Suchergebnisse

Free movement within the Schengen area is a cornerstone of European integration - and indeed an essential part of the European way of life. However, this freedom of movement is limited for forcibly displaced people residing within the European Union (EU). European asylum systems are designed to suppress mobility, which actually prevents many asylum seekers from finding a 'durable solution'. In contrast, enabling legal mobility within and across EU countries, when paired with access to labour markets and ensuring the right to family life, can open new opportunities for forced migrants to settle into receiving communities and truly rebuild their lives. Based on TRAFIG research in Greece and Italy, this policy brief illustrates why mobility is important for displaced people and how it is being hampered by policies and practices. It then suggests strategic ways that policymakers can tap into the potential of mobility to provide additional solutions to protracted displacement in Europe.

Angesichts der Corona-Krise rückt die europäische Flüchtlingspolitik derzeit in den Hintergrund. Doch die Situation der Geflüchteten an der EU-Außengrenze, auf den Inseln der Ägäis und an anderen Orten an den Rändern Europas verschlechtert sich zunehmend, verstärkt durch die globale Pandemie. Benjamin Etzold vom Bonner Friedens- und Konfliktforschungsinstitut BICC und weitere Forscherinnen und Forscher des EU-geförderten Projekt TRAFIG sind nicht nur über die humanitäre Situation, sondern auch über die Politik der EU zutiefst besorgt. Nachdrücklich fordern sie EU-Maßnahmen zum Schutz der Geflüchteten – und nicht vor ihnen.

To prepare the ground for the safe return and reintegration of dispersed population groups, it is necessary to solve the conflict between the government of Iraq and the government of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq about Constitutional Article 140. The ministries of foreign affairs of the European Union member states should intensify the political dialogue with both sides to find a durable agreement and, in parallel, offer advice on reforms to increase civilian oversight of the security forces. As Iraq is no longer considered an emergency country, donors, including the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), can gradually shift the emphasis of bilateral development aid towards the export of expertise. German advice in e-government and administrative set-up can contribute to reducing corruption and developing the basis for decentralisation (implementing Law 21). Effective and good governance is at the root to legally clarify property and land disputes many returning Iraqis are struggling with. A regular supply of basic services and the provision of infrastructure are prerequisites for the return and reintegration of displaced people. Taking care of the needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs) can be closely linked with livelihood support and compensation in the framework of long-term reconciliation and peacebuilding measures adjusted to varying local contexts. Together with European donors, the BMZ should engage in bilateral dialogues with the government of Iraq to facilitate the access of NGOs experienced in setting up these processes. German and European partners in development cooperation should support the economic reform envisaged by the government of Iraq. Given the long-standing dominance of the public sector, private sector development should go hand in hand with a gradual re-orientation of the public sector towards providing infrastructure and services for businesses and households. This dual focus will benefit returnees and receiving communities in the long run.

This working paper is based on the empirical research on translocal figurations of displacement of Syrians in Jordan. It contains methodological discussions, central findings and reflections on these findings. Drawing on the conceptual framework of the TRAFIG project, this paper explores the central research question of TRAFIG, namely "how are protractedness, dependency, and vulnerability related to the factors of local and translocal connectivity and mobility, and in turn, how can connectivity and mobility be utilized to enhance the self-reliance and strengthen the resilience of displaced people?" The paper presents findings from Jordan, where Syrian refugees have sought refuge in host communities. Syrian refugees' stay in Jordan has become increasingly protracted, with the durable solutions of return in safety and dignity, local integration and resettlement remaining out of reach for most. In this paper, we argue that Syrians are de facto integrated in Jordanian host communities due to shared language, religion and socio-cultural ties as a pragmatic strategy for dealing with uncertainty and protracted displacement. We found that family- and kin networks have proven vital in facilitating and protecting mobility out of Syria and within Jordan, even as these networks are strained due to physical and geographic distance, reliant upon aid and financial support and socio-economic stress in the local labour market. We see that Syrians experience uncertain futures in which their mobility aspirations are unrealised, economic prospects are reliant upon and highly competitive with others, and connectivity with the host community is strained and can be improved.

The Multi-Stakeholder Community Consultation (MSCC) is a participatory research tool that has been developed by the DR Congo team of TRAFIG and that will be applied in other countries in the course of the project too. By bringing together a mixed group of respondents (displaced, hosts, authorities, civil society), the tool is geared towards collecting additional insights through an interactive dialogue on intergroup relations, validating findings gathered through other methods, and jointly seeking solutions for problems that are identified by the participants. In this note we provide methodological guidance and share our experience of using the tool in the DRC. Other TRAFIG country teams, interested researchers and practitioners can learn from it and adapt it to their own needs.

