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Public employees do not enjoy the same free speech rights under the First Amendment as do ordinary citizens. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently adopted a virtual per se rule precluding free speech rights for public employees while they are performing ordinary job duties. This Note argues that such a per se rule both lacks policy justification and, more importantly, would undermine the purposes of the First Amendment by impeding academic freedom and permitting viewpoint discrimination. Rejecting the per se rule best preserves the free speech rights of public employees and in turn allows them to speak freely about governmental operations—an especially important function of public employees, who are firsthand witnesses to government activities.

Previous research has studied both rule- and individual-level determinants of rule abidance of frontline workers, but the effect of managerial communication has not been adequately explored. Based on extant literature on street-level bureaucracy, managerial communication, and behavioral public administration, this study develops a novel framework to theorize the relationship between managerial communication and frontline workers' willingness to abide by frontline rules. The framework highlights that managerial communication could improve frontline workers' willingness to abide by rules by directly monitoring their behaviors or indirectly increasing their perceived rule clarity and risk of punishment. Moreover, as organizational size increases, the effect of managerial communication on frontline workers' willingness to abide by rules decreases. The study uses unique data from a 2018–2019 survey covering 94 frontline managers and 717 frontline workers in local security agencies in mainland China to empirically test the hypotheses.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to review "institutional experimentation" for protecting workers in response to the contraction of the standard employment relationship and the corresponding rise of "non-standard" forms of paid work.Design/methodology/approachThe paper draws on the existing research and knowledge base of the authors as well as a thorough review of the extant literature relating to: non-standard employment contracts; sources of labour supply engaging in non-standard work; exogenous pressures on the employment relationship; intermediaries that separate the management from the control of labour; and entities that subvert the employment relationship.FindingsPost-war industrial relations scholars characterised the traditional regulatory model of collective bargaining and the standard employment contract as a "web of rules". As work relations have become more market mediated, new institutional arrangements have developed to govern these relations and regulate the terms of engagement. The paper argues that these are indicative of an emergent "patchwork of rules" which are instructive for scholars, policymakers, workers' representatives and employers seeking solutions to the contraction of the traditional regulatory model.Research limitations/implicationsWhile the review of the institutional experimentation is potentially instructive for developing solutions to gaps in labour regulation, a drawback of this approach is that there are limits to the realisation of policy transfer. Some of the initiatives discussed in the paper may be more effective than others for protecting workers on non-standard contracts, but further research is necessary to test their effectiveness including in different contexts.Social implicationsThe findings indicate that a task ahead for the representatives of government, labour and business is to determine how to adapt the emergent patchwork of rules to protect workers from the new vulnerabilities created by, for example, employer extraction and exploitation of their individual bio data, social media data and, not far off, their personal genome sequence.Originality/valueThe paper addresses calls to examine the "institutional intersections" that have informed the changing ways that work is conducted and regulated. These intersections transcend international, national, sectoral and local units of analysis, as well as supply chains, fissured organisational dynamics, intermediaries and online platforms. The analysis also encompasses the broad range of stakeholders including businesses, labour and community groups, nongovernmental organisations and online communities that have influenced changing institutional approaches to employment protection.

AbstractThis article sets out a unified behavioural research programme that integrates compatible elements of old, new and evolutionary behavioural approaches to economics as an alternative to the dominant unified approach to economics based on rational choice theory and a Walrasian view of market coordination. However, the proposed programme can also be viewed as a general framework for interdisciplinary research on consumer behaviour. It employs the view of scientific research programmes proposed by Lakatos, setting out groups of 'hard‐core' propositions and their associated 'do' and 'do not' rules for the conduct of researchers. The unifying theme is that evolution in the economy (and in human systems more generally) entails the creation, adoption and abandonment of rules for dealing effectively with open‐ended choice problems that are bedevilled by infinite regress problems and cognitive challenges that people seek to address via personal repertoires of hierarchically related rules. To anticipate behaviour, researchers need to develop knowledge of these rules (including heuristics and routines), their functionality and the processes by which they get changed or prove difficult to change even where they cause problems.

