Suchergebnisse

Résultats des calculs colonialistes des grandes puissances, le «foyer national» revendiqué par les Kurdes est passé à la trappe dans les années 20. Estimés, en 1993, entre vingt-deux et vingt-cinq millions, les Kurdes sont partagés entre cinq États : Turquie, Irak, Iran et, dans une moindre mesure, Syrie et ex-Union soviétique. Une analyse précise de leurs conflits avec les différents États, ainsi que de leurs revendications, de leurs organisations, mais aussi de leurs divisions.

AbstractSince 2003 and the establishment of Iraq's Kurdish Regional Government, Iran has witnessed a rise in ethnonationalist activity among its Kurdish population. Much of the motivation for this activity stems from the political success of the Kurds in Iraq. The spread of Iranian Kurdish nationalism has also been influenced by globalisation forces, such as global communications technologies, transnational networks, and increased mobility across borders. In this age of globalisation, the Iranian government's ability to rule over the Kurds will continue to erode, unless it caters toward Kurdish demands of minority rights.

The Kurds seem further from autonomy or independence today than in the past. In part, the cause lies in their disunity in language, religious behavior, & especially tribal structure. The division of their core area among Turkey, Iran, & Iraq after WWI assured Kurdish nationalism major opponents. In Turkey, the government has attempted to deny the very existence of Kurds as a separate people. While Kurdish leaders can exploit the multiparty system to establish local power bases, they must eschew overt ethnic agitation. In Iraq, the military move of the Barzanis was ultimately quashed by a determined well-equipped central government. Only minor dissidence seems possible to continue here. Once the USSR's wartime occupation of the northern part of the country ended in 1946, in Iran the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad--which the Soviets have stimulated & facilitated--collapsed. The Shah has since maintained tight political control, while permitting the Kurds some cultural expression. Although there is little prospect of a renewed Kurdish military bid for autonomy or independence in these three states, economic grievances are likely to continue to foster a sense of ethnic identity among the Kurds. Modified HA.

The Kurds seem further from autonomy or independence today than in the past. In part, the cause lies in their disunity in language, religious behavior, and es pecially tribal structure. The division of their core area among Turkey, Iran, and Iraq after the First World War assured Kurdish nationalism major opponents. In Turkey, the govern ment has attempted to deny the very existence of Kurds as a separate people. While Kurdish leaders can exploit the multi-party system to establish local power bases; they must eschew overt ethnic agitation. In Iraq, the military move of the Barzanis was ultimately squashed by a determined, well- equipped central government. Only minor dissidence seems possible to continue here. In Iran, once the USSR's wartime occupation of the northern part of the country ended in 1946, the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad which the Soviets had stimulated and facilitated collapsed. The shah has since maintained tight political control, while permitting the Kurds some cultural expression. Although there is, thus, little prospect of a renewed Kurdish military bid for autonomy or independence in these three states, economic grievances are likely to continue to foster a sense of ethnic identity among the Kurds.

What the Kurds of Iraq really need is a breakthrough on political formulas. What they need is a far-reaching change in their constitutional relationship with Iraq. This does not necessarily mean that they must have a state of their own, though a state of Kurdistan in which Kurds from Iraq, Turkey, and Iran are united has often been dreamed of. The issue today is not Kurdistan in the sense of a major rescrambling of boundaries. It is the demand of Iraqi Kurds for freedom from oppression. What their leaders are demanding is genuine autonomy within Iraq, guaranteed by UN presence and enshrined in international law.

Fuyant une société oppressive, de plus en plus de femmes kurdes prennent seules le chemin de l'exil. Souvent en rupture familiale, elles sont une proie facile pour les trafiquants.

The emergence of an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, the civil war in Syria, and the electoral ambitions of the JDP have led to new policy being formed by the Turkish government regarding the Kurdish question. However, while the different Kurdish zones communicate through cross-border processes between Turkey, Iraq and Syria, the JDP has to make a choice between the nationalist fringe of its voters and an attempt to forge closer ties with the Kurdish population in South-East Turkey. Adapted from the source document.