuzian conception of societies of control, both in his joint work with Antonio Negri on Empire, as well as more specifically, in a piece titled 'The Global Society of Control.' Here, Hardt contends that there is an incompleteness to Deleuze's work on control, and proceeds to elaborate on the operation of societies of control to fill in these purported gaps. He does so by situating these societies within his and Negri's broader framework of Empire. The study is multifaceted, but here only one aspect of the critique will be considered: the erasure of the dialectic between public and private. 'There is no more outside,' insists Hardt.[14] This is to say, there are no longer any meaningful or permanent divisions between private and public spaces. Nikolas Rose, similarly, argues that inherently public spaces (like public parks, libraries, and playgrounds) are being abandoned in favour of privatised and privately secured places (like shopping malls and arts centres) for acceptable members of the public.[15] Those who have no legitimate, consumerised reason to occupy these new privatised 'public' spaces are denied access to them. Populations and classes of people deemed 'dangerous' or 'undesirable' are excluded from the private-public spaces and, so, from society itself. Deleuze touches on this idea of exclusion as well, in saying that 'three quarters of humanity', who are too poor for debt (as in, those who cannot be managed through the mechanisms of 'control', because these mechanisms rely on monetary and consumerist incentives or 'passwords') and too numerous of confinement (which makes it logistically difficult to subject them to technologies of 'discipline' that rely on confinement) will have to face exclusion to shanty towns and ghettos.[16] From this, we can take two points. Firstly, that neither the societies of control, nor disciplinary societies are or have ever been able to exercise control or discipline over every individual; when they are unable to, they simply exclude these potentially unpredictable and uncontrollable threats to order. Secondly, there is the implicit acknowledgment that technologies of control and discipline can coexist; to conceive of discipline and control as dichotomous notions would be inaccurate.[17] In fact, the question posed by this essay itself may fall victim to a false dichotomy between Foucauldian discipline and Deleuzian control. These mechanisms of power are not necessarily mutually exclusive. We should, therefore, be wary to adopt a view that control represents a natural or irreversible progression (from discipline) in the exercise of power (as Hardt and Negri may be suggesting in saying that control is an intensification of discipline),[18] because they are contingent historical realities. That is what Foucault's work—and Deleuze's analysis of it—suggested of discipline, and it is no less true in the case of control. Thus, we can qualify our thesis by saying that while societies of control are increasingly replacing those of discipline, technologies of discipline (and even of sovereignty) are still employed in certain contexts. Surveillance Surveillance is implicit within Deleuze's conception of control (in the understanding of the individual as a mere data point, not the member of a mass), but Oscar Gandy articulates this technology more explicitly.[19] Such an emphasis on surveillance is problematised, however, by Rose, who posits that societies of control are not predicated on surveillance but on the instilling of self-discipline and self-regulation in their subjects. That rather misses the mark, because, as we have seen, societies of control employ a range of technologies to exercise power. Nothing suggests an emphasis on self-discipline ought to exclude the technology of surveillance, which is implicit in the incentivisation of labour and use of passwords. Telos But Rose's critique of surveillance does helpfully inform another point of discussion: the odd ideas prioritised within societies of control. Deleuze makes brilliant and incisive concluding remarks about this telos of self-improvement and self-actualisation. But what are the motivations behind this ethos of motivation? That is the question Deleuze poses in his conclusion, and it is a question that largely remains unanswered. In some ways, one can only hazard a guess at the mechanisms at work here. That is rather the point. Societies of control have evolved such that their technologies of power and their telos can be more obscure than that of disciplinary societies. VALIDATION With definitions—or, rather, understandings—of both disciplinary societies and societies of control to hand, this essay considers whether it can be said that the latter are replacing the former. The institutions of the disciplinary society Foucault identifies in his body of work—the home, the school, the prison, the barracks, the factory—are all still extant. However, as we have noted above, there need be no 'either/or' as between societies of discipline and of control; the question is more accurately one of degree and we must identify whether a general movement may be occurring. Again, that movement need not be total or irreversible. Such a movement seems to be taking place all around us. For example, remote working and learning, which Deleuze identified as increasing in the 1980's and which has skyrocketed in light of the coronavirus pandemic, has weakened substantially the disciplinary segregation of physical space.[20] At the same time, it has strengthened the all-encroaching productivity ethos of societies of control by placing work or study (itself little more than a preparatory step towards work) within the walls of the private family home. Whilst coronavirus may have accelerated a shift towards societies of control, this trend runs much deeper still. Below, we shall seek to validate the shift Deleuze identifies by employing and analysing four impressionistic vignettes. Vignette A In April 2021, Chinese state television broadcast an exposé of intolerable working conditions faced by food delivery drivers—long hours, meagre pay, algorithms that encourage dangerous driving and heavily fine lateness, and harassment from customers who have full and 'live' access to drivers' locations and contact details. China's couriers are estimated to contribute to close to 1% of the country's economic activity, but the undercover government official earned just £4.52 over a 12-hour shift.[21] The courier works in no strictly delineated or confined space, but everywhere, openly. He is the subject of constant surveillance. Customers have his precise location, his 'ETA', the corporation's promised delivery slot, and his personal mobile phone number at their fingertips. The threat of an angry call or harsh review might appear in those circumstances to operate rather like a panopticon unconfined by space, enforcing conformity. But that is only a minor part of this story; it is secondary to the algorithmic surveillance and control in which both the courier and the customer are merely variables. Drivers will be set timescales in which to complete a delivery determined by the average speed at which drivers have previously made that journey or a similar journey. If they beat that timeframe, they may be rewarded with bonus pay. If they fail, their pay will be docked. Both processes—the incentivisation of speed and disincentivisation of slowness—are automated. The algorithm does not care how the driver gets from A to B, only that he does so quickly and does not damage the customer's goods in the process. So, drivers will travel recklessly in order to beat the clock to boost their meagre pay, but this only shortens the average time of journey completion, making pay boosts harder to achieve and pay docks more likely and contributing to an insane culture of paranoia and uncertainty. Compliance with the requirements of speed in this system is facilitated, not forced. In paying the less perfect worker less and the more perfect worker more, the corporation is nudging the courier to an (ultimately ephemeral) standard of compliance. But it need take no further punishing or corrective action: it knows that the courier, impacted by these forces, will correct himself. The password operating here is that of a courier 'score' that determines the level of pay afforded for work done. This is ripe terrain to consider Deleuze's challenge as to whether the unions will be able to resist forces of control upon the breakdown of the workplace. China, where organised labour is met with fear and hostility, shows that the communist party will intervene by challenging monopolies and exposing low pay. They may moderate the technology of power, but they will not extinguish it; the work is too economically important for that. In the UK, there have been increased efforts by unions to protect insecure, 'gig-economy' labourers and they have had some success.