The business judgment rule (BJR or the Rule) is an American legal export which has become a key corporate governance tool in most leading common law jurisdictions, such as, Australia, Canada and South Africa. However, the Rule has not been formally embraced in the United Kingdom. In Zimbabwe, the Rule has traditionally been treated as a common law feature. However, section 54 of Zimbabwe's new Companies and Other Business Entities Act represents one of the significant advances in strengthening the jurisdiction's corporate governance principles by codifying the Rule. The BJR originated together with the directors' duty of care and skill. There are two main formulations of the BJR. The first one is by the Delaware Chancery Court and the second one derives from the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance. The Rule mostly applies in determining the procedural aspects of the directors' decision or the decision-making process and only in exceptional cases is it invoked to review the merits of their decision. This article seeks to critically analyse the major elements of Zimbabwe's codified BJR and to ascertain its place in the corporate governance framework. As will become clear, it will also be argued that the statutory BJR is intended for the enhancement of directorial accountability.

PurposeThis paper aims to investigate whether the concept of the golden rule of capital accumulation is an applicable normative guidepost for a market economy even in the absence of the distortions usually associated with income and consumption taxes.Design/methodology/approachThe paper uses a simple two‐period overlapping generations model with productive public and private capital.FindingsAs long as the government is subject to some instrument limitation that constrains its ability to effect non‐distortive optimal inter‐generational income redistributions, the market optimum for capital accumulation would generally deviate from the golden rule towards either side of the rule.Originality/valueThe paper provides a transparent characterization of the nature of the optimal deviation from the golden rule in terms of easily interpretable consumption and production parameters.

AbstractConditionality is widely used by international organisations to induce "client states" to engage in structural reform. In the European Union (EU) it plays an important role in ensuring that accession countries adopt EU rules as a condition of membership. Reliance on external incentives, however, limits the effectiveness of bilateral accession conditionality, especially for pre-accession countries with uncertain membership prospects. This article argues that multilateral institutions can boost the rule transfer effects of bilateral accession conditionality by reinforcing its incentive structure. The contention is tested by empirical research into the Energy Community in South East Europe. The research uses cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison to evaluate the rule transfer effects of Community institutions relative to accession conditionality and the terms of energy interdependence. It finds that whilst accession status is the main predictor of alignment with the energy acquis, there is evidence that multilateral institutions of the Energy Community exert a significant reinforcement effect.

When are high earnings considered a legitimate target for redistribution, and when not? We design a real-effort laboratory experiment in which we manipulate the assignment of payrates (societal "reward rules") that translate performance on a real-effort counting task into pre-tax earnings. We then ask subjects to vote on a flat tax rate in groups of three. We distinguish three treatment conditions: the same payrate for all group members ("equal" reward rule), differential (low, medium, and high) but random payrates ("luck" rule), and differential payrates based on subjects' performance on a quiz with voluntary preparation opportunity ("merit" rule). Self-interest is the dominant tax voting motivation. Tax levels are lower under "merit" rule than under "luck" rule, and merit reasoning overrides political ideology. But information is needed to activate merit reasoning. Both these latter effects are present only when voters have "full merit knowledge" that signals precisely how others obtained their incomes.

AbstractSeventy‐six fourth‐grade children and their parents participated in a study of the linkages among parental control and positive affect, children's display rule use, and children's social competence with peers. Using observational measures of parental behavior and children's display rule use, it was found that parental positive affect and control were related to children's display rule use (including both positive and negative responses). Moreover, the links between parental affect and control and children's social competence one year later (as rated by teachers and peers) were found to be mediated by children's display rule use. Finally, fathers' behavior was found to be particularly important in the prediction of children's display rule use. The importance of fathers in children's social and emotional development and the importance of examining multiple parental behaviors are discussed.

The current study examined different types of display rule knowledge and their relation to parental control of children's emotional expression and children's social competence. A sample of 61 third‐grade children (50% Euro‐American, 40% Latino, and 10% African‐American, Asian‐American or other) participated in the current study. Children's knowledge of display rules for positive and negative emotions was explored, as were the different reasons for endorsing the use of display rules. Parental level of control of children's emotions was also examined. Findings indicate that children who endorsed the use of display rules for both positive and negative emotions were rated as more competent by both teachers and peers. Parental control of children's expression of emotion was negatively related to children's knowledge of display rules and better social outcomes.

THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCES ON ECONOMIC and monetary union and on political union will have consequences for economic efficiency and for political power within the European Community. Both will be important for the future of Europe. But the focus of this article is somewhat different: the implications for the rule of law and representative government. Only somewhat different, because the rule of law and representative government provide the most secure framework for economic efficiency and political power. But more significant, because they not only provide that framework but also embody fundamental political values.