The ongoing transformation of the Russian society largely consists in changes in the institutional framework constraining actors' behavior in the emerging market economy. While we have a substantial knowledge about the functioning of a market economy we know very little about how to create such a system. The transition in Eastern Europe offers an opportunity to acquire new knowledge about the prerequisites for the establishment of a market economy. This thesis is based upon research performed in a project called "Institutions and the Emergence of Markets - Transition in the Russian Forest Sector" conducted between 1997 and 2001 at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria. The purpose of the study was to identify institutional hurdles for the reformation of the Russian forest sector. The task was approached through a series of case studies of the institutional problems hampering developments in the forest sector of eight Russian regions. Data describing the behavior of forest enterprises was obtained through an interview survey among enterprise leaders in each one of the eight regions. The so-called Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework provided a common design for the eight case study reports comprising the first phase of the project. One such case study report is included in this thesis - the one dealing with institutional problems in the forest sector of the Arkhangelsk Oblast. Based on the previous eight case studies an integrating analysis was made with the purpose of identifying more general characteristics of the institutional framework embedding the Russian forest sector. The results of the analysis were reported in a journal article published in 2001. This article is also included in the thesis. In a third and final phase of the project, the results of the previous studies were disseminated through a series of policy exercises to forest stakeholders in four of the eight case study regions, the purpose being to see if a participatory policy formulation process could be established among regional forest stakeholders. The third paper included in this thesis reports on the results of the policy exercises conducted in the regions of Murmansk, Karelia, and Arkhangelsk in the autumn of 2000 and the spring of 2001. As this thesis illustrates, transforming the old Soviet command economy into a modern market system is a formidably complex task. The reforms taken early during the transition (e.g., privatization and price liberalization) triggered a series of spontaneous changes in the economy actually threatening to bankrupt many Russian enterprises and ultimately to upset the entire social order. However, the development also triggered its own response in that it made many market non-viable enterprises enter the so- called virtual economy. Here enterprises exchanged goods and services through barter trade thus avoiding true market competition. In fact, many of the rules-in-use (institutions) constraining the behavior of actors in the virtual economy originated in the old Soviet command system. A major problem with the virtual economy is that it maintains the sub-optimal resource allocation typical of the command economy. The findings reported in this thesis empirically corroborate central hypotheses generated by the theory of the virtual economy. Some ideas are also explored about ways to disentangle the institutional deadlock preventing a large part of the forest enterprises from restructuring to become viable in the emerging Russian market economy. The study arrived at the very general conclusion that there are no easy top- down procedures that automatically will lead to an efficiently functioning Russian market economy. The results contest the claims made by the "shock therapy" school of (mainly western) reform advisors to the Russian government. While certain basic reform measures could not be introduced gradually, there was no ground for expecting rapid automatic and profound positive changes in the institutional framework constraining actors' behavior in the Russian economy. On the contrary, the institutional deadlock characterizing the Russian economy will take a long time (and quite innovative thinking) to disentangle. The problem consists in envisaging a way to introduce institutional changes with the multiple purpose of improving the efficiency of the economy (raising people's standard of living) while at the same time improving the workings of democracy and doing so in a society where the existing institutional framework does not work properly. The study led to a number of specific conclusions relating to the possibilities of reforming the Russian forest sector, making the institutional framework constraining actors' behavior more conducive to economic efficiency. It was found that there is a need for changes throughout the entire institutional hierarchy, ranging from constitutional rules, through collective choice rules, to operational rules. Separation of duties and obligations between the political and economic spheres of society should be an underlying principle in all these changes. It was also suggested that policies for improving the institutional framework governing the Russian regional forest sector should be elaborated in a dialogue with the stakeholders who are directly affected by malfunctioning of the sector. The study showed that the use of policy exercises for elaborating improved forest policies seems feasible although the Russian civil society is (still) not sufficiently developed to allow participatory policy formulation procedures to work effectively. ; Godkänd; 2004; 20070116 (haneit)
Part four of an interview with Gloria Mulcahy and Marion Madonia. Topics include: Issues that concerned their father: water problems in Fitchburg. How they were treated growing up as the daughters of the city mayor. Memories with their father- fireworks on the 4th of July, vacationing at Somerset, lunch when they were home sick from school. What it was like being perceived as "rich." ; 1 MARIANNE: We have accomplished many improvements that the war and shortage of labor and materials that the president had denied us. But we had paid dearly for them… I know there's one thing that he did for the City that people are talking about to now. Joe Bally had mentioned, you know, Josey Bally had mentioned that what [Dad had done of this] talking about, and she was, "Mayor Levanti was still here. He solved the water, the water problem there." GLORIA: That was the big thing. MARIANNE: Yeah, that was the biggest thing. That's what I'm trying to get to. SPEAKER 1: Well, just tell me what you remember. MARIANNE: Okay. SPEAKER 1: What's the water problem? And we can all go back to the books about that. MARIANNE: Okay. This is what happened. The memory is gone. That's why we -- we've got to get our memories going back here. Well, I guess me and [Mettle] was always -- Fitchburg had -- [unintelligible - 00:01:07] Highway wasn't even open in those days. And that [unintelligible - 00:01:09] was the busy place now, and I think… I don't know. It seems like… I was in high school, and we were in high school, and we were so interested in boys and stuff. SPEAKER 1: Why do I get the impression that you know a lot more but you just don't want to share… MARIANNE: I do want to share. I got to get my brain working. Okay. [Crosstalk] SPEAKER 1: What about… what about the water? I don't know about… MARIANNE: I don't -- well, I do and I don't. I guess we needed reservoirs in Fitchburg, so he tried to get me and Mettles, and John Fitch, something about putting the lines in. And if he could make that reservoir, we wouldn't be running out of water. They always ran 2 out of water and stuff. GLORIA: Yeah. MARIANNE: And we didn't, and that's something I will have to look into the history of it. And see, now that I am older, now I would like to look into the history. SPEAKER 1: Mm-hmm. MARIANNE: You know, because I can … SPEAKER 1: Apparently, your father made a decision. MARIANNE: Yes. As mayor of Fitchburg, yeah. He did something that I know helped the city very much, and that's all I remember. SPEAKER 1: Do you remember the other issues that he was faced with being mayor? MARIANNE: Oh, I know the normal issues and all that, and I'm just thinking of the normal things. There was a parking garage that he had to build in Fitchburg. Is that where it started? Oh, that was in his third year and his third term, but did he build a parking garage? GLORIA: Yeah. MARIANNE: That one that's still here? SPEAKER 1: Yeah. MARIANNE: It's still here. That's the one? No, I can't remember. It was across from a bowling alley. SPEAKER 1: Or a pressing issue? You know, like the rest of us. You almost don't want to get out of bed because you don't want to deal with something. MARIANNE: Oh, no. He was… SPEAKER 1: Have you ever heard of anything like that? MARIANNE: No, he was -- he enjoyed it so much because, you know, when I graduated in '53 from high school, I used to ride to work with him because I worked in the Building Department as a junior clerk typist, and I remember I would get rides, and I didn't have a car. 3 And in those days, you didn't even have a car; and I didn't go to college, and I went right to work. So I remember he used to warn me. I had to be ready to go to work, and I was always a late person, and he was the type, "Come on, we better go." You know, and he was just busy all day, eight thirty to five or longer. Because I remember he was afraid I would take the car and [crosstalk] the feel of that, because that got me [unintelligible - 00:03:43]. So I was home while he was mayor, and I didn't get married until '59, so. SPEAKER 1: So that was a busy time then when he was mayor, and he was still connected with the parking company. MARIANNE: Oh, yeah. And that's why he had, that's why -- yeah. So in '53, I went to work for the trucking company and [unintelligible - 00:04:05]. And he wasn't at the trucking company at all because he was too busy at the City of Fitchburg taking care of the city. SPEAKER 1: Right. MARIANNE: And he took care of his business, but my father was a trusting person because he was trusting. He never thought that anybody was going to steal from you. And he loved the city, and he was so active in everything and he was such a warm person. SPEAKER 1: Mm-hmm. MARIANNE: And it mattered to -- and even to all of us. We enjoyed it just as much as he did. SPEAKER 1: Right. Yeah. MARIANNE: We enjoyed being in the public eye. 'Cause when you're in it when you're little, you know, you can't help it. You grow with it. And… knowing that we were the mayor's daughters, and that was -- that was hard though sometimes because you didn't know if some of your friends liked you, especially being in high school during that period. You know, I remember I was initiated into the 4 [Tri-Hi-Y] Club, and I wasn't sure if they really -- now as I got older, I think did, "They really like me as a friend or because I was the mayor's daughter?" You know, but… SPEAKER 1: Do you remember feeling differently because you were the mayor or the city councilor's daughter growing up? Were you treated differently than maybe other… MARIANNE: No, just particularly as the mayor's daughter, not council. Do you remember how we were treated? No, we knew because our father was active in politics, so. So maybe they just thought because we had our own company. My father has his own company, they thought… SPEAKER 1: They thought we had money. MARIANNE: They thought we had money. And even to this day, like once I went out with Mike, the son of [unintelligible - 00:05:56], and they said "Oh, you. You are the [upper]. You are from the rich, you are the rich," and I said no, I wasn't. But we didn't live down Warner Street, and there was a difference then. You know, when I went to go to school, Dauby and I used to get kicked around the school because our fathers had their own trucking company. So now everybody else had to go to work. Our parents worked very hard, but they used to pick on us and say that we are rich, so. [We've been in] a lot of fights, and I used to like it. But being in a political -- he was in politics then when I was in Grand School, right? GLORIA: Right. MARIANNE: That was city councilor. But no. That I remember -- it was just because he was self-employed. That was what the kids would point out to us, but we didn't feel any different… Maybe I did feel a little different growing up. If I really think back. GLORIA: I didn't.5 MARIANNE: I don't think… That was my life, and I just loved Dad so much. We all did. We loved our dad and our father, I mean all that. I mean, I think mayor. It did a little bit more because that was the whole city that we were in charge of. SPEAKER 1: Mm-hmm. MARIANNE: I might have felt a little bit different in high school. Not insecure, but it is insecure in a certain way because the boys are looking at you, but you're not looking back. But just the being proud was being proud of your father because he was always at the relay races where they shoot the gun. You know, where the first guy… SPEAKER 1: Mm-hmm. MARIANNE: You know relay race and all that. It was just a nice thing. SPEAKER 1: So how did they make all of you feel special? MARIANNE: Oh, how did it make me feel special… SPEAKER 1: He must have been a busy guy and out a lot and what did he do to keep the family… MARIANNE: Oh, we played tag [crosstalk] we used to play a lot. GLORIA: [unintelligible - 00:07:55] MARIANNE: We just started playing a lot of -- yeah, well, when he was home, I think we had more quality time because I remember I was sitting on the floor once, all of us because in those day we didn't have TV. SPEAKER 1: Right. MARIANNE: We would listen to like a radio theater, and then we talked [unintelligible - 00:08:15] on the radio shows… And he was with us, and those days we still had the air raids and the parties. SPEAKER 1: Mm-hmm MARIANNE: Remember? GLORIA: [unintelligible - 00:08:27] fireworks. Remember? MARIANNE: Oh yeah, that's right. July 4th. That's right. 6 GLORIA: [unintelligible - 00:08:34]. MARIANNE: And we always had that, like a summer camp that we rented, for like two weeks. We always had a vacation, and he did come for that because he loved swimming. SPEAKER 1: Where was that? MARIANNE: Somerset. SPEAKER 1: Somerset. MARIANNE: Yeah. I forgot about that. Let's get back to when we were young. We at least had an outhouse there. Oh, God. In the old days it was hard to go, right? SPEAKER 1: Mm-hmm. MARIANNE: He did find time for us. I remember when I used to be sick he would always come for lunch because I was not in school. And at grammar school, you would go home for your lunch those days. And he would be home and he would come home and stay for about an hour or half an hour, and if I was home sick like with the mumps—I remember that time—he would come home and we would play cards. I was lying on the couch, and he would come in and we would talk and play cards, because I always loved that. And he did find time for us even though he was a busy man. SPEAKER 1: So let me [Unintelligible - 00:09:55]. He was strict. You went to [Nolan] School. [Unintelligible - 00:09:57] the kids who went in the patch? Where did they do? MARIANNE: They went to Nolan as well. We all went to the same school. SPEAKER 1: Yeah, so you weren't living up in the patch. MARIANNE: Well, they all thought we were richer because we lived up on the… GLORIA: And now we are down the patch. MARIANNE: And now we came back. We came back to where our first house was. GLORIA: [Unintelligible - 00:10:17] and that's funny. 7 SPEAKER 1: It's interesting that other people perceived you as being rich, but you didn't feel like you were. MARIANNE: We didn't feel rich. No. No. We just… No, we didn't feel rich. SPEAKER 1: Because you know, usually I hear, "Now we are not poor, but we feel poor." MARIANNE: No, that's true. But we didn't feel poor. I think because we were up the hill, they thought people up the hill -- well, we had our own home. I mean, they had -- some of them had their own homes, too. But maybe it's because there were five of us girls, and they always dressed us. We barely paid our bills, but we always were dressed nice. I mean, I don't know. SPEAKER 1: Mm-hmm. So relatively speaking, you may have had more money. But it just doesn't feel like they were right. MARIANNE: No. Because I remember them saying, "Oh, they buy [crosstalk]. GLORIA: --clothing store. SPEAKER 1: Uh-huh. GLORIA: Mayor of city hall. That's where -- going back, we always -- Easter, Christmas, school. MARIANNE: And then the cabbage there. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. You remember that. MARIANNE: And they let us pay two dollars… GLORIA: I don't remember that. MARIANNE: He was -- I remember he would come -- they would collect in those days, and they would come and collect the money. Even when I went to city hall and I was in high school, we would pay two dollars a month. But we were all dressed well, so I mean that could have made a difference. I don't know, so… Well… [Crosstalk] MARIANNE: Of course not. GLORIA: Right.8 SPEAKER 1: Well maybe it is that whole perception thing, because in all these photographs that you show me of your dad, he is dressed up. MARIANNE: Yeah, we were always dressed nice. My mother always dressed very nicely, and she always wore… GLORIA: Never went without a [unintelligible - 00:12:23]. MARIANNE: No. No. He really supported us well. My mother never worked. Never worked. She didn't have to. GLORIA: Never. SPEAKER 1: What were the boundaries in Fitchburg? You know, the physical boun-, the patch, and [unintelligible - 00:12:41] and things like that? MARIANNE: Yeah, I know. So there were boundaries, but with the patch were supposed to be the Italians, but it could have gone with the first. This picture would have been with that one. Maybe English. I don't know. I can't remember, but in those days, there was always something. But now, it's not. Now it is a one-on-one community, right? Yeah, when you think back to… the pretty things would separate, and like loved ones would be [unintelligible - 00:13:23] Canton, and it would be a certain district. And then further on was Ward Two…/AT/pa/kb/es
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A few weeks ago, American Compass released Rebuilding American Capitalism, A Handbook for Conservative Policymakers. This Forbes column (American Compass Points To Myths Not Facts) provided a very brief critique of the handbook's Financialization chapter, and Oren Cass, American Compass's Executive Director, released a response titled Yes, Financialization Is Real. This Cato at Liberty post is the fifth in a series that expands on the original criticisms. (The first four in the series are available here, here, here, and here.) This post discusses the one remaining core argument American Compass relies on – income stagnation. It demonstrates that the evidence contradicts American Compass's income stagnation story. The idea that Americans' income has stagnated is central to American Compass's argument that American capitalism needs to be rebuilt. The foreword in American Compass's handbook uses this stagnation story as follows: What has happened to capitalism in America? Businesses still pursue profit, yes, but not in ways that advance the public interest. Over the past 50 years, corporate profits rose by 185%. Wages rose by 1%. [Emphasis added.]
It connects this supposed stagnation to financial markets as follows: Financialization shifted the economy's center of gravity from Main Street to Wall Street, fueling an explosion in corporate profits alongside stagnating wages and declining investment. [Emphasis added.]