[22] But here too the overall system of algorithmic control is not removed, but mollified. Vignette B A London-based junior employee at Goldman Sachs, one of the largest investment banks in the world, has complained that staff face 18-hour shifts that mean they are earning less than the UK living wage and regularly take sick leave due to burnout. In 2015, US employee Sarvshreshth Gupta, who had been working 100-hour weeks, took his own life.[23] The company has a £50,000 entry-level base salary.[24] The company's average employee takes home about £260,000 per year.[25] It is at first blush surprising that employees at Goldman Sachs could be said to be subjects of control by twenty-first century technologies of power, and even more surprising to suggest that their situation is comparable to that of couriers in China. But this is precisely the sort of topsy-turviness that is to be expected from (and ultimately serves to legitimate) societies of control, where we all 'work hard'. The impetus to 'get ahead' is central to the ethos of self-improvement and motivation instilled by societies of control. That is perhaps nowhere more evident than amongst the new, highly-remunerated, highly-overworked, 'meritocratic', professional or upper class of managers, bankers, and lawyers.[26] Previously, elite status was maintained through generations by inheritance. That method of status-maintenance has now mostly been displaced by investments in 'human capital'. This can be achieved directly—through funding private schooling, tuition, and even work placements paid for by the volunteer—or indirectly, through covering children's rent and paying for their goods. The crucial factor in bringing about this shift has been the rise of 'meritocracy', which purports that success (i.e. the rate of remuneration for one's work) is a result and marker of an individual's inherent drive and talent but which in reality allows 'a relatively tiny segment of the population […] to transmit advantage from generation to generation' because elite parents stack the odds in favour of their children's advancement from birth.[27] This is the society of control in action: demanding, inequitable and possessing an obscured, democratically-papered-over telos, drive and skill directed at productive activities. But the elite class are not spared from the brutalities of this system, as the above vignette suggests. Since societies are increasingly meritocratic (in the sense that the most skilled and driven will generally be remunerated the most, not in the sense that the system promotes a level playing field) young elite professionals still have to work incredibly hard to 'climb the ladder'. Even if they reach seemingly secure positions of employment, they will still want to continue to reap the rewards of their labour, still need to work intensively to secure funds to invest in their children's human capital, and still be motivated by the overwhelming and corrupting cultural ideal of self-improvement and motivation. The name of Goldman Sachs' personnel team, 'Human Capital Management', is telling. It has been noted, '[l]ives are things that people have; capital has rates of return.'[28] Vignette C About one in every hundred adults in Britain has been trained as a 'mental health first aider' by the MHFA.[29] They advertise their 'proactive' services thus: 'for every £1 spent by employers on mental health interventions, they get back £5 in reduced absence [.] and staff turnover.'[30] The second of five listed responsibilities for first-aiders is to communicate concerns about 'anyone in your workplace, for example to an appropriate manager.'[31] Separately, the UK government is providing '£1 million for innovative student mental health projects' that offer targeted support to those identified statistically as being at highest risk of mental ill-health.[32] Deleuze argued the hospital was being replaced by 'neighbourhood clinics, hospices, and day care'.[33] Similarly, the above vignette suggests that the power that would in a disciplinary society be exercised by the asylum has, in our societies of control, been exercised dispersedly by employers, with the aim being to improve profit-margins and productivity rates. The actual mental wellbeing of employees—or, rather, of human capital—is a means to that end that may give rise to some incidental good. But even these incidental goods are monetised, such as when companies compete on their 'work-life balance' or their inclusion of private therapy in 'healthcare plans' so as to attract the most human capital. Under these conditions, the public healthcare officials sectioning or supporting a member of the public who risks harm to herself or others are reduced in their significance. In their place, the anxious employer preempts possible harm to the corporation by proactively addressing and preventing harm to the employee. Similarly, 'mental health teams' in schools and universities are encouraged by the government to anticipate, based on a series of data-sets, those students who are 'more at risk' and provide targeted interventions to safeguard their health (and, by extension, their productivity). Deleuze says that 'the socio-technological study of the mechanisms of control […] would have to be categorical'. By this it is meant that we must look to each institution of power—the healthcare system, the corporate system, the educational system—and describe the power being exercised there. The above vignette shows that that has become an artificial mode of analysis in this era of control. The healthcare system has been radically dispersed, with detection, prevention, and mitigation (recovery being ancillary) of illness now increasingly undertaken by the corporation and its agents, including crucially the employee herself qua employee or human capital. She will contact her mental health first aider colleague or her employer (though any difference between the two seems doubtful). She will purchase products—self-help books, meditation apps, tickets to motivational talks—with a view to her greater productivity and, hence, 'employability'. In fact, the monetary value she attributes (through her valuable spare time as much as through her pay-power) to her own productivity and employability may reduce the corporate system's nascent role in facilitating compliance; her self-improvement becomes her guiding, internalised ethos as a consumer-employee and she will discipline herself, knowing this self-improvement will be coded and rewarded. Thus, technologies of power in the modern, mental health context cannot be identified within a healthcare system, a corporate system or an education system, nor even within what might be dubbed a 'consumer system'; there is no single system of operation of which we can speak. This conceptual challenge itself demonstrates the ultimate annihilation of the institutions Deleuze anticipates in societies of control. Vignette D In May 2021, the UK government proposed halving state funding for university courses they do not regard as 'strategic priorities', such as music, drama, visual arts, and archaeology. It is estimated that such courses would run at a deficit of £2,700 per enrolled student, and many courses may therefore have to close if the plans go ahead. The government says the decision is 'designed to target taxpayers' money towards the subjects which support the skills this country needs to build back better'.[34] They also say universities should "focus [.] upon subjects which deliver strong graduate employment outcomes in areas of economic and societal importance".[35] Deleuze foretold the 'effect on the school of perpetual training, and the corresponding abandonment of all university research'.[36] Alarming an idea as this may be, the above vignette should at least discourage us from dismissing it altogether. The government's proposal betrays a deeply production-oriented approach to higher education that sees knowledge and learning as purely instrumental to the development of concrete 'skills' to be directed at the most economically valuable production of goods and services and, correspondingly, the strongest employment outcomes. The UK education system no longer possesses its own watchwords (save, perhaps, 'instilling British Values'). Instead, all activity is directed at the future employment prospects of the student. The privatisation of schools (through academisation in England) has allowed for corporate sponsorship that makes this close instrumentalism perfectly plain: the corporation's senior managers become senior managers of underperforming schools and they are expected to foster students' 'aspirations'. Here, the corporate and educational systems are blended together, the former funding the latter, the latter supplying labour to the former. The physical spaces in which learning occurs can at times barely be distinct from the corporate, whether a company name is printed across the school entrance ('Bridge Academy in partnership with UBS') or affixed to laptops donated to school students studying remotely. CONCLUSION There is a great deal of truth to Deleuze's thesis that societies of control are replacing disciplinary societies. We have noted the destruction of swathes of confined and discrete spaces; the intermixing of institutions; the pervasive power