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This paper deals with problems of fiscal consolidation and policy coordination within the European Monetary Union. In the first place, it investigates the potential problems which are caused by cross-country differences in key fiscal parameters and the asymmetric nature of these parameters. In the light of these findings, the pros and cons of policy coordination is evaluated using some alternative multi-country estimates as a point of reference. The empirical results clearly show that policy coordination within the EMU context is difficult because of these large country differences and asymmetries in the transmission mechanisms of fiscal policy. Even so, it is shown that policy coordination clearly pays off.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Coordinating Macroeconomic Adjustment Policy -- 2. The Structure of the International System and Patterns of Policy Coordination -- 3. Insulation and Symptom Management, 1945-55 -- 4. Symptom Management, 1956-70 -- 5. Flexible Exchange Rates and the Search for Policy Autonomy, 1971-77 -- 6. Macroeconomic Conflict and Coordination, 1978-94 -- 7. Conclusions: International Structures, Domestic Politics and Policy Coordination -- Index

Abstract
We analyze allocation of foreign aid to different sectors in a recipient developing country. Donors tend to favor social sectors over other public expenditure programs. Due to incomplete information coordination failure occurs. The donors may concentrate too much on the priority sectors leaving the lower priority, yet important, sectors lacking of funds. Alternatively there may be gaps in services in the priority areas because of the information problem. We find that the more similar preferences the donors have, the more scope there is for coordination failure.

In theory, lower-level governments (provinces, regional governments, or member states) operating in multilevel systems within and beyond the nation-state can choose from a wide repertoire of modes of policy coordination to solve collective problems non-hierarchically. These modes range from unilateral policy emulation over informal intergovernmental agreements to binding interstate law. The modes that governments are willing and capable to use, however, vary considerably across multilevel systems which affects governments' collective problem-solving capacity. This paper argues that the nature of executive–legislative relations in lower-level governments is crucial to account for this variation. The presence (or absence) of power sharing shapes the willingness of lower-level governments to enter agreements that greatly constrain individual government autonomy. Power-concentrating governments, as opposed to power-sharing ones, tend to avoid such agreements. The type of power sharing affects the capacity to enter agreements that require legislative approval. Compulsory power-sharing governments, as opposed to voluntary power-sharing governments, should find it difficult to enter such agreements, since this type of power sharing invites inter-branch divides. To substantiate these arguments, we apply them to Canada, Switzerland, the United States, and the European Union.

Eligible voters have been coordinating their turnout and vote decisions for the House of Representatives in midterm elections. Coordination is a noncooperative rational expectations equilibrium. Stochastic choice models estimated using individual-level data from U.S. National Election Studies surveys of the years 1978–1998 support the coordinating model and reject a nonstrategic model. The coordinating model shows that many voters have incentives to change their votes between the presidential year and midterm after learning the outcome of the presidential election. But this mechanism alone does not explain the size of midterm cycles. The largest source of loss of support for the president's party at midterm is a regular pattern in which the median differences between the voters' ideal points and the parties' policy positions have become less favorable for the president's party than they were at the time of the presidential election (nonvoters show the same pattern). The interelection changes are not consistent with the theory of surge and decline.

This paper analyzes how the formation of expectations constrains monetary and fiscal policy design. Economic agents have imperfect knowledge about the economic environment and the policy regime in place. Households and firms learn about the policy regime using historical data. Regime uncertainty substantially narrows, relative to a rational expectations analysis of the model, the menu of policies consistent with expectations stabilization. When agents are learning about the policy regime, there is greater need for policy coordination: the specific choice of monetary policy limits the set of fiscal policies consistent with macroeconomic stability - and simple Taylor-type rules frequently lead to expectations-driven instability. In contrast, non-Ricardian fiscal policies combined with an interest rate peg promote stability. Resolving uncertainty about the prevailing monetary policy regime improves stabilization policy, enlarging the menu of policy options consistent with stability. However, there are limits to the benefits of communicating the monetary policy regime: the more heavily indebted the economy, the greater is the likelihood of expectations-driven instability. More generally, regardless of agents' knowledge of the policy regime, when expectations are anchored in the long term, short-term dynamics display greater volatility than under rational expectations.