American Compass's very reason for existence is to argue that American capitalism no longer flourishes largely because "globalization and financialization" are "undermining the nation's prosperity." The alleged evidence is that the typical American worker's income has been stagnating for decades. The third sentence of Cass's 2018 book, The Once and Future Worker, laments that "while gross domestic product (GDP) tripled from 1975 to 2015, the median worker's wages have barely budged." This stagnation story, just as American Compass's claims regarding talent, profit, and investment, does not hold up to scrutiny. The empirical evidence undercuts American Compass's stated reason for existing. To be clear: It is true that America has many economic problems. In fact, Cato scholars regularly discuss countless ways to fix many of these problems. Unfortunately for American Compass, though, a broad stagnation (or decline) in Americans' income is not a problem. The opening lines of Cass's book (reproduced above) provide an excellent starting point for this discussion. While it is very easy to verify something like GDP growth for any given period, it is not so straightforward to evaluate "the median worker's wages" because the median worker can be defined in any number of ways. The term could reference, for example, someone who earns the median wage of all U.S. employees, the median wage of all private employees, or the median wage of all production and nonsupervisory employees (excluding managerial staff). Arguably, the term should exclude all part‐time workers or all workers under the age of 16. There simply is no single way to define the median (or typical) worker. This basic problem is magnified by multiple definitions of income, including total compensation (wages plus fringe benefits, such as health insurance) and household income (both before and after taxes and transfers). Separately, for any given measure of income, adjusting for inflation with different price indices results in large disparities in real income growth over long periods of time. And, of course, choosing different time periods from within the overall length of a series can easily produce a deceptively low (or high) growth rate. These problems are all further complicated because the "typical" household from distant decades is no longer the typical American household – aside from multiple other demographic changes, more household income is now typically spread over fewer family members. It is straightforward to use Cass's example to illustrate some of these points. For instance, using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to adjust average hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory employees suggests that real wages have grown less than 1 percent from 1975 to 2015, consistent with Cass's statement. However, adjusting the same earnings data with the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) index indicates that real wages grew 22 percent – obviously not stagnant. Interestingly, using either a longer or shorter timeframe provides a very different growth figure than Cass's 1975 to 2015 period. For example, examining the same income series from 1964 – the first year the data is available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) – to 2015, while adjusting for inflation with the CPI, shows that real wages grew almost 9 percent from 1964 to 2015. Using the PCE shows that real wages grew a bit more than 39 percent from 1964 to 2015. Separately, using the CPI to examine the same income series from 1991 to 2015 (both 1975 and 1991 mark the end of a recession) shows that income grew almost 15 percent. Using the PCE to adjust for inflation suggests that income grew 27 percent for this period.
Figure 1: Real Wage Growth in the U.S. from Varying Start Year (1964–2000) to 2015 As Figure 1 demonstrates, "income growth" is highly influenced by the chosen inflation metric and the starting point for the period of analysis. Figure 1 plots the growth rate in real income – average hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory employees – with the rate calculated using every year from 1964 to 2000, respectively, as the starting point, and 2015 as the ending year. It shows the analysis using both the CPI and PCE to convert nominal wages to real. (Real adjustments made using the PCE, the Fed's preferred price measure, always result in a higher growth rate.) Using 1975 as the starting point for this analysis, for CPI adjusted income, produces the lowest possible (positive) growth rate. Using only this method – the one Cass uses – while ignoring all the others gives the false impression that real income was stagnant. Similar issues arise using the Census Bureau's household income figures, but even the basic data, as reported, contradicts the stagnation story. For instance, without making any adjustments for changes in demographics, Census reports that real median household income increased 34.18 percent from 1967 to 2018.[1] That's hardly stagnant. Still, because the number of people in each household declined 23 percent from 1967 to 2018 (from 3.3 individuals to an all‐time low of 2.53),[2] the Census income distribution figures understate how well individuals have been doing. Larger household incomes are now divided among fewer people, so adjusting for only this change in household size shows that real median household income increased 74 percent, from $14,355 in 1967 to $24,972 in 2018.[3] That's more than double the increase shown in the unadjusted data, far from stagnant. While many journalists have let go of the income stagnation story, others have (even if unintentionally) fueled the false narrative. Take, for instance, an article in The Atlantic that discussed the U.S. Census Bureau's 2018 report Income and Poverty in the United States. The author noted: Around 13 percent of households made more than $150,000 last year; a decade ago, by comparison, 8.5 percent did. While that's something to cheer, without a solid middle class, it's not indicative of an economy that is healthy and stable more broadly.
At best, the author is guilty of a major understatement. The 2018 Census report shows that more than 5 million households – not individuals, but families – moved into the high‐earning category. That shift is undoubtedly something to cheer, but the author still implies that these numbers support a "disappearing middle class" narrative. As Mark Perry from the American Enterprise Institute confirms, the very same Census report shows that the share of households earning between $35,000 and $100,000 fell from more than 53 percent in 1967 to 42 percent in 2018, and that the share of households earning more than $100,000 essentially tripled, from less than 10 percent in 1967 to more than 30 percent in 2018. Moreover, while The Atlantic article largely ignores it, the share of households earning less than $35,000 fell, from approximately 36 percent in 1967 to less than 28 percent in 2018. Together, these statistics show a broad increase in prosperity. In fact, this increase is even more impressive considering that the number of American households essentially doubled from 1970 to 2018. For anyone interested in additional evidence that typical Americans – and even, in many cases, lower income Americans – have been earning higher and higher incomes during the last several decades, here are a few references: William Cline, U.S. Median Household Income Has Risen More Than You Think Richard V. Burkhauser, Jeff Larrimore, and Kosali I. Simon, A "Second Opinion" On The Economic Health Of The American Middle Class Salim Furth, Stagnant Wages: What the Data Show Michael Strain, The Myth of Income Stagnation Scott Winship, Stagnationists Are Simply Wrong and What You Need to Know from the New CBO Income Figures Gerald Auten and David Splinter, Income Inequality in the United States: Using Tax Data to Measure Long‐Term Trends Thomas Hirschl and Mark Rank, The Life Course Dynamics of Affluence Scott Lincicome, The American Wealth Machine and Its Misguided Discontents and The Annoying Persistence of the Income Stagnation Myth John Early, The Myth of American Income Inequality In 2020, perhaps after recognizing that the basic income stagnation story does not hold up, American Compass began releasing its Cost‐of‐Thriving Index (COTI) to provide "a better way to understand the challenge for working families." According to Cass, his COTI is better than looking at inflation‐adjusted (real) income: Economists rely on inflation‐based adjustments to compare costs of living over time, but this method measures the cost of buying the same set of things in different eras. Perhaps a family could more easily afford a 1985 quality of life in 2015 than in 1985, but being in the middle class in 2015 means affording a 2015 quality of life.
While it is true that price indices are imperfect, and they tend to make older incomes look larger than they really were, Cass's description of inflation‐based adjustments over time is highly flawed. Adjusting nominal income to "real" income essentially converts the dollar amount to a quantity, such that it indicates how much "stuff" someone can buy. And both the CPI and the PCE account for (as best as possible) the different quality of goods and services available to people over time, as well how people may buy different products (substitute), including those that they were previously unable to purchase. Setting this flaw aside, American Compass uses its COTI to argue that living standards have declined, supposedly explaining why "America's working families" are correct to "feel that they have come under increasing economic pressure." However, as the American Enterprise Institute's Scott Winship and Jeremy Horpedahl have documented, American Compass's COTI methodology is just as flawed as its understanding of inflation‐based adjustments. In their new paper, Winship and Horpedahl demonstrate that the American Compass COTI decline is the direct result of its design choices. Specifically, American Compass's COTI ignores taxes and transfers (which tend to boost lower earners' incomes), excludes full‐time workers younger than 25 years old, and excludes full‐time female workers. American Compass's COTI also includes a very narrow range of goods and services, defining food, transportation, housing, health care, and higher education as "needs," yet leaving purchases of clothing, home furnishings, utilities, and communications technology out of the COTI. American Compass's COTI methodology is consistent with its propensity for selectively choosing data to give the appearance of supporting evidence for its claims. Thus, Winship and Horpedahl reach a reasonable conclusion regarding American Compass's COTI report: Against these data, Cass asks us to believe that, in truth, living standards are down by 36 percent. We have shown that this claim bears no relationship to reality. … While Cass's claims are out of line with all plausible estimates by serious researchers, they align neatly with his organization's view that American capitalism requires "rebuilding."
It is also worth mentioning that American Compass's COTI conflicts with other research that uses separate alternative measures of well‐being that do not depend on inflation‐adjusted income metrics. For instance, Bruce Sacerdote's 2017 National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) paper reports that consumption for two‐person households with below median income increased as much as 164 percent from 1960 to 2015. The paper points out that spending on food and clothing grew slower than the growth in total consumption during this period, and that this falling share of total consumption for food and clothing is consistent with real income growth being higher than income‐based measures suggest. Another consumption‐based measure of well‐being is the number of work hours needed to purchase the same goods at two different points in time. Researchers can use this metric to gauge whether, for example, real income stagnated from 1975 to 2015. If the amount of time someone would need to work to buy the same bundle of consumer goods in 1975 is no different than it is in 2015, then real income has stagnated. On the other hand, if the required work time to purchase the same bundle has fallen, then the evidence suggests that real income has increased. Using a sample of 400 consumer products, George Mason's Don Boudreaux reports that only one good–men's work boots–costs more in work time in 2019 than in 1975. (In Myths Of Rich And Poor: Why We're Better Off Than We Think, Michael Cox and Richard Alm use the same method and report similar results.) The Simon Project, an endeavor of the Cato Institute's HumanProgress.org, formalizes these ideas by creating an index based on the time price (how long someone must work to acquire a good) of 50 basic commodities. Their index shows that the average time price of these 50 commodities fell more than 72 percent between 1980 and 2018. In practical terms, this figure means that if it took one hour of work to buy a commodity – such as sugar, coffee, pork, or lumber – in 1980, it took only about 17 minutes of work to buy that same commodity in 2018. Put differently, if it took one hour of work to buy an item in 1980, that same hour of work would buy almost four units of the same good in 2018. This Cato post has demonstrated that American Compass's bleak income stagnation story is a false narrative. American Compass selectively chooses its preferred time periods and economic measures so it appears as if the evidence supports its story. Moreover, as previous posts in this series established, American Compass displays this same propensity to selectively pick terms and dates that appear to support its "financialization" narrative. In all these cases, though, the evidence contradicts American Compass's claims.
[1] Authors' calculations using the following U.S. Census income and household size data: Table A‑2. Households by Total Money Income, Race, and Hispanic Origin of Householder: 1967 to 2018, https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2019/demo/p60-266.html, and Table HH‑4. Households by Size: 1960 to Present, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/families/households….
[2] Mark Perry, "More Charts And Commentary Based On This Week's Census Bureau Report On Income," American Enterprise Institute, September 12, 2019, https://www.aei.org/publication/more-charts-and-commentary-based-on-this-weeks-census-bureau-report-on-income/.
[3] Author's calculations using the following U.S. Census income and household size data: Table A‑2. Households by Total Money Income, Race, and Hispanic Origin of Householder: 1967 to 2018, https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2019/demo/p60-266.html, and Table HH‑4. Households by Size: 1960 to Present, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/families/households….
Hayvancılık yönetimi, dengeli bir beslenmeye ihtiyaç duyan insanlar için gerekli olan et ve süt gibi temel ürünlerin üretilmesi, bir iş alanı yaratılması, mahsulün yeniden canlandırılması ve giyim kuşam anlamında derilerinin uygun bir şekilde kullanılmasını içine alan temel bir endüstri olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Tarımsal sektörler arasında hayvancılık, maksimum değer yaratma olasılığına sahip alanların başında gelmektedir. Hayvancılık yönetimi, tıp, yem ve hayvancılık ekipmanları endüstrisi gibi yeni istihdam alanları oluşturmanın avantajına sahiptir. Bu nedenle ekonomiye büyük katkı sağlar.Türkiye; farklı iklim yapısı, yem anlamındaki potansiyeli ve farklı türde canlı hayvanlara sahip olması anlamında, hayvancılık konularına özel ilgi gösterilmesi gereken bir ülke konumdadır. Bununla birlikte, son yıllarda, toplam tarımsal üretimdeki payında, hayvansal üretim tüm gelişmiş ülkelerde istikrarlı bir şekilde artmış, bu tür bir artış Türkiye'de sağlanamamıştır. Bunun nedenleri, bakım ve tedarik hatalarının yanında, çevresel faktörler, hayvan genetik kapasitesinin yetersizliği ve son olarak bir ana dal olmaktan öte, tarımın bir dalı olarak son yıllara kadar kabul edilmesidir.2000'li yılların başından bu yana, daha fazla müşteriye olan talebin karşılanması, spesifik ürün çeşitlerine olan talep ve en kısa teslimat süreleriyle bunların ulaştırılması önemlerini daha da artırdı. Günümüzde, bu yaklaşımlar genellikle dağıtık üretim konusunda ifade edilmektedir. Gelecekte, dağıtık üretim kavramı, üretim veya hizmet sistemleri perspektifinden coğrafi koşulları dikkate alarak daha önemli bir rol oynayacaktır. Dağıtık üretimin esasları, ölçek, konum ve tüketici-üretici ilişkileri açısından farklılık gösteren seri üretim için farklı bir yol sunar. Anahtar temalar, dağıtılmış üretimin, ürünün uzun ömürlü ve kapalı malzeme döngülerinin yanı sıra üretimi yerelleştirmeyi nasıl teşvik ettiğini de içeriyordu. Buradan hareketle kitlesel bireyselleştirme kavramı, değer yaratma kökeni dahilinde bilgiye dayalı olarak gelişen toplumsal üretim sistemi olarak tanımlanabilir.Kitlesel bireyselleştirme ve seri üretimin farklı parametrelerini inceleme sürecinde simülasyon, hangi yolla seçileceğinin anlaşılması için kullanılmıştır. Merkezileştirme ve ademi- merkeziyetçilik, çevresel etkiler, karmaşıklık, müşteri memnuniyeti, ürün çeşitliliği, tasarım ve açık inovasyonun demokratikleştirilmesi, pazar ve müşteri yakınlığı, kaynak kullanımı, bölgeselcilik ve özgünlük, enerji tasarrufu, sürdürülebilirlik gibi parametreler bu anlamda kriterlerin oluşturulmasında kullanılmıştır. Simülasyon bir çevreye ve ajanlara sahip olacak ve aynı zamanda bu ajanlardan objektif sonuçlar elde etmek için kendi kararlarını rastgele almaları gerekecektir. Bu nedenle, ajan bazlı simülasyon yaklaşımı burada benimsenmiştir. Tedarik zinciri, çevrenin-ajanların durumu ve parametreleri, paradigma değişiminin tanımlanması anlamında tasarlanmış ve bu doğrultuda etkili faktörlerin veya etkileşimlerin belirlenmesi için Deney Tasarımı kullanılmıştır. Bunlarla birlikte, optimum koşulun bulunması için parametrelerin seviyeleri ve faktörleri belirlenmiştir. Burada denklemlerden hareketle etkin faktörler ve etkileşimler net şekilde belirlenip, bunların seri üretim ve kitlesel bireyselleştirme çatısı altında Türkiye'de ki et tedarik zincirinin hangi paradigma altında daha verimli sonuç verdiği incelenmiştir. --- Livestock management is an essential industry, by the reason of producing basic products such as meat and milk, which is necessary for people eating a balanced diet, creating a business area, reclamating crop and crop residues that cannot be consumed as human foods. Among agricultural sectors, livestock possesses the maximum possibility of creating accretion value. Livestock management owns the advantage of creating new employment areas, such as medicine, feed and livestock equipment industry. Therefore, it makes a large contribution to the economy.Turkey; including different climate structures, possessing different kinds of livestock, is in a position that livestock issues should take a specific attention. However, in recent years, in the share of total agricultural production, animal production increased steadily in all developed countries, but such an increase could not be achieved in Turkey. The reasons are able to be laid at the beyond of caring and supply failures, environmental factors, the lack of capacity of livestock's genetics and for the last one livestock is still regarded as a branch and insurance of agriculture.Since the beginnings of 2000's, meeting the demand for more customers, specific product variants and shortest delivery times has increased their significance much more. Nowadays, these approaches are generally expressed in the topic of Distributed Manufacturing. In the future, the concept of Distributed Manufacturing, from the perspective of production or service systems will take more substantial role by considering geographic conditions. The essentials of distributed production offers a different way to mass production that differs in scale, location and consumer producer relationship. Key themes are generally included that how distributed production can promote product longevity and closed material loops, as well as localizing production. Mass customization can be identified as the social production system currently evolving based upon knowledge as the origin of value creation.In the process of examining the different parameters of mass customization and mass production, simulation and system modelling may aid us to understand in which way have to be chosen. The parameters can be expressed such as centralization & decentralization, environmental effects, complexity, customer satisfaction, product variation, democratization of design and open innovation, market and customer proximity, usage of resources, regionalism and authenticity, energy saving, sustainability. A livestock management are simulated under some specific criteria based on the paradigm shift of mass customization. This simulation is going to own an environment and agents, and also these agents have to take their own decisions randomly to obtain much objective results. Therefore, an agent based simulation approach need to be done in here. The condition and parameters of supply chain, environment and the agents are able to change to obtain specific results for different parameters of mass customization. Due to these changes, design of experiment have to be made for levels of the parameters to find the optimum condition. After that, the effect of Mass Customization & Mass Production on the results will be examined in detail. The results taken from design of experiment help what have to be done for the solution of problems of Livestock in detail for Turkey.