of technology to tweak and modulate behaviour through coding; and the pointless but universal ethos of motivation. As Deleuze ably demonstrates, analyses of discipline, confinement, hierarchy, and masses can only take us so far in understanding these forces. More necessary in our quest to uncover the telos we are being made to serve is a socio-technological study of control and its methods. However, this essay has also sought to demonstrate the limits of Deleuze's proposed methodology. For a 'categorical' socio-technological study of control becomes more elusive the more deeply a society succumbs to control. Schools, prisons, barracks, hospitals, factories, offices, and homes are increasingly blended (and so less discrete) environments. The office educates, entertains, protects, and diagnoses its employees. The school is a business, its pupils are prospective employees. University is a career stage. Beds, dining tables, and lounges are workstations. For those on 'home detention' during coronavirus in the United States or under TPIMs (Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures) in the United Kingdom, these same spaces are prison cells. The gradual annihilation of the disciplines as physical and conceptual spaces—which Deleuze foresaw—also renders obsolete our existing methods of understanding power. We are in need of new tools to respond to these developments; the study of categories must be replaced with the study of networks and systems. We must explore with curiosity and thoroughness the complex web of relations operating through spaces and lives. BIBLIOGRAPHY Adams R, 'English universities must prove "commitment" to free speech for bailouts' The Guardian (16 July 2020) accessed 6 May 2021 Bakare L and Adams R, 'Plans for 50% funding cuts to arts subjects at universities "catastrophic' The Guardian (6 May 2021) accessed 6 May 2021 Burroughs WS, 'The Limits of Control' in Grauerholz J and Silverberg I (eds), Word Virus: The William S Burroughs Reader (4th edn, Fourth Estate 2010) Collini S, 'Snakes and Ladders' London Review of Books (London, 1 April 2021) 15 Deleuze G, 'Foucault: Lecture 17' (University of Paris, 25 March 1986) accessed 9 May 2021 — — 'Foucault: Lecture 18' (University of Paris, 8 April 1986) accessed 9 May 2021 — — 'Foucault: Lecture 19' (University of Paris, 15 April 1986) accessed 9 May 2021 — — 'Postscript on Societies of Control' (1992) 59 October 3 Department for Education and others, '£1 million for innovative student mental health projects' UK Government (5 March 2020) accessed 11 May 2021 Ewald F, The Birth of Solidarity: The History of the French Welfare State (Cooper M ed, Johnson TS tr, Duke University Press 2020) Feng E, 'For China's Overburdened Delivery Drivers, The Customer—And App—Is Always Right' NPR (Beijing, 1 December 2020) accessed 7 May 2021 Foster M, 'Guess How Much Goldman's Average Salary Is (GS)' Investopedia (25 June 2019) accessed 10 May 2021 Foucault M, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978–79 (Senellart M ed, Burchell G tr, Palgrave Macmillan 2008) — — Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Sheridan A tr, 2nd edn, Vintage Books 1995) Hardt M, 'The Global Society of Control' (1998) 20(3) Discourse 139 — — and Negri A, Empire (Harvard University Press 2001) Makortoff K, 'Goldman Sachs junior banker speaks out over "18-hour shifts and low pay' The Guardian (London, 24 March 2021) accessed 7 May 2021 MHFA, 'Being a Mental Health First Aider: Your Guide to the Role' accessed 10 May 2021. — — 'Workplace Info Pack' accessed 10 May 2021. Morar N, Nail T and Smith DW (eds), Between Deleuze and Foucault (Edinburgh University Press 2016) Muldoon J, 'Foucault's Forgotten Hegelianism' (2014) 21 Parrhesia 102 Nealon J, Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and Its Intensifications since 1984 (Stanford University Press 2008) Negri A, Interview with Gilles Deleuze: 'Control and Becoming' (Joughin M tr, Spring 1990) Rice-Oxley M, 'UK training record number of mental health first aiders' The Guardian (2 September 2019) accessed 11 May 2021 Roffe J, Gilles Deleuze's Empiricism and Subjectivity: A Critical Introduction and Guide (Edinburgh University Press 2016) Rose N, 'Government and Control' (2000) 40(2) The British Journal of Criminology 321–339 Wallin J, 'Four Propositions on the Limits of Control' (2013) 39(1) Visual Arts Research 6–8 Wise JM, 'Mapping the Culture of Control: Seeing through The Truman Show' (2002) 3(1) Television & New Media 29–47 Yang Y, 'China's food delivery groups slammed after undercover TV exposé' Financial Times (London, 29 April 2021) accessed 11 May 2021 — — 'How China's delivery apps are putting riders at risk' Financial Times (London, 26 January 2021) accessed 11 May 2021 [1] Gilles Deleuze, 'Postscript on Societies of Control' (1992) 59 October 3–7. [2] On their complex relationship before and after Foucault's death, see François Dosse, 'Deleuze and Foucault: A Philosophical Friendship' in Nikolae Morar, Thomas Nail and Daniel W Smith (eds), Between Deleuze and Foucault (Edinburgh University Press 2016). [3] James Muldoon, 'Foucault's Forgotten Hegelianism' (2014) 21 Parrhesia 102. [4] Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Alan Sheridan tr, 2nd edn, Vintage Books 1995) [5] Michael Hardt, 'The Global Society of Control' (1998) 20(3) Discourse 139. [6] Deleuze cites these authors in his 'Postscript': (n 1). [7] Gilles Deleuze, 'Foucault: Lecture 19' (University of Paris, 15 April 1986). [8] Burroughs himself concedes his analogy of the life-boat is a 'primitive' one: William S Burroughs, 'The Limits of Control' in James Grauerholz and Ira Silverberg (eds), Word Virus: The William S Burroughs Reader (4th edn, Fourth Estate 2010). [9] 'Postscript' (n 1) 7. [10] ibid. [11] 'Postscript' (n 1) 4. [12] Foucault refers to it as 'biopower'. Biopower is not something that this essay will address, but we can observe that it may be that the Foucauldian notion of biopower and the Deleuzian notion of control are broadly similar or even the same: for a fuller discussion of that relationship, see Thomas Nail, 'Biopower and Control' in Between Deleuze and Foucault (n 2). [13] 'Postscript' (n 1) 5. [14] Hardt (n 5) 140. [15] Nikolas Rose, 'Government and Control' (2000) 40(2) The British Journal of Criminology 331. [16] 'Postscript' (n 1) 7. [17] JM Wise, 'Mapping the Culture of Control: Seeing through The Truman Show' (2002) 3(1) Television & New Media 29. [18] Nail, 'Biopower and Control'. [19] Wise, 'Culture of Control' 33. [20] Deleuze, 'Foucault: Lecture 18'. [21] Yuan Yang, 'China's food delivery groups slammed after undercover TV exposé' Financial Times (London, 29 April 2021). [22] For instance, many will now be recognised as 'workers' rather than as 'self-employed', with greater protections: Uber v Aslam [2021] UKSC 5. [23] Kalyeena Makortoff, 'Goldman Sachs junior banker speaks out over "18-hour shifts and low pay' The Guardian (London, 24 March 2021). [24] ibid. [25] Michael Foster, 'Guess How Much Goldman's Average Salary Is (GS)' Investopedia (25 June 2019). [26] Stefan Collini, 'Snakes and Ladders' London Review of Books (London, 1 April 2021) 15. [27] ibid 22. [28] ibid. [29] Mark Rice-Oxley, 'UK training record number of mental health first aiders' The Guardian (2 September 2019). [30]MHFA, 'Being a Mental Health First Aider: Your Guide to the Role'. [31] MHFA, 'Workplace Info Pack'. [32] Department for Education and others, '£1 million for innovative student mental health projects' UK Government (5 March 2020). [33] 'Postscript' (n 1) 4. [34] Lanre Bakare and Richard Adams, 'Plans for 50% funding cuts to arts subjects at universities "catastrophic' The Guardian (6 May 2021). [35] Richard Adams, 'English universities must prove "commitment" to free speech for bailouts' The Guardian (16 July 2020). [36] 'Postscript' (n 1) 7.
