Suchergebnisse

Models of strategic debt predict that public debt increases with polarization, measured by the ideological distance between the government and its likely successor. Conversely if voters are both short-termist and also more likely to switch their vote for parties offering higher spending and public good provision when the electorate is ideologically concentrated, then debt can fall with polarization, measured by dispersion of ideological preferences in the electorate. Using time-varying polarization measures generated from ideology data from party manifestos, we find a sizable and statistically significant negative association between debt levels in OECD countries and ideological polarization in the electorate.

Abstract
This paper establishes moral duties for intermediaries of political advertising in election campaigns. First, I argue for a collective duty to maintain the democratic quality of elections which entails a duty to contain some forms of political polarization. Second, I show that the focus of campaign ethics on candidates, parties and voters—ignoring the mediators of campaigns—yields mistaken conclusions about how the burdens of the latter collective duty should be distributed. Third, I show why it is fair to require intermediaries to contribute to fulfilling this duty: they have an ultimate filtering position in the campaign communication process and typically benefit from political advertising and polarization. Finally, I argue that a transparency-based ethics of campaign advertising cannot properly accommodate a concern with objectionable polarization. By contrast, I outline the polarization-containing implications of my account, including a prohibition on online targeted advertising, and intermediaries' duties to block hateful political advertising.

The form of political polarization where citizens develop strongly negative attitudes toward out-party members and policies has become increasingly prominent across many democracies. Economic hardship and social inequality, as well as intergroup and racial conflict, have been identified as important contributing factors to this phenomenon known as "affective polarization." Research shows that partisan animosities are exacerbated when these interests and identities become aligned with existing party cleavages. In this paper, we use a model of cultural evolution to study how these forces combine to generate and maintain affective political polarization. We show that economic events can drive both affective polarization and the sorting of group identities along party lines, which, in turn, can magnify the effects of underlying inequality between those groups. But, on a more optimistic note, we show that sufficiently high levels of wealth redistribution through the provision of public goods can counteract this feedback and limit the rise of polarization. We test some of our key theoretical predictions using survey data on intergroup polarization, sorting of racial groups, and affective polarization in the United States over the past 50 y.

Abstract
Even among those who share the same partisan commitments, some people say they despise the opposing party while others report far less animosity. Why are some people more likely to express hostility toward the opposing political party? We explore how individual-level differences in feelings of self-confidence fuel out-party animosities. Drawing on responses to a module of the 2020 Cooperative Election Study, we show that higher levels of internal political efficacy are associated with greater affective polarization. Those who feel self-assured about their political abilities are more likely to admit severing social ties with those who disagree with them and are more tolerant of discrimination against partisan opponents. In a survey experiment, we confirm that those with greater internal efficacy are also more likely to accept discrimination against a member of the opposing party. Affective polarization is greatest among those who feel the most confident of their ability to influence politics.

ObjectivesWe investigate whether growing income inequality has heightened differences in economic interests between "the haves" and "the have nots" and if this class polarization has increased ideological polarization in the electorate.MethodsWe examine the trend in ideological orientation among low‐ and high‐income voters from 1972 to 2008.ResultsWhile both income inequality and ideological polarization have increased in recent years, this analysis indicates that the growth in ideological polarization is not the result of growing income inequality. The well‐off have not become significantly more conservative and less liberal nor have those on the lower rungs of the economic ladder become significantly more liberal and less conservative.ConclusionThe analysis indicates that ideological polarization is the result of the increased polarization of the political parties, not class polarization.

ObjectivesThis article provides an overview of how the interdisciplinary field of disaster studies contributes to the social sciences.MethodsThe following themes are explored in relation to the articles contained in the special issue: disasters are social and political phenomena that generate policy change, disasters reflect and affect democratic governance, and disasters reveal shared experience and collective identity.ResultsDisaster studies bridge the social sciences theoretically and methodologically. Given the scope of disaster impacts—across social, political, economic, ecological, and infrastructure spheres—and the policy response they garner involving public, private, and civic actors, they offer a lens by which to see society and politics in a way that no other critical events can.ConclusionDisaster studies offer important applications of social science theories and concepts that expand the field, broaden our reach as social scientists, and deepen our understanding of fundamental social processes and behaviors in meaningful ways.