Hayvancılık yönetimi, dengeli bir beslenmeye ihtiyaç duyan insanlar için gerekli olan et ve süt gibi temel ürünlerin üretilmesi, bir iş alanı yaratılması, mahsulün yeniden canlandırılması ve giyim kuşam anlamında derilerinin uygun bir şekilde kullanılmasını içine alan temel bir endüstri olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Tarımsal sektörler arasında hayvancılık, maksimum değer yaratma olasılığına sahip alanların başında gelmektedir. Hayvancılık yönetimi, tıp, yem ve hayvancılık ekipmanları endüstrisi gibi yeni istihdam alanları oluşturmanın avantajına sahiptir. Bu nedenle ekonomiye büyük katkı sağlar. Türkiye; farklı iklim yapısı, yem anlamındaki potansiyeli ve farklı türde canlı hayvanlara sahip olması anlamında, hayvancılık konularına özel ilgi gösterilmesi gereken bir ülke konumdadır. Bununla birlikte, son yıllarda, toplam tarımsal üretimdeki payında, hayvansal üretim tüm gelişmiş ülkelerde istikrarlı bir şekilde artmış, bu tür bir artış Türkiye'de sağlanamamıştır. Bunun nedenleri, bakım ve tedarik hatalarının yanında, çevresel faktörler, hayvan genetik kapasitesinin yetersizliği ve son olarak bir ana dal olmaktan öte, tarımın bir dalı olarak son yıllara kadar kabul edilmesidir. 2000'li yılların başından bu yana, daha fazla müşteriye olan talebin karşılanması, spesifik ürün çeşitlerine olan talep ve en kısa teslimat süreleriyle bunların ulaştırılması önemlerini daha da artırdı. Günümüzde, bu yaklaşımlar genellikle dağıtık üretim konusunda ifade edilmektedir. Gelecekte, dağıtık üretim kavramı, üretim veya hizmet sistemleri perspektifinden coğrafi koşulları dikkate alarak daha önemli bir rol oynayacaktır. Dağıtık üretimin esasları, ölçek, konum ve tüketici-üretici ilişkileri açısından farklılık gösteren seri üretim için farklı bir yol sunar. Anahtar temalar, dağıtılmış üretimin, ürünün uzun ömürlü ve kapalı malzeme döngülerinin yanı sıra üretimi yerelleştirmeyi nasıl teşvik ettiğini de içeriyordu. Buradan hareketle kitlesel bireyselleştirme kavramı, değer yaratma kökeni dahilinde bilgiye dayalı olarak gelişen toplumsal üretim sistemi olarak tanımlanabilir. Kitlesel bireyselleştirme ve seri üretimin farklı parametrelerini inceleme sürecinde simülasyon, hangi yolla seçileceğinin anlaşılması için kullanılmıştır. Merkezileştirme ve ademi- merkeziyetçilik, çevresel etkiler, karmaşıklık, müşteri memnuniyeti, ürün çeşitliliği, tasarım ve açık inovasyonun demokratikleştirilmesi, pazar ve müşteri yakınlığı, kaynak kullanımı, bölgeselcilik ve özgünlük, enerji tasarrufu, sürdürülebilirlik gibi parametreler bu anlamda kriterlerin oluşturulmasında kullanılmıştır. Simülasyon bir çevreye ve ajanlara sahip olacak ve aynı zamanda bu ajanlardan objektif sonuçlar elde etmek için kendi kararlarını rastgele almaları gerekecektir. Bu nedenle, ajan bazlı simülasyon yaklaşımı burada benimsenmiştir. Tedarik zinciri, çevrenin-ajanların durumu ve parametreleri, paradigma değişiminin tanımlanması anlamında tasarlanmış ve bu doğrultuda etkili faktörlerin veya etkileşimlerin belirlenmesi için Deney Tasarımı kullanılmıştır. Bunlarla birlikte, optimum koşulun bulunması için parametrelerin seviyeleri ve faktörleri belirlenmiştir. Burada denklemlerden hareketle etkin faktörler ve etkileşimler net şekilde belirlenip, bunların seri üretim ve kitlesel bireyselleştirme çatısı altında Türkiye'de ki et tedarik zincirinin hangi paradigma altında daha verimli sonuç verdiği incelenmiştir. --- Livestock management is an essential industry, by the reason of producing basic products such as meat and milk, which is necessary for people eating a balanced diet, creating a business area, reclamating crop and crop residues that cannot be consumed as human foods. Among agricultural sectors, livestock possesses the maximum possibility of creating accretion value. Livestock management owns the advantage of creating new employment areas, such as medicine, feed and livestock equipment industry. Therefore, it makes a large contribution to the economy. Turkey; including different climate structures, possessing different kinds of livestock, is in a position that livestock issues should take a specific attention. However, in recent years, in the share of total agricultural production, animal production increased steadily in all developed countries, but such an increase could not be achieved in Turkey. The reasons are able to be laid at the beyond of caring and supply failures, environmental factors, the lack of capacity of livestock's genetics and for the last one livestock is still regarded as a branch and insurance of agriculture. Since the beginnings of 2000's, meeting the demand for more customers, specific product variants and shortest delivery times has increased their significance much more. Nowadays, these approaches are generally expressed in the topic of Distributed Manufacturing. In the future, the concept of Distributed Manufacturing, from the perspective of production or service systems will take more substantial role by considering geographic conditions. The essentials of distributed production offers a different way to mass production that differs in scale, location and consumer producer relationship. Key themes are generally included that how distributed production can promote product longevity and closed material loops, as well as localizing production. Mass customization can be identified as the social production system currently evolving based upon knowledge as the origin of value creation. In the process of examining the different parameters of mass customization and mass production, simulation and system modelling may aid us to understand in which way have to be chosen. The parameters can be expressed such as centralization & decentralization, environmental effects, complexity, customer satisfaction, product variation, democratization of design and open innovation, market and customer proximity, usage of resources, regionalism and authenticity, energy saving, sustainability. A livestock management are simulated under some specific criteria based on the paradigm shift of mass customization. This simulation is going to own an environment and agents, and also these agents have to take their own decisions randomly to obtain much objective results. Therefore, an agent based simulation approach need to be done in here. The condition and parameters of supply chain, environment and the agents are able to change to obtain specific results for different parameters of mass customization. Due to these changes, design of experiment have to be made for levels of the parameters to find the optimum condition. After that, the effect of Mass Customization & Mass Production on the results will be examined in detail. The results taken from design of experiment help what have to be done for the solution of problems of Livestock in detail for Turkey.
Eine "Sustainable Livelihoods Analyse" (Analyse des Lebensunterhaltes und seiner Nachhaltigkeit) wurde für eine kleine Siedlung im Norden des Apuseni-Gebirges durchgeführt. Die Haushalte und Unternehmen der Familien bilden eine Einheit im Sinne einer Familienwirtschaft. Die Sustainable Livelihoods Analyse wurde nach den "Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets" des Departments for International Development (UK) gestaltet. Sie besteht aus der Beschreibung des Verwundbarkeitskontextes (Vulnerability Context) und den gesellschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen (Transforming Structures and Processes) für die Zielgruppe, ihren Ressourcen (Assets), ihren Überlebensstrategien (Livelihood Strategies), den erwirtschafteten Ergebnissen (Livelihood Outcomes) und der Identifizierung von Maßnahmen zur Entwicklung von Sustainable Livelihoods (Multiple Entry Points). Zur Darstellung der Livelihood Strategies wurden die Haushalte der Siedlung in vier Klassen gruppiert. Aus jeder Klasse wurde eine repräsentative Familienwirtschaft für die Durchführung einer Fallstudie im Jahr 2002 gewählt. Mit einer Kosten- und Leistungsrechnung wurden die Wertschöpfungen (produzierte Leistungen) und weitere Indikatoren der einzelnen Aktivitäten der Familienwirtschaften berechnet. Die Ergebnisse sind über on-, off- und non-farm-Aktivitätengruppen zu den Summen für die ganze Familienwirtschaft aggregiert. Neben marktgängigen Kosten und Leistungen wurden auch nichtmarktgängige Kosten und Leistungen erfasst und monetär bewertet, als Wertmaß wurden "WEUR" (Wert-Euro) eingeführt. Zur Abbildung von Genderaspekten wurde die Familienarbeit nach Männer- und Frauenarbeit differenziert. Für jede familienwirtschaftliche Aktivität wurde das Management dokumentiert. Für das Jahr 2002 wurden Wertschöpfungen von 2.419 bis 8.148 WEUR (je erwachsene Person: 747 - 2.037 WEUR) ermittelt. Dafür wurden von den Familienwirtschaften 4.649 - 8.141 Arbeitsstunden (je Person 1.359 - 2.324 Arbeitsstunden) eingesetzt. Die mittlere Vergütung einer Familienarbeitsstunde liegt zwischen 0,37 und 1,50 WEUR/Stunde. Die kalkulatorischen Abschreibungen betragen jährlich 38 - 363 WEUR (je Person 19 - 91 WEUR). Zur Wertschöpfung tragen die rein landwirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten (on farm-Aktivitäten) mit 9% - 21% bei, off farm-Aktivitäten mit 69% - 85% (davon Waldnutzungen 27% - 33%, Holzbe- und Holzverarbeitung 33% - 52%), non farm-Aktivitäten mit 0% - 23%. Die Livelihood Strategie der Familienwirtschaften besteht in einem hoch diversifizierten Aktivitäten-Portfolio mit Selbstwerber-Holzeinschlag, Holzeinschnitt auf einfache Sägen, Garten- und Ackerbau, Grünlandwirtschaft, Viehhaltung, handwerkliche Tätigkeiten der Lebensmittel-, Holz- und Wolleverarbeitung und dem landesweiten Vertrieb von Holzprodukten. Funktional ist bei den Aktivitäten eine ausgeprägte Subsistenz- oder Marktproduktion festzustellen. Dabei sind die Marktaktivitäten zur Aufrechterhaltung der Subsitenzaktivitäten wichtig, z. B. ermöglicht das durch die Holzbearbeitung eingenommene Geld den Kauf von Kraftfuttermitteln (Getreideprodukte) für Schweinemast zu Subsistenzzwecken. Entgegen der bisherigen Annahme sind die Familienwirtschaften von Ghetari nicht primär als Landwirtschaften, sondern als Forst- und Sägeunternehmen zu betrachten. Mit der Sustainable Livelihoods Analyse wurden sieben Handlungsfelder mit über 50 Maßnahmen (Multiple Entry Points) zur nachhaltigen Sicherung und Gestaltung der Livelihoods identifiziert. Der Wald war und ist mittelfristig die wichtigste Ressource der Bewohner. Zu Gunsten der Bewohner sollte deshalb ein ökologisch, sozial und wirtschaftlich nachhaltiges Waldmanagement etabliert werden. Die Menschen von Ghetari werden im Zukunftssektor Tourismus durch Talbewohner marginalisiert. Auch bei der Naturparkausweisung sind - unter ökonomischen Gesichtspunkten - die Talbewohner die Gewinner, Ghetari-Bewohner die Verlierer. Um sich angesichts der zukünftigen Rahmenbedingungen zu behaupten, müssen die Ghetari-Bewohner ihre politischen Interessen besser vertreten. Außerdem müssen sie eine für sie passende Kooperationsform finden, um sich auch zukünftig an Märkten behaupten zu können. ; A Sustainable Livelihoods Analysis was carried out in a small settlement in the northern Apuseni-mountains, consisting of 28 family-economies (households). They are marked by the strong unity of household and enterprise in the sense of a family-economy. The Analysis was designed according to the Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets from the "Department for International Development" (UK). This includes a description of the vulnerability context and the transforming structures and processes the inhabitants are faced with, a description of the inhabitants assets, of their livelihood strategies, of their livelihood outcomes and the identification of multiple entry points for increasing their resilience and for developing sustainable livelihoods. To analyse the livelihood strategies the settlement was grouped into four household classes. In 2002 a representative family-economy was chosen from each class for a one-year case-study. A management accounting system was designed to calculate for each family-economy indicators like the value added (income), the calculated writing off and the family labour etc. All in- and outputs of each activity were recorded, calculated according to the marked prices or - in the case of non-marked-products and services - marked with equivalent values. Amounts consisting of added up marked price-values and equivalent values are named "WEUR" ("value"-Euro). The different figures were added up to on-, off- and non-farm-activity groups and to the whole family-economy. To indicate gender aspects the family working hours have been divided into labour of men and of women. The management of each activity was documented additionally. In the year 2002 the calculated annual value added ("income") of the family-economies ranged from 2,419 to 8,148 WEUR (per adult family member: 747 - 2,037 WEUR). To achieve this amount the families brought in between 4,649 to 8,141 working hours (1,359 - 2,324 per person). The average reimbursement of a family's working hour ranged between 0.37 and 1.50 WEUR/hour. The calculated writing offs ranged from 38 - 363 WEUR/year (19 - 91 per person). The on-farm activities contributed 9% - 21% to the value added, off farm-activities 69% - 85% (including forest utilisation 27% - 33%; timber processing and crafting 33% - 52%), non farm-activities 0% - 23%. The livelihood strategies of these family-economies consisted of a highly diversified activity portfolio including logging, sawing, timber processing, agriculture, use of grassland, animal rising, craft and trade. Most activities were either market- or subsistence orientated. Some subsistence orientated activities can only be run with the money earned in market activities, e.g. concentrated feed for pig fattening is bought with the income from timber processing. In contrast to the widespreaded opinion the family-economies in the region are not mainly based on farming but on forest utilisation and timber processing. The Sustainable Livelihoods Analysis identified seven fields of action with more than 50 multiple entry points for securing and for development of the family-economies livelihoods. Forests have been and still are the most important resource for the inhabitants. For the sake of survival the inhabitants future management must establish ecological, social and economical sustainability of the forest. The people from Ghetari are beeing marginalised in favour of the valley dwellers, e. g. due to tourism. The proposed park again will favour the valley dwellers above the Ghetari inhabitants. With these challenges in mind, the Ghetari inhabitants must take somemore interest in politics. Additionally they should find suitable cooperation forms for their products in order to compete in future markets.