Food insecurity and hunger continue to threaten the lives and livelihoods of millions of people. Many of today's food crises are linked to violent conflicts in various ways. The number of people affected by conflict-driven food crises increased from 74 million in 2018 to more than 77 million one year later—particularly in north-eastern Nigeria, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen. The achievement of food security ending hunger and malnutrition and enabling sustainable agriculture production as addressed by Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2 'Zero Hunger' depends therefore largely on progress made on SDG 16 in promoting peaceful and inclusive societies. However, the severe food crises in the past decade have demonstrated the weaknesses to govern food (in)security in conflict settings. While national governments or belligerents are often unable or unwilling to respond adequately to food crises, humanitarian relief operations face the challenges of reaching those people most in need of food supply and simultaneously avoiding exacerbating the conflict. This has left many of the affected communities having to find their own responses to food insecurity. If food crises are to be effectively addressed, research and policy actions need to tackle both food crises and violent conflict.

Europa steht vor enormen Herausforderungen: die Gewaltkonflikte in Bergkarabach und der Ukraine bedrohen den Frieden in Europa, die Spannungen zwischen den USA und China geraten zusehends zu einem Großmachtkonflikt, in dem Europa seine Rolle noch finden muss, und die Debatten über die »europäische Souveränität« vernachlässigen die friedenspolitischen Prioritäten zugunsten militärischer Fähigkeiten. Die Auswirkungen der Covid-19-Pandemie auf den globalen Süden erfordern zudem neue Akzente in der Entwicklungspolitik. Zugleich hält weltweit der besorgniserregende Trend zur Entdemokratisierung an. Das Friedensgutachten 2021 analysiert diese Entwicklungen und gibt Empfehlungen für die Politik.

Die Corona-Pandemie bestimmt aktuell Politik und Gesellschaft. Vor allem in ärmeren Weltregionen verstärkt sie die Gefahren für Frieden und Sicherheit. Zugleich bestehen andere Friedensrisiken fort: der Klimawandel, die Einschränkung bürgerlicher Rechte, ein drohendes Wettrüsten im Cyberraum, die Rivalitäten der Großmächte und die Zunahme rechter Gewalt. Gerade angesichts der Krise bedarf es internationaler Zusammenarbeit, um Frieden zu sichern – und einer proaktiven EU, die diese Kooperation vorantreibt, sowohl innerhalb Europas als auch global. Das Friedensgutachten 2020 analysiert vor diesem Hintergrund aktuelle Gewaltkonflikte, zeigt Trends der internationalen Außen-, Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik auf und gibt Empfehlungen für Bundesregierung und Bundestag. Die deutschen Friedensforschungsinstitute (BICC/HSF/IFSH/INEF) geben das Gutachten seit 1987 heraus.

Am 29. November 2019 fand in Düsseldorf das CoRE-NRW-Netzwerktreffen zum Thema "Salafismus- und Extremismusforschung 2020: Prävention, Wissenstransfer, Vernetzung" statt. An diesem interdisziplinären Austausch nahmen Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler, die in verschiedenen Forschungsdisziplinen zum Thema Radikalisierung arbeiten, sowie Vertreterinnen und Vertreter aus der Präventionsarbeit und der Landesverwaltung teil. In seinem Grußwort hob Thorsten Menne, Ministerium für Kultur und Wissenschaft des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (MKW NRW), hervor, wie wichtig angesichts der aktuellen Bedrohungslage die praxisrelevante, freie Forschung des CoRE-NRW-Netzwerkes ist. CoRE-NRW könne dazu beitragen, neue Perspektiven zu entwickeln, gerade auch, wenn Praxispartnerinnen und -partner in den Forschungskontext mit einbezogen werden. Die neue Koordinierungsstelle, die seit August 2019 beim Friedens- und Konfliktforschungsinstitut BICC in Bonn angesiedelt ist, könne im Auftrag des MKW unterstützen, diese Zusammenarbeit zu stärken.

This working paper is based on empirical research on translocal figurations of displacement in Ethiopia. It explores TRAFIG's central question: "How are protractedness, dependency and vulnerability related to the factors of local and translocal connectivity and mobility, and, in turn, how can connectivity and mobility be utilised to enhance the self-reliance and strengthen the resilience of displaced people?" The paper presents findings from six camps in Tigray and Afar regional states, as well as urban refugees in Addis Ababa and several cities in Tigray. The findings show that the capability to break free from protracted displacement is primarily determined by each refugee's networks and connectivity. Local and translocal connectivity enable refugees to move out of camps, secure livelihoods, widen future chances and process their onward mobility. In the cities or in other countries in which displaced people temporarily or permanently settle, network contacts provide information about job opportunities, support local integration, help to access business licenses informally and to cover costs of living. The extent of support provided through networks, however, depends on the quality of translocal/national social relations. Particularly, such connections that could avail of financial resources determine the pathways of refugees' mobility. For those who have strong networks, camps are just a transit space where they process their onward mobility. Those who do not have strong networks are more susceptible to experiencing protracted waiting periods, diminished livelihood options and general vulnerability. Our study reveals that context is vital for mobility and translocal connectivity: Both dimensions need to be put in the context of previous histories of migration, bonds and alliances with the hosting communities, and the state of current political affairs. Against this backdrop, the study reveals significant differences between the three groups of Eritrean refugees we studied (Tigrinya, Afar and Kunama) in terms of their connectivity, mobility and vulnerability.