Ego te provoco: algunas consideraciones preliminares.El continuo despliegue de potencias extra-regionales por el hemisferio ha adquirido nuevas connotaciones estos dos últimos años. En ambientes políticos, y comunidades epistémicas, han surgido visiones contrapuestas a la hora de evaluar estos despliegues. Por un lado, están quienes ven esta problemática de forma relativamente benigna y en lo medular acorde a las tendencias globalizantes que estarían abarcando todo el planeta sin excepciones de país, cultura, economía o sociedad. Por otro, están quienes matizan las intensidades y diferencian entre los objetivos buscados por una u otra potencia extra-regional. China, India, Rusia e Irán, los actores extra-regionales más activos, tendrían motivaciones distintas; y la receptividad también sería diferenciada. Sin embargo, en los nichos e intersticios por donde circula la influencia extra-regional queda al descubierto una característica común cual es la ausencia relativa del otrora omnipresente comportamiento de Estados Unidos.En este contexto, plagado de factores multidireccionales, es la penetración iraní la que suscita mayor atención. También es sobre la que hay menor información en fuentes públicas. Ello no ha sido óbice, sin embargo, para que, desde 2005 en adelante, ésta penetración sea no sólo ostensible sino creciente. En visibilidad y en complejidad.En efecto, Irán se está desplegando por América Latina a través de una hábil combinación de elementos propios de soft y del hard power. Emplea también una gama de otros elementos intermedios. Los énfasis de unos, o de otros, está relacionados no sólo con el diseño conceptual y praxis desplegada por Teherán, sino también con la receptividad que ha tenido en cada país de la región. De esta forma, se han generado tendencias que hacen de la relación de Irán con los países latinoamericanos un tema esencial de la agenda de seguridad hemisférica.Siguiendo a dos de los más prolíficos autores en esta materia, Román Ortiz y Ely Karmon, y teniendo en consideración el carácter complejo del diseño conceptual y la praxis de la penetración iraní, se sostiene la hipótesis general de que la principal motivación de los iraníes es la obtención de influencia en el "patio trasero de EEUU".Aunque el despliegue iraní se observa en la mayoría de los países del hemisferio, cinco sudamericanos son los que concentran mayor actividad (en orden alfabético): Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Ecuador y Venezuela. Con cada uno, se registra una relación multifacética y no desprovista de elementos sui generis, que poco o nada tienen que ver con los cánones tradicionales de las relaciones bilaterales. En consecuencia, identificar y problematizar estos elementos coadyuva en la muy intrincada tarea de desentrañar las razones por las que, por primera vez en su historia milenaria, los persas se muestran interesados en esta zona del mundo.Para alcanzar un foothold en América del Sur, el régimen iraní se procura diversos tipos de elementos categorizables en a) aquellos de poder suave (diplomacia pura y formal, lazos culturales inocuos, como el hermanamiento de ciudades, convenios universitarios y otros), b) elementos intermedios (apoyo material y espiritual a comunidades shií en la región, a mezquitas y centros religiosos) y c) elementos definitivamente duros (acuerdos militares o industriales vinculados a asuntos de seguridad y defensa o comerciales con dicha finalidad, o bien actividades encubiertas con grupos terroristas afines como Hizbollah). Denominador común de todos estos elementos es su ubicación en el contexto de una estrategia a prioridefinida.La vastedad de los elementos señalados, así como el fortísimo sigilo con que son ejecutados, ha llevado a que analistas y académicos privilegien dos posturas para entender su impacto; ambas benignas. En efecto, la mayoría las ve como algo irrelevante, por momentos incluso con cierta indiferencia, casi como un sub-producto de las excentricidades del régimen de los ayatollahs, mientras que en otros momentos, buscan asociarla a cierta inevitabilidad de los cambios en el escenario mundial y a la pérdida relativa de la influencia estadounidense en América del Sur. Sin embargo, ambas relativizan las verdaderas consecuencias y no dan cuenta de su naturaleza. Naturaleza y consecuencia van de la mano. La primera se entiende por su rasgo fundamental, cual es que toda la estrategia iraní está en manos del Pasdaran. Por cierto que ello no implica necesariamente que todas las consecuencias sean previsibles o inmediatas. Pero al ser el Pasdaran el principal instrumento de la penetración, no se puede sino asociar la penetración a los objetivos e imperativos estratégicos de Teherán, vale decir con los planes nucleares, con la competencia estratégica con EEUU, con la construcción de bases capaces de propinar golpes de represalia en el corazón mismo de Norteamérica y, last but no least, con el papel global asignado a la religión. En otras palabras, con la capacidad de disuasión iraní. Por lo mismo no es casualidad que los planes de desarrollo nuclear y misilístico estén bajo tuición del Pasdaran. Tampoco es casualidad que el despliegue esté tan estrechamente vinculado a su estrategia de promoción del fundamentalismo islámico y a la pretensión de aislar a Israel (1). Vista en el contexto de los imperativos estratégicos de Irán, la generación de complicidades con gobiernos afines es fundamental.En esta materia, el despliegue iraní en la región registra novedades generales y específicas a lo largo del bienio 2010-2011.Hannibal ante portas: Irán se despliega en América del SurCuasi de forma paralela a la gira del Presidente Barack Obama por Brasil, Chile y El Salvador en marzo de 2011, el Viceministro de Relaciones Exteriores iraní, Behrouz Kamalvandi realizó un periplo por Quito, Bogotá y La Paz. Pocas semanas más tarde, al iniciar junio de 2011, el influyente y controversial Ministro de Defensa iraní, Ahmed Vahidi, llegó a Caracas para desplazarse luego a La Paz. Asimismo, a fines de 2010, el régimen de Ahmedinejad destinó US$ 4.500 millones para esta nueva etapa de su despliegue en América del Sur (2).Esta verdadera proliferación de recursos económicos, políticos abiertos y encubiertos, así como diplomáticos indica que los énfasis de estos dos últimos años se han comenzado a vincular crecientemente con el poder duro. De acuerdo a las previsiones de Elías Eliaschev, durante 2011 se completará la designación de 150 cargos para el staff que se dedica a América Latina en general, y de esa masa de US$ 4.500 millones, ya se han empezado a ejecutar US$ 87 millones (una transferencia supervisada por el propio comandante general de las brigadas Quds, Qassem Soleimani), de los cuales, a su vez, siete milllones han ido directo a Hizbollah(3).Parece razonable entonces asumir la hipótesis de que el poder duro ha adquirido centralidad. Sin embargo, los ritmos e impulsos que vaya observando el despliegue iraní dependerá finalmente de los nioveles de receptividad de cada país sudamericano(4). Esta responde a necesidades y motivaciones específicas. De ahí que el despliegue deba tener también una atención relativa en aquellos elementos de poder blando y toda la gama intermedia. Los sucesos acaecidos en torno a la visita de Ahmed Vahidi a Bolivia, examinados infra, así como el objetivo de alcanzar pronto US$ 20 mil millones en inversiones diversas de Irán en la región, confirman esta necesidad que tendrá Irán de ir acomodando su estrategia a las citadas sensibilidades de cada país sudamericano.En cuanto a los elementos de poder suave, el más importante verificador de tendencia del despliegue está dado por el incremento de embajadas iraníes en la región. Teherán tenía hasta el 2007 (5) sólo cinco embajadas en América Latina; de ellas únicamente tres en América del Sur. Hacia el 2011, el número de legaciones con embajador residente ha crecido ostensiblemente. Once suman hasta mediados de 2011 las embajadas iraníes en América Latina. Un dato anexo es que salvo Guyana y Surinam, la diplomacia iraní mantiene legaciones en todos los países de la región, y la única donde no hay embajador residente es aquella en Paraguay. Sin embargo, las visitas a Asunción del embajador concurrente -desde Montevideo- tienen la inusual frecuencia de una por mes; sin contar las constantes visitas de personeros de gobierno a Asunción (6). Finalmente, dentro del ámbito de poder suave, destaca también el apoyo manifiesto expresado por los embajadores de los países integrantes del ALBA en Teherán el 16 de julio de 2010, reiterando el "derecho soberano de Irán para generar energía atómica y utilizarla para fines pacíficos". Declaración vista con satisfacción en Teherán ya que permite visualizar algunos signos homogéneos en la receptividad regional. Debe tenerse en consideración que en los asuntos concernientes al vínculo con Irán, son los países sudamericanos del ALBA (Venezuela y Bolivia) los que llevan la iniciativa (7).En definitiva, se trata de un bienio lleno de connotaciones de alto significado, de una tendencia in crescendo, que, sin embargo, podría terminar abruptamente si la enfermedad del Presidente venezolano eclipsa su protagonismo.a) Relatio in terrorem: ArgentinaLas relaciones argentino-iraníes, a lo largo de estos dos últimos años, siguieron muy fuertemente marcadas por las reverberaciones de los brutales atentados a la embajada israelí y contra la AMIA en 1992 y 1994, respectivamente (8).Antecedentes con poderosa significación fueron descritos y fundamentados por Pepe Eliaschev en el diario Perfil (26.3. 