ABSTRAK Pratama, Giovani Angger. Hak Asuh Anak di Bawah Umur Akibat Perceraian Menurut Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 1974 tentang Perkawinan (Studi Putusan No. 23/Pdt.G/2020/ PN.Tgl). Skripsi. Tegal: Program Studi Ilmu Hukum, Fakultas Hukum, Universitas Pancasakti Tegal. 2020. Salah satu akibat dari putusnya perkawinan karena perceraian adalah timbulnya sengketa perebutan hak asuh anak antara suami dan isteri. Ikatan yang terjalin antara suami dan isteri dapat terputus karena adanya perceraian, namun ikatan anak dengan ibu dan bapak kandungnya tidak akan terputus sampai kapan pun. Masalah yang timbul, siapa yang harus memelihara anak-anak mereka, dan hak-hak apa saja yang harus diberikan oleh orang tua kepada anak-anaknya, Majelis Hakim wajib memeriksa dan mengadili setiap bagian dalam gugatan para pihak, termasuk juga tuntutan hak penguasaan anak. Tujuan dari penelitian ini untuk: 1) Keabsahan putusnya perkawinan karena perceraian golongan Indonesia Kristen, 2) hak asuh anak akibat perceraian menurut Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 1974 tentang Perkawinan pada putusan No. 23/Pdt.G/ 2020/PN.Tgl. Pendekatan penelitian menggunakan pendekatan yuridis normatif. Sumber data penelitian ini adalah data sekunder. Metode pengumpulan data menggunakan studi kepustakaan dan dokumen. Analisis data penelitian menggunakan analisis deskriptif kualitatif. Hasil penelitian diperoleh suatu kesimpulan bahwa: 1) Keabsahan putusnya perkawinan karena perceraian golongan Indonesia Kristen menurut Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 1974 tentang Perkawinan adalah sah. Putusan Hakim tidak mempertimbangkan perselisihan itu berasal dari Penggugat atau Tergugat, atau kesalahan itu terletak pada Penggugat atau Tergugat. Hakim di sini hanya mempertimbangkan segi kepastian hukumnya saja, yaitu alasan perceraian sudah sesuai dengan Peraturan Pemerintah No. 9 Tahun 1975. 2) Perkara hak asuh anak mempertimbangkan ketentuan Pasal 47 Undang Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 1974 tentang Perkawinan, anak yang masih dibawah kekuasaan orang tuanya adalah anak yang belum mencapai umur 18 (delapan belas) tahun. Majelis Hakim dalam memutuskan penguasaan anak tersebut sudah sesuai dengan hukum yang berlaku dengan cara mensinkron dan harmonisasikan antara hukum postif dan sikap sosial kedua orang tuanya untuk kepentingan terbaik anak, serta melihat implikasinya, dari segi hukum positif terhadap anak, penguasaan anak cenderung diberikan kepada ibunya karena mempunyai hubungan biologis dengan ibunya sebelum ia dewasa dan masih sangat memerlukan perhatian dari seorang ibu. Berdasarkan hasil penelitian ini diharapkan akan menjadi bahan informasi dan masukan bagi mahasiswa, akademisi, praktisi, dan semua pihak yang membutuhkan di lingkungan Fakultas Hukum Universitas Pancasakti Tegal. Kata Kunci: Hak Asuh, Anak Di Bawah Umur, dan Perceraian. =============================================================================================== ABSTRACT Pratama, Giovani Angger. Custody of Underage Children Due to Divorce According to Law Number 1 of 1974 concerning Marriage (Decision Study No. 23/Pdt.G/2020/PN.Tgl). Skripsi. Tegal: Legal Studies Program, Faculty of Law, Pancasakti Tegal University. 2020. One of the consequences of breaking the marriage due to divorce is the emergence of a dispute over child custody between husband and wife. The bond that exists between husband and wife can be broken because of a divorce, but the ties between the child and the mother and the biological father will not be broken at any time. The problem that arises, who should look after their children, and what rights should be given by parents to their children, the Panel of Judges is obliged to examine and adjudicate every part of the claims of the parties, including the claim for child control. The purpose of this research is to: 1) The validity of the dissolution of marriage due to divorce of Christian Indonesians, 2) custody of children due to divorce according to Law Number 1 of 1974 concerning Marriage in Decision No. 23/Pdt.G/2020/PN.Tgl. The research approach used a normative juridical approach. The data source of this research is secondary data. Methods of data collection using literature and document studies. Analysis of research data using qualitative descriptive analysis. The results of the study obtained a conclusion that: 1) The legality of the dissolution of marriage due to divorce from Christian Indonesians according to Law Number 1 of 1974 concerning Marriage is legal. The judge's decision did not consider the dispute originating from the Plaintiff or Defendant, or the fault rests with the Plaintiff or Defendant. The judge here only considers the aspect of legal certainty, namely the reason for divorce is in accordance with Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975. 2) In cases of child custody considering the provisions of Article 47 of Law Number 1 of 1974 concerning Marriage, children who are still under the control of their parents are children who have not reached the age of 18 (eighteen) years. The Panel of Judges in deciding that the control of the child is in accordance with the applicable law by synchronizing and harmonizing the positive law and the social attitudes of both parents for the best interest of the child, and seeing the implications, from a positive legal point of view for children, child mastery tends to be given to the mother because had a biological relationship with his mother before he was an adult and still really needs the attention of a mother. Based on the results of this study, it is hoped that it will become material for information and input for students, academics, practitioners, and all those in need in the Faculty of Law, Pancasakti University of Tegal. Keywords: Custody, Minors, and Divorce.
"Self-preservation is the first duty of a nation"Alexander Hamilton "The whole point of the doomsday machineis lost if you keep it a secret!!"Dr. Strangelove I) Introducción: El realismo, la moral y la condición humana El realismo político ha sido la teoría de filosofía política de referencia por más de dos mil años y el programa de investigación dominante en las relaciones internacionales en el siglo XX. A pesar de todos sus defectos e imprecisiones, es el paradigma a partir del cual todas las corrientes rivales se han desarrollado. Tanto Holsti (1984) como Viotti y Kauppi (1993) identifican tres grandes paradigmas en RR.II: los enfoques clásicos o realistas, los enfoques pluralistas (ej. liberalismo) y los enfoques globalizadores o neo-marxistas. El paradigma realista ha sido, sin lugar a contestación, la teoría dominante. De manera más que sucinta es posible afirmar que las dos principales escuelas en RR.II, el realismo y el liberalismo, fundan toda su filosofía sobre concepciones opuestas de la condición humana. En última instancia cualquier filosofía política no es más que un "acto de fe", porque, más allá de cualquier validación heurística o de encadenamiento lógico, ser "realista", "liberal" o "marxista", implica una concepción particular del individuo, una forma de creer y ver al Hombre sobre la cual construiremos nuestra visión de la sociedad. El liberalismo es principalmente una filosofía positiva de la condición humana, basada en la libertad, en la racionalidad, en el libre albedrío y en la perfectibilidad social y humana. La perspectiva realista, como se verá a lo largo de este trabajo, parte de suposiciones radicalmente diferentes. Un supuesto central del realismo, mas no el único, es que el hombre anhela, ansía el Poder por encima de todas las cosas. Pero, ahí donde el liberalismo ve un defecto moral destinado a ser reparado o dominado, el realismo no reconoce más que una característica inmanente al individuo. El ansia de poder, para los realistas, no es ni buena ni mala, simplemente es. He aquí una distinción central entre ambas corrientes filosóficas, mientras el liberalismo anhela un mundo como "debería ser", el realista se contenta de observar cómo es el mundo. Esto ha derivado en un par de críticas importantes hacia la escuela realista. La primera es su ausencia de "compás moral"; la segunda, más relevante para este estudio, es su incapacidad para pensar o explicar el cambio. Algo así como si en la teoría realista el individuo (o el sistema internacional para los neorrealistas), careciese de pasado y futuro y estuviese destinado a vivir el presente encorsetado por una fuerza que lo domina: su apetito de poder para los realistas clásicos y la estructura del S.I en el caso de los neorrealistas. Conviene aquí incorporar una primera distinción, así como una aclaración con respecto a la centralidad del argumento depredador de la condición humana presente en el realismo. Con respecto a la aclaración, varios teóricos que han revisado exhaustivamente el "catalogo de pensadores realistas", refutan la idea que el ansia por el poder sea un argumento central al realismo (sí puede ser subsidiario). Tanto Viotti y Kauppi (1993: 6-7) como Vasquez (1983: 18) no encuentran que la naturaleza humana depredadora sea una suposición fundamental del realismo político. Con respecto a la distinción, he aquí una primera diferenciación entre el realismo clásico y el neorrealismo (o realismo estructural). Si bien es cierto que en el neorrealismo, preocupado únicamente por un análisis estructural (distribución de fuerzas y reglas que gobiernan el S.I), la naturaleza humana está ausente de todo análisis, en el realismo clásico, ya sea el de Tucídides, Hobbes o Morgenthau, es difícil edificar cualquier base teórica sin tener recurso, por lo menos como axioma no declarado, a la condición humana. Así lo expone Shimko (1992: 288): "Assumptions about human nature were not merely afterthoughts, excess intellectual baggage, or flowery rhetorical flourishes; they were the cornerstone of the classical realist analysis of political conflict". Y en palabras de George Kennan, sobre si la divina providencia había protegido o no al pueblo estadounidense de las tentaciones del fascismo propias a otros pueblos: "Unfortunately, I know that is not true…the fact of the matter is that there is a little bit of totalitarian buried somewhere, way down deep, in each and every one of us" (Kennan, 1967:319 en Shimko, 1992:289). El realismo clásico no asume que la moral está ausente de las RR.II, como erróneamente a menudo se expone, sino que argumenta que toda acción basada en la moral es contraproducente a los intereses del estado, principalmente a su seguridad y supervivencia. Es su fundamental oposición al idealismo moral lo que ha en parte dado su nombre al realismo clásico, que se inscribe antes que nada como un enfoque teórico reaccionario al idealismo (Forde, 1995: 143). La manipulación de principios morales sólo puede debilitar la política exterior y conducir a situaciones catastróficas porque, plantean los realistas, las normas que gobiernan el S.I nada tienen que ver con la moral y, con respecto a la condición humana, negar su naturaleza es un acto de ceguera. Así lo explica Morgenthau cuando critica la intervención de los Estados Unidos en la primera guerra mundial "The invocation of abstract moral principles was in part hardly more than an innocuous pastime; for embracing everything it came to grips with nothing. In part, however, it was a magnificent instrument for marshaling public opinion in support of war and warlike policies- and for losing the peace to follow. The intoxications with moral abstractions…has become the prevailing substitute for political thought, is indeed one of the great sources of weakness and failure in American foreign policy" (Morgenthau, 1950: 834). Para Morgenthau, los intereses morales están totalmente divorciados del interés nacional. El único acto verdaderamente inmoral, para los realistas clásicos, es actuar en contra de los intereses racionales del estado. II) El núcleo duro del realismo político Antes de lanzarse al estudio de la escuela realista, de sus principales aportes así como de las críticas que se le han realizado, conviene detenerse brevemente en los postulados centrales que han hecho del programa de investigación del realismo político uno de los más fecundos de las RR.II . En complemento al falsacionismo popperiano, Imre Lakatos (1980) desarrolla la idea del programa de investigación como medio para hacer avanzar el conocimiento científico. Lakatos afirma que el progreso científico no se alcanza únicamente a través de la refutación, sino igualmente, y sobretodo, a partir de la confirmación de conjeturas audaces. La ciencia no progresa automáticamente a través del rechazo de teorías, es más, Lakatos avanza que, para que un programa de investigación pueda progresar es necesario preservar un "núcleo duro" de supuestos fundamentales que serán centrales en el desarrollo de cada programa. Este núcleo duro del programa de investigación es, por decisión metodológica, infalsificable (Lakatos, 1980:112). El núcleo estará rodeado por una "cintura protectora", un conjunto de teorías e hipótesis (derivadas de los supuestos del núcleo duro), destinada a explicar los hechos observados así como predecir nuevos. La validación de estas teorías fortalecerá el núcleo, pero su rechazo, y he aquí una de las innovaciones metodológicas de Lakatos, no invalidará el conjunto del programa de investigación. Un programa será rechazado únicamente cuando un programa rival demuestre un mayor "poder heurístico". ¿Cuál es entonces el núcleo duro del realismo político?, ese conjunto de supuestos infalsificables que, a la manera de axiomas o dogmas, sustentan toda la construcción teórica del programa de investigación del realismo y que están más allá de cualquier cuestionamiento ontológico. Dependiendo de los autores, 3, 4 o hasta 5 son los "dogmas" realistas. Sin embargo, conviene aclarar que no todos los autores realistas adhieren ciegamente a la integralidad de estos supuestos a la manera de un tipo ideal weberiano. Como ya dije, el supuesto de la "naturaleza humana", por ejemplo, es cuestionado. Asimismo, algunos autores resaltan algunos principios por sobre otros. Sin embargo, a pesar de ciertas disensiones entre teóricos sobre el tratamiento y alcance de cada uno de estos axiomas, existe un consenso sobre la centralidad de estas cuestiones en la teoría realista. A mi entender, el realismo político se sustenta en los siguientes principios. A) Los estados son los actores principales de las RR.II; B) El estado es unitario y racional; C) El interés nacional, entendido en términos de seguridad nacional, debe ser la principal preocupación del estado y guiar su política exterior (Los estados buscan el poder); D) La anarquía es la norma que regula el accionar de los estados en el Sistema Internacional. Los tres primeros principios resurgen en prácticamente todos los teóricos realistas como los tres axiomas centrales (y únicos para algunos) del realismo político. Por otra parte, la centralidad del argumento de la anarquía dependerá en gran medida de si la consideramos o no como una característica secundaria o derivada del primer supuesto (el mundo es anárquico porque está compuesto sólo por estados soberanos). Veremos igualmente que si bien la anarquía no es un principio central para la mayor parte de los realistas clásicos como Tucídides o Hobbes, ya que no existiría "de por sí", la anarquía sí representa para los neorrealistas un supuesto fundamental. Ciertos teóricos, inclusive dentro de la escuela realista, han considerado que la anarquía del S.I ha sido por momentos "exagerada" y que existen en los hechos ciertas reglas, normas y mecanismos de cooperación que limitan y regulan el accionar de los estados. En este caso, el concepto de anarquía no sería un supuesto central del realismo. Vasquez (1883: 18) propone que otra suposición central al realismo es que existe una clara distinción entre la política doméstica y la política internacional, y que las relaciones internacionales representan una lucha por el poder y la paz. Entender como funciona esa dinámica, y encontrar formas o normas para dominarla, debe ser el propósito de la disciplina de las relaciones internacionales. Los estados son los actores principales de las RR.II: Otros actores no estatales, transnacionales o internacionales no son tan importantes, principalmente porque no ejercen el monopolio de la violencia interna o no tienen la capacidad de representar una amenaza física a la integridad del estado. Actores como las organizaciones internacionales (N.U, OTAN), no son sujetos de análisis importante ya que están compuestas por estados soberanos e independientes y, por lo tanto, no son autónomos de las partes que los componen. El estado es unitario: Por unitario se entiende que el estado es una única unidad política, soberana sobre su propio territorio. Independientemente de los diferendos internos o de los procesos de negociación políticos o burocráticos que puedan existir, el estado sólo tiene una posición en el concierto internacional. El estado es racional: Los realistas asumen que el estado siempre adoptará la decisión más eficiente, dados los recursos y capacidades disponibles y en un contexto de incertidumbre e información incompleta, para alcanzar sus objetivos (Legro y Moravcsik, 1999: 12). La racionalidad del estado pasa, para los realistas, casi exclusivamente por garantizar su seguridad y buscar el poder. La racionalidad del estado no puede desasociarse de la naturaleza de anarquía del S.I. Es sólo a través de la respuesta racional del estado ante las condiciones de anarquía internacional, que el realismo puede pretender establecer pautas y regularidades en el comportamiento, necesarias al establecimiento de una ciencia que explique comprensivamente el accionar de los estados (Forde, 1995: 145). Un concepto interesante es el de la naturaleza de las preferencias del estado o, dicho de otra manera, del interés nacional. Se tratará este tema en detalle más adelante, pero valga aquí una primera aclaración. El realismo, al asumir que las preferencias de los estados son fijas y mutualmente excluyentes o conflictivas (la seguridad o la búsqueda del poder), se aleja de la "tentación reduccionista" de buscar las causas de la acción del estado en los procesos domésticos de formación y negociación de preferencias, así como de las interpretaciones moralistas, utópicas o legalistas de la naturaleza de la política internacional (Legro y Moravcsik, 1999:14). El realismo propone entonces que las RR.II son un perpetuo proceso de negociación sobre la conquista, distribución y redistribución de recursos y bienes escasos. III) Poder, Sistema y Seguridad Dos cuestiones son centrales al pensamiento realista: el Poder y el Sistema. Ambos conceptos pueden ser pensados desde una perspectiva estática o dinámica. El poder estático representaría el conjunto de atributos o capacidades, militares, económicos, tecnológicos, diplomáticos y otros que posee un estado. El Poder dinámico debe