Suchergebnisse

AbstractChris Wickham's important intervention in debates about the transformation of the Roman world from the fifth century onwards presents a vast array of evidence about the nature of social relations, the economy and the late-Roman and early-medieval state across the Mediterranean and Western-European world. Wickham is successful in taking into account both the high level of regional variation and differentiation across the Roman world and, at the same time, the various key unifying elements which bound these regions together. But, in arguing that the nature of the fiscal apparatus and structures of extraction, redistribution and consumption of surpluses of the late-Roman state were formative in the structure and appearance of the late-Roman élites in East and West as well as in the evolution of their early-medieval successors, a number of structural tensions in the model become apparent. This discussion highlights some of the issues at stake, while, at the same time, affirming the critical importance of the book, more especially its emphasis on the structural force of late-Roman institutions and social relations for the successor-states of the early-medieval West.

Janine Romero Valenzuela analyses the Bolivian lithium program in the largest empirical study to date with a focus on local perspectives and governance, identifying grievances and conflict dimensions. The case study shows that it is particularly an altered governance approach, the local trust in government and the high expectations that the Morales administration could create around lithium that influence local viewpoints. By applying the meaningful grievance concept on the local level, the book supports a further refinement of theories on a resource-governance-conflict-link.

The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) was established in 1981 to monitor the work of civilian government agencies and to coordinate with security forces in Thailand's troubled Malay Muslim majority provinces in the south. Over two decades, the SBPAC developed a reputation for improving the quality of local governance and curbing support for armed separatism. The dissolution of the SPBAC, and its suppressive counterpart the Civilian-Police-Military Command-43 (CPM-43), in 2002 figures prominently in many existing accounts of the contemporary insurgency. Conflicting interpretations of the role of the SBPAC highlight a distinction between its mundane functions and its apparent value to many Malay Muslims as a symbol of the Thai state's goodwill. Studies from the 1990s show that in spite of its shortcomings, the SBPAC achieved a degree of success in building confidence in the Thai state among local Malay Muslim leaders. The decision to revive the SBPAC in 2006 attests to the appeal of its "brand" and the logic of its hearts-and-minds approach to security and development. However, absent mechanisms for popular political representation at the sub-regional level, such an approach is of limited utility. (Contemp Southeast Asia/GIGA)

Malaysia's policy towards southern Thailand has always required a balance between the country's internal security and concern about a neighbouring Muslim minority linked not only by religion but also ethnicity and culture. Security was a paramount concern at independence in 1957, with the southern provinces used as a base by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), the Communist Party of Thailand and Malay irredentists. But after Parti Islam made inroads against the ruling United Malays National Organization by capturing Kelantan (a state adjacent to Thailand) in the 1959 elections, the two premier Malay parties competed to present themselves as the protector of Thailand's Malay Muslims. Security concerns eased with the surrender of the CPM in 1989, but re-emerged in late 2001 with the resumption of conflict in southern Thailand, and the surfacing of militant Islamic groups in Malaysia. Though initially supportive of Thai security interests, Malaysias delicate balance swung towards focusing on the well-being of Thailand's Malays in 2004: the tragic 28 April Krue Se mosque and 25 October Tak Bai incidents led to strong Malaysian protests, an unprecedented parliamentary debate and a general willingness to push the envelope on intervention in Thailand's internal affairs. Tensions remained high through much of 2005, with Thailand alleging that Malaysia was complicit in southern violence. Nonetheless Malaysia ensured Thailand was not embarrassed in international forums such as the Organization of Islamic Conference or ASEAN, and relations improved late in the year. Changes in Thai policy after the September 2006 coup were largely welcomed in Malaysia, but since then Thai-Malaysian cooperation to address the problem has made little headway. (Contemp Southeast Asia/GIGA)