Suchergebnisse

This paper investigates the policy process leading to the rapid and somewhat surprising introduction of a major structural reform in Denmark in 2007. The reform reduced the number of regional and local authorities and changed their responsibilities and financing. The research question is why a reform of this magnitude and scope was introduced in a Scandinavian country at this point in time in spite of previous failures and in spite of likely resistance from actors with vested interests in the existing structure? The article explains the initiation of the reform by a rare opening of a window of opportunity due to a number of contextual factors. Once the window was opened the process changed to one of opportunistic pursuit of institutional and personal interests. Skilful management of the reform process by central actors was important for getting the decision through possible resistance points. Adapted from the source document.

An insufficient level of structural reforms remains a perennial phenomenon in the EU. Despite the gradual expansion of macroeconomic governance, legal instruments fostering the implementation of structural reforms have been underexploited. This article examines the leeway provided by EU Treaties and legislation to use existing and new instruments to incentivize structural reforms more forcefully. First, in light of the recent change in the EU Commission's enforcement practice, we highlight how the sanctions-based regime under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) can be extended to incorporate structural reforms. There is significant room for manoeuvre to account for the implementation of structural reforms both in the preventive and the corrective arm of the SGP. Second, contractual agreements on structural reforms offer an alternative to the sanction based system. Unlike existing instruments, contractual agreements allow for more egalitarian and reward-based incentives and thus deviate from the classic 'surveillance model' of economic governance in the EU. We can conceptualize such agreements in two ways: First, as agreements concluded between the EU and individual Member States, underpinned by financial support as an incentive. Second, as mutual agreements concluded between Member States, which agree on the implementation of structural reforms as a kind of barter trading ensuring reciprocity. We highlight the legal boundaries on scope and design of such agreements and how they relate to the institutional governance setting in the EU. ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.

Structural reform litigation involves legal action against public bureaucracies alleging that an official has violated the legal rights of an agency's client. A pattern of rights infringements raises the specter of systemic dysfunction. If the court finds for the plaintiffs, or if the defendant agency agrees to settle, the remedy reconstitutes agency operations. What are the incentives faced by public managers whose agencies are involved in structural reform litigation? How might public managers retain public accountability while strategically using the institutional arrangements present in such cases? This article examines these questions through a spatial bargaining model and discusses its analytical implications in the context of a comprehensive suit against the child welfare agency in Kansas City, Missouri.

In this working paper we present an analysis of the merger process in Wales in the period from 2002-2012. The mergers were initiated to reduce the overall number of universities as part of an effort to increase the overall competiveness of the Welsh higher education system in the wider United Kingdom higher education system. The Welsh merger structural reforms have been analysed by using a governance approach to HE mergers. The aim is to understand whether the structural reform process can be understood as functioning as an open method of co-ordination. The OMC can provide a conceptualization of bottom-up driven merger processes. This is certainly the case for countries like the UK where universities have high levels of institutional autonomy. Various elements of the OMC approach can be detected in Welsh merger reforms. The structural reforms provided for strong co-ordination and also strong initiative taken by the universities themselves. It is difficult to determine whether the co-ordinated mergers have been successful. On the one hand, it reduced the overall number of universities. The capacity of the system has improved and the average size of the institutions has increased. On the other hand, the desired end point of six institutions has not been met and the average size of the institutions remains relatively low in the UK context.

Introduction / Katsikas, Dimitris and Manasse -- Designing structural reforms in times of crisis : lessons from the past / Katsikas, Dimitris -- The political conditions for economic reform in Europe's south / Terzi, Alessio -- The persistence-resilience trade-off in unemployment the role of labor and product market institutions / Aksoy, Tolga and Manasse, Paolo -- Reforms and external balances in southern Europe and Ireland / CatÆo, Lus A. V -- Labour market reform in Portugal under the adjustment programme lessons for policy design / Turrini, Alessandro -- Some unpleasant labour arithmetics a tale of the Spanish 2012 labour market reform / Cuerpo, Carlos, Geli, Federico and Herrero, Carlos -- Balancing adjustment policies and structural reforms in Greece : the case of product markets / Petralias, Athanassios, Anastasatou, Marianthi and Katsikas, Dimitris -- The political economy of Cyprus : financial sector reform / Clerides, Sofronis -- Non-performing loans in the European periphery : the political economy of reform / Panagiotarea, Eleni -- The restructuring of Spain's banking system : a political economy approach / Otero-Iglesias, Miguel and Steinberg, Federico -- Conclusions / Manasse, Paolo and Katsikas, Dimitris