ser pensado, no como un absoluto, sino como la capacidad de influenciar el accionar de otros estados. En este sentido, la influencia de un estado en el plano internacional no depende únicamente de su dotación objetiva de poder, sino de a) su voluntad de usar dicho poder, b) la percepción que los otros estados tengan de su voluntad a utilizar dicho poder, c) su influencia efectiva sobre otros estados (Viotti y Kauppi, 1993: 44). Es innegable que para muchos realistas el poder es la principal herramienta de presión para influenciar el resultado de la negociación interestatal y que este resultado es proporcional al total de las capacidades materiales (Legro y Moravcsik), 1999: 17). En otras palabras, en un mundo entre iguales (estados soberanos) los poderosos tienen más opciones que los débiles, cuya única opción a menudo es sufrir la dominación del más fuerte. El primero en expresar esta idea, dos mil años antes que Maquiavelo, fue Tucídides en su Historia de la Guerra del Peloponeso, en el famoso diálogo de los Melios, cuando los emisarios atenienses advierten a los melios (libro V: verso 89): "…lo saben ustedes tan bien como nosotros, la justicia sólo forma parte del razonamiento humano cuando las fuerzas en presencia son iguales, de lo contrario, los fuertes ejercen su poder y los débiles deben inclinarse ". En relación al concepto de sistema, una corriente minoritaria (principalmente behaviorista), ve al sistema como un conjunto de interacciones entre el estado y otros actores no estatales. La corriente mayoritaria, entiende el sistema como las diferentes distribuciones de capacidades o de poder entre los estados y las normas que regulan dichas relaciones, principalmente: la anarquía y la incertidumbre (Viotti y Kaupi, 1993: 45-46). Por los tanto, los realistas ven el mundo como una competencia constante por recursos limitados. Lo que cuenta no son las capacidades absolutas, sino el cambio relativo en las capacidades de los actores (Schweller, 1997: 928). Para reflexionar sobre la idea de seguridad y como ésta resulta indisociable de las nociones de poder y sistema, conviene profundizar sobre la brevemente mencionada noción de anarquía, para así reconstruir el encadenamiento lógico del realismo. La anarquía, pieza clave en el entendimiento de la teoría realista implica que, en un sistema internacional compuesto por estados soberanos y autónomos, no existe autoridad superior a la de los estados. La anarquía conlleva que no existe jerarquía entre los estados en el S.I. Si bien es cierto que hay estados más poderosos que otros, y he aquí la diferencia entre autoridad y poder, ningún estado tiene una autoridad superior, ningún derecho legal a gobernar a otro por el solo hecho de ser más poderoso. De esta visión de un mundo anárquico, podemos extrapolar por lo menos dos aspectos importantes que se relacionan con la falta de confianza, o la desconfianza preventiva en la que incurren los actores de las RR.II. y que afectará la seguridad de los estados y del sistema. El primero es que el estado sólo puede contar consigo mismo ya que no existe una autoridad central (a la imagen del Leviatán de Hobbes), capaz de hacer respetar las reglas y compromisos acordados a nivel internacional. Por lo tanto, los estados se encuentran en una situación de self-help. El segundo punto derivado de la anarquía del sistema es lo que ha pasado a denominarse como el dilema de seguridad, que funciona de la siguiente manera: en un contexto de desconfianza y self-help, un estado procederá a armarse para preservar su seguridad frente a cualquier posible amenaza. El dilema radica en que mientras un estado más se arma (aunque sus intenciones sean puramente defensivas), más amenaza la seguridad de terceros estados, quienes, desde una óptica puramente racional, recurrirán a un proceso similar para defenderse de cualquier posible amenaza del primer estado (es la lógica detrás de cualquier carrera armamentística). Así lo expone Waltz (1988: 619): "The uneasy state of affairs is exacerbated by the familiar security dilemma, wherein measures that enhance one state´s security typically diminish that of others. In an anarchic domain, the source of one´s own comfort is the source of another worry". En virtud de la anarquía del sistema internacional, por más que todos los actores conscientemente busquen la paz, la racionalidad del estado (salvaguardar su seguridad) lo conducirá a la única alternativa posible: igualar o superar el armamento rival. Así es como Tucídides explica la guerra entre Atenas y Esparta. Esparta, temerosa del aumento del poder militar ateniense se lanzó en su propia campaña de alianzas para contrarrestar cualquier cambio desfavorable en el balance de poder. Dadas las condiciones del sistema y la naturaleza de los actores que acabo de enunciar, los teóricos, realistas y otros, han pretendido siempre encontrar la fórmula mágica que garantice un S.I más seguro. Parte de esos esfuerzos tienen que ver con el estudio de la teoría de juegos que, aplicada al estudio de las relaciones internacionales, intenta descifrar los diferentes escenarios de cooperación y conflicto, las normas, los incentivos o las amenazas que provocarán determinados comportamientos (siempre entendidos desde la perspectiva de un actor racional) y promoverán la seguridad o la inseguridad en el S.I. Los escenarios más conocidos son los de la "caza del ciervo" de J. J Rousseau, y el dilema del prisionero. El problema de aplicar la teoría de juegos a las relaciones entre estados radica en que, para que la estrategia sea exitosa (o sea, que todos los casos posibles de "jugadas" puedan ser previstos), la información con que cuentan los actores debe ser perfecta (Wagner, 1983: 345). Sin embargo, para los realistas, y en particular para los neorrealistas, la incertidumbre es parte central de la estructura en el S.I. A menudo, los estados actúan como "cajas negras" que proveen escasa o nula información otra que el resultado directo de sus políticas exteriores (Glaser, 1997: 195). Una pregunta interesante es la de saber si ¿el dilema de seguridad es una resultante de la naturaleza del sistema o, si por el contrario, es construido por los estados? Para Alexander Wendt (1995: 73), uno de los principales teóricos de la escuela constructivista, el dilema de la seguridad, así como la idea de anarquía, no están dados por el sistema o por la "naturaleza", sino que son construcciones sociales. Para él, el dilema de seguridad es producto de percepciones intersubjetivas de los estados que, impregnados de una desconfianza generalizada, asumen siempre lo peor en las intenciones de los otros actores. Si, como asume Wendt, el dilema de la seguridad es una creación, o más bien una percepción de los estados, estaría también en ellos la posibilidad de llevar adelante políticas que eviten crear dicho dilema. La respuesta realista ha sido en parte de argumentar que los constructivistas, así como los liberales, magnifican el nivel de competición y conflicto en la teoría realista. Sería más correcto afirmar que muchos realistas (principalmente los realistas defensivos) no ven a los estados como entidades ontológicamente agresivas e identificadas negativamente con la seguridad de otros, sino más bien como actores egoístas, y, por lo tanto, indiferentes a la seguridad ajena, salvo en los casos en que esta los afecte negativamente (Glaser, 1997: 197). La anarquía y la incertidumbre del S.I, ligadas al dilema de la seguridad, han provocado un quiebre de la escuela neorrealista entre los defensores de un realismo ofensivo y los que apoyan un realismo defensivo. Tanto los neorrealistas ofensivos como defensivos parten de los mismos supuestos, algunos de los cuales comparten con los realistas clásicos: los estados poderosos son los principales actores de las RR.II (en esto difieren de los realistas clásicos); los estados son racionales (maximizan sus recursos para alcanzar sus objetivos, en este caso su seguridad) y, producto de la anarquía y de la incertidumbre del S.I, nunca pueden estar del todo seguros de las intenciones de los otros estados y se encuentran entonces en una situación de sef-help; por lo tanto, la principal preocupación de los estados es asegurar su seguridad y supervivencia (security seekers), es decir, minimizar la probabilidad de ser conquistados o destruidos por otros actores; por último, para asegurar su seguridad en el contexto de self-help, los estados procederán a armarse y contarán con capacidades ofensivas y defensivas. Los realistas ofensivos mantienen que los estados intentarán siempre maximizar el poder, mientras que los realistas defensivos proponen que los estados buscan antes que nada mantener el status quo y, por lo tanto, buscarán balancear el poder dentro del sistema internacional. John Mearsheimer (2001) ha sido el principal proponente del realismo ofensivo, mientras que Kenneth Waltz y Stephen Walt del realismo defensivo. Este debate ha provocado la emergencia de una teoría relacionada con el balance entre las estrategias defensivas y ofensivas. Los teóricos se han abocado a estudiar si es posible separar ambas estrategias (en particular en un contexto de supremo desarrollo tecnológico) y si las variaciones entre ofensa-defensa pueden alterar las probabilidades de la guerra y de la competencia en materia de seguridad. Esta teoría, desarrollada en los años 70, ha sido utilizada exhaustivamente para explicar los diferentes escenarios de cooperación y conflicto, las carreras armamentísticas o el control del armamento, la formación de alianzas o las formas óptimas de disuasión, e igualmente para estudiar si los estados buscan ganancias absolutas o relativas. La teoría ofensa/defensa (Offense-Defense Theory ) plantea que existe un balance entre ofensa y defensa que determinará la eficacia relativa de las estrategias de seguridad ofensivas y defensivas. Las variaciones en las dotaciones de ofensa y defensa afectarán los patrones de las relaciones internacionales y de la política exterior. La teoría avanza que el conflicto internacional y la guerra son más factibles de ocurrir cuando la ofensiva lleva la ventaja, mientras que la paz y la cooperación más factibles cuando la defensa tiene ventaja (Lynn-Jones, 1995: 660-661). En materia de seguridad y de relacionamiento internacional, los estados tiene dos estrategias básicas (o una combinación de las dos) para maximizar su seguridad: ofensivas o defensivas. La opción defensiva implica que el estado intenta defender el territorio y los recursos que controla e imposibilitar así cualquier tentativa de conquista sobre su territorio. La estrategia defensiva asume igualmente que dicho estado no busca expandirse, conquistar o destruir un estado rival. La estrategia ofensiva, por el contrario, utiliza la conquista militar para aumentar los recursos del estado, conquistar, intimidar o someter a otros estados que puedan representar una amenaza para el primero. Igualmente, a través de la expansión agresiva, el estado busca cimentar su fortaleza defensiva Lynn-Jones, 1995: 665). Para los ofensivos, la incertidumbre de las acciones contrarias, así como la capacidad de cualquier estado de contar en cualquier momento con determinadas capacidades ofensivas, lleva a que la mejor manera para sobrevivir en un estado de anarquía, sea la de ganar poder a expensas de un estado contrario (Mearsheimer, 2001: 31). El realismo ofensivo parte del supuesto que los estados buscan antes que nada (o exclusivamente) garantizar su seguridad y supervivencia (security seekers) y consideran a los otros estados rivales como agresores en potencia y deben por lo tanto asegurarse ganancias de poder relativas. Mearsheimer argumenta que los estados buscan maximizar su posición de poder relativa ya que la seguridad depende grandemente de la ventaja militar de un estado sobre otro (Mearsheimer, 1994: 11). Esto tiene dos consecuencias, la primera es que la noción de poder es relacional (o dinámica) para los neorrealistas y la segunda es que bajo esta suposición, el dilema de la seguridad corre el riesgo de agravarse. Para los neorrealistas defensivos, esta visión es errónea. Argumentan que el nivel de inseguridad se reduce cuando los estados adoptan una posición defensiva, o más precisamente, cuando el ratio defensa/ofensa aumenta. Una clara ventaja ofensiva hará que la expansión o la conquista sea más factible, provocando el comportamiento agresivo de los estados "codiciosos" y aumentando el dilema de la seguridad. Contrariamente, una fuerte posición defensiva hace de la conquista una posibilidad más remota y aumenta la seguridad colectiva (Montgomery, 2006: 156). Ciertos autores han criticado la offense-defense theory porque consideran que es imposible determinar el balance entre ofensa/defensa porque todas las armas modernas pueden ser utilizadas, casi sin excepción, tanto en una estrategia ofensiva como defensiva (Mearsheimer, 1994: 23). Por lo tanto, si no es posible determinar el ratio ofensa/defensa, la teoría carecería de aplicación práctica. En respuesta a estas críticas, los defensores de este enfoque han argumentado que resulta irrelevante el tipo de arma utilizado (ofensiva o defensiva), lo que cuenta y debe ser objeto de medida o evaluación, es la capacidad de las fuerzas atacantes de derrotar a las fuerzas defensivas (Glaser, 1997:199). En ese caso, podríamos preguntarnos ¿qué pasa, o qué es necesario para que una fuerza defensiva superior se transforme en fuerza ofensiva? *Este artículo fue presentado en la 9° sesión el Seminario Interno de Discusión Teórica 2013, organizado por el Departamento de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad ORT Uruguay. Germán Clulow es Licenciado en Estudios Internacionales por la Universidad ORT –Uruguay, Master en Ciencia Política por la Université de Genève – Suiza, y Master en Estudios de Desarrollo por el Instituto de Altos Estudios Internacionales y de Desarrollo (IHEID-The Graduate Institute) Ginebra, Suiza.
Werden Wälder hinreichend geschützt und bewusst bewirtschaftet, so können sie extrem vielfältige und wertvolle Ökosysteme bereitstellen, die gleichzeitig auch eine Vielzahl von Leistungen für ein gesundes globales Klima, die Umwelt und für die Lebensgrundlage des Menschen erbringen. Letztlich sind es gerade solche Ökosystemdienstleistungen, die Wälder zu einem wichtigen Teil der neuen "grünen Ökonomie" gemacht haben, worin globale Lebensmittel-, Holz- und Klimamärkte das ökologische Kapital der Wälder vermarkten. Auch deshalb ist heute generell bekannt, dass Waldökosysteme durch geeignete Regulierung der Waldbewirtschaftung und durch effektive Forstpolitik geschützt werden müssen. Nur so kann das ökologische und ökonomische Potential der Waldökosysteme für heutige und für zukünftige Generationen, also nachhaltig, bereitgestellt werden. Für den Zweck solcher wichtigen forstpolitischen Entscheidungen brauchen Politiker jedoch verlässliche Informationen aus der Wissenschaft. Die UN Konventionen zu den sektoralen Themen Biodiversität (CBD), Klimawandel (UNFCCC), Degradierung (UNCCD) und Luftverschmutzung (CLRTAP), sowie die Berichtspflichten, die solche Konventionen ihren Mitgliedstaaten auferlegen, sind Ausdruck dieses Informationsbedarfs. Allerdings sind viele Leistungen der Wälder nur schwer messbar, auch weil sie ideell aufgeladen sind und weil sie sozio-ökonomischen Wertvorstellungen entsprechen müssen, die nur im Kontext gesellschaftlicher Hintergründe definiert werden können. Rein wissenschaftlich, also neutral und frei von sozialen Wertvorstellungen, sind sie daher kaum messbar. Das betrifft insbesondere die Vorteile und Werte die die Biodiversität bereitstellt, beispielsweise die genetische Ressourcen, landschaftliche Schönheit oder abstraktes Wissen, das biotischen Systemen innewohnt und das möglicherweise durch technische Wissenschaften wie Biotechnologie und Pharmazie nutzbar gemacht werden kann. Solche Werte müssen über Interessenvertreter der Gesellschaft, also durch gewählte Regierungen und deren Verwaltungen herausgearbeitet und vertreten werden. Ein Ziel der vorliegenden Dissertation ist es, solch politisch relevante Komponenten der Biodiversität und deren Informationsbedarf zu identifizieren. Zu diesem Zweck analysiert die vorliegende Arbeit politische Berichtsprozesse und deren Datenbedarf auf drei verschiedenen Verwaltungsebenen: Von der (1) globalen- (Biodiversitätskonvention der Vereinten Nationen UN-CBD), zur (2) europäischen (Flora-Fauna-Habitat Richtlinie der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, EG FFH Richtlinie) bis zur (3) nationalen Ebene. Um den nationalen Informationsbedarf herauszuarbeiten, analysiert die Studie ferner Datenquellen, die nationale Autoritäten als relevant für die Erfüllung der oben genannten EU- und UN- Berichtspflichten erachten. Diese Analyse beinhaltet Fallstudien dreier Länder: Deutschland, Schweden und Polen. Sprachbarrieren führten allerdings dazu, dass sich die polnische Fallstudie auf die UN Berichte beschränken musste. Zudem wurde der parlamentarische Diskurs von 2010 über die Novelle des Bundeswaldgesetzes als Beispiel für die Relevanz von Waldinformationen in politischen Diskursen und Entscheidungsverfahren gewählt. Ein Ausblick eröffnet zum Abschluss denkbare Ansatzpunkte für die Wissenschaft, zur besseren Quantifizierung schwer messbarer Variablen und zur umfassenderen Berichterstattung über politische Aspekte der Biodiversität als essentiellen und integrativen Teil einer "nachhaltigen" Waldbewirtschaftung. Obwohl diese Arbeit die Bereitstellung von politisch relevanten Informationen als wissenschaftliche Aufgabe betrachtet, muss dennoch beachtet werden, dass die Beteiligung an politischen Prozessen und Entscheidungen durchaus Risiken für die Wissenschaft bergen kann. So gibt Guildin (2003) zu bedenken, dass die Einbindung von Wissenschaftlern in politische Fragestellungen als politische Parteilichkeit wahrgenommen werden könnte und somit ein Risiko für die Glaubwürdigkeit der Wissenschaft darstellt. Einige Autoren sprechen sogar von der "Politisierung der Wissenschaft" (Krott, 2012; Krott et al., 2014; Pregernig, 2007) und meinen damit einen Schaffungs- und Selektionsprozess von Informationen, der inhärent politisch voreingenommen und verzerrt ist, da er sich weitestgehend einseitig an politischen Agenden und den drängendsten Fragen der Politik ausrichtet (Hellström, 2000 zitiert von Janse, 2008). Dabei ist es allgemeine Auffassung, dass Entscheidungsträger voreingenommene und verzerrte Informationen akzeptieren, um im Interesse einzelner Akteure, sub-optimale Entscheidungen zu unterstützen, die aber zum Nachteil der Mehrheit sind (Krott, 2012, 2013). Im Lichte der fortschreitenden Waldzerstörung und der Unfähigkeit von Entscheidern, diese Zerstörung durch Kompromisse und eine harmonisierte internationale Waldkonvention zu bekämpfen, sprechen manche Autoren sogar von einem "fragmentierten", "politisch gewollten", "ineffektiven" oder "verfehlten" Wald- "Regime Komplex" (Humphreys, 2006, 