2011). El primero apunta a la propuesta de la Casa Rosada para negociar un acuerdo secreto entre los dos gobiernos para dejar de lado el proceso judicial que lleva a cabo el juez Alberto Nisman contra exdiplomáticos y altos funcionarios iraníes a cambio de un compromiso por mayor intercambio comercial (9). La revelación de este antecedente tuvo como resultado que la visita del canciller Hector Timmerman a Israel, anunciada para fines de marzo, estuvo a punto de ser cancelada debido al profundo malestar causado en el gobierno iraní. Declaraciones posteriores de la cancillería argentina, negando la propuesta, mitigaron el estado de crispación bilateral, y el canciller finalmente se desplazó a Jerusalén.Un segundo antecedente de alta significación, y que causó gran molestia en el juez Nisman, es la revelación de tareas de reclutamiento y recolección de fondos en Brasil por parte de Hizbollah, Hamas y Al Qaeda en la zona de la Triple Frontera, en las que el iraní Moshe Rabbani, sindicado como autor intelectual del ataque a la AMIA, es fundamental. Rabbani ha visitado ocasionalmente Brasil utilizando pasaporte falso (10). Para ahondar aún más la controversia, Rabbani participó en abril de 2011 en un programa de radio junto al activista kirchnerista Luis D´Elía negando la versión de sus viajes a Brasil. Anexo a esta problemática, durante el bienio continuó también la controversia en torno a las actividades de la embajada de Irán en Buenos Aires. El juez Rafael Rafecas, por ejemplo, denunció que desde esa legación se financia a muchas agrupaciones anti-judías y que el nexo es el activista pro-gubernativo Luis D´Elía (11).El intento de revertir el estado de deterioro generalizado que existe en las relaciones bilaterales, y que Eliaschev adjudica a la influencia del canciller Timmerman, ocurrió meses después de que la Presidenta Cristina Fernandez, hablando ante la Asamblea General de la ONU en septiembre de 2010, propusiera una solución a la Lockerbie, que comprendiera un proceso judicial a los iraníes acusados por el caso de la AMIA en un tercer país, por mutuo acuerdo entre Irán y Argentina (12). No queda muy claro la finalidad de la propuesta, ya que, como era dable esperar, provocó una agria carta respuesta de Irán dirigida al Presidente de la Asamblea General(13).Finalmente cabe consignar que en el plano comercial, a inicios de abril de 2011, se anunció que Teherán empezará a incrementar sus compras de soya. La iniciativa surgió no sólo por el interés de Irán sino por la baja de las exportaciones argentinas de este producto a la India para las que era necesario encontrar otro poder comprador (14).En suma, el bienio 2010-2011 ha servido para constatar que el vínculo iraní-argentino sigue alterado en sus cimientos (15). La intensidad de las reverberaciones que continúan emanando de los atentados a la embajada israelí y a la AMIA ponen necesariamente un signo de interrogación a la evolución ulterior que tenga este problema, cuya solución definitiva no se divisa. En tal sentido, el principal elemento a monitorear es la presunta oferta emanada de Teherán a mediados de julio orientada a re-tomar el diálogo.b) Dulce periculum: las tentaciones bolivianas El bienio 2010-2011 fue especialmente fructífero para la relación entre estos dos países. Mirado desde el punto de vista de la estrategia iraní, los antecedentes del período consolidaron a Bolivia, en términos cualitativos, como el segundo eslabón más importante en la región. Mirado desde la perspectiva boliviana, asistencia iraní en diversos ámbitos superó los US$ 1200 millones lo que convirtió a Irán en el segundo donante del país, superando a la Unión Europea (16).En el plano diplomático adquirieron relevancia varios hechos como la inauguración de la embajada iraní en La Paz, en septiembre de 2010, el viaje del Presidente Morales a Teherán un mes más tarde (17), y los desplazamientos realizados por varios altos personeros del gobierno iraní por territorio boliviano durante el primer semestre de 2011. Desde el punto de vista comunicacional, lo más destacado del viaje de Morales a Teherán y Tabriz, fue el anuncio de que Irán asistiría a Bolivia en la construcción de una planta de energía nuclear. Dado que el asunto carece de toda viabilidad debido al precario nivel de masa crítica existente en Bolivia respecto a esta materia, el anuncio adquiere singularidad. Desde ahora en adelante habrá movimientos, algunos visibles, otros menos, de especialistas y personeros vinculados a elementos de poder duro iraní. En este marco, fuertes sospechas tiene la aprobación de un proyecto de ley por el Congreso boliviano en junio de 2011, destinado a facilitar el turismo entre los dos países, ya que, pese a no existir cifras oficiales sobre el tema, todas las estimaciones apuntan a un flujo prácticamente inexistente.Otros dos elementos de poder duro son tanto la declaración conjunta emitida tras el viaje de Morales, en el sentido de que ambos países señalan a EEUU como enemigo común, como también el anuncio de crear un banco binacional que permitirá gestionar futuros proyectos. Esto último, ya se había visualizado un mes antes del viaje de Morales, cuando el ministro de Industrias y Minas de Irán, Ali Akhbar Mehravian asistió a la presentación de cartas credenciales del embajador Alireza Ghozeilee en La Paz, asunto que además, coincidió con la apertura física de la legación persa. La cartera del ministro constituyó una señal indicativa del énfasis que Irán está dando a este vínculo. Consecuentemente, durante la visita de Mahrebi, ambos países suscribieron acuerdos en materias de gas, petróleo y petroquímica. Además, Mahrebi inauguró las dependencias de la Iranian Oil en Santa Cruz y ofreció una nueva línea de crédito por US$ 254 millones que permitirá expandir los proyectos existentes y examinar nuevos proyectos en torno a la extracción del litio.Posteriormente, en marzo de 2011, la visita del Vicecanciller Behrouz Kamalvandi hizo anuncios que reforzaron el carácter estratégico que está asumiendo Bolivia en el despliegue iraní en la región. Kamalvandi anunció tanto la creación de un Centro Geocientífico, que se dedicará a estudiar datos geológicos de Bolivia, como de una red de transmisión y de antenas que permita crear un canal nacional de televisión. El objetivo central del Centro Geocientífico es localizar yacimientos de uranio. Hasta ahora, los estudios sobre localización y caraterísticas de depósitos uraníferos bolivianos son confusos, debido a su obsolescencia y poca acuciosidad. Uranio existiría en la Cordillera de Los Frailes, en Cotaje (Potosí) y en Mamonó, el este del país cerca d ela frontera con Brasil, en el Parque Noel Kempff Mercado y bajo el Bosque Seco Chiquitano (ambos forman el ecosistema El Pantanal). Tras la visita de Mehravian, la ministra boliviana de Planificación, Viviana Caro manifestó, "hay intenciones de realizar trabajos, pero lo que se necesita es una carta geológica actualizada en la que colaborará Irán" (18). Jorisch sostiene que el litio podría ser utilizado como un acelerador alternativo en el enriquecimiento de uranio. Durante su visita, Kamalvandi firmó acuerdos justamente para explotar litio (algo acordado inicialmente durante la visita de Ghozeilee)(19). Además, comprometió una línea de crédito adicional a la de US$ 270 millones ya existente para construir represas. Se trata de una línea crediticia abierta que se materializará apenas lo disponga el gobierno de Morales.Una significancia mayor tiene la llegada a Bolivia, en junio de 2011, del ministro de Defensa iraní, Ahmed Vahidi (20), quien visitó La Paz y Santa Cruz. Declaraciones de Vahidi ofreciendo todo tipo de ayuda militar que Bolivia demande y la invitación a la inauguración de la Escuela Militar del ALBA, ratifican la hipótesis sustentada acerca de la especificidad estratégica que tiene el despliegue iraní en Bolivia. Como trascendió por la prensa, Vahidi debió interrumpir su estadía en Bolivia, cuando fue detectado por el servicio de inteligencia argentino (SI) mientras se efectuaba una ceremonia en el Colegio Militar de Aviación (COLMILAV) en la que se entregaban licencias de pilotos a cadetes de Bolivia, Venezuela y Panamá. Ello motivó la rápida queja del gobierno de Cristina Fernández, quien advirtió al Presidente Morales sobre el retiro de la invitación que se le había cursado para que visitara Buenos Aires la semana siguiente (21). Bolivia presentó sus excusas al gobierno argentino, y ni Morales ni su ministra de Defensa, Cecilia Chacón se refirieron públicamente al incidente. Vahidi, sin comentarlo directamente, valoró positivamente su paso por Bolivia y reiteró que "la cooperación total con los países latinoamericanos goza de prioridad para Irán"(22).El carácter estratégico de Bolivia en el despliegue iraní en la región, había quedado esbozado en octubre de 2010, cuando el ministro de Economía y Finanzas de Bolivia, Luis Arce informó de un acuerdo entre los dos países para la compra de equipos militares iraníes, el mantenimiento de las aeronaves de la Fuerza Aérea Boliviana (FAB), así como un acuerdo para entrenamiento militar. Ese anuncio ministerial ocurrió dos semanas después que Morales llegara procedente de Teherán (23).En síntesis, la relación bilateral ha entrado en una etapa cualitativamente distinta estos dos últimos años, marcada por claras intenciones de fortalecer un compromiso que adquiere visos de estratégico. El interés manifestado por ambos en esta línea indica que se debería generar mayores niveles de asociatividad bilateral en el futuro cercano. En todo caso, si Bolivia no cautela los aspectos políticos formales de este acercamiento, se producirán inevitablemente fricciones inesperadas con terceros, tal cual de desprendió de la tensión argentino-iraní en relación a Vahidi. La experiencia de este hombre clave del Pasdaran en Bolivia es una señal que los próximos pasos del acercamiento bilateral