Suchergebnisse

Der vorliegende Bericht entstand aus den Beobachtungen einer dreiwöchigen Reise von Human Rights Watch nach Nigeria im Februar/März 1994. Er gibt einen aktuellen Überblick (Juli 1995) über die Repressionsmethoden und Menschenrechtsverletzungen der Militärregierung gegenüber Demokratiebefürwortern und Umweltaktivisten. Des weiteren werden die Umstände des Mordes an vier Ogoniführern, die der Kooperation mit der Regierung beschuldigt wurden, geschildert. Für die Lynchmorde machte die Regierung den Führer des Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Ken Saro-Wiwa und weitere MOSOP-Aktivisten verantwortlich. Die erste Gerichtsverhandlung gegen Ken Saro-Wiwa und seine Mitangeklagten wird ebenfalls diskutiert. (DÜI-Spl)

1. Introduction -- 2. Gender and its complexities -- 3. Human rights and gender: the first stage -- 4. Feminist approaches, gay and lesbian studies, queer theory: their engagement with gender and human rights -- 5. Human rights and gender: the second stage -- 6. Successes and challenges: right to be free from violence -- 7. Successes and challenges: culture and human rights -- 8. Successes and challenges: family and human rights -- 9. General conclusions.

Public pronouncements on human rights by American officials and by nongovernmental rights advocates often include references to dignity. Yet the term does not appear in the fundamental texts that shaped the American commitment to rights -- the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, and the post-Civil War amendments to the United States Constitution. Many of those using the word may not recognize that Europeans (and others, too) who speak of dignity often mean something that does not accord with the central value given to liberty in the traditional American approach to rights. Though liberty and dignity can be complementary values, there are circumstances in which they can come into conflict. Yet references to dignity have become prominent in American discussions of rights, perhaps because the term is used so frequently in other parts of the world. Another factor may be recognition that, in some important areas, commitment to the concept of dignity, as it is understood in Europe, provides greater protection for rights than is available in the United States. The clearest and most forceful European assertion of the central place of dignity is to be found in the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law) of 1949, in effect, the country's Constitution. Article I begins, "Human dignity is inviolable. To respect it and protect it is the duty of all state power. The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world." The Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which went into effect in December 2009 with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, essentially repeats this language in Article I: "Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected." As Michael Rosen points out in his recent book, Dignity: Its History and Meaning, the commitment to dignity has had immense importance in constitutional jurisprudence in Germany. Shortly before its incorporation in the Grundgesetz, dignity was given a similar place in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948, without dissent, but with abstentions by the Soviet Union and its satellites, as well as by both South Africa and Saudi Arabia. Historically, the concept of dignity is particularly associated with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and his categorical imperative: each person is to be treated as an end in himself or herself. Though contemporary constitutional thinking about dignity may be largely derived from Kant, it seems evident that dignity achieved its prominent place in post-war texts about rights in part as a response to the crimes of the Second World War. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThe present article is devoted to developing a libertarian understanding of whether natural rights may or may not underpin human rights and, if so, how. Libertarianism is first defined in terms of the nonaggression principle (NAP), in answer to the question "What is the proper use of force?" This provides a basis for the libertarian positions on property rights, taxation, and many other issues, including human rights. Various philosophical rationales for the NAP are explored, including utilitarianism, religion, and natural rights. The basis of human rights is then examined. Every ethical tradition supports the nonaggression principle, which makes it an ideal candidate for the fundamental basis of human rights. Unfortunately, other traditions expand upon human rights by adding "positive" rights that ultimately violate the NAP. The conclusion takes up the application of libertarian principles to three issues, which could be viewed as human rights questions: discrimination, abortion, and the "trolley problem." The last one involves taking one life to save many others.

International human rights networks have publicized the exigencies of human rights violations in North Korea and have mobilized international and domestic laws as part of their respective movements to pressure North Korea on human rights. This article asks how effective these attempts at legal mobilization have been. While leveraging law has found success in other parts of the world for human rights improvement, this article argues that legal mobilization has had very limited impact in North Korea due to larger political impediments such as denuclearization priorities, ideological polarization between human rights groups, and North Korea's own counter- discourse to human rights. Adapted from the source document.

Human rights have become one of the most important moral concepts in global political life over the last 60 years. Charles Beitz, one of the world's leading philosophers, offers a compelling new examination of the idea of a human right.--. - Source other than Library of Congress.