2009; Chaytor, 2001; Dimitrov, 2005; Dimitrov et al., 2007; Rayner et al., 2010). Dieser "fragmentierte" Regime-Komplex sei, so die Ansicht mancher, durch die selektive Nutzung, Manipulation oder absichtliche Ignoranz wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse unterstützt (Hertin et al., 2009; Krott, 2012; Pregernig, 2007). Die vorliegende Dissertation vertritt die Ansicht, dass man bei solchen Zuschreibungen politischer Voreingenommenheit, klar zwischen den Aufgaben der "Wissenschaft" als solcher und der "politischen Entscheidungsfindung" unterscheiden muss. Es wird argumentiert, dass für die jeweiligen Seiten im Grenzbereich von Politik und Wissenschaft nur dann ein Risiko für politische Voreingenommenheit oder Verzerrung ("risk of political bias") besteht, wenn die jeweiligen Seiten zwei grundlegende Prinzipien untergraben, die ihre Existenz in demokratischen Systemen legitimieren. Für Wissenschaftler ist dieses grundlegende Prinzip primär die "Transparenz", d.h. die Verifizierbarkeit des Schaffungsprozesses von Informationen durch die wissenschaftliche Gemeinschaft. Für politische Entscheider hingegen ist das primäre Prinzip die "Transparenz" des Entscheidungsfindungsprozesses selbst. Diese Annahme basiert auf Krotts (2012) Theorie über "nicht verifizierbare Informationen", welche davon ausgeht, dass "nicht verifizierbare Informationen", d.h. intransparente Informationen, politischen Interessen Vorschub geben, indem sie die Verzerrung von Ergebnissen in Richtung politisch gewollter Ergebnisse ermöglichen. Basierend auf diesem theoretischen Konzept, ist das zweite Ziel der vorliegenden Dissertation, bei Wissenschaftlern ein Bewusstsein über solche Risiken politischer Verzerrungen ("risk of political bias") zu wecken. Die Aufmerksamkeit gilt dabei sowohl "wissenschaftlichen" Prozessen, wie der Bereitstellung und Generierung von Informationen, als auch politischen Aufgabenbereichen, wie der Interpretation und Entscheidungsfindung. Letztlich will die Dissertation somit auch Vorschläge für die Vermeidung entsprechender Risiken erarbeiten. Für analytische Zwecke wurde das Risiko politischer Verzerrungen durch Verifizierung zweier grundlegender Annahmen ermittelt: (1) das Vorliegen "politischer Motivationen" (d.h. politische Ziele, die Interessenvertreter motivieren könnten, auf Ergebnisse Einfluss zu nehmen) und (2) "Intransparenz" der Datenakquise, bzw. der Entscheidungsprozesse (d.h. Prozesse im wissenschaftlichen, bzw. politischen Aufgabenbereich, die es ermöglichen, Ergebnisse stillschweigend entsprechend spezifischer Interessen und Ziele zu verzerren). Beide Annahmen werden jeweils anhand von 3 Fallstudien untersucht, die repräsentativ für die verschiedenen Etappen des Wissenschafts-Politik Dialogs sind, beginnend mit der "wissenschaftlichen" Aufgabe der Datenerhebung und Bereitstellung, bis hin zur "politischen" Aufgabe der Entscheidungsfindung. (1) Dabei stellt der parlamentarische Diskurs von 2010 über die Novelle des deutschen Bundeswaldgesetzes exemplarisch eine nationale Fallstudie über die Risiken politischer Verzerrung im Aufgabenbereich der Entscheidungsfindung dar. Die beiden darauf folgenden Fallstudien beleuchten wissenschaftliche Aufgabenbereiche der Datenerhebung und Bereitstellung im Waldbereich, beginnend mit (2) den nationalen Berichtspflichten unter der EG FFH Richtlinie und dann überleitend zu den (3) internationalen Verpflichtungen unter der Biodiversitätskonvention (CBD) der Vereinten Nationen. Im Ergebnis zeigte der parlamentarische Diskurs schließlich, dass Entscheider abhängig von Parteizugehörigkeit und den entsprechenden Interessen der jeweiligen Wählerschaft, Informationen tendenziell dahingehend selektierten und interpretierten, dass sie entweder eher utilitaristische oder umweltbezogene Ziele forcierten. Obwohl die im Parlament zitierten Nachweise und Schlussfolgerungen teilweise intransparent waren, blieben sie dennoch weitgehend transparent. Nicht verifizierbare Informationen warfen hingegen Kritik auf und waren generell nicht in der Lage, Vertreter gegenläufiger Meinungen zu überzeugen und einen Konsens herbeizuführen. Im folgenden zweiten Ergebnisteil der Analyse, der sich mit dem wissenschaftlichen Aufgabenbereich der Datenerhebung befasste, stellte sich die Durchführung solcher "wissenschaftlichen" Aufgaben als größtenteils transparent heraus. Diese Transparenz eröffnete letztlich nur wenige Möglichkeiten zur versteckten politischen Einflussnahme auf die entsprechenden Kaskaden der Datenakquise, seien es die Messverfahren, die Analyse oder die Zusammenstellung in der Berichterstattung. Dies traf insbesondere auf nationale Waldinventuren zu, die sich generell auf Ökosystemdienstleistungen konzentrieren die leicht zu quantifizieren sind (z.B. Holzvolumen und Zuwachs) und die häufig genug sind, um in Stichprobenverfahren erfasst zu werden (z.B. bestimmte Baumarten im Gegensatz zu Arten der Bodenvegetation wie Moose oder Flechten, Pilze und Tierarten). Durch Biodiversität und (Wald-) Ökosysteme bereitgestellte Ressourcen und Ökosystemdienstleistungen (im Sinne der CBD-Definition) waren hingegen schwer zu messen. Daher blieben entsprechende Berichtspflichten generell so vage, dass die Mitgliedstaaten die Möglichkeit hatten, individuelle Komponenten der Biodiversität entsprechend ihrer Relevanz in den jeweiligen nationalen oder lokalen Kontexten zu definieren. Obwohl sich die Selektion von Definitionen und Analysemethoden nationaler Berichte dabei im Allgemeinen als transparent herausstellte, waren in einigen Fällen, die zugrundeliegenden Inventurmethoden und Variablen, die ein Feldbiologe für seine Aufnahmen und Messungen wählte, nicht immer uneingeschränkt transparent. Das muss generell noch kein Problem sein und man könnte annehmen, dass die Ergebnisse dennoch objektiv sind, wenn man davon ausginge, dass persönliche Interessen nicht im Wiederspruch zu den erzielten Ergebnissen stünden. Jedoch deuten Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass Gutachter in einigen Fällen Aufgaben hatten, die im Konflikt mit Monitoring Ergebnissen stehen könnten. Entsprechend der oben beschriebenen Theorie aus der Politikwissenschaft, könnte dieser Konflikt unter Umständen als ein Risiko für wissenschaftliche Glaubwürdigkeit (miss-) verstanden werden. Um dieses Thema anzugehen, versucht die vorliegende Dissertation im Ausblick und am Beispiel der schwedischen Nationalen Waldinventur, denkbare Ansätze für eine mögliche Harmonisierung von Messverfahren und eine Neuausrichtung von Mandaten vorzulegen. Interessenkonflikte, zweideutige Vorgaben und das damit verbundene Risiko für verdeckte und interessengerichtete, d.h. politische Einflussnahme durch die Selektion spezifischer Methoden könnten so möglicherweise vermieden werden. Die Anwendbarkeit solcher Vorschläge hat jedoch klare Grenzen. Bei der Lektüre dieser Dissertation und der Interpretation ihrer Ergebnisse muss stets beachtet werden, dass Vorschläge und Schlussfolgerungen auf einer theoretischen Argumentation beruhen und nur auf eine sehr begrenzte Evidenzbasis zurückgreifen konnten, bei der die Unsicherheiten in Bezug auf die Richtigkeit der erzielten Ergebnisse nicht messbar und daher unbekannt ist. So konnte sich die Dissertation ausschließlich auf wenige Interviews, öffentlich verfügbare Berichte, Gesetzestexte, Mandate und andere Publikationen zu stützen. Wobei diese Quellen aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach nicht in der Lage gewesen sein konnten, ein allumfassendes Bild aller beteiligten politischen Interessen zu vermitteln. Zudem ist es auch schwierig, alle in politischen Kontexten verfügbaren und verwendeten Waldinformationen vollständig zu ermitteln. Daher stellen weder die Schlussfolgerungen über politische Motivationen, noch jene über die (In-)Transparenz der politischen Informationsquellen einen Anspruch auf Vollständig- oder Richtigkeit. Auch wenn Intransparenz von Waldinformationen politischen Interessen theoretisch genützt hätten, lässt sich letztendlich unmöglich feststellen, ob Interessenvertreter die Möglichkeit versteckter politischer Einflussnahme tatsächlich genutzt haben, um "wissenschaftliche" Daten in Richtung eines politisch gewollten Ergebnisses zu lenken oder zu verzerren. Die vorliegende Studie identifiziert daher ausschließlich Risiken und macht keine Annahmen über die (statistische) Sicherheit der erzielten Ergebnisse und Schlussfolgerungen. ; If preserved and managed wisely, forests have the potential to be extremely diverse and valuable ecosystems that generate a multitude of benefits for a healthy global climate, the environment and human livelihoods. It is, in the end, such multitude of ecosystem services that have made forests an important component of a new "green economy" that markets the ecological capital of forests on global food-, timber- and carbon markets and turns them to economic assets. It is not least for that reason why today, it is generally understood that forest ecosystems have to be preserved through forest policies that effectively regulate forest management. Only then, the ecological and economic benefits of forests can be preserved such as to guarantee sustained provision for today and for future generations. Yet, for the purpose of making such important decisions, forest policy-makers need reliable scientific information. The UN Conventions on the topics of biodiversity (CBD), climate change (UNFCCC), degradation (UNCCD) and air pollution (CLRTAP), and the reporting obligations they impose on member states mirror that requirement. Yet, many benefits provided by forests are difficult to measure, not least because they are connoted by socio-economic backgrounds and charged by ideologies. From a purely scientific perspective, i.e. neutral and void from ideologies or social values, they are therefore difficult to assess and interpret. This relates specifically to assets provided by biodiversity such as genetic resources, scenic beauty or abstract knowledge intrinsic to biotic systems that may be used in sciences such as biotechnology and pharmacy. Such values have to be defined and defended by representatives of public interests, i.e. by elected politicians and their respective administrative bodies. The first objective of this study is to identify such components of biodiversity that are relevant for policy-makers. For this purpose, this thesis analyses biodiversity reporting processes and their data requirements at three different jurisdictional levels: Ranging from (1) Global (UN-CBD) to (2) European (EC-Habitats Directive) and (3) national reporting processes. To identify national data requirements, the study further analyses data sources that national authorities deemed to be relevant for meeting the aforementioned EU- and UN obligations. The analysis looks at three case-study countries: Germany, Poland and Sweden. However, language barriers meant that the Polish case-study remained restricted towards the analysis of UN reports. The 2010 parliamentary discourse on the amendment of the German forest act is further taken as a case-study for the relevance of forest information in political discourse and decision-making. An outlook eventually proposes ideas or starting points for future research such as to improve the quantification of variables that are difficult to measure and to report more comprehensively to the political aspects of biodiversity as an integral part of "sustainable forest management". Even though this thesis regards the provision of policy relevant information as a scientific responsibility, it also has to be recognized that the involvement in the political arena of policy-making may imply certain risks for scientists. As Guldin (2003) note, the involvement of scientists in political questions may create perceptions of advocacy and thus poses a risk to scientific credibility. Some authors have even introduced the notion of the "politicization of science" (Krott, 2012; Krott et al., 2014; Pregernig, 2007) where information generation and selection is inherently biased towards hot topics of political interest (Hellström, 2000 quoted by Janse, 2008). The assumption is that policy-makers accept biased information to support sub-optimal decisions that are in the interest of a selective group of powerful stakeholders, but to the disadvantage of the majority (Krott, 2012, 2013). In the face of continued forest destruction and the inability of stakeholders to combat such destruction by compromise and an international forest convention, some authors, even speak of a "fragmented", "politically wanted", "ineffective" or "failed" forest "regime-complex "(Humphreys, 2006, 2009; Chaytor, 2001; Dimitrov, 2005; Dimitrov et al., 2007; Rayner et al., 2010). Such a "fragmented" regime-complex is, as some argue, supported by the selective use, manipulation or intentional ignorance of scientific evidence (Hertin et al., 2009; Krott, 2012; Pregernig, 2007). This thesis argues that when attributing political bias to either side of the policy-science interface, it is important to make a clear distinction between the responsibilities of "science" and "policy-making". It is argued that either science or policy-makers may be perceived as politically biased only, when they undermine democratic systems by violating two basic principles that justify the existence of science and policy-making respectively. For scientists that primary principle is "transparency", i.e. verifiability, of information generation processes through the scientific community. For policy makers the primary principle is "transparency" of the decision-making process itself. These assumptions base on Krott's (2012) theory of "unverified information", which assumes that "unverified information", i.e. information that is neither verifiable nor transparent, allows political motivations to skew or bias results towards a politically favored result. Based on that theoretical concept the second objective of this thesis is to make scientists aware of the risks of political bias within data provision- and decision making processes, and to provide recommendations as how to avoid such risks. For analytic purposes, "risk of political bias" was identified by verifying two assumptions: (1) "political motivations" (i.e. political objectives that could motivate stakeholders to come to biased results) and (2) "non-transparency" of data acquisition or decision making processes (i.e. processes that allows political objectives to tacitly bias results). These assumptions are identified in 3 case studies where each is illustrative for different stages of the science-policy interface, ranging from scientific data generation to political decision-making: (1) the 2010 parliamentary discourse on the amendment in the national forest act of Germany represents a national case study on risks of bias in political responsibilities of decision-making. Subsequently, two following case studies represent scientific responsibilities of monitoring and reporting forest status from (2) the national level under reporting obligations of the EC Habitats Directive, to (3) the international level under reporting obligations under the United Nations CBD. Results on the parliamentary process eventually showed that policy makers tended to select and interpreted information such that they supported either utilitarian or environmentalist objectives, depending on party-membership and the interest of their respective groups of voters. However, apart from a few exceptions, the quoted evidence and conclusions made were largely transparent. Unverified information in contrast, tended to raise criticism and generally failed to convince opponents and did not contribute to consent. Then, in the second part of analysis, which looked at scientific responsibilities of data generation, the execution of such scientific tasks showed to be largely transparent. That transparency then provided little options of political interests to tacitly influence any stage of the data generation process, be it measurement, analysis or data compilation and reporting. This applied especially to assessments made by National Forest Inventories, which typically focus on forest resources that are easy to quantify (e.g. timber volume and increment) and common enough to be assessed by sampling (e.g. specific tree-species rather than species of the ground vegetation or mosses, lichen, fungi and species of fauna). Ecosystem services and resources provided by biodiversity and (forest) ecosystems (as defined by CBD, 1992) in contrast were more difficult to measure. In such cases reporting obligations were generally vague enough to allow member states to specify those components of biodiversity that they deem to be most relevant in national or site-specific contexts. Even though national reports and the selection of respective definitions and analytic methods proved to be generally transparent, the underlying field measurements and attributes that field experts chose to select were not always completely clear. This is no problem per-se, and we may assume that results are impartial if the assessors' personal objectives were not at odds with monitoring results. However results indicated that in few cases, assessors did have responsibilities that could possibly be at odds with monitoring results. Following the argumentation of political theory, this conflict might be (mis-) perceived as a risk to scientific credibility. To address that issue, and by using the Swedish National Forest Inventory as a role model, an outlook proposes possible options of harmonising and redistributing measurement responsibilities in very specific cases such as to avoid conflict of interest and to remove any remaining ambiguity that could possibly allow such interests to steer the outcomes. The applicability of such recommendations has, however, clear limitations. When reading this thesis and interpreting its findings, it is important to always bear in mind that conclusions drawn are based on a theoretical concept and very limited evidence to verify or measure the certainty of conclusions. The thesis thus had to rely on a few interviews, publically available reports, legal mandates and other publications, all of which are very unlikely to capture the complete picture of the political interests at stake. It is also nearly impossible to capture all the different sources of forest information used or available in forest policy contexts. Therefore, neither the conclusions on political motivations, nor those on the (non-)transparency of data-use make any claim to be complete, accurate or precise. Finally, even if non-transparency of forest information had served political interests, it is impossible to confirm that stakeholders really exploited such options of steering or biasing results towards a favoured outcome. The present study therefore exclusively identifies risks, yet it does not make any claim about the (statistical) certainty of its results and conclusions.