se caractericen por la opacidad y el sigilo.c) De omnibus dubitandum, las aprehensiones del neo-lulismobrasileño Las relaciones bilaterales durante el bienio, sometidas a las reverberaciones del viaje del Presidente Ahmedinejad a Brasil, ocurrido en las postrimerías del 2009, siguen mostrando señales ambivalentes. Sin embargo, la fuerza ex intra de algunas de éstas indican que, paulatinamente, se ha ido instalando la idea de poner las relaciones bilaterales bajo premisas nuevas. Son señales que, decodificadas, ofrecen matices diferenciadores respecto a los años de lulismo puro.En efecto, a lo largo de casi todo el 2010 se observó una atención brasileña muy deferente hacia problemática iraní, ejemplificada en la crítica que hizo el canciller Celso Amorim en marzo de ese año a la imposición de sanciones contra el régimen de Teherán. El pragmatismo del lulismo puro cobró expresividad en el acuerdo Brasil-Turquía (marzo 2010), que provocó desconcierto en varios países centrales, malestar en Washington y preocupación en Israel (24). Ese acuerdo, percibido positivamente por Ahmedinejad, se suscribió en el marco de la cumbre de los G-15 realizada en Teherán.Otra señal proveniente del pragmatismo lulista había ocurrido poco antes, en abril de 2010, cuando Petrobras anunció que mantendría sus oficinas en Teherán y todas sus inversiones en el Mar Caspio, pese al clima internacional desfavorable. Prosiguió al mes siguiente, cuando de forma demostrativa, Lula realizó una visita oficial a Teherán, que culminó en el controversial acuerdo con Turquía. Continuó en junio de 2010, cuando, en votación dividida, el Consejo de Seguridad aprobó sanciones (Resolución 2040) con los votos en contra de Brasil y Turquía (ambos miembros no permanentes del órgano en ese momento).En esta postura pragmática subyacía una visión muy clara. Lula veía los asuntos internacionales con un prisma que favorecía la mantención del diálogo con todo tipo de regímenes y de rechazo a la imposición de sanciones. Para Lula, el efecto de las sanciones terminaban recayendo en los más pobres. Lula, además, insistía en el necesario respeto a la cultura, costumbres y leyes de todos los países, alegando que de lo contrario se alimentaba las tendencias al caos en el sistema internacional.Sin embargo, la asunción de Dilma Roussef comenzó a ofrecer matices respecto allulismo puro, denominación que parte del supuesto que con Dilma el lulismo sigue representando el prisma central de la política exterior brasileña.Sin embargo, los nuevos matices, advertibles en las primeras decisiones de Dilma en torno a la problemática iraní, sugieren que subyacen ideas nuevas. Aunque es prematuro visualizar la intensidad que estas ideas nuevas, se pueden conjeturar énfasis de tipo cuasi doctrinario, por ejemplo en materia de derechos humanos, vistos tanto genéricamente como en lo relativo al de las mujeres. Tal inclinación salpicará directamente la relación con Irán.Dos novedades interesantes sobre esto son las siguientes. Dilma, por ejemplo, fue mucho más dura que su antececesor en cuanto a criticar la lapidación de Sakineh Ashtiani, por presunta complicidad en asesinato de su esposo. Indicó que era "inaceptable y medieval". Apenas ocurrido el hecho, y en su calidad de candidata presidencial, Dilma, solicitó al entonces Presidente Lula, que diera indicaciones a su embajador en Teherán, Antonio Luis Salgado para reunirse con autoridades de la cancillería persa e informarles que Brasil estaba en condiciones de garantizar asilo a Ashtiani.Luego, ya en funciones, invitó a la abogada disidente Shirin Ebadi, Premio Nobel de la Paz 2003, asunto que irritó a la cancillería iraní. Luego, el ministerio de Cultura brasileño formuló críticas a la censura de las obras del escritor Paulo Coelho en Irán.Probablemente el dato más significativo ocurrió en 2011, cuando, por primera vez en 10 años, Brasil (junto a Panamá y Colombia y contra Cuba y Ecuador) votaron a favor de una moción en la Comisión de Derechos Humanos para monitorear la situación de éstos en Irán. Baste recordar que el año previo -2010, es decir bajo ellulismo puro- Brasil se abstuvo (25).Aunque el re-enfoque brasileño implicará que Brasil ya no tendrá un papel tan relevante en el establecimiento del foothold iraní en la región, el régimen de Ahmedinejad ha reaccionado con cautela ante las nuevas señales provenientes de Brasilia. No ha hecho ver sus molestias y pareciera optar por darle preeminencia a los espacios e intersticios que se muestren disponibles. En esa línea, anunció que establecerá un centro comercial durante el segundo semestre 2011 para facilitar negocios entre los dos países (26). El régimen iraní es consciente que el deterioro de la relación bilateral perjudicará más a Irán que a Brasil. Además, también hay señales de continuidad.Vital en este aspecto es la mantención del negocio de la triangulación de alimentos, carnes y azúcar que realizan empresas brasileñas instaladas en Dubai y Emiratos Arabes Unidos.Huelga subrayar que este recalibramiento seguirá siendo monitoreado por Washington y las potencias centrales. A lo largo del bienio ha habido varios motivos de preocupación que podrían repetirse. Por ejemplo, según revelaciones de Wikileaks, a fines de 2010, se produjo una situación que generó preocupación en EEUU y en Alemania, ya que la empresa Machine Sazi Tabriz (MST) habría estado adquiriendo material de uso dual a la brasileña Mello SA Maquinas e Equipamentos. Siemens habría detenido a última hora importantes envíos a Mello SA que iban a ser entregados a MST (27).En definitiva se puede establecer que la relación brasileño-iraní pasa por momentos de ciertas re-definiciones producto de los cambios políticos internos en Brasilia. Dado que la cautela dominará la apreciación de ambos, es probable que la agenda bilateral no oscile entre elementos de poder duro ni blando, sino descanse en aquellos intermedios, donde las cuestiones estrictamente comerciales vayan adquiriendo centralidad. (1) Los dos principales instrumentos globales de la línea estratégica anti-israelí son ese híbrido llamado Hizbollah y el Pasdaran; ambos con capacidades para operar en cualquier parte del globo. Los mortíferos ataques en Buenos contra la embajada de Israel en Buenos Aires en 1992 y contra la AMIA en 1994, ejecutados conjuntamente, son los mejores ejemplos de dicha capacidad. Karmon sostiene que la amenaza terrorista es el principal desafío a la seguridad internacional y que después de la guerra fría no se podría hablar de un conflicto armado donde no se haga uso del instrumento terrorista. En tal sentido –añade- la gran amenaza actual proviene de lo que denomina la "coalición iraní", compuesta por Irán y su proxy organization, Hizbollah, creado por el Pasdaran, por Siria, por Hamas.(2) La cifra aparece en varias de las referencias utilizadas en este texto. Según Eliaschev, las prioridades de esta nueva fase del despliegue iraní son: la Triple Frontera (Brasil, Paraguay, Argentina), Venezuela y Panamá. (3) Ver: "Venezuela e Irán".(4) Otros elementos de poder duro son el esfuerzo por instalar en la región bancos iraníes o bien formar instituciones bancarias asociadas así como la cooperación para la prospección y explotación de recursos energéticos específicos (uranio, litio, petróleo y gas).(5) Fecha referencial clave. El despliegue iraní adquirió contornos más precisos y sistémicos con la Conferencia Internacional sobre América Latina, denominada "Desarrollo en América Latina: su papel y su estatus en el futuro sistema internacional" (febrero, 2007) y en la que participaron invitados de Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Cuba, Brasil, Uruguay y Ecuador aparte de latinoamericanistas de Italia, Rusia, y China". Fue un seminario auspiciado por el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores iraní y sirvió para dar luces acerca del diseño conceptual y modelos de praxis para materializar la iniciativa. Procuró insertar conceptualmente el despliegue en las corrientes revolucionarias de la época, buscando asociar las figuras de los comandantes Chamran y Guevara como simbólicas del encuentro revolucionario entre Irán y América Latina. El gobierno iraní invitó a exponer al seminario a dos hijos de Guevara. Pocos meses más tarde, en Teherán e Isfahan, también con auspicio de organismos de gobierno, se efectuó el Primer Congreso Internacional de Literatura Latinoamericana. Ver Witker, op cit. pp. 171-172.(6) La relación de Irán con Paraguay se inicia bajo mandato del Presidente Lugo el 15 de agosto de 2008. Un trascendido relevante en las relaciones de Irán con esta zona del mundo es la presunta petición formulada a inicios de abril de 2011 por Ahmedinejad al Presidente paraguayo, Fernando Lugo en orden a garantizar asilo para Muammar Gaddafi.(7) Ver "Apoyo del ALBA a Irán" en el sitio http://www.noticiasdeiran.com (accesado el 01.06.2011).