Suchergebnisse

The "self-incrimination" clause of the Fifth Amendment was brought forward in five cases, in three of which it was attended by the "search and seizure" provisions of the Fourth Amendment. The most important of these cases was Gouled v. the United States, in which the court was asked to pass upon the admissibility in evidence, first, of a paper obtained surreptitiously by officers of the government from the office of the accused; and secondly, of papers, described to be of "evidential value only," which were taken from the office of accused under a search warrant. The court, declaring that the constitutional provisions involved must receive "a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon ‥‥ the rights secured by them," held that the government had no right to the possession of any of these papers nor to the use of them as evidence. At the same time, it was held that if the government had had the right to seize the papers in question, for instance, as so much contraband property, and had done so under a warrant sufficient in form, "then it would have been competent to use them to prove any crime against accused as to which they constituted relevant evidence."

The work of the court last term is chiefly notable for its amplification of certain important results of the preceding term. Thus, the final objection to the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment was refuted; the last great question touching the meaning of the word "income" in the Sixteenth Amendment was answered; the emergency powers of government in war time were brought into contact with more usual sources of public authority—this in the rent law cases; and some minor phases of the problem of freedom of speech and press were disposed of. However, in two cases, both of much interest to the political scientist, somewhat novel questions of national power were raised; and in neither was a certainly final solution offered. Questions of state power were again of decidedly subordinate significance and interest.

From the historical point of view no more interesting case was decided last term than that of Missouri v. Holland, in which a bill in equity brought by the state of Missouri to prevent a game warden of the United States from attempting to enforce the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918, and the regulations made by the secretary of agriculture in pursuance of this act was finally dismissed, Justices Van Devanter and Pitney dissenting without opinion.The objectors to the statute and the underlying treaty based their argument upon the Tenth Amendment, supplemented by the proposition that the control of migratory birds within their respective limits is a power reserved to the states, and from these premises they proceeded to draw the conclusion that "what an act of Congress could not do unaided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the states, a treaty cannot do." But, Justice Holmes answers in his opinion for the court, the treaty-making power is expressly delegated to the United States, treaties made under the authority of the United States are the supreme law of the land, and by article 1, section 8, Congress may pass all laws necessary and proper to carry valid treaties into effect.

The work of the Supreme Court during the term concluded last June was quite unusual both in the nature of the problems involved and the importance of certain of the results achieved. The center of interest in constitutional interpretation has swung, for the time being at least, decidedly from questions of state power to those of national power. This is partly the aftermath of the war, partly the corollary of recent amendments to the Constitution. By the same sign, the court has been confronted in recent months with not a few problems of considerable novelty—some indeed being questions of first impression—with the result that it has been called upon to enunciate principles which must guide its interpretation of important provisions of the Constitution for years to come. In preparing this review, the unique quality of the court's work during the period under consideration ought to determine the procedure. Accordingly the greater part of the space is devoted to a few outstanding cases, all of which involve questions of national power, while less striking results have received much briefer consideration, often only cursory mention.

Several of the cases already considered under the commerce clause involved further questions under the Fourteenth Amendment. Georgia's misuse of the mileage ratio in applying the unit rule to the taxation of wandering cars was found so arbitrary as to violate the requirement of due process. The minority insisted that "the case presents no question of taxing a foreign corporation with respect to personal property that never has come within the borders of the state." This was not specifically denied by the majority who seem to base their decision on excessive valuation of property within the jurisdiction rather than on taxation of property outside the jurisdiction. Yet in substance the case is one of taxing extra-state values though not extra-state tangible objects.Missouri's excessive fee for certificates authorizing the issue of bonds secured by railroad property within the state, which was held an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce, was alleged by complainant to be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment as well. The opinion of the court did not pass on the due-process question, but the cases cited under the commerce clause relied also on the Fourteenth Amendment.

United States v. Hill by a vote of seven to two sustained the so-called Reed Amendment by which Congress prohibited the introduction of liquor into any state which forbade the sale or manufacture of liquor within its borders. West Virginia, though interdicting manufacture and sale, allowed any person to bring into the state for personal use a quart of liquor each month. Since Mr. Hill did only what West Virginia sanctioned, Mr Justice McReynolds for himself and Mr. Justice Clarke insisted that "the Reed Amendment in no proper sense regulates interstate commerce, but is a direct intermeddling with the state's internal affairs." He inquired rhetorically: "If Congress may deny liquor to those who live in a state simply because its manufacture is not permitted there, why may not this be done for any suggested reason, e.g. because the roads are bad or men are hanged for murder or coals are dug. Where is the limit?" For the majority Mr. Justice Day answered that the control of Congress over interstate commerce is not limited by state laws and that "the policy of Congress acting independently of the states may induce legislation without reference to the particular policy or law of any given state."

There is little or no homogeneity to the questions to be considered under the head of retroactive legislation. A dispute whether a state has passed a law impairing the obligation of contracts may turn on a question as to the proper interpretation or application of language, or on opposing views of what is sufficient consideration or what agreements are against public policy. It was under the obligation-of-contracts clause that the Pennsylvania Hospital case decided that the power of governmental authorities to exercise eminent domain could not be bargained away. The crucial question is more often whether alleged rights existed than whether undoubted rights have been impaired. The Fourteenth Amendment and the doctrine of vested rights combine to make the obligation-of-contracts clause almost superfluous, as it is difficult to think of any impairment of the obligation of contracts which that clause inhibits which could not equally well be held deprivations of liberty or property without due process of law.This is apparent from the fact that retroactive legislation by Congress is questioned under the due-process clause of the Fifth Amendment, a contract being regarded as a property right that can be interfered with only when there is sufficient justification for what is done.

The federal Child Labor Law was declared unconstitutional in Hammer v. Dagenhart by a vote of five to four. It forbade the transportation in interstate or foreign commerce of the product of any mine or quarry "in which within thirty days prior to the time of the removal of such product therefrom children under the age of sixteen years have been employed or permitted to work," with similar prohibitions covering the products of mills and factories in which children under fourteen were employed or children under sixteen were employed more than eight hours a day. The majority opinion misinterpreted the statute and assumed that it permitted goods "to be freely shipped after thirty days from the time of their removal from the factory," whereas it permitted only the shipment of stock on hand thirty days after children had ceased to be employed. The law was so framed as to avoid the necessity of proof that children coöperated in the making of specific articles produced in a factory in which children were employed, and yet to remove any ban on shipment from an establishment which for thirty days had employed only adult labor.

Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- Abbreviations and Legends -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. Relationships between Forms, Levels, and Types of Law (Kokuhō no keishiki) -- Case 1. Japan v. S. Matsumoto (1961). The Organization Control Ordinance Case. The Political Organization Control Ordinance enacted during the Occupation cannot apply because it was repealed after the act of the accused but before charges were lodged against him for failing to report to the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office during a criminal investigation

Examines the influence of American law and theories of judicial review on the development, practice, and theorization of judicial review in Norway, Denmark, and Iceland from the 19th century. This study describes how Nordic scholars in the late 19th century rationalized judicial review based on American theory

Examines the influence of American law and theories of judicial review on the development, practice, and theorization of judicial review in Norway, Denmark, and Iceland from the 19th century. This study describes how Nordic scholars in the late 19th century rationalized judicial review based on American theory.