[spa] OBJETO: El presente trabajo de investigación se centra en demostrar el impacto y validez de un modelo inclusivo contextualizados en el área de Educación Física y fundamentado en el aprendizaje dialógico. Precisamente, comprobar la presencia de los principios del aprendizaje dialógico es otro de los objetivos de investigación. El modelo se denomina 'Retos Interactivos con Responsabilidad Compartida' y tiene por objetivo ofrecer una EF dialógica capaz de democratizar los aprendizajes de todos los alumnos y alumnas, sin dejar a nadie atrás. ESTADO DE CUESTIÓN: Por un lado, y teniendo en cuenta que cualquier programa educativo de calidad debe ser inclusivo y transformador, se procede a analizar la presencia de la calidad, la inclusión y la perspectiva crítica en el contexto educativo general y en la EF específicamente. Por otro lado, en un intento por contextualizar el aprendizaje dialógico en el área de EF, se dedica un capítulo a describir los principios del aprendizaje dialógico y su aplicación al área de EF, configurando el concepto de Educación Física Dialógica. Por último, se dedica un capítulo a presentar el modelo inclusivo Retos Interactivos con Responsabilidad Compartida, detallando el origen, la fundamentación, las claves y la estructura didáctica. DISEÑO METODOLÓGICO: La metodología de investigación seleccionada para la presente investigación es la Metodología Comunicativa. La elección metodológica se explica por dos motivos. En primer lugar, por a la afinidad dialógica existente entre la metodología de investigación y el modelo inclusivo objeto de estudio. En segundo lugar, porque, ante el desafío de aportar contribuciones que permitan avanzar hacia una EF de éxito, la organización comunicativa de la investigación y el análisis comunicativo de los datos se convierten en aspectos metodológicos esenciales y decisivos para lograr el impacto deseado. RESULTADOS: la implementación de modelo Retos Interactivos con Responsabilidad Compartida garantiza la presencia de los principios el aprendizaje dialógico independientemente del contexto. Los efectos sobre el aprendizaje derivados de su implementación demuestran aprendizajes de calidad a nivel curricular y convivencial, pero también se reportan aprendizajes relacionados con sentimientos como la amistad y la solidaridad. Por último, se reporta que el modelo inclusivo es un modelo en movimiento, en constante mejora y enriquecimiento gracias a la constante conversación entre las evidencias científicas, la práctica acumulada y las aportaciones de las personas participantes en la investigación. CONCLUSIONES: El modelo inclusivo Retos Interactivos con Responsabilidad Compartida se configura un modelo de éxito que favorece la democratización de los aprendizajes gracias a la presencia de los principios del aprendizaje dialógico. APORTACIONES: Una de las aportaciones de esta tesis es ofrecer un modelo inclusivo que, articulado por los principios del aprendizaje dialógico, garantiza un programa de EF inclusivo, de calidad y crítico, además de estar supeditado y ser compatible con el enfoque educativo que se orienta hacia las Actuaciones Educativas de Éxito. En definitiva, esta tesis aporta una importante contribución a la Educación Física Dialógica. ; [eng] PURPOSE: This PhD/Doctoral thesis focuses on demonstrating the impact and validity of an inclusive model contextualized in the area of Physical Education and based on dialogical learning. Furthermore, the verification of the presence of the principles of dialogic learning is another of the research objectives. The model is called 'Interactive Challenges with Shared Responsibility' and it aims to offer a dialogic PE for democratizing the learning of all students. STATE OF THE ART: On the one hand, and taking into account that any quality educational program must be inclusive and transformative, the presence of quality, inclusion and critical perspective in the general education context and specifically in PE was analyzed. On the other hand, in an attempt to contextualize dialogic learning in the area of PE, a chapter is devoted to describing the principles of dialogic learning and its application to the area of PE, creating the concept of Dialogic Physical Education. Finally, a chapter is dedicated to present the inclusive model Interactive Challenges with Shared Responsibility, describing the origin, fundamentals, theoretical keys and teaching structure. METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN: The research methodology selected for this research is the Communicative Methodology. Two reasons explain the methodological selection. Firstly, the dialogic affinity between the research methodology and the inclusive model. Secondly, the communicative organization of the research and the communicative analysis of the data become essential and decisive methodological aspects in order to achieve the desired impact, due to the challenge of making contributions for progressing towards a successful PE. RESULTS: the implementation of the Interactive Challenges with Shared Responsibility model guarantees the presence of the principles of dialogic learning regardless of the context. The effects on learning derived from its implementation demonstrate quality learning at the curricular and social level, but also learning related to feelings such as friendship and solidarity are reported. Finally, the inclusive model is a model in permanent improvement and enrichment, based on the ongoing conversation between scientific evidence, accumulated practice and the contributions of the people participating in this research. CONCLUSIONS: The Interactive Challenges with Shared Responsibility is configured as a successful model promoting to the democratization of learning thanks to the presence of the principles of dialogic learning. CONTRIBUTIONS: One of the contributions of this thesis is to offer an inclusive model that, based on the principles of dialogic learning, guarantees an inclusive, quality and critical PE program, being subordinated and compatible with the educational approach that is oriented towards the Successful Educational Actions. Definitely, this thesis becomes an important contribution to Dialogical Physical Education.
Introduction. In French Guyana, between 2014 and 2017, the number of asylum seekers (AS) has increased by five times, amounting to 85% (n=5176) of all of the AS in all French overseas territories. Most of them were from Haiti (88.9%). Those migrants have led the French Red Cross to offer a medical consultation dedicated to the AS (CODA), in association with the FIIO and the prefecture since March 2017, systematically proposed to the AS when they arrive. The consultation includes a check-up by a nurse and a blood test and a medical consultation with screening for tuberculosis, diagnosis, vaccination, treatment proposal and the referral to other medical departments. The main aim of this study was to describe some chronic infections and non-communicable diseases and sexual related infections among the asylum seekers in French Guyana.Methods. The prevalence has been established by a transversal, retrospective, monocentric study that includes all the AS that have consulted at CODA between the beginning of July 2017 and the end of December 2018.Results. Overall, 2135 persons have been included representing 42 % (n=5088) of all the AS during the study. They mostly came from Haiti (76.7%, n=1589), Dominican Republic (10.6%, n=220) and from Syria (4.6%, n=97). The median age was 30 years old [IQR 25 – 37] and sexual ratio M/F was 1/1,1. The prevalence was 1.7 % (n=32) for the HIV, and even 2.0 % in the population from Haiti (29/1420), 5.3 % (n=99) for chlamydia, 0.8 % (n=15) for the syphilis, 0.5 % (n=9) for HBV and 0.7 % (n=13) for the gonococcus. The prevalence of chronic HBV (Ag HbS +) was 26 % (n=49), cured HBV: 24. % (n=460). Only 4.9 % of the AS was initially vaccinated against HBV (n=91). Two cases of tuberculosis has been identified. About the NCD, the prevalence of obesity was 17.6% (n=346), anemia : 16.8 % (n=309) with a significantly higher prevalence for women (OR=8.04, p=0.00). 10.6% (n=219) of the AS had a high blood pressure and 0.7% (n=9), a high glucose rate.Conclusion. This study points out the necessity of dealing with and taking care of this hardly studied group of people. The prevalence of HBV and HIV were high with a little vaccination rate against HBV.This study also highlights the importance of the tuberculosis screening among newly arrived migrants. Finally this study emphasizes the importance of NCD among AS. The access to health care seems essential not only for AS, but for every newly arrived migrants in order to ensure an early integration into the heath care system in order to avoid complications and the spread of infectious diseases. Recently, a modification of the law has made the acquisition of refugee status difficult and the reduction of AS' rights has led to a substantial decrease in the number of AS in French Guyana. It seems important, in this context to propose this consultation for screening and orientation to all of the newly arrived migrants whether they are AS or not. ; Introduction : En Guyane française, entre 2014 et 2017, le nombre de demandeurs d'asile (DA) a été multiplié par plus de cinq, représentant 85% des demandes d'asile faites en outre-mer. La plupart des DA étaient originaire d'Haïti (88.9%). Cette vague migratoire a amené la Croix-Rouge française à proposer, à partir de mars 2017, une prise en charge dédiée à la santé des DA, en lien avec la préfecture et l'OFII, proposée systématiquement aux DA dès leur enregistrement. Cette prise en charge comprenait une consultation paramédicale d'accueil avec prise de constantes et bilan biologique de dépistage, suivie d'une consultation médicale avec remise des résultats, rattrapage vaccinal, dépistage de la tuberculose, traitement ou orientation vers d'autres services pour assurer une poursuite des soins. L'objectif de cette étude était de décrire les infections chroniques, les IST et certaines pathologies non infectieuses rencontrées chez les DA en Guyane Française. Matériel et Méthode : Les prévalences ont été établies par une étude observationnelle transversale, monocentrique, incluant rétrospectivement toutes les personnes ayant consulté à la consultation dédiée aux DA, entre le 1er juillet 2017 et le 31 décembre 2018, suite à une demande d'asile. Résultats : Au total, 2135 personnes ont été incluses soit 42% (n=5088) des DA enregistrées sur la période d'étude. Ils provenaient principalement d'Haïti (76.7%, n=1589), de République Dominicaine (10.6%, n=220) et de Syrie (4.6%, n=97). La médiane d'âge était de 30 ans [IQR 25-37] pour un sexe ratio H/F de 1/1,1. Les prévalences étaient de 1.7% (n=32) pour le VIH, atteignant 2.0% dans la population originaire de Haïti (29/1420), 5.3% (n=99) pour la chlamydiase, 0.8% (n=15) pour la syphilis, 0.5% (n=9) pour l'hépatite C et 0.7% (n=13) pour le gonocoque. La prévalence d'hépatite B chronique (Ag Hbs positif) était de 2.6% (n=49), d'hépatite B guérie de 24.5% (n=460). La proportion de personnes vaccinées contre le VHB était de 4.9% (n=91). Deux cas de tuberculose-maladie ont été identifié à distance de la consultation initiale. Concernant les NCD, la prévalence de l'obésité était de 17.6% (n=346), celle de l'anémie était de 16.8 % (n=309) avec une nette prédominance féminine (OR=8.04, p=0.000). 10.6% (n=219) des demandeurs d'asile présentaient une tension artérielle élevée et 0.7 % (n=9), une glycémie élevée. Conclusion : Cette étude, qui s'intéresse à l'état de santé d'une population peu étudiée en Guyane, démontre l'importance de la consultation d'accueil pour les demandeurs d'asile. Les prévalences d'hépatite B évolutive et d'infection par le VIH étaient élevées, avec peu de protection vaccinale anti-VHB parmi les demandeurs d'asile. En outre, notre étude corrobore les recommandations de dépistage de la tuberculose. Par ailleurs, cette étude souligne la part importante des pathologies non infectieuses dans les problématiques de santé des demandeurs d'asile. L'accès au dépistage et aux soins semble essentiel pour les demandeurs d'asile, comme pour tous les primo-arrivants, afin de les intégrer précocement dans un parcours de soins en évitant les cas secondaires. Récemment, une modification des procédures est entrée en vigueur en Guyane, et semble associée à une forte diminution des demandes d'asile. Dans ce contexte, il parait encore plus justifié d'élargir cette consultation de dépistage et d'orientation à tous les primo-arrivants, qu'ils soient ou non demandeurs d'asile.
Introduction. In French Guyana, between 2014 and 2017, the number of asylum seekers (AS) has increased by five times, amounting to 85% (n=5176) of all of the AS in all French overseas territories. Most of them were from Haiti (88.9%). Those migrants have led the French Red Cross to offer a medical consultation dedicated to the AS (CODA), in association with the FIIO and the prefecture since March 2017, systematically proposed to the AS when they arrive. The consultation includes a check-up by a nurse and a blood test and a medical consultation with screening for tuberculosis, diagnosis, vaccination, treatment proposal and the referral to other medical departments. The main aim of this study was to describe some chronic infections and non-communicable diseases and sexual related infections among the asylum seekers in French Guyana.Methods. The prevalence has been established by a transversal, retrospective, monocentric study that includes all the AS that have consulted at CODA between the beginning of July 2017 and the end of December 2018.Results. Overall, 2135 persons have been included representing 42 % (n=5088) of all the AS during the study. They mostly came from Haiti (76.7%, n=1589), Dominican Republic (10.6%, n=220) and from Syria (4.6%, n=97). The median age was 30 years old [IQR 25 – 37] and sexual ratio M/F was 1/1,1. The prevalence was 1.7 % (n=32) for the HIV, and even 2.0 % in the population from Haiti (29/1420), 5.3 % (n=99) for chlamydia, 0.8 % (n=15) for the syphilis, 0.5 % (n=9) for HBV and 0.7 % (n=13) for the gonococcus. The prevalence of chronic HBV (Ag HbS +) was 26 % (n=49), cured HBV: 24. % (n=460). Only 4.9 % of the AS was initially vaccinated against HBV (n=91). Two cases of tuberculosis has been identified. About the NCD, the prevalence of obesity was 17.6% (n=346), anemia : 16.8 % (n=309) with a significantly higher prevalence for women (OR=8.04, p=0.00). 10.6% (n=219) of the AS had a high blood pressure and 0.7% (n=9), a high glucose rate.Conclusion. This study points out the necessity of dealing with and taking care of this hardly studied group of people. The prevalence of HBV and HIV were high with a little vaccination rate against HBV.This study also highlights the importance of the tuberculosis screening among newly arrived migrants. Finally this study emphasizes the importance of NCD among AS. The access to health care seems essential not only for AS, but for every newly arrived migrants in order to ensure an early integration into the heath care system in order to avoid complications and the spread of infectious diseases. Recently, a modification of the law has made the acquisition of refugee status difficult and the reduction of AS' rights has led to a substantial decrease in the number of AS in French Guyana. It seems important, in this context to propose this consultation for screening and orientation to all of the newly arrived migrants whether they are AS or not. ; Introduction : En Guyane française, entre 2014 et 2017, le nombre de demandeurs d'asile (DA) a été multiplié par plus de cinq, représentant 85% des demandes d'asile faites en outre-mer. La plupart des DA étaient originaire d'Haïti (88.9%). Cette vague migratoire a amené la Croix-Rouge française à proposer, à partir de mars 2017, une prise en charge dédiée à la santé des DA, en lien avec la préfecture et l'OFII, proposée systématiquement aux DA dès leur enregistrement. Cette prise en charge comprenait une consultation paramédicale d'accueil avec prise de constantes et bilan biologique de dépistage, suivie d'une consultation médicale avec remise des résultats, rattrapage vaccinal, dépistage de la tuberculose, traitement ou orientation vers d'autres services pour assurer une poursuite des soins. L'objectif de cette étude était de décrire les infections chroniques, les IST et certaines pathologies non infectieuses rencontrées chez les DA en Guyane Française. Matériel et Méthode : Les prévalences ont été établies par une étude observationnelle transversale, monocentrique, incluant rétrospectivement toutes les personnes ayant consulté à la consultation dédiée aux DA, entre le 1er juillet 2017 et le 31 décembre 2018, suite à une demande d'asile. Résultats : Au total, 2135 personnes ont été incluses soit 42% (n=5088) des DA enregistrées sur la période d'étude. Ils provenaient principalement d'Haïti (76.7%, n=1589), de République Dominicaine (10.6%, n=220) et de Syrie (4.6%, n=97). La médiane d'âge était de 30 ans [IQR 25-37] pour un sexe ratio H/F de 1/1,1. Les prévalences étaient de 1.7% (n=32) pour le VIH, atteignant 2.0% dans la population originaire de Haïti (29/1420), 5.3% (n=99) pour la chlamydiase, 0.8% (n=15) pour la syphilis, 0.5% (n=9) pour l'hépatite C et 0.7% (n=13) pour le gonocoque. La prévalence d'hépatite B chronique (Ag Hbs positif) était de 2.6% (n=49), d'hépatite B guérie de 24.5% (n=460). La proportion de personnes vaccinées contre le VHB était de 4.9% (n=91). Deux cas de tuberculose-maladie ont été identifié à distance de la consultation initiale. Concernant les NCD, la prévalence de l'obésité était de 17.6% (n=346), celle de l'anémie était de 16.8 % (n=309) avec une nette prédominance féminine (OR=8.04, p=0.000). 10.6% (n=219) des demandeurs d'asile présentaient une tension artérielle élevée et 0.7 % (n=9), une glycémie élevée. Conclusion : Cette étude, qui s'intéresse à l'état de santé d'une population peu étudiée en Guyane, démontre l'importance de la consultation d'accueil pour les demandeurs d'asile. Les prévalences d'hépatite B évolutive et d'infection par le VIH étaient élevées, avec peu de protection vaccinale anti-VHB parmi les demandeurs d'asile. En outre, notre étude corrobore les recommandations de dépistage de la tuberculose. Par ailleurs, cette étude souligne la part importante des pathologies non infectieuses dans les problématiques de santé des demandeurs d'asile. L'accès au dépistage et aux soins semble essentiel pour les demandeurs d'asile, comme pour tous les primo-arrivants, afin de les intégrer précocement dans un parcours de soins en évitant les cas secondaires. Récemment, une modification des procédures est entrée en vigueur en Guyane, et semble associée à une forte diminution des demandes d'asile. Dans ce contexte, il parait encore plus justifié d'élargir cette consultation de dépistage et d'orientation à tous les primo-arrivants, qu'ils soient ou non demandeurs d'asile.