(8) La trayectoria y los eventos dramáticos ocurridos en la capital argentina apuntan a un diseño conceptual y praxis específicas del interés de Irán en Argentina, pues no se divisan motivos demográficos o migratorios, ni económicos, ni gran colaboración militar, aunque sí hay versiones, no confirmadas, de interés en la industria nuclear argentina a comienzos de los 90. Sí tiene fuerza explicativa la numerosa población judía en Argentina. Al asumir a los aproximadamente 250 mil judíos argentinos como blanco de su despliegue global, se advierten elementos coherentes con el esquema antijudío que marca la diplomacia iraní desde fines de los 80.(9) El acuerdo habría nacido tras una oferta hecha por Timmerman mientras efectuaba una visita a Aleppo, Siria entre el 23 y 24 de enero de 2011. Los mediadores iban a ser el Presidente sirio Bashar al Assad y su canciller Walid al Mohalem. El texto de Eliaschev asegura que en septiembre de 2010 y febrero de 2011 se produjeron tratativas directas, aunque discretas, entre Argentina e Irán a nivel de "funcionarios poco conocido".(10) Pagina 12 y Perfil (7 de abril). El juez Nisman identificó una casa de seguridad de Rabbani y otros 20 terroristas en Sergipe N° 67 en la ciudad Foz de Iguacú.(11) Rafecas instruye casos contra algunos grupos terroristas como Quebracho. Esas afirmaciones las hizo en una reunión realizada en la Sociedad Hebraica del Pilar, Buenos Aires el 30 de marzo de 2011.(12) Hay versiones que indican que esta fórmula habría sido propuesta en 2003 y que no se habría encontrado ningún país dispuesto a servir como tal.(13) "Respuesta de Irán a Argentina en Naciones Unidas" en http://www.noticiasdeiran.com (accesado 14.6.2011).(14) El intercambio comercial entre Irán y Argentina llegaba en 2011 a US$ 1.200 millones anualmente.(15) Inicialmente, las investigaciones tropezaron con las enormes dudas acerca de qué pudo haber motivado esta expansión terrorista hacia América del Sur. También se hicieron públicas varias hipótesis argentino-céntricas de un presunto descontento del mundo musulmán por la participación de Buenos Aires en la primera guerra desatada por Estados Unidos contra Irak, aunque Irán era muy hostil al Irak de Saddam Hussein 1980-1988. Ese resentimiento musulmán se habría visto alimentado también por otros motivos. Los daños causados a Irak, financista de Egipto, y potencial beneficiario del proyecto misilístico Cóndor (desarrollado por Argentina y Egipto), abandonado por Menem por imposición de Estados Unidos. Luego estaría la decepción de Trípoli tras haber invertido fondos en la campaña electoral de Menem. Otro elemento de resentimiento musulmán con Argentina sería la distancia que tomó Buenos Aires respecto del Movimiento de No Alineados en 1991 y su acercamiento a Estados Unidos. Por último, la desilusión experimentada por Damasco ante los diversos viajes de Menem a Medio Oriente en los que no visitó Siria (el país de sus ancestros), a la vez que se convertía en el primer Presidente argentino en viajar a Israel. Todas hipótesis excesivamente argentino-céntricas y carentes de efectivo poder explicativo.(16) Irán ha financiado una fábrica de textiles, una de cemento, un hospital en El Alto, una procesadora de lácteos y ha iniciado estudios para una ensambladora de tractores. La suma es un conjunto de créditos que forman parte del llamado Plan de Cooperación Industrial válido por cinco años firmado en 2007 durante la visita de Ahmedinejad a La Paz. Notoriedad tiene un reportaje de la BBC (27.11.2009) alerta sobre la posible obligatoriedad que existiría en el centro hospitalario construido en El Alto para que las mujeres porten velo.(17) La visita de Morales incluyó un desplazamiento a la ciudad de Tabriz donde visitó una fábrica de tractores. Irán tiene la oferta de instalar una ensambladora similar a la levantada en Venezuela.(18) Ver: "Uranio y agua para Irán" en http://www.noalamina.org (accesado 10.6.2011).(19) Sobre este punto, las negociaciones se habían iniciado en octubre de 2010 durante la segunda visita de Morales a Teherán. Bolivia tiene un depósitos estimados de 100 millones de toneladas métricas (TM) de litio, lo que correspondería al 70% de las reservas mundiales.(20) Excomandante general de la Fuerza Quds del Pasdaran. Existe orden de captura internacional por su participación en el atentado contra la AMIA en Buenos Aires en 1994. Por años nexo entre Teherán y Hizbollah. Su cargo actual implica una tuición directa en el programa de desarrollo nuclear de Irán. La orden de captura de Interpol se extiende a Moshen Rabbani (ex agregado de prensa en la embajada iraní en Buenos Aires), Ali Akhbar Velayati (excanciller), Alí Fallahijan (exministro de Informaciones), Alí Rafsanjani (expresidente), Moshen Rezai (exasesor presidencial), Hadi Soleimanpour (exvicecanciller).(21) Gran parte de la prensa mundial consignó esta nota ese día. El canciller David Choquehuanca endosó responsabilidades a funcionarios medios del Ministerio de Defensa. Otro antecedente que apoya la sospecha de una circunstancia embarazosa es que Vahidi se encontraba alojado en el mismo hotel (Casa Blanca), que el Presidente Morales. Ver La Tercera, Santiago de Chile 6.6. 2011.(22) La Prensa (Bolivia) 03.06.2011.(23) El anunció precisó que podrían adquirirse FAJR-3, S-68 e IRAN-140 así como helicópteros. Ver Los Tiempos, Cochabamba 1.11.2010.(24) El acuerdo consistía en que Irán se comprometía a enviar 1200 kilos de uranio enriquecido al 3,5% hacia Turquía y recibiría el producto enriquecido al 20% para usos médicos, en un proceso supervisado por EEUU, Francia y Rusia más el Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica.(25) Aprobada por 22 votos a favor , 7 en contra y 14 abstenciones.(26) Aunque la relación entre ambos países también se remonta a comienzos del siglo 20 sólo a partir de los 90 comenzó a registrar cierto volumen al intercambiar alimentos. Sin embargo, a partir de 2003, Petrobras obtuvo una primera licencia de exploración de petróleo en el Mar Caspio con lo que la relación bilateral aumentó fuertemente. En 2004, Petrobras obtuvo una segunda licencia y en 2007 una tercera. El 2009, asociada con Repsol, obtuvo derechos de explotación del bloque Tosan, también en el Caspio.(27) State 123431 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL:12/12/2034 *El autor es politólogo y periodista de la Universidad de Chile,PhD en Comunicaciones por la Universidad Carlos IV de Praga, República Checa y egresado del Centro Hemisférico de Estudios de la Defensa, National Defense University (CHDS-NDU). Ha sido jefe de la Mención en Relaciones Internacionales del Doctorado en Estudios Americanos de la Universidad de Santiago y jefe de Cátedra de Estudios Internacionales de la Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos (ANEPE) de Chile. En la actualidad es profesor de la ANEPE y la Universidad Alberto Hurtado de Santiago de Chile,profesor visitante del Colegio Interamericano de Defensa, Washington DC. Ha publicado varios artículos sobre terrorismo y seguridad internacional en revistas académicas, destacando "Los guiños de Mefisto. Relaciones Irán-América Latina, los casos de Chile y Argentina", "El síndrome de Herostratos o la conversión de terroristas en íconos". "Momentos palmerstonianos: retórica integracionista y conductas divisivas a la luz de la cumbre energética de 2007".
This article considers the challenges faced by digital evidence specialists when collaborating with other specialists and agencies in other jurisdictions when investigating cyber crime. The opportunities, operational environment and modus operandi of a cyber criminal are considered, with a view to developing the skills and procedural support that investigators might usefully consider in order to respond more effectively to the investigation of cyber crimes across State boundaries.
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Previously posted on May 10/22 and Jan 30/23 Kissinger in Washington, May 7, 2022Henry Kissinger will be one hundred years old in a few weeks and has published five books since he turned ninety. Along with President Nixon, he futilely prolonged and escalated the Vietnam War for four years when defeat was already inevitable. But he also received the Nobel Peace Prize precisely for negotiating the ceasefire for that same war. His doctrine also has these two faces. On the one hand, he conceives international politics as the interaction between states seeking power. On the other hand, he favors the balance of powers so that no one is able to fully impose its dominance on the others. In the academic literature, Kissinger's approach is called "realism" and is widely accepted. The main alternative is the so-called "liberal" approach, which trusts in the ability of institutions to prevent wars and keep peace. From there arose the League of Nations, which failed, and the United Nations and its specialized organizations, which have had significant success on many issues, but are also currently showing their insufficiency. The most accurate postulate of the realists is that the world is more peaceful when there are multiple powers than when there are only two, as in the Cold War, or a single super-dominant one, as seemed to be the case with the United States after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The success of the formula requires that the multilateral