Multilevel union administration: the transformation of executive politics in Europe
In: Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics
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In: Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics
In: European Union politics: EUP, Volume 1, Issue 1, p. 125-144
ISSN: 1465-1165
This article critically examines the recent wealth of institutionalist rational choice literature on the EU. It appraises the major fault lines & debates. It argues that non-cooperative game theory provides a thorough set of tools to examine the effects of different sorts of institutions upon the powers & limitations of different institutional actors. In certain areas scholars have not fully utilized the models applied to other political systems, but EU scholarship has taken a great leap forward in the past few years. Fully specified models with proper predictions are now being developed, though there is a tendency for modelers to introduce too many new assumptions that make empirical comparison with earlier models problematic, as it is sometimes hard to see which new assumptions are of most import. But we are into a new phase of normal science rational choice institutionalist explanation of the EU. 98 References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd.]
In: European Union politics: EUP, Volume 22, Issue 2, p. 293-315
ISSN: 1741-2757
Scholars have long recognized that national identity-related factors are among the strongest predictors of citizens' attitudes toward the European Union. But while some find that they reinforce support for the European Union, other scholars show that national identity undermines its support. In this article, we aim to disentangle this puzzle by studying how the national identity profiles of European citizens relate to support for the European Union across individuals and member states. To this end, we employ data from the International Social Survey Program 2013, by far the most extensive collection of survey questions on national identity, and the technique of latent class analysis. Our results show which specific configurations of national identity entail support, ambivalence or rejection of the European Union, their antecedents, and their variation across countries.
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Cyprus and the European Union" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: European Union politics: EUP, Volume 10, Issue 2, p. 155-176
ISSN: 1741-2757
Whereas research on corporate lobbying in the USA has produced a set of robust findings, less is known about the determinants of business political action in other policy arenas and beyond the nation-state. In particular, we do not know how well the standard profit-seeking model of firm political activity travels. The article examines this issue with an analysis of business lobbying in the EU that reflects tactical adaptation to lobbying at the supranational level. Using data on 2000 large companies, we show that a modified profit-seeking model of corporate political behaviour is generalizable to corporate lobbying in Brussels. By contrast, theories emphasizing nationally distinct types of interest intermediation find little support in the data.
In: European Union Politics, Volume 7, Issue 1, p. 5-29
The European Parliament (EP) possesses a highly specialized committee system, operating in a complex institutional and political environment, yet little empirical work has investigated how MEPs are assigned to EP committees and what consequences this process has for representation and policy-making. In this article I examine the growth of EP committees and committee membership since 1979, and address the question of whether these committees are representative of the EP as a whole. Using an original data set of committee membership, national and EP party affiliation, MEP characteristics, and MEP policy preferences derived from roll-call votes, I address three key questions: Does committee membership reflect the party group composition of the EP? Do committee members possess specialized expertise in their committees' policy areas? And, finally, do committee members' general or committee-specific policy preferences differ substantially from those of the overall Parliament? The results suggest very strongly that, although committee members do tend to possess policy-specific expertise, committees are, nonetheless, highly representative of the EP as a whole, in terms of both party and policy representation.
In: European Union politics: EUP, Volume 3, Issue 1, p. 7-32
ISSN: 1741-2757
This article presents spatial models of policy-making in the European Union and focuses on interest group lobbying. It analyzes the two principal legislative procedures: consultation and codecision. Lobbying is modeled as a game of strategic information transmission from an informed lobbyist to uninformed policy makers. The theory characterizes sets of proposals that can be adopted under both procedures and determines the proposers' optimal proposal strategies. It analyzes the lobbyist's lobbying strategies at the proposal and vote stages, and studies policy makers' voting strategies. The article's principal conclusions are that at the proposal stage it is optimal for the lobbyist to lobby a policy maker with preferences close to her own, whereas at the vote stage it is optimal for her to lobby the pivotal policy maker.
In: European Union politics: EUP, Volume 22, Issue 4, p. 631-654
ISSN: 1741-2757
A number of studies have established a strong link between anti-immigration and Eurosceptic attitudes. But does this relationship necessarily imply that more immigration would increase public Euroscepticism in member states of the European Union? I evaluate this question by analyzing immigration data and Eurobarometer survey data over the period 2009–2017. The analysis shows no evidence that individual levels of Euroscepticism increase with actual levels of immigration. This result suggests that a strong link between anti-immigration and Eurosceptic attitudes does not necessarily translate into a strong link between immigration levels and public Euroscepticism. Public Euroscepticism can still be low even if immigration levels are high.