Das Jahr 1989 markiert nicht nur den Beginn entscheidender geopolitischer Veränderungen, sondern gleichzeitig den Ursprung eines bedeutsamen Wandels in der internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Mit der viel beachteten Studie 'Sub-Saharan Africa – From Crisis to Sustainable Growth' initiierte die Weltbank eine Debatte über die Relevanz institutioneller Faktoren für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, die in den folgenden Jahren unter dem Titel 'Good Governance' erhebliche Bedeutung erlangte. Nahezu alle zentralen Akteure begannen, entsprechende Aspekte in ihrer praktischen Arbeit zu berücksichtigen, und entwickelten eigene Konzepte zu dieser Thematik. Wenn auch mit der Konzentration auf Institutionen als Entwicklungsdeterminanten eine grundlegende Gemeinsamkeit der Ansätze festzustellen ist, unterscheiden sie sich jedoch erheblich im Hinblick auf die Einbeziehung politischer Faktoren, so dass von einem einheitlichen Verständnis von 'Good Governance' nicht gesprochen werden kann. Während die meisten bilateralen Akteure sowie DAC und UNDP Demokratie und Menschenrechte explizit als zentrale Bestandteile betrachten, identifiziert die Weltbank einen Kern von Good Governance, der unabhängig von der Herrschaftsform, also sowohl in Demokratien wie auch in Autokratien, verwirklicht werden kann. Die Implikationen dieser Feststellung sind weit reichend. Zunächst erlaubt erst diese Sichtweise der Bank überhaupt, entsprechende Aspekte aufzugreifen, da ihr eine Berücksichtigung politischer Faktoren durch ihre Statuten verboten ist. Bedeutsamer ist allerdings, dass die Behauptung der Trennbarkeit von Good Governance und der Form politischer Herrschaft die Möglichkeit eröffnet, Entwicklung zu erreichen ohne eine demokratische Ordnung zu etablieren, da folglich autokratische Systeme in gleicher Weise wie Demokratien in der Lage sind, die institutionellen Voraussetzungen zu verwirklichen, welche als zentrale Determinanten für wirtschaftlichen Fortschritt identifiziert wurden. Damit entfällt nicht nur ein bedeutsamer Rechtfertigungsgrund für demokratische Herrschaft als solche, sondern rekurrierend auf bestimmte, dieser zu attestierende, entwicklungshemmende Charakteristika können Autokratien nun möglicherweise als überlegene Herrschaftsform verstanden werden, da sie durch jene nicht gekennzeichnet sind. Die Schlussfolgerungen der Weltbank unterstützen somit auch die vor allem im Zusammenhang mit der Erfolgsgeschichte der ostasiatischen Tigerstaaten vertretene Idee der Entwicklungsdiktatur, die heute mit dem Aufstieg der Volksrepublik China eine Renaissance erlebt. Der wirtschaftliche Erfolg dieser Staaten ist danach auf die überlegene Handlungsfähigkeit autokratischer Systeme zurückzuführen, während Demokratien aufgrund der Verantwortlichkeitsbeziehungen zwischen Regierenden und Regierten nicht in der Lage sind, die notwendigen Entscheidungen zu treffen und durchzusetzen. Die dargestellte Sichtweise der Weltbank ist allerdings von verschiedenen Autoren in Zweifel gezogen worden, die auch für ein im Wesentlichen auf technische Elemente beschränktes Good Governance-Konzept einen Zusammenhang mit der Form politischer Herrschaft erkennen. So wird beispielsweise vertreten, das Konzept der Bank bewege sich ausdrücklich nicht in einem systemneutralen Vakuum, sondern propagiere zumindest implizit die Etablierung demokratischer Regierungsformen. Im Übrigen steht die aus den Annahmen der Weltbank neuerlich abgeleitete Idee der Entwicklungsdiktatur in einem erheblichen Widerspruch zu der von multilateralen wie bilateralen Akteuren verstärkt verfolgten Förderung demokratischer Herrschaft als Mittel für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung sowie der fortschreitenden Verbreitung der Demokratie. Besteht nun doch ein Einfluss der Herrschaftsform auf die Verwirklichung von Good Governance als zentraler Entwicklungsdeterminante und kann zudem davon ausgegangen werden, dass Demokratien diesbezüglich Vorteile besitzen, dann ist eine Entwicklungsdiktatur keine denkbare Möglichkeit, sondern im Gegenteil demokratische Herrschaft der gebotene Weg zu wirtschaftlichem Wachstum bzw. einer Verbesserung der Lebensverhältnisse. Aufgrund der mit den Schlussfolgerungen der Weltbank verbundenen bedeutsamen Implikationen und der bisher weitestgehend fehlenden ausführlichen Thematisierung dieses Gegenstands in der Literatur ist eine detaillierte theoretische Betrachtung der Zusammenhänge zwischen den zentralen Elementen von Good Governance und demokratischer Herrschaft notwendig. Darüber hinaus sollen die angesprochenen Beziehungen auch einer empirischen Analyse unterzogen werden. Gegenstand dieser Arbeit ist deshalb die Fragestellung, ob Good Governance eine von demokratischer Herrschaft theoretisch und empirisch unabhängige Entwicklungsstrategie darstellt. ; The year 1989 has not only brought the beginning of crucial geopolitical transformations after a period of confrontation that lasted for more than four decades but simultaneously the rise of a significant change in the international development cooperation. With the famous study 'Sub-Saharan Africa – From Crisis to Sustainable Growth', the World Bank initiated a debate on the relevance of institutional factors for economic development which obtained remarkable importance in the subsequent years under the title 'good governance'. Virtually all central actors started to consider such aspects and heed them in their practical work, among them the Bretton-Woods-organizations World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD and a multitude of bilateral players. But although there was an essential consensus about the concentration on institutions as determinants for development, the concepts differ considerably regarding the inclusion of political factors. Therefore it is not possible to assume that there is an undivided understanding of 'good governance'. Whereas most of the bilateral actors as well as DAC and UNDP explicitly regard democracy and human rights as central elements, the World Bank defines a core of good governance that is independent from the form of political rule and therefore possible to achieve in both democracies and autocracies. The implications of this ascertainment are far reaching. First of all, this perception actually permits the bank to include institutional aspects in its work since their articles of agreement prohibit political factors to be taken into account. But more relevant is that the idea that good governance can be separated from the form of political rule provides the opportunity to achieve development without the establishment of a democratic order, since autocratic regimes are in the same way as democracies able to realize the necessary preconditions which have been identified as central determinants for economic progress. As a consequence, not only does an important justification for democracy itself vanish, but referring to certain characteristics of democratic regimes that are seen to repress development, autocracies can perhaps be identified as the superior form of rule. The World Bank's conclusions therefore also support the idea of an undemocratic developmentalist state which evolved in the context of the East Asian tigers' success stories and is of relevance today because of China's economic rise. Accordingly, the prosperity of these countries can be traced back to the predominant capacity to act while democracies are not able to reach the necessary decisions and to implement inevitable policies because of the accountability relations between the branches of government and the people. In addition, to assume that certain factors relevant for development are independent from the form of political regime has further consequences. It is now possible for extern players and for affected countries, to boost economic development without being confronted with the difficulties of a change in the system, explicitly the redemption of an autocratic regime and the institutionalization and consolidation of a democracy. Furthermore, autocratic rulers cannot stabilize their leadership by satisfying the needs of the population without starting a political change. nBut the World Bank's view is far from being undisputed. A multitude of authors recognize multifaceted connections between the form of political rule and good governance, even though the latter is limited to technical aspects. For example, the bank's concept is regarded as not neutral relative to the form of rule and implicitly propagating a democratic regime. For the rest, the idea of an undemocratic developmentalist state stands in clear contradiction to the spread of democracy in the 1990s as a part of the third wave of democratization and to the promotion of democracy by multilateral and bilateral players as a means for economic development. If there is actually an influence of the form of political rule on those institutional factors identified as central determinants for development and if an advantage of democracies can be found, then a developmentalist autocracy is no viable possibility. Far from it, democracy could then be seen as the appropriate path to economic growth and an improved living standard. Because of the meaningful implications of the World Bank's conclusions and since there is no detailed study of this subject in scientific literature, a detailed theoretical as well as empirical analysis of the relationship between democracy and good governance is necessary. The question if good governance is a development strategy that is theoretically and empirically independent from democratic rule therefore is discussed in this paper.
Wie gestaltete sich adlige Erziehung im Übergang vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit, noch vor dem auch bildungsgeschichtlichen Wandel durch Reformation und Humanismus? Wie ist in diesen Zeiten ein junger Prinz für seine künftigen Aufgaben als Herrscher und Politiker vorbereitet worden? Gab es einen bestimmten Kanon von Fächern oder Lehrinhalten, deren Vermittlung durch Unterricht oder auch durch adlig-höfische Sozialisation eine spezifische, an seiner hohen Stellung und Verantwortung orientierte Bildung und Ausbildung eines Fürstensohns zum Ziel hatte? Diesen Fragen, welche die historische Forschung bisher weitgehend vernachlässigt hat, geht die Trierer Dissertation nach. Sie bietet damit die erste ausführliche und quellengestützte Darstellung der Kindheit und Jugend Karls V., die in den großen Biographien immer voreilig übergangen wird, wo meist ein bereits "fertiger" Kaiser in Erscheinung tritt. Ein Blick zurück auf die direkten Vorfahren - Kaiser Friedrich III., Kaiser Maximilian I. und Karls früh verstorbenen Vater, Philipp den Schönen - erkundet die Traditionen und Formen habsburgisch-burgundischer Fürstenerziehung, ihren Platz sowie ihre Organisation und personales Umfeld am Hofe. Der frühe Tod des Vaters und die psychische Labilität der Mutter bestimmten Karls Kindheit und Jugend. Anstelle der leiblichen Eltern waren es Großvater, Tante und Erzieher, die sich um ihn bemühten; daneben weitere Lehrer - darunter Adrian von Utrecht, der spätere Papst Hadrian VI., und Erasmus von Rotterdam, aber auch nicht wenige aus den spanischen Ländern -, Beichtväter und Edelknaben, die das soziale Umfeld der Erziehung komplettierten. Somit befand sich der Zögling inmitten verschiedener Interessengruppen, die in Konkurrenz untereinander sowie gemäß eigener Vorteile und Absichten agierten. Schon früh musste der junge Habsburger zu der Rolle finden, die nicht nur seine Familie, sondern auch die großen europäischen Dynastien von ihm erwarteten; denn es ging in erster Linie um Kontinuität und Berechenbarkeit, in der Familie wie in der Politik. Oft genug wurde der im höchsten Grade umsorgte wie überwachte, lange unselbständige Prinz zum Spielball der stark divergierenden Interessen seines Umfeldes, was sich auch an der Praxis der zahlreichen Heiratsoptionen zeigte, in die er ungefragt "eingepasst" wurde. Die Jugendjahre Karls V. spielten sich am Hof seiner Tante, Margarete von Österreich, ganz im burgundischen Milieu ab, das ihn kulturell und politisch prägte. Einen nachhaltigen Eindruck hinterließ hier die burgundische Rittertradition, aufs höchste symbolisiert im Orden vom Goldenen Vlies. Die Erziehung Karls, der in den ersten Jahren zusammen mit seinen Schwestern unterrichtet wurde, verlief im Prinzip zweigleisig. Neben einer fundamentalen religiösen Unterweisung durch Geistliche und Beichtväter konzentrierten sich seine Lehrer - Gelehrte wie Höflinge - einmal auf die Vermittlung eines angemessenen, gelehrten Bildungswissens und dann aber vor allem auf das praktische Handlungswissen, dabei insbesondere auf die adlige Sozialisation im Milieu des Hofes. Erziehung und Ausbildung blieben immer pragmatisch auf die späteren Aufgaben des Regierens, der Politik und der herrscherlichen Repräsentation ausgerichtet. Die Wirkung dieser Erziehung lässt sich exemplarisch fassen in Karls während der späteren Jahre konsequent verfolgten Familienpolitik, die von den Betroffenen allerdings nicht immer kritiklos akzeptiert wurde. Stationen seiner Persönlichkeitsentwicklung, die sich über viele Jahre, wenn nicht das ganze Leben, hinzog, werden vor diesem Hintergrund beleuchtet. Als die wohl prägendste Erfahrung auf dem schweren Weg vom früh verwaisten, schwächlichen und meist unsicher wirkenden Knaben zum selbständig agierenden Monarchen kann Karls erste Reise nach Spanien im Jahre 1517 gesehen werden. Hier stieß er erstmals auf offene Ablehnung und sah sich mit unerwarteten, bis dahin völlig fremden Problemen konfrontiert. Zugleich bedeutete sein Regierungsantritt als spanischer König für ihn persönlich eine entscheidende kulturelle Neuorientierung. ; What forms did the upbringing and education of young noblemen take during the transition from the middle ages to modernity, before the onset of the reformation and humanism? How was a young royal prepared for his future twin roles as a ruler and politician? Was there a standard curriculum or set of subject matters to be conveyed - either through direct instruction or more indirectly through socialization at court - that was tailored specifically to a royal- high position and responsibilities? These questions, which have been largely ignored by historic research, are at the heart of this dissertation from Trier, Germany. The paper offers the first extensive and sources-based examination of the childhood and adolescence of Charles V, a period of his life that often receives only cursory attention in traditional biographies, which tend to feature a "full-fledged" emperor appearing on the scene. An examination of the upbringing of his direct ancestors - Emperor Frederick III, Emperor Maximilian I and Charles" father, Philippe the Handsome, who died when Charles was still young - explores how young noblemen were raised under Habsburg and Burgundy traditions and customs, as well as their position at court and the organization of, and influences on, their personal lives. The early death of his father and mental instability of his mother dominated Charles" childhood and adolescence. Instead of his natural parents, he was raised by his grandfather, aunt and tutors. A number of teachers were influential during his upbringing, among them Adrian of Utrecht, who was later to become Pope Hadrian VI, as well as Erasmus of Rotterdam and a number of tutors from Spain. His social surroundings were rounded out by confessors and the sons of other noble families. As a result, Charles found himself at the center of a web of people with different agendas, who acted in competition with one another and primarily to further their own interests and goals. The young Habsburg heir early on had to fill the role that was expected not just by his family, but by other European dynasties as well; the highest priorities were continuity and predictability, within the family as well as in politics. Coddled and under constant close supervision, the prince long lacked autonomy and self-reliance and was a pawn of diverging interests at court, a situation that was reflected in the many marriage scenarios into which he was maneuvered without his own input. Charles V spent his youth at the court of his aunt, Margaret of Austria, where he was fully immersed in the Burgundy milieu that would shape him culturally and politically. An especially strong influence on the young royal was exerted by Burgundy- knighthood traditions, as exemplified by the Order of the Golden Fleece. Charles was initially educated alongside his sisters, and his instruction consisted of two main components. The first was centered on broad-based religious instruction by members of the clergy and his confessors. The instructors of the second component - academics and courtiers - focused on teaching a scholarly curriculum and, especially later on, practical skills, chief among the aristocratic socialization at court. His upbringing and education were always pragmatic and focused on readying him for the future tasks of governance, politics and sovereign representation. The effects of this training were exemplified by the stringent family politics that Charles would practice in later life, which was not always accepted without complaint by those it affected. Against the background of Charles" upbringing, this paper explores crucial milestones of his personal development, which lasted for many years - if not his entire life. Perhaps the most formative experience on his journey from an orphaned, seemingly weak and insecure boy to a self-assured monarch was Charles" first voyage to Spain in 1517. It was during this trip that he first encountered open antagonism and was confronted with heretofore unknown challenges. At the same time, his crowning as King of Spain meant, personally and culturally, a decisive reorientation for Charles.