equilibrium could only be overthrown by an effort of a magnitude too difficult to mount. As a historical example, Kissinger has analyzed and praised the so-called Concert of Europe that was formed, after the defeat of Napoleon's France, by Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and also recovered France. According to his interpretation, the Concert "came close to constituting the government of Europe" and achieved a long period without European-wide wars. The balance was upset by the unification of Germany at the end of the 19th century and its consequent aggressive expansionism, which led to the absurd and catastrophic First World War. Taking a similar approach, Kissinger continues to praise the construction of the European Union, which has prevented new general wars on the continent. During his time in government, the biggest concern was that communism would end up dominating the world according to the domino theory, whereby the fall of a piece like Indochina would be followed by Burma and Thailand, as well as Indonesia (which, in fact, was very close), and from there, India, Japan, the Middle East... That's why the Vietnam war extended to Laos and Cambodia. But this is also the reason for the diplomatic opening to China, to break the Sino-Soviet bloc and achieve a certain multilateral balance. The current interest of the discussion is that the role of the United States as the only superpower may be less exclusive and exclusionary than it seemed. A version of political realism in academia tends to analyze international relations "after hegemony" as a ground for "anarchy", that is, destructive conflicts and wars. However, the changes around the Ukrainian war can be read as a new opportunity for multilateral cooperation. The United States has the initiative and many economic and military resources, but, paradoxically, it may have a good opportunity to expand pluralism. In the new situation of divided government between the Presidency and Congress, the most ambitious projects in domestic policy are paralyzed, so Joe Biden can focus on foreign policy, where he has more power, and expand multilateral cooperation. The European Union is beginning to develop, for the first time, a spirited common international policy, in contrast to the dissent during the Iraq war, when the governments of Britain and Spain were on one side and those of France and Germany on the other. The rulers of China and India, which are rivals to each other, have told Russia that the world is not ready for war. This configuration with more than three major powers points to a balance of powers capable of avoiding polarization, since, otherwise, a coalition of two-to-one preludes conflict. Specifically, the Group of Seven, which is the nucleus of a latent world government, needs to work more closely with some members of the Group of Twenty, which includes India and China, so that its decisions are widely accepted and effective. Negotiations between the US and the EU for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), in which substantive agreements had been reached, were paralyzed by Trump, and could now be revived. The Trans-Pacific Agreement for Economic Cooperation was also abandoned by Trump, but the other eleven initial countries went ahead on their own and ended up signing the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), to which China has presented its candidacy. Many in the United States are clamoring for re-entry in what had been its own initiative. And after the war in Ukraine, a new international structure will have to be defined, especially for Central and Eastern Europe, in which, as Kissinger said in a recent interview, "Russia should find a place." Realism shows that the seeking for power explains many things, and the balance of power can prevent a general war. But when there is neither a single dominant power nor a confrontation between two, "liberal" rules and institutions may be the best mechanism for peace and multilateral cooperation.Also in Spanish in the daily La Vanguardia-click While President Biden is not clear, and sometimes he is confusing about how the war in Ukraine could end, some other voices in Washington can speak and suggest more clearly. Several of them did it a few days ago at the Financial Times Weekend Festival, which was held, for the first time outside England, at the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington.The first surprisingly constructive intervention was from William J. Burns, the current CIA Director. Just a year ago, he came from retirement after a long career as a diplomat, and as such, in his presentation, the conversation with an FT journalist, and the dialogue with the audience, he showed a broader vision than the usual spies. When he was Ambassador in Boris Yeltsin's Moscow in the mid-1990s, Burns already felt that the NATO expansion until the borders of Russia was "premature at best, and needlessly provocative at worst." More specifically, to push for NATO membership of Ukraine and Georgia was "a serious strategic mistake that did indelible damage" –an opinion that at the time was shared by the governments of France and Germany. In an official encounter, Putin had told him that Ukraine in NATO "would be a hostile act toward Russia."Burns emphasized, of course, that there is "absolutely no justification for the invasion of Ukraine." Yet, he resumed that kind of strategic explanation while dismissing the ideological elaborations that pretend either justify or condemn the attack. In short: Russia has "pushed back" after Ukraine moved westward away from Russian influence.In his view, nevertheless, Putin miscalculated regarding the power of the Russian Army (which was sent to a "special operation" not planned by its generals), about Ukrainian resistance, and with the supposition that the West would be distracted by elections in Germany and France. He tried to explain the recent candidacies of Sweden and Finland to NATO as a deterrent against Putin's other potential attacks in the future. But the Director of the CIA did not utter a word that could be interpreted as supporting Ukraine's NATO membership.Even more thrilling was the participation of Henry Kissinger on "the new world disorder." The former Secretary of State is 99 years old this month, announced a new book of immediate publication, and for nearly one hour was focused, clear, and insightful, also in a dialogue with the audience. Kissinger started by using his academic background and remarking that the foreign policy's main priority of Russia, which is the largest country in the world, has always been to protect its huge territory from invasions. From this perspective, after the Cold War, the country's leadership was "offended" by NATO's absorption of Eastern Europe.Now –he noted— public discussion on Ukraine is all about confrontation, but by reflecting on the previous failures of the several governments he advised, he lamented that, again, nobody knows where we are going. Kissinger had already opposed Ukraine's candidacy to NATO when President Bush and Vice-president Cheney launched it in 2008. Six years later, at the Russian occupation of Crimea, he warned that Ukraine should not join either the East or the West, but it should function as "a bridge" between the two. He had predicted that otherwise, "the drift toward confrontation would accelerate."Most striking was his warning about the use of nuclear weapons. "I would not make Ukraine's membership to NATO a key issue," he remarked at the Kennedy Center. It would be "unwise to take an adversarial position," mainly because of the horrible danger of a nuclear war. His approach was certainly in contrast with that in the 1970s, of which he was reminded, when the gibberish theory of the "domino" was used to attack one country after another. Bush and Cheney still used that approach in the early 2000s to justify "preventive wars." I got the impression that with aging, intelligent people like Kissinger may feel that it is not worth trying to deceive himself again, and despite his physical frailness (or perhaps because of that), his more mature brain moves in the direction of more honest and clear thinking. His main argument was that in the past, although confrontation was addressed to "preserve the balance of power" between the US and the Soviet Union, at the same time, he also promoted agreements for nuclear arms reduction and control. Nowadays, modern technology would produce much worse destruction, so he claimed for a "new era" in which the governments should take more care about the consequences of nuclear arms and favor diplomacy above all. Kissinger reminded the audience that, in the past, nuclear countries such as the Soviet Union and the United States accepted military defeats from non-nuclear countries, such as in Vietnam and (both) in Afghanistan. Even more now, "we have to deescalate to conventional arms and learn to live with adversarial relations." Kissinger has met Putin more than twenty times and asserted that "there is still room for negotiation" with him. In Spanish in the daily La Vanguardia