In: European Union politics: EUP, Volume 3, Issue 2, p. 205-230
ISSN: 1741-2757
The construction of a monetary union with a single currency in Europe raises serious concerns for those who understand the democratic process as one in which social groups compete on different ideological programs. This is because it increasingly constrains national governments of different partisan hues to follow similar fiscal and monetary policies. Recent empirical studies indicate that these concerns might be somewhat misplaced since there is evidence that partisan convergence on macroeconomic policy predates these institutional developments. One problem with these studies, though, is that they fail to include the electoral system as a constraint on partisan behavior. Since electoral systems generate centripetal and centrifugal tendencies, we should expect to find strong evidence for partisan differences only where electoral rules encourage dispersion. We test this argument using data on fiscal policy from European Union countries between 1981 and 1992. We find that there is still no systematic evidence for partisan differences. Given this, it is hard to see how EMU can add to the democratic deficit in the European Union.
In: European Union politics: EUP, Volume 21, Issue 3, p. 451-473
ISSN: 1741-2757
Does the Early Warning System alert the European Commission about the prospects of passing new policy? We present a model of European Union policymaking in which the Early Warning System plays an important signalling role. In our model, the Commission uses signals from the Early Warning System to update its belief about governments' voting strategies in the Council. The Commission may then anticipate difficult negotiations by withdrawing its proposal early. We find empirical evidence for our theory: (1) reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments strongly predict opposition from their governments and (2) the Commission is more likely to withdraw proposals that receive reasoned opinions, even in the absence of a yellow card. Our results run counter to the dominant view in the literature that the Early Warning System is not a very relevant aspect of EU decision-making. Instead, reasoned opinions constitute a clear signal that negotiations are more likely to fail.
In: European Union politics: EUP, Volume 12, Issue 1, p. 127-142
ISSN: 1741-2757
Based upon existing fiscal federal arrangements, this article considers the options facing the European Union to reform its own framework. There are two plausible ways the EU can stabilize the finances of its member states over the longer term. The first is to take steps that complement the market discipline of individual member states. For market discipline to play this positive role, three conditions need to be met: (1) markets need to have accurate information on member state finances; (2) the market valuation of a given state also has to be an accurate valuation of the sustainability of that state's finances; and (3) populations need to interpret market discipline as a signal about their government's competence and punish governments that face market pressure. Such a system is possible under the current Stability and Growth Pact, and indeed it appears that all three conditions held in summer 2009. Any bailout of a member state, however, undermines this type of system. More political integration would be needed to prevent a state from getting into a situation where a bailout would be an option. The Brazilian model is a precedent that the European Union could emulate. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
In: Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics
In: Springer eBook Collection
1. Introduction -- 2. Regimes of Diversity -- 3. Diversity in the European Union -- 4. Approaches to Diversity in the EU -- 5. Unity and Diversity through EU Institutions and Procedures -- 6. "Europe" as a Symbol – Symbols of Europe -- 7. Exclusion and Belonging: The Ambiguities of European citizenship -- 8. The Gradual Emergence of European Minority Rights -- 9. Conclusions -- Epilogue.
In: European Union politics: EUP, Volume 19, Issue 1, p. 3-24
ISSN: 1741-2757
The analysis compares voters' preferences in economic policy to political parties' economic written parliamentary questions during the 2009–2014 term of the European Parliament. The corpus of over 55,000 written questions was ideologically scaled via crowdsourcing. The analysis shows that parties are unresponsive to second-order and to disengaged voters. The results also suggest that there is no upper class bias in European Parliament political representation. The data highlight a strong tendency of EP7 political parties to cluster around the position of the average European voter, at the expense of their average supporter. The democratic deficit is therefore at most a pluralism deficit in the European Parliament, since substantive representation in the European Parliament is successful as far as the majoritarian norm is concerned.
In: European Union politics: EUP, Volume 5, Issue 1, p. 47-72
ISSN: 1741-2757
Although shifts in policy positions are a fundamental feature of the European Union (EU) bargaining process they have not yet been studied systematically. This article provides evidence on the extent to which position shifts occur and tests alternative models of the bargaining process that predict such shifts. We examine a subset of the DEU data set that contains information on shifts in actors' positions on issues raised by 28 Commission proposals. The three bargaining models presented here posit alternative mechanisms that drive actors' position shifts during the EU bargaining process. Our research shows that position shifts occur frequently during the EU bargaining process and these shifts in actors' policy positions are best understood in terms of compromise and exchange among actors.
In: European Union politics: EUP, Volume 8, Issue 3, p. 299-328
ISSN: 1741-2757
Committees of national officials play a major role in the decision-making of the European Union's main legislative body, the Council of Ministers. The study investigates the conditions under which bureaucrats decide on legislative dossiers without direct involvement of ministers. A statistical analysis is performed to examine this question, using an original data set of 439 legislative proposals. The results of the analysis indicate that formal institutional features such as the voting rule in the Council and the involvement of the European Parliament affect committee decision-making, whereas no effects of committee socialization and preference divergence among member states are identified. The results diminish concerns about the democratic legitimacy of Council decision-making to some extent, as the findings demonstrate that bureaucrats tend to decide only the less salient and more complex proposals.